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THE VENDOR TIMES

NRC/NRR/DRO The Vendor Times **December 2022**

The Director's Cut

Christopher Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Oversight

In fiscal year (FY) 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) vendor inspection staff conducted a total of 11 inspections for operating reactors, including vendor and quality assurance (QA) implementation. In addition to inspections, the vendor inspection staff observed three Nuclear Procurement Issues Corporation (NUPIC) audits, conducted three licensing audit and participated in four NRC Region 2 assists. One of the NUPIC observations was conducted in support of the staff's review of NEI 17-06 "Guidance on Using International Electrotechnical Commission 61508 SIL Certification to Support the Acceptance of Commercial Grade Digital Equipment of Nuclear Safety Related Applications". This document will allow NRC inspections to be streamlined and will provide less regulatory uncertainty in the dedication of commercial digital items while continuing to ensure safety and security.

During these inspections and audits, the NRC evaluates vendors' compliance with Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance."

The vendor inspection staff performed a number of hybrid inspections to accommodate the travel restrictions associated with the Coronavirus disease pandemic 2019 (COVID-19) and each vendor's personnel availability and facility operations. Taking this approach allowed the vendor inspection staff to perform all of the scheduled activities for FY 2022, which included vendor inspections that were delayed from FY 2021 due to the impact of COVID-19.

The vendor inspection staff continued to maintain continual communication with the nuclear supply chain stakeholders via the 8th Workshop on Vendor Oversight which was held virtually on June 2022 with approximately 300 attendees participating in this two-day meeting. The NRC's 2023 Town Hall Meeting on Vendor Oversight is tentatively scheduled for June 2023. These public meetings are important because they provide an opportunity to our stakeholder in the nuclear supply chain to engage directly with the NRC staff to discuss regulatory and technical issues of interest to them.

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- Tribute to Paul Prescott

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The Director's Cut (cont.)

The vendor inspection staff led the agency efforts in responding to the Office of Inspector general's audit on Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Items (CFSI) and special inquiry report. Additional information on this topic is provided in an article below.

The vendor inspection staff continues to communicate and engage industry organizations on topics related to quality assurance and vendor oversight. The NRC inspection staff participates in multiple meetings throughout the FY with organizations such as NUPIC, the Vendor Inspection Cooperation Working Group (VICWG), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Joint Utility Task Group (JUTG), and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III and Section XI, ASME Board of Conformity Assessment, and the ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1).

Our inspection reports are publicly available on the NRC's Vendor Quality Assurance Inspection website at: https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/oversight/quality-assurance/vendor-insp.html along with our presentations made at the various industry meetings.

Christopher Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Oversight

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2022 Vendor Inspection Trends and Additional Oversight activities

The Vendor Inspection Program Plan (VIPP) verifies that reactor applicants and licensees are fulfilling their regulatory obligations with respect to providing effective oversight of the supply chain. It accomplishes this through a number of activities, including performing vendor inspections that will verify the effective implementation of the vendor's QA program, establishing a strategy for vendor identification and selection criteria, and ensuring vendor inspectors obtain the necessary knowledge and skills to perform inspections. In addition, the VIPP addresses interactions with nuclear consensus standard organizations, industry and external stakeholders, and international constituents. From October 1, 2021 to September 30, 2022, the vendor inspection staff completed a total of 11 vendor inspections. The NRC issued three Notice of Nonconformance (NON) against vendors during FY 2022. Regarding 10 CFR Part 21, one Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to vendors during FY 2022.

FY 2022 NOVs and NONs



Vendor Inspection Findings

FY 2022 Vendor Activities



Vendor activities

The NONs cited against the vendors fell within Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services" and Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions" of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC inspection staff does not consider this to be indicative of any industry trend but will place more focus on these two criteria during future vendor inspections.

In addition to inspections for new and operating reactors, there is still a need to continue to perform limited inspections of vendor's safeguards information programs and inspections of National Strategic Alliance for FLEX Emergency Response (SAFER) facilities.

Also, the NRC inspection staff continues to assess supply chains of the advanced reactors under development/construction in order to provide effective oversight of vendors and to ensure that the quality of materials, equipment, and services supplied by these vendors are consistent with the regulations.

- Frankie Vega, Reactor Operations Engineer

2022 Vendor Workshop

2022 Vendor Workshop

From June 1 to June 2, 2022, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Division of Reactor Oversight (DRO), successfully hosted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) 8th Workshop on Vendor Oversight. Due to concerns regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the importance of social distancing, the NRC held the workshop virtually. The workshop had an audience of about 300 attendees, representing companies and organizations from 10 countries including vendors, industry groups, government regulatory agencies, and both foreign and domestic utilities. The workshop provided an open forum for exchanging information regarding the supply of components and materials to both new and operating nuclear power plants. The workshop included a keynote address by the DRO Director, Mr. Chris Miller, as well as presentations from members of the NRC staff, Cooper Nuclear Station, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and Duke Energy. Presentations included the following topics: (1) the NRC staff's response to the Office of Inspector General's report on Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items; (2) Nuclear Procurement Issues Corporation's audit team and supplier interface before, during, and after the audit; (3) assessment of laboratories owned by the U.S. Department of Energy; (4) commercial-grade dedication inspections at licensees; (5) lessons learned from inspecting during a pandemic; (6) implementation of the EPRI guidance on hybrid and remote assessments; and (7) lessons learned from implementing the EPRI guidance on hybrid and remote assessments. In addition, there were two open question and answer sessions each day of the workshop.

For more information on the workshop, please visit the following ink:

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/oversight/quality-assurance/vendor-oversight.html

- Yamir Diaz-Castillo, Reactor Operations Engineer

Assessment of the Department of Energy's Nationals Laboratories

In a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated May 9, 2013 to the Nuclear Energy Institute (Agencywide Documents Access Management System Accession (ADAMS) No. ML13023A051), the NRC staff documented its regulatory position that Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" and 10CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approval for Nuclear Power Plants," licensees, Authorized Nuclear Inspection agencies, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and other State and Federal agencies, which may provide items or services to NRC licensees, are not required to be evaluated or audited as these are organizations known to the NRC to have acceptable Quality Assurance programs. The NRC staff has received several inquiries from nuclear industry

stakeholders on what type of assessment is required for the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories that provide basic components and services to the U.S. nuclear power industry.

The DOE national laboratories are contractor operated facilities owned or leased by the U.S. Federal Government and managed by third party contractors. As such, the national laboratories are not considered Federal agencies, and the NRC staff's regulatory position outlined in the May 2013 SER does not apply to the national laboratories.

Therefore, when licensees, applicants, and vendors procure items or services from a DOE national laboratory that will be used in a safety-related application, they are responsible for verifying the effective implementation of the laboratory's programmatic quality controls and other technical and regulatory requirements imposed through contractual documents, as applicable, consistent with Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50. This technical position will be documented in a Regulatory Issue Summary that is expected to be issued before the Summer 2023.

- Yamir Diaz-Castillo, Reactor Operations Engineer

Mutual Benefits to NRC and NUPIC as Learning Organizations

Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part, that "The effectiveness of the control of quality by contractors and subcontractors shall be assessed by the applicant or designee at intervals consistent with the importance, complexity, and quantity of the product or services." As such, NRC-licensees are responsible for the oversight of their suppliers and therefore, as part of their QA program implementation, perform audits and surveys of their safety-related and commercial suppliers, respectively.

Since each NRC-licensee is responsible for maintaining their own approved-supplier lists (ASL) and auditing their suppliers to maintain them on the ASL, it would quickly become overwhelming to individual suppliers to support all of those licensee audits. In order to mitigate the concern as well as ensure for a robust and standardized oversight program, the industry developed the Nuclear Procurement Issues Corporation (NUPIC). NUPIC was formed in 1989 by a partnership involving all domestic and several international nuclear utilities. The NUPIC organization has developed standardized checklists used to guide the performance of supplier audits and surveys, and as part of the organizations duties helps coordinate joint utility audits and surveys of the supply chain. These joint audits and surveys serve to fulfill each licensee's responsibilities for oversight of selected suppliers that provide components or services to five or more NUPIC members.

While the NRC expects licensees to fulfill their responsibilities to perform oversight of their suppliers, the NRC's Quality Assurance and Vendor Inspection Branch (IQVB) periodically observes NUPIC joint utility audits to confirm that the industry is adequately performing audits of safety-related suppliers consistent with the NUPIC policies and procedures to confirm adequate implementation of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements.

NRC's Inspection Procedure (IP) 43005, "NRC Oversight of Third-Party Organizations Implementing Quality Assurance Requirements," was developed by the NRC staff to verify, by direct observation, the effectiveness of the independent oversight activities performed by third-party organizations, such as NUPIC, to qualify vendors in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 21. IP 43005 provides guidance to the NRC inspectors to observe the NUPIC team as they perform their audit

activities including accompanying the NUPIC auditors while they perform facility walkdowns, observations of production, testing, or inspection activities, or interviews with vendor personnel. In addition, NRC inspectors sample documents reviewed by the auditing organization and observe NUPIC team meetings and discussions regarding their evaluations.

At Vendor inspection: Greg Galletti, Yamir Diaz-Castillo and Paul Prescott

The NRC has found periodic observations to be invaluable for assessing the industry's approaches and activities when performing oversight of the supply chain to help ensure adequate implementation of Appendix B to10 CFR Part 50 requirements by NRC-licensees and ultimately preserve supply chain integrity which is vital to the successful construction and operation of our Nation's commercial nuclear fleet.

Greg Galletti, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer

SAFER Inspection Overview

During the week of July 25 to 29, 2022 the NRC inspected the Strategic Alliance for *FLEX* Emergency Response (SAFER) Facility in Memphis, TN. SAFER is responsible for the storage, maintenance, and testing of SAFER FLEX equipment by NRC licensees to mitigate the consequences of a beyond-design-basis accident. Since the SAFER facility has the same turbine generators as the one that failed as Susquehanna, the NRC inspectors reviewed SAFER's response to the Susquehanna Turbine Generator (STG) catastrophic failure. The NRC inspectors found that SAFER personnel communicated with Susquehanna and the turbine generator vendor after the STG unit failure and documented their findings in a corrective action report. Susquehanna's evaluation did not identify a specific root cause for the Phase 2 equipment failure; however, the speed trip timing setting was suspected to be longer than necessary to prevent the engine from going into an overspeed condition and resulted in the failure. In response to this suspected cause, SAFER implemented multiple corrective actions which included designing, testing and installing a ballistic blanket around the turbine generator combustion chamber, thus reducing the potential for fatalities in case of catastrophic failure. In addition, SAFER changed the generators' speed trip timing settings for multiple instances based on information received from the generator vendor and an engineering evaluation that was performed. The final speed trip timing setting was set just below than the original settings. The NRC inspectors also observed SAFER test a generator that had the corrective actions in place and did not identify any issues with the test. The NRC inspectors noted that SAFER worked with limited information from the generator vendor to develop reasonable and adequate corrective actions in response to the catastrophic failure of the STG .

- **Aaron Armstrong, Reactor Operations Engineer**

NRC's Response to the Office of the Inspector General's Audit on Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items



On February 9, 2022, the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued report OIG-22-A-06, "Audit of NRC's Oversight of Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items [(CFSI)] at Nuclear Power Reactors," (Agencywide Document Accession and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 22040A058) documenting its findings and recommendations for the NRC to improve its oversight of CFSI at nuclear power plants. This audit report identified two areas for improvement: (1) NRC should clarify and communicate with stakeholders on how the NRC collects, assesses, and disseminates information regarding CFSI; and (2) NRC should improve its staff's awareness on CFSI. The report included eight specific recommendations based on the audit findings as follows:

1. Develop processes and guidance to collect, process, and disseminate CFSI information;

2. Communicate those processes across the agency, or at least to the divisions affected by CFSI;

3. Develop a coherent agencywide approach for CFSI, identifying the agency's primary objective regarding mitigation of CFIS into agency-regulated equipment, components, systems, and structures;

4. Clearly define CFSI;

5. Include a CFSI category in the Allegation Management System (AMS);

6. Develop inspection guidance with examples pertaining to identifying CFSI in inspection procedures;

7. Develop CFSI training for inspectors; and,

8. Develop a knowledge management and succession plan for CFSI.

On April 11, 2022, the NRC staff issued its response (ADAMS Accession No. ML22077A775) to the OIG's audit report in which it agreed with the recommendations in the OIG's audit report and provided planned actions to address each recommendation. Specifically, the NRC staff committed to following:

1. The NRC staff will enhance the existing processes and guidance in the NRC CFSI Technical Review Group (TRG) desktop guide to include a more detailed and systematic process to collect, process, and disseminate CFSI information.

2. The NRC staff will disseminate the CFSI TRG desktop guide to liaisons in the NRC program and regional offices as well as develop a communications plan on this subject.

3. The NRC staff will develop an agencywide charter for activities related to CFSI.

4. The NRC staff will incorporate the definition for CFSI in relevant agency guidance documents.

5. The NRC staff will include a CFSI category in the AMS.

6. The NRC staff will evaluate current inspection guidance across business lines and identify potential CFSI guidance in inspection procedures (IPs) that should be revised to provide CFSI guidance.

7. The NRC staff will develop an individual study activity (ISA) on the topic of CFSI to be included in inspection manuals that support different inspection programs.

8. The NRC staff will incorporate CFSI knowledge management plans into the NRC's Knowledge Management Program and workforce planning activities.

The NRC staff provided the OIG with a status update (ADAMS Accession No. ML22237A227) on each of the planned action from the staff's response on September 20, 2022. In this update, the NRC staff documented:

1. The issuance of Revision 1 of the CFSI TRG desktop guide that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder and provided enhancements to the NRC's processes for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating CFSI information.

2. The planned dissemination of the revised CFSI TRG desktop guide to liaisons within NRC program and regional offices affected by CFSI.

3. The issuance of an NRC Charter on Activities Related to CFSI.

4. The development of a formal NRC definition for CFSI and the identification of guidance documents that should be revised to incorporate this definition.

5. The inclusion of CFSI as a category in AMS.

6. The incorporation of CFSI guidance in the recently issued IP 71111.21N.03, "Commercial Grade Dedication," and identification of other relevant inspection guidance that will be revised to include CFSI guidance.

7. The identification of relevant inspection manual chapters for the inspector qualification activities of different inspection programs that should be revised to incorporate an ISA on CFSI.

8. The planned updates to NRC's internal knowledge management webpage for CFSI to incorporate additional guidance on CFSI and proposed future training for new CFSI TRG members.

Based on this status report, the OIG issued its analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML22280A058) of the staff's actions to date on each of the recommendations in which it agreed that recommendations 1, 3, and 5 are closed and the remaining recommendations remain open and resolved. The NRC staff will continue to work towards completing the remaining actions by October of 2023 and will be provide another status update to the OIG by May 31, 2023.

- Deanna Zhang, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer

A Day in the Life of a Construction Resident Inspector

It's Monday morning and I walk into the Vogtle 3 and 4 resident office, and before I can set my stuff down, a field engineer follows me into the office to inform me of the walkdown scheduled to happen after lunch is about to start in five minutes and the weld inspection that was supposed to happen this morning was performed last night. Also, the envelope that was slid under the office door is an allegation that I need to process along with everything else on my plate for today. This day is not uncommon in the Vogtle 3 and 4 resident office. If there is anything constant in our construction environment, it's change.

Senior Construction Inspector Raju Patel inspecting reactor internals after hot functional testing

As construction resident inspectors (CRIs), we are the onsite eyes and ears of the NRC and we verify with reasonable assurance that the plant is being built as designed and will operate safely. To do that, we need to be aware of construction and testing activities happening on any given day. In addition to attending the plan-of-the-day meeting, we interact routinely with field engineers, test engineers, operators, and many other licensing staff to gather status information on construction and testing activities. Unlike the operating reactor fleets, with detailed outage/online work tracking databases, there are too many moving parts for this project to only rely on a schedule, so communication is key!

The CRIs implement the construction reactor oversight process, conducting inspections to verify the as-built facility conforms to the conditions of the combined license, an element under the Part 52 licensing process for new reactors. A big portion of our inspections focus on Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). As the Vogtle Unit 3 is wrapping up construction, another big focus of our inspections is preoperational testing activities, and readiness of programs that will be required during operation. The CRIs perform procedural reviews prior to testing to determine if the test procedures satisfy Chapter 14, "Initial Test Program," of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors also observe testing of the various safety related structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and review documents after testing is completed to verify the acceptance criteria was met. These inspections are conducted in parallel in accordance with various inspection procedures and allow us to verify the facilities are constructed as designed and the licensee will have the appropriate programs in place to operate them safely.

Since there are many construction and testing activities happening at the same time, we therefore select "smart" samples based on the risk significance of the plant SSCs, the uniqueness of the testing or construction activity, or if during the process of building or installing an SSC, the inspection attribute that is made inaccessible. These types of samples ensure an adequate variety of activities are inspected throughout construction. For example, when we were informed the pressurizer safety valves would be installed, we selected various aspects of installation to observe such as staging, cleanliness, welding, final nondestructive examination (NDE) records, and associated testing. Using this approach, if we do not get to inspect all aspects or if we do not get to inspect the installation of both valves, we would still be able to inspect a sufficient amount of the installation to complete the inspection sample.

One of the most significant inspection walkdowns I performed occurred over approximately a six-month period when the licensee was performing extensive repairs for the Unit 3 spent fuel pool and fuel transfer

canal. I observed the replacement and welding of the duplex stainless steel liner floor plates, the extensive testing including phased array ultrasonic testing, vacuum box testing, and leakage tests, and reviewed root causes, and corrective actions. It was truly an NRC team effort, but these are the kinds of things the CRIs are looking for out in the plant.

Providing reasonable assurance that the plant will **operate** safely starts with CRIs doing our part to provide reasonable assurance the plant has been **constructed** safely and in accordance with licensing requirements and construction codes. This is extremely important because there will be areas of the plant that will be inaccessible once it enters commercial operation. We, as CRIs, inspect those areas during construction. This is why I believe the CRIs at Vogtle 3 and 4 play a major role in carrying out the NRC's mission of protecting people and the environment!

Resident Inspector Brian Griman performing containment closeout inspection prior to Integrated Leak Rate Test

- Raju Patel, Senior Construction Inspector

Draft Guide 1403 (Proposed Regulatory Guide 1.28, Revision 6)

The NRC staff has completed its review of ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance NQA-1-2017, NQA-1-2019, and NQA-1-2022 and determined that these editions are one method for meeting the regulatory requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. These editions will be endorsed in Draft Guide (DG) 1403 (Proposed Revision 6 to Regulatory Guide 1.28), "Quality Assurance Program Criteria (Design and Construction)." The staff is proposing two new regulatory positions. One is in reference to Part II, Subpart 2.2 stating that Etching shall not be used on nickel alloys, weld areas, or sensitized areas of stainless steel. The second new position is related to Part II, Subpart 2.5, stating Codes and standards are referenced or invoked throughout Subpart 2.5. When the referenced or invoked code or standard becomes superseded or canceled, licensees or applicants need to submit their proposed alternative for NRC review and approval, as appropriate, for continued use of the code or standard or a proposed alternative. Dates for draft guide for public review will be available by the end of this year. After public comments are considered and incorporated as appropriate, the revised guide is issued as final. The staff provides the public notice of the issuance of the RG by publication in the Federal Register.

The NRC staff will then update the staff's quality assurance program review guidance in Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 17.5, "Quality Assurance Program Description – Design Certification, Early Site Permit and New License Applicants." The staff and applicants should use the SRP as superseded or supplemented by new or revised regulations, regulatory guidance, staff analyses of previous applications, and other published staff positions to perform its review of a power reactor operating license application and a proposed change to an existing operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, or a new reactor license application under 10 CFR Part 52.

- Andrea Keim, Reactor Operations Engineer

Tribute to Paul Prescott

It is with mixed emotions that we announce the retirement of Mr. Paul Prescott. Paul joined the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1991, as a Resident Inspector bringing extensive experience in reactor design and operations to the oversight of Quad Cities and Palisades from 1991 to 1999. He demonstrated his technical expertise with the identification of significant issues such as maintenance and engineering deviations associated with a dropped control rod blade, reactor core isolation cooling issues, emergency diesel generator high crankcase pressure, and improper use of Furmanite in the plant.

From 1999 to 2002, Mr. Prescott assumed the responsibility of Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) at Duane Arnold. He was responsible for planning, executing and the successful completion of the reactor oversight process (ROP). While SRI, he excelled at licensee oversight, identifying significant issues such as the potential for water hammer in the high-pressure coolant injection exhaust line, emergency service water system piping wall thinning, and weaknesses in the licensee's temporary modification program.

At Vendor Workshop: Paul Prescott

Paul has always demonstrated outstanding leadership and technical expertise. In 2002, he joined the Quality Assurance (QA) and Vendor Inspection Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) where he was the lead technical reviewer of QA programs for several highly visible reviews such as naval reactors, first-of-a-kind Moly-99 medical utilization facilities, and vendor QA programs.

During his many years with the Quality Assurance and Vendor Inspection branch, Paul demonstrated his highly specialized technical expertise to develop NRC guidance for areas where guidance did not exist and improved staff and industry guidance in several areas, including commercial-grade dedication (CGD), software QA, and QA consistent with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," and selected portions of Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." He was also the principal developer of the NRC's QA program guidance for 10 CFR Part 52 applications for the design, construction, and eventual operation of new reactors.

Although Paul often exudes an intimidating presence and very direct presentation style, he is truly one of the kindest, thoughtful gentlemen you could know. His approach to all things "QA" is based on excellence in performing one's duties and he continues to set a very high-standard and strives to educate those interested in the topic. He has been the "go-to" guy for numerous industry professionals looking for answers to difficult QA questions, and through his hundreds of presentations to stakeholders at NRC Workshops on Vendor Oversight, the Regulatory Information Conference (RIC), biannual meetings of the EPRI JUTG, NUPIC, ASME NQA-1, and the NRC vendor inspection training sessions on topics such as the NRC's position on current auditing practices for vendors, training on CGD and Part 21, and industry experience related to vendor issues, has improved the industry's implementation of QA processes and programs.

When Paul is not educating his fellow NRC inspectors or supply chain leaders, he enjoys spending time with his wife, Kathy, their two sons and daughters-in-law, and his two grandkids. Paul grew up in Maine and graduated from the Maine Maritime Academy. He returns annually to Maine's for R&R and enjoys hunting and hiking in the great outdoors. Paul also enjoys tinkering with engines and is an accomplished machinist. He has also taken an interest in home remodeling thanks to Kathy's honey do list.

Paul is a valuable resource, not only to the NRC, but to the public that he serves. He is instrumental in providing outreach to stakeholders in public meetings through presentations in his areas of expertise. He consistently resolves technically challenging problems in these areas in ways that are consistent with the principles of good regulation. Additionally, Paul takes every opportunity to provide clarity to stakeholders regarding the staff's position on these topics through public outreach. He has participated in numerous public meetings, providing easy to understand presentations on these topics and eagerly takes questions to resolve stakeholder inquiries. While his responses often start with "It Depends," Paul always explains the basis of his responses in a clear and understandable manner.

Throughout his career, Paul has demonstrated leadership and tirelessly contributed to the development of junior staff through mentoring and coaching and has consistently exhibited outstanding work ethic. Paul is the true definition of mentor, co-worker, and friend. We are all sad to see him go but are excited for his next chapter. We will truly miss having Paul as part of our NRC family and wish him the best in his retirement.

Richard P. McIntyre (NRC staff retired), Les Taggert (past NUPIC Chairman) and Paul Prescott

- **Greg Galletti, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer; Toni Sakadales, Program Analyst**

Would you like to be added to the newsletter distribution? Or suggest topics?

We welcome useful and informative feedback on the content of this newsletter. Please contact Frankie Vega, Reactor Operations Engineer, IQVB, by telephone at 301-415-1617 or by email at Frankie.Vega@nrc.gov.