

LES-22-110-NRC
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ATTN: Document Control Desk
Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

Louisiana Energy Services, LLC
NRC Docket No. 70-3103

Subject: 10 CFR 71.95 60 Day Report, Missing Cylinder Cap Gasket

On July 27, 2022, Louisiana Energy Services, dba Urenco USA (UUSA), was notified that the cap gasket was missing from a 30B cylinder shipped to Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas (GNF-A) fabrication facility in December 2018. UUSA has determined that this event is reportable per 10 CFR 71.95(b). In accordance with 10 CFR 71.95(c), UUSA is providing a written report within sixty days of the discovery of this event (Enclosure 1).

If you have questions concerning this submittal, please contact Chris Schwarz, Licensing and Performance Assessment Manager at 575.394.5783.

Respectfully,


Paul Lorskulsint
Chief Nuclear Officer

Kevin Slaviney
DOA For Paul Lorskulsint

Enclosure: 1.) 10 CFR 71.95 Report Regarding a Missing Cylinder Cap Gasket

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Enclosure 1

10 CFR 71.95 Report

As required by 10 CFR 71.95(c), UUSA provides response to the following items:

(1) A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all component or system failures that contributed to the event and significant corrective action taken or planned to prevent recurrence.

On December 14, 2018, UUSA shipped a 30B cylinder filled with Feed material to GNF-A (Urenco identification number 015U10003) within a UX-30 shipping package to Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas Facility at Wilmington, South Carolina. On July 26, 2022, the cylinder was sent to dry conversion processing when the gasket was found to be missing. UUSA was notified of the missing gasket on July 27, 2022. UUSA created EV 156409 to document the error. This cylinder had been disconnected at UUSA on July 16, 2018 at approximately 0200.

(2) A clear, specific, narrative description of the event that occurred so that knowledgeable readers conversant with the requirements of part 71, but not familiar with the design of the packaging, can understand the complete event. The narrative description must include the following specific information as appropriate for the particular event.

(i) Status of components or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event;

There were no components or systems that were inoperable and contributed to the event.

(ii) Dates and approximate times of occurrences;

Date UUSA disconnected cylinder: July 16, 2018
Date USAA shipped the 30B cylinder December 14, 2018
Date GNF-A discovered the missing gasket: July 26, 2022
Date UUSA was informed of the missing gasket: July 27, 2022

(iii) The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known;

This event occurred due to lack of self-checking, a human performance error when installing the cylinder valve cap.

(iv) The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known;

There were no failed components that contributed to this event.

(v) A list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected for failures of components with multiple functions;

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There were no failed components that contributed to this event.

(vi) The method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error;

GNF-A notified UUSA of the missing cap gasket. UUSA created EV 156409 to document the error.

(vii) For each human performance-related root cause, a discussion of the cause(s) and circumstances;

UUSA performed a causal investigation and identified that due to a lack of self-checking and did not ensure a gasket was installed in the cylinder cap.

(viii) The manufacturer and model number (or other identification) of each component that failed during the event; and

There were no components that failed during the event.

(ix) For events occurring during use of a packaging, the quantities and chemical and physical form(s) of the package contents.

The cylinder, when shipped to GNF-A on December 14, 2018, contained 2,238.5 kg of UF6 in solid form.

(3) An assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event. This assessment must include the availability of other systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event.

The purpose of the cap gasket is to prevent any dispersal of possible contamination from the valve's internal space and also to protect the valve from intrusion of dirt and/or water from the outside. The cap gasket is not part of the pressure retaining containment of the valve. A missing cap gasket could result in increased risk of minor contamination of the internals of the UX-30 package or intrusion of dirt and/or water to the cylinder valve. It is likely that the installed cap, without the gasket, would have performed this same function, therefore the safety consequences of this event are low.

(4) A description of any corrective actions planned as a result of the event, including the means employed to repair any defects, and actions taken to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future.

Review and recommend addition of procedural steps for verification of gasket installation after cylinder disconnects. Action 171052 created for this recommendation.

(5) Reference to any previous similar events involving the same packaging that are known to the licensee or certificate holder.

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A search of previous similar events identified one example of UUSA shipping a cylinder without a cap gasket.

- On October 19, 2019, Westinghouse reported that a 30B cylinder was received without a cylinder cap gasket. This cylinder was shipped in April of 2019.
- The Westinghouse event is detailed in letter LES-19-178-NRC dated December 18, 2019.

(6) The name and telephone number of a person within the licensee's organization who is knowledgeable about the event and can provide additional information.

Additional information can be obtained by contacting Chris Schwarz, Licensing and Performance Assessment Manager at 575.394.5783.

(7) The extent of exposure of individuals to radiation or to radioactive materials without identification of individuals by name.

This event did not result in exposure to individuals.