

**Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000)  
Generic Technical Specification Traveler (GTST)**

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**Title: Changes related to Section 3.1.8, PHYSICS TEST Exceptions - MODE 2**

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**I. Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers, Approved Since Revision 2 of STS NUREG-1431, and Used to Develop this GTST**

**TSTF Number and Title:**

TSTF-425, Rev. 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control – RITSTF Initiative 5b

**STS NUREGs Affected:**

NUREG-1430, -1431, -1432, -1433, -1434

**NRC Approval Date:**

18-Mar-09

**TSTF Classification:**

Technical change

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**II. Reference Combined License (RCOL) Standard Departures (Std. Dep.), RCOL COL Items, and RCOL Plant-Specific Technical Specifications (PTS) Changes Used to Develop this GTST**

**RCOL Std. Dep. Number and Title:**

NA

**RCOL COL Item Number and Title:**

NA

**RCOL PTS Change Number and Title:**

- VEGP LAR DOC A015: Requirements related to SDM “within limit” are revised to make “limit” plural (i.e., “limits”).
- VEGP LAR DOC A024: TS 3.1.8 LCO listing is revised to be consistent with reformatting and reorganization of TS 3.3.1, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.”
- VEGP LAR DOC M01: TS 3.1.8, current SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a “REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST” is revised to “COT.”
- VEGP LAR DOC L10: TS 3.1.8 is revised to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for LCO 3.3.1, and correct the title for LCO 3.3.1 to “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.”
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**III. Comments on Relations Among TSTFs, RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Items, and RCOL PTS Changes**

This section discusses the considered changes that are: (1) applicable to operating reactor designs, but not to the AP1000 design; (2) already incorporated in the GTS; or (3) superseded by another change.

TSTF-425 is deferred for future consideration.

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**IV. Additional Changes Proposed as Part of this GTST (modifications proposed by NRC staff and/or clear editorial changes or deviations identified by preparer of GTST)**

Revise SR 3.1.8.1 Frequency to add “Once” as the lead in, i.e., the Frequency to state: “Once prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS.”

**APOG Recommended Changes to Improve the Bases**

Throughout the Bases, references to Sections and Chapters of the FSAR do not include the “FSAR” clarifier. Since these Section and Chapter references are to an external document, it is appropriate to include the “FSAR” modifier. (DOC A003)

Revise the 2nd paragraph of the “Background” section in the Bases to correctly state the role of 10 CFR 50.59.

In the “Applicable Safety Analyses” section in the Bases, correct the reference to the title of LCO 3.4.2.

In the “Applicable Safety Analyses” section of the Bases, delete the last paragraph which references WCAP-11618 and is misleading. Also in the “reference” section, remove reference to WCAP-11618.

Revise the discussion in the “LCO” section of the Bases to be consistent with the TS requirements being addressed.

In the “Surveillance Requirements” section of the Bases for SR 3.1.8.1, correct the title of the reference to LCO 3.3.3.

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## **V. Applicability**

### **Affected Generic Technical Specifications and Bases:**

Section 3.1.8, PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions – MODE 2

### **Changes to the Generic Technical Specifications and Bases:**

The LCO description is revised to make the listing of the Functions consistent with the revised TS 3.3.1. (DOC A024, DOC L10)

SR 3.1.8.1 is revised to replace “REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST” with “COT” and to make listing of SRs consistent with the revised TS 3.3.1. (DOC M01)

Editorial changes are made to the ACTIONS Table. (DOC A015)

The 2nd paragraph in the “Background” section of the Bases is revised to correctly state the role of 10 CFR 50.59. (APOG Comment)

In the “Applicable Safety Analyses” section of the Bases, title of LCO 3.4.2 is corrected, reference to WCAP-11618 is removed, and the last paragraph discussing WCAP-11618 is deleted. (APOG Comment)

In the “LCO” section of the Bases, the discussion is revised to add information consistent with the TS requirements. (APOG Comment)

In the “Surveillance Requirements” section of the Bases for SR 3.1.8.1, the title of LCO 3.3.3 is corrected. (APOG Comment)

The acronym “FSAR” is added to modify “Section” and “Chapter” in references to the FSAR throughout the Bases. (DOC A003)

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## **VI. Traveler Information**

### **Description of TSTF changes:**

NA

### **Rationale for TSTF changes:**

NA

### **Description of changes in RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Item(s), and RCOL PTS Changes:**

#### **VEGP LAR DOC A015:**

Requirements related to SDM “within limit” are revised to make “limit” plural (i.e., “limits”). Condition A and Required Action A.1 are revised.

#### **VEGP LAR DOC A024:**

TS 3.1.8 LCO listing is revised to be consistent with reformatting and reorganization of TS 3.3.1, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.” Current listing LCO 3.3.1 Functions 2, 3, 6, and 16.b, is revised to list new Function 1, 2, and 3 (Function 16.b is deleted per DOC L10). Additionally, SR 3.1.8.1 requirement “on power range and intermediate range channels per SR 3.3.1.8 and SR 3.3.1.9” is revised to “power range neutron flux and intermediate range neutron flux channels per SR 3.3.1.6, SR 3.3.1.7, and SR 3.3.3.2” to accurately reflect power range and intermediate range channel nomenclature and to reflect changes in referenced numbering.

#### **VEGP LAR DOC M01:**

TS 3.1.8, current SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a “REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST” is revised to “COT.”

#### **VEGP LAR DOC L10:**

TS 3.1.8 is revised to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for LCO 3.3.1, and correct the title for LCO 3.3.1 to “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.”

### **Rationale for changes in RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Item(s), and RCOL PTS Changes:**

#### **VEGP LAR DOC A015:**

These changes editorial in nature and provide clarification of and consistency among different requirements.

VEGP LAR DOC A024:

TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 are reformatted to address inconsistencies in formatting and approach between current TS 3.3.1 and TS 3.3.2. Each of TS 3.3.1 and TS 3.3.2 were broken down into specific subsets of the Protection and Safety Monitoring (PMS) function improving clarity and usability of the Sections. This resulted in renumbering of the requirements and changes to other specifications where TS 3.3.1 and TS 3.3.2 are referenced. These changes are appropriate and necessary.

VAGP LAR DOC M01:

TS Section 1.1 definition of Reactor Trip Channel Operational Test (RTCOT) has been removed and the definition of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST and CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) has been revised.

The revised TS Section 1.1 definition for Channel Operational Test (COT) (refer to DOC A001) states "A COT shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY. The COT shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the required alarm, interlock, and trip setpoints required for channel OPERABILITY such that the setpoints are within the necessary range and accuracy. The COT may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps."

References to RTCOT have been replaced with reference to COT in current SR 3.3.1.8 and current SR 3.3.1.9. Use of COT for these SRs is consistent with similar testing specified in NUREG-1431, TS 3.3.1. Use of COT is also consistent with testing performed on other instrumentation specified in the current TS. Current SR 3.1.8.1 requires performance of a Reactor Trip Channel Operational Test (RTCOT) on power and intermediate range channels per current SR 3.3.1.8 and SR 3.3.1.9. Reference to "REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST," is revised to "COT," for consistency with changes made to current SR 3.3.1.8 and SR 3.3.1.9. SR 3.1.8.1 is revised to reference renumbered and revised surveillances for the following reactor trip instrumentation functions:

(GTS 3.3.1.8) SR 3.3.1.6, COT for

- Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate
- Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint
- Overtemperature  $\Delta T$
- Overpower  $\Delta T$
- Pressurizer Pressure Low Setpoint
- Pressurizer Pressure High Setpoint
- Pressurizer Water Level - High 3
- Reactor Coolant Flow - Low
- Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Bearing Water Temperature - High
- RCP Speed - Low
- Steam Generator (SG) Narrow Range Water Level - Low
- Steam Generator (SG) Narrow Range Water Level - High 2

(GTS SR 3.3.1.9) SR 3.3.1.7, COT for

- Power Range Neutron Flux Low Setpoint

(GTS SR 3.3.1.9) SR 3.3.3.2, COT for

- Intermediate Range Neutron Flux

VEGP LAR DOC L10:

Reactor Trip System interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current plant status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not blocked during plant conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are Operable. Additionally, several interlocks are included as part of the ESFAS. These interlocks permit the operator to block some signals, automatically enable other signals, prevent some actions from occurring, and cause other actions to occur. The interlock Functions backup manual actions to ensure bypassable Functions are in operation under the conditions assumed in the safety analyses.

Interlock Operability is adequately addressed by each related Function's requirement to be Operable and the requirement for actuation logic operability. For these TS Functions to be Operable, the associated Functions would have to be in the required state as a support feature for operability. These interlock functions do not directly trip the reactor or initiate an ESFAS function, and as such are removed from the actuation instrumentation listing in TS. The role of the interlocks, and the operability relationship to supported TS Functions, is retained in the TS Bases, as well as being described in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls. The acceptability of the removal of these interlocks is addressed in GTSTs for Section 3.3.1

Current TS 3.1.8 lists Functions of LCO 3.3.1 where the number of required channels is allowed to be reduced to three. Function 16.b is no longer included since this Function is removed as described above.

**Description of additional changes proposed by NRC staff/preparer of GTST:**

Revise SR 3.1.8.1 Frequency to add "Once" as the lead in. The Frequency states: "Prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS." This frequency is revised to "Once prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS."

In the "Background" section of the Bases, the last sentence in the 2nd paragraph was revised to correctly state the role of 10 CFR 50.59 as follows:

Requirements for ~~notification of~~ **prior approval** by the NRC, for the purpose of conducting tests and experiments **not described in the FSAR**, are specified in 10 CFR 50.59 (Ref. 2).

In the "Applicable Safety Analyses" section of the Bases, the title of LCO 3.4.2 is corrected, and the last paragraph is deleted as follows:

LCO 3.4.2 "**RCS** Minimum temperature for Criticality"

~~Reference 7 allows special test exceptions (STE) to be included as part of the LCO that they affect. It was decided, however, to retain this STE as a separate LCO because it was less cumbersome and provided clarity.~~

In the "LCO" section of the Bases, the 2nd paragraph was revised as follows:

The requirements for LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended and **the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation," Functions 1, 2, and 3 may be reduced to 3 required channels** during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:



In the “Surveillance Requirements” section of the Bases for SR 3.1.8.1, the title of LCO 3.3.3 was corrected as follows:

...and LCO 3.3.3, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) **Intermediate** Range Instrumentation.”

In the “References” section of the Bases, WCAP-11618 is deleted from the list of references.

The acronym “FSAR” is added to modify “Section” and “Chapter” in references to the FSAR throughout the Bases. (DOC A003)

**Rationale for additional changes proposed by NRC staff/preparer of GTST:**

In general, the frequency of performance is always implied as “once per” unless otherwise stated. Adding “once” in this Frequency clarifies any ambiguity. If for some reasons, PHYSICS TESTS need to be restarted within a short time, confusion may result whether SR 3.1.8.1 needs to be performed again. This change avoids this potential misreading.

The revised sentence in the “Background” section of the Bases accurately states the role of 10 CFR 50.59.

Adding “RCS” to the title of LCO 3.4.2 makes the reference to LCO 3.4.2 consistent with the title of LCO 3.4.2.

Reference 7 (i.e. WCAP-11618), in the “Applicable Safety Analyses” section, is the MERITS Topical report and was never “NRC Approved.” Furthermore, a WCAP could never “allow” any TS provision. As such, the paragraph contains misleading information and should be deleted.

The revision to the “LCO” section of the Bases adds information consistent with the TS requirement being addressed. This is also consistent with NUREG-1413 Bases content.

The change to the discussion in SR 3.1.8.1 makes the title of LCO 3.3.3 consistent with the title used in LCO 3.3.3.

Since reference to WCAP-16118 is deleted, it is deleted from the list of references.

Since Bases references to FSAR Sections and Chapters are to an external document, it is appropriate to include the “FSAR” modifier.

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## VII. GTST Safety Evaluation

### Technical Analysis:

#### Changes in reference to LCO 3.3.1

The change to references is necessitated by the changes made to TS 3.3.1. TS 3.3.1 is broken into multiple specifications to improve clarity and usability. This reorganization of TS 3.3.1 is addressed in separate GTSTs for STS Subsections 3.3.1 through 3.3.7. This change is administrative, since it just matches references with renumbered requirements and is therefore acceptable.

#### Removal of Function 16.b in LCO description

Function 16.b is removed from LCO 3.3.1. The justification for removal of this Function from TS 3.3.1 is provided in the GTST for TS 3.3.1. Since the Function 16.b is removed from the TS, there is no need to reference the function in Specification 3.1.8. Accordingly, removal of this reference is acceptable.

#### Replacement of RTCOT with COT

Reactor Trip Channel Operational Test (RTCOT) definition has been removed from Section 1.1 because the definition of Channel Operation Test (COT) has been modified to address aspects of RTCOT. Acceptability of COT replacing RTCOT is addressed in the GTST for TS 3.3.1. Since changing the reference to "REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST," in SR 3.1.8.1 to "COT" only maintains consistency with changes made to current SR 3.3.1.8 and SR 3.3.1.9, this is an acceptable administrative change.

#### Revising SR 3.1.8.1 to add "once" as lead in

Adding "once" in this Frequency clarifies any ambiguity. If PHYSICS TESTS need to be restarted within a short time, the current Frequency could be interpreted as requiring performance of SR 3.1.8.1 again. This change avoids this potential misreading. This change is also consistent with VEGP LAR DOC A014, where "once" is added as a lead in to SR 3.1.7.1. Since this change just clarifies the intent of the existing Frequency, it is acceptable.

#### Deletion of last paragraph in the "Applicable Safety Analyses" section of the Bases

Removing this paragraph removes reference to WCAP-16118, the MERITS Topical report. WCAP-16118 was never approved by NRC and is not relevant to the discussion. This deletion is, therefore, acceptable.

#### Modification to the "LCO" section of the Bases

This modification makes the Bases presentation consistent with the LCO requirement being addressed and NUREG-1431, Rev. 4. Therefore, it is acceptable.

### Remaining Changes

The remaining changes are editorial, clarifying, grammatical, or otherwise considered administrative. These changes do not affect the technical content, but improve the readability, implementation, and understanding of the requirements, and are therefore acceptable.

Having found that this GTST's proposed changes to the GTS and Bases are acceptable, the NRC staff concludes that AP1000 STS Subsection 3.1.8 is an acceptable model Specification for the AP1000 standard reactor design.

### **References to Previous NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs):**

None

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## VIII. Review Information

### Evaluator Comments:

None

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### Review Information:

Availability for public review and comment on Revision 0 of this traveler approved by NRC staff on 4/1/2014.

#### APOG Comments (Ref. 7) and Resolutions

(Internal #3) Throughout the Bases, references to Sections and Chapters of the FSAR do not include the "FSAR" modifier. Since these Section and Chapter references are to an external document, it is appropriate to include the "FSAR" modifier. This is resolved by adding the "FSAR" modifier as appropriate.

(Internal #85) 3.1.08, Pg. 07, Discussion in GTST Section VI was revised replacing "new" with "renumbered and revised" and adding further details.

(Internal #86) 3.1.08, pg. 27, The "Background" section in the Bases was revised to correctly state the role of 10 CFR 50.59.

(Internal #87) 3.1.08, Pg. 30, In the "Applicable Safety Analyses" section of the Bases, the title of LCO 3.4.2 is corrected.

(Internal #88) 3.1.08, Pg. 30 and Pg. 34, Reference to WCAP-16118 and associated discussions were removed from the "Applicable Safety Analyses" and "References" sections of the Bases.

(Internal # 89) 3.1.08, Pg. 31, The discussion in the "LCO" section of the Bases was revised adding information consistent with the TS requirements improving clarity and consistency.

(Internal #90) Title of LCO 3.3.3 referenced in the Bases for SR 3.1.8.1 was corrected.

**NRC Final Approval Date:** 6/02/2015

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**IX. Evaluator Comments for Consideration in Finalizing Technical Specifications and Bases**

None

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**X. References Used in GTST**

1. AP1000 DCD, Revision 19, Section 16, "Technical Specifications," June 2011 (ML11171A500).
2. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3 and 4, Technical Specifications Upgrade License Amendment Request, February 24, 2011 (ML12065A057).
3. RAI Letter No. 01 Related to License Amendment Request (LAR) 12-002 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 Combined Licenses, September 7, 2012 (ML12251A355).
4. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, Response to Request for Additional Information Letter No. 01 Related to License Amendment Request LAR-12-002, ND-12-2015, October 04, 2012 (ML12286A363 and ML12286A360).
5. NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 13 to Combined License (COL) No. NPF-91 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3, and Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-92 for VEGP Unit 4, September 9, 2013 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML13238A337), which contains:
  - ML13238A355, Cover Letter - Issuance of License Amendment No. 13 for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (LAR 12-002).
  - ML13238A359, Enclosure 1 - Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-91
  - ML13239A256, Enclosure 2 - Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-92
  - ML13239A284, Enclosure 3 - Revised plant-specific TS pages (Attachment to Amendment No. 13)
  - ML13239A287, Enclosure 4 - Safety Evaluation (SE), and Attachment 1 - Acronyms
  - ML13239A288, SE Attachment 2 - Table A - Administrative Changes
  - ML13239A319, SE Attachment 3 - Table M - More Restrictive Changes
  - ML13239A333, SE Attachment 4 - Table R - Relocated Specifications
  - ML13239A331, SE Attachment 5 - Table D - Detail Removed Changes
  - ML13239A316, SE Attachment 6 - Table L - Less Restrictive Changes

The following documents were subsequently issued to correct an administrative error in Enclosure 3:

  - ML13277A616, Letter - Correction To The Attachment (Replacement Pages) - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4- Issuance of Amendment Re: Technical Specifications Upgrade (LAR 12-002) (TAC No. RP9402)
  - ML13277A637, Enclosure 3 - Revised plant-specific TS pages (Attachment to Amendment No. 13) (corrected)
6. TSTF-GG-05-01, "Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications," June 2005.

7. APOG-2014-008, APOG (AP1000 Utilities) Comments on AP1000 Standardized Technical Specifications (STS) Generic Technical Specification Travelers (GTSTs), Docket ID NRC-2014-0147, September 22, 2014 (ML14265A493).
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**XI. MARKUP of the Applicable GTS Subsection for Preparation of the STS NUREG**

The entire section of the Specifications and the Bases associated with this GTST is presented next.

Changes to the Specifications and Bases are denoted as follows: Deleted portions are marked in strikethrough red font, and inserted portions in bold blue font.

3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions – MODE 2

LCO 3.1.8 During the performance of PHYSICS TESTS, the requirements of:

- LCO 3.1.3 “Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC),”
- LCO 3.1.4 “Rod Group Alignment Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.5 “Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.6 “Control Bank Insertion Limits,” and
- LCO 3.4.2 “RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality”

may be suspended, and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, “~~RTS~~ Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation,” Functions ~~2, 3, 6, and 16.b~~ 1, 2, and 3, may be reduced to 3 provided:

- a. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) lowest loop average temperature is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ ,
- b. SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR, and
- c. THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP.

APPLICABILITY: During PHYSICS TESTS initiated in MODE 2.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. SDM not within limits.	A.1 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limits.	15 minutes
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Suspend PHYSICS TESTS exceptions.	1 hour
B. THERMAL POWER not within limit.	B.1 Open reactor trip breakers.	Immediately

## ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. RCS lowest loop average temperature not within limit.	C.1 Restore RCS lowest loop average temperature to within limit.	15 minutes
D. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	15 minutes

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.8.1 Perform a <del>REACTOR TRIP CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST COT</del> on power range <b>neutron flux</b> and intermediate range <b>neutron flux</b> channels per <b>SR 3.3.1.6, SR 3.3.1.7, and SR 3.3.3.2</b> <del>SR 3.3.1.8 and SR 3.3.1.9.</del>	<b>Once prior</b> <del>Prior</del> to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS
SR 3.1.8.2 Verify the RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ .	30 minutes
SR 3.1.8.3 Verify THERMAL POWER is $\leq 5\%$ RTP.	30 minutes
SR 3.1.8.4 Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR.	24 hours

## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

## B 3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions – MODE 2

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BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The primary purpose of the MODE 2 PHYSICS TESTS exceptions is to permit relaxations of existing LCOs to allow certain PHYSICS TESTS to be performed.

Section XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, (Ref. 1) requires that a test program be established to ensure that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service. All functions necessary to ensure that the specified design conditions are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences must be tested. This testing is an integral part of the design, construction, and operation of the plant. Requirements for ~~notification of~~ **prior approval by** the NRC, for the purpose of conducting tests and experiments **not described in the FSAR**, are specified in 10 CFR 50.59 (Ref. 2).

The key objectives of a test program are to (Ref. 3):

- a. Ensure that the facility has been adequately designed;
- b. Validate the analytical models used in the design and analysis;
- c. Verify the assumptions used to predict unit response;
- d. Ensure that installation of equipment in the facility has been accomplished in accordance with the design; and
- e. Verify that the operating and emergency procedures are adequate.

To accomplish these objectives, testing is performed prior to initial criticality, during startup, during low power operations, during power ascension, at high power and after each refueling. The PHYSICS TEST requirements for reload fuel cycles assure that the operating characteristics of the core are consistent with the design predictions and that the core can be operated as designed (Ref. 4).

PHYSICS TEST procedures are written and approved in accordance with established formats. The procedures include information necessary to permit a detailed execution of the testing required, to ensure that the design intent is met. PHYSICS TESTS are performed in accordance with

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**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

these procedures and test results are approved prior to continued power escalation and long-term power operation.

The typical PHYSICS TESTS performed for reload fuel cycles (Ref. 4) in MODE 2 are listed below:

- a. Critical Boron Concentration - Control Rods Withdrawn;
- b. Control Rod Worth;
- c. Isothermal Temperature Coefficient (ITC).

These tests are performed in MODE 2. These and other supplementary tests may be required to calibrate the nuclear instrumentation or to diagnose operational problems. These tests may cause the operating controls and process variables to deviate from their LCO requirements during their performance.

- a. The Critical Boron Concentration - Control Rods Withdrawn Test measures the critical boron concentration at hot zero power (HZP). With rods out, the lead control bank is at or near its fully withdrawn position. HZP is where the core is critical ( $k_{\text{eff}} = 1.0$ ), and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is at design temperature and pressure for zero power. Performance of this test should not violate any of the referenced LCOs.
- b. The Control Rod Worth Test is used to measure the reactivity worth of selected control banks. This test is performed at HZP and has four alternative methods of performance. The first method, the Boron Exchange Method, varies the reactor coolant boron concentration and moves the selected control bank in response to the changing boron concentration. The reactivity changes are measured with a reactivity computer. This sequence is repeated for the remaining control banks. The second method, the Rod Swap Method, measures the worth of a predetermined reference bank using the Boron Exchange Method above. The reference bank is then nearly fully inserted into the core. The selected bank is then inserted into the core as the reference bank is withdrawn. The HZP critical conditions are then determined with the selected bank fully inserted into the core. The worth of the selected bank is calculated based on the position of the reference bank with respect to the selected bank. This sequence is repeated as necessary for the

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**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

remaining control banks. The third method, the Boron Endpoint Method, moves the selected control bank over its entire length of travel and while varying the reactor coolant boron concentration to maintain HZP criticality again. The difference in boron concentration is the worth of the selected control bank. This sequence is repeated for the remaining control banks. The fourth method, Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement (DRWM), moves each bank, individually, into the core to determine its worth. The bank is dynamically inserted into the core while data is acquired from the excore channel. While the bank is being withdrawn, the data is analyzed to determine the worth of the bank. This is repeated for each control and shutdown bank. Performance of this test will violate LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits," LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," or LCO 3.1.6, "Control Bank Insertion Limits."

- c. The ITC Test measures the ITC of the reactor. This test is performed at HZP. The method is to vary the RCS temperature in a slow and continuous manner. The reactivity change is measured with a reactivity computer as a function of the temperature change. The ITC is the slope of the reactivity versus the temperature plot. The test is repeated by reversing the direction of the temperature change and the final ITC is the average of the two calculated ITCs. Performance of this test could violate LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality."

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**APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES**

The fuel is protected by LCOs that preserve the initial conditions of the core assumed during the safety analyses. The methods for development of the LCOs that are excepted by this LCO are described in the Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology report (Ref. 5). The above mentioned PHYSICS TESTS, and other tests that may be required to calibrate nuclear instrumentation or to diagnose operational problems, may require the operating control or process variables to deviate from their LCO limitations.

**FSAR** Chapter 14 defines requirements for initial testing of the facility, including low power PHYSICS TESTS. Sections 14.2.10.2 and 14.2.10.3 (Ref. 6) summarize the initial criticality and low power tests.

## BASES

## APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Requirements for reload fuel cycle PHYSICS TESTS are defined in ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-2005 (Ref. 4). Although these PHYSICS TESTS are generally accomplished within the limits for the LCOs, conditions may occur when one or more LCOs must be suspended to make completion of PHYSICS TESTS possible or practical. This is acceptable as long as the fuel design criteria are not violated. When one or more of the requirements specified in:

- LCO 3.1.3 “Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC),”
- LCO 3.1.4 “Rod Group Alignment Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.5 “Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.6 “Control Bank Insertion Limits,” and
- LCO 3.4.2 “**RCS** Minimum Temperature for Criticality,”

are suspended for PHYSICS TESTS, the fuel design criteria are preserved as long as the power level is limited to  $\leq 5\%$  RTP, the reactor coolant temperature is kept  $\geq 541^\circ\text{F}$ , and SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR.

PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core nuclear parameters or the exercise of control components that affect process variables. Also involved are the movable control components (control and shutdown rods), which are required to shut down the reactor. The limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional, and therefore no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Test Exception LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

~~Reference 7 allows special test exceptions (STE) to be included as part of the LCO that they affect. It was decided, however, to retain this STE as a separate LCO because it was less cumbersome and provided additional clarity.~~

## LCO

This LCO allows the reactor parameters of MTC and minimum temperature for criticality to be outside their specified limits. In addition, it allows selected control and shutdown rods to be positioned outside of their specified alignment and insertion limits. Operation beyond specified

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**BASES**

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## LCO (continued)

limits is permitted for the purpose of performing PHYSICS TESTS and poses no threat to fuel integrity, provided the SRs are met.

The requirements of LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended **and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, “Reactor trip System (RTS) Instrumentation,” Functions 1, 2, and 3 may be reduced to 3 required channels** during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. RCS lowest loop average temperature is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ ,
- b. SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR, and
- c. THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP.

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**APPLICABILITY**

This LCO is applicable when performing low power PHYSICS TESTS. The Applicability is stated as “During PHYSICS TESTS initiated in MODE 2” to ensure that the 5% RTP maximum power level is not exceeded. Should the THERMAL POWER exceed 5% RTP, and consequently the unit enter MODE 1, this Applicability statement prevents exiting this Specification and its Required Actions.

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**ACTIONS**A.1 and A.2

If the SDM requirement is not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. The operator should begin boration with the best source available for the plant conditions. Boration will be continued until SDM is within limits.

Suspension of PHYSICS TESTS exceptions requires restoration of each of the applicable LCOs to within specification.



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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**B.1

When THERMAL POWER is > 5% RTP, the only acceptable action is to open the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to prevent operation of the reactor beyond its design limits. Immediately opening the RTBs will shut down the reactor and prevent operation of the reactor outside of its design limits.

C.1

When the RCS lowest  $T_{avg}$  is < 541°F, the appropriate action is to restore  $T_{avg}$  to within its specified limit. The allowed Completion Time of 15 minutes provides time for restoring  $T_{avg}$  to within limits without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time. Operation with the reactor critical and with temperature below 541°F could violate the assumptions for accidents analyzed in the safety analyses.

D.1

If the Required Action of Condition C cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within an additional 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 additional minutes is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from MODE 2 HZP conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**SR 3.1.8.1

The power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 by LCO 3.3.1 “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation” and LCO 3.3.3, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Intermediate Range Instrumentation.” A ~~REACTOR TRIP~~ CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each power range **neutron flux** (Table 3.3.1-1 Functions **1 and 2-a and 2.b**) and intermediate range **neutron flux** (LCO 3.3.3 ~~Function 4~~) channel prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS. This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS.

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**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**SR 3.1.8.2

Verification that the RCS lowest loop  $T_{avg}$  is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$  will ensure that the unit is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the RCS temperature at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will provide assurance that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.

SR 3.1.8.3

Verification that the THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP will ensure that the plant is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the THERMAL POWER at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.

SR 3.1.8.4

The SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the following reactivity effects:

- a. RCS boron concentration;
- b. Control bank position;
- c. RCS average temperature;
- d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation;
- e. Xenon concentration;
- f. Samarium concentration; and
- g. Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).

Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in this calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.

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**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration and on the low probability of an accident occurring without the required SDM.

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."
  2. 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests and Experiments."
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," August 1978.
  4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-2005, "Reload Startup Physics Tests for Pressurized Water Reactors," American National Standards Institute, November 29, 2005.
  5. WCAP-9273-NP-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985.
  6. **FSAR** Chapter 14, "Initial Testing Program."
  - ~~7. WCAP-11618, including Addendum 1, April 1989.~~
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**XII. Applicable STS Subsection After Incorporation of this GTST's Modifications**

The entire subsection of the Specifications and the Bases associated with this GTST, following incorporation of the modifications, is presented next.

## 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

## 3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions – MODE 2

LCO 3.1.8 During the performance of PHYSICS TESTS, the requirements of:

LCO 3.1.3 “Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC),”  
 LCO 3.1.4 “Rod Group Alignment Limits,”  
 LCO 3.1.5 “Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits,”  
 LCO 3.1.6 “Control Bank Insertion Limits,” and  
 LCO 3.4.2 “RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality”

may be suspended, and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation,” Functions 1, 2, and 3, may be reduced to 3 provided:

- a. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) lowest loop average temperature is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ ,
- b. SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR, and
- c. THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP.

APPLICABILITY: During PHYSICS TESTS initiated in MODE 2.

## ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. SDM not within limits.	A.1 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limits.	15 minutes
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Suspend PHYSICS TESTS exceptions.	1 hour
B. THERMAL POWER not within limit.	B.1 Open reactor trip breakers.	Immediately

## ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. RCS lowest loop average temperature not within limit.	C.1 Restore RCS lowest loop average temperature to within limit.	15 minutes
D. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	15 minutes

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.8.1 Perform a COT on power range neutron flux and intermediate range neutron flux channels per SR 3.3.1.6, SR 3.3.1.7, and SR 3.3.3.2.	Once prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS
SR 3.1.8.2 Verify the RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ .	30 minutes
SR 3.1.8.3 Verify THERMAL POWER is $\leq 5\%$ RTP.	30 minutes
SR 3.1.8.4 Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR.	24 hours

## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

## B 3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions – MODE 2

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BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The primary purpose of the MODE 2 PHYSICS TESTS exceptions is to permit relaxations of existing LCOs to allow certain PHYSICS TESTS to be performed.

Section XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, (Ref. 1) requires that a test program be established to ensure that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service. All functions necessary to ensure that the specified design conditions are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences must be tested. This testing is an integral part of the design, construction, and operation of the plant. Requirements for prior approval by the NRC, for the purpose of conducting tests and experiments not described in the FSAR, are specified in 10 CFR 50.59 (Ref. 2).

The key objectives of a test program are to (Ref. 3):

- a. Ensure that the facility has been adequately designed;
- b. Validate the analytical models used in the design and analysis;
- c. Verify the assumptions used to predict unit response;
- d. Ensure that installation of equipment in the facility has been accomplished in accordance with the design; and
- e. Verify that the operating and emergency procedures are adequate.

To accomplish these objectives, testing is performed prior to initial criticality, during startup, during low power operations, during power ascension, at high power and after each refueling. The PHYSICS TEST requirements for reload fuel cycles assure that the operating characteristics of the core are consistent with the design predictions and that the core can be operated as designed (Ref. 4).

PHYSICS TEST procedures are written and approved in accordance with established formats. The procedures include information necessary to permit a detailed execution of the testing required, to ensure that the design intent is met. PHYSICS TESTS are performed in accordance with

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**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

these procedures and test results are approved prior to continued power escalation and long-term power operation.

The typical PHYSICS TESTS performed for reload fuel cycles (Ref. 4) in MODE 2 are listed below:

- a. Critical Boron Concentration - Control Rods Withdrawn;
- b. Control Rod Worth;
- c. Isothermal Temperature Coefficient (ITC).

These tests are performed in MODE 2. These and other supplementary tests may be required to calibrate the nuclear instrumentation or to diagnose operational problems. These tests may cause the operating controls and process variables to deviate from their LCO requirements during their performance.

- a. The Critical Boron Concentration - Control Rods Withdrawn Test measures the critical boron concentration at hot zero power (HZP). With rods out, the lead control bank is at or near its fully withdrawn position. HZP is where the core is critical ( $k_{\text{eff}} = 1.0$ ), and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is at design temperature and pressure for zero power. Performance of this test should not violate any of the referenced LCOs.
- b. The Control Rod Worth Test is used to measure the reactivity worth of selected control banks. This test is performed at HZP and has four alternative methods of performance. The first method, the Boron Exchange Method, varies the reactor coolant boron concentration and moves the selected control bank in response to the changing boron concentration. The reactivity changes are measured with a reactivity computer. This sequence is repeated for the remaining control banks. The second method, the Rod Swap Method, measures the worth of a predetermined reference bank using the Boron Exchange Method above. The reference bank is then nearly fully inserted into the core. The selected bank is then inserted into the core as the reference bank is withdrawn. The HZP critical conditions are then determined with the selected bank fully inserted into the core. The worth of the selected bank is calculated based on the position of the reference bank with respect to the selected bank. This sequence is repeated as necessary for the



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**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

remaining control banks. The third method, the Boron Endpoint Method, moves the selected control bank over its entire length of travel and while varying the reactor coolant boron concentration to maintain HZP criticality again. The difference in boron concentration is the worth of the selected control bank. This sequence is repeated for the remaining control banks. The fourth method, Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement (DRWM), moves each bank, individually, into the core to determine its worth. The bank is dynamically inserted into the core while data is acquired from the excore channel. While the bank is being withdrawn, the data is analyzed to determine the worth of the bank. This is repeated for each control and shutdown bank. Performance of this test will violate LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits," LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," or LCO 3.1.6, "Control Bank Insertion Limits."

- c. The ITC Test measures the ITC of the reactor. This test is performed at HZP. The method is to vary the RCS temperature in a slow and continuous manner. The reactivity change is measured with a reactivity computer as a function of the temperature change. The ITC is the slope of the reactivity versus the temperature plot. The test is repeated by reversing the direction of the temperature change and the final ITC is the average of the two calculated ITCs. Performance of this test could violate LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality."

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**APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES**

The fuel is protected by LCOs that preserve the initial conditions of the core assumed during the safety analyses. The methods for development of the LCOs that are excepted by this LCO are described in the Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology report (Ref. 5). The above mentioned PHYSICS TESTS, and other tests that may be required to calibrate nuclear instrumentation or to diagnose operational problems, may require the operating control or process variables to deviate from their LCO limitations.

FSAR Chapter 14 defines requirements for initial testing of the facility, including low power PHYSICS TESTS. Sections 14.2.10.2 and 14.2.10.3 (Ref. 6) summarize the initial criticality and low power tests.

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**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

Requirements for reload fuel cycle PHYSICS TESTS are defined in ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-2005 (Ref. 4). Although these PHYSICS TESTS are generally accomplished within the limits for the LCOs, conditions may occur when one or more LCOs must be suspended to make completion of PHYSICS TESTS possible or practical. This is acceptable as long as the fuel design criteria are not violated. When one or more of the requirements specified in:

- LCO 3.1.3 “Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC),”
- LCO 3.1.4 “Rod Group Alignment Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.5 “Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits,”
- LCO 3.1.6 “Control Bank Insertion Limits,” and
- LCO 3.4.2 “RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality,”

are suspended for PHYSICS TESTS, the fuel design criteria are preserved as long as the power level is limited to  $\leq 5\%$  RTP, the reactor coolant temperature is kept  $\geq 541^\circ\text{F}$ , and SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR.

PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core nuclear parameters or the exercise of control components that affect process variables. Also involved are the movable control components (control and shutdown rods), which are required to shut down the reactor. The limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional, and therefore no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Test Exception LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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**LCO**

This LCO allows the reactor parameters of MTC and minimum temperature for criticality to be outside their specified limits. In addition, it allows selected control and shutdown rods to be positioned outside of their specified alignment and insertion limits. Operation beyond specified limits is permitted for the purpose of performing PHYSICS TESTS and poses no threat to fuel integrity, provided the SRs are met.

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**BASES**

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**LCO (continued)**

The requirements of LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor trip System (RTS) Instrumentation," Functions 1, 2, and 3 may be reduced to 3 required channels during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. RCS lowest loop average temperature is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ ,
- b. SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR, and
- c. THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP.

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**APPLICABILITY**

This LCO is applicable when performing low power PHYSICS TESTS. The Applicability is stated as "During PHYSICS TESTS initiated in MODE 2" to ensure that the 5% RTP maximum power level is not exceeded. Should the THERMAL POWER exceed 5% RTP, and consequently the unit enter MODE 1, this Applicability statement prevents exiting this Specification and its Required Actions.

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**ACTIONS**A.1 and A.2

If the SDM requirement is not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. The operator should begin boration with the best source available for the plant conditions. Boration will be continued until SDM is within limits.

Suspension of PHYSICS TESTS exceptions requires restoration of each of the applicable LCOs to within specification.

B.1

When THERMAL POWER is  $> 5\%$  RTP, the only acceptable action is to open the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to prevent operation of the reactor beyond its design limits. Immediately opening the RTBs will shut down the reactor and prevent operation of the reactor outside of its design limits.

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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**C.1

When the RCS lowest  $T_{avg}$  is  $< 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ , the appropriate action is to restore  $T_{avg}$  to within its specified limit. The allowed Completion Time of 15 minutes provides time for restoring  $T_{avg}$  to within limits without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time. Operation with the reactor critical and with temperature below  $541^{\circ}\text{F}$  could violate the assumptions for accidents analyzed in the safety analyses.

D.1

If the Required Action of Condition C cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within an additional 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 additional minutes is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from MODE 2 HZP conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**SR 3.1.8.1

The power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 by LCO 3.3.1 "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation" and LCO 3.3.3, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Intermediate Range Instrumentation." A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each power range neutron flux (Table 3.3.1-1 Functions 1 and 2) and intermediate range neutron flux (LCO 3.3.3) channel prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS. This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS.

SR 3.1.8.2

Verification that the RCS lowest loop  $T_{avg}$  is  $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$  will ensure that the unit is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the RCS temperature at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will provide assurance that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.

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**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**SR 3.1.8.3

Verification that the THERMAL POWER is  $\leq 5\%$  RTP will ensure that the plant is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the THERMAL POWER at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.

SR 3.1.8.4

The SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the following reactivity effects:

- a. RCS boron concentration;
- b. Control bank position;
- c. RCS average temperature;
- d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation;
- e. Xenon concentration;
- f. Samarium concentration; and
- g. Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).

Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in this calculation because the reactor is subcritical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration and on the low probability of an accident occurring without the required SDM.

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**BASES**

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- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.”
  2. 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and Experiments.”
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, “Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants,” August 1978.
  4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-2005, “Reload Startup Physics Tests for Pressurized Water Reactors,” American National Standards Institute, November 29, 2005.
  5. WCAP-9273-NP-A, “Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology,” July 1985.
  6. FSAR Chapter 14, “Initial Testing Program.”
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