

LaSalle County Station 2601 North 21st Road Marseilles, IL 61341 815-415-2000 Telephone

10 CFR 50.73

RA22-055

February 9, 2022

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

> LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 <u>NRC Docket No 50-374</u>

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2022-003-01, Supplement to Manual Scram due to Isophase Bus Duct Fire and 2A RPS Normal Power Supply Trip.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Constellation Energy Generation, LLEC (CEG) is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2022-003-01 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2.

There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dan Mearhoff, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,

John Van Flut

John Van Fleet Jr Plant Manager LaSalle County Station

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station

NRC FOR				U.S. NUC	LEAR REC	GULATOR	Y COMN	ISSION	AP	PROVED BY ON	AB: NO. 3150	-0104	EXPIRE	S: 08/3	31/2023
(08-2020) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form <u>http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/</u>)								form	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Ubrary, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0017, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attri: Desk ail: <u>or a submission@omb.eco.gov</u> . The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.						
1. Facilit	ty Name								Γ	2. Do	ocket Number	8	3. Pag	ie.	
LaSa	alle Co	ounty Stat	tion, Unit	2					0	5000 - 374			1	OF	3
4. Title Mani	ual Sc	ram due	to Isopha	ise Bus Du	ict Fire f	followed	l by 2/	A RPS	Nc	ormal Power	Supply Tr	ip			
5	5. Event l	Date	<u> </u>	6. LER Number	r	7	. Report	Date			8. Other I	Facilities Invo	olved		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision No.	Month	Day	Year	ır	Facility Name NA			N		et Number
09	26	2022	2022	003	01	02	03	202	23	Facility Name NA			N		et Number
9. Opera	9. Operating Mode 10. Power Level 100 percent														
		11	I. This Rep	ort is Submi	tted Purs	suant to t	he Req	uiremer	nts	of 10 CFR §: (Check all th	at apply)			
10	CFR P	art 20	20.7	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(iv	v)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(x)			
20.	.2201(b)	,	20.7	2203(a)(3)(i)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(v	10 (CFR Pa	art 73		
20.	.2201(d)	1	20.2	2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.69(g	g)			50.73(a)(2)(v	/)(B)	73.71(a))(4)		
20.	.2203(a)((1)	20.2	2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)				50.73(a)(2)(v	73.71(a))(5)			
20.	.2203(a)((2)(i)	10 C	FR Part 21		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)				50.73(a)(2)(v	/)(D)	73.77(a))(1)(i)		
20.	.2203(a)((2)(ii)	21.2	.(c)		50.73(;	a)(2)(i)(C	2)		50.73(a)(2)(v	/ii) [73.77(a))(2)(i)		
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			10 C	10 CFR Part 50			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v	iii)(A)	73.77(a))(2)(ii)		
20.	.2203(a)((2)(iv)	50.3	86(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(;	a)(2)(ii)(E	B)		50.73(a)(2)(v	iii)(B)				
20.:	.2203(a)((2)(v)	50.3	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)					50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						-
Π οτι	HER (Sr	pecify here, i	in abstract, c	or NRC 366A).											
					12.	Licensee	Conta	ct for th	nis L	ER					
Licensee (CJ Sn		Operations	s Directo	r					Phone Number (Include area code) (815) 415-2200						
			13.	Complete Or	ie Line fc	or each C	ompon	ent Fail	ure	Described in t	this Report				
Cause		System	Component	t Manufactur	er Report	table to IR	IS	Cause	0	System	Component	t Manufactu	urer Re	portabl	le to IRIS
Х		EF	RHE	O026		Y		D		MP	GBU	X100	,	Y	<u>,</u>
	14. Supplemental Report Expected									in Data	Month	Day		Year	
No		X Y	es (If yes, c	omplete 15.	Expected	d Submission Date)				. Expected Submission Date		04	03		2023
6. Abstra	ct (Limit	to 1560 spac	es, i.e., appr	oximately 15 sir	ngle-space	d typewritte	en lines)								
										rcent power,					

At 0238 CDT on September 26, 2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was initiated due to a reported fire on the isophase bus duct. The scram was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally with the exception of a loss of 2A reactor protection system (RPS) normal power supply. The 2A RPS normal power supply output breaker tripped on over voltage. Operations successfully transferred 2A RPS power to the alternate power supply. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on September 26, 2022.

The cause of the 2A RPS loss of normal power was a degraded voltage adjust potentiometer (POT) on the output breaker. The most likely cause of the isophase bus duct fire is written guidance that governs the work did not provide the detailed instructions needed to perform disassembly and reassembly of the Unit 2 Isophase Bus Duct (IPBD) bolted connections with high precision.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR	REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: N	O. 3150-010	4 EXPIRES	: 08/31/2023
(08-2020)			Estimated burden per response to c	omply with this m	andatory collection request:	80 hours. Reported
			lessons learned are incorporated int regarding burden estimate to the FO			
			Nuclear Regulatory Commissio Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and	the OMB reviewe	r at: OMB Office of Informat	tion and Regulator
**************************************			Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Off Washington, DC 20503; e-mail:	cer for the Nuclea	r Regulatory Commission, 7 omb.eop.gov. The NRC m	25 17th Street NW hay not conduct o
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and gu http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collecti			sponsor, and a person is not require requesting or requiring the collection	ed to respond to,	a collection of information ur	nless the documen
1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOC	KET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER	
				YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REV NO.
LaSalle County Station, Unit 2	<u> </u>	05000- 374		2022	- 003	- 01
NARRATIVE				2022	- 003	- 01
Plant and System Identification						
LaSalle County Station Unit 2 is a G The affected systems were the Main	eneral Electronic Elec	ctric Boiling Water stem (MP) and the	Reactor with 3546 Mega Reactor Protection Syst	watts Ther em (RPS).	mal Rated Core P	ower.
The MP system provides safe and re network.	eliable distr	ibution of electrica	I power from the Main G	enerator to	the off-site transn	nission
RPS initiates a rapid insertion of all t neutron flux instrumentation become setpoints, power sources, and contro	es inoperab	le, or a manual sc	ram signal is inserted by	the operat	or. In addition, the	Э
Condition Prior to Event						
Unit(s): 2 Date	e: e(s) Name:	September 26, Power Operatio		ie: 0238 ver Level: 1		
Description						
Fire and manual scram						
Electrical Maintenance personnel ide the Unit 2 isolated phase bus duct ar 0230 CDT they notified the MCR tha Operations dispatched the fire brigad scrammed at 0238 CDT. The brigade reported extinguished at 0240 CDT.	nd notified It there was de and ente	the Main Control F s visible sparks, sn ered abnormal ope	Room (MCR). The Field noke and indications of a erations procedures for a	Supervisor fire from the fire. The u	was dispatched a ne bus duct enclos nit was manually	nd at
2A RPS Breaker trip						
Following the Manual Scram, the 2A occurred as expected following the lo RPS power to the alternate feed and	oss of A RF	S power. Operation	ons entered abnormal or			
Cause						
The most likely cause of the isophase instructions needed to perform disase high precision. This resulted in degra The overheating resulted in a failure gasket.	sembly and aded shuni	d reassembly of th bolted connection	e Unit 2 Isophase Bus D resistance causing ove	uct (IPDB) rheating in	bolted connection the bolted connec	s with tions.
The cause of the 2A RPS Breaker tri	p was a de	graded voltage ad	ljust potentiometer.			
Reportability and Safety Analysis						
Fire and manual scram						
The fire was extinguished in less than and station emergency power source promptly to extinguish the fire and the other than the bus duct itself.	es were ava	ailable at all times	throughout the event. Er	nergency re	esponse personne	acted

NRC FORM 366A (08-2020)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET CONTINUATION SHEET	RC FORM 366A -2020)	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/202								
I. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 05000-374 YEAR Securemat. VARRATIVE RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event or condition that results in the actuation of the F When the reactor is critical. An ENS report was made to the NRC at 0639 on September 26, 2022 (EN# 56120). 2A RPS Breaker trip The RPS is divided into two trip systems that are physically and electrically independent. The design of this system is suc that the loss of power to one of these trip systems neither prevents nor causes a reactor scram. Normal power to RPS bus and associated RPS actuation was considered an invalid actuation because it was not the result of a valid signal and not an intentional manual action. The RPS bus loss condition resulted general containment isolation signals that affected containment isolation values system or multiple main steam isolation values while the unit was critical. Therefore, the RPS bus loss condition is reportable in accordance with 1 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Safety System Functional Failure Review The system equipment responses di nor result in a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as defined in accordance with 1 NE 199-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline." The RPS logic safety function was satisfied by its actuation for designed inputs. Corrective Actions Corrective actions taken in response to the conditions were: Unit 2 Manually scrammed. Fire brigade dispatched and fire promptly extinguished. Swap 2A RPS to alternate power supply and Int 1	See NUREG-1022, R.31	CONTINUATION	SHEET	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Report lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send commu- regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by e-mail Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regula Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street I Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: <u>oira submission@omb.eop.gov</u> . The NRC may not conduc sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the docum requesting a cranuition generation dired was a current weith OMB office of information unless						
LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 05000-374 NUMBER 2022 -003 - VARRATIVE ARRATIVE RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event or condition that results in the actuation of the F when the reactor is critical. An ENS report was made to the NRC at 0639 on September 26, 2022 (EN# 56120). 2A RPS Breaker trip The RPS is divided into two trip systems that are physically and electrically independent. The design of this system is suc that the loss of power to one of these trip systems neither prevents nor causes a reactor scram. Normal power to RPS bu A and B is supplied by two motor-generator (MG) sets. Alternate power for either RPS bus inform the Alternate Instrumer and RPS Bus Transformer. The loss of an RPS bus and associated RPS actuation was considered an invalid actuation because it was not the result of a valid signal and not an intertinonal manual action. The RPS bus loss condition resulted general containment isolation signals that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves while the unit was critical. Therefore, the RPS bus loss condition is reportable in accordance with 1 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Safety System Functional Failure Review The system equipment responses to the conditions were: • Unit 2 Manually scrammed. • Fire brigade dispatched and fire promptly extinguished. • Swap 2A RPS to alternate power supply and restored containment isolations • Degraded 2A RPS voltage potentiometer replaced and normal power to 2A RPS restored. • D			2. DOC							
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POI.	31, 2021, the 2A RP									
	POT.									

Component Failure Data Device: 2A RPS Logic MG Set Output Breaker – Voltage Adjustment Potentiometer Component Type: Rheostat / Potentiometer [RHE] Manufacturer: Ohmite [0026] Part: RHS500

Device: Bus, Iso Phase, Main Power Transformer Component Type: Bus, isolated phase [GBU] Manufacturer: Commonwealth Edison [X000] Part: 706232