



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

May 4, 2023

David Rhoades
Senior Vice President
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)
Constellation Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 6055

**SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3—INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2023001 AND 05000249/2023001**

Dear David Rhoades:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On April 12, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with P. Boyle, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Ruiz, Robert
on 05/04/23

Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000237 and 05000249
License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

Letter to David Rhoades from Robert Ruiz dated May 4, 2023.

SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2023001 AND 05000249/2023001

DISTRIBUTION:

Jessie Quichocho
Paul Zurawski
RidsNrrDorlLpl3
RidsNrrPMDresden Resource
RidsNrrDrolrib Resource
John Giessner
Mohammed Shuaibi
Diana Betancourt-Roldan
Allan Barker
R3-DORS

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML23124A273

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUNSI Review		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Non-Sensitive <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Publicly Available <input type="checkbox"/> Non-Publicly Available	
OFFICE	RIII	RIII			
NAME	NShah:mb	RRuiz			
DATE	05/04/2023	05/04/2023			

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000237 and 05000249

License Numbers: DPR-19 and DPR-25

Report Numbers: 05000237/2023001 and 05000249/2023001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-001-0058

Licensee: Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Location: Morris, IL

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023

Inspectors: M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
C. St. Peters, Resident Inspector
J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Implement Condensate System Startup Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2023001-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71152A
A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on November 18, 2022, when the licensee failed to implement plant procedure DOP 3300-02, "Condensate System Startup," revision 64. Specifically, the licensee's failure to properly implement step G.1.d of procedure DOP 3300-02 resulted in valve 3-3302-505, U3 condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals, not being fully opened. This resulted in seal degradation for the Unit 3 condensate pump 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D and an emergent downpower.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 11, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 81 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 12, 2023. On March 18, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 83 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 19, 2023, and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 6, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 33 percent to troubleshoot and add oil to the 3B reactor recirculation pump lower motor oil reservoir. The unit returned to rated thermal power on February 7, 2023. On March 4, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 33 percent to install a remote oil addition modification for the 3B reactor recirculation pump lower motor oil reservoir leak and perform seal replacement for condensate/condensate booster pumps. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 8, 2023. On March 11, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 83 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 17, 2023. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 18, 2022, and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather associated with high winds and possible tornadic activity on March 31, 2023.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 2 station blackout (SBO) diesel generator during the Unit 3 SBO maintenance window on January 13, 2023
- (2) 2/3 'B' standby gas treatment on January 18, 2023
- (3) Unit 2 standby diesel generator while the 2/3 standby diesel generator was unavailable for maintenance on January 30, 2023
- (4) Unit 3 SBO diesel generator while the 2/3 standby diesel generator was unavailable for maintenance on February 1, 2023
- (5) Unit 3 core spray (CS) 'A' on February 25, 2023
- (6) Unit 2 'B' CS on March 16-17, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire Zone (FZ) 9.0.B, Unit 3 diesel generator elev. 517', on February 15, 2023
- (2) FZ 8.2.6E, Unit 3 reactor feedwater pump switchgear H2 seal elev. 538', and FZ 6.1, Unit 3 250V battery charger room elev. 538', on February 15, 2023
- (3) FZ 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 reactor building general area 545', and FZ 11.2.2, Unit 2 southeast corner room elev. 476', on March 9, 2023
- (4) FZ 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 reactor ground floor elev. 517', and FZ 9.0C Unit 2/3 swing diesel generator room elev. 517', on March 10, 2023
- (5) FZ 11.2.3, Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection pump room elev. 476', on March 16, 2023
- (6) FZ 11.2.1, Unit 2 southwest corner room elev. 476' on March 16, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on March 14, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Condensate and feedwater system
- (2) Isolation condenser

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) 2/3 standby diesel generator emergent work on January 30–February 1, 2023
- (2) Protected pathway on Unit 3 due to CS system logic functional test on March 16, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Unit 3 dPIS 3-1349-A, Unit 3 isolation condenser condensate return line high flow, found out of technical specification tolerance as documented in CR 4545127
- (2) High pressure coolant injection turbine drain pot solenoid operated valve not in compliance as documented in CR 4549507 on January 24-25, 2022
- (3) Surface water tritium review as documented in CR 4554958 on March 2-3, 2023
- (4) Unit 2/3 diesel fire pump battery terminal corrosion documented in CR 4563676 on March 21-22, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) DIS 0250-03, Electromagnetic relief valve/target rock valve pressure switches calibration, on Unit 3 after replacing switch 3-0203-3A, per Work Order (WO) 98106167
- (2) DOS 6600-01, Diesel generator surveillance tests, following planned preventative maintenance on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator, on March 17-24, 2023

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) DOP 1500-15, Unit 2 LPCI [low pressure coolant injection] system quarterly flow rate test, on March 21, 2023

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 standby liquid control system 'A' pump test for WO 5325917
- (2) DOP 1500-10, Unit 2 LPCI system pump operability and quarterly test with torus available and inservice testing (IST) program, on March 21, 2023

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) Dresden pre-NRC exercise drill on February 22, 2023

OTHER ACTIVITIES–BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) Evaluation and corrective actions for the Unit 3 condensate/condensate booster pump seal degradation that resulted in emergent downpowers under CR 4539818

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Implement Condensate System Startup Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2023001-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71152A
A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on November 18, 2022, when the licensee failed to implement plant procedure DOP 3300-02, "Condensate System Startup," revision 64. Specifically, the licensee's failure to properly implement step G.1.d of procedure DOP 3300-02 resulted in			

valve 3-3302-505, U3 condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals, not being fully opened. This resulted in seal degradation for the Unit 3 condensate pump 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D and an emergent downpower.

Description:

On November 19, 2022, Unit 3 was in power ascension to full power after the D3R27 refueling outage. During power ascension, discharge pressure on the 3B condensate pump was observed to be higher than the normal expected pressure band. The licensee initially diagnosed the increase in discharge pressure as a seal failure. Engineering staff walked down the 3B condensate pump and observed abnormal conditions, which included slight oscillation of the outer shaft seal while operating and a positive pump suction pressure. The site decided to secure the 3B condensate pump to inspect the outer seal. Vibration data was collected from the 3B condensate and condensate booster pump, with a step change identified in axial vibration on the outboard/thrust bearings of the condensate booster pump. On November 20, 2022, the site held an engineering technical call during which, based on the information, no formal troubleshooting was performed.

On November 21, 2022, the inboard bearing and seal were replaced on the 3B condensate pump. The inspectors determined that no repairs on the 3B condensate booster pump were performed. At the time, the 3C condensate/condensate booster pumps were also running, and no changes were observed. After repairs were made to the 3B condensate pump seal, the pump was returned to service and Unit 3 proceeded in power ascension to full power.

On November 28, 2022, an unexpected alarm, 903-6 G-4, "Condensate Pump Discharge Pressure Low," was received in the main control room. Equipment operators were dispatched and reported that the 3B condensate pump was making a grinding noise and the inboard seal had movement when a strobe light was used. Thermography revealed that the inboard seal had lower temperatures than the other pumps. Turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) temperatures for the 3B condensate pump were found to be elevated, which indicated higher bearing temperatures. The 3B condensate/ condensate booster pump along with the 3C reactor feed pump were secured. The site performed a load drop from 100 percent MWe to around 85 percent MWe to replace the 3B condensate pump seals for a second time.

On November 30, 2022, at 5:35 a.m., elevated temperatures were identified on the 3A condensate pump inboard and outboard seals. Troubleshooting revealed that valve 3-3302-505, "U3 Condensate Booster Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve," to Condensate Pump Seals, was not full open. The site took actions to improve cooling to the running 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. At 6:30 a.m., Unit 3 commenced an emergent load drop of greater than 20 percent, and staffed their outage control center (OCC) at which point 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps temperatures lowered and stabilized. At 2:41 p.m. on November 30, 2022, Unit 3 commenced power ascension as a result of stabilized mechanical seal temperatures on the 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. On December 1, 2022, Unit 3 was returned to full power following the 3B condensate/condensate booster pump seal replacement.

The licensee performed a corrective action program evaluation (CAPE) and implemented an adverse condition monitoring plan (ACMP). The ACMP established parameters to monitor 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps until seal replacement could occur. Inspector review of the CAPE identified the cause of the event was the operator failed to fully open the cooling water supply valve, 3-3302-505, as directed by procedure, DOP 3300-02. Inspectors noted that the

CAPE also identified that no peer check was performed in the field. Additionally, a CAPE contributing cause was that the OCC did not set the vision for challenging assumptions and use the management model to document technical justifications during the first seal failure. This resulted in delayed seal overheat determination and ultimately seal failure. This contributing cause occurred during the initial identification of the 3B condensate pump seal degradation. During the licensee's review of the event, it was identified that the technical call on November 20, 2022, did not have operations or maintenance on the call. It was also found that an incorrect assumption of refuting no flow as the cause occurred, while degraded cooling flow, ultimately the cause of the seal degradation, was not assessed. The CAPE identified that manual valve 3-3302-505 was also found to be missing its handwheel early in the outage, D3R27, but no condition report was written. The missing handwheel led to the operator incorrectly identifying the valve position. The site also performed an extent of condition which involved operator performance. The site determined other procedures and surveillances performed by the operator showed no adverse conditions as a result of performance.

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the inboard and outboard seals on the 3B condensate pump on two separate occasions. The inboard and outboard seals were replaced at a later date for the 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. A standing order was established to implement clear standards on use of peer check, stop work criteria, and pre-job briefing standards.

Corrective Action References: CR 4539818, Unexpected Load Drop

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to open valve 3-3302-505 as directed by step G.1.d in procedure DOP 3300-02 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, failure to open valve 3-3302-505 as directed resulted in seal degradation on the 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps and subsequent emergent downpower.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because they answered "No" to the questions in Exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions."

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee staff did not stop when they went to manipulate a manual valve without a handwheel. This resulted in the operator incorrectly determining the valve position and failing to open the valve 3-3302-505 as directed by step G.1.d in procedure DOP 3300-02.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a. requires, in part, written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 4 addresses "Procedure for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of Safety-Related BWR Systems" and Section 4.n, addresses "Condensate System (hotwell to feedwater pumps, including demineralizers and resin regeneration)."

The licensee established procedure DOP 3300-02, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64, to address placing the condensate system into operation and start the first and subsequent condensate/condensate booster pumps. DOP 3300-02, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64, step G.1.d. requires operators to "open 2(3)-3302-505, U2(3) condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals."

Contrary to the above, on November 18, 2022, the licensee failed to implement step G.1.d. of procedure DOP 3300-02, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64. Specifically, the operator in the field did not open valve 3-3302-505 after incorrectly determining the valve position. This resulted in seal degradation of the Unit 3 A, B, C, and D condensate pumps and a subsequent emergent downpower.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 12, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to P. Boyle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 4666587	NRC Identified Issues	3/31/2023
	Procedures	DOA 0010-02	Tornado Warning/Severe Winds	27
		OP-AA-108-111-1001	Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines	24
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	4551943	NRC Concern Unit 3 Station Blackout Area	2/1/2023
	Drawings	M-358	Diagram of Core Spray Piping	CN
	Procedures	DOP 1400-E1	Unit 2 Core Spray System Electrical Checklist	4
		DOP 1400-M1	Unit 2 Core Spray System	24
		DOP 1400-M1/E1	Unit 3 Core Spray System	21
		DOP 6600-M1	Unit 2 Standby Diesel Generator	30
		DOP 6620-E1	Unit 2 Station Blackout Electrical Checklist	03
		DOP 6620-M1	Unit 2 Station Blackout Mechanical Checklist	10
		DOP 6620-M2	Unit 3 Station Blackout Mechanical Checklist	5
DOP 7500-M1/E1	Unit 2/3 Standby Gas Treatment	06		
71111.05	Fire Plans	102 U2RB-2	Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Elev. 476'	4
		103 U2RB-3	Unit 2 Southeast Corner Room Elev. 476'	4
		104 U2RB-4	Unit 2 HPCI Pump Room Elev. 476'	06
		105 U2RB-5	Unit 2 Reactor Ground Floor Elev. 517'	6
		108 U2RB-7	Unit 2 Reactor Building General Area 545'	5
		162 U3TB-73	Fire Zone 9.0.B Unit 3 Diesel Generator Elev. 517'	07
		166 U3TB-77	Fire Zone 8.2.6E Unit 3 RFP Switchgear H2 Seal Elev. 538'	06
		169 U3TB-80	Fire Zone 6.1 Unit 3 Battery Charger Room Elev. 538'	06
	184 2/3 EDG	Unit 2/3 Swing Diesel Generator Room Elev. 517'	7	
Miscellaneous	EC 633230	86-10 Evaluation Supporting Removal of Fire Hose from Hose Stations	0	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Fire Drill Scenario No. 22-13	3A TBCCW Cooling Water Pump (3-3801A) Fire	3/14/2023
	Procedures	OP-AA-201-008	Pre-Fire Plan Manual	5
71111.12	Miscellaneous		Isolation Condenser System Health Report	03/15/2023
			Feedwater/Condensate System Health Report	03/15/2023
	Work Orders	5219595	Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI Flow Calibration	4/7/2022
		5247430	Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI Flow Calibration	7/29/2022
		5280863	Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI Flow Calibration	10/4/2022
	5299174	Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI Flow Calibration	12/28/2022	
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	4551179	2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Output Breaker Trip	1/30/2023
	Procedures	MA-AA-716-004	Conduct of Troubleshooting	20
		OP-AA-106-101	Significant Event Reporting	25
		OP-AA-106-101-1001	Event Response Guidelines	32
		OP-AA-108-117	Protected Equipment List	03/16/2023
	WC-AA-2000	Emergent Issue Response	13	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	4513772	Isolation Condenser Condensate Line High Flow DPIS 3-1349-A found OOT	07/29/2022
		4545127	dPIS 3-1349-A Found Out of Tech Spec Tolerance	12/28/2022
	Drawings	12E-3506	Schematic Diagram Primary Containment Isolation System Isolation Condenser Control Logic	AF
	Procedures	DIS 1300-07	Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam/Condensate Line High Flow Calibration	30
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	4561990	3-0203-3A PS Controller OOT	03/14/2023
	Procedures	DIS 0250-03	Electromagnetic Relief Valve/ Target Rock Valve Pressure Switches Calibration	56
		MA-DR-	Diesel Generator Post Maintenance Testing Run	19

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Work Orders	MM-5-66001		
		5142252	OP PMT U2 EDG (Maintenance Run + DOS 6600-01)	03/16/2023
		5244617	OP PMT Air Start Regulator on D2 EDG DOS 6600-01	03/16/2023
		5318364	D2 QTR TS LPCI System Flow Test Surveillance	03/21/2023
		5320673	D2 QTR TS LPCI System Pump Run and IST Surveillance	03/21/2023
		53337201	OP D2 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability	03/16/2023
		98106167	IM Repair ERV/Target Rock Pressure Controller (DIS 0250-03)	03/15/2023
71114.06	Miscellaneous		Dresden Pre NRC Exercise Drill	02/22/2023
71151	Miscellaneous		NRC Performance Indicator Data: Initiating Events - Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours	01/01/2022 - 12/31/2022
			NRC Performance Indicator Data: Initiating Events - Unit/Reactor Shutdown Occurrences	01/01/2022 - 12/31/2022
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	4538093	Condensate and Feedwater Dissolved Oxygen Above Action Level	11/19/2022
		4538124	3B Condensate Pump Inboard Bearing	11/19/2022
		4539461	3B Condensate Pump Seal Degraded	11/28/2022
		4539818	Unexpected Load Drop	11/30/2022
	Drawings	M-348	Diagram of Condensate Piping	EDSF
	Procedures	DOP 3300-01	Condensate System Fill and Vent	22
		DOP 3300-02	Condensate System Startup	64
		OP-AA-108-111	Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan	17