ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 187

TO FACILITY COMBINED LICENSE NO. NPF-92

DOCKET NO. 52-026

Replace the following pages of the Facility Combined License No. NPF-92 with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Combined License No. NPF-92

REMOVE	INSERT
7	7

Appendix C to Facility Combined License No. NPF-92

REMOVE	INSERT
C-62	C-62
C-79a	C-79a
C-97a	C-97a
C-130	C-130
C-160	C-160
C-177	C-177
C-195	C-195
C-225	C-225
C-237	C-237
C-256	C-256
C-266	C-266
C-299	C-299
C-323	C-323
C-372	C-372
C-429	C-429
C-430	C-430
C-432a	C-432a
C-433	C-433
C-433a	C-433a

(continued)

REMOVE	INSERT
---	C-433b
---	C-433c
C-435	C-435
C-435a	C-435a
C-436	C-436
C-437	C-437
C-438	C-438

(7) Reporting Requirements

(a) Within 30 days of a change to the initial test program described in UFSAR Section 14, Initial Test Program, made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 or in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII, “Processes for Changes and Departures,” SNC shall report the change to the Director of NRO, or the Director’s designee, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d).

(b) SNC shall report any violation of a requirement in Section 2.D.(3), Section 2.D.(4), Section 2.D.(5), and Section 2.D.(6) of this license within 24 hours. Initial notification shall be made to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, with written follow up in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

(8) Incorporation

The Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan, and ITAAC in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively of this license, as revised through Amendment No. 187, are hereby incorporated into this license.

(9) Technical Specifications

The technical specifications in Appendix A to this license become effective upon a Commission finding that the acceptance criteria in this license (ITAAC) are met in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(g).

(10) Operational Program Implementation

SNC shall implement the programs or portions of programs identified below, on or before the date SNC achieves the following milestones:

(a) Environmental Qualification Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(b) Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program implemented before initial criticality;

(c) Preservice Testing Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(d) Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(e) Fire Protection Program

1. The fire protection measures in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 for designated storage building areas (including adjacent fire areas that could affect the storage area) implemented before initial receipt

Table 2.1.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
20	2.1.02.05a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
21	2.1.02.05a.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
22	2.1.02.05b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
23	2.1.02.06	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
24	2.1.02.07a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
25	2.1.02.07a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
26	2.1.02.07b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
80	2.1.03.08	8. The reactor vessel direct vessel injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the RCS following the break of a direct vessel injection line.	An inspection will be conducted to verify the flow area of the flow limiting venturi within each direct vessel injection nozzle.	The throat area of the direct vessel injection line nozzle flow limiting venturi is less than or equal to 12.57 in^2.
81	2.1.03.09a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
82	2.1.03.09a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
83	2.1.03.09b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
84	2.1.03.09c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
85	2.1.03.10	Not used per Amendment No. 112		
86	2.1.03.11	11. The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb.	Manufacturing tests of the Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV beltline material will be performed.	A report exists and concludes that the initial RPV beltline Charpy upper-shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
		6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
99	2.2.01.05.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
100	2.2.01.05.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
101	2.2.01.06a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
102	2.2.01.06a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
103	2.2.01.06b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
104	2.2.01.06c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
166	2.2.03.05a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
167	2.2.03.05a.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
168	2.2.03.05b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
169	2.2.03.06	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
170	2.2.03.07a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
171	2.2.03.07a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
172	2.2.03.07b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
173	2.2.03.07c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		

Table 2.2.4-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
231	2.2.04.07a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
232	2.2.04.07a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
233	2.2.04.07b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
234	2.2.04.07c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
235	2.2.04.08a.i	8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the RCS and provides overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.	i) Inspections will be conducted to confirm that the value of the vendor code plate rating of the steam generator safety valves is greater than or equal to system relief requirements.	i) The sum of the rated capacities recorded on the valve vendor code plates of the steam generator safety valves exceeds 8,240,000 lb/hr per steam generator.
236	2.2.04.08a.ii	8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the RCS and provides overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.	ii) Testing and analyses in accordance with ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.	ii) A report exists to indicate the set pressure of the valves is less than 1305 psig.

Table 2.2.5-5
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
259	2.2.05.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
260	2.2.05.05a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
261	2.2.05.05a.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
262	2.2.05.05b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
263	2.2.05.06a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
264	2.2.05.06b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
265	2.2.05.07a.i	7.a) The VES provides a 72-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR. 7.b) The VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas.	i) Testing will be performed to confirm that the required amount of air flow is delivered to the MCR. iii) MCR air samples will be taken during VES testing and analyzed for quality. i) Testing will be performed with VES flow rate between 60 and 70 scfm to confirm that the MCR is capable of maintaining the required pressurization of the pressure boundary.	i) The air flow rate from the VES is at least 60 scfm and not more than 70 scfm. iii) The MCR air is of breathable quality. i) The MCR pressure boundary is pressurized to greater than or equal to 1/8-in. water gauge with respect to the surrounding area.

Table 2.3.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
296	2.3.02.06b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
297	2.3.02.06c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
298	2.3.02.07a	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
299	2.3.02.07b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
300	2.3.02.07c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
301	2.3.02.08a.i	8.a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.	i) Testing will be performed by aligning a flow path from each CVS makeup pump, actuating makeup flow to the RCS at pressure greater than or equal to 2000 psia, and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pump discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank.	i) Each CVS makeup pump provides a flow rate of greater than or equal to 100 gpm.
		8.b) The CVS provides the pressurizer auxiliary spray.	Testing will be performed by aligning a flow path from each CVS makeup pump to the pressurizer auxiliary spray and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pump discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank and with RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2000 psia.	Each CVS makeup pump provides spray flow to the pressurizer.
		9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.	Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
		10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions.	Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 using the controls in the MCR.	Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions.
		10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.	i) Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS.	i) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Table 2.3.6-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
366	2.3.06.07a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
367	2.3.06.07a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
368	2.3.06.07b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
369	2.3.06.07c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
370	2.3.06.08a	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
371	2.3.06.08b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
372	2.3.06.09a.i	9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the RCS during shutdown operations.	i) Inspections will be conducted on the low temperature overpressure protection relief valves to confirm that the capacities of the vendor code plate ratings are greater than or equal to system relief requirements.	i) The rated capacities recorded on the valves' vendor code plates are not less than the flow required to provide low-temperature overpressure protection for the RCS, as determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure-temperature curves developed for the as-procured reactor vessel material.
373	2.3.06.09a.ii	9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the RCS during shutdown operations.	ii) Testing and analysis in accordance with the ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the relief valves open at a pressure not greater than the set pressures required to provide low-temperature overpressure protection for the RCS, as determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure-temperature curves developed for the as-procured reactor vessel material.
374	2.3.06.09b.i	9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.	i) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat removal capability of the RNS heat exchangers.	i) A report exists and concludes that the product of the overall heat transfer coefficient and the effective heat transfer area, UA, of each RNS heat exchanger is greater than or equal to 2.2 million Btu/hr-°F.

Table 2.3.7-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
397	2.3.07.05.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
398	2.3.07.05.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
399	2.3.07.06a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
400	2.3.07.06b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
401	2.3.07.07a	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
402	2.3.07.07b.i	7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the spent fuel pool includes a sufficient volume of water.	i) The volume of the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer canal, and both gate areas above the fuel assemblies and below the spent fuel pool cooling suction piping is greater than or equal to 130,350 gallons.
403	2.3.07.07b.ii	7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.	ii) Inspection will be performed to verify the cask washdown pit includes sufficient volume of water.	ii) The water volume of the cask washdown pit from the cask washdown pit floor to 13.75 feet above the cask washdown pit floor is greater than or equal to 34,100 gallons.
404	2.3.07.07b.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
405	2.3.07.07b.iv	Not used per Amendment No. 84		

Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria				
No.	**ITAAC No.**	**Design Commitment**	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
448	2.3.10.10	Not used per Amendment No. 112		
878	2.3.10.11a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
879	2.3.10.12	12. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.	Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.10-5

Component Name	**Tag No.**	**Component Location**
WLS Reactor Coolant Drain Tank	WLS-MT-01	Containment
WLS Containment Sump	WLS-MT-02	Containment
WLS Degasifier Column	WLS-MV-01	Auxiliary Building
WLS Effluent Holdup Tanks	WLS-MT-05A WLS-MT-05B	Auxiliary Building
WLS Waste Holdup Tanks	WLS-MT-06A WLS-MT-06B	Auxiliary Building
WLS Waste Pre-Filter	WLS-MV-06	Auxiliary Building
WLS Ion Exchangers	WLS-MV-03 WLS-MV-04A WLS-MV-04B WLS-MV-04C	Auxiliary Building
WLS Waste After-Filter	WLS-MV-07	Auxiliary Building
WLS Monitor Tanks	WLS-MT-07A WLS-MT-07B WLS-MT-07C	Auxiliary Building
	WLS-MT-07D WLS-MT-07E WLS-MT-07F	Radwaste Building

Table 2.3.13-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
464	2.3.13.05.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
465	2.3.13.06a.i	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
466	2.3.13.06a.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
467	2.3.13.06b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
468	2.3.13.06c	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
469	2.3.13.07	Not used per Amendment No. 84		

Table 2.5.2-8
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
527	2.5.02.05a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
528	2.5.02.05b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
529	2.5.02.06a.i	6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.	An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	i) The reactor trip switchgear opens after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This only needs to be verified for one automatic reactor trip function.
530	2.5.02.06a.ii	6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.	An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	ii) PMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.
		6.b) The PMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.	An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	Appropriate PMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.
		6.c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.	An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using the PMS manual actuation controls.	ii) PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

Table 2.6.1-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
578	2.6.01.01	Not used per Amendment No. 168		
579	2.6.01.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
580	2.6.01.02.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
581	2.6.01.02.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
582	2.6.01.03a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
583	2.6.01.03b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
584	2.6.01.04a	Not used per Amendment No. 112		
585	2.6.01.04b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		

Table 2.7.1-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
679	2.7.01.02b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
680	2.7.01.03a	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
681	2.7.01.03b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
682	2.7.01.04a	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
683	2.7.01.04b	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
684	2.7.01.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
685	2.7.01.05.ii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
686	2.7.01.05.iii	Not used per Amendment No. 84		
687	2.7.01.06a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
786	3.3.00.05c	5.c) The boundaries between the following rooms, which contain safety-related equipment – PXS valve/accumulator room A (11206), PXS valve/accumulator room B (11207), and CVS room (11209) – are designed to prevent flooding between these rooms.	An inspection of the boundaries between the following rooms which contain safety-related equipment – PXS Valve/ Accumulator Room A (11206), PXS Valve/Accumulator Room B (11207), and CVS Room (11209) – will be performed.	A report exists that confirms that flooding of the PXS Valve/ Accumulator Room A (11206), and the PXS Valve/ Accumulator Room B (11207) is prevented to a maximum flood level as follows: PXS A 110'-2", PXS B 110'-1"; and of the CVS room (11209) to a maximum flood level of 110'-0".
787	3.3.00.06a	6.a) The available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11).	An inspection will be performed of the as-built radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" to define volume.	A report exists and concludes that the as-built available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11).
788	3.3.00.06b	6.b) The radwaste building waste accumulation room has a volume greater than or equal to 1417 cubic feet.	An inspection of the radwaste building waste accumulation room (50351) is performed.	The volume of the radwaste building waste accumulation room (50351) is greater than or equal to 1417 cubic feet.
789	3.3.00.07aa	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
790	3.3.00.07ab	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
791	3.3.00.07ac	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
792	3.3.00.07ba	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
793	3.3.00.07bb	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
794	3.3.00.07bc	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			4) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.	4) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.
			5) For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway with low-voltage power cables, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.	5) For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway with low-voltage power cables, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.
			6) For configuration involving enclosed raceways, the minimum separation is 1 inch in both horizontal and vertical directions.	6) For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.
			7) The minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch for configurations with a non-safety conduit and a free air safety cable with low-voltage power cables and below.	7) The minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch for configurations with a non-safety conduit and a free air safety cable with low-voltage power cables and below.
			iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.	iii.a) Where minimum separation distances are not met inside containment, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.
			iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis.	iv.a) For areas inside containment, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.	v.a) For areas inside containment, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.
		7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways that route the Class 1E electrical cables and the communication cables are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	a) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables inside containment are identified by the appropriate color code.
		7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E divisional cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	a) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables inside containment associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.
801	3.3.00.07d.ii.b	7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.	Inspections of the as-built raceways that route Class 1E cables will be performed to confirm that the separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables is consistent with the following:	Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables is consistent with the following:
			ii.b) Within other plant areas (limited hazard areas), the minimum separation is defined by one of the following:	ii.b) Within other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:
			1) The minimum vertical separation is 5 feet and the minimum horizontal separation is 3 feet.	1) The vertical separation is 5 feet or more and the horizontal separation is 3 feet or more.

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables ≤ 2/0 AWG. This minimum vertical separation is 3 inches for the configuration with a conduit above and crossing the open tray at an angle equal to or greater than 45 degrees.	2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables ≤ 2/0 AWG. This minimum vertical separation may be reduced to 3 inches for the configuration with a conduit above and crossing the open tray at an angle equal to or greater than 45 degrees.
			3) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches between a conduit and an open configuration for low- voltage power cables greater than 2/0 AWG but not greater than 750 kcmil. The vertical separation is 3 inches if a conduit is above and crossing an open tray at an angle equal to or greater than 45 degrees.	3) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches between a conduit and an open configuration for low- voltage power cables greater than 2/0 AWG but not greater than 750 kcmil. The vertical separation may be reduced to 3 inches if a conduit is above and crossing an open tray at an angle equal to or greater than 45 degrees.
			4) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.	4) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.
			5) For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway with low-voltage power cables, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.	5) For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway with low-voltage power cables, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			6) For configuration involving enclosed raceways, the minimum separation is 1 inch in both horizontal and vertical directions.	6) For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch
			7) The minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch for configurations with a non-safety conduit and a free air safety cable with low-voltage power cables and below.	7) The minimum vertical separation is 1 inch and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch for configurations with a non-safety conduit and a free air safety cable with low-voltage power cables and below.
			iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.	iii.b) Where minimum separation distances are not met inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.
			iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis.	iv.b) For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.
			v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.	v.b) For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.

Table 3.3-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways that route the Class 1E electrical cables and the communication cables are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	b) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building are identified by the appropriate color code.
		7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E divisional cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	b) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.	iii.c) Where minimum separation distances are not met inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.
			iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis.	iv.c) For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.
			v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.	v.c) For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.
		7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways that route the Class 1E electrical cables and the communication cables are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	c) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building are identified by the appropriate color code.
		7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E divisional cables and the as-built raceways that route the Class 1E cables will be conducted.	c) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.
803	3.3.00.07d.iii.a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
804	3.3.00.07d.iii.b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
805	3.3.00.07d.iii.c	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
806	3.3.00.07d.iv.a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
807	3.3.00.07d.iv.b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
808	3.3.00.07d.iv.c	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
809	3.3.00.07d.v.a	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		

Table 3.3-6
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
810	3.3.00.07d.v.b	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
811	3.3.00.07d.v.c	Not used per Amendment No. 187.		
812	3.3.00.07e	7.e) Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.	Inspections of the as-built Class 1E communication cables will be conducted.	Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.