

Facility: FERMIL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT			Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021										
Admin JPMs	1 ADMIN Topic and K/A	2 LOD (1-5)	3 Attributes							4 Job Content		5 U/E/S	6 Explanation
			I/C Focus	Cues	Critical Steps	Scope (N/B)	Overlap	Perf. Std.	Key	Minutia	Job Link		
SRO-A1.a	Conduct of Operations												N/A – RO Only Exam
SRO-A1.b	Conduct of Operations												N/A – RO Only Exam
SRO-A2	Equipment Control												N/A – RO Only Exam
SRO-A3	Radiation Control												N/A – RO Only Exam
SRO-A4	Emergency Procedures/Plan												N/A – RO Only Exam

<p>RO-A1.a 802-3006-402</p>	<p>Conduct of Operations 2.1.45  Perform Torus Water Average Temperature Calculation</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>X</p>					<p>X</p>	<p>X</p>		<p>U S</p>	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JPM is coded as "Modified." Identify the original JPM and explain how this this JPM has been "Modified" from the original version. Chief Examiner's understanding, based on previous discussions, was that the Initial Conditions would specify that an SRV had actuated, requiring the inoperable instrument point to be replaced with the highest reading temperature of the operable instrument points plus 45°F, to make the JPM "Modified."</li> <li>• JPM Task Standard is deficient (see previous comment, i.e., not written for out-of-spec condition).</li> <li>• Evaluator Key is correct for the condition described in the first comment above (i.e., SRV actuated), which is <b>NOT</b> the condition described in the submitted version of the JPM.</li> <li>• Initial Conditions under the JPM Information Section state that Torus Water Level is 140 inches. Initial Conditions on the Cue Sheet state that Torus Water Level is 0 inches. Resolve this discrepancy.</li> <li>• Initial Conditions under the JPM Information Section do not include information on the status of the SRVs. Initial Conditions on the Cue Sheet provide SRV status. Information should be identical in both locations.</li> <li>• Revise the Cue prior to JPM Step #1 to provide the applicants with procedure 29.ESP.01 in its entirety. Delete the reference to Section 15.0</li> <li>• Task Standard, in addition to referencing 29.ESP.01 Section 15.0, should also identify the calculated Average Torus Water Temperature Value of 84.59°F and the associated evaluation strategy (i.e., Temperature point inoperable and SRV not</li> </ul>
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													<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>actuated).</li> <li>A range of values has not been specified for the calculation. A range of 0 to +.04 (84.59 to 84.63) would seem appropriate.</li> </ul> <p><b>FERMI:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corrected initial conditions to indicate Low-Low set is controlling pressure implying an SRV has actuated.</li> <li>Corrected the performance steps to include the appropriate actions and standards for this condition.</li> <li>Corrected the Torus water level initial condition to 0".</li> <li>Corrected the task standard to include sufficient detail and procedural references.</li> <li>Added an appropriate data range for the calculation based on the comment above.</li> <li>Corrected cue prior to step 1 to provide entire ESP procedure as instructed.</li> <li>Provided copy of JP-OP-802-3006-401, original unmodified version.</li> </ul>
RO-A1.b 802-4101-211	<p>Conduct of Operations 2.1.25</p> <p>Determine RHR Reservoir and RHR Cooling Tower Operation</p>	3						X	X			ES	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individual JPM Elements, in addition to listing the JPM Steps, should also specify the associated procedure steps in Enclosure C. See convention used in Equipment Control JPM RO-A2.</li> <li>Differences exist between (a) the Initial Conditions (Condition N in the 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet) and Initiating Cue information on the JPM Information Section, AND (b) the Cue Sheet. Also, the Cue Sheet Initiating Cue does not need to include the "Enclosures B and C" information. Information should be identical in both locations.</li> <li>Revise the Cue prior to JPM Step #1 to also provide the applicants with procedure 20.000.28 (in its entirety).</li> <li>Performance Standard for JPM Step #1 needs to specify how the</li> </ul>



	<p>Perform 24.138.06, Jet Pump Operability Test – Two Loop</p>												<p>version. Chief Examiner's understanding, based on previous discussions, was that an "out-of-spec" condition would be introduced in the Jet Pump section of the surveillance to make the JPM <b>"Modified."</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JPM Task Standard is deficient (see previous comment, i.e., not written for out-of-spec condition).</li> <li>Provide a marked up evaluator key for the Jet Pump calculations, including a copy of the "out-of-spec" plot(s).</li> <li>JPM Step 6 (procedure 24.138.06, Step 5.1.6) incorrectly references Steps 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. The correct procedural steps are 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.</li> </ul> <p><b>FERMI:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Original unmodified JPM and evaluator key are now provided.</li> <li>Added an out of spec data point for one JP as requested. Modified performance standard for that step appropriately</li> <li>Corrected JPM standard as directed</li> <li>Corrected JPM step 6 as directed.</li> </ul>
<p>RO-A3 802-4101-454</p>	<p>Radiation Control 2.3.5  Calculate Offgas Radioactivity Release</p>	<p>3</p>									<p>E S</p>	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Examiner Cue prior to JPM Step #1 states "Provide Examinee with Cue Sheets and copy of 20.000.07." As previously discussed, the JPM is to be performed in the simulator. Accordingly, applicants will be required to first locate the procedure in the simulator, at which point the Examiner will provide a copy of the AOP. Applicants will also be required to use simulator instrumentation and the "OFFGAS LOG RADIATION MONITORS CONVERSION FACTORS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5" sheet posted on the rear of panel H11-P601.</li> </ul>	



Simulator/In-Plant JPMs	1 Safety Function and K/A													
<p>Sim A 315-0004-002</p>	<p>1 202001 A4.01</p>	3											E S	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiating Cue under the Job Information Section does not match the Initiating Cue on the Cue Sheet with respect to Procedure steps that have been completed. Information should be identical in both locations.</li> <li>The Examiner Cue prior to Step #1 of the JPM states that place-keeping is complete thru Step 8.2.9. The Initiating Cue in the Job Information Section states that Steps 8.2.1 through 8.2.8 are complete.</li> <li>Include Noun Name for Annunciator 3D138 in JPM Step 20. Noun Name is "RECIRC PUMP A MOTOR VIBRATION HIGH."</li> <li>Noun Name for Annunciator 3D138 is missing under "References" in the JPM Information Section. Provide the Noun Name.</li> </ul> <p><b>FERMI:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corrected initiating cue as directed.</li> <li>Corrected examiner cue prior to step 1 as directed</li> <li>Added noun name for 3D138 as directed</li> </ul>
<p>Sim B 315-0108-001</p>	<p>2 204000 A4.08</p>	3											S	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ES-301-2 Outline submitted by the Chief Examiner (CE) for the SRO-I position selected Sim JPM B to be excluded. The ES-301-2 that was included as part of the 75-Day submittal, had instead excluded Sim JPM H. Sim JPM B was specifically selected by the CE so that all applicants could be tested on Safety Function 9 (Sim JPM H). Note that Safety Function 2 is tested both in the simulator and in the plant, whereas Safety Function 9 is only tested in the simulator. Revise the ES-301-2 for the SRO-I position to exclude Sim JPM B only.</li> </ul> <p><b>CE NOTE:</b> ES-301-2 Outline for the SRO-I position corrected. Note however, that only</p>













**Instructions for Completing This Table:**

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1. (ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1–5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
3. In column 3, “Attributes,” check the appropriate box when an attribute is **not met**:
  - The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
  - The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
  - All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
  - The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
  - Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
  - The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
  - A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
4. For column 4, “Job Content,” check the appropriate box if the job content flaw **does not meet** the following elements:
  - Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
  - The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
5. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

Facility: FERMIL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT				Scenario: 1				Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Event	Realism /Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation
1 – Transfer TWMS from Bypass Mode to Cleanup Mode								S	<u>Normal Event</u>
2 – RPV Water Level 3 Instrument Failure (B21-N080C)					TS			S	
3 –HPCI Logic Bus B Power Failure					TS			S	
4 – East CRD Pump Breaker Fault/Trip					TS		X	S	<b>2019 NRC Exam; Scenario 7, Event 6 (Previous 2 NRC Exams)</b>
5 – SJAE Trip								S	
6 – FWH Level Instrument Failure								S	<u>Reactivity Manipulation</u>
7 –Lightening Strike Causes Loss of Offsite Power								S	<u>Major Event</u>
8 –EDG 12 Fails to Auto Start (Recoverable). Start Failure Trips on EDG 13 & 14						CT1		E S	<p><u>NRC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearly identify the Critical Task action in the D2 so that it stands out from the other action items (i.e., bold, highlight, different color, etc.).</li> </ul> <p><u>FERMI:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Critical Task font bolded and underlined.</li> <li>CT updated to provide bounding conditions.</li> <li>During development and later in phone conversation with Chief Examiner, noted that this event was credited on D1 to BOP. ATC performs actions. Updated D1 and ES-301-5/6 to reflect this.</li> </ul>
9 – SBLOCA with RCIC Trip on Overspeed						CT2		E S	<p><u>Major Event</u></p> <p><u>NRC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearly identify the Critical Task action in the D2 so that it stands out from the other action items (i.e., bold, highlight, different color, etc.).</li> </ul>

									<b>FERMI:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Critical Task font bolded and underlined.</li><li>• CT updated to provide bounding conditions.</li></ul>
9	0	0	0	0	3	2	8	<b><u>E</u></b> <b><u>S</u></b>	<b>Form ES-D-1 Prepared by NRC</b>

Facility: FERMIL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT				Scenario: 3				Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation
1 – Perform SDV Vent & Drain Valve Operability Test								S	<u>Normal Event</u>
2** – Degrading Condition on In-Service North RRMG Set Lube Oil Pump								S	<u>Reactivity Manipulation</u> **ATC applicant actions in response to the Event 2 malfunction, resulted in a trip of the North RRMG Set and subsequent entry into Single Loop Operation, requiring insertion of the CRAM Array to lower Reactor Power < 66.1%. Accordingly, the reactivity manipulation originally scripted for Event 3 was invalidated and the Event 6 malfunction nullified. The ATC applicant was credited with (1) a reactivity manipulation in Event 2 for actions taken in response to the North RRMG Set trip, and (2) a component failure in Event 3 for action taken in response to the #3 TCV unitized actuator fault. ES-301-5 appropriately updated.
3** – #3 TCV Unitized Actuator Fault								S	<u>Reactivity Manipulation</u> **ATC applicant actions in response to the Event 2 malfunction, resulted in a trip of the North RRMG Set and subsequent entry into Single Loop Operation, requiring insertion of the CRAM Array to lower Reactor Power < 66.1%. Accordingly, the reactivity manipulation originally scripted for Event 3 was invalidated and the Event 6 malfunction nullified. The ATC applicant was credited with (1) a reactivity manipulation in Event 2 for actions taken in response to the North RRMG Set trip, and (2) a component failure in Event 3 for action taken in response to the #3 TCV unitized actuator fault. ES-301-5 appropriately updated.
4 – Leading Edge-Flow Meter (LEFM) System Failure					TS			S	<u>CE NOTE: Event deleted during Onsite Validation.</u>
4 – RWCU Leak with Auto Isolation Failure					TS			S	
5 – Turbine First Stage Pressure Instrument Failure (C71-N052A)					TS			S	



<p>6** – Gland Steam Normal Regulating Valve F433 Controller Failure South Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Manual Runback PB to Lower Power</p>							X	S	<p><b>CE NOTE:</b> Event replaced during Onsite Validation.</p> <p><b>2019 NRC Exam; Scenario 2, Event 5 (Previous 2 NRC Exams)</b> **ATC applicant actions in response to the Event 2 malfunction, resulted in a trip of the North RRMG Set and subsequent entry into Single Loop Operation, requiring insertion of the CRAM Array to lower Reactor Power &lt; 66.1%. Accordingly, the reactivity manipulation originally scripted for Event 3 was invalidated and the Event 6 malfunction nullified. The ATC applicant was credited with (1) a reactivity manipulation in Event 2 for actions taken in response to the North RRMG Set trip, and (2) a component failure in Event 3 for action taken in response to the #3 TCV unitized actuator fault. ES-301-5 appropriately updated.</p>
<p>7 – Neutron Flux Instabilities / Hydraulic ATWS / SLC Common Discharge Header Rupture</p>						CT1 CT3		E S	<p><b>Major Event</b></p> <p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical Tasks CT-1 and CT-3 not flagged in the D2 with a parenthetical reference.</li> <li>• Clearly identify the Critical Task actions in the D2 so that they stand out from the other action items (i.e., bold, highlight, different color, etc.).</li> </ul> <p><b>FERMI:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical Task font bolded and underlined; parenthetical reference added.</li> <li>• CTs updated to provide bounding conditions.</li> </ul>
<p>8 – Main Turbine Trip / Bypass Valves Trip</p>						CT2		E S	<p><b>NRC:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical Task CT-2 not flagged in the D2 with parenthetical references.</li> <li>• Clearly identify the Critical Task action in the D2 so that it stands out from the other action items (i.e., bold, highlight, different color, etc.).</li> </ul> <p><b>FERMI:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical Task font bolded and underlined; parenthetical reference added.</li> <li>• CT updated to provide bounding conditions.</li> <li>• Separated BOP actions for ATWS overrides per telecom with Chief Examiner.</li> <li>• Added critical parameter monitoring associated with CT bounding conditions.</li> </ul>
<p>9 – Div I / II RHRSW Pump Trip</p>								S	
<p>9 8**</p>	0	0	0	0	2	3	8	E S	<p><b>Form ES-D-1 Prepared by NRC</b></p> <p>**ATC applicant actions in response to the Event 2 malfunction, resulted in a trip of the North RRMG Set and subsequent entry into Single Loop Operation, requiring insertion of the CRAM Array to lower Reactor Power &lt; 66.1%. Accordingly, the reactivity manipulation originally scripted for Event 3 was invalidated and the Event 6 malfunction nullified. The ATC applicant was credited with (1) a reactivity manipulation in Event 2 for actions taken in response to the North RRMG Set trip, and (2) a component failure in</p>

										Event 3 for action taken in response to the #3 TCV unitized actuator fault. ES-301-5 appropriately updated.
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Facility: FERMIL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT				Scenario: 4 [REDACTED] (SPARE) INFORMATION REDACTED				Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation
[REDACTED]								█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]					█			█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]								█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]					█			█	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]						█		█	[REDACTED]





**Instructions for Completing This Table:**

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

- 2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) **OR** if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
- 3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is **no** verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)
  - opening, closing, and throttling valves
  - starting and stopping equipment
  - raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure
  - making decisions and giving directions
  - acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should **not** be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3))
- 5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is **not** appropriate.
- 6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
- 7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started **only**.
- 8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 9 Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
- 10 Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

- In column 1, sum the number of events.
- In columns 2–4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
- In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
- In column 6, TS are required to be  $\geq 2$  for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
- In column 7, preidentified CTs should be  $\geq 2$  for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)
- In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is  $< 2$  new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
- In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

Facility: FERMIL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT								Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021		
Scenario	1 Event Totals	2 Events Unsat.	3 TS Total	4 TS Unsat.	5 CT Total	6 CT Unsat.	7 % Unsat. Scenario Elements	8 U/E/S	11 Explanation	
1	9	0	3	0	2	0	0%	E S		
3**	9 8	0	2	0	3	0	0%	E S	**ATC applicant actions in response to the Event 2 malfunction, resulted in a trip of the North RRMG Set and subsequent entry into Single Loop Operation, requiring insertion of the CRAM Array to lower Reactor Power < 66.1%. Accordingly, the reactivity manipulation originally scripted for Event 3 was invalidated and the Event 6 malfunction nullified. The ATC applicant was credited with (1) a reactivity manipulation in Event 2 for actions taken in response to the North RRMG Set trip, and (2) a component failure in Event 3 for action taken in response to the #3 TCV unitized actuator fault. ES-301-5 appropriately updated.	
4	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	SPARE SCENARIO – INFORMATION REDACTED	

**Instructions for Completing This Table:**

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the **total** number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

- a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements:  $\left(\frac{2 + 4 + 6}{1 + 3 + 5}\right) 100\%$

8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is ≤ 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9 In column 11, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.



Facility: FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT			Exam Date: May 24 – June 2, 2021			
OPERATING TEST TOTALS						
	Total	Total Unsat.	Total Edits	Total Sat.	% Unsat.	Explanation
Admin. JPMs	4	2 0	2 0	0 4		
Sim/In-Plant JPMs	11	0	8 0	3 11		
Scenarios	3	0	3 0	0 3		
<b>Op. Test Totals:</b>	18	2 0	13 0	3 18	11.11 0.0	<i>All Enhancement items appropriately addressed and all UNSAT items corrected post exam submittal.</i>

**Instructions for Completing This Table:**

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

1. Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the "Total" column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter "9" in the "Total" items column for administrative JPMs. For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
2. Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
3. Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.
4. Total each column and enter the amounts in the "Op. Test Totals" row.
5. Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded "% Unsat." cell.  
  
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
  - satisfactory, if the "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is ≤ 20%
  - unsatisfactory, if "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is > 20%
6. Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the "as-administered" operating test required content changes, including the following:
  - The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
  - The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
  - CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including post scenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
  - The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
  - TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).