



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 14, 2022

Mr. Eric Carr  
President and Chief Nuclear Officer  
PSEG Nuclear LLC – N09  
P.O. Box 236  
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT  
NO. 231 RE: REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOR  
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (EPID L-2021-LLA-0083)

Dear Mr. Carr:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 231 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station in response to your application dated May 7, 2021, as supplemented by letter dated February 1, 2022.

The amendment revised Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink" (UHS), to modify the limiting condition for operation river temperature, increase the temperature in the action statement for opening the emergency discharge valves, add a new 72-hour allowed outage time for one station service water system pump or one safety auxiliary cooling system pump or one emergency diesel generator inoperable with UHS temperature above 88 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), and revise the UHS average temperature limit and maximum temperature. In addition Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.1.3.b is being increased.

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's monthly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

***/RA/***

James S. Kim, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch I  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-354

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 231 to  
Renewed License No. NPF-57
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: Listserv



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-354

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 231  
Renewed License No. NPF-57

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC dated May 7, 2021, as supplemented by letter dated February 1, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 231, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

James G. Danna, Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch I  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Renewed Facility  
Operating License and Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 14, 2022

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 231

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57

DOCKET NO. 50-354

Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating License with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Remove  
3

Insert  
3

Replace the following page of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove  
3/4 7-5

Insert  
3/4 7-5

reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended;

- (4) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;
- (5) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
- (6) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility. Mechanical disassembly of the GE14i isotope test assemblies containing Cobalt-60 is not considered separation.
- (7) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 30, to intentionally produce, possess, receive, transfer, and use Cobalt-60.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level

PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core Power levels not in excess of 3902 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 231, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.1.3 The ultimate heat sink (Delaware River) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum river water level at or above elevation -9'0 Mean Sea Level, USGS datum (80'0 PSE&G datum), and
- b. An average river water temperature of less than or equal to 88.0°F.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and \*.

ACTION:

With the river water temperature in excess of 88.0°F, continued plant operation is permitted provided that:

- both emergency discharge valves are open and emergency discharge pathways are available;
- with one SSWS pump or one SACS pump or one EDG inoperable, restore the inoperable SACS pump or SSWS pump or EDG within 72 hours;
- with ultimate heat sink temperature greater than 91.0°F and less than or equal to 93.0°F, verify once per hour that water temperature of the ultimate heat sink is less than or equal to 91.0°F averaged over the previous 24 hour period;

Otherwise, with the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5, declare the SACS system and the station service water system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2.
- c. In Operational Condition \*, declare the plant service water system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.3 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. By verifying the river water level to be greater than or equal to the minimum limit in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
- b. By verifying river water temperature to be within its limit:
  - 1) in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program when the river water temperature is less than or equal to 85°F.
  - 2) in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program when the river water temperature is greater than 85°F.

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\* When handling recently irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.



UNITED STATES  
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 231

TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-354

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 7, 2021 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21127A085), as supplemented on February 1, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22032A334), PSEG Nuclear LLC, (PSEG, the licensee), requested changes to the technical specifications (TS) for the Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek), specifically TS 3/4.7.1.3, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).

The proposed changes would:

- modify the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) river temperature,
- increase the temperature in the action statement for opening the emergency discharge valves,
- add a new 72 hour allowed outage time (AOT) for one Station Service Water System (SSWS) pump or one Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) pump or one Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable with UHS temperature above 88 °F,
- revise the UHS average temperature limit and maximum temperature, and
- increase the river temperature in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.1.3.b.

The supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on July 13, 2021 (86 FR 36781).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 System Description

The UHS for Hope Creek is the Delaware River. The SSWS is a safety-related open loop system which provides cooling water to safety-related heat exchangers and non safety-related



heat exchangers during normal operating conditions and during the loss of offsite power (LOP). During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and other design basis accidents (DBAs), the SSWS provides river water to cool only the safety-related heat exchangers.

The Safety and Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling System (STACS) is a closed loop cooling water system consisting of two subsystems: SACS and Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling System (TACS). The heat from both systems is transferred to the SSWS via the SACS heat exchangers. The non safety-related TACS portion of the system is isolated following a LOP and/or LOCA scenario.

SACS provides cooling water to the engineered safety features equipment, including the residual heat removal heat exchanger, during normal operation, normal plant shutdown, LOP, and LOCA conditions. TACS is designed to provide cooling water to the turbine auxiliary equipment during normal plant operation and normal plant shutdown.

The two principal safety functions of the UHS are the dissipation of residual heat after reactor shutdown and the dissipation of residual heat after an accident. The UHS temperature limit is established to ensure the design basis temperatures of safety-related equipment are not exceeded.

## 2.2 Description of the Proposed Changes

The proposed changes to TS 3.7.1.3 are as follows:

- LCO 3.7.1.3.b entry temperature will be increased from 85.0 °F to 88.0 °F.
- The temperature to perform the action to open both emergency discharge pathways will be increased from 85.0 °F to 88.0 °F.
- The action to ensure that all SSWS pumps are OPERABLE, all SACS pumps are OPERABLE, all EDGs are OPERABLE, and the SACS loops have no cross-connected loads (unless they are automatically isolated during a LOP and/or LOCA) when river temperature is above 88.0 °F will be replaced with a new 72 hour AOT for one SSWS pump or one SACS pump or one EDG inoperable when river temperature is above 88.0 °F.
- The action statement temperature setpoint for performance of UHS temperature averaging will be increased from 89 °F to 91.0 °F with the maximum temperature limit being increased from 91.4 °F to 93.0 °F.

Additionally, the licensee proposes to increase the temperature in SR 4.7.1.3.b from 82 °F to 85 °F.

## 2.3 Regulatory Requirements and Guidance

In Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.36, "Technical specifications," the NRC established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the following categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings;

(2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

Paragraph 50.36(c)(2) of 10 CFR states, in part, that LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility, and when an LCO is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the LCO can be met.

Paragraph 50.36(c)(3) of 10 CFR states that SRs are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met.

NUREG-0800 "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [light-water reactor] Edition," Section 9.2.5, "Ultimate Heat Sink", Revision 2, July 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052350549), Section IV, "Acceptance Criteria" and "Evaluation Findings," contains the following, in part:

GDC 44, as related to UHS requirements. Acceptance is based upon meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.27 and demonstrating the capability to transfer heatloads from safety-related SSCs [structure, system, and components] to the heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.

Guidance for staff review of TSs is contained in NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 16.0, "Technical Specifications." The NRC staff has prepared standard technical specifications (STS) for each of the light-water reactor nuclear steam supply systems and associated balance-of-plant equipment systems. The applicable current STS for Hope Creek are contained in NUREG-1433, Vol. 1, Rev. 5, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric BWR/4 Plants: Specifications," (ADAMS Accession No. ML21272A357).

STS 3.7.2 of NUREG-1433, includes the provisions of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler 330 (TSTF-330), entitled "Allowed Outage Time – Ultimate Heat Sink," as Condition E, which applies when the UHS temperature exceeds the SR value but remains below the temperature limitations of equipment necessary for accident mitigation and safe shutdown. With the water temperature of the UHS greater than the SR limit, long-term cooling capability to dissipate the heat of an accident safely may be affected. To ensure long term cooling capability when UHS water temperature is above the SR limit, more frequent monitoring and averaging of the temperature over the previous 24 hour period is required to establish that adequate long term cooling capability remains available. Consistent with TSTF-330, licensees who wish to adopt this change to the STS should confirm that the following conditions, which form the basis for acceptance of the UHS temperature averaging approach, are satisfied:

- a. The UHS is not relied upon for immediate heat removal (such as to prevent containment over-pressurization), but is relied upon for longer-term cooling such that the temperature averaging approach continues to satisfy the accident analysis assumptions for heat removal over time.
- b. When the UHS is at the proposed maximum allowed value, equipment that is relied upon for accident mitigation, anticipated operational occurrences, or for safe shutdown, will not be adversely affected.

- c. Plant-specific assumptions have been adjusted (as necessary) to be consistent with the maximum allowed UHS temperature.
- d. Cooling water that is being discharged from the plant does not affect the UHS intake water temperature.

### 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The UHS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety-related components during a transient or accident and during normal operation. The UHS dissipates residual heat after reactor shutdown and after an accident through the cooling components of the SSWS and STACS systems which are the principal systems at Hope Creek that use the UHS to dissipate residual heat.

The temperature limit on the UHS ensures adequate cooling to SSWS to keep plant safety systems operating within design limits during a design basis event. If the requirement for temperature of the SSWS system supplied by the UHS exceeds the TS instantaneous 93.0 °F or a 24-hour average 91.0 °F limit in the existing TS, then both units would be placed in the Hot Shutdown Operational Condition within 12 hours and the Cold Shutdown Operational Condition within 36 hours.

The licensee states it based the proposed TS changes on its calculation EG-0047, which supported the current UHS temperature limits contained in the Hope Creek TS as approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 168 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062130012). The proposed UHS temperature limits maintain the current instrument uncertainty allowance of 1.3 degrees. The staff finds that the proposed changes to the UHS temperature limits do not impact the containment analysis and maintain the post-accident SACS outlet temperature of 100 °F consistent with Amendment No. 120 (ADAMS Accession No. ML011770031).

#### 3.1 Increase in UHS Temperature Limits

The licensee proposes to increase the temperature limit contained in LCO 3.7.1.3.b from 85 °F to 88 °F. The action statement requirement of TS 3.7.1.3 allows continued operation above the current temperature limit provided that both emergency discharge valves are open and emergency discharge paths are available. This action was added to TS 3.7.1.3 in Amendment No. 106 (ADAMS Accession No. ML011770134).

The NRC staff finds that increasing the temperature limit for LCO 3.7.1.3.b to 88 °F is acceptable because a single failure of an emergency discharge flow path can be accommodated up to 88 °F with reasonable margin remaining.

The licensee states in its license amendment request (LAR) that Amendment No. 168 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062130012) added the allowance for averaging temperature fluctuations over a period of 24 hours in accordance with TSTF-330 entitled "Allowed Outage Time – Ultimate Heat Sink". This change increases the previously approved temperature average of 89 °F and overall limit of 91.4 °F to a temperature average to 91.0 °F with an overall limit of 93.0 °F. These average and overall limits maintain the SACS header below its design basis post-accident temperature of 100 °F for the limiting design basis events. This change increases the previously approved temperature average of 89 °F and overall limit of 91.4 °F to a temperature average to 91.0 °F with an overall limit of 93.0 °F. These average and overall limits maintain the SACS header below its design basis post-accident temperature of 100 °F for the limiting design basis events. Components that rely upon the

UHS temperature to maintain system operating temperature limits are analyzed to withstand service water temperatures up to 95.0 °F. Operating procedures identify the maximum allowable SACS temperature as 95 °F during normal power operations. The existing SACS temperature limits are not changed by this proposed technical specification change. Additionally, in the LAR the licensee states the following with respect to equipment relied upon for accident mitigation:

The EDGs rely on the UHS (via SACS) to immediately remove heat from the engine cylinder jackets, turbocharger, combustion air, generator outboard bearings, speed governor oil, and the lubricating oil. As discussed above, the SACS heat exchanger outlet temperature of 100°F is maintained for continuous UHS temperatures up to 91.3°F.

The NRC staff determined that the licensee did not discuss the continuous cooling of the various EDG components by SACS up to the proposed UHS temperature of 93.0 °F. In a letter dated January 6, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22006A321), the NRC staff requested justification to address the effects of a 91.4 °F to 93.0 °F UHS temperature increase upon the steady state operating temperatures of the jacket water, lube oil, and intercooler respectively to ensure that the elevated temperature conditions remain within design basis limits.

In a letter dated February 1, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22032A334), the licensee provided a response which states, in part, the following:

An evaluation of the immediate cooling capability was performed (Technical Evaluation 70214210-0230, "Hope Creek Heat Sink Temperature Limits (LAR H21-01) – NRC RAI for Immediate EDG Cooling") using the same conservative assumptions and methodologies in calculation EG-0047. This evaluation demonstrates that in the short term, all EDGs receive sufficient cooling with a peak UHS temperature of 93°F. The immediate cooling requirements of the EDGs are not exceeded by the proposed peak temperature of 93°F.

Based on the information provided in the original LAR and the licensee's response, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the proposed UHS temperature average of 91.0 °F and overall limit of 93.0 °F will not adversely impact normal or post-accident operating temperature limits.

3.2 Add action for inoperable EDG, SACS pump, SSWS Pump and eliminate requirement for all EDGs, SACS pumps and SSWS pumps to be operable with UHS temperature greater than 88 °F

The licensee states that the current action to ensure that all EDGs, SACS pumps, and SSWS pumps are operable above 88 °F is proposed to be replaced with a new action that will allow either one SSWS pump or one SACS pump or one EDG to be inoperable for a period of 72 hours. This 72-hour AOT would be allowed when UHS temperature exceeds 88 °F. Below 88 °F, the EG-0047 calculation supports the longer 30-day allowed outage times of the SACS TS 3.7.1.1 and SSWS TS 3.7.1.2. These longer AOTs were based on having a SACS or SSWS pump out of service and having the capability to withstand an additional pump failure in the same system. Above this temperature, this additional failure assumption could not be maintained so the restriction was added to TS 3.7.1.3 (originally added in Amendment No. 120,

ADAMS Accession No. ML011770031) to ensure that all EDGs, SACS pumps, and SSWS pumps were operable.

The existing methodology considers the worst random single failure to be the failure of an EDG. The failure of an EDG will also cause loss of power to the respective SACS and SSWS pump powered from the same bus since offsite power is also assumed to be lost. The case of a single EDG failure with a LOCA coincident with a Safe Shutdown Earthquake is the case that determined the UHS maximum temperature limit of 91.3 °F.

The staff finds an AOT of 72 hours for a single EDG, SSWS pump, or SACS pump is acceptable because it is consistent with the analyzed plant configuration that maintains adequate cooling and there is a low likelihood of a DBA occurring during this period.

### 3.3 Increase Temperature for Surveillance Requirement Performance

The licensee states in the LAR that SR 4.7.1.3.b requires the verification of river temperature within limits. Currently, SR 4.7.1.3.b.1 requires performance once per 24 hours in accordance with the surveillance frequency control program (SFCP) and 4.7.1.3.b.2 requires performance once per 2 hours in accordance with the SFCP when river temperature exceeds 82 °F. With the LCO 3.7.1.3.b temperature being increased by 3 °F, the river temperature contained in SRs 4.7.1.3.b.1 and 4.7.1.3.b.2 is proposed to increase the same 3 °F amount to 85 °F. This increase in temperature will reduce unnecessary burden on control room operators' time and attention by minimizing increased frequency of temperature readings as they approach the required action. The staff finds that the 3 °F margin between the SR and the required action thresholds is based on the anticipated gradual UHS temperature fluctuation throughout the year and SR 4.7.1.3 remains acceptable for use with the higher temperature limit.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that increasing the TS UHS temperature limit to a 24-hour average of 91.0°F and an overall limit of 93.0°F has no impact on the accident analysis. The NRC staff also finds that increasing the TS UHS temperature limit to a 24-hour average of 91.0°F and an overall limit of 93.0°F does not significantly affect the equipment that is cooled by the UHS. The NRC staff also finds that increasing the TS UHS temperature limits has no effect on the structure of the UHS nor the amount of water available to the UHS. The NRC staff, therefore, concludes that the proposed TS temperature limits are consistent with the bases of STS 3.7.2 in NUREG-1433 and, within those temperature limits, the facility continues to meet the requirements of GDC 44.

Based on the technical acceptability of LCO 3.7.1.3 and SR 4.7.1.3 changes as discussed in Section 3 of this SE, the NRC staff finds that the proposed LCO provides the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When the LCO is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow remedial actions permitted by the TS until the condition can be met. In addition, the proposed SR assures that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met. The NRC staff, therefore, concludes that 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) are met.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed TS changes listed in Section 2.2 of this SE are acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on December 21, 2021. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes SRs. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, as published in the *Federal Register* on July 13, 2021 (86 FR 36781), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: C. Peabody  
D. Scully  
C. Ashley

Date: March 14, 2022

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT  
NO. 231 RE: REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOR  
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (EPID L-2021-LLA-0083) DATED MARCH 14, 2022

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**ADAMS Accession No.: ML21348A713**

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