



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

September 20, 2022

Mr. James Barstow
Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
and Support Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

**SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2022012,
05000260/2022012 AND 05000296/2022012**

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On August 26, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Manu Sivaraman and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's problem identification and resolution program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

The Regional Administrator has authorized an additional non-baseline inspection using Inspection Procedure 92702, "Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders" to verify the licensee's implementation of the 2017 Confirmatory Order (CO) requirements because this follow-up inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine reactor oversight process (ROP) baseline inspections.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Deschaine, Wesley
on 09/20/22

Wesley D. Deschaine, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 296
License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2022012, 05000260/2022012 AND 05000296/2022012 – dated September 20, 2022

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DATE	9/13/2022	9/20/2022			

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000259, 05000260 and 05000296

License Numbers: DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68

Report Numbers: 05000259/2022012, 05000260/2022012 and 05000296/2022012

Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-012-0011

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Location: Athens, AL

Inspection Dates: August 08, 2022 to August 26, 2022

Inspectors: D. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Karlovich, Resident Inspector
N. Peterka, Senior Project Engineer
A. Ponko, Sr. Construction Inspector

Approved By: Wesley D. Deschaine, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Pressure Boundary Leak on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Test Line			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000259/2022012-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71153
A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.4 was identified when the licensee failed to apply corrective actions from previous fatigue failures of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1 equivalent socket welded connections resulted in a through-wall piping leak on a test line upstream of the RHR and Shutdown Cooling test shut-off valve.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000259/2022-001-01	LER 2022-001-01 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Pressure Boundary Leak on Residual Heat Removal System Low Pressure Coolant Injection Test Line	71153	Closed
LER	05000259/2022-001-00	LER 2022-001-00 from Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 regarding Pressure Boundary Leak on Residual Heat Removal System Low Pressure Coolant Injection Test Line	71153	Closed

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment (SCWE).
 - Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action program's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted an in-depth corrective action program review of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, RHR Service Water System, and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System.
 - Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience,
 - Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
 - Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 50-259/2022-001-00 and -01 - Pressure Boundary Leak on Residual Heat Removal System Low Pressure Coolant Injection Test Line. (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML E220531t052550 and E220316t044020). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

92702 CONF - Enforcement Related Order Follow-Up-Only

The Regional Administrator has authorized an additional non-baseline inspection using Inspection Procedure 92702, "Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders" to verify the licensee's implementation of the 2017 Confirmatory Order (CO) requirements because this follow-up inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine reactor oversight process (ROP) baseline inspections. The inspectors reviewed commitments associated with two items from Confirmatory Order EA-17-022, issued to TVA on July 27, 2017.

Enforcement Related Order Follow-Up-Only (1 Sample)

- (1) Commitment V.1.d.1: This commitment required an independent third-party to perform quarterly audits for the first year after the date of issuance of the Confirmatory Order (CO), and semi-annually for the next two years, of the adverse employment action process. The inspectors reviewed the "Seventh Independent Auditor's Report of the TVA Adverse Employment Action Process for Semester Ending 12/31/2019," dated 12/26/2019 and the "Eighth Independent Auditor's Report of the TVA Adverse Employment Action Process for Semester Ending 6/30/2020," dated 6/26/2020 . These are the final two semi-annual audits for Browns Ferry. The inspectors verified that the audits included a review of all adverse employment actions, periodical attendance at Executive Review Boards and a review of chilling effect mitigation plans (inclusive of recommendations as appropriate). The inspection of the audits was completed for Browns Ferry only.

The inspectors also performed a review of three recent Adverse Employment Action and Executive Review Board (ERB) packages at Browns Ferry. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the background information and safety conscious work environment (SCWE) screening provided in the packages along with any associated SCWE Mitigation Plans.

Commitment V.1.e.1: This commitment required TVA to conduct an independent nuclear safety culture (NSC) assessment consistent with industry standard practices at Browns Ferry within one year of issuance of the CO, and another NSC assessment within approximately two years of the first assessment. TVA was further required to evaluate the results and develop, implement, and track to completion corrective actions to address weaknesses identified through the assessments and compare the results of the latter assessment with prior years' survey results in an effort to identify trends. The inspectors reviewed the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NSC evaluations completed by Oak Ridge Associated Universities in June 2018 and October 2019. The inspectors verified if corrective actions were identified, developed and tracked to completion. The inspectors also verified if the results of the latter assessment were compared with prior years' survey results in an effort to identify trends. The inspection was completed for Browns Ferry only.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Pressure Boundary Leak on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Test Line			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000259/2022012-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71153
<p>A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.4 was identified when the licensee failed to apply corrective actions from previous fatigue failures of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1 equivalent socket welded connections resulted in a through-wall piping leak on a test line upstream of the RHR and Shutdown Cooling test shut-off valve.</p> <p><u>Description:</u> On January 15, 2022, at 2320 Central Standard Time (CST), during a drywell entry for leak identification, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering personnel discovered a through-wall piping leak on a test line upstream of the RHR and Shutdown Cooling test shut-off valve. This test line is classified as ASME Code Class 1 piping and constitutes part of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. The leak was located just upstream of 1-SHV-074-0794A where the socket weld for the valve and the socket weld for the upstream sockolet overlapped. This leak was determined to be unisolable from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The licensee made an event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. Operations personnel declared the Unit 1 LPCI system Loop I inoperable and maintained Unit 1 in Mode 4 or 5 until the leak was repaired.</p> <p>This condition is assumed to have developed in September of 2021, when system monitoring detected a step change in unidentified drywell leakage. The licensee decided to repair the detected leak during a maintenance outage that was scheduled due to a previously identified fuel leak. The leaking RHR piping was identified during initial drywell entry.</p> <p>Corrective Actions: A temporary modification was implemented to remove the test valves and vent piping to resolve leakage until addressed during the next Unit 1 outage. The test line was cut and capped and on January 20, 2022, at 1520 CST, Unit 1 LPCI Loop I was declared operable. The root cause of this event was small bore piping which was not specifically analyzed for fatigue failure vulnerability due to operational or resonance vibration. The corrective action for this event is to implement Engineering Change Packages for all small-bore piping with vulnerability to fatigue failure due to exceeding the endurance limit due to operational vibration.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: CR 1747875</p> <p><u>Performance Assessment:</u></p> <p>Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to apply corrective actions from fatigue failures of ASME Code Class 1 equivalent socket welded connections in the Units 2 and 3 drywells on RHR shutdown cooling lines and the 3A Recirculation Loop was a performance deficiency (PD). Specifically, the failures were addressed under Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 961217 and an extent of condition was performed under PER 98-011374-000. The corrective actions developed were not incorporated during the Unit 1 restart in 2007.</p> <p>Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the RCS Equipment and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide</p>			

reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inadequate application of corrective actions from previous fatigue failures of ASME Code Class 1 equivalent socket welded connections resulted in an un-isolable through wall leak in the test line upstream of the RHR and Shutdown Cooling test shut-off valve and was identified as RCS pressure boundary leakage.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The finding screened out in the review of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone as the PD was not related to pressurized thermal shock; therefore, the finding was addressed under the Initiating Events cornerstone. Since a reasonable assessment of degradation, could have resulted in exceeding the RCS leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional Senior Risk Analyst (SRA) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, utilizing the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) 8 Version 8.2.6, and the NRC Browns Ferry Unit 1 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model version 8.61 dated 6/12/2019. The exposure period was from September 11, 2021, when indications of the leak were present until January 15 when the plant was taken to mode 4, a total of 126 days. The PD was conservatively modelled as an increase in the small LOCA frequency by two orders of magnitude given the leak upstream of 1-SHV-074-0794A had the potential to cause the socket to fail and initiate an unisolable small break loss of coolant accident if the entire socket failed. The dominant sequence was a Small Break Loss of coolant accident with failure of the turbine bypass valves, failure of high-pressure injection and operators failing to manually depressurize the reactor. The detailed risk evaluation estimated that the PD resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of $< 1.0 \text{ E-6/year}$, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: TS LCO 3.4.4 requires, in part, "operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;" while in Modes 1, 2, and 3; otherwise, the unit shall be shut down and in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours.

Contrary to the above, from approximately September 11, 2021, to January 15, 2022, while Unit 1 was in Mode 1 with an unisolable pressure boundary leak present, the licensee operated in a condition prohibited by TSs because the unit had not been placed in Mode 3 and Mode 4.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On August 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. Manu Sivaraman and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	Condition Reports (CRs)	1775692, 1775693, 1774140, 1773954, 1745874, 1767368, 1784571, 1774143, 1785100, 1778716, 1782024, 1769257, 1794453, 1687343, 1698900, 1679626, 1680257, 1680682, 1769257, 1747875, 1642929, 1663776, 1747824, 1712139, 1712139, 1716499, 1700879, 1690583, 1612226, 1621239, 1620905, 1699093, 1736015, 1640160, 1740513, 1769605, 1733846, 1705816, 1663775, 1640732, 1659001, 1779311, 17223229, 1776857, 1689113, 1699014, 1699015, 1736017, 1689250, 1740838, 1627098, 1651234, 1639467, 1629973, 1660188, 1780920, 1692907, 1778527, 1777520, 1776697, 1783784, 1781532, 1781093, 1743378, 1736780, 1735693, 1725900, 1718130, 1715560, 1707957, 1706925, 1705189, 1688751, 1670628, 1660073, 1657879, 1715213, 1681154, 1651335, 1777288, 1743599, 1661852, 1788589, 1771842, 1751010, 1676114, 1640515, 1770005, 1723754, 1715260, 1687954, 1636300, 1768085, 1689190, 1696769, 1699014, 1649097, 1642037, 1660079, 1660775, 1434505, 1477448, 1504345, 1522472, 1540693, 1540684, 1540695, 1548744, 1553670, 1575596, 1578086, 1590864, 1628393, 1645959, 1649674, 1661315, 1664063, 1677968, 1681376, 1682390, 1695271, 1698453, 1696877, 1705020, 1705816, 1712139, 1712629, 1716190, 1716499, 1737479, 1737669, 1738803, 1739373, 1739548, 1745754, 1745983, 1755306, 1754502, 1754835, 1756427, 1756432, 1756448, 1759180, 1756456, 1766933, 1783069, 1784017, 1678515, 1788309, 1777794, 1766776, 1760216, 1755932, 1693940, 1679209, 1667993, 1634753, 1794696, 1784017, 1773876	Various

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		NCR-886	TVA returned motor	Rev. 0
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection		2022 NRC PI&R Inspection, the inspector provided an observation based on the review of CR 1642929 (U2 "B" RPS half scrams). The technicians were not interviewed during the investigation to see if any insight could be gained on the cause of the bent contact arm on the relay.	08/25/2022
		CR 1795391	No indication above 0-XS-031-2201 as expected	08/10/2022
		CR 1795425	3A Torus Suction Valve BFN-3-FCV-074-0001 on elev. 519' battery for cordless drill sitting on support steel approx. 8' off ground	08/09/2022
		CR 1795429	RHR Walkdown Observation: 2A RHR motor scaffold on south side of motor is touching motor and conduit.	08/09/2022
		CR 1795433	1A RHR Motor - North side - scaffold has approx. 1/2" gap from motor.	08/09/2022
		CR 1795810	NRC notification attached to CR1766933 (NRC Form 361) appears to be blank.	08/09/2022
		CR 1796216	Procedural enhancements could be made that caution against too much examination of failed components if there will be a chance that the component could be send to the vendor for examination including Part 21 considerations	08/11/2022
		CR 1798172	Several interviewees (mainly recent new hires) were not aware of the TVA Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and that the ECP was a option for raising safety concerns	08/22/2022
		CR 1798174	During interviews with Security personnel, two items were brought up that were characterized as long standing personnel safety issues that were not resolved in a timely manner. 1) Flashing light on gate N2 and, 2) Difficult operation of the Delta gates in manual	08/23/2022
		Engineering	EDN0248920111	250V DC Non-1E Main Battery, Chargers, Inverter and

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date	
	Evaluations		Regulating Transformer Sizing		
		EDN0248920112	250 V DC Non-1E Main Battery System Voltage Drop Calculation	Rev. 46	
		EDQ024820020042	250V DC Unit Batt Load Study, VD, SC, and Batt Capacity for LOCA/LOOP, Station Blackout and NFPA 805 Analysis for Unit/shutdown Board Battery	Rev. 94	
		EDQ0999890047	Cable Ampacity Study- V4 and V5 cables in conduit, V3 cables fed from Panel 9-9 and Battery Boards 1, 2, and 3; Panel 8 and 9, and other safety related V3 Cables	Rev. 82	
		EDQ2000870028	120V Voltage Drop Calculation	Rev. 87	
		MDQ0009992012000094		Rev. 7	
	Miscellaneous			OE Screening Committee Meeting: Covering OE from 12/15/20 to 12/28/20	12/30/2020
				OE Screening Committee Meeting: Covering OE from 06/22/21 to 06/28/21	06/30/2021
				OE Screening Committee Meeting: Covering OE from 12/14/21 to 12/20/21	01/26/2022
				OE Screening Committee Meeting: Covering OE from 07/12/22 to 07/19/22	07/20/2022
		Func 064A-B, 2-CKV-076-0653	(a)(1) Plan	Rev. 3	
		Func 073-B &C, HPCI	(a)(1) Plan	Rev. 9	
		Func 099-B, RPS	(a)(1) Plan	Rev. 4	
		Func 573-B, Main Bank Battery 5	(a)(1) Plan	Rev. 2	
	Operability Evaluations	Operability Determination	1649288, 1781455, 1678680, 1637517	Various	
	Procedures	3-AOI-6-1		Feedwater Heater String/Extraction Steam Isolation	Rev. 0007
		MCI-0-001-VL002		Main Steam Relief Valves Target Rock Model 7567 Disassembly, Inspection, Repair and Reassembly	Rev. 0056
		NEDP-22		Operability Determinations and Functional Evaluations	Rev. 0022
		NEDP-27		Past Operability Evaluations	Rev. 0007
		NPG-SPP-01.16		Condition Report Initiation	Rev. 0006

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		NPG-SPP-01.7.1	Employee Concerns Program	Rev. 0006
		NPG-SPP-03.5	Regulatory Reporting Requirements	Rev. 0017
		NPG-SPP-22.103	Performance Assessment and Monitoring	Rev. 0015
		NPG-SPP-22.300	Corrective Action Program	Rev. 0024
		NPG-SPP-22.500	Operating Experience Program	Rev. 0015
		NPG-SPP-22.600	Issue Resolution	Rev. 0013
	Self-Assessments	SA for CR 1670754	2021 Maintenance & Technical Training Comprehensive Assessment	08/02/2021
		SA for CR 1688503	Electrical Maintenance Training Program	07/20/2021
		SA for CR 1721138	Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Review Self Assessment	11/15/2021
		SSA2002	Security and Safeguards Information (SGI)	01/30/2020
		SSA2102	Operations Audit	05/13/2021
		SSA2103	Chemistry and Environmental Monitoring Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant	06/11/2021
		SSA2104	Radiation Protection / Radiological Waste Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant	07/08/2021
		SSA2107 SSA2204	Corrective Action Program Maintenance	02/05/2021 06/04/2022
	Work Orders	Work Orders (WO)	122142871, 122066471, 122872922, 121649338, 121718721, 122205985, 120561853, 121384897, 122866305, 121724417, 122071657, 122071658, 122071659, 122071660, 121788877, 121851803, 119961886, 121798832, 122026684, 122075517, 122076896, 122092952, 121665266, 122565105	Various
71153	Corrective Action Documents	98-011374-000	Crack in body seat drain weld for 3-FCV-068-003 identified during the performance of 3-SI-3.3.1.A, ASME Section XI System Leakage Test	10/14/1998
		PER 961217	Two failures identified on the RHR System I Testable Check Valve (3-FCV-074-0054) piping.	08/09/1996
92702 CONF	Miscellaneous		Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation	June 2018
			Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation	October 2019
			Seventh Independent Auditor's Report of the TVA	12/26/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Adverse Employment Action Process for Semester Ending 12/31/2019	
			Eighth Independent Auditor's Report of the TVA Adverse Employment Action Process for Semester Ending 6/30/2020	06/26/2020
		BFN-2019-013	Employee Review Board Package	10/08/2019
		BFN-2020-05	Employee Review Board Package	01/08/2020
		BFN-2020-13	Employee Review Board Package	04/17/2020