UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

July 6, 2022

Mr. Daniel Stoddard
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2022011 AND 05000281/2022011

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On May 26, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Surry Power Station. On May 26, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Wilson and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very-low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Matthew S. Fannon, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281
License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2022011 AND 05000281/2022011- dated July 6, 2022

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OFFICE	RII/DRP	RII/DRP	RII/DRS	NRR/DRO	RII/DRP
NAME	J. Seat	K. Carrington	M. Schwieg	D. Merzke	M. Fannon
DATE	6/27/2022	6/27/2022	6/27/2022	6/27/2022	7/6/2022

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000280 and 05000281
License Numbers:	DPR-32 and DPR-37
Report Numbers:	05000280/2022011 and 05000281/2022011
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2022-011-0025
Licensee:	Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility:	Surry Power Station
Location:	Surry, VA
Inspection Dates:	May 09, 2022 to May 26, 2022
Inspectors:	J. Seat, Senior Project Engineer K. Carrington, Senior Resident Inspector D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector B. Towne, Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Transient Combustible Stored in a Restricted Area			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000280/2022011-01 Open/Closed	[P.5] - Operating Experience	71152B
An NRC identified finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action program (CAP), use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.

- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's CAP in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors conducted an in-depth corrective action program review of the auxiliary feedwater, service water, and fire protection systems. The inspectors also conducted a review of chilled water system deficiencies identified within the past five years or more.

- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience.

- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.

- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment	71152B
1. Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in each of the following areas adequately supported nuclear safety, and in general, met the requirements in licensee procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," and other self-imposed standards.	

Problem Identification: The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program and that there was generally a low threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: Based on the review of condition reports, the inspectors concluded that problems were prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the condition report significance determination guidance in procedure PI-AA-200. Inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in compliance with CAP procedures and that causal determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.

Corrective Actions: The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem, and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality, to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed corrective actions in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely.

2. Operating Experience

The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC Operating Experience information for station applicability, as prescribed by PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate any potential station impact. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner, to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating Experience lessons-learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.

3. Self-Assessments and Audits

The inspectors determined that the licensee effectively performed self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluate those issues, and resolve them commensurate with their safety significance. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical. The inspectors verified that corrective action documents were initiated to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from self-assessments and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Quality assurance program audits appropriately assessed performance and identified areas for improvement.

4. Safety Conscious Work Environment

Based on safety culture interviews with approximately 20 plant personnel, reviews of the latest safety culture survey results, and interviews with employee concerns program (ECP) personnel, the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the safety conscious work environment. Employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

Transient Combustible Stored in a Restricted Area			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section

Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000280/2022011-01 Open/Closed	[P.5] - Operating Experience	71152B

An NRC identified finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone.

Description: On May 12, 2022, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the Unit 1 auxiliary building 13-foot elevation. The inspectors identified an unattended, partially filled, oil drum within a few feet of the Unit 1 charging pump exterior wall.

The inspectors reviewed the transient fire loading report posted on the nearby wall. The report did not identify any flammable/combustible liquids in the area. Additionally, in Section 2, Work Area Preparation and Precautions, it was checked to observe the restrictions in fire zones listed in Attachments 8 or Attachment 9 or obtain variance.

The inspectors reviewed CM-AA-FPA-101, Attachment 9, Surry Power Station Transient Combustible Loading Limits and Restrictions, which includes a restriction for the auxiliary building general area that states, “No transient within 10 ft. of exterior wall of charging pump cubicles on elev. 2 ft. and 13 ft."

The inspectors determined the unattended oil drum was located within a restricted area and the station had failed to establish any variance or compensatory actions associated with a transient combustible stored within a restricted area or combustion free zone.

Corrective Actions: On May 26, 2022, the licensee removed the oil drum from the restricted area and the licensee is reviewing additional corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: CR1200410

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors found that the licensee’s failure to implement the fire protection program in accordance with licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, which resulted in the storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone, was a performance deficiency within the licensee’s ability to foresee and prevent.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the transient combustible was stored within a restricted or combustion free zone, which affected the zone’s function to prevent the spread of fire near the Unit 1 charging pumps. The inspectors used IMC 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” dated January 1, 2021, to inform answers to the more than minor screening questions and found this condition consistent with more than minor Example 4.j.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, “Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP.” This finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustible was stored in an approved

container and had a “low degradation” grading in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. The inspectors found that the licensee did not implement relevant internal operating experience related to the NRC 2nd Quarter 2021 Green NCV due to a transient fire load incident.

Enforcement:

Violation: License Condition 3.I, “Fire Protection,” states in part, “The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report…” UFSAR Section 9.10.1, Design Bases, states in part, “Compliance with these criteria is contained in the following documents… Fire Protection Program document and the associated Administrative Procedures describe the administrative and technical controls.” Licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, Attachment 9, Surry Power Station Transient Combustible Loading Limits and Restrictions, which includes a restriction for the auxiliary building general area that states, “No transient within 10 ft. of exterior wall of charging pump cubicles on elev. 2 ft. and 13 ft.”

Contrary to the above, from May 12, 2022 to May 22, 2022, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR, resulting in noncompliance with the fire protection program document, CM-AA-FPA-100, and the associated administrative procedure, CM-AA-FPA-101, which describe the administrative and technical controls of transient combustibles. Specifically, the licensee stored a transient combustible within the auxiliary building restricted or combustion free zone.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation	71152B

Minor Violation: The NRC identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) associated with the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) fire main connection tell-tale drain into the corrective action program.

NRC inspectors performed a system walkdown of the AFW system for both units on May 12, 2022. The inspectors noted that the AFW fire main connection line to the AFW pump suction header had a tell-tale drain that was covered by a foreign material exclusion (FME) cover. The FME cover, which was not required for a vertical downward opening, had the potential to prevent detection of leakage from the drain. The issue was reported to station operators and the condition was promptly corrected, though a condition report was not entered into the CAP. The condition can reasonably be viewed as a condition adverse to quality, and per station procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, should have resulted in a condition report for the purpose of tracking and resolving the issue. Although the condition was promptly corrected, the ability to track and trend the condition across the station was not possible without an entry into the CAP. On May 24, 2022, the issue was brought up to Surry Licensing during a daily debrief for the PI&R Inspection, and a CR was entered into the CAP.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined that this issue was minor in accordance with NRC's inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0612, "Issue Screening", IMC 0612, App. B, "Additional Issue Screening Guidance" and IMC 0612, App. E, "Examples of Minor Issues." Specifically, the performance deficiency could not be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event; if left uncorrected, would not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern and did not adversely affect the mitigating systems cornerstone objective.

Enforcement: The licensee initiated a CR to capture the improper instillation of the FME cover. This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On May 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to David Wilson and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Calculations	CALC-0114-0130-CALC-001	CW System Transient Hydraulic Analysis	Rev. 0
	Corrective Action Documents	CA8117061	White Finding for 2-FW-142 not Meeting Inservice Testing Requirements of ASME Code	07/30/2020
		CA8166318		
		CA8166321		
		CA8166323		
		CA8166324		
		CA8166325		
		CA8166327		
		CA8166328		
		CA8166331		
		CA8166332	ACA-1: Ensure all CVCM plans are accessible in Doctop	10/12/2020
		CA8166333		
		CA8166334	ACA-3: Incorporate IST activities into work management software	10/12/2020
		CA8354712	LEE to Engineering for TRM surveillances not performed for fire-related barriers	03/16/2021
		CA8576750		
		CA8601602	Level of Effort Evaluation	10/14/2021
		CA9162869	Perform a Performance Gap Analysis for manual valve operation	11/23/2021
		CR1094534		
		CR1125376		
		CR1150701		
		CR1151545		
		CR1152247	OC-18 in effect greater than two weeks	07/24/2020
		CR1152249	OC-18 in effect more than two weeks	07/24/2020
		CR1152636	Notice of Violation (White) received for 11/19/2019 TDAFW pump check valve failure event	07/31/2020
		CR1152857	LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2, Loss of	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Containment Cooling Affecting Partial Pressure Indication	
		CR1153258		
		CR1154065	LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2, Loss of Containment Cooling Affecting Partial Pressure Indication	
		CR1154513	2-FW-P-3A ('A' MDAFW Pump) Control Switch Abnormal Operation	09/01/2020
		CR1155733		
		CR1157426	NRC Identified Potential issue of 2-FW-139 Drain Line Pipe Cap Interference	10/06/2020
		CR1158530		
		CR1158885	2-FW-139 'A' AFW Header Drain Line Seismic Interference	10/20/2020
		CR1159061	Coatings not applied at welds on AFW piping	10/22/2020
		CR1161543		
		CR1162361		
		CR1163031	1-VS-AC-6 not running after changing red indication LED	12/28/2020
		CR1163387		
		CR1165891		
		CR1166392		
		CR1166441	Damage/Corrosion found on U1 B AFW Booster Pump Piping	02/24/2021
		CR1166865		
		CR1167077		
		CR1167156	NRC Resident question about Drainage from 2-FW-T-2 (U2 Terry Turbine) Common Drain Line	03/08/2021
		CR1168515	Active Boric Acid Leak on CS Piping with AFW Booster Suction Piping as Target	03/24/2021
		CR1168526	U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping Coating Degraded and Missing	03/24/2021
		CR1169561		
		CR1170487		
		CR1172375	1-RM-RI-162 Exceeded CM Criteria	05/09/2021
		CR1172611		
		CR1173255		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR1173255		
		CR1173652	MRule: Function IA004 Exceeded Condition Monitoring Performance Criteria	05/24/2021
		CR1176202		
		CR1176203		
		CR1177055		
		CR1177065		
		CR1177495		
		CR1177537	NRC 2nd Quarter 2021 Exit Meeting Results - 1 Green NCV due to transient fire load incident	07/26/2021
		CR1177578	OC-18 to log U1 A MFP vibrations has been open for >2 weeks	07/26/2021
		CR1178422		
		CR1179974	OC-18 in effect greater than 2 weeks for 1-RC-P-1B	09/03/2021
		CR1180114		
		CR1180294	OC-18 in effect greater than 2 weeks	09/09/2021
		CR1181818	OC-18 for Warehouse Fire Panel in effect for greater than 2 weeks	10/02/2021
		CR1182150		
		CR1182240		
		CR1183416	Unit 2 AFW Crosstie Piping Minor Exterior Corrosion	10/21/2021
		CR1183992		
		CR1184741		
		CR1185570	Unit 2 High level Differential Measurement OC-18	11/11/2021
		CR1186728		
		CR1187117		
		CR1187191		
		CR1187259	2-CN-TK-1 Level Lowering Faster than AFW Pump Seal Leakage	12/05/2021
		CR1187623		
		CR1188592	OC-18 for Cardox tank bleeding off CO2	01/01/2022
		CR1189577	1-FW-P-2 Load Reject test During 1-OPT-FW-003 Extended Valve Operating Time	01/19/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR1189589	1-FW-625 TDAFW Full Flow Recirc Valve difficult to Operate	1/19/2022
		CR1189686		
		CR1191800		
		CR1192369		
		CR1192697	Through wall leak was discovered while excavating 01-FP-70	03/02/2022
		CR119300	Four Burrs on the 45 degree AFW Enclosure Mating Surface	03/07/2022
		CR1194071		
		CR1194173	U1 Backup heat detection calculation in alarm due to C RCP upper thrust bearing temperature point	03/19/2022
		CR1198536		
		CR550366	1-CD-P-1C motor field cable brittle and deteriorated	05/28/2014
		CR552987		
		LEE CR1174831		
		PIR1180430		
		PIR1198741		
		PIR1198747		
		RCE 8117061		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR1199368	NRC Enhancement for 1-OPT-FW-003	05/13/2022
		CR1199378	NRC Identified Degraded Coatings on Unit 1 AFW Piping	05/13/2022
		CR1200197	NRC Identified FME cover on telltale drain 1-FW-119	05/24/2022
		CR1200236	Exhaust buildup on 1-SW-P-1B	05/24/2022
		CR1200410	NRC Identified: Transient combustible concern near the 1-CH-P-1C Cubicle	05/26/2022
		CR1200420	NRC Identified a CR was not submitted in PAMS	05/26/2022
	Engineering Evaluations	0-NAT-M-004	Engineering Acceptance Test	7
		EP-0012	Combustible Loading Analysis – Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2	28
		ETE-SU-2015-1026	Aging Management License Renewal Requirements for General Condition Monitoring Inspections and System Walkdowns	Rev 0
	Miscellaneous		Surry Work Order Back Log for the last five years	
			Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing Dominion Power Surry Nuclear Plant	05/30/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			System Health Report - Service Water, 2Q2021	
			Examination of Surry Buried Fire Protection Pipe Adjacent to 1-FP-70	04/14/2022
			System Health Report - Service Water, 4Q2021	
			VEOC Situational Awareness Unit- Surry Nuclear Power Station Quarterly Siren Test Procedures	11/16/2020
		CM-AA-FPA-101	Transient Fire Loading Report - AAC Diesel	04/29/2022
		CR576301		
		CVCM Plan 1-018a		
		CVCM Plan 2-047		
		IA004 Tracking	(a)(1) Action Plan 1-IA-C-3 Found belt broke while 2-IA-C-3 tagged OOS	Rev 0
		LEE CA8324576	Service Water (SW) temperature to Main Control Room (MCR) chiller 1-VS-E-4A could not be adjusted within the specified range	03/04/2021
		LEE CA9178967	Failure Analysis of Starter, Timing Switch and Relay for Diesel Engine	02/02/2022
		Q2-2021 SURR Common AFW-Auxiliary Feedwater	System Health Report	
		Q4-2020 SURR Common AFW-Auxiliary Feedwater	System Health Report	
		Q4-2021 SURR Common AFW-Auxiliary Feedwater	System Health Report	
		RM009 Tracking	(a)(1) Action Plan - 1-RM-RI-162 Exceeded CM Criteria	Rev 0
		U1 Operations Aggregate Impact	U1 Operations Aggregate Impact Reports (monthly, 8/2020 - present)	
		U2 Operations	U2 Operations Aggregate Impact Reports (monthly, 8/2020 -	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Aggregate Impact	present)	
		VS010 Tracking	(a)(1) Action Plan - Emergency Switchgear Room Air Handing Units	Rev 1
	Operability Evaluations	CR1171138		
		CR1171157		
		CR1171160		
		OD-CA8521833	Unit 2 'D' CW Line Pipe Supports	07/16/2021
	Procedures		VEOC Situational Awareness Unit - Surry Power Station Quarterly Siren Test Procedures	07/07/2021
		0-ECM-0706-01	ESW Diesel Starter Replacement	Rev. 5
		0-FCA-8.00	Limiting Auxiliary Building Fire	Rev 25
		0-OP-FP-003	Administrative Control of 1-FP-36 or 1-FP-37	Rev 23
		0-OPT-FP-007	OPERABILITY TEST OF FIRE PROTECTION VALVES INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA	11
		0-OPT-SW-002	Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1B	Rev. 75
		1-NPT-LR-002-AFW	547 Day Freq. PT: LR GCM Review (Auxiliary Feedwater) - Unit 1 Areas Outside of Cont	04/21/2021
		1-NPT-LR-002-CN	547 Day Freq PT: LR GCM Review (Condensate) - U1 Areas Outside Cont	04/26/2021
		1-OPT-FW-003	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2	1/19/2022
		1-OPT-FW-003	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2	4/11/2022
		CM-AA-FPA-101	Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials	15
		OP-AA-1700	Operations Aggregate Impact	Rev 8
		PI-AA-300-3007	Level of Effort Evaluation	1
		WM-AA-100	Work Management	36
	Self-Assessments	CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-19-05	Corrective Actions, Independent Review, and License Commitments	07/22/2019
		CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-20-10	Maintenance, North Anna Power Station and Surry QC Inspection	01/25/2021
		CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-21-03	Measuring & Test Equipment and North Anna Power Station Refueling	06/03/2021
		CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-21-05	Corrective Action, Independent Review, and License Commitments	08/27/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-21-07	Inservice Inspection, Inservice Testing, and Appendix J Programs	10/07/2021
		PIR 1144740	Operations Configuration Control	
		PIR 1144740	Configuration Control	
		PIR 1144752	Work Observation	
		PIR 1144752	Work Observation Program	
		PIR 1147091	Trending	
		PIR 1149802	Temporary Equipment Labeling	
		PIR 1150992	Maintenance and Technical Training	
		PIR 1150992	Comprehensive Training Self-Assessment Effectiveness Review	
		PIR 1151088	Electrical, I&C, Chemistry, and Engineering Training	
		PIR1155421	Electrical, I&C, Chemistry, and Engineering Training	
	Work Orders	38103650490	HYDRANT REPLACEMENT	0
		38204186322	BONNET REPLACEMENT (LR)	0
		WO38103514870	R)(DC/ETE NEEDED) Feeder Cable Replacement	05/28/2014
		WO38204214101	Valve Overhul (R/R)	02/24/2020
		WO38204214102	Valve Overhaul (R/R)	02/24/2020
		WO38204220423	Perform Coating Repairs (LR)	06/12/2020
		WO38204223534	Indicator Plate Investigation/Replacement	09/01/2020
		WO38204224837	Valve and Piping Rotation (DC SU-21-00108)	10/07/2020
		WO38204225597	Prep and Coat Pipe Support (3"-WAPD-82-601)	10/23/2020
		WO38204236618	Prep and Coat AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping	03/25/2021
		WO38204236619	Recoated U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping	03/25/2021
		WO38204236620	U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping Coating Degraded and Missing	03/25/2021
		WO38204242505		
		WO38204244529		
		WO38204248333	Clean/Prep/Coat Piping	10/21/2021
		WO38204291380	Leak Seal Enclosure Installation	
		WO38204291581	Investigate/Repair Valve/Handwheel	