



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

January 10, 2024

Doug Pehrson  
ANO Site Vice President  
Entergy Operations, Inc  
Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc. N-TS  
1448 S.R. 333  
Russellville, AR 72802

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 – SECURITY BASELINE  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2023420 AND 05000368/2023420

Dear Doug Pehrson:

On December 14, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Brad Wertz, General Manager of Plant Operations and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jeff K. Clark".

Signed by Clark, Jefferson  
on 01/10/24

Jefferson K. Clark, Chief  
Security Performance Evaluation Branch  
Division of Security Operations  
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368  
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®  
Doug Pehrson, [dpehrso@entergy.com](mailto:dpehrso@entergy.com)  
Todd Kauffman, [tkauff1@entergy.com](mailto:tkauff1@entergy.com)

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NAME	P. Coughlin	J. Berry	T. Weir	J. Clark	
DATE	01/08/2024				

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000313 and 05000368

License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6

Report Numbers: 05000313/2023420 and 05000368/2023420

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-420-0019

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2

Location: Russellville, AR

Inspection Dates: November 13, 2023, to December 15, 2023

Inspectors: J. Berry, Team Leader, NSIR  
P. Coughlin, Senior Physical Security Inspector, NSIR  
T. Eck, Physical Security Inspector, NSIR  
T. Weir, Physical Security Inspector, RIV

Approved By: Jefferson K. Clark, Chief  
Security Performance Evaluation Branch  
Division of Security Operations  
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

Enclosure

## **SUMMARY**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a security baseline inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### **List of Findings and Violations**

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

### **Additional Tracking Items**

None.

## **INSPECTION SCOPES**

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2201, "Security Inspection Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## **SAFEGUARDS**

### 71130.03 - Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing

#### Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing (1 Sample)

- (1) NRC inspectors completed the Contingency Response – Force-on-Force (FOF) Testing inspection procedure by evaluating the licensee's performance in implementing the physical protection program to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to, and including, the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. Two NRC-evaluated FOF exercises were conducted for the evaluation.

## **REPORT ATTACHMENTS**

Supplemental Information for the report is considered Safeguards Information and is located separately within the NRC's Safeguards Information Local Area Network and Electronic Safe database, under NS125962.

## **INSPECTION RESULTS**

No findings were identified.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On December 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the security baseline inspection results to Mr. Brad Wertz, General Manager of Plant Operations and other members of the licensee staff.

**DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71130.03	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-ANO-2023 03847	Protective Strategy briefing exceeded the allotted timeframe provided.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03851	NRC observed that multiple alternate Push to Talk (PTT) phones, located at a security position were not charged, preventing them from functioning.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03852	NRC observed that the volume level for multiple PTT phones, located at multiple security positions appeared to be very low compared to the environmental background noise at the positions.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03853	NRC observed that multiple cell phones, located at a security position were not charged, preventing them from functioning.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03854	NRC observed that a delay gate near the discharge channel was not locked as demonstrated by another delay gate in the same vicinity.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03857	During tabletop exercises, an opportunity for improvement was identified regarding Operations support. The opportunity for improvement suggests having support personnel knowledgeable Unit 1 and Unit 2 operations as tabletop drill players.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03872	NRC observed that a gun port located as a security position appeared to be hesitant to open smoothly.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 03885	NRC identified that the required Security patrols of a specific area should be evaluated for potential changes needed to meet regulatory requirements.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04078	Exercise 1, it was identified there is an area near the MAC 8 where additional delay features can be added.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04079	Exercise 1, a Security code was called too early.	

	CR-ANO-C-2023 04080	04080 Badge Action Requests submitted via Illuminate for two NextEra Joint Composite Adversary Force members, supporting ANO's NRC Evaluated Force on Force Inspection, failed to trigger the creation of Entergy MyLearning accounts for each individual. Without the Entergy MyLearning accounts, the individuals were initially unable to be badged for Unescorted Access at ANO.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04081	Exercise 1, it was identified that there are inconsistencies with building nomenclature and how they are communicated between response force members.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04082	Exercise 1, several responders deployed to defensive positions without direction from the RTL.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04083	Exercise 1, it was identified that the adversary controller briefing needs to contain additional detailed information.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04084	Exercise 1, the NRC observed a player & controller go to a personal vehicle after receiving their drill equipment from the SAAB trailer which is contrary to expectations.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04085	Exercise 1, it was identified that plant personnel were moving throughout the plant during drill play which resulted in an unplanned admin hold.	
	CR-HQN-2023 03782	Exercise 1, it was identified that plant personnel were moving throughout the plant during drill play.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04086	Exercise 1, it was identified that an adversary controller called out the incorrect gun port when communicating suppressive fire.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04088	Exercise 1, it was identified that simulating the use of ballistic window shields in the BRE's was not consistent.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04089	Exercise 1, it was identified that there were missed opportunities for the response force to declare a security code.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04090	Exercise 1, it was identified that the on site warehouse dock roof top may impact responders' field of view.	
	CR-ANO-C-2023 04091	Exercise 1, a responder was neutralized by the adversary team.	



		CR-ANO-C-2023 04092	Exercise 1, it was identified that the control measures for vehicle engagement were not implemented correctly.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04093	Exercise 1, it was identified that additional delay should be placed at the on-site warehouse dock.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04094	Exercise 1, it was identified that the blue door on the South side of the on-site warehouse should be evaluated for modifications.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04098	Exercise 2, it was identified that there was a missed opportunity during the controller briefing to identify that additional clarifying information involving a simulated explosion could have been provided to the alarm station operators during drill play.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04099	Exercise 2, it was identified that there was a missed opportunity to perform a scenario matrix review with the adversary controllers to ensure that all relevant information is provided in controller injects.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04100	Exercise 2, it was identified that a responder failed to retrieve a part of their response gear upon their initial deployment.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04101	Exercise 2, it was identified that there were two Kubota's parked by the train bay which could have impacted Security response.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04102	Exercise 2, it was identified that there are response positions that are experiencing communications issues during drill play when communicating via handheld to handheld.	
		CR-ANO-C-2023 04103	NRC had comments on the Target Sets procedure and made the following observation: After review of the Target Set 1 India, it was identified that the licensee could clarify the language within Target Set 1 India to aid an end user in understanding the as written actions necessary to reduce ambiguity and inference of actions.	

	CR-ANO-C-2023 04104	NRC had comments on the Target Sets procedure and made the following observation: After review of Target Set 2 Hotel, it was identified that the licensee could clarify the language within Target Set 2 Hotel to better identify components of interest within the Target Set. The verbiage associated with this Target Set is difficult to understand when identifying specific components associated with this Target Set.	
Engineering Evaluations		Revised ANO BRE Blast Analysis	09/25/2023
Miscellaneous		Arkansas Nuclear One LLEA MOU	12/15/2022
		Arkansas Nuclear One Table of Security Personnel	06/07/2021
	ASLP-AO-DUTYS	Auxiliary Operator Duties	Rev 28
	ASLP-RO-SEC	Station Security Requirements	Rev 10
	WO 53005959 06/26/2023	2023 Annual Vehicle Barrier System Field Inspection Report	06/26/2023
Procedures		Arkansas Nuclear One Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training & Qualification Plan	Rev 20, 01/12/2022
	ANOSF-014-01	Protected Area Patrol	Rev 2
	Arkansas Nuclear One, EN-ES-229	General Security Strategies	Rev 1, 12/14/2019
	Arkansas Nuclear One, OP-1043.004	Compensatory Measures for Security System Component Outages	Rev 50, 05/17/2022
	Arkansas Nuclear One, OP-1043.042	Response to Contingencies	Rev 22
	Arkansas Nuclear One, OP-1043.047	Defensive Strategy	Rev 29, 05/17/2022
	Arkansas Nuclear One, OP-1043.048	Law Enforcement Response Plan	Rev 4
	Arkansas Nuclear One, OP-	Target Sets	Rev 13, 03/20/2023

	1043.049		
	EN-NS-215	Conduct of Security Force Exercises and Drills	Rev 21
	EN-NS-215-03	Triennial Force-on-Force Exercises	Rev 0
	EN-NS-216	Controller Responsibility Guidelines	Rev 13
	EN-NS-234	Force-on-Force Mock Adversary Program	Rev 3
	EN-OP-131	Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment	Rev 0
	OP-1043.014	Patrols and Inspection	Rev 48
	OP-1043.014	Patrols and Inspections	Rev. 48
	OP-1043.015	Testing Intrusion Detection Systems	Rev 57

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 – SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000313 /2023420 AND 05000368/2023420 DATE January 10, 2024

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