UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

May 3, 2024

Terry Brown
Site Vice President
Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Route 2
Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2024001

Dear Terry Brown:

On March 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Signed by Dickson, Billy
on 05/03/24

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Terry Brown from Billy C. Dickson, Jr., dated May 03, 2024.

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2024001

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Number:	05000346
License Number:	NPF-3
Report Number:	05000346/2024001
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2024-001-0071
Licensee:	Vistra Operations Company LLC
Facility:	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Location:	Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Dates:	January 01, 2024 to March 31, 2024
Inspectors:	J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cassara, Resident Inspector J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist B. Towne, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Reactor Protection System Flow Modules Installed with Incorrect Configuration			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000346/2024001-01 Open/Closed	None	71152A
NRC inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III "Design Control," associated with Davis-Besse's installation of incorrectly configured Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) flow modules into the Reactor Protection System (RPS) on November 28, 2023. This finding closes Un-Resolved Item (URI) 05000346/2023004-02.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
URI	05000346/2023004-02	Reactor Protection System Flow Modules Installed with Incorrect Configuration	71152A	Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 27, 2024, the unit entered coast-down operations and began a scheduled refueling outage on March 3, 2024. On March 28, 2024, the unit entered startup, and on March 31, 2024, the unit reached full power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Decay heat/low pressure injection train 2, while train 2 is protected during the week ending January 27, 2024
(2) Station blackout diesel during the monthly operational test of emergency diesel generator 1 on February 1, 2024
(3) Service water system following Mode 3 entry for startup after the 1R23 refueling outage on March 26, 2024

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the core flood tank system during the 1R23 refueling outage during the week ending March 23, 2024.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Diesel generator 1-1 room, elevation 595', fire area 1PFP-AB-318 on January 2, 2024
(2) Mechanical penetration room 4, rooms 115CC, 314 and 314CC, fire area A, on January 26, 2024
(3) Diesel generator 1-2 room, rooms 319 and 318A, fire area J, during the week ending February 3, 2024
(4) Auxiliary feed pump 2 room, elevation 565', fire area F on February 23, 2024
(5) Shield building annulus space, fire area A and AB, during refuel outage, on March 21, 2024
(6) Containment building 565', 585', 603' elevations, fire area D, during the week ending March 30, 2024

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation in component cooling water room during component cooling water heat exchanger 2 maintenance during the week ending February 24, 2024

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during yellow risk while draining the reactor coolant system for refuel operations, and during shift turnover during the week ending March 9, 2024
(2) The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during start up actives including approach to criticality, zero power physics testing, and mode changes after refuel outage during the week ending March 30, 2024

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance during unannounced simulator based training. Scenario included a steam leak inside containment, loss of offsite power, and a trip of auxiliary feedwater, on February 6, 2024

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) MS100-1 main steam bypass valve stroke time testing during performance of DB-PF-03811 miscellaneous valves test on January 11, 2024

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Reactor coolant pump 1-2 seal replacement during the week ending March 30, 2024

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Assessment of elevated risk and mitigating actions during station air compressor (SAC) 1 maintenance outage during the week of January 2, 2024
(2) Elevated risk during continued full power operation with a degraded cable inducing MW indication perturbation on the main generator during the week of January 22, 2024
(3) Elevated risk during operation of main feed pump turbine 1 at rated power with the failure of one of two shaft speed pickups during the week ending February 12, 2024
(4) Elevated risk during 1R23 refueling outage yellow risk window while draining the reactor coolant system for refuel operations in control room and reactor containment, during the week ending March 9, 2024

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Emergency ventilation system due to mechanical penetration room door 308 found open on January 5, 2024
(2) Integrated controller system due to degraded wire which caused main generator generated MWe to fluctuate, January 18, 2024
(3) Control rod drive (CRD) system logic cabinet 3 following axial power shaping rod reference light not illuminating at the 50 percent zone reference on January 27, 2024
(4) Decay heat/low pressure injection pump #2 due to degraded v-ring gasket, during the week ending February 10, 2024
(5) Containment air cooler #3 (CAC 3) operability due to degraded heat transfer capability from plugged tubes in excess of acceptance criteria on March 16, 2024
(6) DH9B decay heat pump 1 suction from emergency sump motor operated valve (MOV) operability determination due to as-found testing of max total closing thrust exceeding the allowable thrust criteria on March 7, 2024

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage 1R23 activities from March 2, 2024 to March 29, 2024

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

(1) Post-maintenance test of EDG 1 starting air system following maintenance on January 4, 2024
(2) Decay heat/low pressure injection pump quarterly test following scheduled maintenance during the week ending February 10, 2024
(3) Emergency diesel generator 1 after governor maintenance on March 15, 2024
(4) Source range nuclear instrument 2 after replacement of source range detector, during the week ending March 30, 2024
(5) Reactor coolant pump 1-2 after replacement of seal package, during the week ending March 30, 2024
(6) Post-maintenance testing of auxiliary feed following refueling outage 1R23 on March 24, 2024

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) DB-SP-03218 High pressure injection (HPI) train 1 pump and valve test on January 31, 2024
(2) DB-SP-03160 Auxiliary feedwater Pump 2 quarterly test on January 9, 2024
(3) DB-SC-03114 Safety features actuation system (SFAS) train 1 integrated response time test during the week ending March 23, 2024

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) In service testing for DH9B decay heat pump 1 suction from emergency sump motor operated valve on March 7, 2024

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels, the concentrations, and quantities of radioactive materials, and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Samples)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:

(1) licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA) at main control point during a refueling outage.
(2) licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA) at containment facility control point during a refueling outage.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

(1) Cutting up incore detectors
(2) Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping cut 545' ECCS sump room
(3) Reactor coolant pump stage 2 seal replacement

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):

(1) Unit 1 fuel transfer tube area
(2) Unit 1 east west tunnel
(3) Unit 1 west steam generator manway

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

(1) Portable HEPA ventilation Unit 1 ECCS sump room
(2) Portable HEPA ventilation Unit 1 east steam generator

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Reactor coolant pump 1-2 degraded seal replacement during 1R23 refueling outage.

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance events. The licensee identified an adverse trend in the occurrence of human performance events including minor injuries, configuration control, inadvertent component mispositioning, worker errors, doors left unsecured, and site protection events. Each event was addressed individually within the corrective action program; however, the increased frequency of events within a short timeframe was identified for additional corrective action by the licensee. Inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee. The licensee performed an evaluation with cross-functional representation to understand commonalities and broader organizational and programmatic drivers. The common trend for the identified events was workers not adhering to human performance standards. The licensee subsequently implemented an action plan to address human performance standards.

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) (Partial)
The inspectors reviewed aspects of Licensee Event Report (LER) 2021-001, "Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch Failure due to Direct Current System Ground (ADAMS Accession Number ML21105A489). This review was insufficient to close the LER. The results of this inspection should be considered during subsequent reviews and closure of the LER. This LER remains Open.

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the extent of condition and root cause evaluation of improperly configured reactor coolant system flow modules installed in the reactor protection system causing a trip of RPS channel 1 during the week ending February 23, 2024.

INSPECTION RESULTS

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Reactor Protection System Flow Modules Installed with Incorrect Configuration</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cornerstone</td><td>Significance</td><td>Cross-Cutting Aspect</td><td>Report Section</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mitigating Systems</td><td>Green
NCV 05000346/2024001-01
Open/Closed</td><td>None</td><td>71152A</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">NRC inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III "Design Control," associated with Davis-Besse's installation of incorrectly configured Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) flow modules into the Reactor Protection System (RPS) on November 28, 2023. This finding closes Un-Resolved Item (URI) 05000346/2023004-02.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Description:

On November 28, 2023, the licensee replaced reactor pressure system (RPS) channel 1 reactor coolant system (RCS) flow signal converter cards under an approved work order. During restoration from the maintenance, RPS channel 1 unexpectedly tripped on Power-Flow-Imbalance. The licensee placed RPS channel 1 in manual bypass per the Technical Specifications. The licensee submitted CR-2023-08805 to describe the event. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that the refurbished signal converter cards the technician installed during the maintenance had incorrect capacitor values, resulting in excessive noise in the RCS flow signal. On November 30, 2023, the licensee replaced the RCS flow modules with the modules they removed during the previous maintenance, and RPS channel 1 was restored to operability and returned to service. The licensee reviewed the unplanned RPS channel 1 trip and generated CR-2023-09194 to capture the review findings. The review revealed the licensee refurbished the RCS flow modules to the incorrect vendor manual specifications. Proper configuration guidance was available in a vendor technical manual but not in the instrument and control (I&C) data package. The vendor manual that *was* referenced in the data package resulted in incorrect capacitor values, which led to excess noise in the circuit and the resultant trip of the RPS channel once they were placed in service.

Corrective Actions: RCS flow modules with the correct configuration were installed in the system on November 30, 2023, and RPS Channel 1 was restored to operability and placed in service. The licensee performed an extent of condition review and investigation, which was completed on February 1, 2024. The conclusion of the investigation and extent of condition was that no other RPS equipment was affected, and the associated vendor manual M-324AQ-00340 update was made to ensure proper configurations for RPS equipment in the future.

Corrective Action References: CR-2023-09194, CA-2023-09194-001, CR-2023-08805, CR-2023-04107</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel 1 was made inoperable by the installation of incorrectly configured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow modules. The licensee used an incorrect vendor manual to configure the flow modules which directly resulted in the excess circuit noise and trip of RPS channel 1 when placed in service. The</td></tr>
</table>

failure to use the correct vendor specification when refurbishing the RCS flow modules is a performance deficiency within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone was adversely affected because channel 1 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was made inoperable as a direct result of the performance deficiency.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.” This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the degraded condition did not affect a single RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram AND the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: None

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires in part, measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of material, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures systems and components.

Contrary to the above, from November 28, 2023, until November 30, 2023, the licensee failed to appropriately review for suitability of application of parts essential to the safety-related function of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow modules. Specifically, the capacitors installed during refurbishment of signal converter cards resulted in inappropriate output signal conditioning and excessive noise within the system and subsequent inoperability of channel 1 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI: 05000346/2023004-02.

Unresolved Item (Closed)	Reactor Protection System Flow Modules Installed with Incorrect Configuration URI 05000346/2023004-02	71152A

Description: On November 28, 2023, reactor pressure system (RPS) channel 1 reactor coolant system (RCS) flow signal converter cards were replaced under an approved work order. During restoration from the maintenance RPS channel 1 unexpectedly tripped on Power-Flow-Imbalance. The licensee placed RPS channel 1 in manual bypass per the technical specifications. The licensee submitted CR-2023-08805 to describe the event. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that the refurbished signal converter cards that the technician installed during the maintenance had incorrect capacitor values, resulting in excessive noise in the RCS flow signal. On November 30, 2023, the licensee replaced the RCS flow modules with the modules they removed during the previous maintenance, and RPS channel 1 was restored to operability and returned to service.

1. The licensee reviewed the unplanned RPS channel 1 trip and generated CR-2023-09194 to capture the review findings. During the review, it was revealed that the RCS flow modules were refurbished to the incorrect vendor manual specifications. Proper configuration guidance was available in a vendor technical manual but not included in the I&C data package. The vendor manual that *was* referenced in the data package resulted in incorrect capacitor values, which led to excess noise in the circuit and the resultant trip of the RPS channel once they were placed in service. The failure to use the correct vendor specification when refurbishing the RCS flow modules is a performance deficiency within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct.

Corrective-Action-Reference(s): CR-2023-08805, CR-2023009194

Observation: Reactor coolant pump 1-2 degraded seal replacement during 1R23 refueling outage.	71152A

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

In October 2023, the licensee identified reactor coolant pump 1-2 third stage seal was degraded. The seal package for reactor coolant pump 1-2 was replaced during the 1R23 refueling outage in March 2024. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances leading to this issue, the licensee's corrective actions, and extent of condition. The inspectors also reviewed surveillance test procedures, drawings, operational decision-making issues, and work orders relevant to the seal replacement. No findings of significance were identified.

Observation: Adverse Trend in the Occurrence of Human Performance Events	71152S

Davis-Besse identified an adverse trend in human performance events, including minor injuries, configuration control, inadvertent component mispositioning, worker errors, unsecured doors, and site protection events. The licensee addressed each event individually within the corrective action program; however, the licensee identified the increased frequency of events within a short timeframe and identified a need for additional corrective action. Davis-Besse performed an evaluation with cross-functional representation to understand commonalities and broader organizational and programmatic drivers. The common trend for the identified events was workers not adhering to human performance standards. The licensee subsequently implemented an action plan to address human performance standards. The inspectors did not identify any findings of significance.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On March 31, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Terry Brown and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 15, 2024, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to C. Jackson, General Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	2024-00841	NRC Identified Door 43A Malfunctioning	02/01/2024
	Procedures	DB-OP-06012	Decay Heat and Low Pressure Injection System Operating Procedure	86
		DB-OP-06014	Core Flooding System Procedure	39
		DB-OP-06261	Service Water System Operating Procedure	77
		DB-OP-06334	Station Blackout Diesel Generator Operating Procedure	35
71111.05	Fire Plans	PFP-AB-238	Auxiliary Feed Pump Room	5
		PFP-AB-314	No.4 Mechanical Penetration Room Rooms 115CC, 314 and 314CC	10
		PFP-AB-318	Diesel Generator 1-1 Room Elevation 595', Fire Area 1PFP-AB-318	Rev 08
		PFP-AB-319	Diesel Generator 1-2 Room Rooms 319 And 318A Fire Area J	8
		PFP-CB-216	Steam Generator West D Ring Area Room 218 Fire Area D	6
		PFP-CB-218	Steam Generator East D Ring Area Room 218 Fire Area D	6
		PFP-CB-A208	Southwest Penetration Area of Annulus Space Elevations 585 and 603 Partial Room 127W Fire Area AB	8
		PFP-CB-A236L	East Penetration Area of Annulus Space Elevations 585 and 603 Partial Room 127W Fire Area A	5
71111.06	Work Orders	WO 200726464	Component Cooling Water Train 2 Heat Exchanger Clean/Inspect	02/23/2024
		WO 200726464	Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1	03/06/2024
71111.11Q	Miscellaneous	LOR-OTLC-202401	DBS 101 Unannounced Scenario	Rev 0
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	2024-00246	Mistimed Valve Stroke of MS100-1 during Performance of DB-PF-03811	01/11/2024
		2024-02408	Failed VT-1 Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Cap Screws	03/20/2024
		2024-02412	Material Certification Documentation Issues with Reactor	03/20/2024

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Coolant Pump 1-2 Gland Plate Capscrew Replacement	
	Procedures	DB-PF-03811	Miscellaneous Valve Test	Rev 38
	Work Orders	200899384	Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Seal Replacement	03/16/2024
		200899385	Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Seal Alignment	03/11/2024
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	2024-00493	Large Plant Swing Following a Test of Annunciators	01/18/2024
		2024-00539	Megawatt Indication Perturbation on Night Shift	01/20/2024
	Miscellaneous	Program Change	Test Program Change for DB-SS-04050 MFPT1 Overspeed Test	05/18/2017
	Work Orders	200425509	MFPT1 Overspeed Test	03/28/2022
		200869655	Station Air Compressor 1-1 Motor	01/03/2024
71111.15	Calculations	C-ME-099.16-007	Thrust/Torque Calculation Methodologies for Limitorque MOVs	Rev 01
		C-NSA-011.01-019	Analysis of SW System Online Flow Balance Test Data for Train 2	Rev 5
	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2024-00104	Mechanical Penetration Room 4 Door 308 Found Unsecured	01/05/2024
		CR-2024-00493	MW Swing Occurred Concurrent with DEHC Alarm	01/18/2024
		CR-2024-00713	50% Zone Reference Light for APSR 8-5 (L4) Did Not Illuminate When Rod Was Taken to 50%	01/27/2024
		CR-2024-01902	DH9B As Found Overthrust during Diagnostic Testing	03/07/2024
		CR-2024-02240	CAC 3 SE Acceptance Criteria for as-found Plugged Tubes Not Met	03/16/2024
		CR-2024-02248	CAC 3 As-Found Outside Design Basis Calculation Sensitivity Study	03/16/2024
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2024-00934	Decay Heat Pump #2 V-Ring Gasket Degradation	02/05/2024
		CR-2024-00998	Decay Heat Pump #2 V-Ring Gasket Fell off of Pump Shaft	02/07/2024
	Work Orders	200884242	Decay Heat Pump 1-2 PM 0287	02/08/2024
71111.20	Miscellaneous	1R23 SDDID	1R23 Shutdown Defense in Depth Report	02/06/2024
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2023-07908	AFPT 2 Governor Speed Setting Knob Cannot be Turned Counter-Clockwise When on Low Speed Stop	10/20/2023
		CR-2024-02506	NI-2 Power Supply Needs Replaced	03/23/2024
	Procedures	DB-SC-03070	Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Monthly Test	39

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		DB-SC-03076	Emergency Diesel Generator 1 184 Day Test	46
		DB-SC-03114	SFAS Train 1 Integrated Response Time Test	26
		DB-SP-03160	AFP 2 Quarterly Test	38
		DB-SP-03165	AFW Train 1 and Train 2 Flow Path to SG Verification	6
		DB-SP-03218	HPI Train 1 Pump and Valve Test	36
		DB-SP-03447	Decay Heat Train 2 Pump and Valve Test (Mode 1-3)	13
	Work Orders	200871501	Auxiliary Feed Pump 2 Quarterly	01/10/2024
		WO 200688397	DH9B Decay Heat Pump Suction from Emergency Sump MOV	03/07/2024
		WO 200884242	Decay Heat/ Low Pressure Injection Pump Quarterly Maintenance Test	02/08/2024
		WO 200899384	Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Seal Replacement	03/16/2024
		WO 200899722	Source Range Nuclear Instrument 2 Replacement	03/22/2024
71124.01	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2024-02205	NRC Identified - Improper Tool Equipment Monitor for Release Use	03/15/2024
		CR-2024-02207	NRC Identified - Missed Daily HEPA Testing Requirement	03/15/2024
		CR-2024-2170	NRC Identified - Improvement Opportunity with Alpha Monitoring	03/14/2024
	Miscellaneous	Standing Order 2024-001	Alpha Contamination Risk Level Assignments	01/08/2024
	Procedures	DB-HP-01109	Significant Radiological Evolution Barriers	35
		NOP-OP-4702	Air Sampling and Analysis	8
		NOP-OP-4704	Breathing Zone Air Sampling and Analysis	3
	Radiation Surveys	ASR# 24-0176	Air Sample 545' ECCS #2	03/13/2024
		DB-I-20240313-7	ECCS #2 Sump Drain Line Cut Out	03/14/2024
		DB-M-2-20240307-3	1R23 632 West Manway Removal / Bowl Survey	03/08/2024
		DB-M-20220318-3	Floor of Incore Tank While Flooded	03/18/2022
		DB-M-20220326-8	Incore Tank Post Decon	03/26/2022
		DB-M-20240307-12	S/G East Initial Lower Bowl Survey / Diaphragm Removal	03/08/2024

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		DB-M-20240307-2	1R23 S/G Upper East Initial Bowl Survey	03/07/2024
		DB-M-20240307-3	1R23 632 West Manway Removal / Bowl Survey	03/08/2024
		DB-M-20240307-9	S/G West Initial Lower Bowl Survey/Diaphragm Removal	
		DB-O-20230105-1	Stage 3 RCP 1-2 Parts	01/23/2023
		DB-R-20240312-1	RCP Seal	03/12/2024
	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	124-5114	Incore Cutting / Cask Transfer / Post Incore Cutting Tank Decon	0
		124-6021	Mechanical Maintenance Work Activities in Auxiliary Building	0
		124-6032	Contractor Services Activities (Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, Painters) Work Activities in Auxiliary Building	1
71124.03	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2024-02207	NRC Identified - Missed Daily HEPA Testing Requirement	03/15/2024
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2023-07692	Degrading Seal Parameters for Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2	10/11/2023
		CR-2024-00397	RCP 1-2 Seal Performance Change Observed following Service Water 1358 Operation	01/16/2024
71152S	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2024-00407	Adverse Trend in Human Performance Events and Errors Since November 2023	01/16/2024
		CR-2024-01119	Increase in Human Performance Errors within Security	02/13/2024
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2023-08805	RPS Channel 1 Trip	11/28/2023
		CR-2023-09194	RPS Channel 1 RCS Flow Mode Configured to Incorrect Vendor Specification	12/14/2023
	Work Orders	WO#200915806	RPS Channel 1 Flux/Delta Flux/Flow Bistable Test	11/28/2023