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Information Removed from DBNPS, Unit No.1 UFSAR Page 1 of 1

In accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports," licensees periodically report a brief description of information removed from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the basis for its removal. The following provides a summary of the information removed from the UFSAR and the basis for removal.

1. Section 1.6 of the DBNPS UFSAR provides a cross reference to specific UFSAR figures that are also controlled drawings. These UFSAR figures provide duplicate information and are removed from the UFSAR with the controlled drawing referenced in the applicable section.

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Commitment Change Summary Report Page 1 of 2

COMMITMENT NUMBER / SOURCE / DATE	COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	CHANGE	REASON FOR CHANGE
DB-O01501 Serial 1000, 11/7/1983	QCI 3070 establishes guidelines of receipt inspections performed. All Q- List, fire protection and/or ASME items are receipt inspected.	NOP-LP-2020 establishes guidelines for conduct of receipt inspections performed. All safety-related components are receipt inspected.	The actions of GL 83-28 were intended to address issues related to reactor trip system reliability and general management capability of understanding the causes of unscheduled reactor shutdowns. The scope of required actions associated with "Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface" was limited to safety-related components; however, the original committed response transcended safety- related components to include all fire protection and/or ASME items, which may or may not be safety-related. This change realigns with the original scope of the GL required actions.
DB-O05414 Serial 1-0284, 8/4/1982	Threaded fasteners of closure connections in the scope of IEB 82-02 will be inspected each time when opened for component inspection or maintenance.	All threaded fasteners within the scope of IEB 82-02 will be inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section XI 1974 or later requirements.	The original commitment was created based on Action 2 from the IEB, which was a one-time action that was completed almost 40 years ago. Since that time, a better understanding of the degradation of threaded fasteners has been developed and ASME Section XI code requirements have changed. A graded approach is used based on leakage and visual signs of degradation. This change aligns with current inspection requirements.

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COMMI NUMBER / SO	TMENT URCE / DATE	COMMITMENT DESCRIPTION	CHANGE		REASON FOR CHANGE		
DB-O21576 Serial 3157, 5/31/2005 (NRC Order Section B.5.b- related commitment)		Implement mitigative strategies as described.	Implement mitigative strategies as described. (The change for this commitment is in the detailed description of the SFP mitigation strategy, which is contained in a separate document from the commitment.)		The updated SFP mitigation strategy reduces risk associated with fuel movements, while still providing an effective mitigation of fuel damage. Refer to Commitment DB-O21806 below.		
DB-O21806 Serial 3238, 2/27/2006 (NRC Order Section B.5.b- related commitment)		Procedures revised to require that the discharge fuel assemblies will be stored in the SFP in the appropriate dispersion pattern as soon as possible but no later than 60 days following shutdown for refueling, or prior to reactor restart (Mode 2) following refueling, whichever is later, unless other factors make this not readily available.	Procedures revised to provide SFP makeup of 500 gpm and SFP spray of 200 gpm within 2 hours/120 minutes from the time personnel diagnose actions are required. In the event this makeup/spray capability is not available, procedures are also in place to require that discharge fuel assemblies will be stored in the SFP in the appropriate dispersal pattern as soon as possible but no later than 60 days following shutdown for refueling or prior to reactor restart (Mode 2) refueling, whichever is later.		The updated SFP mitigation strategy credits SFP makeup and spray capabilities and SFP level instrumentation installed in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event in March of 2011. The updated strategy reduces risk associated with fuel movements, while still providing an effective mitigation of fuel damage.		
List of Abbreviations Used:							
ASME GL gpm IEB	American Socie Generic Letter gallons per minu Inspection and E	ty of Mechanical Engineers Ite Enforcement Bulletin	NOP QCI SFP	Nuclear O Quality Cc Spent Fue	perating Procedure ontrol Instruction I Pool		