



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION IV  
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

April 24, 2023

EA-23-008

John Ferrick, Site Vice President  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
17265 River Road  
Killona, LA 70057

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2023001, INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL  
STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200075/2023001, AND EXERCISE OF  
ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION


Dear John Ferrick:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On April 17, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mandy Halter, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The licensee identified a violation of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10) CFR 72.212(b)(6), associated with tornado hazard protection. Because this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, "Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations," and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken or plans to take the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation handling operations.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Dixon, John  
on 04/24/23

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Projects Branch D  
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000382 and 07200075  
License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:  
As stated

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WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000382/2023001, INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION  
REPORT 07200075/2023001, AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION DATED  
APRIL 24, 2023.

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WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000382/2023001, INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT  
07200075/2023001, AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: **ML23110A762**

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000382 and 07200075

License Number: NPF-38

Report Number: 05000382/2023001 and 07200075/2023001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-001-0009 and 1-2023-001-0081

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Location: Killona, LA 70057

Inspection Dates: January 1, 2023, to March 31, 2023

Inspectors: L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector  
D. Childs, Senior Resident Inspector  
J. Freeman, Spent Fuel Storage Inspector  
A. Patz, Senior Resident Inspector  
A. Sanchez, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Projects Branch D  
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, (Waterford) in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

### Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
EDG	EA-23-008	Enforcement Action 23-008: Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)	60855	Closed
LER	05000382/2022-005-00	Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Relay Failure Results in Reactor Trip and Emergency Feedwater Actuation	71153	Closed

## PLANT STATUS

Waterford, Unit 3, began the inspection period at full power and remained at full power until January 17, 2023, when the unit was down powered to 50 percent to perform maintenance on the generator output breakers. The unit returned to full power on January 19, 2023. On March 9, 2023, the unit experienced excessive reactor coolant system leakage and was shut down. The unit was restarted on March 14, 2023, and returned to full power on March 16, 2023, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## REACTOR SAFETY

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) emergency diesel generators, startup transformers, and permanent temporary emergency diesel during planned generator output breaker maintenance on January 18, 2023
- (2) controlled ventilation area system train B during planned maintenance for controlled ventilation areas system train A on January 31, 2023
- (3) component cooling water and auxiliary component cooling water train B during auxiliary component cooling water train A outage for planned maintenance on February 9, 2023
- (4) low pressure safety injection system train B while train A was inoperable for surveillance testing on February 28, 2023
- (5) high pressure safety injection system trains A and B during and following elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage on March 10, 2023

## 71111.05 - Fire Protection

### Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) fire area RAB-15A-001, elevation +46.00' reactor auxiliary building emergency diesel fuel oil feed tank B space on January 5, 2023
- (2) fire area RAB-2-003, elevation +69.00' auxiliary building chilled water tanks and component cooling water surge tank rooms on January 10, 2023
- (3) fire area RAB-3-001, elevation +46.00' reactor auxiliaries building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment room on February 27, 2023

### Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill in the +15.00' elevation of the turbine building involving a lube oil fire on main feed pump B on January 27, 2023

## 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

### Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power maneuvers for main generator output breaker maintenance from January 17-19, 2023.

### Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator for a down power from 100 to 50 percent and a subsequent reactor trip and loss of offsite power on January 12, 2023.

## 71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

### Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) shutdown cooling train B following bearing failures in the auxiliary component cooling water pump B motor on May 9 and May 23, 2022

### 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

#### Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) yellow risk due to planned outage of turbine driven emergency feedwater pump AB on January 12, 2023
- (2) elevated green risk due to generator output breaker maintenance from January 17-20, 2023
- (3) yellow risk due to planned outage of auxiliary component cooling water pump A from February 9-10, 2023
- (4) elevated green risk due to forced shutdown and restart following high unidentified reactor coolant system leakage from March 10-16, 2023
- (5) yellow risk due to replacement of capacitive voltage transformer on offsite power line 1 from March 26-30, 2023

### 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

#### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) auxiliary component cooling train B operability determination following identification that a cover was not used on the out-of-service wet cooling fan 4B on January 19, 2023
- (2) reactor coolant leakage detection system operability determination following identification of non-functional flow switches on the containment fan coolers A, B, and C on January 24, 2023
- (3) controlled ventilation area system train B operability determination following identification of damage to isolation damper on January 31, 2023
- (4) component cooling water train B operability determination following identification of errors in calculation for severe corrosion on a pipe support on February 13, 2023
- (5) safety-related 4kV bus 3A operability determination following relay surveillance failure and relay replacement on February 21, 2023
- (6) reactor coolant system boundary operability determination following identification of leakage into containment on March 13, 2023

### 71111.18 - Plant Modifications

#### Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) temporary modification EC-94938 to isolate core differential pressure instrument following identification of a deep notch in the instrument piping on March 13, 2023



#### 71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

##### Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

- (1) high pressure safety injection pump B flow control valve testing following replacement of thermal overload relay on January 26, 2023
- (2) safety-related 4kV bus 3A following replacement and calibration of undervoltage relays on February 21, 2023
- (3) startup transformer B following corrective maintenance on generator output breaker B and associated disconnects on March 2, 2023
- (4) component cooling water pump A after lube oil change and sight glass refurbishment on March 8, 2023, and subsequent retest after test failure on March 9, 2023

##### Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) low pressure safety injection pump A surveillance test on February 28, 2023
- (2) reactor protection system matrix testing on March 12, 2023

##### Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) spent fuel pool heat exchanger temperature control valve quarterly inservice testing on January 4, 2023

#### **OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

##### 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

##### IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022

##### IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022

##### IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022

##### 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

#### Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) engineered safety features actuation system relay failure resulting in main steam isolation valve and main feed isolation valve closure on June 24, 2022

#### 71153 - Follow up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

##### Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated a plant shutdown due to exceeding technical specification reactor coolant system leakage and licensee's response on March 10, 2023.

##### Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05000382/2022-005-00, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Relay Failure Results in Reactor Trip and Emergency Feedwater Actuation (ADAMS Accession No. ML22361A050). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

#### **OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL**

##### 60855 - Operation of an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)

The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's ISFSI activities to verify compliance with requirements of the Certificate of Compliance 72-1032, License Amendment 5, and the HI-STORM FW Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), revision 8. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures, corrective action reports, and records to verify ISFSI operations were compliant with the Certificate's technical specifications, requirements in the FSAR, and NRC regulations.

##### Operation Of An ISFSI (1 Sample)

- (1) Inspectors evaluated the licensee's dry cask storage loading operations from January 2-6, 2023, during an on-site inspection. The Waterford ISFSI is sized to store 72 casks containing a mix of HI-STORM 100 storage casks and HI-STORM FW storage casks. At the time of the inspection, the ISFSI pad contained a total of 31 HI-STORM 100 storage casks and the licensee was in the process of loading the first HI-STORM FW cask. The HISTORM FW casks will each contain a Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) with 37 fuel assemblies (MPC-37).

During the on-site inspection, the inspectors evaluated and observed the following activities:

- placement of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and empty MPC into the spent fuel pool
- loading and verification of spent fuel into canister #32

- walkdown of the ISFSI pad
- heavy load lifts using the cask handling crane to place the canister lid, while under water in spent fuel pool cask loading pit
- heavy load lifts to remove the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and loaded MPC from the spent fuel pool
- canister welding and non-destructive testing activities on the lid-to-shell weld

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following documentation during the inspection:

- fuel selection evaluations for the canisters loaded since the last NRC ISFSI inspection (canisters 28-32)
- radiation surveys for radiological dose at the owner-controlled boundary to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 for years 2020-2022
- selected ISFSI-related condition reports issued since the last NRC ISFSI inspection
- quality assurance program implementation, including recent audits, surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities related to ISFSI operations
- compliance to technical specifications for operational surveillance activities and FSAR required annual maintenance activities

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Enforcement Discretion	Enforcement Action EA-23-008: Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)	60855
<p><u>Description:</u> Upon issuance of NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 22-001 (ML22087A496), dated April 15, 2022, the licensee performed an assessment of all outdoor dry cask storage activities that were not explicitly analyzed for tornado hazards in the system's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Two configurations were identified by the licensee where transport activities did not have a related tornado wind and hazard analysis consistent with the cask's design basis requirements. These situations occurred during outside operations when the HI-STORM FW overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.</p> <p>The Holtec HI-STORM FSAR Section 2.2, <i>HI-STORM FW Design Loading</i>, which includes Section 2.2 iv. <i>Short Term Operations</i>, "normal operation evolutions necessary to support fuel loading or unloading activities," describes the general design criteria for the cask system. This includes all off-normal condition loads, environmental phenomena, and accident conditions. Specifically, FSAR Section 2.2.3.e. <i>Environmental Phenomena and Accident Condition Design Criteria - Tornado</i>, describes that the FW system must withstand pressures, wind loads, and missiles generated by a tornado while maintaining kinematic stability and continued integrity of the canister must be demonstrated. Tornado hazards are evaluated in the FSAR Section 3.1.2.1.e., <i>Design Criteria and Applicable Loads - Tornado</i>, Section 3.4.4.1, <i>Safety Analysis</i>, and Section 12.2.6.1, <i>Tornado Analysis</i>. These sections of the FSAR do not include an analysis for tornado hazards when the overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.</p>		

**Corrective Actions:** The licensee followed the guidance actions as described in the EGM. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and the licensee established additional measures to mitigate tornado hazards, through procedures, during periods of ISFSI handling operations. These actions included, restricting outdoor dry cask storage activities during periods of adverse weather, establishing meteorological criteria, designating staff to monitor weather during ISFSI handling operations, describing actions to take in the event of severe weather necessary to place the cask in an analyzed condition, minimizing the duration of ISFSI handling operations during which ISFSI important to safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are in an unanalyzed condition, documentation that required weather checks are complete prior to the start of ISFSI handling operations, and documenting in the CAP a request for the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder to request an amendment within 6 months of the date of the EGM or implement physical design modifications and/or perform evaluations that demonstrate important to safety SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including tornadoes and tornado-generated missiles prior to the expiration date of the EGM (April 15, 2024).

**Corrective Action References:** CR-HQN-2022-00782

**Enforcement:**

**Significance/Severity:** This violation was dispositioned in accordance with the traditional enforcement process using Section 2.3 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This issue was determined by inspectors to be of more than minor safety significance, since if left uncorrected, the deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The violation was evaluated to be similar to a Severity Level IV violation in Enforcement Policy Section 6.5.d.2.

**Violation:** Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 72.212 (b)(6), states, in part, that the general licensee must review the Safety Analysis Report referenced in the CoC or amended CoC and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the general license, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports.

Contrary to the above from January 10, through March 7, 2023, the licensee failed to determine whether reactor site parameters including analyses of tornado missiles were enveloped by the cask design bases. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an analysis consistent with FSAR Section 2.2 to demonstrate the FW cask system would maintain kinematic stability and continued integrity of the canister during short term operations, such as, when the overpack was on the low-profile transporter and when the Vertical Cask Transporter carried the overpack using the HI-STORM FW lifting brackets.

**Basis for Discretion:** In general, the NRC has extensive history analyzing severe weather events including tornado hazard scenarios using probabilistic methods (or risk assessments) in licensing on a case-by-case basis to assess specific plant features to prevent a release of radioactivity exceeding regulatory limits. For ISFSIs, such methods can be employed, supported by analysis, to demonstrate that tornado hazards will not impair the capability of SSCs important to safety to perform their intended design functions.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) completed a generic risk analysis of potential tornado missile protection non-compliances to examine the risk significance of tornado hazard scenarios (ML14114A556). In this case, the generic bounding risk analysis performed by NRR concluded that a tornado missile scenario is of low-risk significance at power reactor sites, due in part to the low probability of wind speeds exceeding 75 miles per hour (less than  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  per year). This generic analysis did not specifically address ISFSI handling operations but there are several key insights in the analysis that may apply to a risk assessment for this issue. Specifically, rather than evaluate site-specific configurations, the NRR generic analysis used bounding assumptions regarding tornado and high winds initiating event frequencies (IEFs) coupled with bounding assumptions for missile strike area to develop conservative estimates of core-damage frequency. This generic analysis assumes that plants are in a condition vulnerable to a tornado for a full reactor-year worth of exposure time.

For ISFSI handling operations, the vulnerable configuration would be typically limited to a few weeks of exposure time per year which would result in additional conservatism to the results documented in the NRR generic analysis. Furthermore, ISFSI handling operations that may lead to loss of confinement of radioactive material due to a missile strike or high winds should be bounded by the assumptions regarding tornado and high winds IEFs. Appropriate administrative controls including compensatory measures would provide defense-in-depth and further reduce the likelihood of occurrence and mitigate loss of confinement events. This defense-in-depth approach should include provisions to (1) preclude ISFSI handling operations during periods of adverse weather or when adverse weather is predicted, and (2) provide compensatory measures to place important to safety SSCs in an analyzed condition or provide physical protection as necessary to maintain confinement of radioactive material during ISFSI handling operations.

In summary, the combination of the low probability of tornado events in conjunction with formally documented administrative controls that (1) restrict initiation of ISFSI handling operations during projected periods of adverse weather and, (2) cease ISFSI handling operations and place important to safety SSCs in a protected configuration or analyzed condition at the outset of adverse weather conditions, form the basis for the exercise of enforcement discretion for ISFSI handling operations. As a further condition of this enforcement discretion, licensees will conduct a site-specific assessment to determine the appropriate corrective actions to ensure that important to safety SSCs will not be adversely impacted by tornado hazards. As such, the exercise of enforcement discretion limited to the conditions of this EGM will not impose significant additional risk to public health and safety.

Since this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, "Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations," and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued ISFSI handling operations.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On March 7, 2023, the inspectors presented the ISFSI triennial inspection results to John Ferrick, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 17, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mandy Halter, General Manager for Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
60855	Calculations	HI-2200993	ISFSI Site Boundary Dose Rate Calculations for Waterford 3	2
60855	Corrective Action Documents	CR HQN 2022-0782	EGM 22-01	04/19/2022
60855	Miscellaneous	Holtec HI-STORM FW FSAR	HI-STORM FW FSAR - REV 8 - Waterford	8
60855	Miscellaneous	QS-2022-W3-007	Nuclear Independent Oversight (NIOS) Follow-up Surveillance for the Performance Assessment Finding (PAF) for ineffective management of the Waterford 3 Dry Fuel Storage campaign issues documented in CR-WF3-2022-06489.	0
60855	Miscellaneous	Surveillance Report No. QS-2020-W3-006	Nuclear Independent Oversight Follow-up Surveillance of a Quality Assurance Finding (QAF) documented in CR-WF3-2020-04257 for procedure use and adherence issues identified during the 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit, QA-20-2020-W3-01.	8
60855	Miscellaneous	Surveillance Report No. QS-2021-W3-004	Nuclear Independent Oversight Second Follow-up Surveillance of a Quality Assurance Finding (QAF) documented in CR-WF3-2020-04257 for procedure use and adherence issues identified during the 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit, QA-20-2020-W3-01.	8
60855	Miscellaneous	USA/72-1032	Certificate of Compliance for Spent Fuel Storage Casks - Certificate No. 1032	5
60855	Procedures	OP-903-001	Technical Specification Surveillance Logs	102
60855	Procedures	Surveillances for Week of 04-12-2020.pdf	Surveillances for Week of 04-12-2020 using OP-903-001.	0
60855	Procedures	Surveillances for Week of 08-15-2021.pdf	Surveillances for Week of 08-15-2021 using OP-903-001.	0
60855	Procedures	Surveillances for Week of 09-18-	Surveillances for Week of 09-18-2022 using OP-903-001.	0

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		2022.pdf		
60855	Radiation Surveys	ISFSI AREA DLR Data April 2019 to Jul 2022 by Area Designation.xlsx	ISFSI AREA DLR Data April 2019 to Jul 2022 by Area Designation	0
60855	Radiation Surveys	ISFSI TLD Data 2021	Dose from year 2021 on all TLDs on perimeter fence.	0
60855	Self-Assessments	QA-20-2020-W3-1	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Audit 2020	0
60855	Self-Assessments	QA-20-2022-W3-1	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) Audit 2022	0
60855	Work Orders	WO 52388198	CRNMCRN0006 - INSPECT CRANE PER MM & ME PROCEDURES	1
60855	Work Orders	WO 52959322	Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2022	1
60855	Work Orders	WO-52866741	Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2020	0
60855	Work Orders	WO-52919595	Annual External Surface Examination on Accessible Surfaces of the HI-STORM 100S Overpack - 2021	1
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00733	
71111.04	Miscellaneous	W3-DBD-001	Safety Injection System Design Basis Document	305
71111.04	Procedures	OP-002-001	Auxiliary Component Cooling Water	320
71111.04	Procedures	OP-002-003	Component Cooling Water	322
71111.04	Procedures	OP-002-010	Reactor Auxiliary Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning and Containment Purge	317
71111.04	Procedures	OP-006-008	Transformer Operation	311
71111.04	Procedures	OP-009-002	Emergency Diesel Generator	360
71111.04	Procedures	OP-009-008	Operating Procedure Safety Injection System	48
71111.04	Work Orders		52931846	
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00328, 2023-00330, 2023-00333, 2023-00341	



Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Resulting from Inspection			
71111.05	Fire Plans	NS-TB-001	+15 Turbine Building Switchgear/East	16
71111.05	Fire Plans	NS-TB-002	+15 Turbine Building West	6
71111.05	Fire Plans	RAB 2-003	Chilled Water Tanks and CCW Surge Tank Rooms	9
71111.05	Fire Plans	RAB 3-001	HVAC Equipment Room	11
71111.05	Fire Plans	RAB-15A-001	Emergency Diesel Oil Feed Tank B Space	6
71111.05	Fire Plans	RAB-16A-001	Emergency Diesel Oil Feed Tank A Space	6
71111.05	Procedures	EN-OP-115-17	Fire Brigade Organization and Responsibilities	0
71111.05	Procedures	EN-OP-125	Fire Brigade Drills	0
71111.11Q	Procedures	EN-OP-115	Conduct of Operations	31
71111.11Q	Procedures	EN-RE-302	PWR Reactivity Maneuver	5
71111.11Q	Procedures	OP-010-004	Power Operations	341
71111.11Q	Procedures	OP-010-005	Plant Shutdown	343
71111.11Q	Procedures	OP-902-000	Standard Post Trip Actions	17
71111.11Q	Procedures	OP-902-003	Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery	
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2022-03704, 2022-04112	
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-01104, 2023-01171	
71111.12	Engineering Evaluations	EC-92951	Availability of Shutdown Cooling in Modes 5 & 6 for Refuel 24	0
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00739, 2023-01181	
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00789, 2023-00734	
71111.13	Miscellaneous	1-EFW-PUMP-EFWMPMP0001 AB	Tagout	01/12/2023
71111.13	Procedures	EN-WM-104	On Line Risk Assessment	24

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71111.13	Work Orders		580044, 563477, 585886	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2022-03463, 2022-04265, 2022-06268, 2023-00343, 2023-00510, 2023-00743, 2023-00862, 2023-00863, 2023-00867, 2023-00870, 2023-01181, 2023-01185	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00934	
71111.15	Drawings	5817-514	36" Type 9220 Valve	February 1978
71111.15	Engineering Changes	EC 81134	Operability Input to Evaluate Corrosion	01/14/2019
71111.15	Engineering Changes	EC 94716	Operability Input for Corroded Weld on CCRR-393	02/10/2023
71111.15	Miscellaneous	W3-DBD-010	Containment Cooling HVAC and Related Systems	2
71111.15	Miscellaneous	WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report	316
71111.15	Procedures	MI-003-409	Containment Aire Cooler Condensate Flow Switches Channel Functional Test	302
71111.15	Work Orders		516390, 580421, 580779, 586267, 590775	
71111.18	Drawings	G172	Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System	40
71111.18	Drawings	G204 Sh7	Reactor Auxiliary and Containment Building Miscellaneous Piping	14
71111.18	Engineering Evaluations	EC 94938	Impact of Isolation of RC-115B and RC-108B	0
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2023-00466	
71111.24	Miscellaneous	W3-DBD-001	Safety Injection System Design Basis Document	305
71111.24	Miscellaneous	W3-DBD-4	Component Cooling Water Auxiliary Component Cooling Water	307
71111.24	Procedures	ME-003-318	GE Undervoltage Relay Model 12IAV55C	307 and 308
71111.24	Procedures	ME-003-410	Motor-Operated Valve Thermal Overload Channel Calibration	314
71111.24	Procedures	OP-903-030	Safety Injection System Pump Operability Verification	41

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71111.24	Procedures	OP-903-050	Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump and Valve Operability Test	45
71111.24	Procedures	OP-903-107	Plant Protection System Channel Functional Test	318
71111.24	Procedures	OP-903-118	Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests	64
71111.24	Procedures	OP-903-121	Safety Systems Quarterly Inservice Testing Valve Tests	36
71111.24	Work Orders		52979572, 53020393, 52968090, 52969093, 52978733	
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2022-0025	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 1st Quarter 2022	04/20/2022
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2022-0047	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 2nd Quarter 2022	07/20/2022
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2022-0061	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter 2022	10/20/2022
71151	Miscellaneous	W3F1-2023-0003	NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 4th Quarter 2022	01/20/2023
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CR-WF3-YYYY-NNNN	2022-4908, 2022-4926, 2022-4937	