



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

April 25, 2022

Mr. Jim Barstow
Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs & Support Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street
LP 4A-C
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION
(TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2022010 AND 05000328/2022010

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On March 17, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Tom Marshall, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JB", written over a horizontal line.

Signed by Baptist, James
on 04/25/22

James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Br 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000327 and 05000328
License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION
 (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2022010 AND 05000328/2022010

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DATE	04/25/2022	04/25/2022			

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000327 and 05000328

License Numbers: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Report Numbers: 05000327/2022010 and 05000328/2022010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-010-0023

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Location: Soddy Daisy, TN 37379

Inspection Dates: February 28, 2022 to March 18, 2022

Inspectors: C. Baron, Contractor
J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector
P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector
R. Fanner, Reactor Inspector
C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector
P. Meier, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Patterson, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Sandal, Senior Reactor Analyst
T. Su, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 residual heat removal pump 1B-B
 - Compliance with the Update Final Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specifications
 - Material condition and configuration
 - Surveillance test procedures and recent results
 - System health report
 - Normal and emergency operating procedures
 - Corrective action history
- (2) 480V Shutdown Boards 1A1-A, 1B1-B, 1B2-B
 - Compliance with UFSAR, TS and TS Bases
 - Material Condition and Configuration
 - Design Requirements
 - Environmental Conditions
 - Protective relay setting and calibration
 - Overcurrent protection and coordination
 - System Health Report
- (3) 1B EDG - Mechanical/Electrical
 - Surveillance Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Corrective maintenance records
 - Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures
 - Vendor Manuals for battery chargers
 - Condition Report history
 - Alarm Response Procedures
 - Design Procedures and Guides review
 - Environmental Qualification Documents

- (4) Unit 1 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B
 - Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures
 - Surveillance Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Inservice Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Basis for Pump Test Acceptance Criteria, Including Instrument Uncertainty
 - Validation of Time Critical Action Associated with Isolating AFW Flow
 - Safety and Seismic Classification of Piping Associated with AFW Pumps
 - Potential Backleakage of Hot Fluid Through AFW Check Valves
 - Potential Clogging of AFW Control Valves
 - Material Condition of Pumps and Associated Equipment
 - Corrective Action History

- (5) Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) SQN-1-PCV-068-0340A-A & SQN-1-PCV-068-0334-B
 - Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures
 - Surveillance Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Time Critical Action Associated with PORVs

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 Containment Purge/Relief Valves 1-FCV-30-46, -47, -48, -56, -57
 - Surveillance Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Appendix J Test Procedures and Recent Results
 - Air-Operated Valve and Inservice Testing Program Documents
 - Setpoint Control Calculations
 - Valve and Actuator Vendor Manuals
 - Environmental Qualification Documents
 - Wiring, Logic, Control, and Flow Diagrams
 - Preventive Maintenance History
 - Corrective Action History

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

- (1) DCN 22703, Replace Unit 1 TDAFW Governor Valve Controller w/Digital Controller
- (2) SCN 23632-5, Replace MSIV Actuator Springs on Unit 2 MSIV 2-FCV-1-4
- (3) D23623, Degraded non-conforming motor-operated valve (MOV) modification for the gear replacement of the refueling water storage tank to residual heat removal pump control valve SQN-1-FCV-063-0001-A
- (4) DCN 23680, 480V Shutdown Board Transformer 1A1-A
- (5) D22644, Replace Pressurizer PORVs due to Current Valves Being Obsolete and Reaching End of Life

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (4 Samples)

- (1) IN 2010-25 Inadequate Electrical Connections
- (2) IN 2019-08 Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Events
- (3) IN 2004-01: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Recirculation Line Orifice Fouling - Potential Common Cause Failure
- (4) IN 84-06: Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

INSPECTION RESULTS

Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: Safety Classification of Piping Associated with Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suctions	71111.21 M
This issue is a current licensing basis question and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.	
<p>Description: The inspectors identified a concern with the safety classification of a section of piping in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The water supply for the AFW pumps of both units is normally aligned from the two non-safety related, non-seismic condensate storage tanks (CSTs) through a common 16-inch header. The piping from the CSTs up to the auxiliary building wall is classified as TVA Class H. The Class H piping is not safety related, not seismically qualified, and not protected from external events.</p> <p>The portion of piping from the auxiliary building wall to the check valves located adjacent to the six AFW pump suction is classified as TVA Class G and Seismic Category I(L)A as defined in TVA Design Criteria Document SQN-DC-V-3.0, Classification of Piping, Pumps, Valves, and Vessels, Revision 23. The Class G piping is quality related, but not safety related, and is designed to maintain pressure retention in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). In accordance with SQN-DC-V-3.0, Category I(L)A seismic qualification may be accomplished without meeting the full extent of the design, construction, quality assurance, and other regulatory requirements normally specified for Seismic Category I structures, systems, or components wherein a quality related function must be assured. The remainder of the AFW system is classified as TVA Classes C and B.</p> <p>The inspectors reviewed calculation CAD530HCGLCS110882, Auxiliary Feedwater System Pressure Switch Analytical Limits, Revision 18, which evaluated the automatic transfer of the AFW pumps' suction supply from the CSTs to the safety related essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system. This transfer would be automatically initiated by low pressure switches in the CST supply header after a time delay. The AFW pumps would continue to operate during the transfer. The calculation took credit for the volume of water contained in a portion of the Class G piping after a seismic event; this volume was required to prevent air ingestion to the pump suction during the time required to complete the transfer, less than one minute. If the Class G piping was not available, the transfer would not be successful without damaging the AFW pumps.</p> <p>Based on these reviews, the inspectors were concerned with the classification of the Class G piping required to support the suction transfer. This portion of AFW system would be required to maintain pressure retention until the pump suction transfer was completed. SQN-DC-V-3.0, Table 3.1-1a addresses the classification of systems. Regarding AFW, it states that condensate supply and other piping not required after a seismic event but in Seismic Category I structures are TVA Class G, Seismic Category I(L). It also states that portions of the system not in SC-2a but required after a seismic event are TVA Class C, Seismic Category I. Based on calculation CAD530HCGLCS110882, the inspectors determined that this portion of piping would be required after a seismic event and should be TVA Class C, Seismic Category I in accordance with SQN-DC-V-3.0. The inspectors also observed that TVA Design Criteria Document SQN-DC-V-3.0 referenced NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, Steam and Radioactive Waste Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, February, 1976; and that the design criteria document was consistent with the regulatory guide regarding safety</p>	

classifications.

In response to this concern, the licensee stated that the classification of this piping was consistent with the licensing basis, was designed to maintain pressure retention in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), was located within a safety related building, and was subject to periodic visual inspections in accordance with the Aging Management Program. They stated that this portion of the piping was only required to perform a secondary, not primary, safety function as discussed in Position 2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, Revision 2, February 1976.

After extensive discussions with licensee personnel and NRC staff, the inspectors concluded that there was very low safety significance associated with the difference between classifying this section of piping as TVA Class C, Seismic Category I and TVA Class G, Seismic Category I(L)A. The inspectors also concluded that the current licensing basis was not clear and significant resources would be required to fully resolve this issue.

Licensing Basis: UFSAR Table 10.4.7-5 states that AFW system components were classified in accordance with the draft version of ANS 18.2 issued August 1970 and that a point-by-point comparison with RG 1.26 quality groups shows no significant differences for the AFW.

UFSAR Section 3.7.3.6, Seismic Analysis of System Piping, states All piping systems important to safety that have been designed to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) are designated as Category I.

Those portions of structures, systems, or components which perform secondary safety functions and which are not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor but whose failure could jeopardize, to an unacceptable extent, the achievement of a primary safety function are considered Category I(L) safety related.

Where pressure boundary integrity is required, the piping is classified as Category I(L)A. For Category I(L)A, all piping and tubing shall be analyzed to meet the requirements for Category I except that ASME Section III subsection NC Equation 9 needs not to be evaluated for the upset condition.

UFSAR Table 10.4.7-6, Responses to Short- and Long-Term Recommendations Resulting From a General NRC Investigation of AFWS, states that pump damage is prevented by the automatic transfer to the alternate water source which is essential raw cooling water.

Significance: This potential issue would Phase 1 screen to GREEN in question 1 of exhibit 2 (for mitigating systems - AFW) of IMC 0609 App A because there is no increased likelihood of failure of the pipe due to the qualification in question (i.e., no change in PRA likelihood of failure between the nominal and conditional case).

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On March 17, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. Tom Marshall, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21M	Calculations	03D53EPMGLC031193	Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Usable Volume for Aux Feedwater Use	Rev. 10
		03D53EPMWLL063094	AFW Hydraulic Analysis	Rev. 17
		2219280000	Minimum Head Required for the Turbine-Driven and Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps	Rev. 26
		2219280000A	Flow to Steam Generator During Main Steam Line Break for Various Single Component Failures	Rev. 15
		3BD53HCGHCM090486	Auxiliary Feedwater System Maximum Operating Pressures	Rev. 18
		B25861217301	7-Day Fuel Oil Tank Volume & Setpoints Calculation - Diesel Generators	Rev. 7
		B87 890810 003	SQN Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Consumption 7 Day Supply Calculation	Rev. 3
		CAD0530HCGLCS032384	Auxiliary Feedwater System Instrument/Process Safety Limits	Rev. 24
		CAD530HCGLCS110882	Auxiliary Feedwater System Pressure Switch Analytical Limits	Rev. 20
		ED00009992018000092	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Dedication, Qualification, and Software Verification & Validation Documentation	Rev. 0
		MDQ00000120020128	System Level Review for Sequoyah Main Steam Supply System (MSSS) Air Operated Valves (AOV)	Rev. 0
		MDQ00000120020133	Evaluation of Required Thrust for MSIVs and SG-PORVs (Pilot-Operated Balanced Disk Globe AOVs) At Sequoyah Nuclear Power Station	Rev. 1
		MDQ00000120020134	Component Level Review Calculation for SQN Main Steam Supply (MSS) System Pilot-Operated Balanced Disk Globe Air Operated Valves (AOVs)	Rev. 5
		MDQ00099920040148	Set Point Controls Parameters Review Calculation for Sequoyah Category 2 Air Operated Valves (AOVs)	Rev. 10
SCG-4M-00976	Seismic Qualification of 32" Main Steam Isolation Valve	Rev. 4		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		SQN-APS-003	480VAC APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study	Rev. 115
		SQN-CPS-051	Circuit Protection Device Evaluation	Rev. 74
		SQNETAPAC	Auxiliary Power System	Rev. 111
		SQS20110	Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedure Setpoints	Rev. 40
		SQTP-003	ASME Section XI In-service and Augmented Valve Identification for the Second and Third Ten Year Interval	Rev. 042
	Corrective Action Documents	Condition Report (CR)	1210327, 1494201, 1557491, 1560137, 1561929, 1687020, 1697239, PER 20333	
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	1758304	Administrative Drawing Discrepancies Were Identified When Responding to an NRC Question	
		1758706	Procedure Weakness Was Identified When Responding to a Question Asked By an NRC Inspector	
		1759019	SQN DBAI 2022010 / DWG 1-47W610-30-1 Discrepancy	03/03/2022
		1759352	5/28/21 performance of 1-SI-SXP-003-202.B, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Comprehensive Performance Test	
		1759354	11/8/21 performance of 1-SI-SXP-003-201.B, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Performance Test	
		1759382	During Extent of Condition Review, an EOP Weakness Was Identified	
		1759385	During the Extent of Condition Review, Additional Deficiencies In PI-4 Were Identified	
		1760059	SQN DBAI 2022010 / Revise 0-MI-MVV-000-022.0 and MMTP-152	03/07/2022
1760945		NRC Asked Whether If It Necessary to Consider Flow As Part Of The Overall Uncertainty For The IST Pump Flow Tests		
1762821	SQN Should Consider Using AFW Discharge Header Temperature Elements to Monitor for Backleakage Through AFW Check Valves			

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR 1761999	ECP 22703 TDAFW flow controller dead time not explicitly discussed in 50.59	03/14/2022
	Drawings	1,2 45N749-4	Wiring Diagram 480V shutdown Board 1B2-B Single Line	Rev. 63
		1,2- 45N749-1	Wiring Diagrams 480 V SD Board 1A1-A Single Line	Rev. 54
		1,2- 45N749-3	Wiring Diagram 480V Shutdown Board 1B1-B Single Line	Rev. 58
		1,2-45N630-11, Sht. 11	Wiring Diagrams, Ventilation System Schematic	Rev. 9
		1,2-47W611-30-1	Mechanical Logic Diagram, Ventilation System	Rev. 4
		1,2-47W801-1	Flow Diagram, Main & Reheat Steam	Rev. 122
		1,2-47W866-3	Auxiliary Building -Flow Diagram Heating Vent & Air Cond Air Flow	Rev. 20
		1-3591A16	Breaker Setting Sheet 480V Shutdown BD 1B1	Rev. 5
		1-3591A17	Breaker Setting Sheet 480V Shutdown BD 1B1-B	Rev. 5
		1-47W610-30-1	Mechanical Control Diagram, Cntmt Ventilation Sys	Rev. 23
		1-47W866-1	Flow Diagram, Heating and Ventilating Air Flow	Rev. 43
		SQN-0-45N779-23	Wiring Diagram – 480V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram SH-23	Rev. 44
		SQN-0-45N779-49	Wiring Diagram – 480V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram SH-49	Rev. 4
		SQN-0-47W427-3	Mechanical Auxiliary Feedwater Piping	Rev. 5
		SQN-0-47W427-4	Mechanical Auxiliary Feedwater Piping	Rev. 12
		SQN-0-47W611-3-3	Mechanical Logic Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System	Rev. 44
		SQN-0-47W803-2	Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater	Rev. 78
		SQN-0-47W813-1	Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System	Rev. 59
		SQN-1-47W610-3-3	Mechanical Control Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System	Rev. 32
		SQN-2-47K427-59	N2-03-10A Isometric - Auxiliary Feedwater Piping	Rev. 4
	Engineering Changes	DC 22703	Upgrade the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Governor and Flow Controller	Rev. 2
	Miscellaneous		Equipment Failure Investigation Checklist - Unit 1, B Train Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Failure	dated 08/20/21

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report	Amend. 29
		0-GO-14-1	Daily Logsheet	Rev. 55
		0-TI-SXI-000-100.0	Inservice Testing Program Bases Document	Rev. 6
		0-TI-SXI-000-200.0	Inservice Testing Program	Rev. 7
		Amendment No. 61	Deletion of Reference to Motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) With Bypassed Thermal Overload Devices and Other MOVs	dated 10/22/87
		Part 21, Event Number 54095	INTROL POSITIONERS POTENTIAL LATENT DEFECT	05/31/2019
		SO-22-007	Standing Order - Isolation of AFW to a Faulted S/G	dated 03/02/22
		SQN-DC-V-13.9.5	Reactor Building Environmental Control System	Rev. 9
		SQN-DC-V-21.0	Environmental Design	Rev.29
		SQN-DC-V-4.1.1	Main Steam System	Rev. 19
		SQN-VTD-A585-0020	Instruction Manual for 32" Main Steam Isolation Valves	Rev. 10
		SQN-VTD-B237-0020	General Operating and Maintenance Instructions Double Acting and Spring Return Series Pneumatic Rotary Valve Actuators	Rev. 1
		SQN-VTD-B237-0030	General Operating and Maintenance Instructions for Nuclear Series Actuators	Rev. 1
		SQN-VTD-B237-0070	Operating and Maintenance Instructions Disassembly and Assembly Spring Return Series Actuators	Rev. 2
		SQN-VTD-F130-1300	Fisher Controls 67C Series Instrument Supply Regulators	Rev. 1
		SQN-VTD-W120-7457	MPH-DS Breaker (MARCH, 1999) Maintenance Program Manual for Safety Related Type DS Low Voltage Metal Enclosed Switchgear	Rev. 5
	Procedures	0-PI-DXX-000-100.06.2	Uninsulated Components External Surfaces Inspection	Rev. 5
		0-PI-OPS-000-004.0	Periodic Validation of Time Critical Actions Using Simulator	Rev. 15
		0-SI-SLT-030-258.3	Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Containment Vacuum Relief	Rev. 12
		0-SI-SXV-068-201.0	Pressurizer PORV Operability Test	Rev. 2

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		0-TI-DXX-000-016.0	Erosive Wear Degradation Monitoring Program	Rev. 3
		0-TI-OPS-000-004.0	Time Critical Operator Actions	Rev. 11
		0-TI-OPS-000-004.0	Time Critical Operator Actions	Rev. 11
		0-TI-SXI-000-200.0	Inservice Testing Program	Rev. 7
		0-TPP-DXX-000-100.06	License Renewal Aging Management Program Basis Document External Surfaces Monitoring Program	Rev. 2
		1-SI-ICC-003-144.0	Calibration of Condensate Storage Tank Suction Header Pressure Switches to Auxiliary Feedwater System (1-PS-3-144A, -144B & -144D)	Rev. 14
		1-SI-ICC-003-144.0	Calibration of Condensate Storage Tank Suction Header Pressure Switches to Auxiliary Feedwater System	Rev. 14
		1-SI-OPS-003-118.0	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Automatic Actuation	Rev. 38
		1-SI-SXP-003-201.B	Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Performance Test	dated 02/08/22
		1-SI-SXP-003-202.B	Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Comprehensive Performance Test	dated 05/28/21
		1-SI-SXV-000-201.0	Full Stroking of Category "A" and "B" Valves During Operation	Rev. 28
		1-SO-3-2	Auxiliary Feedwater System	Rev. 62
		DS-M4.2.1	Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program Methods	Rev. 10
		E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	Rev. 43
		E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	Rev. 43
		E-1	Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant	Rev. 32
		E-3	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	Rev. 28
		EA-202-2	Operating Equipment from 6.9KV Shutdown Board	Rev. 0
		EA-3-10	Establishing Motor Driven AFW Flow	Rev. 5
		EA-3-11	Local Isolation of MD and TD AFW	Rev. 2
		ECA-0.0	Loss of All AC Power	Rev. 37
		ES-1.3	Transfer to RHR Containment Sump	Rev. 24
		ES-1.4	Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation	Rev. 7
		NPG-SPP-09.18.1	Vulnerability Identification and	Rev. 10

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Management	
		NPG-SPP-09.26.13	Air Operated Valve Program	Rev. 1
		NPG-SPP-09.7.2	Flow Accelerated Corrosion Control Program	Rev. 5
		NPG-SPP-09.7.5	Erosion Program	Rev. 1
		SAR Change 20-27	Increased Operator Action Times for a SGTR	dated 06/02/06
		SQN-DC-V-13.9.8	Auxiliary Feedwater System	Rev. 30
		SQN-DC-V-27.4	Reactor Coolant System	Rev. 26
		SQN-DC-V-3.0	The Classification of Piping, Pumps, Valves, and Vessels	Rev. 23
	Work Orders	Work Order (WO)	111338695, 119443478, 119446769, 119746807, 120281971, 120440234, 120792667, 120883320, 121401831, 121135517, 121135880, 121446977, 121721612, 121881329, 121912740, 121919585, 121982107, 122040836, 122062181, 118860328, 118860343, 120231713, 121719840, 120573157	