



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

November 1, 2021

Mr. Doug Lawrence
Site Vice President
Dominion Energy Virginia
Surry Power Station
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883-0315

**SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION – TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION TEAM
INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2021011 AND 05000281/2021011**

Dear Mr. Lawrence:

On October 8, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Surry Power Station. On October 7, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect (CCA) assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

D. Lawrence

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281
License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Enclosure:
As stated

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SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION – TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION
REPORT 05000280/2021011 AND 05000281/2021011 DATED November 1,
2021

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OFFICE	DRS/EB2	DRS/EB2	DRS/EB2	DRS/EB2	DRS/EB2
NAME	M. Singletary	W. Monk	J. Montgomery	L. Jones	S. Shaeffer
DATE	10/26/2021	10/26/2021	10/26/2021	10/26/2021	11/01/2021

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000280 and 05000281

License Numbers: DPR-32 and DPR-37

Report Numbers: 05000280/2021011 and 05000281/2021011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-011-0048

Licensee: Dominion Energy Virginia

Facility: Surry Power Station

Location: Surry, VA

Inspection Dates: September 20, 2021 to October 08, 2021

Inspectors: L. Jones, Senior Reactor Inspector
W. Monk, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Lead)
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Singletary, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a triennial fire protection team inspection (FPTI) at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Corrective Actions for Incorrect OMA Step in FCA Operating Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000280/2021011-01 Open	[H.14] - Conservative Bias	71111.21N. 05
The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Surry Unit 1 OLC 3.I, Fire Protection, for the licensee's failure to implement adequate corrective actions for an inadequate Fire Contingency Action (FCA) operating procedure.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and industry standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin teleworking. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N.05 - Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI)

Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) Credited for Fire Prevention, Detection, Suppression, or Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (SSD) Review (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors verified that components and/or systems will function as required to support the credited functions stated for each sample. Additional inspection considerations are located in the fire hazards analysis (FHA) or safe shutdown analysis (SSA).

- a. Review deficiencies or open fire protection impairments for the selected system, including any temporary modifications, operator workarounds, or compensatory measures.
- b. Verify that operator actions can be accomplished as assumed in the licensee's FHA, or as assumed in the licensee's fire probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA) analysis and SSA.
- c. Review repetitive or similar maintenance work requests which could be an indicator of a design deficiency and could affect the ability of the components to perform their functions, when needed.
- d. Ensure that post maintenance and/or surveillance activities are performed as scheduled.
- e. Perform a walkdown inspection to identify equipment alignment discrepancies. Inspect for deficient conditions such as corrosion, missing fasteners, cracks, and degraded insulation.
- f. Ensure the selected SSCs that are subject to aging management review (AMR) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54 are being managed for aging (e.g., loss of material, cracking, reduction of heat transfer) in accordance with appropriate aging management programs. Verify that the licensee's aging management program activities (such as, Fuel Oil Analysis or Selective Leaching Aging Management Program) associated with FP equipment are being implemented.
- g. If a review of operating experience issues will be completed for the selected inspection sample, verify that the licensee adequately reviewed and dispositioned the operating experience in accordance with their processes.

- (1) SSC #1 (Fire Prevention): Transient Combustible Controls and Hot Work Programs

- (2) SSC #2 (Detection/Suppression): Low Pressure CO2 Fire Suppression System
- (3) SSC #3 (SSD): U1 & U2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System and Emergency Power System Bus
- (4) SSC #4 (SSD): Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System

Fire Protection Program Administrative Controls (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors verified that the selected control or process is implemented in accordance with the licensee’s current licensing basis. If applicable, ensure that the licensee’s FPP contains adequate procedures to implement the selected administrative control. Verify that the selected administrative control meets the requirements of all committed industry standards.

- (1) Fire Protection Admin Program #1: Fire Protective Equipment Surveillance Program
- (2) Fire Protection Admin Program #2: Fire Brigade Drills and Training Program

Fire Protection Program Changes/Modifications (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors verified the following:

- a. Changes to the approved FPP do not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.
- b. The adequacy of the design modification, if applicable.
- c. Assumptions and performance capability stated in the SSA have not been degraded through changes or modifications.
- d. The FPP documents, such as the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, fire protection report, FHA, and SSA were updated consistent with the FPP or design change.
- e. Post-fire SSD operating procedures, such as abnormal operating procedures, affected by the modification were updated.

- (1) FPP Changes Mod / DCP #1: DCP DU-18-00112 – Charging SW Fire Protection Pipe Replacement
- (2) FPP Changes Mod / DCP #2: DCP SU-16-00108 & 109 – U1/U2 AFW MOV Hot-Short Resolution

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Corrective Actions for Incorrect Operator Manual Action Step in FCA Operating Procedure			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000280/2021011-01 Open	[H.14] - Conservative Bias	71111.21N.0 5
The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Surry Unit 1 OLC 3.1, Fire Protection, for the licensee’s failure to implement adequate corrective actions for an inadequate Fire Contingency Action (FCA) operating procedure.			
<u>Description:</u>			
On May 13, 2021, the licensee discovered that step 20 d) of fire SSD procedure 1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire, referenced the incorrect breaker for de-			

energizing the U1 480V 'J' motor control centers (MCCs). The step called for operators to open breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-3. The correct breaker to de-energize the 480V 'J' MCCs is breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-4. Breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-3 is for an alternate feeder to a filter exhaust fan, and this breaker is normally maintained racked out during normal plant operations. The procedure directed operators to take steps to de-energize the U1 480V 'J' MCC because it removes power from various motor operated valves (MOVs) in order to assure the MOVs remain in their required SSD position to assure adequate charging flow to the Reactor Coolant System and Auxiliary Feedwater flow to the steam generators. Upon discovery, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1172768 and the issue was characterized as a condition adverse to quality. The initial actions taken were to notify supervision, and to submit the issue to the site's Feedback Incorporation Process (FIP). The FIP process was not a part of the site's CAP program, and actions taken within the FIP process are not officially tracked or monitored as a part of the CAP. Additionally, the CR did not contain any other corrective actions nor note any other compensatory measures taken.

On October 4, 2021, during an inspection walkdown, inspectors discovered that step 20 d) of procedure 1-FCA-3.00 was still incorrect. Inside the FIP process, the proposed change was qualitatively given a priority of six months for the station's procedures group to respond, and no justification for this timeframe was required to be given. Additionally, in June 2021, plant personnel erroneously interpreted an all procedures freeze request from the station's training group to mean that the FCA (among other site Emergency Operating Procedures and Abnormal Operating Procedures) should not be updated until at least September 2021.

Corrective Actions:

- Operations department to update 1-FCA-3.00.
- Operations department to review Lessons Learned for timeliness of FIP submittal process and implementation.
- Extent of condition review of the site's other FCAs.

Corrective Action References:

- CR 1181961, NRC issuing Green NCV for Timeliness of Implementation, 10/05/2021

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to correct an operator manual action (OMA) step error in 1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault & Cable Tunnel Fire as soon as practical was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the OMA step error as soon as practical allowed an error that reduced the reliability of an FCA procedure to exist for over five months.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, "Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP." The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, "Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP." Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined the issue was

of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that the credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted (Question 1.4.1-A).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. H.14 (Conservative Bias) - Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. Individuals did not use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable because when the FCA error was initially discovered no immediate corrective actions were taken nor any compensatory measures were put in place. Additionally, prompt and corrective action to correct the Fire SSD procedure was not taken.

Enforcement:

Violation: Surry Unit 1 Operating License Condition 3.I requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Section 9.10.1 of the FSAR states, in part, that the Surry Power Station satisfies the regulatory criteria set forth in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCS 9.5-1 and that compliance with this criteria is contained within, among other documents, the Dominion fleet Fire Protection Program document. Section 3.11 of the Fire Protection Program document CM-AA-FPA-100 states, in part, that all aspects of the fire protection program shall be implemented in accordance with Topical Report DOM-QA-1, Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD). Section 16.1 of DOM-QA-1 states, in part, that the Company has established and implements corrective action programs, procedures, and processes to assure that conditions adverse to quality at Company nuclear facilities are promptly identified and corrected. Section 16.4 states that the Company commits to meeting the standards for corrective action of NQA-1-1994, Part I, Basic Requirement 16. Basic Requirement 16 of Part 1 to NQA-1-1994 states that conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practical.

Contrary to the above, from May 13, 2021 to October 4, 2021, the licensee failed to assure that a condition adverse to quality was corrected as soon as practical.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained nor documented in this report.

- On October 7, 2021, the inspectors presented the triennial Appendix R fire protection team inspection (FPTI) results to Mr. Doug Lawrence, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS

Inspectors reviewed one Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report, in reference to an inspection sample which was issued before the inspection period. No other third-party reviews were conducted.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	0-EPT-0904-05	SMOKE AND THERMAL DETECTOR CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	Rev. 21
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1096345	The 6" fire protection piping in MER 2 is corroded and blistering	05/02/2018
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1098380	Inattentive Hot Work Fire Watch	05/25/2018
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1112720	Fire Watches Required Due to Potential Spurious Actuation of CO2 in CV&T	12/19/2018
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1121959	Sprinkler Actuated Above 2A2-2 and 2C2-2 MCCs	4/27/2019
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1123110	FME cover found in fire protection piping	5/12/2019
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1133589	Documentation for Exiting TRM 3.7.1 24-Hour Action Statement	10/19/2019
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1135940	Documented Appendix R Design Basis for SG PORV Spurious Operation Is Not Correct	11/14/2019
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1141708	Smoke detector failed to activate in SAS Halon System	02/20/2020
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1150473	COVID Plexiglas Wall at Warehouse Counter Blocks Sprinkler Heads	06/25/2020
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1152534	Transient Stored in Unit 2 Safeguards Valve Pit without TFLR	07/29/2020
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1156906	Fire Protection Piping has Thru Wall Leak	10/02/2020
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1172768	Incorrect mark number for breaker in 1-FCA-3.00	05/13/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1177199	App R Concern ID with Cable Separation Associated with U1&U2 EDG and Emergence Bus Operation	07/20/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1177390	Apparent Appendix R Non-Compliance Identified at NAPS	07/22/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 1180502	Appendix R Assumptions for EPS Supply Breakers not Consistent with Industry Guidelines	09/12/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 581390	NRC Violation for Design Control Deficiencies Within the Fire Protection Program	6/3/2015
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR1165692	Electrical connection arcing and smoking	02/12/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents	RAS 7492729		Rev. 3
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1180958	Head on 1-ELT-LF-052 does not illuminate	09/20/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181134	Fire Team SCBA Bottle Pressure Found <4000 psi, NRC Identified	09/22/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181135	Expired Batteries Noted During Walkdown by NRC	09/22/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181201	Transient Combustible in MER 3 Not in Compliance with CM-AA-FPA-101	09/23/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181229	1-BS-DR-40/41 Door Sweeps Do Not Fully Contact the Floor for the Full Width of Door	09/23/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181234	Error Identified in Appendix R Report Table 4.1a and b	09/23/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181613	Deluge Valve High Trim Pressure	09/29/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181907	Light to Medium Loading on Turbine Building Sprinkler Heads	10/04/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1181961	NRC Issuing GREEN NCV for Timeliness	10/05/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1182015	Fire Treated Wood in MER 1	10/05/2021
71111.21N.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 1182143	NRC TFPI Team Observation - No Documented Eval for PM Strategy on MSVH Smoke Detectors	10/07/2021
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FAR-202	Equipment Location – App “R” MSVH Area Plan Surry Power Station – Unit 2	Rev. 8
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-1AA	Appendix R Evaluation, Electrical One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 28
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-1D	4160V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 31
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-90AA	Appendix R Block Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 3
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-90EA	Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Electrical Distribution System, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 8
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-90EB	Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Diesel Control Isolation System, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 4
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FE-90EF	Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Diesel Control, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 5
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11448-FM-068A	Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram, Feedwater System, Surry Power Station Unit 1	Revision 65
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11548-FE-1AA1	One Line Diagram, Appendix R Evaluation, Surry Power Station Unit 2	Revision 30
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11548-FE-90AA	Appendix R Block Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater System,	Revision 2

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Surry Power Station Unit 2	
71111.21N.05	Drawings	11548-FM-068A	Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram, Feedwater System, Surry Power Station Unit 2	Revision 62
71111.21N.05	Engineering Changes	SU-16-00108	U2 AFW MOV Hot-Short Resolution	Rev. 8
71111.21N.05	Engineering Changes	SU-16-00109	U1 AFW MOV Hot-Short Resolution	Rev. 12
71111.21N.05	Engineering Changes	SU-18-00112	Charging SW Fire Protection Pipe Replacement	Rev. 3
71111.21N.05	Engineering Evaluations	ETE-CEP-2011-0012	Appendix R Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Identification - Surry	Revision 3
71111.21N.05	Engineering Evaluations	ETE-SU-2019-0006	Alternate Compensatory Measures for Emergency Switchgear Fire with Carbon Dioxide Release	Rev. 0
71111.21N.05	Engineering Evaluations	NE-1200	Key Operator Actions Assumed in the Safety Analyses	Rev. 19
71111.21N.05	Engineering Evaluations	PA 3069154	Evaluate IN 17-04 as it Applies to Surry	12/20/2019
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous		Supplement 1 to Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report Dated September 19, 1980	9/18/1980
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous		Submittal Documenting Surry Power Station Fire Protection Modifications	10/29/1980
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous		Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report	September 19, 1979
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	Cable Routing Evaluation for Unit 1 AFW Injection Valves		
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	DOM-QA-1	Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description	Revision 29
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	EP-0013	Fire Protection Information Relating to Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, 1979 FP-SER and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes	6/30/1999
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	Individual Plant Examination of Non-Seismic		December 1994

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		External Events and Fires		
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	NFPA 27	Private Fire Brigades	Code of Record 1975
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	SPS UFSAR	Section 9.10 – Fire Protection	Rev. 52
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	Surry Power Station	Generic Hot Work Fire Watch Lesson Plan	Rev. 3
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	Surry Power Station Appendix R Report		Revision 44
71111.21N.05	Miscellaneous	Surry Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report		Revision 52.06
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-AP-48.00	Fire Protection - Operations Response	Revision 38
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-DRP-049	Time Critical Operator Actions	Rev. 21
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-FCA-1.00	Limiting MCR Fire	Rev. 58
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-FCA-7.00	Limiting Mechanical Equipment Room 3 or 4 Fire	Revision 14
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-LSP-FP-036	SECURITY HALON SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST	Rev. 5
71111.21N.05	Procedures	0-OSP-TCA-001	Time Critical Action Validation and Verification	Rev. 26
71111.21N.05	Procedures	1-FCA-3.00	Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire	Revision 26
71111.21N.05	Procedures	1-FCA-4.00	Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire	Revision 26
71111.21N.05	Procedures	1-FCA-5.00	Limiting Safeguards Area Fire	Revision 13
71111.21N.05	Procedures	1-OSP-ZZ-001	AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE	Rev. 17
71111.21N.05	Procedures	2-FCA-3	Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire	Rev. 27
71111.21N.05	Procedures	AD-AA-100	Technical Procedure Process Control	Rev. 14
71111.21N.05	Procedures	CM-AA-FPA-10	Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program	Rev. 5
71111.21N.05	Procedures	CM-AA-FPA-100	Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program	Rev. 16
71111.21N.05	Procedures	CM-AA-FPA-101	Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials	Rev. 15
71111.21N.05	Procedures	CM-AA-FPA-102	Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process	Rev. 10

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21N.05	Procedures	ER-AA-AMP-103	Scoping and Screening of License Renewal Aging Management Components	Rev. 0
71111.21N.05	Procedures	ER-AA-AMP-104	Aging Management Review for License Renewal Systems, Structures, and Components	Rev. 0
71111.21N.05	Procedures	PI-AA-200	Corrective Action	Rev. 36