



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

August 25, 2023

Steven M. Snider
Site Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672-0752

**SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION – COMPREHENSIVE ENGINEERING TEAM
INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2023011 AND 05000270/2023011 AND
05000287/2023011**

Dear Steven M. Snider:

On July 20, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Baptist, James
on 08/25/23

James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287
License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION – COMPREHENSIVE ENGINEERING TEAM
 INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2023011 AND 05000270/2023011 AND
 05000287/2023011 Dated August 25, 2023

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML23236A615

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OFFICE	RII:DRS	RII:DRS	RII:DRP	RII:DRS	RII:DRP
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DATE	08/17/2023	08/16/2023	08/16/2023	08/21/2023	08/16/2023
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NAME	G. Ottenberg	J. Baptist			
DATE	08/25/2023	08/25/2023			

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000269, 05000270 and 05000287

License Numbers: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55

Report Numbers: 05000269/2023011, 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-011-0027

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station

Location: Seneca, SC

Inspection Dates: June 26, 2023, to July 21, 2023

Inspectors: P. Braaten, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer
D. Jackson, Senior Project Engineer
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Ruh, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inappropriate Procedure, Instructions and Evaluation for Online RBCU Cleaning			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000270/2023011-01 Open/Closed	[H.5] - Work Management	71111.21M
Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, when the licensee used an operating procedure and clearance that failed to address containment operability when breaching closed loop piping in containment during online reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) cleaning.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21M - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) (IP section 03.01) (7 Samples)

For each component sample, the inspectors reviewed the licensing and design bases. The inspectors reviewed a sample of operator actions, corrective action program documents, internal and external operating experience, test records, preventive maintenance records, work orders, aging management programs, and performed a walkdown of the component or procedure. Additional component specific design attributes reviewed by the inspectors are:

- (1) 2B Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU)
 - Compliance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), and TS Bases
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Design bases documents and calculations, including heat transfer capacity and design basis accident response capability
 - Aging Management

- (2) MOV-3-V-186, Unit 3 Condenser Vacuum Breaker Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)
 - Visual inspection during walkdown of component
 - Design bases documents and setup calculation assumption agreement with installed configuration
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Time critical operator actions

- (3) 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal
 - Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Design bases documents and calculations
 - Flow diversion and inventory control

- (4) 2RC-67, Pressurizer Code Safety Valve
 - Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Upper, middle, and lower ring settings
 - Post event analysis and conclusions

- (5) DCSF, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Normal Battery
 - Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and TS Bases
 - Visual inspection during walkdown
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Protection and coordination
 - Battery sizing calculation revision

- (6) CT2, Unit 2 Startup Transformer
 - Compliance with UFSAR, TS, and Bases
 - Visual inspection during walkdown of various components in system
 - Environmental conditions
 - Design requirements
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Periodic testing, inspection, and post-test analyses
 - Protection and coordination
 - Conformance with manufacturer instructions for installation, maintenance, testing and operation

- (7) 3B Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Pump
 - Visual inspection during walkdown of component
 - Surveillance testing & maintenance records
 - Design bases documents and calculations, including net positive suction head
 - Abnormal operation procedure controls during first-siphon operation and turbine building flood scenarios
 - Integration with water hammer prevention system

Modifications (IP section 03.02) (4 Samples)

- (1) EC 102450, Replace Unit 1 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Outlet Piping for "A" RCPM Air Coolers with Stainless Steel, Revision 3; EC 102458, Replace Carbon Steel LPSW Piping from 1B RCP with Stainless Steel Inside Cavities, Revision 7; EC 102459, Replace Carbon Steel LPSW Inlet Piping to 1A RCP with Stainless Steel Inside Cavities, Revision 9
- (2) EC 417411, MCC 3XS4 Primary Control Power Fuse KTK-2 to KTK-3, Revision 0
- (3) EC 408968, Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer (CT2) Open Phase Protection Equipment Installation & Tie-Ins, Revision 14
- (4) EC 411560, Lake Level Reduction Commissioning Project, Revision 1

10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations/Screening (IP section 03.03) (8 Samples)

- (1) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2004416, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for EC 112474, Modify U1 SSF RCS
- (2) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2352826, Revision to ONS UFSAR 6.2.1 - LOCA Long-Term Containment Response
- (3) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2420522, R017 Unit Runback
- (4) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2373422, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for EC 400480, Gardell CMSS upgrade
- (5) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 2322877, 525 kV Switchyard 62B Breaker Failure Relay Replacement
- (6) 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation; AR 1974647, EC 96547, Rev. 0, U1 Main Power System Protective Relaying Upgrade, Revision 1
- (7) 10 CFR 50.59 Screening; AR 2356028, EC 408968, Rev. 15, Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer (CT2) Open Phase Protection Equipment Installation & Tie-Ins, 09/14/21
- (8) 10 CFR 50.59 Screening; AR 2278976, Replace 30", Class F, Expansion Joint

Operating Experience Samples (IP section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) NRC Information Notice 2018-09: Electrical Arc Flash Caused By Foreign Material Damages Fire Door

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inappropriate Procedure, Instructions and Evaluation for Online RBCU Cleaning			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000270/2023011-01 Open/Closed	[H.5] - Work Management	71111.21M
<p>Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, when the licensee used an operating procedure and clearance that failed to address containment operability when breaching closed loop piping in containment during online reactor building cooling unit (RBCU) cleaning.</p> <p>Description: On April 17, 2023, the licensee began a planned maintenance activity on unit 2 to clean the heat exchanger tubes of the 'A' RBCU in containment. This activity was being completed to proactively restore heat transfer capacity margin to the unit based on an observed declining performance trend during routine thermal performance testing. The licensee used operating procedure OP/2/A/1104/010 "Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW)," enclosure 4.7 "Isolation of LPSW to 2A RBCU (MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4)" to perform the isolation. The enclosure was intended for isolating a leaking RBCU and was focused on precluding the possibility of thermal over-pressurization caused by heating of water trapped between the supply and return isolation valves during an accident condition. As a result, the steps required operators to vent the RBCU piping to containment to avoid this adverse effect. The procedure steps were sequenced such that a 1" vent valve (2LPSW-532), was opened prior to closing and deactivating the 2A RBCU outlet valve (2LPSW-18). While in this configuration, a direct pathway existed from containment to the environment (Lake Keowee) through the LPSW outlet piping of a size capable of exceeding the limit associated with operability of containment. The duration of this condition was approximately no more than three hours based on available information. The procedure required operators to enter Technical</p>			

Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3 "Containment Isolation Valves," Condition C while the 1" vent valve was open, but this step was in error since the vent valve was neither a containment isolation valve nor associated with a particular containment penetration described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The specified safety function impacted by breaching the LPSW system pressure boundary was actually containment itself per TS LCO 3.6.1 "Containment," Condition A, which has a 1-hour completion time for restoring containment operability before requiring the unit to be shutdown to Mode 3 within the next 12 hours. Contrary to the licensee's topical report DUKE-QAPD-001-A, "Quality Assurance Program Description," section D17.3.2.14, "Document Control," the use of the enclosure and the errors it contained made it not appropriate for the circumstance that it was being used for.

Later, during the RBCU cleaning activity, the LPSW system was breached to a much larger extent to gain access to the tubesheet of the RBCU. While in this configuration, the 6-inch outlet LPSW piping penetration was isolated by the deactivated motor operated valve 2LPSW-18 and a second manual valve 2LPSW-81 by a clearance. These isolations were credited to permit continued operation by satisfying the required actions of TS LCO 3.6.3, Condition C, but, as previously discussed, TS LCO 3.6.1, Condition A was the proper condition to evaluate. Licensee procedure AD-OP-ALL-0200 "Clearance and Tagging," section 5.5.29 required that "safety related clearances shall include consideration of TS adherence and LCOs," but the clearance did not identify applicability of TS LCO 3.6.1. Since the TS adherence error was not recognized, the clearance for the maintenance was ultimately an unrecognized compensatory measure used for maintaining the operability of containment during the maintenance period of approximately 24 hours. Licensee procedure AD-OP-ALL-0105 "Operability Determinations" required a documented operability determination supporting basis and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for temporary facility changes that use compensatory measures to maintain operability of structures, systems or components (SSCs) affected by a deficient condition that may compromise the SSC's required capability. In this case, LPSW system breaches compromised the required leak tight barrier of containment, and the licensee implemented a change to the facility by modifying the design function of an RBCU outlet valve to be a closed leak tight valve in order to maintain containment operability. However, the suitability of these valves for maintaining containment operable was not formally evaluated by the licensee. Inspectors questioned whether leakage would be limited to less than or equal to the maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) and if TS LCO 3.6.1 surveillance requirements would be satisfied by use of these valves. Inspectors noted that these valves were not described as containment isolation valves in the current version of the UFSAR and that 2LPSW-18 had been previously excluded from the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, leakage testing program on the basis that the closed loop LPSW system piping, containing the RBCU, in containment was designed to remain intact and operating throughout a post-accident period. When the licensee breached this closed loop and credited the valve isolation, the licensee rendered the exclusion basis for the LPSW outlet penetration valve invalid. Licensee procedure AD-LS-ALL-0008, "10 CFR 50.59 Review Process," section 5.1.10 indicated that "Intentionally creating a deficient condition and corresponding compensatory action as a means of bypassing a technical specification LCO action statement, action time, or other license condition is prohibited." In this case, the licensee created a deficient condition affecting containment and bypassed TS LCO 3.6.1 by misapplying TS LCO 3.6.3. Additionally, the licensee did not review the compensatory action under 10 CFR 50.59 to confirm it would not affect other ancillary aspects of the facility.

At the completion of the cleaning activity, the licensee attempted to refill the 2A RBCU piping from the outlet direction while sequentially observing four different 1" vent valves for a solid

stream of flow to indicate the piping was filled. Similar to the initial isolation sequence, while in this configuration, a direct pathway existed from containment to the environment through the LPSW outlet piping of a size capable of exceeding maximum allowable leakage rate for containment. The duration of this condition was approximately ten hours based on available information. A similar sequence of events was completed between April 18 and 19, 2023, for cleaning of the 2C RBCU.

Corrective Actions: The licensee developed actions to update operating procedures, design basis documents, evaluate licensee event reporting and to ensure any resulting compensatory measures are evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.

Corrective Action References: ARs 2477886, 2477925, 2480047, 2480068

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: For the evolution of conducting online RBCU cleaning, the failure to utilize a procedure maintained appropriate for the circumstance per DUKE-QAPD-001-A, section D17.3.2.14, and failure to include consideration of TS adherence and LCOs during clearance development per AD-OP-ALL-0200, section 5.5.29, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, operators used an enclosure of OP/2/A/1104/010 which was written for a different circumstance and neither the enclosure nor the developed clearance accurately considered TS LCO 3.6.1 adherence during the activity.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the performance deficiency created circumstances where breaches in containment exceeded the allowable leakage rate for containment operability.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using the barrier integrity screening questions associated with reactor containment in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, subsection C, and because the finding represented an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment through valves, IMC 0609 Appendix H, "Containment Integrity SDP" was used. The finding was considered to be a Type B finding because it was not expected to have any impact on the core damage frequency of the facility. Based on IMC 0609 Appendix H, Table 4.1, and section 03.03 of IMC 0308, Attachment 3, Appendix H, small lines (less than 2.5 inches in diameter for pressurized water reactors with large dry containments) would not generally contribute to LERF. Since the open pathway during the vent/drain/refill evolutions was limited to approximately 0.75 inches in diameter and any leakage through isolation valves used during the cleaning process (while the cooling coil heads were removed) was not expected to resemble a leak path through a 2.5-inch diameter hole, the finding screened as Green.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. In this case, the licensee performed a first-time evolution for an activity normally performed during outages, and did not demonstrate the characteristic of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety functions would be maintained.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," required, in part, that "activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Contrary to the above, between April 17 and 19, 2023, the isolation and restoration procedures and instructions used for performing online RBCU cleaning were not appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, neither the operating procedure nor the clearance properly identified how containment TS operability would be impacted when breaching the pressure boundary of the closed loop RBCU LPSW piping in containment.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On July 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection results to Steven M. Snider and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21M	Calculations	ONEI-0400-400	Revised Reactor Building Cooling Unit Requirements in Support of 1-year Mission Times	002
		OSC-11485	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for EC 96547, Unit 1 Main Power Relay Upgrade	0
		OSC-11802	Deentrainment Study of CCW Discharge Piping	0
		OSC-11804	Evaluation of Oconee Motor Protective Device Trip Times During Open Phase Conditions	1
		OSC-11939	Oconee PRA Analysis of Implementation Options for Open Phase Condition Protection	1
		OSC-11956	Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test	007
		OSC-2280	LPSW NPSHa and Minimum Required Lake Level	23
		OSC-2322	SSF Suction Supply Availability	20
		OSC-4300	(Elec) Protective Relay Settings	40
		OSC-5349	Minimum Lake Level Required to Maintain Sufficient NPSH to the LPSW Pumps via Gravity Flow	6
		OSC-6195	U1/2/3, SSF 125VDC Power System Battery and Charger Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Analysis	10
		OSC-6522	Turbine Building Flood CCW Reverse Flow Analysis	0
		OSC-6550	Hydraulic Model of Condenser Service Water for Chillers A and B	5
		OSC-6577	CCW Turbine Building Flood Analysis	2
		OSC-8064	ROTSG Long Term Containment Response Following a Large Break LOCA	024
		OSC-8064, Appendix O	ROTSG Long-Term Containment Response Following a Large-Break LOCA, ONS GOTHIC LBLOCA Cold Leg Break Analyses with RBCU capacities adjusted for latest AEROFIN Fouling Data	024
OSC-8508	Time Critical Valve Force Requirement Evaluation Calculation [for 3V-0186]	0		
OSC-8769	Oconee PRA Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System Notebook	5		
	Corrective Action	1774378,		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Documents	1884665, 2286307, 2325530, 2330063, 2392335, 2393844, 2401187, 2473099, 2317121, 2278976, 2278976, 2407202, 2474094, 2294192, 2356028, 2333096,		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	2476828	CETI23: CLEAN/INSPECT SMALL OIL LEAK / 3HP-26	
		2476829	CETI23: INSPECT/REPLACE BROKEN, MISSING ELECTRICAL COVER / 3HP-26	
		2477315	CETI23 - Restore Reference to OSS-254.00-00-2020	
		2477425	CETI23 Remove reference 2.5.2.1.2 (Duke Calc OSC-3610) from OSS-0254.00-00-1035	
		2477474	CETI23 Reference Errors in DBDs OSS-254.00-00-1035 & 2020	
		2477539	Non-Conservative Method Used in OSC-6550 for Change in Solubility Calc	
		2477541	CETI23-Fusion records for NCR 02296030 and NCR 02356836 are incomplete records	
		2477607	CETI23 – error identified in OSC-11956	
		2477789	CETI2023 OSC-6195 has a conflict in regard to SSF battery design margin	
		2477793	CETI23 – Issues with eRead communications provided to OPS on CT2 OPP system	
	2477797	CETI2023 SSF 125 VDC Essential Power System DBD has		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			misleading statement	
		2477882	CETI23: OSC-8508 contains unsubstantiated assumptions	
		2477886	Possible Seat Leakage Not Mentioned in RBCU Online Isolation Procedure	
		2477908	CETI23 – RBCU LPSW Temperature Design Control Concern	
		2477925	Questions Regarding T.S. Entry During Online RBCU Isolation	
		2477974	CETI23 - Training package OP-OC-SF-062 contains incorrect info	
		2478002	CETI23 NRC identified questions about GARDEL CDA classification	
		2478374	CETI23 - NRC Observation on Alarm Response Guides for Open Phase Conditions	
		2479288	CETI23 - TS SR 3.7.8.3 is Non-Conservative	
		2479310	Areas for Improvement in AP/11	
		2479324	OSC-11802 Contains Incorrect Methodology for Determining Deentrainment	
		2479697	CETI23 - Typographical Error in 50.59 Eval Changes Intended Meaning	
		2479861	CETI23 - ONS Calculation OSC-6522 should have been made historical or superceded	
		2479874	OSC-11802 Does Not Account for Air Leakage Thru Concrete Joints/Cracks	
		2479888	CETI23 - Unit 1 MPR 11U1 and 11U3 LED Illuminated	
		2479940	OSC-5349 Needs to Be Updated	
		2480022	CETI23 - UFSAR DESCRIPTION OF PZR CODE SAFETY RING SETTINGS REQUIRES	
		2480047	Containment Inoperable for >1 hr during 2A RBCU Cleaning Restoration	
		2480068	Unrecognized Comp Measure for Containment Operability	
		2480075	CETI23 - Questions on EC 406309 50.59 Evaluation Conclusions	
		2480078	Area for Improvement in Controlling LPSW Pumps in TB	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Flood Scenarios	
		2480084	IST Functions for RBCU Isolation Valves Need to be Evaluated	
		2480089	CETI23 - Updates to 1,2,3V-186 EV attributes	
	Drawings	0-1709	Three Line Diagram Transformers No. 2, 2T, & CT2	18
		O-0325	Condenser Discharge Structure Units 1-3 Concrete & Miscellaneous Steel Plan & Elevations	4
		O-0336-A	Units 1-3 Condenser Cooling Water Pipe Emergency CCW Discharge Pipe	10
		O-0424-A	Piping Layout Miscellaneous Outside Yard Piping General Layout	42
		O-0510C	Piping Layout Miscellaneous Piping Sections and Details Turbine Building	51
		O-1400-I	Piping Layout Basement Floor Sections Turbine Building	56
		OEE-71-01	Elementary Diagram Start-Up Trans. No. CT2 Diff. Lock-Out Relay	18
		OFD-100A-1.1	Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System	43
		OFD-133A-02-01	Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System (CCW Intake Pumps Discharge)	39
		OFD-133A-02-02	Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System (Normal Intake & Discharge)	28
		OFD-133A-02-03	Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System (Condensate Coolers)	16
		OM 1300. -- 0009.001	Elementary Diagram GEI-70357 364D900DA SH. 1 Transformer CT2	D4
		OM 1300. -- 0004.001	Vendor Drawing No. NP254501	3
		OM 1300. -- 0009.002	Station Service Transformer No CT2 Elementary Diagram	3
		OM 1300. -- 0012.001	CT2 Transformer G.E. Instruction Power Transformers	13
		OM-200-0150-001	Vacuum Breaker Valve	01
		Engineering	104170	Replace 30", Class F, Expansion Joint 3-C-MJ-0009 in EFW

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date	
	Changes		Supply		
	Miscellaneous	Clearance OPS-2-23-LPS-2A RBCU CLN-0661			
		DUKEONS008-RPT-001	Study Report for Lake Keowee Water Level Reduction	0	
		IQ Review	Large Oil Filled Transformers	6	
		NEI 01-01	Guideline on Licensing Digital Upgrades	03/15/2002	
		NEI 19-02	Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition Implementation	1	
		NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2002-22	Use of EPRI/NEI Joint Task Force Report, "Guideline on Licensing Digital Upgrades: EPRI TR-102348, Revision 1, NEI 01-01: A Revision of EPRI TR-102348 to Reflect Changes to the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule"	11/25/2002	
		ON-1607.32-05-03.EL_BECK RL		2	
		ON-1607.32-05-03.EL_SEL RL		2	
		OP-OC-SF-062	Simulator Exercise Guide (SF-062)	11b	
		OSS-0254.00-00-1035	(MECH) Design Basis Specification for Vacuum System	020	
		OSS-0254.00-00-2000	(Elect) 4KV Essential Auxiliary Power System	31	
		OSS-0254.00-00-2004	(Elect) 230 KV Switchyard System	26	
		OSS-0254.00-00-2020	(Elect) SSF 125 VDC Essential Power System	14	
		TI 2515/194, NRC Temporary Instruction	Inspection of Licensees' Implementation of Industry Initiative Association with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)	11/01/2017	
		Procedures	AD-MN-ALL-0002	Foreign Material Exclusion	15
			AP/0/4/1700/048	Loss of a Startup Transformer	0
			AP/0/A/1700/025	Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure	68

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		AP/1/A/1700/011	Recovery from Loss of Power	63
		AP/1/A/1700/024	Loss of LPSW	30
		AP/2/A/1700/010	Turbine Building Flood	13
		AP/3/A/1700/027	Loss of Condenser Vacuum	006
		CNM-1392.00-0013.001	DOBLE Evaluation Criteria	0
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Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		20383112-09, 20450277-01, 20450285-01, 20383112-01, 20450284-01, 20209404-09, 20209404-08, 20209404-74, 20209404-78		