

Public Meeting to Discuss the NRC Staff's Consideration of Options for a Potential Rulemaking on Security for Special Nuclear Material

April 19, 2022

Purpose of this Meeting

- Provide information on the NRC's development of a Commission paper regarding enhanced security for special nuclear material (SNM)
- This is an Observation meeting
- Attendees will have the opportunity to ask questions and/or make comments about the issues discussed; however, the NRC will not provide written responses to comments or questions raised

Key Messages

- Staff is evaluating the pros and cons of multiple options to inform a recommendation to the Commission in response to Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-SECY-19-0095, “Discontinuation of Rulemaking – Enhanced Security of Special Nuclear Material” ([ML21217A065](#))
- For currently-licensed SNM, the existing regulatory framework provides adequate protection of public health and safety and promotes the common defense and security

Background

- January 2015 – Final regulatory basis on Enhanced Security for SNM ([ML14321A007](#))
- April/June 2016 – Direction to suspend rulemaking activities
- August 2018 – Direction to staff to complete expedited, limited-scope rulemaking
- October 2019 – SECY-19-0095, “Discontinuation of Rulemaking – Enhanced Security of Special Nuclear Material” ([ML19157A084](#))
- August 2021 – SRM-SECY-19-0095 – Provide a notation vote paper with options on enhanced security of SNM and the potential regulatory, resource, and timing impacts of the options, per the Commission’s direction ([ML21217A065](#))

Current criteria for evaluating options

- Takes into account the most current threat environment
- Increases regulatory predictability and consistency for material possessed by current licensees and potentially by applicants
- Enhances licensees'/applicants' ability to implement a flexible approach to security of SNM
- Considers the full spectrum of SNM, i.e., Categories I-III*

* Categories of SNM can be found in [10 CFR Part 110, Appendix M](#). They correspond to the following descriptors in [10 CFR 73](#): “Formula quantity,” “SNM of moderate strategic significance,” and “SNM of low strategic significance,” respectively.

Current criteria for evaluating options

- Requires a licensee to have access to information, e.g., adversary characteristics, for which some licensee staff may not currently have the appropriate security clearance
- Ensures consistency with prior Commission direction
- Takes into account the most current internationally-accepted security guidance, e.g., IAEA INFCIRC/225/Revision 5
- Assesses relative capital and recurring costs to industry

Additional criteria for evaluating options

- Attendees may share additional criteria they believe the NRC staff should consider in evaluating the options being developed for this paper.

Initial Options Under Consideration

- Option 1 – No Action (Status Quo)
- Option 2 – Resume 2015 rulemaking
- Option 2a – Resume 2015 rulemaking **and include spent nuclear fuel (SNF)** in scope
- Option 3 – Update existing regulations only for Category (Cat) II SNM
- Option 4 – Revise regulations for Cat I/II to be more performance-based (per Section 3.4 of 2015 Regulatory Basis); Revise regulations for Cat III consistent with 2015 Reg Basis
- Option 4a – Revise regulations for Cat I/II to be more performance-based (per Section 3.4 of 2015 Reg Basis) **and include SNF in scope;** Revise regulations for Cat III consistent with 2015 Reg Basis

Option 1 – No Action (Status Quo)

- Continue case-by-case approach of considering material attractiveness in licensing decisions
- Discontinue rulemaking

Option 2 – Resume rulemaking from 2015

Regulatory Basis

- Incorporate measures in Cat I and III orders into the regulations
- Use material attractiveness, primarily dilution, to further grade and right-size physical protection under the existing categorization structure
- Raise the external radiation (“self-protecting”) level threshold in §73.6 to take account of whether the current radiation level (1 gray [100 rad] per hr at 1 meter [3.3 ft] without considering shielding) will sufficiently incapacitate an adversary to prevent it from completing its objective

Option 2a – Resume rulemaking and include SNF in scope

- SNF not considered in 2015 Reg Basis – “the physical protection requirements for these three classes of facilities would be covered by separate NRC rulemakings...”
- Revisions would address regulatory inconsistency re: protection levels
 - Transport of SNF below current external radiation level threshold would require Cat I protection
 - Staff position – this level of protection would be too stringent

Option 3 – Update Only Existing Regulations for Category II SNM

- Create two tiers of regulations for Cat II material
 - Moderately dilute*, e.g., High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU)
 - Small quantities of (currently categorized as less-than-Cat I) Strategic SNM
- No revision of Cat I or III regulations

*“Moderately dilute”

U-235: 1% \leq dilution factor \leq 20%; **U-233/Pu:** 1% \leq dilution factor \leq 10%

Option 4 – Recraft Cat I/II Regulations to be more Performance-Based; Revise Cat III Regulations

- Stratify requirements for Cat I and Cat II material by non-dilute vs. moderately dilute
- Performance-based
 - Cat I non dilute – Conduct site-specific vulnerability assessments (VA) to demonstrate ability to defend against the Design Basis Threat
 - Cat I moderately dilute and Cat II non dilute – Conduct site-specific VAs to address specific set of adversary characteristics
 - Cat II moderately dilute – Perform timeline and tabletop analyses considering threat characteristics to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives
- Revise regulations for Cat III to add limited number of prescriptive requirements

Option 4a – Recraft Cat I/II Regulations to be more Performance-Based and consider SNF; Revise Cat III Regulations

- Implement Option 4 and include SNF in scope

QUESTIONS?

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