



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

December 7, 2021

Mr. Peter Dietrich  
Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer  
DTE Electric Company  
Fermi 2 – 260 TAC  
6400 North Dixie Highway  
Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND  
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021012

Dear Mr. Dietrich:

On November 5, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Feliz-Adorno, Nestor  
on 12/07/21

Néstor J. Feliz Adorno, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000341  
License No. NPF-43

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Peter Dietrich from Néstor Féliz Adorno dated December 7, 2021.

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021012

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000341

License Number: NPF-43

Report Number: 05000341/2021012

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-012-0009

Licensee: DTE Electric Company

Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2

Location: Newport, MI

Inspection Dates: October 18, 2021 to November 05, 2021

Inspectors: M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
J. Harvey, Project Manager  
K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Operations Engineer  
R. Ng, Project Engineer  
C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Néstor J. Félix Adorno, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## **SUMMARY**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### **List of Findings and Violations**

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

### **Additional Tracking Items**

None.

## **INSPECTION SCOPES**

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## **OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

### 71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

#### Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensee's Corrective Action Program, use of operating experience, self-assessments, and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
  - **Corrective Action Program Effectiveness:** The inspectors assessed the Corrective Action Program's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems.
  - **Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits:** The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.
  - **Safety Conscious Work Environment:** The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment of Corrective Action Program	71152B
<p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program was generally effective with opportunities for improvements and supported nuclear safety.</p> <p><u>Effectiveness of Problem Identification:</u></p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the Corrective Action Program. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the Corrective Action Program completely and accurately.</p> <p>The team noted that the licensee utilized a number of Corrective Action Program support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit process and the Operating Experience Program. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, that had not been previously identified by licensee staff and were subsequently entered into the Corrective Action Program. For example, the licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits to identify issues in station processes. These identified deficiencies were entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both NRC and industry operating experience and entered them into the Corrective Action Program when they were applicable to the station.</p> <p>The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the Corrective Action Program to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.</p> <p>The team performed a 5-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems. Specifically, the team focused on corrosion and performance aspects of the systems. As part of this review, the team interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the plant health reports, and reviewed selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents. In addition, the team performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of the system piping, selected components, and surrounding areas. The team concluded that piping degradation and performance concerns for the systems were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program at a low threshold and the corrective actions were adequate and timely commensurate with their safety significances. The team did identify a minor procedural violation related to the implementation of the compensatory action related to an operability evaluation. The details of the minor violation are described in the section below. For the areas walked down, the team did not identify any additional issues.</p> <p><u>Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:</u></p> <p>Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Ownership Screening Committee and the Management Review Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing</p>	

issues and prioritizing actions. The team observed a productive dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified, the Corrective Action Program directed that an equipment operability or functionality review be performed. As a result, the samples reviewed were evaluated in a timely manner.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in implementing corrective actions. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with Corrective Action Program requirements. The corrective actions assignments that were sampled by the team for selected NRC documented violations and for licensee event reports (LERs) were generally effective and timely.

Use of Operating Experience

71152B

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee's performance in the use of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the Corrective Action Program to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented under the Corrective Action Program to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed the information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as Corrective Action Program issues reviews and investigations.

The team noticed that some of the operating experience processing steps were not formally incorporated into the licensee's operating experience procedures. For example, the licensee's operating experience coordinator has subscribed to a service that retrieves operating experiences from external sources, which was not described in the procedure. While these actions were beneficial to the licensee, the lack of a formalized process could lead to missed operating experience response when unexpected turnover occurs. The licensee entered this issue into the Correction Action Program as CARD 21-29874 and is reviewing their internal process for potential process changes.

Self-Assessments and Audits

71152B

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the Corrective Action Program itself. Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) had identified deficiencies with the licensee's processes and those issues were addressed by the station through the Corrective Action Program.



Safety Conscious Work Environment	71152B
<p>During this inspection, the team assessed safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at Fermi. The team conducted individual interviews and facilitated supervisor and worker focus group meetings. The teams reviewed corrective action resolution documents (CARDS), Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel reports and the results of the June 2020 and January 2021 Nuclear Safety Culture Pulse Surveys. The team identified no SCWE issues. An environment exists at Fermi where personnel are free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation.</p> <p>During interviews and focus group meetings, employees described morale and trust concerns that may warrant plant management assessment and intervention. Morale concerns centered around workload and resources, issues brought on by work at home practices, and treatment of contract employees. Employees also described trust concerns between work groups. Some described mistrust within work groups, due in part to the newness of supervisors brought in from outside the organization. The licensee is aware of these issues and is developing actions to address these concerns via CARD 21-29964.</p>	

Minor Violation	71152B
<p>Minor Violation: CARD 21-25216, "Oil Level "C" MDCT [mechanical draft cooling tower] Fan Gear Reducer is Low," documented the licensee's discovery of a low oil level on the MDCT fan "C" gear reducer. This component is required to support operability of the Division 1 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The licensee determined the condition did not impact UHS operability and performed engineering functional analysis EFA-E11-21-005, revision 0, to further evaluate the system's ability to perform its safety function. This evaluation specified several compensatory actions to ensure operability. Compensatory Action 2 required, in part, to maintain the oil level at the high-level mark. Per the vendor of the gearbox, oil level indication would drop as oil is redistributed around the inside of gearbox during operation. Therefore, it would be advantageous to maintain the oil level at the high mark with the fan in standby to account for this drop. However, the inspectors noted Compensatory Action 2 was not included in the Compensatory Monitoring List that the licensee used to implement compensatory actions. Instead, the Compensatory Monitoring List stated, in part, to check that the oil level is in band during standby and during operation only.</p> <p>Step 3.4.4 of MQA11, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 49, requires that supervisors and managers ensure that immediate or compensatory corrective actions are taken for identified conditions. Thus, the inspectors determined that the failure to follow MQA-11 procedure was a performance deficiency and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."</p> <p>Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency was minor because the deficiency did not result in reasonable doubt about the equipment's operability. The licensee had actions to monitor the oil leakage during standby and measure the oil level during operation ensuring adequate oil level when the fan is called upon to perform its safety functions.</p> <p>Enforcement: The licensee generated CARD 21-30007, "2021 NRC PI&amp;R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure Documents Don't Match," to restore compliance. This failure to comply with Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.</p>	

Observation: Work Control and Risk Management Concerns	71152B
<p>The team reviewed several CARDS from 2019, 2020 and 2021, documenting issues identified internally and externally related to the station's understanding of risk. For instance, CARD 19-29121, "Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work Items," was generated on November 26, 2019, to capture several instances of work items authorized by Operations that resulted in an adverse impact to the plant. One example identified in this CARD was associated with the licensee's failure to consider mitigating factors defined in a fire protection engineering evaluation (FPEE) for a non-functional alternate diesel fire pump (ADFP). Specifically, the licensee performed work on the combustion turbine generators (CTGs) while the ADFP was non-functional. The CTGs were credited as a mitigating factor in that FPEE. This misunderstanding of risk to the station resulted in the licensee not being able to perform that mitigating action for the ADFP. Another example from this CARD was associated with the station's failure to recognize the risk and complexity associated with installing that ADFP as a temporary modification. The lack of understanding ultimately resulted in the temporary modification not meeting all necessary design requirements and a safety near miss when the ADFP recirculation line became dislodged during testing. NRC inspectors documented a Green finding with an associated violation related to this issue in Inspection Report 2019003 (ADAMS Accession Number ML19310E673). As a result, the licensee implemented actions to address the trend identified in CARD 19-29121. However, on November 12, 2020, CARD 20-32176, "Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and Identification of Risk," was generated to document risk management problems in Operations. Two additional risk management related CARDS were created in 2021: CARD 21-21524, "NQA Audit 21-0100 Deficiency - Fermi has not Exhibited the Behaviors Necessary to Consistently Identify, Assess, Eliminate or Reduce, and Manage Risks Associated with Station Operations," and CARD 21-26403, "2021 WANO Peer Review - AFI OF.2." The inspectors did not identify a violation or finding with the issues associated with these CARDS. However, the inspectors noted that this appeared to be a recurring observation and that a lack of understanding of risk identification and mitigation continued to be an apparent challenge for the station.</p> <p>The inspectors also reviewed numerous CARDS over the last year related to work planning. For instance, CARD 21-29208, "23.307.16 Section 5.1 (EDG [emergency diesel generator] 13 Slow Start Surveillance) not Scheduled Prior to Critical Date," discussed the station's failure to schedule a Technical Specification required surveillance for the EDG 13 prior to the week the surveillance date went critical. The licensee identified this issue before the surveillance was past due and was able to rearrange the work week to perform the surveillance. The team noted that work management gaps can also lead to challenging the station's risk identification and mitigation as required work may not be incorporated into the overall risk profile for the work week.</p> <p>The licensee generated CARD 21-29873, "2021 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment," to capture the inspectors' observations.</p>	

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On November 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to you and other members of the licensee staff.

**DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	09-27876	2009 Configuration Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) Self-Assessment - Additional Unanalyzed HPCI/RCIC and Room LOCA Heat Load	10/08/2009
		10-24554	HPCI and RCIC Gland Steam Leakage Higher than Expected	06/03/2010
		10-30552	Generic Letter 2008-01 UT Examination: PM Event X058 Detected Void in Div. 1 Core Spray	11/12/2010
		10-31129	UFSAR 6.2.1.6 Description of Mill Scale/Varnish Overstates Quantity and is Inconsistent with Design	11/24/2010
		11-29284	Legacy Circuit Design Associated with the RHR 4.16KV Load Shed Scheme	10/12/2011
		13-22655	UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Description of Main Steam Line Break Source Term Concentrations Appears to be Incorrect	04/15/2013
		13-28648	2013 NRC UHS Inspection: Potential Unanalyzed Condition Related to Limiting Post-Tornado Suppression Pool Temperature	12/06/2013
		14-25130	P44F400A Div 1 EECW TCV AOV Abnormalities that were Identified During WO	06/20/2014
		14-25229	Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed High Energy Line Break Area for 15 Psig Heating Steam	06/25/2014
		14-25229	Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed HELB Break Area for 15 Psig Heating Steam	06/25/2014
		15-22830	Legacy Issues with Appendix R/Loop Drywell Temperature Response	04/20/2015
		15-23277	RHR SW Return from RHR HX High Temperature Alarm Setpoints Above Piping Design	05/07/2015
		16-23673	Independent RHR SW Inspection - Piping Calculation is Inconsistent with Drawing	05/04/2016
		17-20462	EDGSW Support Discrepancies	01/16/2017
		17-21170	R1700S011A Inverter not Outputting as Expected	02/09/2017
17-28611	E1150F068B Packing Leak Root Cause Evaluation	05/23/2018		
18-25183	Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with Unknown Cause	07/05/2018		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		18-25847	Div 2 MDCT Fan Brake Inverter Found with No Power	08/03/2018
		18-26647	Valve External Has Corrosion	09/04/2018
		18-26888	Localized Pit Discovered	09/13/2018
		18-27268	Noted Flange Corrosion on Stage to Column Flange on 'B' RHRSW	09/24/2018
		18-27271	#13 EDGSW Pump Min Flow Line Approximately 3" Broke Off	09/24/2018
		18-27477	Indications on Removed Stem	09/28/2018
		18-27533	Div 1 RHR Decant Pump Has Through Holes	09/29/2018
		18-27571	OSC Cognitive Trend, RHRSW Corrosion	09/30/2018
		18-27594	Observed Flange Corrosion on RHRSW A Pump Column	10/01/2018
		18-27797	Request Work Orders for RHRSW Valves	10/04/2018
		18-29220	Placing T4100D018, Control Room Humidifier in Service Caused Dripping Water in the Control Room and Computer Room	11/26/2018
		18-29727	The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off	12/04/2018
		18-30069	NRC Identified Potential Trend - Repetitive Failures of Important Equipment	12/13/2018
		18-30289	Damage to S. RHR HX RM Platform Beam B88 at Top of Steel (TOS) El. 613'-5"	12/20/2018
		19-20083	NQA Audit 18-0116 Deficiency - CDA Testing/Evaluations Not Completed	01/03/2019
		19-20762	RHRSW LIR - Recommendation	02/04/2019
		19-20772	RHRSW LIR Deficiency - SW Pump Motor Corrosion	02/04/2019
		19-21857	Site Excellence Plan Action Tracking	03/10/2019
		19-22982	2019 Radiation Protection Excellence Plan	04/18/2019
		19-24737	EDG 14 Surging in Idle During Surveillance Run	06/24/2019
		19-25280	NRC Identified: Local Lake Level Indication Reads Higher than UFSAR Assumed Maximum Starting Level for Flood	07/12/2021
		19-25762	Lead Shielding in CFT Pump Room	08/02/2019
		19-26201	Improper Configuration of Security Equipment - Microwave Zone 04 Receiver	08/16/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		19-26836	NRC Identified Reactor Feedwater System Bailey DCS Maintenance Incomplete Information	09/11/2019
		19-26837	NRC Identified: CTG Black Start Capability Removed when Relied Upon for FPEE-19-0003	09/11/2019
		19-27064	Review and Address CARD Quality Issued with CARD 20002	09/20/2019
		19-27140	NRC Question to Determine if CTG 11.1 has the Correct CDA	09/23/2019
		19-27635	Adverse Trend for EQ Program PM Implementation	10/08/2019
		19-27709	Reassess DCS S1401 CDA as Direct	10/09/2019
		19-28279	NQA Audit 19-0110 Adverse Finding	10/30/2019
		19-28748	NQA Audit 19-0111 Deficiency	11/14/2019
		19-29121	Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work Items	11/26/2019
		20-20091	Division 1 RHR Pump Room Dampers	01/06/2020
		20-20456	Corrosion Identified on Roof Plug Anchor Above RHR Pump A	01/15/2020
		20-20580	CDAs Associated with CTG 11.1 Were Incorrectly Classified as Indirect	01/17/2020
		20-20727	Evaluation MWC10 and the WO Review/ALARA Planning Process	07/31/2020
		20-21776	Radworker Boundary Control Trend Identified	02/18/2020
		20-21944	Trend of EDG Equipment Issues in 2019	02/21/2020
		20-22759	Procedural CST Minimum Level Requirements Appear to be Non-Conservative Relative to Limits Established in DC-5874 Vol I Rev A	03/13/2020
		20-23266	Corrosion of RHRSW Pipe at MDCT Penetration MK-151	03/26/2020
		20-24300	LHRA Conditions Identified in the Torus Proper	04/11/2020
		20-24960	NQA RF20 Adverse Trend in Identification and Control of LHRA and HRA	04/21/2020
		20-25851	Unexpected DR Alarm During Scaffold Modification at MSIV D	05/17/2020
		20-26407	Notification of 10CFR Part 21 for Rosemont Model 1153, 1154, and 3150 Series Transmitters Pressure Transmitters	06/01/2020
		20-26719	Stator Water Cooling Conductivity Meter Malfunction	06/09/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		20-28926	Secondary Containment Isolation	08/03/2020
		20-29403	Unable to Complete Work Order 53093540 (Trend Only)	08/19/2019
		20-29842	NQA Audit 20-0108 Deficiency	09/01/2020
		20-29870	RF20 Dose Overage	09/02/2020
		20-30213	NQA Audit 20-0111 Deficiency – Outdated Revisions of Documents Identified at Emergency Response Facility – Repeat Audit Issue	09/14/2020
		20-31803	Operations Missed Risk Assessment for CRD Suction from CST	10/30/2020
		20-32176	Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and Identification of Risk	11/12/2020
		20-32606	EDP 80072 MDCT Discrepancies Identified During Installation	12/02/2020
		20-32992	NRC IN 2007-12, Supplement 1: Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibrations and Reflective Metal Insulation	12/16/2020
		20-33238	EDG 11 Crankcase Oil Exhibits Increased Fuel Oil in the Crankcase Oil	12/29/2020
		21-20377	RP Department Indicator for Level 2/3 PCEs Did Not Meet YE Goal	01/13/2021
		21-21536	CARD Quality Review Team Gap in Corrective Action Quality - Maintenance Electrical	02/17/2021
		21-21704	Apparent Cause Evaluation-Suction Hoses Installed Beyond Expected Depth	02/23/2021
		21-22253	CARD Quality Review Team: Gap in Countermeasure Action Quality-Training	03/11/2021
		21-22547	Apparent Cause Evaluation - Failure to Complete Compensatory Fire Watch Inspections – NRC Identified	03/22/2021
		21-22634	Trend in RP Technician Unplanned SRD Dose Rate Alarms	03/24/2021
		21-22813	Torque Wrench with Fixed Contamination Possibly	03/29/2021
		21-23492	Trend Noted on Roof Leaks	04/21/2021
		21-23702	Watertight Penetration	04/27/2021
		21-23855	Potential Unanalyzed Condition Following	05/03/2021
		21-23904	Non-Conservative Assumption in MSLB/FWLB Design	05/04/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Calculation	
		21-24537	#2 HPSV [High Pressure Stop Valve] Indicates Closed in the MCR [Main Control Room]	05/23/2021
		21-24629	Review NRC IN 2021-01 for Applicability to MOV Program	05/26/2021
		21-25216	Oil Level "C" MDCT Fan Gear Reducer is Low	06/12/2021
		21-25224	UNSAT Conditions on MDCT Gear Reducer Oil Level Do Not Show up RED on Operator Rounds	06/13/2021
		21-26030	Investigate Limit Switches on Remote Valves Causing MCRD	07/08/2021
		21-27024	NRC Violation 2Q2021 - License Condition 2(C)(9), "Modifications for Fire Protection"	08/21/2021
		21-28309	NRFP Controller Not Indicating Properly	09/21/2021
		21-28431	MDCT 'D' Spray Nozzle Inspection	09/23/2021
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	1-29661	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: CARD 18-25183 "Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with Unknown Cause" Rescreened After Closure to Correct Classification with No CARD Initiated to Document This	10/29/2021
		21-09785	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to AIM	11/03/2021
		21-29217	Misalignment Between Hard Copy CARD Form and Web ARMs CARD Form	10/18/2021
		21-29296	Content of IWE Program in IWE Report	10/20/2021
		21-29407	2021 PI&R - Evaluate the Process for Adding MCRD # to the WO in Maximo	10/22/2021
		21-29479	2021 NRC PI&R - Feedback from NRC on Investigation Details in eCARD for B/F CARDS	10/25/2021
		21-29589	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - Enhancement Action to Update Applicable Design Documentation Associated to C11F412	10/27/2021
		21-29620	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection – NRC Identified Gap in CARD 21-22878	10/28/2021
		21-29621	2021 NRC PI&R – NRC Identified CARD Quality Issues for CARD 21-22535 (Evaluate OE 2021-0085 for Potential Mitigating Actions)	10/28/2021
	21-29646	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified Delay in Initiation of CARD	10/29/2021	



Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			21-29628: NCAP Actions Closed Inappropriately	
		21-29673	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: Potential CARD Re-Classification Miss for CARD 20-31731	10/29/2021
		21-29746	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Typo in CARD 13-28648	11/02/2021
		21-29785	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to AIM	11/03/2021
		21-29812	2021 NRC PI&R (NRC Identified) - RP Org Effectiveness Review in CARD 20-29870 Found 3 Actions Incorrectly Categorized as Corrective Actions	11/05/2021
		21-29819	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CARD Tag Hanging After CARD Closure	11/04/2021
		21-29821	2021 NRC PI&R CARD (NRC Identified) - DC-6004 VOL I Packing Friction Revision (Trend Only)	11/04/2021
		21-29831	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified: NCAP CARD Action Closure Inadequate	11/04/2021
		21-29850	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Question) - Survey the Industry on Tracking Methods for Comp Actions in CAP CARDS	11/04/2021
		21-29851	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection – NRC Enhancement Opportunity – Operator Rounds Validation	11/04/2021
		21-29855	2021 PI&R NRC Identified - Enhancement Action Categorized as a Corrective Action in CARD 20-26407	11/04/2021
		21-29869	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation	11/05/2021
		21-29871	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to CRD System	11/05/2021
		21-29872	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the RP Program	11/05/2021
		21-29873	2021 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment	11/05/2021
		21-29874	2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the OE Program	11/05/2021
		21-29881	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection – NRC Identified Gap from RFI-167	11/05/2021
		21-29903	QHSA - EFA Compensatory Measures Deficiency, MES27 5.2.3	11/05/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		21-29946	2021 NRC PIR Inspection – Potential Minor Violations	11/08/2021
		21-29964	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection – Theme of Trust Noted in Interviews	11/08/2021
		21-30007	2021 NRC PI&R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure Documents Don't Match	11/09/2021
	Engineering Evaluations	EQ1-EF2-063-G01	Qualification Evaluation Report (QER) Revision 0	12/18/2019
	Miscellaneous		System Health Report for Residual Heat Removal	1Q2021
		NQA-19-0110	Station Blackout and Maintenance Rule Programs	11/20/2019
		NQA-19-0111	Corrective and Operation Experience Programs	12/20/2019
		NQA-20-018	Radiation Protection, Radiological Effluent and Radioactive Material Transfer and Disposal Program	10/16/2020
	Procedures	23.412	Turbine Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System	73
		35.000242	Barrier Identification/Classification	60
		MMR 03	Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Scoping	6
		MMR 10	Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Monitoring	18
		MMR-14	Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Structures Monitoring	8
		MMR03	Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual	6
		MQA 11-100	Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing Procedure - Operability Determination Process	4
		MQA11-200	Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing Procedure	1B
		MQA11-300	Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing Procedure - Screening and Assignment	6
		MQA11-400	Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition	4
		MQA11-500	Non-Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition	5
		ODE-6	Operator Challenges	20
	Self-Assessments		2020 Fermi Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment	11/03/2020
			2020 FME Formal Self-Assessment	10/16/2020
			Quick Hit Self-Assessment of Fluid Leak Management Program (MDI-59)	10/09/2020
		2021 Latent Issue Review (LIR) for the IWE-Primary	02/26/2021	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Containment Inspection Program	
		19-0109	Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program	09/17/2019
		19-0111	Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Corrective Action and Operating Experience Programs	11/26/2019
		21-0100	Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Operations, Fire Protection, and Emergency Operating Procedures Programs	02/22/2021
		21-0108	Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program	09/13/2021
		NPRP-19-0087	QHSA: Radiation Protection Performance Improvement	10/16/2019
		NPRP-20-0024	QHSA: 71124.01, Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls, 71124.03, In-Plant Airborne Radiation Control and Mitigation & 71124.04 Occupational Dose Assessment	03/09/2020
		NPRP-21-0040	QHSA: Radiological Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment	06/08/2021