



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2056 WESTINGS AVENUE, SUITE 400
NAPERVILLE, IL 60563-2657

June 16, 2025

Terry Brown
Site Vice President
Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Rte. 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000346/2025010

Dear Terry Brown:

On May 8, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the station's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba
on 06/16/25

Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Terry Brown from Elba M. Sanchez Santiago dated June 16, 2025.

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2025010

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000346

License Number: NPF-3

Report Number: 05000346/2025010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-010-0000

Licensee: Vistra Operations Company, LLC

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Dates: April 21, 2025 to May 08, 2025

Inspectors: R. Cassara, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer
J. Robb, Operations Engineer

Approved By: Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green FIN 05000346/2025010-01 Open/Closed	[P.2] - Evaluation	71152B
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (green) for the licensee's failure to perform an operability evaluation in accordance with procedure NORM-OP-1009, "SRO Review of Condition Reports." Specifically, the licensee incorrectly determined that exceeding the core lift criteria did not have a functional impact on the SSC because they believed that the suspected cause of the flow calculation changes was due to temperature inputs to the calculations drifting. The licensee did not perform an operability determination to evaluate the impact of the temperature drift to the calculation methodology for both the core lift and the departure of nucleate boiling (DNB) safety analysis.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
 - Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the reactor coolant pump issues. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
 - Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience.
 - Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
 - Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment	71152B
Assessment of the Corrective Action Program	
Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors concluded the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.	
<u>Effectiveness of Problem Identification:</u>	
Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to	

identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The inspectors also determined the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP, timely, completely and accurately. The inspectors observed that issues were being identified by all levels of organization and with varying degrees of safety, security, or radiological significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. For example, the inspectors noted that the licensee periodically performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station programs and processes. The identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both the NRC and from industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP for evaluation when they were applicable to the station. The inspectors determined the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee had conducted effectiveness reviews and used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

The Inspectors performed a review of the reactor coolant pump issues over the last 5 years. The inspectors focused on any potential recurring or age-related issues that were not identified by the licensee. As part of this review, the inspectors reviewed selected corrective action program documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The inspectors concluded that deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold. Issues with the pumps were characterized and addressed appropriately. The inspectors did not identify any programmatic deficiencies in this area.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety, security or radiological significance of the identified problem. The licensee utilized a multi-discipline team consisting of department directors and managers to review the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions would adequately address the causes and extent of condition when applicable. Upon completion of the evaluation or actions, the Corrective Action Review Board reviewed those products to ensure they met the CAP requirements. During the Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings the inspectors observed, licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues. The inspectors also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. Licensee staff were prepared and challenged each other on disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety, security or radiological significance of the issues. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming issue was identified, the CAP process was effective in directing equipment operability or functionality reviews. The inspectors did identify an issue related to an operability review, which was documented in the Results Section of this report.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety, security or radiological significant were tracked to completion in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a causal evaluation were resolved in

accordance with CAP requirements. The inspectors sampled assignments associated with violations that were identified by the NRC previously and those associated with various significances. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely and addressed the adverse conditions.

Assessment	71152B
<p>The Use of Operating Experience</p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee’s performance in the use of operating experience (OE) was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written, and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The inspectors observed OE information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as issue reviews and investigations. The licensee is also cognizant on generating OE lesson learned from issues encountered in the plant. The inspectors did not identify any issue of significance in this area.</p>	

Assessment	71152B
<p>Self-Assessments and Audits</p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee’s performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the inspectors identified issues that were not previously known, including issues regarding the CAP itself. Those issues were generally captured, and actions were generally taken by the licensee through the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any issue of significance in this area.</p>	

Assessment	71152B
<p>Safety Conscious Work Environment</p> <p>The inspectors reviewed the results of the Davis-Besse safety culture survey that was conducted in November 2024. The inspectors noted the survey documented negative staff responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The inspectors also noted that there was a high number of negative responses in several departments regarding confidence in the CAP to prioritize, investigate, and resolve issues. As a result, the inspectors reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey trends. The inspectors also performed individual interviews of a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors, supervisors and contractors from various departments. The inspectors also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 23 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.</p> <p>Based on the interviews and a review of licensee actions, the inspectors determined licensee personnel believed that they could raise nuclear safety, security or radiological issues through multiple channels including ECP without fear of retaliation. Licensee staff also believe that the CAP effectively addresses issues important to nuclear safety. However, some licensee staff have expressed frustration with the CAP process on resolving low-level issues partly because</p>	

they are not aware of all the considerations and constraints going into the decisions. Similarly, several licensee staff members were not fully aware of the ECP or how they could utilize the program. The inspectors determined that the ongoing licensee efforts to improve communications should address these negative responses. The inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the safety conscious work environment at Davis-Besse.

Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green FIN 05000346/2025010-01 Open/Closed	[P.2] - Evaluation	71152B

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (green) for the licensee's failure to perform an operability evaluation in accordance with procedure NORM-OP-1009, "SRO Review of Condition Reports." Specifically, the licensee incorrectly determined that exceeding the core lift criteria did not have a functional impact on the SSC because they believed that the suspected cause of the flow calculation changes was due to temperature inputs to the calculations drifting. The licensee did not perform an operability determination to evaluate the impact of the temperature drift to the calculation methodology for both the core lift and the departure of nucleate boiling (DNB) safety analysis.

Description:

In May 2022, the licensee identified an increasing trend in RCS flow rate calculated per DB-SP-03358, "RCS Flow Rate Test." This reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate test is a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance that is required to be performed every 18 months. The purpose of the surveillance was to verify the TS minimum RCS flow limit rate limit. Additionally, it serves to verify the core lift analysis maximum RCS flow rate limit, which is not a TS controlled parameter. The method used is to perform a secondary side heat balance to calculate the RCS flow rate. The surveillance is also used to verify that plant RCS flow instruments are within acceptable tolerance for other TS surveillances. The TS minimum flow rate limit is to ensure that the initial condition assumed in the safety analysis for DNB is maintained. Although the core lift criteria is not a TS limit, it precludes the fuel assembly liftoff during postulated Condition I and Condition II events. Conditional I events are normal operations such as startup, shutdown or refueling. Condition II events are plant transients such as loss of feedwater or control rod drop. These flow limits protect the fuel rod fission product barrier. At the time the trend was identified, both acceptance criteria were satisfied but the licensee implemented a number of actions to investigate the increasing trend.

In April 2024, during the next surveillance, the RCS flow rate calculated from one of the two channels exceeded the core lift analysis maximum RCS flow limit. The licensee initiated condition report CR-2024-2942 for this condition. Per procedure NORM-OP-1009, "SRO Review of Condition Reports," states that "Entry into the Operability Determination (OD) process is contingent upon the Deficient Condition satisfying the Three Required Entry Criteria (TRC)." The licensee at the time determined that Criterion 1, "Does the deficient condition affect a TS SSC installed in an operating unit?" was met. The licensee determined that Criteria 2, "Does the deficient condition have a functional impact on the SSC? This includes the ability to perform required functions under postulated, off-normal design conditions" was not met because the licensee believed there was reasonable assurance that the core lift analysis was met and therefore, the RCS and fuel would continue to perform their functions. This was based on the RCS radiochemistry and no indications of fuel defects or

fuel failure and diverse indication of acceptable flow. As such, Criterion 3, "Is the functional impact of the deficient condition substantive?" did not need to be answered. Therefore, the licensee did not perform an operability determination.

In May 2025, the inspectors reviewed the condition report associated with this issue. Based on the review, the inspectors determined that exceeding the core lift criteria had a functional impact on the fuel assembly during postulated, off-normal design conditions. Specifically, given that the licensee believed at the time that the suspected cause of the flow calculation changes was due to temperature inputs to the calculations drifting, the inspectors determined that the impact to the calculation methodology was not evaluated and could impact both the core lift and the DNB safety analyses. The inspectors concluded that both Criterion 2 and 3 should have been answered "yes" and an operability determination be performed.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the CAP and plans to revise the core lift analysis to address the issue.

Corrective Action References: CR-2025-03538, Inadequate Detail in CR-2024-04075 to Capture Basis for Meeting Technical Specification Requirements

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an operability evaluation in accordance with NORM-OP-1009 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Specifically, the licensee incorrectly determined that exceeding the core lift criteria did not have a functional impact on the SSC because they believed that the suspected cause of the flow calculation changes was due to temperature inputs to the calculations drifting. However, the impact from the temperature drift to the calculation methodology was not evaluated and could impact both the core lift and the DNB safety analyses.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, since the same calculation is used to verify both the maximum core lift analysis limit and the minimum RCS flow limit, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the impact to both safety analysis methodology, which is directly related to the fuel barrier performance.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors screened the issue to Green because the inspectors answered all the Fuel Cladding Integrity questions in IMC 0609 Exhibit 3 - Barrier Integrity Screening Questions "no."

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the cause of the RCS flow exceeding the core lift limit and therefore, did not consider the full impact to the calculation methodology of both safety analysis limits.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On May 8, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Terry Brown and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	ATA-2023-2857	NRC Cyber Security Inspection IP71130.10 Self-Assessment	02/13/2023
		CR-2017-11317	Cyber Security Program: Control Deficiencies	11/17/2017
		CR-2017-11807	Cyber Security Program: Control Deficiencies	11/30/2017
		CR-2018-10472	Error in the Auxiliary Building Tornado Differential Pressure Model	11/27/2018
		CR-2020-03138	Received L787 RCP 1-1 MTR LWR BRG OIL LVL High Computer Point	04/12/2020
		CR-2020-04242	System Monitoring – Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-2 Seal Cavity Pressure Trends	05/14/2020
		CR-2021-02678	2021 Cyber Inspection: Untimely Implementation of CA-2017-11807-001	04/08/2021
		CR-2021-04888	Cyber: Implement the New Baseline Configuration Auditing Requirements of NOBP-SS-1205, Cyber Security Configuration Control	06/23/2021
		CR-2021-05292	RCP 1-2 Third Stage Cavity Pressure Reading Lower than Normal	07/10/2021
		CR-2021-07196	Rising Trend RCP 1-2 Drinking Bird Counts	09/25/2021
		CR-2021-08974	Service Water Baseline Test Engineering Review DB-PF-03216	11/24/2021
		CR-2021-09282	NRC TI inspection: DB-OP-06313 Procedure Enhancement Observation for Open Phase Condition	12/07/2021
		CR-2022-00817	HPI Train 1 Pressure Rising Following MU Valve Stroke	02/03/2022
		CR-2022-03833	Increasing Trend for Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Calculated per DB-SP-03358, RCS Flow Rate Test	05/04/2022
		CR-2022-09409	RCP Motor Oil Drain Tank Level High	12/11/2022
		CR-2022-09426	2022 NRC Radiation Protection Baseline Inspection: NRC Identified Tritium Sampling Basis Methodology Was Not Determined	12/12/2022
		CR-2022-09681	RCP 1-2 Third Stage Seal Downward Pressure Trend and Elevated Seal Leakage Rate	12/21/2022
CR-2023-02245	Performance Gap Analysis Requested for Instrument and Control Maintenance Regarding Nuclear Instrument	03/24/2023		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Maintenance	
		CR-2023-02453	2023 Security Training Inspection, NRC Finding	03/30/2023
		CR-2023-02623	Zip Drive Disk Discovered at PAF Entrance Area	04/04/2023
		CR-2023-02948	Conditions outside of Original Design Tolerance Identified While Mapping the Cooling Tower	04/12/2023
		CR-2023-03338	Ground Settling Aggregate Review Enhancements	04/21/2023
		CR-2023-03771	MS-C-23-08-20: Prep - Utilization of a Cancelled Documents by Access Authorization	05/04/2023
		CR-2023-04596	SBODG Cylinder 20 Rocker Arm Shaft Cap Broken	06/05/2023
		CR-2023-04687	SBODG Extended Unavailability Time due to Low Fuel Oil Level	06/08/2023
		CR-2023-04801	Call Tree Individual Did Not Respond to Unannounced Call-In Dill	06/14/2023
		CR-2023-04944	Insufficient Documentation of Evaluations for Sink Holes/Areas of Settlement Within 15 feet of Safety-Related Structures	06/21/2023
		CR-2023-05000	Failure to address adverse condition (Fire Protection piping misalignment) in Corrective Action Program	06/22/2023
		CR-2023-05298	Trending for Self Powered Neutron Detectors	07/03/2023
		CR-2023-05430	Replacement Door 458 Incorrect Size	07/11/2023
		CR-2023-05666	FME: Retaining Pin Stuck Between Fuel Pins of Fuel Assembly	07/20/2023
		CR-2023-05671	SCBA-029 Failed Monthly Performance Test	07/20/2023
		CR-2023-05829	RC Loop 2 Hotleg NR Temp (PPCS:T730) Appears High	07/26/2023
		CR-2023-05945	Area of Concern (AOC) Issued to Davis-Besse Site Protection due to Recent Trend of Safety and Human Performance	07/31/2023
		CR-2023-06048	MS-C-23-07-08: FINDING: M&TE Usage Not Tracked in ATICTS	08/03/2023
		CR-2023-06564	2023 WANO AFI: NP.1 Workers are Not Consistently Adhering to Human Performance Standards during Work Activities.	08/23/2023
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2023-06732	#1 Emergency Diesel Generator (#1 EDG) Monthly Water Jacket Iron Analysis is Trending Higher Than Typical Values.	08/29/2023

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2023-07574	RCP 1-1 Drinking Bird Counter Stopped Moving	10/07/2023
		CR-2023-07667	RC Loop 2 Hot Leg NR Temp Appears High (PPCS:T730)	10/11/2023
		CR-2023-07692	Degrading Seal Parameters for RCP 1-2	10/11/2023
		CR-2023-07894	AFPT 2 Governor is Hunting Excessively at the HSS.	10/20/2023
		CR-2023-09194	RPS Channel 1 RCS Flow Mode Configured to Incorrect Vendor Specification	12/14/2023
		CR-2024-00078	Startup Transformer Bushings are Beyond the Normal Life Expectancy of 30 Years	01/04/2024
		CR-2024-00153	Transfer of CWMT #1 to CWMT #2 during RE1770 A/B Testing (ACE)	01/08/2024
		CR-2024-00232	Individual Accessed Radiological Control Area (RCA) without a Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD)	01/10/2024
		CR-2024-00407	Adverse Trend in Human Performance Events and errors Since November 2023 at Davis-Besse	01/16/2024
		CR-2024-00824	Security Did Not Meet 1 of 2 Objectives from the Area of Concern	02/01/2024
		CR-2024-01034	MS-C-24-02-22: No Condition Report for a 10CFR21 Notification from Velan	02/08/2024
		CR-2024-01052	MS-C-24-02-22: Corrective Action Response Does Not Include Sufficient Objective Evidence for Closure as Required by CAP	02/09/2024
		CR-2024-01054	MS-C-24-02-22: Effectiveness Review ER-2023-01268-1 Is Not Correct	02/09/2024
		CR-2024-01119	Increase in Human Performance Errors Within Security	02/13/2024
		CR-2024-01181	MS-C-24-02-09: PMT Leak Check Hold Time Information Not Properly Documented and Missing Painter Initial	02/15/2024
		CR-2024-01182	MS-C-24-02-09: Issues with Order 200867885 Documentation	02/15/2024
		CR-2024-01340	Aggregate Review of Ground Settling/Buried Piping Leaks at Davis-Besse	02/21/2024
CR-2024-01446	Radioactive Material Identified during Baseline Survey.	02/23/2024		
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2024-01529	CFAM Elevation Notice - Davis-Besse Site Protection Inconsistent Application of Security Fundamentals	02/27/2024
		CR-2024-02076	Unexpected Dose Rates Found during Incore Tank Survey	03/12/2024

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2024-02170	NRC Identified – Improvement Opportunity with Alpha Monitoring	03/14/2024
		CR-2024-02249	Water Accumulation in Fire Pump Diesel Day Tank	03/16/2024
		CR-2024-02254	RCP 1-2 Whip Restraint SE Nuts Loose	03/16/2024
		CR-2024-02338	Positive Whole Body Count on Steam Generator Worker	03/19/2024
		CR-2024-02488	Integrated SFAS Test Train 1 Required Evaluation of IST Program Document for Valve Stroke Times - 1R23	03/22/2024
		CR-2024-02599	MS Line 2 to AFPT 1 Isolation Valve MS106A Tripping Closed with SG Pressure >20PSIG	03/26/2024
		CR-2024-02942	Calculated RCS Flowrate per DB-SP-03358 Exceeds Core Tilt Limit	04/04/2024
		CR-2024-03162	Fire Piping Rupture Outside the Turbine Building Near the Tool Crib Entrance	04/11/2024
		CR-2024-03180	Station Blackout Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank Elevated Micro-Organism	04/12/2024
		CR-2024-03400	Trending: Spent Fuel Pool Leakage/SF99-Q, ZONE 2 FUEL TRANSFER PIT FLOOR LEAK MONITOR DRAIN, Blockage Impacts	04/18/2024
		CR-2024-03413	EPZ Siren 002 Located in Jerusalem Township in Lucas County Failed the April 17, 2024, Siren Test.	04/18/2024
		CR-2024-03734	Irregular Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) Results From 2nd Half 2023	04/26/2024
		CR-2024-04083	Individual Alarms Passive Monitor Upon Issuance of Dose of Legal Record Dosimeter	05/06/2024
		CR-2024-04337	Trending Small Changes in CTRM Indications Following CTRM Ventilation Swap.	05/14/2024
		CR-2024-04787	Main Steam Line Room 1 (Room 601) Temperature Exceeded 120 Degrees Fahrenheit	05/30/2024
		CR-2024-04911	RCS Leakage Trends Not in MAOM at Time of Publishing	06/04/2024
		CR-2024-05061	Level 4 Clearance Discrepancy	06/11/2024
		CR-2024-05271	Surveillance Testing to Fulfill SR 3.3.1.3 Not Performed on a Staggered Test Basis	06/20/2024
		CR-2024-05297	MS-C-24-05-31: Staged Combustibles Not Addressed in Fire Loading Calculations	06/20/2024

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2024-05444	Turbine Building North Slab Trending	06/26/2024
		CR-2024-05571	Level 4 Clearance Condition	07/02/2024
		CR-2024-05576	Level 4 Clearance Issue for C49 Work	07/02/2024
		CR-2024-06093	RCP 1-2 Nuclear Safety Concern	07/25/2024
		CR-2024-06186	Discrepancy Between Plant Drawing and Field Wiring	07/30/2024
		CR-2024-06323	Level 4 Clearance Issue	08/05/2024
		CR-2024-06451	NRC Identified (NRC Inspection 71130.05): CR-2021-05955-ATA-01 Closed without Supporting Justification.	08/08/2024
		CR-2024-06580	EP Drill: 8/13/24: Drill Participant Did Not Respond	08/14/2024
		CR-2024-06768	Concern Identified Regarding Concurrent Yellow Risk Surveillance Testing	08/22/2024
		CR-2024-06827	Demin Water Transfer Pump 1 Trip Due to Mispositioning of Switch	08/26/2024
		CR-2024-06857	NRC Identified Fire Barrier Question	08/27/2024
		CR-2024-06873	NRC Identified Fire Barrier Penetration Question	08/27/2024
		CR-2024-06932	Level 4 Clearance Event - Potential Drawing Discrepancy on E-666 Sh1	08/29/2024
		CR-2024-07102	Preliminary Indications Identified Potential Rotation Issues with Siren 504 Following Testing.	09/06/2024
		CR-2024-07221	NRC Identified Concern (Protected Equipment Postings)	09/11/2024
		CR-2024-07227	EPZ Siren 005 Did Not Receive the Test Signal during the Silent Siren Test on 09/11/2024	09/11/2024
		CR-2024-07386	INPO Temporary Modifications (>1 Cycle) Indicator Yellow for August 2024	09/18/2024
		CR-2024-07412	Fleet Assessment Notice of Concern - Negative Trend in Plant Status Control, Bumping of Components	09/19/2024
		CR-2024-07435	License Event Report (LER) 2021-001 Revision 01	09/19/2024
		CR-2024-07563	Security Did Not Meet 1 Objective from the Area of Concern	09/25/2024
		CR-2024-07800	DB Siren 002 Failure	10/04/2024
		CR-2024-07935	EDG Speed Switch Evaluation Concludes an Unanalyzed Condition Existed.	10/10/2024
		CR-2024-08176	Siren 205 in Ottawa County Had a Communications Failure during 10/18/2024 Testing.	10/18/2024

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71152B	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2024-08416	Plant Status Control Event - SW37, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 3 OUTLET ISOLATION, Inadvertently Left Closed During Performance of DB1OP-06262, Attachment 30 (ACE)	10/26/2024
		CR-2024-08554	Several Telephone Lines Were Found Dead During Walkdown/Communication Test at the Joint Information Center Emergency Response Facility	10/31/2024
		CR-2024-09019	NRC NCV: Inadequate Assessment of Fire Brigade Performance (ACE)	11/18/2024
		CR-2024-09020	NRC NCV: Reactor Protection System Flow Modules Found Not Conforming to Design	11/18/2024
		CR-2024-09356	Meteorological Tower Primary 75M Wind Speed Failed	12/04/2024
		CR-2024-09424	Davis-Besse Backup 4-Way Blast Dial Server is Out of Service	12/09/2024
		CR-2024-09449	Error in Historical CCW HX 1 Performance Test	12/10/2024
		CR-2024-09582	NRC NCV: Failure to Ensure Adequate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow	12/16/2024
		CR-2024-09751	Primary 75-Meter Wind Direction Indicating Erratically.	12/25/2024
		CR-2025-00041	Siren 103 Current Fail After 1/3/25 Audible Test	01/03/2025
		CR-2025-00151	Outside Phones Lines are Out of Service	01/09/2025
		CR-2025-00155	75M Wind Direction Drift from Acceptable Direction	01/09/2025
		CR-2025-00727	During testing, Lucas County Emergency Operations Center Could Not be Contacted From the Emergency Operations Facility 4-Way Phone	02/04/2025
		CR-2025-00888	Annunciator 6-1-B Failed to Flash during Annunciator Panel Testing	02/10/2025
		CR-2025-00917	Unsatisfactory Simulator DEP Classification	02/11/2025
		CR-2025-00934	Davis-Besse 2024 Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey Chemistry Red Pillars	02/12/2025
		CR-2025-00936	Davis-Besse 2024 Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey Security Red Pillar	02/12/2025
		CR-2025-00939	IIS: As-Found Condition of T86-4 and DA1144 Penetration	02/12/2025
		CR-2025-00992	EDG Air Start Tank T86-4 Relief Concern	02/13/2025
		CR-2025-01139	Draft Tornado dP Calculation Results	02/20/2025

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		CR-2025-01226	Davis-Besse 2024 Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey Other Site Matrixed Organization Red Pillar	02/25/2025
		CR-2025-01263	EDG Air Receiver Tank Returned to Service with Identified Condition from Internal Tank Inspection Not Fully Understood	02/26/2025
		CR-2025-01586	P465 and Q479 Received during Valve Stroke of HP2A	03/08/2025
		CR-2025-02078	Site Protection Did Not Meet the Effectiveness Review Criteria Listed in ER-2024-01119-1	03/24/2025
		CR-2025-02356	Improvement Opportunity – CREVS Testing	04/01/2025
		CR-2025-02751	Received Computer Points Q479 HP INJ VLV LEAKING and P465 HP INJ VLV IN PRES	04/13/2025
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2025-03150	2025 NRC PI&R Inspection: Backup Call Manager is Out of Service	04/24/2025
		CR-2025-03358	2025 NRC PI&R Inspection - Trend - Radiation Protection Decrease in Condition Report Initiation	05/01/2025
		CR-2025-03602	2025 NRC PI&R Inspection: Observation on CR Documentation	05/12/2025
	Engineering Changes	24-1158-001	TM - AFW Pump Recirculation Rupture Disk	0
		CR-2014-08079	Leakage Indicated on HP57/HP59 and HP56/HP58 Back to Back Check Valve Test, DB-PF-03969	05/01/2014
	Miscellaneous		Surveillance Test Intervals (STI) List	12
		ATL-2025-0147	2024 SCWE Survey: Davis-Besse - Negative Red Questions and Department/Section Discussions	02/11/2025
		OE-2021-0105-6	NRC Information Notice 2020-04: Operating Experience Related to Failure of Buried Fire Protection Main Yard Piping	04/20/2023
		OE-2023-0138-1	OE547830R20230412 Turbine Trip due to Primary Phase Differential Generator Lockout	05/10/2023
		OE-2023-0341-1	IER L1-17-5, Rev.1 Line of Sight to the Reactor Core	08/22/2023
		OE-2023-0397-1	OE559877R20230914 Main Generator Transformer Lockout Caused By Failed Lightning Arrestor	01/04/2024
OE-2023-0482-1		OE563910R20231103 Degraded Service Water Piping	01/03/2024	
OE-2023-0514-1		IN 2023-06, Emergency Telecommunication Services Changes, ML23289A249	12/11/2023	
71152B	Miscellaneous	OE-2024-0002-2	NRC Information Notice 2023-04: Operating Experience Related to Fire Events at Decommissioning Nuclear Power	01/02/2024

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			Plants In The United States	
		OE-2024-0012-2	Information Notice 2021-01, Supplement 1: Lessons Learned From U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspections of Design-Basis Capability Of Power-Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants	01/12/2024
		OE-2024-0016-1	OE577016R20240114 Loss of Offsite Power Path due to Cable Pothead Fault to Ground	03/19/2024
		OE-2024-0062-1	NRC Information Notice 2024-01: Minimization And Control of Contamination Involving Discrete Radioactive Particles at Decommissioning Facilities	02/15/2024
		OE-2024-0121-1	NRC Information Notice 2024-02: Impact on Licensee Emergency Plans From Changes Made by Offsite Response Organizations to Alert And Notification Systems	04/04/2024
		OE-2024-0141-2	OE558315R20240415 Fuel Assembly Misplaced	10/14/2024
		OE-2024-0305-1	OE587467R20240830 Main Transformer Fire Resulted in Loss of One Train of Offsite Power and Reactor Trip	10/22/2024
		OE-2024-0341-1	OE581674R20240930 Automatic Plant Runback due to Integrated Control System	10/14/2024
	Procedures	DB-CH-06900	Operational Chemical Control Limits	74
		DB-OP-06513	Auxiliary Building Non-Radioactive Areas Ventilation	31
		DBRM-EMER-5003	Equipment Important To Emergency Response	23
		FLT-PI-BP1350	Corrective Action Review Board	0
		NOBP-LP-2003	Employee Concern Program	7
		NOBP-OP-0012	Operator Workarounds, Burdens, Control Room Deficiencies and Operations Aggregate Assessment	9
		NOP-LP-2001	Corrective Action Program	50
		NOP-LP-2023	Conduct of Quality Assurance Compliance Auditing	22
		NOP-OP-1009	Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments	09
		NORM-OP-1009	SRO Review of Condition Reports	11
	Self-Assessments	ATA-2023-10840	Review and Assess Area Radiation Monitor OE	06/29/2023
		ATA-2023-11519	Operations Assessment of Procedural Workarounds in OPS Procedures	07/11/2023
ATA-2023-20106		Emergency Diesel Generator 2 October 2023 Maintenance	11/27/2023	

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			Outage Critique	
		ATA-2023-21847	Davis-Besse Radiation Protection Program Review for 2024 in accordance with NOP-OP-4001 (Radiation Protection Program)	12/28/2023
		ATA-2023-2758	Conduct Rollup Assessment of Department Response to IPA Gap and Focus Areas Following Training Cycle 23-02	02/09/2023
		ATA-2023-2857	NRC Cyber Security Inspection IP71130.10 Self-Assessment	02/13/2023
		ATA-2023-2857	NRC Cyber Security Inspection IP71130.10 Self-Assessment	02/13/2023
		ATA-2023-4223	PM Feedback Self-Assessment	03/08/2023
		ATA-2023-4498	Davis-Besse Emergency Feedwater System Assessment	03/10/2023
		ATA-2023-9469	NI Divergences: Trend and Summarize Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range Divergences	06/07/2023
		ATA-2024-1977-ATA-37	Area 8 Fitness-for-Duty Reviews/Assessments	01/26/2024
		ATL-2022-0550-ATA-16	2nd Quarter 2023 Unannounced Call-in Drill	08/25/2023
		ATL-2022-0902-ATA-05	Assess Actions Taken to Date Regarding Chemistry Section's Three Red Pillars in the 2022 SCWE Survey	12/12/2022
		ATL-2023-0258-ATA-09	Review Project Schedules Generated to Ensure They Have Sufficient Granularity	06/26/2024
		ATL-2023-0673-ATA-18	Monitor Quality of Completed CAP Products	01/13/2025
		ATL-2024-0448-ATA-06	Quarterly Unannounced Augmentation Drill - 3rd Quarter 2024	10/10/2024
		ATL-2025-0221-ATA-05	2025 NRC PI&R Inspection Document Request - Performance Improvement	04/04/2025
		QFO-2023-0008	Fitness-For-Duty Audit	10/30/2023
		QFO-2024-0004	Corrective Action Program (CAP) Limited Scope Audit	02/20/2024
		QFO-2024-0013	MS-C-24-08-03 Radiation Protection (QA Audit)	08/05/2024
	Work Orders	WO 200877259	RCS Flow Rate Test	04/04/2024
		WO 200925503	Troubleshoot / Repair / Replace RPS2RC2406	11/30/2023