



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION II  
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

May 9, 2024

Laura Basta  
Site Vice President  
Duke Energy Progress, LLC  
3581 West Entrance Road, RNPA02  
Hartsville, SC 29550

**SUBJECT: H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000261/2024001**

Dear Laura Basta:

On March 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant. On April 25, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Taylor, Ryan  
on 05/09/24

Ryan C. Taylor, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000261  
License No. DPR-23

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2024001 DATED MAY 9, 2024

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NAME	J. Zeiler	V. Gaffney	N. Childs	R. Taylor	
DATE	05/02/2024	05/03/2024	05/9/2024	05/9/2024	

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000261

License Number: DPR-23

Report Number: 05000261/2024001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2024-001-0033

Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, LLC

Facility: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant

Location: Hartsville, SC

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2024 to March 31, 2024

Inspectors: V. Gaffney, Resident Inspector  
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Ryan C. Taylor, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Related to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Degradation Leads to Forced Shutdown			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000261/2024001-01 Open/Closed	[P.2] - Evaluation	71152A
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ). Specifically, a root cause evaluation (RCE) conducted for the October 2021 forced unit shutdown due to malfunction of the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) #2 seal failed to identify long-standing internal 'A' seal water injection filter vessel degraded conditions; unfiltered seal water through all three RCP seal packages resulted in increased accumulation of debris that adversely affected seal performance. The licensee's failure to correct the seal water injection filtration problems resulted in a subsequent malfunction of the 'C' RCP seal in September 2022, forcing a unit shutdown to conduct necessary seal repairs.			

### Additional Tracking Items

None.

## PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On January 26, 2024, the unit was down powered to 54 percent (%) to remove the 'A' main feedwater pump (MFP) from service to repair a pinhole leak in a metal braided flexible hose on the pump's primary lube oil pump discharge line. Following repairs and restart of the 'A' MFP, the unit returned to RTP on January 27, 2024. The unit remained at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## REACTOR SAFETY

### 71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

#### Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather involving a tornado watch on January 9, 2024.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during multiple days of freezing weather conditions, review completed on January 22, 2024.

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) 'B' containment spray (CS) pump while 'A' CS pump was unavailable during component testing on January 4, 2024
- (2) 'A' service water booster pump (SWBP) while 'B' SWBP was out of service for pump assembly replacement maintenance on January 22-23, 2024
- (3) 'A' and 'B' chemical and volume control system (CVCS) charging pumps while 'C' CVCS charging pump was out of service for scheduled pump bearing replacement and power frame inspection maintenance on February 5, 2024

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system on March 1, 2024.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) north and south cable vaults (fire zones 8 and 9) on January 10, 2024
- (2) CVCS charging pump room (fire zone 4) on February 6, 2024
- (3) residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger room (fire zone 12) on February 22, 2024
- (4) 'A' and 'B' RHR pump pit (fire zone 27) on March 4, 2024
- (5) main, startup, and unit auxiliary transformer yard (fire zone 26) on March 20, 2024

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 23, 2024.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

- (1) CVCS charging pump room area (flood zone FLC040A) on March 27, 2024

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the following activities:
  - scheduled power maneuver to 54% RTP to remove the 'A' MFP from service and repair a lube oil pump hose leak on January 26-27, 2024
  - scheduled infrequent evolution to conduct 5-year periodic main generator voltage testing on February 9, 2024

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an annual operator requalification exam simulator scenario on February 13, 2024.

## 71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

### Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) NRC identified emergency lighting unit ELS-174 failed battery backup condition [nuclear condition report (NCR) 2504284]

### Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

- (1) multiple failures of components associated with the 'A' and 'B' train post-accident inadequate core cooling monitor instrumentation (NCRs 2499855, 2501676, and 2502370)

## 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

### Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) elevated risk (Green) during planned power maneuver to 54% RTP to remove the 'A' MFP from service and replace a leaking lube oil pump hose on January 26-27, 2024
- (2) elevated risk (Green) during 'C' CVCS charging pump maintenance on February 5-8, 2024
- (3) elevated risk (Green) during 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) underground fuel oil piping pressure testing in accordance with work order # 20528669 on February 26, 2024
- (4) elevated risk (Green) during channel operational testing of overtemperature delta-T and overpower delta-T reactor trip protection channel circuitry on March 13-14, 2024

## 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) NCR 2498543, degrading inboard and outboard bearing oil conditions identified on the 'A' safety injection pump on January 3, 2024
- (2) NCR 2498882, flexible hose leak from discharge of lube oil pump for the 'A' MFP, review completed on January 12, 2024
- (3) NCR 2502170, lower than expected pump discharge flow rate following replacement of 'B' SWBP pump assembly, review completed on February 2, 2024



- (4) NCR 2502371, 'B' service water pump abnormal high discharge flow indicated during surveillance testing, review completed on February 9, 2024

#### 71111.18 - Plant Modifications

##### Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) engineering change (EC) 422284, permanent modification to upgrade the turbine trip electro-hydraulic control oil filter system

#### 71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

##### Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

- (1) OST-303-2, 'B' SWBP inservice pump rebaseline testing, following pump replacement maintenance, on January 23, 2024
- (2) OST-302-1, testing of motor-operated valve V6-16B (service water south header supply to turbine building), following valve motor breaker maintenance, on January 24, 2024
- (3) OST-201-1, 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing, following pump preventive maintenance, on January 30, 2024
- (4) OP-301C and OST-101-3, 'C' CVCS charging pump break-in operation and testing, following pump bearing and power frame preventive maintenance and inspections, on February 8, 2024
- (5) OST-303-2, 'B' SWBP rebaseline testing, following pump impeller running gap clearance adjustment maintenance, on March 12, 2024

##### Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

- (1) OST-011, quarterly control rod exercise testing, on January 4, 2024
- (2) OST-409-2, 'B' EDG fast speed testing, on January 10, 2024
- (3) OST-949, main generator gross and net reactivity capability testing, on February 9, 2024

##### Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) OST-251-1, 'A' RHR pump and valve IST, on March 4, 2024

#### 71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

##### Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on February 28, 2024. The drill involved a seismic event followed by a loss of spent fuel pool water level.

Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) A simulator-based licensed operator annual examination scenario on February 13, 2024.

**OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023)

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) unit down power to 54% to repair oil leak from pump oil cooler on the 'A' MFP (NCR 2495952)
- (2) 'B' and 'C' reactor coolant pump seal performance issues resulting in September 2022 unit forced outage to replace seal packages (NCR 2443909)

**INSPECTION RESULTS**

Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Related to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Degradation Leads to Forced Shutdown			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000261/2024001-01 Open/Closed	[P.2] - Evaluation	71152A
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ). Specifically, a root cause evaluation (RCE) conducted for the October 2021 forced unit shutdown due to			

malfunction of the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) #2 seal failed to identify long-standing internal 'A' seal water injection filter vessel degraded conditions; unfiltered seal water through all three RCP seal packages resulted in increased accumulation of debris that adversely affected seal performance. The licensee's failure to correct the seal water injection filtration problems resulted in a subsequent malfunction of the 'C' RCP seal in September 2022, forcing a unit shutdown to conduct necessary seal repairs.

Description: Beginning early September 2022, the licensee began monitoring increasing #2 seal leak-off from the 'C' RCP. On September 24, 2022, the #2 seal leak-off reached its allowed limit of 1.1 gpm and in accordance with abnormal operating procedures, the operators conducted a unit shutdown. While the RCP #2 seal is classified as non-safety related, it provides a backup and monitoring support function for the safety-related #1 seal. High leakage through the #2 seal adversely affected the ability to accurately monitor leak-off and thus performance of the #1 seal, which is designed to protect the reactor coolant system barrier integrity. After replacing the 'C' RCP seal package in the associated forced outage, the licensee attempted to restart the 'B' RCP during plant heat-up for restarting the unit. However, attempts were unsuccessful due to the 'B' RCP #1 seal not meeting the minimum allowed leak-off flow for pump operation. As a result, the forced outage was extended to replace the seal package on the 'B' RCP. Subsequently, the unit was restarted, returned to full power, and operated without any further RCP seal complications until shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage in November 2022.

The licensee performed an RCE of the 'B' and 'C' RCP seal malfunctions which determined that, like the previous 'A' RCP seal malfunction that occurred in October 2021 due to excessive #2 seal leak-off, both the 'B' and 'C' seals exhibited similar degradation mechanisms. Specifically, all three pump seals had excessive accumulated debris, mainly from iron oxide buildup, deposited on critical internal seal surfaces such as the double delta channel seal areas of the #2 and #1 seals, which inhibited proper operation of the #2 seal due to increased friction and wear. As part of this causal investigation, a detailed inspection of the internals of the in-service 'A' seal water injection filter vessel was conducted during the November 2022 refueling outage. The results of this inspection identified long-standing degradation of the filter cartridge guide plate holder which provides lateral support of the six filter cartridges installed in the vessel. The degraded guide plate, which contained exposed sharp edges and missing sections, allowed filter cartridge integrity damage to the extent there was unfiltered seal injection water circulating through the RCP seals which contributed to increased debris accumulation in the seal surfaces. Based on review of historical video and photos captured from previous 'A' seal water injection filter cartridge replacement activities from 2012, 2014, as well as in 2021, it was revealed that the degraded guide plate had existed (and was continuing to degrade) without being properly addressed, at least, since 2012. These historical photos provided evidence that the filter cartridges were experiencing damage during removal, as well as during the installation due to interaction with the damaged guide plate. In addition, the licensee discovered that the filter cartridge basket assembly in both the 'A' and 'B' seal water injection filters were mis-aligned by 90 degrees. The impact of this configuration error allowed filter inlet flow to directly impinge on the filter cartridges versus being dispersed by a flow diversion plate as designed. This resulted in even greater potential for filter cartridge damage during operation due to the higher flow induced mechanical interaction against the degraded filter guide plate.

The inspectors reviewed details of the licensee's previous RCE documented in NCR 2402792 for the October 2021 'A' RCP #2 seal failure. This RCE determined the mostly likely cause of excessive debris in the seal was an inadequate preventive maintenance (PM) strategy associated with the frequency of replacing the seal water injection filter cartridges. The

licensee initiated corrective actions to revise the PM strategy to include a time-based seal water injection filter cartridge replacement. The inspectors noted that this RCE included specific actions to remove, inspect, and replace the cartridge filters in the 'A' seal water injection filter vessel. However, the licensee failed to identify the long-standing degradation of the filter cartridge guide plate, damage to the used cartridge filters, or the mis-aligned filter basket assembly. Based on review of the filter cartridge replacement procedure CM-502, "Filter Cartridge Maintenance," which existed from 2012 through 2021, the inspectors determined that it contained specific instructions to visually inspect all the filter vessel parts, including the filter cartridges and guide plate, for "wear, burrs, scratches, or gouges, and record the results" on a data sheet. However, the completed procedure for the October 2021 filter cartridge replacement documented that there were no discrepancies noted. Other missed opportunities to identify the degraded filtration system issues included the decision not to quarantine the removed filter cartridges as originally planned and conduct a more detailed examination or take photographs of their as-found condition or review the available historical video and photographs of filter cartridge replacement activities. The inspectors concluded that it was reasonable that the licensee should have identified and corrected the degraded conditions associated with the 'A' seal water injection filter system in October 2021.

**Corrective Actions:** The licensee's immediate corrective actions included replacing the seal packages for the 'B' and 'C' RCPs. During the Fall 2022 refueling outage, the 'A' seal water injection filter vessel was restored to its as-designed configuration. Seal injection system flushing was performed through each of the RCP seal injection lines to help remove debris and higher flow flushes are planned during the Fall 2024 refueling outage. In addition, to address potential 'A' RCP seal degradation due to further debris accumulation since it operated October 2021 through November 2022 with the degraded 'A' seal water injection vessel, the licensee plans to replace the 'A' RCP seal package in the next Fall 2024 refueling outage.

**Corrective Action References:** NCRs 2402792, 2443909, and 2462656

Performance Assessment:

**Performance Deficiency:** The licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct a degraded condition associated with the RCP seal injection filter system that adversely impacted performance of the RCP seals was a performance deficiency within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.

**Screening:** The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to conduct a thorough RCE and implement timely corrective actions in October 2021 for a degraded RCP seal water injection system contributed to a similar incident in September 2022 involving a forced reactor shutdown due to the 'C' RCP #2 seal leak-off flow exceeding procedural limits.

**Significance:** The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Specifically, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions." Inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip AND the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify the damaged RCP seal water injection filter during the initial RCE for the 'A' RCP seal performance issue in October 2021 which allowed for continued damage to seal water injection filter cartridges and conditions conducive to degradation of the 'B' and 'C' RCP seals.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," required, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, prior to November 2022, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving a degraded 'A' seal water injection filter. Specifically, the licensee initiated an RCE for an October 2021 'A' RCP #2 seal malfunction but failed to identify and correct 'A' seal water injection filtration system problems contributing to a forced unit shutdown in September 2022 due to a 'C' RCP seal performance problem.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 25, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Laura Basta and other members of the licensee staff.

**DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Procedures	AD-OP-ALL-0120	Severe Weather Preparations and Considerations	Rev. 0
		AD-OP-RNP-0120	Severe Weather Response	Rev. 0
		EDP-009	Freeze Protection Panels	Rev. 84
		OP-925	Cold Weather Operation	Rev. 85
		PM-059	Freeze Protection for Safety Related or Fire Protection Circuits	Rev. 21
71111.04	Drawings	5379-01485	Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System Flow Diagram	
	Procedures	OP-201	Residual Heat Removal System	Rev. 85
		OP-301	Chemical and Volume Control System Operations and Alignments	Rev. 128
		OP-910	Spent Fuel Pit Cooling and Purification System	Rev. 52
71111.05	Fire Plans	CSD-RNP-PFP-AB2-0226-001	Auxiliary Building Elevation 226 Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 2
		CSD-RNP-PFP-FB2-0226-001	Fuel Handling Building Elevation 226 Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 0
		CSD-RNP-PFP-PA-003	Protected Area Southeast Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 2
	Procedures	AD-FP-ALL-1520	Transient Combustible Control	Rev. 1
		AD-OP-ALL-0207	Fire Brigade Administrative Controls	Rev. 6
		AD-TQ-ALL-0086	Fire Brigade and HAZMAT Training	Rev. 6
		FP-012	Fire Protection Systems Minimum Equipment and Compensatory Actions	Rev. 36
		OMM-002	Fire Protection Manual	Rev. 58
71111.06	Calculations	RNP-F/PSA-0009	Assessment of Internally Initiated Flood Events	Rev. 2
		RNP-F/PSA-0104	RNP Internal Flooding PRA Plant Partitioning and Walkdown Data	Rev. 0
		RNP-F/PSA-0105	Robinson Nuclear Plant Internal Flooding Analysis	Rev. 4
		RNP-M/MECH-1881	Internal Flooding Pipe Breaks for Reactor Auxiliary Building	Rev. 2
71111.11Q	Engineering Evaluations	Reactivity Manipulation Plan	RNP Unit 2 Cycle 34 January 2024 MFP-A Repair	Rev. 0

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Procedures	AD-OP-ALL-1000	Conduct of Operations	Rev. 23
		AD-TQ-ALL-0420	Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation	Rev. 20
		OP-105	Maneuvering the Plant When Greater Than 25% Power	Rev. 74
		OST-949	Main Generator MVAR Testing for NERC Reliability Standard MOD-025-2	Rev. 10
71111.12	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1210	Maintenance Rule Program	Rev. 5
71111.13	Procedures	AD-WC-ALL-0200	On-Line Work Management	Rev. 21
		AD-WC-ALL-0240	On-Line Risk Management Process	Rev. 4
		CSD-WC-RNP-0240-00	RNP ERAT Guidance	Rev. 1
		OMM-048	Work Coordination and Risk Management	Rev. 71
71111.15	Procedures	AD-OP-ALL-0105	Operability Determinations	Rev. 7
71111.18	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1132	Preparation and Control of Engineering Changes	Rev. 26
		AD-EG-ALL-1137	Engineering Change Product Selection	Rev. 12
71111.24	Procedures	PLP-033	Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) Program	Rev. 70
71114.06	Procedures	AD-EP-ALL-0105	Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center	Rev. 11
		AD-EP-ALL-0106	Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center	Rev. 9
		AD-EP-ALL-0111	Control Room Activation of the ERO	Rev. 7
		Ad-EP-ALL-0304	State and County Notifications	Rev. 7
		CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02	EAL Wallchart	Rev. 3
71151	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1217	Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI)	Rev. 3
		AD-PI-ALL-0700	Performance Indicators	Rev. 6
71152A	Procedures	AD-PI-ALL-0100	Corrective Action Program	Rev. 30
		AD-PI-ALL-0106	Cause Investigation Checklists	Rev. 10