




**Addressing hazards from common causes in engineering DI&C systems
without diverse designs – State-of-the-Art**

**Enlarged Halden HTO Programme Review Group (EHPRG) meeting
September 25-28, 2023**

Presenter: Sushil Birla
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Division of Engineering

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent an official position of the U.S. NRC.




Understanding the Cost of Correcting Defects



McConnell, Steve. "Software Quality at Top Speed." August 1996.

<http://www.stevemcconnell.com/articles/art04.htm>


Economics!




Prevention




Mitigation




Evolve Assurance capability incrementally




Evolve Assurance capability: NPP Case




One vision of the Assurance Process




Envisioned pre-certification activities




Creating the appropriate standards: One vision




Research to reduce the uncertainty space



Defect-prevention through Refinement



Leverage domain engineering




Create pre-certified reusable assets

- Domain modeling
- Domain engineering

(see [NUREG/CR-6263](#); [IEEE Std 1517:2010](#); [ISO/IEC 26550](#))

Reasoning Model to support performance-based evaluation

(based on the Toulmin model¹)




¹Toulmin, S., The Uses of Argument, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1958



Some known technical limitations

- Validating results of hazard analysis
 - Did it really identify all causes that could degrade the safety function?
- Validating assumptions about the environment of the safety system, e.g.:
 - Conditions of operation and maintenance
 - Configuration control → change impact analysis
- Qualifying suite of tools from different sources
 - Libraries
 - Underlying languages
- Infrastructure for independent V&V

Why holistic? Effects of Missing Elements of Change



Adapted by Dr. Palma Buttles-Valdez, SEI from: Delorise Ambrose, 1987



Acronyms & Abbreviations 1/2

AADL	Architecture Analysis and Design Language
CCF	Common cause failure
Dev	Development
Engrg	Engineering
DI&C	Digital Instrumentation and Control
EPRI	Electrical Power Research Institute
esp.	Especially
FSM	Finite state machine
HA _p	Hazard analysis of plans
HA _r	Hazard analysis of requirements
HA _a	Hazard analysis of architecture
HA _{dd}	Hazard analysis of detailed design
HA _i	Hazard analysis of implementation
HA _t	Hazard analysis of testing (including test specifications and oracles)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
I&C	Instrumentation and Control
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISO	International Standards Organization
IV&V	Independent Verification and Validation
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OWL	Web Ontology Language
RIL	Research Information Letter
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RWI	Review, Walkthrough, and Inspection

Acronyms & Abbreviations 2/2

R&D	Research and Development
Reqmts	Requirements
RIL	Research Information Letter
RPS	Reactor Protection System
SCR	Software Cost Reduction (set of techniques for designing software systems)
spec	specification
SQuaRE	Systems and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation
STPA	System Theoretic Process Analysis (method of hazard analysis)
Std	Standard
V&V	Verification and Validation
V _p	V&V of plans
V _r	V&V of requirements
V _a	V&V of architecture
V _{dd}	V&V of detailed design
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