



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

August 30, 2023

Terry Brown
Site Vice President
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Rte. 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

**SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000346/2023011**

Dear Terry Brown:

On July 28, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's problem identification and resolution program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Stoedter, Karla
on 08/30/23

Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Terry Brown from Karla Stuedter date August 30, 2023.

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000346/2023011

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000346

License Number: NPF-3

Report Number: 05000346/2023011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-011-0023

Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Dates: July 10, 2023 to July 28, 2023

Inspectors: T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector
R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer
C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The team performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
 - Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification and resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The team conducted a five-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. The team also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
 - Operating Experience: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience.
 - Self-Assessments and Audits: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
 - Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE): The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's programs to establish and maintain a SCWE.
 - The team reviewed the completed corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR) opened during IP 95001 Supplemental Inspection (ML22314A225), dated November 10, 2022, associated with a White Notice of Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The team verified these corrective actions had been completed as scheduled and as prescribed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment Assessment of the Corrective Action Program	71152B
<p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.</p> <p><u>Effectiveness of Problem Identification:</u></p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP completely and accurately.</p> <p>The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. For example, the licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station processes. The identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both the NRC and from industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP when they were applicable to the station.</p> <p>The team determined the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.</p> <p>The team performed a 5-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. Specifically, the team focused on any recurring or age-related issues of the system. As part of this review, the team reviewed plant health reports, selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The team also performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of system piping, selected components and surrounding areas. The team concluded that deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold. Corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.</p> <p><u>Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:</u></p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming issue was identified, the CAP process was effective in directing equipment operability or functionality reviews. The licensee used a multi-discipline team consisting of department directors and managers to verify the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions adequately addressed the scope and significance of the documented issue. Upon completion of the evaluation or action, the Corrective Action Review Board reviewed those actions to ensure they met the CAP requirements. During the</p>	

Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings the team observed, licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing and screening issues. The team also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. The members came prepared and challenged each other on disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety significance of the issues.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a root cause evaluation or other causal evaluation methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations that were identified by the NRC previously and with licensee event reports. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely.

Assessment Use of Operating Experience	71152B
<p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in the use of OE was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. OE lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed OE information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as issue reviews and investigations.</p> <p>Although the team did not identify any issues of significance in this area, the team noted that the licensee did not have a formal process that captured the initial OE screening results. For example, the licensee screened NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2022-02, "Operational Leakage," as information only. This was in accordance with procedure NOBP-LP-2100, "Operating Experience Process," which allowed RIS documents to be screened as information only. This RIS was screened as information only because licensee personnel compared the information in the RIS to existing procedures for evaluating operational leakage and determined that the existing procedures matched the information in the RIS. As a result, no additional actions or procedure revisions were required. However, the station did not retain a formal record for the decision to screen the RIS as information only. The licensee was able to produce an informal record of the screening decision, however, this could potentially make it more difficult for future reviewers to understand the rationale behind a particular OE screening. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR-2023-06405, "Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation," to further evaluate the issue.</p>	

Assessment Self-Assessments and Audits	71152B
<p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and</p>	

enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the CAP itself. Those issues were addressed by the licensee through the CAP. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.

<p>Assessment Safety Conscious Work Environment</p>	<p>71152B</p>
<p>The team reviewed the Davis-Besse safety culture survey results from 2020-2022 and noted the survey results revealed negative staff responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The teams also noted that there was a high number of negative responses in several departments regarding confidence in the CAP to prioritize, investigate, and resolve issues. As a result, the team reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey trends. The team also performed individual and group interviews of a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors and supervisors from various departments. The team also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 51 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.</p> <p>Based on the individual and group interviews and a review of licensee actions, the team determined licensee personnel believed that they could raise nuclear safety and safeguards issues through multiple channels including ECP without fear of retaliation and that the CAP effectively addresses quality issues. Although morale appeared low in several departments due to resource issues, the team found no evidence of challenges to the SCWE at Davis-Besse.</p>	

<p>Assessment Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence for the Emergency Diesel Generator White Finding</p>	<p>71152B</p>
<p>During the 95001 Supplemental Inspection for the Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch White finding (ML22314A225), two CAPRs had not been completed. Therefore, during this inspection, the team reviewed the completed actions to verify prompt and effective CAPR implementation.</p> <p>For EF-2022-0079-001, "Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual," the team noted that the licensee revised the Design Criteria Manual with a discussion on grounded Direct Current (DC) components experiencing more than 260 Volts DC during a DC system positive to ground fault based on the licensee's specific 125/250 Volt battery configuration. Specifications E-005Q, E-007Q, E-039Q, E-287Q, E-854Q, and M-180Q, and System Descriptions 003A, 003B, 007, 009, 022C, and 049 were also updated with a discussion on this condition and that DC components are specified to be rated for the full voltage of 260 Volt and above. The team concluded this action met the intent of the action item and therefore, this correction action item is closed.</p> <p>For CA-2022-0079-004, "Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250 Volt DC System," the team noted the licensee performed a training needs analysis and concluded a document based training manual describing the DC distribution system and voltages experienced by grounded DC components during a positive to ground fault condition was needed. The team reviewed the subject training manual slides created by the licensee and concluded the licensee captured their 125/250 Volt DC system configuration and voltages</p>	

encountered by grounded DC components during positive to ground fault condition appropriately. This corrective action item is closed.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On July 28, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Terry Brown and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	CA-2022-00079-001	Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual	07/07/2022
		CA-2022-00079-004	Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250 Volt DC System	05/09/2022
		CR-2015-05014	NRC Response to Task Interface Agreement 2014-11: Design and Licensing Basis for Shield Building	04/10/2015
		CR-2015-05215	INPO 2015: BACC – Valve Packing Leak Found on HP2B During Walkdown	04/14/2015
		CR-2015-07969	NRC NCV: Departure from Method of Evaluation (Described in DB UFSAR) Required Prior NRC Approval Under 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2) And Method Not Approved by NRC For Intended Application	06/05/2015
		CR-2016-04587	Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature RTD Wire Insulation Degradation	04/05/2016
		CR-2017-03117	Broken ROCA Outrigger Wires	03/19/2017
		CR-2017-11317	Cyber Security Program: Control Deficiencies	11/11/2017
		CR-2018-00682	Quality Records Discovered in Desk	01/25/2018
		CR-2018-06678	Shield Building Bore S5-666.0-10 Findings	07/26/2018
		CR-2018-07467	Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 from DH51	08/23/2018
		CR-2019-00643	Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Time Between DH 1A Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Closed Seat Contact to Control Switch Trip Greater Than 0.155 Seconds	01/22/2019
		CR-2019-01943	Form NOP-OP-4705-01 10CFR50.75 (g) Leak Spill Record Needs Added to Closed CR-2018-03211.	03/05/2019
		CR-2019-05867	2019 NRC PI&R: Violation for Lack of Design Calculation for Control Room Blockwall 5337	07/11/2019
		CR-2020-00013	Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Pipe Support Spring Hangers are Set Outside the Working Range	01/02/2020
CR-2020-01739	1R21 BACC: Tail Pipe of DB-SV4610B	03/03/2020		
CR-2020-04201	BACC: Active Leakage Identified on DH1509	05/12/2020		
CR-2020-05859	Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Siren Activation	07/21/2020		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2020-09055	Storm Damage to Shield Building Scaffold	11/24/2020
		CR-2021-02023	Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump 2 Seal Leakage	03/19/2021
		CR-2021-04967	Clogged Floor Drains Near SFP on 603'	06/27/2021
		CR-2021-05199	Potential NCV of 10 CFR 72.48 for 2019 DB Fuel Loading Campaign	07/08/2021
		CR-2021-05249	Circ Water Pump 1 & 3 Casing Drains Blocked	07/09/2021
		CR-2021-05261	Shield Building Scaffold Pans Dislodged	07/09/2021
		CR-2021-05342	Excessively Dirty Smoke Detector in Service Water Pump Room	07/13/2021
		CR-2021-05395	NRC Identified: Vegetation Growth Around Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Air Sampling Stations	07/15/2021
		CR-2021-05789	Water Curtain Activation	07/30/2021
		CR-2021-05835	Lane 1A Explosive Detector Flow Warning	08/02/2021
		CR-2021-06786	Near Miss: Negligent Discharge of Rifle at Security Weapons Range	09/08/2021
		CR-2021-06947	Failed Post Maintenance Testing on Miscellaneous Diesel Generator	09/15/2021
		CR-2021-07039	Misposition of Containment Air Cooler (CAC) Number 3 to Slow Speed	09/19/2021
		CR-2021-07100	Elevated Vibrations on Containment Purge Exhaust Fan Motor Outboard Bearing	09/21/2021
		CR-2021-07124	Governor linkage Bolting Connection from the Terminal Shaft Lever Broken	09/22/2021
		CR-2021-08097	ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard	10/25/2021
		CR-2021-08097	ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard	10/25/2021
		CR-2021-08681	Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System Refueling Interval Test DB-SS-03708 Step 4.5.5 required CR	11/13/2021
		CR-2021-08974	Service Water Baseline Test Engineering Review DB-PF-03216	11/24/2021
		CR-2021-09167	Causal Evaluation; NRC Non-Sited Violation (NCV), Failure to Provide Procedural Instructions for Transferring Gland Sealing Steam from Main to Auxiliary Steam Following Reactor Trip	12/03/2021
		CR-2021-09279	Fatigue Rule Violation	12/07/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2021-09697	DB-FP-0417 Acceptance Criteria 5.1.2 went Overdue on 12/23/2021 for Number 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (MPR) Water Curtain Spray System	12/25/2021
		CR-2022-00101	Diesel Air Start Relief Valves Potential Leakage	01/06/2022
		CR-2022-00112	Flex N+1 EFWST Replenishment and SFP Spray Pump Would Not Start	01/06/2022
		CR-2022-00158	Video Capture System Not Functioning	01/07/2022
		CR-2022-00491	Video Capture Not Working as SAS/CAS	01/22/2022
		CR-2022-00673	Items Stored on Top of Flammable Locker in Maintenance Hot Shop	01/28/2022
		CR-2022-00731	Video Capture Not Working at SAS/CAS	01/31/2022
		CR-2022-00735	Video Capture Server Was Offline for Five Days	01/31/2022
		CR-2022-00744	Video Capture System Not Functioning	01/31/2022
		CR-2022-00774	Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump P 42-1, Outboard Bearing Indication of Oil Leakage	01/01/2022
		CR-2022-00821	FirstEnergy Notified D-B That Relay Calibrations Marked Complete on Order Record 200803544 Still Need to Be Performed	02/03/2022
		CR-2022-00879	Root Cause Evaluation, Abnormal Procedure Entries for Loss of Letdown Flow Path	12/07/2022
		CR-2022-01302	EFWP Quarterly Test Time to Rated Speed Not Obtained	02/19/2022
		CR-2022-01484	Scaffold Pole in Travel Path of MS100	02/10/2022
		CR-2022-01780	MS100 Limit Switch Issue	03/07/2022
		CR-2022-01861	Site Protection Officer Left a Security Door Without Proper Authorization	03/08/2022
		CR-2022-02089	DB-SC-03076, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1, 184 Day Test Step Incorrectly Signed	03/12/2022
		CR-2022-02550	Decay Heat Pump 2 Pump O/B Constant Oiler Empty	03/23/2022
		CR-2022-02578	DH Pump 2 Spray Shield Installed and Not Tracked	03/23/2022
		CR-2022-02731	Integrated SFAS Test Train 2 Required Evaluation of IST Program Document for Valve Stroke Times - 1R22	03/28/2022
		CR-2022-02787	Initial Venting of the CRDM Quick Vent Hydraulic Closures Failed at Seven Locations	03/30/2022
		CR-2022-03028	Maintenance Tag Found in Incore Tank in MODE 3	04/05/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2022-03195	As Found Condition of the East Transfer Tube Flange	04/12/2022
		CR-2022-03669	Decay Heat Pump 1 IB/OB Bearings Constant Level Oilers Were Found Empty	04/28/2022
		CR-2022-03731	Decay Heat Pump Problem Solving	04/29/2022
		CR-2022-03960	Causal Evaluation; Inadvertent Drain of EHC Fluid	05/10/2022
		CR-2022-04169	Pressure Differential Switch PDS-2686B Preconditioned During Performance of DB-MI-03203	05/16/2022
		CR-2022-04258	Work Performed During 1R22 Without Notification	05/20/2022
		CR-2022-04648	MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200822950 Missing Initials and Dates on Line-Outs	06/06/2022
		CR-2022-04683	MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200574481 Missing Information	06/07/2022
		CR-2022-04714	MS-C-22-05-07 – Order 200878599 Procedure Adherence Issue and Error	06/08/2022
		CR-2022-04715	MS-C-22-05-07 – Order 200861477 Procedure Adherence Issues and Errors	06/08/2022
		CR-2022-04763	EDG Critical Relays Identified as Non-Critical	03/28/2022
		CR-2022-04767	MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200789259 Issues	06/10/2022
		CR-2022-04822	MS-C-22-05-07 – Orders Have Several Procedure Non-Adherence Issues	06/13/2022
		CR-2022-04845	CAC Inlet MOV's That Require Static Testing Due to ASME Section III Potentially in Conflict with Plant Conditions	06/14/2022
		CR-2022-04936	HKD Circuit Breaker Tolerance Change Found to Impact Coordination of Recently Installed HKD Circuit Breakers for BE2168, BE3320, and BF2315	06/17/2022
		CR-2022-04943	Decay Heat Pump#2 Concluded to be Previously Inoperable in Mode 3 with Outboard Bearing Oil Leak Not Resolved	06/17/2022
		CR-2022-05830	Operator Actions Not in Accordance with Procedure, Following Isolation of Letdown	07/27/2022
		CR-2022-06032	MS-C-22-08-02: FINDING Issues Identified with the Last Three Revisions of the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Non-Compliance with Administrative Technical Specifications 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).	08/05/2022
		CR-2022-07873	MS-C-22-09-19 Finding: Missing Reportable Events Log	10/18/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Documentation Identified	
		CR-2022-08738	Davis-Besse 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey Chemistry Red Pillars	11/15/2022
		CR-2023-00252	RCS Pressure Inputs to Inadequate Core Cooling Curve Are Inconsistent	01/11/2023
		CR-2023-00480	Main Steam Line 2 Pressure Low to SFRCS PS-3689D Was preconditioned (Trending)	01/23/2023
		CR-2023-00689	Potential FME issue with DO3671	02/01/2023
		CR-2023-00753	Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Due to Improper Continuity Reading	02/03/2023
		CR-2023-00856	Causal Evaluation; New Site Gap Identified from Integrated Performance Assessment	02/07/2023
		CR-2023-00909	QC Witness Point Missed	02/09/2023
		CR-2023-01360	5 Year Review of Decay Heat Removal-Low Pressure Injection (DH-LPI) System; Increased Particle Content in Oil for DH Pump 2	02/27/2023
		CR-2023-01484	Work Performed on CDA Without Addressing Cyber Security	03/02/2023
		CR-2023-02017	CAS SDMS Alarm Screen Host Down	03/16/2023
		CR-2023-02239	Explosive Detector 1A Air Pump Warning	03/23/2023
		CR-2023-02416	EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run, Initial Notification not Timely Completed	03/29/2023
		CR-2023-02421	EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run Staffing Forms Not Completed	03/29/2023
		CR-2023-02426	CAS SDMS Graphics Screen Locked Up	03/29/2023
		CR-2023-02485	Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill 2023 Emergency Response Dry Run Drill, Three Objectives Not Met in Dose Assessment	03/31/2023
		CR-2023-02657	Condition Report Not Initiated for Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engine (RICE) Rule Non-Compliance	04/05/2023
		CR-2023-02696	JT3035 Hard Tamper	04/06/2023
		CR-2023-02941	Plant Walkdown Concern Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room 105 Auxiliary Latch	04/12/2023
		CR-2023-03429	2B Explosive Detector Air Pump Warning	04/24/2023
		CR-2023-03924	NRC Question on External Operating Experience for	05/09/2023

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Underground Fire Protection Piping Leaks	
		CR-2023-04687	SBODG extended Unavailability Time Due to Low Fuel Oil Level	06/08/2023
		CR-2023-05314	Officer Assumed Shift Without Required Equipment	07/04/2023
		CR-2023-05341	SW Strainer 1 Packing Leak	07/05/2023
		CR-2023-05365	2B Explosive Detector Failed to Verify	07/06/2023
		CR-2023-05524	EDG 1 Governor Oil Level Increasing	07/14/2023
		CR-2023-05525	CCW Room Door 332 Left Unsecure	07/14/2023
		OE-2021-0201	IN 21-01, Lessons Learned from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspections of Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants	05/18/2021
		OE-2021-0218	OE478914R20210601 Second Fuel Defect Identified During Outage Fuel Sipping	08/04/2021
		OE-2021-0288	Power Reduction Due to Condensate Pump Lower Motor Bearing Temperature	10/11/2021
		OE-2021-0328	IN21-03, Operating Experience Related to the Duane Arnold Energy Center Derecho Event on August 10, 2020	08/21/2021
		OE-2021-0329	IN21-02, Recent Issues Associated with Monitoring Occupational Exposure to Radiation from Licensed and Unlicensed Radiation Sources	08/21/2021
		OE-2021-0346	Circulating Water Pump Bearing Failure Due to Water Intrusion	10/17/2021
		OE-2021-0473	INPO 21-003, Achieving and Sustaining High Plant Reliability	12/28/2021
		OE-2022-0026	IER L4-22-2, Fire Events and Trends	01/22/2022
		OE-2022-0028	Plant Status Control Program Performance Continues to Be Unacceptable	03/16/2022
		OE-2022-0029	OE512183R20220121 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Received a Start Signal During Preparations for a Surveillance test	03/22/2022
		OE-2022-0037	Operations Use of Glass Top Simulator in the Control Room	03/22/2022
		OE-2022-0168	Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to CONTROL Element Slip	06/30/2022
		OE-2022-0170	IER L3-22-3, Power Excursion and Delayed Scram During Zero-Power Physics Testing	08/04/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		OE-2022-0243	IER L2-19-6 Revision 1, Preventing Debris-Induced Fuel Failures	07/19/2022
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2023-06405	Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation	08/17/2023
	Engineering Evaluations	EER 601325660	Shld Bldg Scaffold Wire Tie/Debris Nets	07/21/2021
		PERP 882	Part/Component Equivalent Replacement Package; Replacement of LB3250 Style Breaker with KD3250	1
	Procedures	NOBP-LP-2008	Corrective Action Review Board	25
		NOBP-LP-2008	Corrective Action Review Board	25
		NOBP-LP-2100	Operating Experience Process	24
		NOBP-LP-3002	Incident/Near Miss Response and Reporting	16
		NOP-LP-1103	Reportable Events	7
		NOP-LP-2001	Corrective Action Program	50
		NOP-WM-1003	Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation and Screening	17
		NOP-WM-5008	Control of Scaffolding	0
		NOP-WM-5008	Control of Scaffolding	2
		NOP-WM-5008	Control of Scaffolding	3
		NOP-WM-5008	Control of Scaffolding	4
		NOP-WM-5008-1	Scaffold Request Form	0
		NORM-OP-1009	SRO Review of Condition Reports	11
	Self-Assessments	ATA-2021-15159	Self-Assessment: Review of Engineering Product Quality Observations with Design Engineering Manager 2Q21-3Q21	11/03/2021
		ATA-2021-8770	Self Assessment of Equipment Important to Emergency Response	07/28/2021
		ATA-2022-11340	Self-Assessment: Integrated Control System	09/29/2022
		ATA-2023-0593	Davis-Besse Clearance Assessment	03/08/2023
		ATA-2023-4498	Davis-Besse Emergency Feedwater System Assessment	05/18/2023
		ATL-2021-0346-ATA-05	2021 CREHAB Self-Assessment Objective #6 - Safety Analysis Control	09/16/2021
		ATL-2022-0785-ATA-02	Review of Extended Corrective Actions - Strategic Engineering	10/04/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-2022-05970-ATA-01	Engineering Training Program Focused Self Assessment	11/10/2022
		MS-C-21-11-24	Quality Assurance (QA) Audit of Emergency Preparedness	12/07/2021
		MS-C-22-03-01	QA Audit of Operations	05/10/2022
		MS-C-22-05-07	Quality Assurance Audit Report	06/27/2022
		QFO-2022-0004 (MS-C-22-09-19)	Security Audit (2022)	11/01/2022
	Work Orders	WO 200823448	EER 601301892 PM 12328 RPLC for ZS100D and ZS100E	01/08/2021