UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

May 5, 2025

Eric S. Carr
President, Nuclear Operations
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Dominion Energy
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Blvd., Floor: IN-3SE
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2025001 and 07201038/2025001

Dear Eric S. Carr:

On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On April 22, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Signed by Baptist, James
on 05/05/25

James B. Baptist, Chief
Projects Branch 4
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000395
License No. NPF-12

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2025001; 07201038/2025001 DATED MAY 05, 2025

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: **ML25122A033**

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OFFICE	RII/DORS	RII/DORS	RII/DORS		
NAME	C. Even	C. Read	J. Baptist		
DATE	05/02/25	05/02/25	05/05/25		

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Number:	05000395; 07201038
License Number:	NPF-12
Report Number:	05000395/2025001; 07201038/2025001
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2025-001-0032; I-2025-001-0086
Licensee:	Dominion Energy
Facility:	Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Location:	Jenkinsville, SC
Inspection Dates:	January 01, 2025, to March 31, 2025
Inspectors:	K. Dials, Resident Inspector A. Ponko, Senior Construction Project Inspector M. Read, Senior Resident Inspector J. Vasquez, Construction Project Inspector J. Walker, Sr Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:	James B. Baptist, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to identify and correct water intrusion which degraded the reliability of a safety-related ventilation damper			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000395/2025001-01 Open/Closed	[P.1] - Identification	71152A
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified for the licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion near safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct water intrusion from the control building (CB) roof which caused unexpected deterioration of a safety-related control room ventilation damper and subsequent failure.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000395/2024-002-01	LER 2024-002-01 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1, Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration System	71153	Closed
LER	05000395/2024-002-00	LER 2024-002-00 for Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Loss Of Control Room Emergency Filtration System	71153	Closed
LER	05000395/2024-003-00	LER 2024-003-00 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Common Cause Inoperability of Engineered Safety Features	71153	Closed

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures on January 6-8, 2025, for the following systems: emergency diesel generators, fire service, condensate storage tank, and service water pump house.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Radiation monitor RM-A3, main plant vent exhaust, on January 13, 2025, while radiation monitor RM-A13 was nonfunctional
(2) Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and flow paths on February 3, 2025, while the 'B' emergency diesel generator was out of service for maintenance
(3) Chemical volume and control system on February 6, 2025, during work on 'B' boric acid transfer pump
(4) Reactor building cooling on March 14, 2025
(5) Chilled water system, completed on March 28, 2025, while 'A' chiller was out of service for preventative maintenance

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Control building elevation 436 feet, cable spreading room and cable chase, on January 21, 2025
(2) Control building elevation 448 feet, fire areas CB22 and CB23, on February 3, 2025
(3) Turbine building elevation 463 feet, fire area TB01, on February 3, 2025
(4) Turbine building lubricating oil storage room, completed on February 25, 2025
(5) PTP-114.095, testing of the CO2 system in the computer room in the control building elevation 436 feet, on March 31, 2025
(6) Service water pump house on March 31, 2025

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the fire brigade training and performance during an annual offsite responder fire drill on March 1, 2025.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reduction of 10 percent reactor power for quarterly turbine valve testing, electro-hydraulic control system leak response, and manual reactor trip on February 10, 2025, and reactor startup on February 12, 2025.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator exercise that covered numerous control failures, feedwater pump issues requiring reactor trip, small break loss of coolant accident, and emergency declaration on March 13, 2025.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Instrumentation card removal from balance-of-plant rack #9 and replacement of 'B' loop delta-temperature card TE-422 on January 27, 2025
(2) 'B' emergency diesel generator preventative maintenance on February 3-5, 2025
(3) Maintenance and testing on the FLEX 80KW diesel generators concurrent with maintenance on the 'A' emergency diesel generator on February 18, 2025
(4) Scaffolding activities in the turbine lubricating oil storage tank room on February 25, 2025
(5) 'A' control room air handler maintenance and control room pressure boundary breach on March 18, 2025

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR1259562, 'B' service water pump house fan motor high current readings, completed on February 21, 2025
(2) CR1283389, secondary parameter differences post-trip, review completed on February 27, 2025
(3) CR1280545, reactor vessel level indication system indicator LI-1320 reading high, review completed on March 3, 2025
(4) CR1263051, 'B' emergency diesel generator governor failure on June 27, 2024, review completed on March 3, 2025
(5) CR1284910, turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump speed indications not functioning following governor replacement, review completed on March 17, 2025

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

(1) SOP-505, air handling damper testing for XDP-22B, 23B, and 24B, on January 15 and 16, 2025, following actuator preventative maintenance
(2) STP-345.002, testing of 'B' loop delta-temperature card TE-422, on January 27, 2025, following card replacement
(3) EMP-300.012, agastat relay calibration, on January 29, 2025, following relay replacement for breaker XSW1EA04
(4) SOP-306, emergency diesel generator testing, on February 5, 2025, following 'B' emergency diesel generator preventative maintenance
(5) ERTP-100.008, testing for XEG0141 FLEX 80KW diesel, following automatic transfer switch and annual maintenance, on February 19, 2025
(6) STP-125.002A, 'A' emergency diesel generator operability testing, on February 21, 2025, following annual maintenance
(7) SOP-505, testing of the 'A' train control room ventilation train, on March 20, 2025, following fan motor and damper maintenance
(8) PTP-113.002, 'A' chiller testing, on March 28, 2025, following preventative maintenance

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1) STP-360.032, control room supply air atmospheric radiation monitor RM-A1 channel operational test, on January 7, 2025
(2) STP-228.001, fire protection system fire pumps test, on January 15, 2025
(3) STP-360.007, reactor building area radiation monitor RM-G18 calibration on January 17, 2025
(4) STP-220.002, turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump and valve test, on March 4, 2025
(5) STP-223.002A, for stroke testing service water valve 3107B, on March 11, 2025

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) STP 222.002, component cooling pump 'B' Group A Inservice pump test, on February 3-4, 2025
(2) STP-225.001A, 'A' emergency diesel generator pump and valve testing, on February 21, 2025, following fuel oil and air start system maintenance

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR1280961, radiation monitor RM-A2 reactor building atmospheric particulate high radiation alarm, review completed on January 24, 2025
(2) CR1263051, 'B' emergency diesel generator governor failure, review completed on March 3, 2025
(3) CR1273279, 'A' residual heat removal pump breaker failure, review completed on March 20, 2025

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to identify potential trends in failures of safety-related ventilation dampers that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The review was completed on March 31, 2025.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000395/2024-002-00 (01), Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration System (ADAMS Accession No. ML25028A244). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section IP71152 and are documented in Inspection Report 05000395/2024004 under Inspection Results Section IP71111.15. This LER is Closed.

Reporting (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee's event reporting determinations to ensure it complies with reporting requirements:

(1) LER 05000395/2024-003-00, Common Cause Inoperability of Engineered Safety Features (ADAMS Accession No. ML24323A154). This LER was retracted by the licensee on January 30, 2025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML25030A188). This LER is Closed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation Of An ISFSI

Operation Of An ISFSI (1 Sample)

(1) Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, “Inspection Program for Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel and Reactor-Related Greater-than-Class C Waste at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and for 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation Packagings."

Operation of an ISFSI (1 Sample)

From March 17-20, 2025, the inspectors performed a review of the licensee’s ISFSI activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. During the on-site inspection, the inspectors observed and reviewed licensee activities in each of the five safety focus areas including occupational exposure, public exposure, fuel damage, confinement, and impact to plant operations.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Additionally, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of the heavy load lifting equipment, the ISFSI haul path, and the ISFSI pad.

INSPECTION RESULTS

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Failure to identify and correct water intrusion which degraded the reliability of a safety-related ventilation damper</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cornerstone</td><td>Significance</td><td>Cross-Cutting Aspect</td><td>Report Section</td></tr>
<tr><td>Barrier Integrity</td><td>Green
NCV 05000395/2025001-01
Open/Closed</td><td>[P.1] - Identification</td><td>71152A</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” was identified for the licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion near safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct water intrusion from the control building (CB) roof which caused unexpected deterioration of a safety-related control room ventilation damper and subsequent failure.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Description: On July 19, 2023, the control room air handling unit ‘A’ inlet control damper (“damper 22A”) failed to fully stroke open, but the “open” position and its effects did not affect operability of the system. Damper 22A was lubricated and verified to fully stroke open on</td></tr>
</table>

July 22, 2023.

On August 1, 2023, damper 22A failed to shut during alignment of the system to support ventilation testing. This failure impacted the operability of the 'A' train of the control room emergency filtration system. Damper 22A was lubricated and verified to stroke closed on August 1, 2023.

On August 9, 2023, the system was tagged out to perform inspections and additional maintenance. Damper 22A was lubricated and stroked until it stroked freely. Work order closure notes stated, "The [as-found] damper wouldn't satisfy the limit switch during fan start. [F]ound damper rusted and hard to stroke. Duct is sweating causing damper to rust." The work order notes covered the August 1 to 9, 2023, maintenance discussions.

On August 20, 2024, damper 22A failed to shut during alignment of the system for maintenance, causing an entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. The damper was manually closed to exit the TS. During troubleshooting, mechanics noted that the damper was "stuck closed." On August 23, 2024, damper 22A was found "tight" and was inspected, cleaned, lubricated, and manually stroked until free movement.

Damper 22A is safety-related and required to close on a signal from the control room to protect the control room in the event of an onsite radiological release.

Inspectors assessed past maintenance of damper 22A and interviewed mechanics to determine if other factors were contributing to the negative performance trend of damper 22A. Inspectors reviewed deficiencies that were identified during CB roof inspections in September 2022 and March 2023 and were closed to Work Orders and minimal repairs. Inspector discussions with mechanics in January 2025 revealed that the licensee had knowledge of exterior deterioration of the damper linkage caused by water intrusion. Puddles were evident on the floor under the ducting, but the 22A damper is located high enough that a ladder would have been required to view the trapped water in the frame of the damper and the rust on the surrounding metal components. Mechanics stated that they had been asked to evaluate a "tenting" strategy to divert the water intrusion away from the damper, which was not possible due to the configuration.

Inspectors concluded that the additional humidity from standing water caused unexpected deterioration which resulted in stroke issues on July 19 and August 1, 2023. Although the damper was lubricated and retested after each of these instances, the licensee failed to adequately identify and correct the water intrusion onto the damper frame which continued to degrade the damper linkage until a subsequent failure on August 20, 2024.

Corrective Actions: In August 2024, the licensee established a bridging strategy to pump the roof membrane to minimize future water intrusion and repaired the roof penetration over the 22A damper. Inspectors have not identified any rainwater intrusion near the 22A damper since the repairs. The license also performed additional preventative maintenance and internal inspections of the 22A damper.

Corrective Action References: CR1266916, CR1266660, CR1234525, CR1233577, CR1281551

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion onto the frame of the 22A damper was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly identify water intrusion onto the 22A damper when workers had knowledge of the water and damper deterioration and failed to correct the condition prior to a successive failure of the 22A damper. This performance deficiency was within the licensee's ability to foresee and prevent.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. This PD adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events because the 'A' train control room ventilation was rendered inoperable. This violation is similar to Example 4.G of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues."

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Appendix A states, in part, "Findings that impact control room habitability require further evaluation. Findings related to the radiological barrier functions of the control room, auxiliary building, reactor building, and spent fuel pool building are not expected to impact CDF or LERF. If degradation of the radiological barrier could result in a substantial potential for overexposure, the finding should also be evaluated using IMC 0609 Appendix C." This example did not meet the definition of "substantial potential for overexposure" in Appendix C and therefore screened to Green.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the licensee did not completely and accurately document the discovery of water intrusion onto the 22A damper and associated deterioration.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states, in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality (CAQ), such as nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Section 16, "Corrective Action," of the V.C. Summer Quality Assurance Program Description, Revision 35, described the methods to meet Criterion XVI, which stated, in part, "The Company has established and implements corrective action programs, procedure, and processes to assure that conditions adverse to quality at Company nuclear facilities are promptly identified and corrected."

Licensee procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revision 41, step 3.1.4 stated, "Submit a CR [Condition Report] for any issue or concern that does not meet specific requirements of procedures, policies, management expectations, or accepted industry standards." Attachment 1 provides an example of "Degradation, damage, failure, malfunction, or loss of plant equipment". Step 3.5.6 allows closure of Level 3 condition reports to the Work Management Process. Several condition reports were identified related to CB roof inspection deficiencies,

and all were closed to work orders without addressing the leakage near the 22A damper. The water intrusion onto the frame of the 22A damper and that the deterioration had caused stroke issues on August 1 and 9, 2023, were not adequately identified or corrected in a CR.

Contrary to the above, upon discovery of the water intrusion causing deterioration of the 22A damper in August 2023, the licensee failed to identify and correct the water intrusion onto the damper frame which continued to degrade the damper linkage until a subsequent failure on August 20, 2024. The licensee properly identified the condition on January 27, 2025. Inspectors noted that a bridging strategy to pump the roof membrane had been established in August 2024 to address a personnel safety issue and this action limited additional water intrusion.

Additionally, inspectors previously identified that this event resulted in a violation of Technical Specifications, which was previously documented in inspection report 05000395/2024004 (ML25037A330).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the ISFSI inspection results to Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
60855	Calculations	DC04160-032	Thermal Evaluation of HI-TRAC FW inside Decon Pit	Revision 4
	Corrective Action Documents	CR1196658		
		CR1269904		
		CR1282343		
		CR1283828		
	Engineering Evaluations	Dominion Energy, ETE-NAF-2021-0120	"V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report,"	Revision 1
		Dominion Energy, ETE-NAF-2025-0012	"Holtec MPC 547 Fuel Assembly Certification and Canister Loading Map"	Rev. 0
	Miscellaneous	Holtec Report No. HI-2114830	Final Safety Analysis Report on the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System	Revision 21
	Procedures	Dominion Energy, CM-A-A-400	10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments	Revision 17
		Holtec International, EXT-000671	High Temp Liquid Penetrant Examination	Revision 0
		Holtec International, EXT-001028	"High Temp Liquid Penetrant Examination	Revision 0
		Holtec International, EXT-001029	Visual Examination of Welds	Revision 0
		Holtec International, HPP-2036-0200	MPC-37 Loading	Revision 15
		Holtec International, HPP-2036-0300	MPC-37 Sealing, Drying, Backfilling	Revision 16
		Holtec International,	MPC-37 Stackup (Transfer)	Revision 10

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		HPP-2036-0400		
		Holtec International, HPP-2036-0500	HI-STORM FW Movements	Revision 12
	Self-Assessments	Audit 24-07: Operations		
		ETE-NAF-2021-0120	10 CFR 72.48 Screenings	Revision 1
		Evaluation No. 1335	10 CFR 72.49 Evaluation	Revision 1
		Evaluation No. 1435	10 CFR 72.49 Evaluation	Revision 0
		Evaluation No. 1577	10 CFR 72.49 Evaluation	Revision 2
		Evaluation No. 1646	10 CFR 72.49 Evaluations	Revision 0
		EXT-000671	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 0
		EXT-001028	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 0
		EXT-001029	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 0
		EXT-001098	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 0
		HPP-2036-0300	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 16
		HPP-2036-0400	10 CFR 72.48 Screening	Revision 10
		HSP-1105	10 CFR 72.48 Screenings	Revision 11
		QA-AUD-201905		
		QA-SUR-201817		
		QA-SUR-201902		
	Work Orders	WO 88201754174		
71153	Miscellaneous	N/A	post-trip report for the reactor trip on February 10, 2025	February 11, 2025
	Procedures	OP-AP-105	Post Trip Review	12