



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2056 WESTINGS AVENUE, SUITE 400
NAPERVILLE, IL 60563-2657

December 19, 2024

Kelly Ferneau
Executive VP and Chief Nuclear Officer
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000315/2024010 AND 05000316/2024010

Dear Kelly Ferneau:

On November 8, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards.

The team also evaluated the station's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.


One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Learn, Matthew
on 12/19/24

Matthew C. Learn, Acting Branch Chief
Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Kelly Ferneau from Matthew C. Learn dated December 19, 2024.

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2024010 AND 05000316/2024010

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000315 and 05000316

License Numbers: DPR-58 and DPR-74

Report Numbers: 05000315/2024010 and 05000316/2024010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2024-010-0055

Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company

Facility: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant

Location: Bridgman, MI

Inspection Dates: October 21, 2024 to November 08, 2024

Inspectors: N. Audia, Reactor Inspector
R. Cassara, Resident Inspector
J. Mancuso, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Winslow, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By: Matthew C. Learn, Acting Branch Chief
Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

| Failure to Establish and Maintain a Procedure for Disassembly and Assembly of the Seal Table Appropriate to the Circumstances | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------------|----------------|
| Cornerstone | Significance | Cross-Cutting Aspect | Report Section |
| Initiating Events | Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024010-01 Open/Closed | [P.5] - Operating Experience | 71152B |
| The inspectors identified a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage. | | | |

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
 - Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the source range nuclear instrumentation system. The corrective actions for the following non-cited violations, minor violations (NCVs), and findings were evaluated as part of the assessment: NCV 2023003-01, "Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Without an Operable Fuel Handling Exhaust Train," NCV 2023012-01, "Failure to Establish Acceptance Criteria for Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channel Check," and NCV 2024301-01, "Failure to Maintain NRC Licensing Exam Security."
 - Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience.
 - Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
 - Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

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| Assessment | 71152B |
| Corrective Action Program Effectiveness | |
| <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.</p> | |
| <u>Problem Identification</u> | |
| <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The inspectors determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP completely and accurately.</p> | |
| <p>The inspectors performed a 5-year review of the source range nuclear instrumentation system. As part of this review, the inspectors interviewed the system engineer, reviewed plant health reports, and reviewed selective corrective actions and condition evaluation documents.</p> | |
| <u>Problem Prioritization and Evaluation</u> | |
| <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective at prioritizing and thoroughly evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Initial Screening Committee and the Management Screening Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. In addition, the inspectors observed a healthy dialogue between the members of these committees. The members were engaged and challenged each other when dispositioning issues.</p> | |
| <u>Corrective Actions</u> | |
| <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee generally assigned corrective actions that were effective and timely for NRC identified issues.</p> | |
| <p>During the review of a licensee's root cause evaluation and in responding to questions by the inspectors, the licensee identified that the storage location, tracking, and review of Engineering Recommendations as a part of shift turnover was not formalized. This observation is documented in the report.</p> | |

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| Assessment | 71152B |
| Use of Operating Experience | |
| <p>The inspectors determined that the licensee's utilization of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned</p> | |

were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.

The inspectors noted, as part of an apparent cause evaluation review, a missed opportunity to incorporate historical operating experience related to seal table leaks into a site procedure. It was identified as an apparent cause of the failure of a seal table Swagelok fitting in April 2024. The site created a corrective action to incorporate the operating experience into the site procedure. Additionally, the licensee identified a contributing cause associated with post-outage reports from a vendor that were not documented in the CAP. The team identified a finding and associated non-cited violation for the failure to establish and maintain a procedure for disassembly and assembly of the seal table appropriate to the circumstances, and minor performance deficiency for the failure to maintain vendor post-outage reports in accordance with the site procedure documented in this report.

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| Assessment | 71152B |
| Self-Assessments and Audits | |
| <p>The inspectors determined that the licensee’s self-assessments and audits were generally effective. The licensee periodically conducted department self-assessments and nuclear oversight audits throughout the organization. These assessments and audits were generally effective in identifying issues and opportunities for improvement at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known. The licensee’s Nuclear Oversight (NOS) also identified deficiencies in the licensee’s processes, which were addressed through the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any concerns in this area.</p> | |

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| Assessment | 71152B |
| Safety-Conscious Work Environment | |
| <p>The inspectors reviewed results from the 2023 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) procedure and discussed the program with the ECP manager. Additionally, the inspectors conducted one-on-one interviews with 29 licensee staff concerning the ability to raise issues, the free flow of information, if underlying factors exist that would produce a reluctance to raise nuclear safety concerns, and the effectiveness of the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.</p> <p>In general, the licensee’s staff was aware of and familiar with the CAP and other processes to raise nuclear safety concerns, such as the ECP. Licensee staff indicated they could raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation. The inspectors did not identify examples of retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns.</p> | |

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|---|--|------------------------------------|----------------|
| Failure to Establish and Maintain a Procedure for Disassembly and Assembly of the Seal Table Appropriate to the Circumstances | | | |
| Cornerstone | Significance | Cross-Cutting Aspect | Report Section |
| Initiating Events | Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024010-01 Open/Closed | [P.5] - Operating Experience | 71152B |
| The inspectors identified a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 when the | | | |

licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage.

Description:

On April 26, 2024, the licensee began to pressurize the RCS at the end of the Unit 2 Cycle 28 refueling outage. During the 300-pound pressure walkdown of Unit 2 containment, a leak was identified associated with a high-pressure Swagelok fitting, 2-NZI-J7, within the seal table.

When the RCS is at 300 psig, maintenance procedure, 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, step 4.3.1.b states, in part, “if fittings are leaking, then tighten leaking seals one flat at a time until leak stops or until no more threads are visible between high-pressure lower fitting and Swagelok fitting.” After identification of the leak, an adjustment to the fitting was made to improve the leak from 4–5 drops per minute to 1–2 drops per minute where plant operating experience exhibited that the leak would seal itself as RCS pressure rose.

On April 27, 2024, another walkdown of containment was conducted while the RCS was at 1000 psig. The leak associated with 2-NZI-J7 had significantly increased. The operators depressurized the RCS to attempt to tighten the fitting further. When tightening the fitting was unsuccessful, the site ultimately replaced the fitting.

The licensee identified the direct cause of the leak to be galling of the fitting which inhibited the fitting from sealing properly. An investigation into the history of 2-NZI-J7 identified the fitting had a history of leakage tracing back to 2009. It was replaced in 2013 and has required an adjustment due to leakage during every Unit 2 outage since the replacement. The site believes that galling occurred gradually with each disassembly and makeup process.

The site performed a review of operating experience regarding the fitting and identified Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 84-09, Revision 2, Primary System Leaks at Seal Tables. This bulletin was assigned a vendor technical document number by the site on February 9, 1996. The bulletin states, in part, “fitting threaded surfaces should be relubricated with Neolube each time they are remade.” Additionally, the licensee identified two reports from their current vendor which also recommended the use of lubrication to help prevent galling.

The licensee did not incorporate the use of lubrication on fitting threaded surfaces into 12-MHP-5021-001-135, contrary to Westinghouse and vendor guidance. The use of 12-MHP-5021-001-135 to remake seal table fitting threaded surfaces without lubrication led to the galling of the fittings and RCS leakage.

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced 2-NZI-J7 as an immediate corrective action. Additionally, the licensee has created an action to revise 12-MHP-5021-001-135 to include the use of lubrication on the threaded surfaces of seal table fittings which is to be completed prior to the next refueling outage.

Corrective Action References: AR 2024-3823, “U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7”

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee not establishing and maintaining a procedure for disassembly and assembly of the Unit 2 seal table appropriate to the circumstances is a performance deficiency. Specifically, maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135 did not require the use of lubrication when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. As a result, the use of 12-MHP-5021-001-135 led to the galling of 2-NZI-J7, and associated RCS leakage.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the galling of 2-NZI-J7 due to lack of use of lubrication led to RCS leakage. This caused the site to revert reactor pressurization from 1000 psig to fix the fitting.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors screened the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section A, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Initiators. The inspectors answered 'no' to the questions and screened the finding to Green.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate relevant operating experience from NSID-TB-84-09 to use lubrication on seal table fitting threaded surfaces into site procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting aspect represents present licensee performance despite the finding occurring outside the nominal 3-year period. 2-NZI-J7 has needed an adjustment due to leakage every Unit 2 outage since 2013, and there were opportunities in the last 3 years to identify the need for lubrication prior to the failure of the fitting.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9 addresses, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance," and states, in part, "maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances."

Contrary to the above, from March 1, 2013, through April 27, 2024, the licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in 12-MHP-5021-001-135 when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and RCS leakage.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Performance Deficiency

71152B

Failure to Maintain Vendor Post-Outage Reports in Accordance with Site Procedure

Minor Performance Deficiency: On November 7, 2024, the inspectors reviewed AR 2024-3823, U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7, which was written due to leakage from 2-NZI-J7 during RCS pressurization at the closure of the Unit 2 Cycle 28 outage. This AR included an associated in-depth apparent cause evaluation (IACE) to identify the cause of the 2-NZI-J7 leakage. The licensee identified a contributing cause which was that deliverables and expectations were not established or communicated between the site and vendor valve personnel.

The licensee identified that the vendor was providing the site with post-outage reports. Ownership of the vendor's contract was not consolidated to a single person, which caused the post-outage reports, dated June 8, 2022, and November 15, 2023, to be received and held by an uninvolved individual. Therefore, these reports were not documented in the site's corrective action program.

Contract Management Procedure, PMP-3140-CON-001, Contract Development, Execution, and Administration, states, in part, that the contract administrator should "maintain a contract file during the work. It is important to maintain a complete record of the Contractor's work and accomplishments during the entire Contract duration as this file is the central source for all information at this Site, pertaining to this Contract." Contrary to this self-imposed standard, the contract administrator did not receive the post-outage reports from the vendor, which inhibited them from being placed in the contract file. The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance because it was not associated with one of the cornerstone attributes.

Observation: Engineering Recommendations Not Part of Operations Turnover

71152B

The inspectors reviewed AR 2024-4331, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Oscillating Steam Generator Water Levels, and questioned an interim corrective action associated with a communication to Operations on how to conduct future rapid downpowers of the reactor. In the course of their response, the licensee identified that the storage location, tracking, and review of Engineering Recommendations as a part of shift turnover was not formalized. The licensee wrote AR 2024-8253, Engineering Recommendations not part of Operations Turnover. The inspectors reviewed the provided documentation and came to the same conclusion for engineering recommendations. The issue of concern is not a performance deficiency because it is not a result of the licensee's failure to meet a requirement or standard.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On November 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Kelly Ferneau, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|--|------------------|
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2010-12917 | Seal Table Leak at Fitting J-7 | 11/30/2010 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2015-5413 | Unit 2 Seal Table Leak | 04/15/2015 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2016-14517 | Boric Acid Leaks on Seal Table | 12/19/2016 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2016-14892 | BA Leakage at Seal Leak Off Table | 12/30/2016 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2019-10136 | 2-N-23 is Broke | 10/19/2019 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2019-11101 | Water Leakage on U2 L/C Seal Table | 11/08/2019 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2020-2908 | 2-NRI-32, Ch 2 Source Range was Indication Erratically | 03/30/2020 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2020-3925 | U2 Seal Table Inactive Leaks | 05/07/2020 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2021-4623 | Seal Table J7 Location Dry BA | 05/19/2021 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2021-6575 | N-31 Start Up Range Meter Not Responding | 07/28/2021 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2022-4225 | Unit 1 N-31 Source Range Failed Low - Loss of Detector Volt | 05/13/2022 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2022-9185 | Unit 2 Scaler Timer Stopped Responding | 11/08/2022 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2022-9292 | Unit 2 Audio Count Rate Not Working Following Reactor Trip | 11/10/2022 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-1931 | 2-NRC-6 Indicating at Power Between -.05 and .5 dpm | 03/07/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-2620 | Evaluators Do Not Implement Student Performance Evals | 03/30/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-3814 | Undefined Acceptance Criteria for Source Range Channel Check | 05/17/2023 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|--|------------------|
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-3815 | CA 2021-7098-7 Action Taken Not as Prescribed | 05/17/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-4958 | NOS ARMA for In-Storage Preventative Maintenance Activities | 07/06/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-4974 | NRC Inspection - Design Control Violation | 07/06/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-5234 | Tracking Mechanism for SCBA Bottles | 07/20/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-5237 | Operations Facial Hair Expectations | 07/20/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-5586 | Failure of Both 12-HV-BD-AFX-1/2 | 08/02/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-5650 | Unlocked Gate | 08/07/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-6546 | 12-CYB-FWA/FWB Configuration Does Not Match ICD | 09/14/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-7605 | 1-PP-3W West MDAFP Control Circuit Cable Found Cut | 10/19/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-9004 | Clearance Error | 11/28/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2023-9270 | Secondary Transient During Unit 2 Main Turbine Valve Testing | 12/09/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-0755 | 2-NRI-6 is Fluctuating at 1 DPM | 01/28/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-1261 | Part 21 Evaluation: Ametek Capacitors in Inverter | 02/13/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-1656 | Revision to OHI-2070 for Reactivation of Licenses | 02/27/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-2321 | Unplanned Reactor/Turb Trip Due to Thrust Bearing High Vibration | 03/22/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-2417 | As Found Set Point Found Out of Spec for 2-NRI-31-DWR | 03/25/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-3823 | U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7 | 04/27/2024 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|--|------------------|
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-3987 | U2 Seal Table from F7 Lower Swagelok Fitting | 05/02/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-3997 | During NOP/NOT Walkdown Seal Table H13 Exhibited BA Water | 05/02/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-4039 | 1-NRI-31 has Spikes, Counts on Scaler/Timer, Audio Blip | 05/02/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-4331 | Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip (Oscillation S/G Water Levels) | 05/15/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-4939 | Risk Stated Incorrectly for Seal Table Leakage | 06/11/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-5121 | Part 21 Evaluation for Flowserve 1/2 1878 Piston Check Valve | 06/18/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-5668 | 12-HV-AFX Flow Rate Change | 07/17/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-5717 | NRC Observation during 71130.04 Inspection | 07/18/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-5827 | NRC ILT Exam Security Issue | 07/24/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-6515 | Review of NRC Information Notices/Generic Correspondence | 08/26/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-6704 | QHSA 2022-10086 Does Not Meet Procedure Requirements | 09/04/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | AR 2024-7197 | Worker Had to Change AR | 09/26/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2022-9793 | Operability Determination Quick Hit Self-assessment | 12/01/2022 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2022-9799 | WANO PO&Cs | 12/01/2022 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2023-0443 | Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER) (2023) | 01/17/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2023-3740 | Loss of Electronic Control Due to Light Socket Short Circuit | 05/16/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2023-5358 | OHI-4023 Rules of Usage | 07/26/2023 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|---|---------------------------|--|------------------|
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2023-9042 | RP Human Performance Tools Usage. | 11/29/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2024-0208-2,3,4,5,7,12 | 2024 Part 21 Tracking Items | 01/08/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2024-2779 | NRC Information Notice 2024-02 | 04/02/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2024-3050 | Adverse Trend in Industry SCRAM Performance | 04/09/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents | GT 2024-6509 | NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-02 | 08/26/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2023-0299 | Incorrect use of Westinghouse Document to Justify Condition | 01/11/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2023-3814 | Undefined Acceptance Criteria for Source Range Channel Check | 05/17/2023 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2024-8016 | Missing Information in Quick Hit Self-Assessment | 10/23/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2024-8052 | CARC Assignment Does Not Contain Sufficient Evidence | 10/24/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2024-8253 | Engineering Recommendations not Part of Operations Turnover | 11/04/2024 |
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2024-8348 | Contradictions in Seal Table Procedure | 11/07/2024 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|---|---------------------|--|------------------|
| 71152B | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | AR 2024-8349 | Contract Files IAW PMP-3140-CON-001 | 11/07/2024 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | | Initial Screening Agenda Packages | Various |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | | Management Screening Committee Packages | Various |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | | Corrective Action Review Board Packages | Various |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | | Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment | 2023 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | 12EHP-5036-EQR-002 | Engineering Recommendation to Operations | 05/15/2024 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | LA-C-1500 | Safety Conscious Work Environment Training for Leaders | 3 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | NOS-23-03 | Nuclear Oversight Audit NOS-23-03, Material Control and Measuring and Test Equipment | 07/27/2023 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | NOS-23-06 | Nuclear Oversight Audit: Fitness for Duty (FFD) | 10/11/2023 |
| 71152B | Miscellaneous | NOS-24-01 | Corrective Action Program | 03/13/2024 |
| 71152B | Procedures | 12-MHP-5021-001-135 | Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly | 5 |
| 71152B | Procedures | 12-THP-6010-RPP-019 | Locked High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Verification | 7 |
| 71152B | Procedures | 12-THP-6010-RPP-418 | HRA, LHRA, and VHRA Posting Checklist | 44 |
| 71152B | Procedures | OHI-4000 | Conduct of Operations: Standards | 155 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PDP-7020-001 | Nuclear Oversight Internal Audit Process | 42 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMI-2015 | Policy for Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment | 4 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMI-7030 | Corrective Action Program | 48 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-3140-CON-001 | Contract Development, Execution, and Administration | 25 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-4010-ODM-001 | Operational Decision Making | 19 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-5020-FLM-001 | Fluid Leak Management Program | 17 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-5020-LCD-001 | Control of Leak Collection Devices | 15 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-6010-RPP- | High, Locked High, and Very High Radiation Area Access | 35 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|--|------------------|
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| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-7030-CAP-005 | Conduct of Causal Evaluations | 27 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-7030-MOP-001 | Corrective Action Program Management Oversight Process | 41 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-7030-OE-001 | Operating Experience Program | 38 |
| 71152B | Procedures | PMP-7034-SAP-001 | Conduct of Self-Assessments | 39 |
| 71152B | Self-Assessments | GT 2022-9799 | WANO PO&Cs | 12/01/2022 |
| 71152B | Self-Assessments | GT 2023-0330 | Predictive Maintenance Program | 01/12/2023 |
| 71152B | Self-Assessments | GT 2023-0438 | QHSA: Perform Annual RP Program Review (2023) | 01/17/2023 |
| 71152B | Self-Assessments | GT 2023-0445 | Trending Program Quick Hit Self-Assessment | 01/17/2023 |
| 71152B | Self-Assessments | GT 2024-0528 | Fluid Leak Management Self-Assessment | 01/18/2024 |
| 71152B | Work Orders | C10070060001 | 2-NZI-J7, Replace Fitting (Seal Table) | 04/29/2024 |
| 71152B | Work Orders | C10070060002 | 2-NZI-J7, PMT Leak Check | 05/02/2024 |