



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION I
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August 3, 2023

Charles McFeaters
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
PSEG Nuclear, LLC - N09
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000354/2023002 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE
INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200048/2023001

Dear Charles McFeaters:

On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station. On July 12, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Robert DeNight, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hope Creek Generating Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Brice A. Bickett, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000354 and 07200048
License No. NPF-57

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000354/2023002 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE
INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200048/2023001 DATED
AUGUST 3, 2023

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000354 and 07200048

License Number: NPF-57

Report Number: 05000354/2023002 and 07200048/2023001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-002-0032

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC

Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station

Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ

Inspection Dates: April 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023

Inspectors: J. Ambrosini, Nuclear Engineer
D. Beacon, Nuclear Engineer
J. Bresson, Reactor Engineer
L. Dumont, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Henrion, Senior Health Physicist
S. Mercurio, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Kostick, Health Physicist
B. Patel, Structural Engineer

Approved By: Brice A. Bickett, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Technical Specification Surveillance Test Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000354/2023002-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.24
The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> , Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for PSEG's failure to incorporate appropriate criteria for establishing the initial test conditions, as outlined in the Hope Creek Generating Station technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.2.1.f, within their procedure HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006, Revision 19. Consequently, the initial test conditions that were set for the surveillance test on September 28, 2022, deviated from the specified SR. This discrepancy raised concerns about the validity of the test conducted on that date to satisfy the TS SR.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The Hope Creek Generating Station unit began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On April 30, 2023, the unit commenced a TS required shutdown because drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure could not be established to perform SR 4.6.2.1.f. Following corrective maintenance on the drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, the unit returned to the rated thermal power on May 7, 2023, followed by a down power to 80 percent for control rod pattern adjustment and returned to rated thermal power on May 8, 2023. On May 10, 2023, the unit was down powered to 85 percent to collect data for shutdown margin and returned to rated thermal power on May 11, 2023. On May 29, 2023, the unit was down powered to 85 percent to perform control rod pattern adjustment and returned to rated thermal power the same day and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's readiness for seasonal extreme hot weather conditions on June 26, 2023.

Impending Severe Weather (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's readiness for impending adverse weather conditions on June 27 through 28, 2023.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) 'A' station service water train while 'C' train out of service for planned maintenance during the week of May 8, 2023

- (2) High pressure coolant injection system during reactor core isolation cooling system out of service on May 22, 2023
- (3) 'D' emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage system on June 22, 2023
- (4) 'B' safety auxiliaries cooling system on June 29, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Core spray pump room and reactor building sump pump rooms in pre-fire plan FP-HC-3414 on May 24, 2023
- (2) Control building electrical access area in pre-fire plan FP-HC-3533 on May 26, 2023
- (3) Control equipment, inverter, and battery rooms in pre-fire plan FP-HC-3561 on May 31, 2023
- (4) 'B' safety auxiliaries cooling system heat exchanger and pump room in pre-fire plan FP-HC-3432 on June 1, 2023
- (5) Electrical equipment area in pre-fire plan FP-HC-3513 on June 2, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the fire brigade training and performance during a live fire training on May 25, 2023.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during reactor startup following the maintenance outage on May 4 through 5, 2023.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during a training exercise on April 10, 2023.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Planned maintenance on 500kV 5015 line and inoperability of 'A' control room supply fan during the week April 3, 2023

- (2) Unplanned inoperability of 'B' filtration, recirculation, and ventilation system vent fan on April 17, 2023
- (3) Maintenance activities associated with the unit shutdown required by TS during the week of May 1, 2023
- (4) Planned inoperability of reactor core isolation cooling system on May 22 through 25, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Drywell to suppression chamber pressure trend during the normal nitrogen makeup to the drywell on April 26, 2023
- (2) 'B' residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger room coolers during shutdown cooling operations on May 4, 2023
- (3) 'A' station service water pump discharge vent line degradation on May 24, 2023
- (4) Safety-related inverter (1AD481) blown fuse indication due to intermittent continuity on the associated wiring connection on May 30, 2023
- (5) Control rod blades 10-19 and 34-19 apparent loss of boron affects shutdown margin on May 31, 2023

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) Engineering Change Package 4HT-23-022 on June 15, 2023
- (2) Design Equivalent Change Package for the safety-related inverter 1AD481 static switch fuse wiring on June 26, 2023

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Maintenance outage to perform corrective maintenance on drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breakers following indication of bypass leakage from April 30 through May 7, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

- (1) 'B' filtration, recirculation, and ventilation system vent following corrective maintenance on April 17, 2023
- (2) 'A' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker following corrective maintenance on May 3, 2023
- (3) Reactor core isolation cooling system motor operated valve (F010) following diagnostic testing on May 23, 2023
- (4) 'A' standby liquid control system following planned maintenance on May 30, 2023
- (5) 1AD481 inverter following indication of blown fuse due to intermittent continuity between fuse and control board connections on May 31, 2023
- (6) 'D' station service water pump strainer following corrective maintenance on June 27, 2023

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

- (1) HC.OP-PT.NB-4160, allowed outage time diesel generators periodic test on April 19, 2023
- (2) HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006, drywell to suppression chamber leak rate test on May 5, 2023
- (3) HC.RE-ST.ZZ-0007, shutdown margin surveillance on May 10, 2023

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) SH.OP-PT.FLX-0480, FLEX 480V Caterpillar diesel generator (10-G-2025) on May 9, 2023

71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) As a result of the 2020 COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, the licensee requested and received an exemption to reschedule their biennial emergency preparedness exercise from 2020 to 2021. The inspectors performed the emergency preparedness program inspection scheduled for 2021 in its place, then performed emergency preparedness exercise inspections in 2021 and 2022.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's maintenance and testing of the Alert and Notification System on June 5 through 9, 2023, for the period of September 2020 through May 2023.

71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Organization on June 5 through 9, 2023.

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan (EP) changes:
- 2022-18, EP-HC-325-207, Security, Editorial Changes to Add Event Descriptions to the Security Contingency Event Table for Emergency Action Levels U1.1, HA1, and HS1.1
 - 2022-20, EP-HC-325-204, EAL Technical Basis – Irradiated Fuel Events
 - 2023-06, EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance
 - 2023-07, Transfer of Land Ownership, Wind Port Project

This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's maintenance and testing of the emergency preparedness program on June 5 through 9, 2023, for the period of September 2020 through May 2023.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on May 10, 2023.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

- (1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

- (1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

BI02: RCS Leak Rate (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)

- (1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

EP02: Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

(1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

EP03: Alert and Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

(1) April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

71152S - Semi-annual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semi-annual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed PSEG's corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation of an ISFSI

Operation of an ISFSI (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings June 5 through 8, 2023. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:
- Fuel selection and fuel loading
 - Stack-up and download of the loaded multi-purpose canister into HI-STORM
 - Drying and backfill evolutions
 - Closure welding and non-destructive weld evaluations
 - Transfer and transport evolutions
 - Radiological field surveys

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Technical Specification Surveillance Test Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000354/2023002-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.24
The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> , Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for PSEG's failure to incorporate appropriate criteria for establishing the initial test conditions, as outlined in the Hope Creek Generating Station technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.2.1.f, within their procedure HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006, Revision 19. Consequently, the initial test conditions that were set for the surveillance test on September 28, 2022, deviated from the specified SR. This discrepancy raised concerns about the validity of the test conducted on that date to satisfy the TS SR.			
<u>Description:</u> Hope Creek Generating Station TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.2.1 requires that the suppression chamber shall be operable with a total leakage between the suppression chamber and drywell of less than the equivalent leakage through a 1-inch			

diameter orifice at a differential pressure of 0.80 psi. This LCO is met by implementing the TS SR 4.6.2.1.f, by conducting a drywell to suppression chamber bypass leakage test at an initial differential pressure of 0.80 psi and verifying that the differential pressure does not decrease by more than 0.24 inch of water per minute for a period of 10 minutes.

On May 3, 2023, the inspectors observed the performance of the drywell to suppression chamber bypass leakage test in accordance with the procedure HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006, "Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leak Rate Test," Revision 19. This test satisfies the requirements outlined in TS SR 4.6.2.1.f. As mentioned previously, the objective of this test is to verify that the total leakage bypass area, which would enable the direct entry of drywell atmosphere into the suppression chamber atmosphere without passing through the suppression chamber water, is less than that of a one-inch diameter orifice at a differential pressure of 0.80 psi.

The operators commenced the test on May 3, 2023, by pressurizing the drywell using the primary containment instrumentation gas compressor, and once the initial differential pressure of 0.80 psi was achieved, they secured the pressurizing process. According to Step 5.2.6.a, it is necessary to allow the suppression chamber airspace to stabilize for a minimum of one-hour after attaining a differential pressure of 0.80 psi between the drywell and suppression chamber. There is a note associated with the Step 5.2.6.a, which states that during the one-hour suppression chamber stabilization period, the differential pressure between drywell and suppression chamber may decay to less than 0.80 psi, however, pressure must be maintained between 0.71 and 0.80 psi prior to commencing the 10-minute data collection. Once this condition is met, Step 5.2.6.c initiates the 10-minute data collection period to satisfy the SR 4.6.2.1.f. Step 5.2.6.c reads, ensure differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber will remain in the 0.71 to 0.80 psi test band during the data collection. Repressurize the drywell prior to commencing data collection, if necessary.

While observing the test from the main control room, the inspectors monitored the trend during the one-hour stabilization period. The inspectors reviewed the associated note and Step 5.2.6.c, leading them to approach the control room supervisor (CRS) for a discussion regarding the intention behind the note and step. Based on the pressure trend observed during the stabilization period, the inspectors questioned the CRS about the specific differential pressure at which the 10-minute data collection should commence. The operations team's response aligned with what the step stated, affirming that they could initiate the 10-minute decay test within the 0.71 to 0.80 psi differential pressure band. However, the inspectors intervened, highlighting that the TS SR required the pressure decay test to begin at an initial differential pressure of 0.80 psi, not below it. Anything less than 0.8 psi would not be in compliance with the TS SR, and would provide an inaccurate demonstration of the acceptance criteria of not decreasing by more than 0.24 inches of water per minute for a 10-minute period. Based on the inspectors questioning, the operators were promptly informed to maintain a differential pressure of 0.80 psi, instead of the previously understood range of 0.71 to 0.80 psi, before initiating the 10-minute pressure decay test at Step 5.2.6.d.

The inspectors concluded that the HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006 procedure was inadequate with respect to providing guidance to establish the initial test conditions as required by TS SR 4.6.2.1.f. The inspectors observed that the procedure allowed for the establishment of initial test conditions at a differential pressure lower than required. This discrepancy could result in failure to demonstrate the satisfactory performance of the surveillance test, and consequently, it impacts the ability to verify compliance with the TS LCO 3.6.2.1.

Corrective Actions: PSEG's immediate action was to brief the control room operators to ensure that minimum differential pressure of 0.80 psi was maintained at the initiation of 10-minute data collection period. Subsequently, PSEG entered this issue in their corrective action program as Notification 20940735 to revise the procedure.

Corrective Action References: 20935570, 20939236, 20935533, and 20940735

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that PSEG's failure to ensure that adequate guidance and acceptance criteria are translated into their safety-related procedure for the performance of surveillance test was a performance deficiency that was within their ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, based on the review of results from past surveillance test performed on September 28, 2022, with the procedure in place, it was revealed that the bypass leakage test had been performed with an initial differential pressure of 0.72 psi, a deviation from the TS SR 4.6.2.1.f. The inspectors determined that conducting the test below the specified threshold of 0.80 psi raises doubts about its ability to accurately assess and ensure that the total leakage between the suppression chamber and drywell remains below the equivalent leakage through a one-inch diameter orifice.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Using Exhibit 3, "Barriers Integrity Screening Questions," the finding screened to Green, very low safety significance, because this performance deficiency did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, was not a failure of containment isolations system, containment pressure control equipment, containment heat removal components, or failure of the plant's severe accident mitigation features, and it did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, as of July 12, 2023, PSEG's procedure HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0006, Revision 19, utilized for conducting safety-related test to fulfill the requirements of TS SR 4.6.2.1.f and demonstrate compliance with LCO 3.6.2.1, did not incorporate adequate quantitative measures for establishing the initial test conditions necessary to verify the satisfactory completion of the drywell to suppression chamber bypass leak test.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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Observation: Semi-annual Trend Observation	71152S
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The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends that might indicate the existence of more significant safety concerns. As part of this review, the inspectors included repetitive or closely related issues documented by PSEG in their corrective action program database, trend reports, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, and maintenance or corrective action program backlog. The inspectors determined, in general, PSEG was appropriately identifying, evaluating, and resolving issues and potential trends. The inspectors recognized one general trend related to human performance behaviors specific to procedure use and adherence. Examples of issues that inform this trend include:

- 20924896: The chemistry supervisor inappropriately marked a procedure step as not applicable to the performance of the gamma spectrum analysis of the radwaste sample tank before sending it to the condensate storage tank. As a result, the radwaste sample tank was sent to the condensate storage tank without gamma spectrum analysis.
- 20925617: During the test and calibration of the radiation monitoring system for the refuel floor exhaust, technicians incorrectly operated the radiation monitoring system for the control room, which resulted in an inadvertent automatic response operation of the control room ventilation system.
- 20939524: Technicians implementing a procedure for reactor water level channel test and calibration lifted incorrect wire leads, causing automatic start of the 'B' safety and auxiliary cooling system pump and 'B' Technical Support Center ventilation train.
- 20939474: Fire protection personnel used non-insulated tools to retrieve a broken bulb socket, causing an electrical failure in the panel circuit, which led to the activation of the fire suppression system.

PSEG evaluated each of these examples individually and entered the appropriate corrective action processes to address each. PSEG entered this trend in their corrective action program under Notification 20940461. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance during this semi-annual trend review.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On June 8, 2023, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to David Mannai, Executive Director Regulatory Affairs and Nuclear Oversight, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 8, 2023, the inspectors presented the independent spent fuel storage installation loading campaign inspection results to Robert DeNight, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 12, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Robert DeNight, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Miscellaneous	NOTF 20939944		
		NOTF 20940130		
71111.15	Miscellaneous	NOTF 20935616		
		NOTF 20935656		
		NOTF 20936590		
		NOTF 20937694		
		TE 80134461-0010		
71111.18	Procedures	4HT-23-022	Install D SSW Strainer Packing Gland Follower Clamp (80134625)	
71111.24	Miscellaneous	NOTF 20919490		
		NOTF 20939942	NRC ID Packing Leak Following Restoration	
		NOTF 20939943	NRC ID Strainer Insulation on Restored	
		NRC ID NOTF 20935921 During Walkdown		
	Work Orders	3037590		
71114.02	Miscellaneous		FINAL 2005 REP-10 DESIGN REVIEW REPORT, PSEG Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations	Revision 1
71114.05	Miscellaneous		PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan	