



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

November 2, 2023

Jamie Coleman
Fleet Regulatory Affairs Director
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
3535 Colonnade Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH-INTegrated INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2023003
AND 05000366/2023003

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Edwin I. Hatch. On October 24, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Johnny Weissinger and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.


One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Edwin I. Hatch.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Edwin I. Hatch.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Blamey, Alan
on 11/02/23

Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000321 and 05000366
License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:
As stated

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SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2023003 AND 05000366/2023003 DATED NOVEMBER 02, 2023

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| DATE | 11/01/23 | 10/31/23 | 11/02/23 | | |

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000321 and 05000366

License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Report Numbers: 05000321/2023003 and 05000366/2023003

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-003-0018

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch

Location: Baxley, GA

Inspection Dates: July 01, 2023, to September 30, 2023

Inspectors: L. Day, Reactor Inspector
J. Diaz-Velez, Senior Health Physicist
R. Easter, Resident Inspector
T. Fanelli, Senior Resident Inspector, (acting)
P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
G. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Smith, Reactor Systems Engineer

Approved By: Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Edwin I. Hatch, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

| Failure to Ensure the Quality of Class 1E Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) | | | |
|---|--|------------------------|----------------|
| Cornerstone | Significance | Cross-Cutting Aspect | Report Section |
| Mitigating Systems | Green NCV 05000321,05000366/2023003-01 Open/Closed | [H.6] - Design Margins | 71152A |
| The NRC identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to ensure the efficacy of work instructions that affect the quality of deteriorated Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) for use in Class 1E service. | | | |

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On July 1, 2023, the unit operators reduced power to approximately 97 percent due to high condensate temperature and returned to rated power later that day. On July 15, 2023, the unit operators reduced power to approximately 98 percent due to high condensate temperature and returned to RTP later that day. On August 1, 2023, the unit operators reduced power to approximately 55 percent in order to remove the 1B circulating water pump from service due to high thrust bearing temperatures. On August 2, 2023, the unit operators raised reactor power to approximately 70 percent. On August 9, 2023, the 1B circulating water pump was restarted and unit operators began raising power and 100 percent RTP was achieved on August 10, 2023. On August 13, 2023, the unit operators reduced power to approximately 94 percent due to a partial loss of feedwater heating. On August 16, 2023, following repairs and restoration of the feedwater heaters, the unit was returned to rated thermal power. On August 20, 26, 27 and 28, the unit operators reduced power to approximately 97 percent RTP due to high condensate temperatures. On each occasion, and following the reduction of condensate temperatures, the unit operators raised power to RTP. On September 18, 2023, unit operators reduced power to approximately 95 percent RTP for a rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent RTP on September 10, 2023. Unit 1 operated at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On September 8, 2023, unit operators reduced power to approximately 68 percent RTP to support main turbine valve testing, a control rod sequence exchange, and control rod testing. Later, on September 9, 2023, unit operators began raising power and achieved approximately 100 percent RTP on September 10, 2023. Later, on September 10, 2023, the unit operators reduced power to 94 percent for a rod pattern adjustment. Unit 2 operated at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk significant systems from Hurricane Idalia on August 29 and 30, 2023.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) prior to removing the 1B EDG from service for a scheduled outage, on July 10, 2023.
- (2) 1C EDG prior to removing the 1B EDG from service for a scheduled outage, on July 10, 2023.
- (3) 1B Core Spray (CS) system when the 1A CS system was out of service for planned maintenance on August 29, 2023.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Unit 1 Control Building 130-foot Elevation on July 7, 2023.
- (2) Unit 2 Control Building 130-foot elevation on July 7, 2023.
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Intake Structure on July 17, 2023.
- (4) Unit 2 Reactor Building 158/164-foot Elevation on August 17, 2023.
- (5) Unit 1 Turbine Building 164-foot Elevation (Non-High Radiation Areas) on September 19, 2023.
- (6) Unit 2 Turbine Building 147-foot Elevation (Non-High Radiation Areas) on September 19, 2023.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 2 Diagonals on July 18, 2023.
Including the following:
 - Unit 2 reactor building southwest control rod drive compartment
 - Unit 2 reactor building northeast residual heat removal (RHR) and CS compartment
 - Unit 2 reactor building southeast RHR and CS compartment
 - Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling northwest compartment
 - Unit 2 high pressure core cooling (HPCI) southeast compartment

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 control rod sequence exchange on September 9, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew in the simulator performing scenario, H-LR-AF-00205, "CPE - Shift RPS to Alternate, Inadvertent Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Initiation, Trip of Stator Cooling Pump, Main Turbine Lube Oil (MTLO) Temperature Control Valve (TCV) Failure, Loss of Cooling to Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD), Thermal Hydraulic Oscillations, ATWS, Isolate Main Steam Line (MSL) Break," on July 10, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Unit 2 P33-01, hydrogen oxygen analyzers being evaluated for (a)(1) due to greater than three condition monitoring events in the past 36 months
- (2) Open Phase Condition monitoring equipment

Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:

- (1) spare molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) used in safety related applications

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Unit 1 and 2 elevated risk due to scheduled 1B EDG outage, on July 11, 2023.
- (2) Unit 1 elevated risk due to scheduled 1A CS pump outage, on August 29, 2023.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Condition Report (CR) 10982950 Unit 2 A standby gas treatment failed to indicate flow due to failed discharge damper 2T46-F002A, resulting from failed linkage and repair with commercially graded dedicated replacement parts.

- (2) CR 10988406 and CR 10989416 Unit 2 2R25-S004 Circuit 26 no longer requires a fire watch due to engineering evaluation and 2R25-S037 circuit 52 breaker alignment acceptance criteria.
- (3) CR 10985434 2T46-F002A flow scan unsatisfactory resulting in engineering operability determination.
- (4) CR 10991301 unit 2 'C' plant service water (PSW) supply line pin hole leak resulting in a request for engineering review and code case evaluation.

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) Temporary modification to install a temporary heat trace on the Unit 1 A and B H₂O₂ analyzers.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 A-division of standby gas treatment (SBGT) following damper repair on July 5, 2023.
- (2) Unit 1 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) following motor generator set system outage, on July 12, 2023.
- (3) Unit 1 and 2 'B' swing EDG following diesel outage, on July 12, 2023
- (4) Unit 1 'B' circulating water pump following motor refurbishment, on August 9, 2023.
- (5) 34SV-P41-001-2, PSW Pump Operability after 2C pump seal repair, work order SNC1463827.

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 A-division CS surveillance test on July 7, 2023.
- (2) Unit 2 control rod scram time testing on September 9, 2023.
- (3) Unit 1 34SV-E41-002-1, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Operability on September 13, 2023.

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 A-division of residual heat removal service water in-service inspection (IST) surveillance on July 31, 2023.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill which included unidentified reactor coolant leakage, a failure of the reactor control rods to insert and reactor fuel damage with off-site dose implications on September 12, 2023.

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:

- (1) Main Plant Vent Stack
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Building Vents
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Liquid Waste Discharge
- (4) Recombiner Building Vent
- (5) Discharge Structure Outfall

Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)

Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:

- (1) Unit 2 Reactor Building Vent noble gas monitor compensatory sampling, October 27, 2022–October 30, 2022
- (2) Recombiner Building Vent compensatory flow estimation, October 19, 2022–October 20, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Building Vent sampling line configuration

Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:

- (1) Gaseous Release Permit G-20230627-101-C
- (2) Liquid Release Permit L-20230527-155-B

71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensee's radiological environmental monitoring program.

GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee’s implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.

OTHER ACTIVITIES–BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (June 30, 2022, through July 1, 2023)

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

- (1) February 12, 2022, through May 25, 2023

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1)
 - CRs 10915674 and 10915161, initiated to ensure MCCB testing is conducted and to create a work order for deferred MCCB testing.

INSPECTION RESULTS

| Failure to Ensure the Quality of Class 1E Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) | | | |
|--|---|------------------------|----------------|
| Cornerstone | Significance | Cross-Cutting Aspect | Report Section |
| Mitigating Systems | Green NCV 05000321,05000366/2023003-01 | [H.6] - Design Margins | 71152A |

| | | | |
|---|-------------|--|--|
| | Open/Closed | | |
| <p>The NRC identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to ensure the efficacy of work instructions that affect the quality of deteriorated Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) for use in Class 1E service.</p> | | | |
| <p><u>Description:</u> The Hatch design basis and licensing basis for testing and surveillances of MCCBs is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 308-1970 for Unit 1 and 308-1971 for Unit 2, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." IEEE 308 Section 6, "Surveillance Requirements," specifies in part that "tests shall demonstrate that the equipment operates within design limits and that the system is operational and can meet its performance specifications and detect the deterioration of the system toward an unacceptable condition" [i.e., quality]. The licensee failed to meet these requirements to ensure that the quality of the Class 1E MCCBs would assure their reliability service.</p> | | | |
| <p>As part of routine maintenance activities, Hatch personnel identified that aging had deteriorated MCCBs in various ways (e.g., high contact resistance and inaccurate trip characteristics). The deteriorated MCCBs included spares that were installed in the power distribution panels for decades. The deterioration could prevent the MCCBs from reliably performing their safety functions. The inspectors noted that the licensee's Class 1E maintenance and test procedures are developed on current industry standards and practices, which do not address methods to reform unacceptable MCCB deterioration. Condition report (CR) 10588304 documented that MCCBs in good condition (new) should have a resistance of approximately 0.003 milliohms, however many of the deteriorated MCCBs had contact resistances that exceeded several megaohms.</p> | | | |
| <p>Inspectors found a new plant-specific, work instruction in the back of work order (WO) SNC898390 dated February 25, 2020. This work instruction was not specified in the work instruction section of the WO. The WO assessed MCCBs in power distribution panel 1R25S043. Where deteriorated spare MCCBs were found, the licensee designed steps to reform unacceptable contact deterioration. Maintenance technicians were directed to cycle energized MCCBs mechanically and repeatedly as many times as necessary to reduce the contact resistances to at least a 0.4-ohm value. This cycling creates heat in the MCCB. To cool off, the steps contained pauses between cycling periods, as many as necessary. The steps were not supported by identifiable industry quality standards or recommended maintenance guidelines. The acceptability of the 0.4-ohm value was not documented. In-service heat dissipation in these MCCBs can cause the residual deterioration to increase again and can cause unacceptable voltage reduction to Class 1E components. The inspectors noted that the steps in this WO were performed immediately before testing the MCCBs to demonstrate that the equipment operates within design limits and that the system is operational and can meet its performance specifications. This WO did not document the as-found or the as-left resistances of the deteriorated MCCBs.</p> | | | |
| <p>The WO replaced a failed Class 1E MCCB (1R25S043 BKR 1, Unit 1, B Control room A/C condensing unit) with one of these deteriorated spare MCCBs (BKR 7). The WO stopped testing in 1R25S043 after the first failure (BKR 1) because the rest of the deteriorated spares were unsatisfactory. The inspectors determined the efficacy of the steps used to affect the contacts quality could not be assured, therefore the WO did not assure continual, reliable, MCCB operation while in Class 1E service. This affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone.</p> | | | |

In addition, the inspectors reviewed completed WO SNC1003970, dated March 14, 2019. This WO did not have detailed work instruction steps directing the technicians; however, it documented the as-found and as-left resistances. The technicians used similar words to record the steps they were performing (cycling the MCCBs). Approximately 30 MCCBs with deteriorated contacts was identified. After technicians performed steps to affect the contacts, there were examples of inappropriate results accepted as satisfactory. For example, as-found resistance of 6.7 megaohms was reduced to 4.0 ohms and it was marked satisfactory. A resistance of 3.5 megaohms was reduced to 6.7 ohms and it was marked satisfactory. The WO did not identify that any of these MCCBs were used in Class 1E service.

The efficacy of the work instructions on the quality of the MCCBs was not assured. The steps obscured the deterioration long enough for the MCCBs to be found satisfactory. The inspectors determined that the ongoing deterioration had a likelihood of recurrence, and it could cause unacceptable heating and voltage reduction that could degrade Class 1E SSC and adversely affect their reliability. The inspectors determined that the licensee did not meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, criterion III requirement to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents.

Corrective Actions: The licensee placed the issue into the corrective action program and has stated that none of the spare MCCBs that were initially determined to be deteriorated will be used in Class 1E service even if was determined to be satisfactory using the work instruction steps before testing.

Corrective Action References: condition reports (CR) 11018578 and 11018699

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to ensure the efficacy of work instructions that affect the quality of deteriorated Class 1E molded case circuit breakers was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the use of deteriorated MCCBs in Class 1E circuits increases the probability of failure and affects the reliability and availability of plant mitigation systems used to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." the inspectors determined the finding screened to Green, very low safety significance, because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC (MCCBs), but the MCCB maintained its operability or PRA functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety related equipment. Specifically, the inspectors determined the licensee failed to use a systematic and rigorous process to ensure the maintenance of MCCB design margins with the acceptance of deteriorated MCCBs that could impact the specified performance of certain MCCBs once placed in Class 1E service.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires that the licensee to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.

Contrary to the above, since March 14, 2019, the licensee failed to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards were controlled, and that processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components were reviewed for suitability. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the efficacy of work instructions that affect the quality of deteriorated molded case circuit breakers for use in Class 1E service.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On October 24, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Johnny Weissinger and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the Radiation Protection inspection exit meeting inspection results to Johnny Weissinger and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|------------------|
| 71111.01 | Procedures | 34AB–Y22-002-0 | Naturally Occurring Phenomena | 20.3 |
| 71111.01 | Procedures | NMP–OS-017 | Severe Weather | 3.1 |
| 71111.04 | Drawings | H-16331 | Unit 1 Core Spray System P&ID | 38.0 |
| 71111.04 | Procedures | 34SO–E21-001-1 | Core Spray System | 24.10 |
| 71111.04 | Procedures | 34SO–R43-001-1 | Diesel Generator Standby AC System | 29.5 |
| 71111.05 | Fire Plans | NMP– ES-035-019-GL02-F02 | Control Building El. 130 | 1.0 |
| 71111.05 | Fire Plans | NMP– ES-035-019-GL02-F07 | Intake Structure | 1.0 |
| 71111.05 | Fire Plans | NMP– ES-035-019-GL02-F31 | U2 Reactor Building EL 158/164 | 1.0 |
| 71111.06 | Drawings | 2T45-1030 | Unit No. 2 Leak Detection System Instrument & Drainage Sumps P&ID | 5.0 |
| 71111.06 | Drawings | H-26823 | Unit No. 2 RHR System Service Water Return From RHR Heat Exchanger | 2.0 |
| 71111.06 | Procedures | 34AB–T22-002-2 | Loss of Secondary Containment Integrity | 1.1 |
| 71111.06 | Procedures | 34AB–T22-003-2 | Secondary Containment Control | 4.5 |
| 71111.06 | Procedures | 34AB–T23-004-2 | Torus Water Level | 1.4 |
| 71111.11Q | Miscellaneous | | Observation Summary - Emergency Preparedness Observation Form for DEP Session During LOCT | 07/10/2023 |
| 71111.11Q | Miscellaneous | H-LR-AF-00205 | CPE - Shift RPS to Alternate, Inadvertent ADS Initiation, Trip of Stator Cooling Pump, MTLO TCV Failure, Loss of Cooling to ASD, Thermal Hydraulic Oscillations, ATWS, Isolate MSL Break | 2.0 |
| 71111.11Q | Procedures | 34GO–OPS-005-1 | Power Changes | 30.11 |
| 71111.11Q | Procedures | 34GO–OPS-065-0 | Control Rod Movement | 15.11 |
| 71111.11Q | Procedures | 42CC–ERP-011-0 | Control Rod Exchange | 15.7 |
| 71111.11Q | Procedures | NMP–RE-008-F01 | Detailed Reactivity Management Plan | 09/07/2023 |
| 71111.12 | Corrective Action Documents | Condition Reports (CRs) | 10723451, 10735427, 10742768, 10743777, 10750160, 10780594, 10977318, 10976099 | |
| 71111.13 | Miscellaneous | | Hatch U1 RICT On-Line Configuration Risk Monitor | 07/11/2023 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|------------------|
| | | | Current Risk Summary Report | |
| 71111.13 | Miscellaneous | | Hatch U2 RICT On-Line Configuration Risk Monitor Current Risk Summary Report | 07/11/2023 |
| 71111.13 | Miscellaneous | | Hatch U1 RICT On-Line Configuration Risk Monitor Current Risk Summary Report | 08/29/2023 |
| 71111.13 | Miscellaneous | 1-ET-23-1E21-00003 | 1E21-C001A Core Spray Pump | 08/28/2023 |
| 71111.13 | Miscellaneous | 1-ET-23-1R43-00003 | 1R43S001B Diesel Generator 1B Protective Equipment | 07/11/2023 |
| 71111.13 | Procedures | NMP-OS-010-002 | Hatch Protected Equipment Logs | 12.4 |
| 71111.15 | Corrective Action Documents | Condition Reports (CRs) | 10982950, 10979985, 10947708, 10988406, 10989416, 10985434, 10991301 | |
| 71111.15 | Engineering Evaluations | Purchase Order: SNG10315077 | Certification of Conformance for Arm, Vane for SGBT Damper | 06/30/2023 |
| 71111.15 | Engineering Evaluations | RER Response Form | SNC1524290 | |
| 71111.15 | Engineering Evaluations | Technical Evaluations (TE) | 1128686, 1132633 | |
| 71111.15 | Miscellaneous | 2-FLX- 22-00099 | 2T46-F002A Repaired After Failed Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) | 11/02/02022 |
| 71111.15 | Miscellaneous | 2-LCO-23-00113 | 2C Diesel PSW Pipe Leak | 07/27/2023 |
| 71111.15 | Procedures | NMP-OS-019-013 | Beyond Design Basis Equipment Unavailability Tracking | 5.0 |
| 71111.15 | Procedures | NMP-OS-019-013-GL02 | Hatch BDB Equipment Unavailability Tracking Guideline | 5.1 |
| 71111.18 | Engineering Changes | SNC1221569 | U1 POST LOCA H2O2 Analyzer Replacement Heat Trace | 1 |
| 71111.18 | Procedures | NMP-ES-095 | Interface Procedure for IP-ENG-001, "Standard Design Process" | 13.0 |
| 71111.18 | Work Orders | SNC1228011 | H2O2 Analyzer Heat Trace Temporary Replacement | 1 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34GO-OPS-005-1 | Power Changes | 30.11 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SO-N71-001-1 | Condenser Circulating Water System | 31.7 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SV-E11-004-1 | RHR Service Water Pump Operability | 22.4 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SV-E21-001-2 | Core Spray Pump Operability | 24.6 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SV-R43-002-2 | Diesel Generator 1B Monthly Test | 26.6 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SV-T46-002-2 | Standby Gas Treatment System Damper Operability | 5.2 |

| Inspection Procedure | Type | Designation | Description or Title | Revision or Date |
|----------------------|---|---|---|------------------|
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 34SV-T46-003-2 | Standby Gas Treatment Ventilation And Operability | 11.3 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 42SV-C11-003-0 | Control Rod Scram Testing | 12.3 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | 52CM-MNT-001-0 | MINITORK Valve Maintenance | 3.1 |
| 71111.24 | Procedures | NMP-RE-008-F02 | Simplified Reactivity Management Plan | 2.1 |
| 71111.24 | Work Orders | Work Orders (SNC) | 1502261, 1090784, 1493990, 959061, 625715, 961305, 9617101, 112311, | |
| 71124.06 | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | CR 10989194 CR 10987025 CR 10987026 CR 10987835 CR 10987836 CR 10987837 CR 10987839 | | |
| 71124.06 | Miscellaneous | Unit 1 Reactor Building Vent Flowrate Data, 6/4/23 - 7/13/23 | | |
| 71124.06 | Procedures | 64-CI-OCB-002-2 | Unit Two Reactor Building Vent Radiation Monitoring | Version 17.9 |
| 71124.07 | Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection | CR 10987024 CR 10987028 CR 10987595 CR 10987532 CR 10987838 | | |
| 71151 | Calculations | NMP-AD-029 | Hatch Performance Indicator Data | 07/20/2023 |
| 71151 | Corrective Action Documents | CR 10952899 | 1A EDG failed to start and reach rated speed during performance of monthly surveillance | 03/03/2023 |
| 71151 | Miscellaneous | PI Information Report | PI Information Report 6/30/2022 - 7/1/2023 | 1.0 |
| 71152A | Corrective Action Documents | Condition Reports (CRs) | CR 10593112, CR 10588304, CR 10915674, CR 10915161 | |
| 71152A | Procedures | 52PM-R24-001-0 | Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing | rev 42.18 |
| 71152A | Work Orders | SNC1003970 | Test Spare and In-Service Breakers in 2R25S129 | 3/17/2019 |
| 71152A | Work Orders | SNC898390 | Test Breakers in panel 1R25S043 IAW IEEE 308-1971 | 3/1/2020 |
| 71152A | Work Orders | SNC900113 | Test the Safety Related Molded Case Circuit Breakers in Accordance to the IEEE 308-1971 Section 6.3 | 10/21/2020 |