Enclosure 1
Changes to PSAR Chapters 3, 4, 5, 9 and 14
(Non-Proprietary)

Principal Design Criteria	**SAR Section**
PDC 26, Reactivity control systems	4.2.2 4.5
PDC 28, Reactivity limits	4.2.2, 7.3
PDC 29, Protection against anticipated operation occurrences	4.2.2, 7.3, 7.5
PDC 30, Quality of reactor coolant boundary	4.3
PDC 31, Fracture prevention of reactor coolant boundary	4.3
PDC 32, Inspection of reactor coolant boundary	4.3
PDC 33, Reactor coolant inventory maintenance	4.3, 9.1.4, 9.3
PDC 34, Residual heat removal	4.6, 6.3
PDC 35, Passive residual heat removal	4.3, 4.6, 6.3
PDC 36, Inspection of passive residual heat removal system	6.3
PDC 37, Testing of passive residual heat removal system	6.3
PDC 44, Structural and equipment cooling	9.1.5, 9.7
PDC 45, Inspection of structural and equipment cooling systems	9.1.5, 9.7
PDC 46, Testing of structural and equipment cooling systems	9.1.5, 9.7
PDC 60, Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment	5.1, 9.1.3, 9.2, 11.2
PDC 61, Fuel storage and handling and radioactivity control	9.3
PDC 62, Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling	9.3
PDC 63, Monitoring fuel and waste storage	9.3, 11.2
PDC 64, Monitoring radioactivity releases	9.1.2, 9.1.3, 9.2
PDC 70, Reactor coolant purity control	9.1.1
PDC 71, Reactor coolant heating systems	9.1.5
PDC 73, Reactor coolant system interfaces	5.2

The reflector blocks form an upper plenum and a fluidic diode, which is a stainless-steel passive device that connects the upper plenum to the top of the downcomer as shown in Figure 4.3-1. The diode introduces a higher flow resistance in one direction, while having a lower flow resistance in the other direction. The diode restricts flow from the higher-pressure downcomer into the upper plenum during conditions with forced circulation. The flow passes in the low-resistance direction of the diode from the upper plenum to the top of the downcomer driven by natural circulation.

The graphite reflector blocks reflect neutrons back into the core, increasing the fuel utilization while protecting the reactor vessel from fluence based forms of degradation. Further discussion of the reflector's neutronic characteristics are detailed in Section 4.5.

4.3.1.2.2 Core Barrel

The 316H SS core barrel creates an annular space between itself and the reactor vessel and defines the downcomer flow path for the coolant. The core barrel includes cutout features which limit the siphoning of reactor coolant in the event of a break in the vessel cold leg, and~~The core barrel~~ has a flanged top which is welded to the inner wall of the vessel shell. The barrel is kept concentric to the shell by radial tabs which allow for differential thermal expansion.

4.3.1.2.3 Reflector Support Structure

The 316H SS reflector support structure, as shown in Figure 4.3-1, defines the flow path from the downcomer annulus into the core as well as provides support to the graphite reflector blocks. The reflector support structure ensures a stable core configuration for all conditions (e.g., reactor trip and core motion) by controlling the radial and circumferential positions of the reflector blocks.

4.3.2 Design Basis

Consistent with PDC 1, the safety-related portions of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals are fabricated and tested in accordance with generally recognized codes and standards.

Consistent with PDC 2, the reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals perform their safety functions in the event of a safe-shutdown earthquake and other natural phenomena hazards.

Consistent with PDC 4, the reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals accommodate the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated events.

Consistent with PDC 10, the reactor vessel and internals maintain a geometry and coolant flow path to ensure that the specified acceptable system radionuclide release design limits (SARRDLs) will not be exceeded during normal operation including postulated events.

Consistent with PDC 14, the reactor vessel is fabricated and tested to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage or sudden failure of the reactor coolant boundary by gross rupture.

Consistent with PDC 30, reactor vessel is fabricated, and tested to quality standards, and pre- and in-service inspections, as well as testing where practicable, will be used to detect and identify the location of coolant leakage.

Consistent with PDC 31, the reactor vessel has sufficient margin to withstand stresses under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated events such that the reactor coolant boundary does not degrade due to the effects of neutron embrittlement, corrosion, material wear, fatigue, stress rupture, thermal loads, or failure due to stress rupture and fracture. The design shall account for residual, steady-state, and transient stresses and consider flaw size.

Consistent with PDC 32, the reactor vessel permits inspection, monitoring, or functional testing of important areas and features to assess structural integrity and leak-tightness of the safety-related portions of the reactor coolant boundary.

Consistent with PDC 33, the core barrel design includes anti-siphon features to limit reactor coolant inventory loss in the event of breaks in the PHTS cold leg.

Consistent with PDC 35, the reactor vessel internals will assure sufficient core cooling during postulated events and remove residual heat. The safety function of the fluidic diode is to provide a flow path via natural circulation to transfer heat from the reactor core during and following postulated events such that fuel and reactor internal structure damage that could interfere with continued effective core cooling is prevented.

Consistent with PDC 74, the design of the reactor vessel and reflector blocks shall be such that their integrity and geometry are maintained during postulated events to permit sufficient insertion of the control and shutdown elements providing for reactor shutdown.

4.3.3 System Evaluation

The 316H SS structures of the reactor vessel system are fabricated and tested in accordance with Reference 1 standards. The 316H SS vessel internals also satisfy the chemistry restrictions of the ASME Section III code in Division 5, Article HGB-2000. Per the ASME standard, ER16-8-2 weld metal will be used in fabrication of the 316H structures. Commensurate with the safety-related function of the reflector block in ensuring acceptable design limits and maintaining the reactor coolant flow path, quality related controls will be placed on the ETU-10 graphite. KP-FHR specifications and procurement documents incorporate and reference the applicable guidance and ASME standards. The quality assurance program is described in Section 12.9. These controls demonstrate conformance with PDC 1.

The reactor vessel system makes up a portion of the reactor coolant boundary. The reactor vessel and graphite reflector blocks are therefore designed to maintain geometry during a safe shutdown earthquake to ensure the vessel integrity, insertion of negative reactivity via the RCSS, and to maintain the flow path. The reactor vessel and vessel internals will have dynamic behaviors during a design basis earthquake. These include fluid-structure interaction within the vessel, oscillatory response of components mounted to the reactor top head, i.e., head-mounted oscillators, and relative movement of graphite reflector blocks with respect to one another within the coolant. These dynamic behaviors are accounted for in the design of the reactor and its internals, to ensure continued functionality during and after a design basis earthquake. Models are used to understand fluid migration tendencies considering the pebble bed, reflector blocks, core barrel, and other reactor vessel internal features. The insights gained from the analysis of these models are used to design the reactor to prevent damage to the vessel during a design basis earthquake. The reactor vessel, vessel internals, and vessel attachments such as the RCSS are classified as SDC-3 per ASCE 43-19 “Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities” (Reference 2). The reactor vessel will also be protected from the failure of nearby non-safety related SSCs during a design basis earthquake by seismically mounting, physically separating, or using a barrier to preclude adverse interaction, and from failure of attached non-safety related SSCs, such as attached piping (e.g., by design for preferential failure of the non-safety component is a way that does not impact the vessel). These features demonstrate compliance with PDC 2.

The reactor vessel can accommodate internal and external static and dynamic loads. The thermal expansion of the reactor vessel shell and bottom head is supported by the reactor vessel support system (RVSS) (see Section 4.7) during reactor startup, normal operation, and postulated events. Mechanical loadings from static weight, seismic load, and forces from the pebble bed, coolant, and core metal under the gas tungsten arc welding process. The vessel precludes material creep, fatigue, thermal, mechanical, and hydraulic stresses. The leak tight design of the reactor vessel head minimizes air ingress into the cover gas and precludes corrosion of the internals. The high temperature, high carbon grade 316H SS of the core barrel and reflector support structure have high creep strength and are resistant to radiation damage, corrosion mechanisms, thermal aging, yielding, and excessive neutron absorption. Vessel fluence calculations, as described in Section 4.5, confirm adequate margin relative to the effects of irradiation. The fast neutron fluence received by the reactor vessel from the reactor core and pebble insertion and extraction lines is attenuated by the core barrel, the reflector, and the reactor coolant. Coolant purity design limits are also established in consideration of the effects of chemical attack and fouling of the reactor vessel. These features demonstrate conformance with PDC 31.

The MSS utilizes coupons and component monitoring to confirm that irradiation-affected corrosion is non-existent or manageable. The 316H SS reactor vessel and ER16-8-2 weld material, as a part of the reactor coolant boundary, will be inspected for structural integrity and leak-tightness. As detailed in Reference 3, fracture toughness is sufficiently high in 316H SS under reactor operating conditions that additional tensile or fracture toughness monitoring and testing programs are unnecessary. These features demonstrate conformance to PDC 32.

Anti-siphon cutouts are above the PHTS cold leg with coolant on both sides of the core barrel during normal operation. In the event of a cold leg break, reactor coolant level is expected to decrease and the cover gas moves into the downcomer to break the siphon thus precluding coolant from being siphoned below the fluidic diode flow pathway elevation. These design features demonstrate conformance to PDC 33.

Fluidic diodes are used to establish a flow path for continuous natural circulation of coolant in the core during postulated events to remove residual heat from the reactor core to the vessel wall. During and following a postulated event, the hot coolant from the core flows from the upper plenum through the low flow resistance direction of the fluidic diode to the cooler downcomer via natural circulation, thereby cooling the core passively. Continuous coolant flow through the reactor core prevents potential damage to the vessel internals due to overheating thereby ensuring the coolable geometry of the core is maintained. The anti-siphon feature also limits the loss of reactor coolant inventory from inside the reactor vessel in the event of a PHTS breach. These features demonstrate compliance with PDC 35.

The reactor vessel reflector blocks permit insertion of the reactivity control and shutdown elements. The ETU-10 grade graphite of the reflector blocks is compatible with the reactor coolant chemistry and will not degrade due to mechanical wear, thermal stresses and irradiation impacts during the reflector block lifetime. The graphite reflector material is qualified as described in the Kairos Power topical report “Graphite Material Qualification for the Kairos Power Fluoride Salt-Cooled High-Temperature Reactor,” KP-TR-014 (Reference 4). To preclude damage to the reflector due to entrained moisture in the graphite, the reflector blocks are “baked” (i.e., heated uniformly) prior to coming into contact with coolant and the reactor vessel is design to preclude air ingress. The reflectors, which act as a heat sink in the core, are spaced to accommodate thermal expansion and hydraulic forces during normal operation and postulated events. The gaps between the graphite blocks also allow for coolant to provide cooling to the reflector blocks. The reactor vessel permits the insertion of the reactivity control and shutdown elements as well. The vessel is classified as SDC-3 per ASCE 43-19 and will maintain its geometry to ensure the RCSS elements can be inserted during postulated events including a design basis earthquake. These features demonstrate compliance with PDC 74.

4.6 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN

4.6.1 Description

The thermal hydraulic design of the reactor is a combination of design features that enable effective heat transport from the fuel pebble to the reactor coolant and eventually to the heat rejection system of the reactor, considering the effects of bypass flow and flow non-uniformity. The design features that play a key role in the thermal-hydraulic design of the reactor system include the fuel pebble (see Section 4.2.1), reactor coolant (see Section 5.1), reactor vessel and reactor vessel internal structures (see Section 4.3), the primary heat transport system (PHTS) (see Section 5.1), and the primary heat rejection system (PHRS) (see Section 5.2). Thermal hydraulic computer codes and evaluation models are discussed in Section 4 and 5 of Reference 1, and Section 4 of Reference 2.

4.6.1.1 Core Geometry

The core geometry is maintained in part by the reactor vessel internals including the reflector blocks which keep the pebbles in a general cylindrical core shape. Coolant inlet channels in the graphite reflector blocks are employed to limit the core pressure drop. The use of pebbles in a packed bed configuration also creates local velocity fields that enhance pebble-to-coolant heat transfer. The reactor thermal hydraulic design uses the following heat transfer mechanisms to extract the fission heat.

- Pebble-to-coolant convective heat transfer
- Pebble radiative heat transfer
- Pebble-to-pebble heat transfer by pebble contact conduction
- Pebble-to-pebble heat transfer by conduction through the reactor coolant
- Heat transfer to the graphite reflector by modes of conduction, convection, and radiation.

4.6.1.2 Coolant Flow Path

During normal operation, reactor coolant at approximately 550°C enters the reactor vessel from two PHTS cold leg nozzles and flows through a downcomer formed between the metallic core barrel and the reactor vessel shell as shown in Figure 4.6-1. The coolant is distributed along the vessel bottom head through the reflector support structure, up through coolant inlet channels in the reflector blocks and the fueling chute and into the core with a portion of the coolant bypassing the core via gaps between the reflector blocks. The coolant transfers heat from fuel pebbles which are buoyant in the coolant and provides cooling to the reflector blocks and the control elements via engineered bypass flow. Coolant travels out of the active core through the upper plenum via the coolant outlet channels and exits the reactor vessel via the PHTS outlet. The maximum vessel exit temperature is 620°C and dependent on the amount of corresponding bypass flow through the reflector blocks.

During postulated events where the normal heat removal path through the PHTS is no longer available, including when the PHTS is drained, a fluidic diode (see Section 4.3), is used to create an alternate flow path. During such events, forced flow from the primary salt pump (PSP) is also not available. The fluidic diode then directs flow from the hot well to the downcomer as shown in Figure 4.6-1. This opens the path for continuous flow via natural circulation. During normal operation, while the PSP is in operation, the fluidic diode minimizes reverse flow.

4.6.4 Testing and Inspection

Reactor coolant temperatures, flow, and core power will be periodically monitored during operations to be within specified limits. Instrumentation will also be periodically calibrated.

4.6.5 References

1. Kairos Power LLC, "KP-FHR Core Design and Analysis Methodology," KP-TR-017-P, Revision 0.
2. Kairos Power LLC, "Postulated Event Methodology," KP-TR-018-P, Revision 0.

5.1.3 System Evaluation

The design of the nonsafety-related PHTS is such that a failure of components of the PHTS does not affect the performance of safety-related SSCs due to a design basis earthquake. In addition to protective barriers, the PHTS pipe connections to the reactor vessel nozzles have sufficiently small wall thickness, such that if loaded beyond elastic limits, inelastic response occurs in the PHTS piping which is nonsafety-related. These features, along with the seismic design described in Section 3.5, demonstrate conformance with the requirements in PDC 2 for the PHTS.

While the PHTS is a closed system, there are conceivable scenarios that may result in the release of radioactive effluents. The fuel design locates the fuel particles near the periphery of the fuel pebble, enhancing the ability of the fuel to transfer heat to the coolant. The thermal hydraulic analysis of the core (see Section 4.6) ensures that adequate coolant flow is maintained to ensure that SARRDLs, as discussed in Section 6.2, are not exceeded. These features demonstrate conformance with the requirements in PDC 10.

The design of the reactor coolant, in part, ensures that power oscillations cannot result in conditions exceeding SARRDLs. The reactor is kept near ambient pressure and the reactor coolant in the PHTS does not experience two phase flow. The coolant has a high thermal inertia making the reactor resilient to thermal-hydraulic instability events. These features, in part, demonstrate conformance with the requirements in PDC 12.

The functional containment is described in Section 6.2. The design relies primarily on the multiple barriers within the TRISO fuel particles to ensure that the radiological dose at the exclusion area boundary as a consequence of postulated events meets regulatory limits. However, the reactor coolant also serves as a distinct physical barrier for fuel submerged in Flibe by providing retention of fission products that escape the fuel. The design of the reactor coolant composition provides, in part, a means to control the accidental release of radioactive materials during normal reactor operation and postulated events (PDC 60), and supports, in part, demonstration of the functional containment aspects. The design aspects of the reactor coolant are discussed in Reference 5.1.5-1. The Flibe also accumulates radionuclides from fission products, and transmutation products from the Flibe and Flibe impurities. The retention properties of the Flibe are credited in the safety analysis as a barrier to release of radionuclides accumulated in the coolant, and radionuclide concentration is limited by technical specifications. The transport of radionuclides through Flibe is based on thermodynamic data that will be justified in the application for an Operating License. These features demonstrate conformance with the requirements in PDC 16.

The PSP casing design sets the inlet elevation of the anti-siphon surface for the hot leg should a leak occur in the external portion of the PHTS. In the event of a break in the external portion of the PHTS hot leg ~~This anti-siphon feature limits the loss of reactor coolant inventory from inside the reactor vessel the event of a PHTS breach~~ or ~~in~~ breaches of inventory management system piping connected to the PHTS (see Section 9.1.4.), reactor coolant level is expected to decrease and the cover gas moves into the pump well to break the siphon. This precludes coolant from being siphoned below the elevation of the PSP casing. These anti-siphon features demonstrate compliance with PDC 33.

The design of the PHTS controls the release of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents in the event the PHTS working fluid is inadvertently released to the atmosphere via leaks in the piping system. The PHTS SSCs that are part of the reactor coolant boundary are designed to the ASME B31.3 Code (for the piping) and Section VIII (for the PHX) such that leaks are unlikely. Means are provided for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of reactor coolant leakage in the PHTS SSCs. A postulated event in the PHTS would be a PHX tube failure. This event would cause Flibe interactions. The IMS is designed to preferentially fail in a way that does not impact the RV system. This satisfies PDC 2 for the IMS.

The IMS is designed such that safety-related systems in proximity to the IMS are protected against the dynamic effects potentially created by the failure of IMS equipment. The IMS is a low pressure system, as the reactor coolant pressures are bounded by the reactor coolant static head pressures, thus precluding pipe whip. This satisfies PDC 4 for the IMS.

The IMS is designed to preclude the inadvertent draining of the RV during normal operation and during RV fill/drain operations. During normal operation, when the reactor vessel is fueled, the RV fill/drain transfer line is equipped with passive RV isolation features such as caps, flanges, and/or a transfer line disconnect, designed to preclude inadvertent reactor coolant draining from the RV by siphoning. In the event of a leak in the RV fill/drain transfer line, while connected to the reactor vessel during fueled operation, the reactor coolant leak is detected by the plant control system, the PSP is tripped, and the RV cover gas pressure is limited to an upper bound thus precluding the ejection of reactor coolant through the transfer line dip-tube. During RV fill/drain operations, the reactor vessel is defueled, and the fill/drain line is connected, an isolation valve is used to interrupt the reactor coolant flow and a cover gas inlet is used to break the siphon in the transfer lines. These design features satisfy the requirements of PDC 33.

The RV coolant level management line short dip tube and overflow weir designs preclude inadvertent reactor coolant draining from the RV into the RV level management tank. As level drops in response to a break in the reactor coolant level management line, cover gas would fill the short dip tube and would break the siphon. Additionally, the overflow weir is designed in a way that precludes the uncovering of fuel due to thermal expansion of the reactor coolant. In the event of a leak in the RV level management tank or transfer line, the reactor coolant leak is detected by the plant control system, and the pump for the reactor level management is tripped to minimize the overflow of reactor coolant from the RV through the overflow weir. As level drops in response to a break in the reactor coolant level management line, cover gas would fill the overflow weir and would break the siphon. This design configuration satisfies the requirements of PDC 33.

The IMS encompasses a PHTS drain line, equipped with a PHTS drain valve, which interfaces with the PHTS fill/drain tank. The PHTS design contains an RV anti-siphon feature (see Section 5.1), thus precluding inadvertent reactor coolant drain from the RV, precluding the IMS from draining the RV. These design features satisfy the requirements of PDC 33.

The makeup inventory function of IMS is not relied on to mitigate the consequences of a postulated event. As described in Section 4.3, the safety-related portions of the reactor coolant boundary are limited to the reactor vessel and a failure of the reactor vessel is precluded by design. Therefore, the makeup functional requirements of PDC 33 have been addressed by design.

The system is expected to handle reactor coolant with fission as well as activation products; therefore, the system will be designed to minimize contamination and support eventual decommissioning, consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406.

9.1.4.4 Testing and Inspection

The components of the IMS, including valves, tanks, pumps and other components, are located such that they are accessible for periodic inspection and testing.

9.1.4.5 References

1. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, “Process Piping,” ASME B31.3. 2016.

graphite or are expected to cool quickly such that oxidation, if any, would be minimal and not affect the acceptability of the pebble for reuse. These design features satisfy the requirements of PDC 3 for the PHSS. Fire protection systems are further discussed in Section 9.4.

The pebble handling portion of the PHSS is protected from the effects of discharging fluids. There are no pressurized piping systems in or around the PHSS thus precluding the design from high energy line considerations. A hypothetical water line break in the area of the storage system does not pose a criticality risk as the analyses supporting the storage system assume complete submergence and internal flooding of the storage canisters in water. The PHSS is designed in consideration of the high radiation environment where equipment will be functioning. The PHSS design also considers and accounts for the temperature within the system to preclude oxidation of graphite pebbles. The stainless steel PHSS storage canisters are designed to accommodate pressure due to the accumulation of radionuclides and thermal loads associated with the amount of spent fuel loaded in each canister during normal and postulated event conditions. The canisters are also designed to accommodate the tensile stress exerted during transfer and are compatible with handling equipment. The interior of the stainless steel canisters is also designed to account for radiolysis products from spent nuclear fuel and ensures the integrity of the canister, seal, and weld thus precluding the potential release of radionuclides from the canister. These design features demonstrate that the PHSS satisfies the environmental and dynamic effects in PDC 4.

The PHSS interfaces with the reactor vessel at the PEM and the pebble insertion line. The elevation of the PEM relative to the coolant free surface is such that coolant inventory loss from the reactor vessel is limited in the event the PEM breaks. The pebble insertion line is designed to limit inventory loss to an elevation no lower than the primary salt pump elevation, in the event of a break in the insertion line. The pebble insertion line uses overflow protection cutouts to direct any coolant in the insertion line back down into the reactor vessel. Cover gas fills the line to break the siphon. These design features of the PHSS satisfy the requirements in PDC 33.

PDC 61 requires that the safety-related portions of the PHSS that contain radioactivity be designed to ensure (1) capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components, (2) suitable shielding for radiation protection, (3) appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering, (4) residual heat removal capability, and (5) significant reduction in fuel storage cooling under postulated event conditions is precluded. The design features which address PDC 61 for the PHSS are discussed below:

- The TRISO fuel particle provides a functional containment as described in Section 6.2. Radioactive material and fission products are contained within the particle unless the TRISO layers are compromised or defective (see Section 4.2.1). The fuel pebble, as described in Section 4.2.1, is designed to preclude physical damage or changes in geometry to the TRISO particle during anticipated loads from normal operation, storage, shipping and handling. Therefore, the TRISO particle is credited for the confinement of radioactive materials rather than the PHSS. The pebble can experience thermal and mechanical loads while being handled, inspected, operated, and stored; however, such loads do not introduce incremental failures of TRISO particles. Furthermore, the PHSS design precludes pebble damage from overheating and oxidation. Heat removal mechanisms within the system, such as thermal radiation and convection via natural circulation, are sufficient to remove the decay heat produced by individual pebbles during their transit through the PHSS. Also, oxidation associated with air or moisture ingress into the PHSS is negligible for pebbles at temperatures experienced in the system. The system also minimizes pebble wear. The limiting PHSS malfunction event, which is discussed in Section 13.1.5, does not cause temperature excursions, oxidation, or mechanical stresses on the TRISO particles. Therefore, containment and confinement of radioactivity is maintained by the TRISO particles.

Section	Section Name	LCO or Condition	Basis
		Inlet gas system pressure is maintained within an upper bound limit.	The objective is to limit the quantity and pressure of spilled Flibe or cover gas to ensure a postulated event does not exceed limits.
		Argon purity in the cover gas is maintained within an upper bound limit.	The objective is to limit radionuclides in the Flibe below solubility limits where solute-solute interactions can be neglected.
		The quantity of materials at risk in the gas space of the primary heat transport system and the primary heat rejection system is maintained within an upper bound limit.	The objective is to limit the quantity of materials at risk in the cover gas to ensure a postulated event does not exceed limits.
		The quantity of air in the reactor ~~coolant~~ system during steady state is maintained within an upper bound limit.	The objective is to limit the air ingress to the reactor ~~coolant~~ system to prevent void accumulation and corrosion.
3.4	Engineered Safety Features	Decay heat removal system operability	The objective is to specify the requirement to have an operable decay heat removal system to ensure that the safety limits will not be exceeded.
		Reactor vessel integrity	The objective is to specify a design operating temperature limit to ensure the safety limit is not exceeded for postulated events.
3.5	Ventilation Systems	N/A	N/A
3.6	Emergency Power	N/A	N/A

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