UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 27, 2021

Mr. James Barstow
Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
and Support Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 350 REGARDING ONE-TIME CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.12, "LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM," (EPID L-2021-LLA-0194)

Dear Mr. Barstow:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 350 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This amendment is in response to your application dated October 22, 2021 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21296A000).

The amendment revises Technical Specification 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," to add a one-time note to allow operation of one safety injection pump and one charging pump capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system during MODE 5 or MODE 6 with the pressurizer manway cover removed.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's monthly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Perry H. Buckberg, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-328

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 350 to DPR-79
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: Listserv

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 350
Renewed License No. DPR-79

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated October 22, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 350 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by October 28, 2021.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

David J. Wrona

Digitally signed by David J. Wrona
Date: 2021.10.27 16:13:29 -04'00'

David J. Wrona, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License
and Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 27, 2021

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 350

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Replace page 3 of the Renewed Facility Operating License with the attached page 3. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
3.4.12-1	3.4.12-1

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System

LCO 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump and no safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and one of the following pressure relief capabilities:

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR; or

b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of ≥ 3.0 square inches.

----------NOTES----------

1. Two charging pumps may be made capable of injecting for ≤ 1 hour for pump swap operations.

2. Accumulator may be unisolated when accumulator pressure is less than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the PTLR.

3. Two safety injection pumps and two charging pumps may be capable of injecting for ≤ 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to lowering temperature on any RCS loop below 325°F, whichever occurs first.

4. During the Unit 2 Cycle 24 Refueling Outage, for the purpose of testing the 2A-A safety injection pump, the 2A-A safety injection pump and one charging pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS with the RCS depressurized and the pressurizer manway cover removed. This Note expires when the Unit ascends into MODE 4 from MODE 5.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is ≤ LTOP arming temperature specified in the PTLR,
MODE 5,
MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.

UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 350

TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated October 22, 2021 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21296A000), the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Sequoyah), Unit 2, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission). The requested change would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," to add a one-time note to the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to allow operation of one safety injection pump and one charging pump capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system (RCS) during MODE 5 (cold shutdown) or MODE 6 (refueling) with the pressurizer manway cover removed in order to complete testing of safety injection pump 2A-A.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 System Description

The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary is not compromised by violating the pressure and temperature (P/T) limits. The licensee describes this in Section 2.1 of the enclosure to the LAR as follows:

> The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute when the RCS is water solid, while shutdown; as a pressure fluctuation can occur more quickly than an operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the RCS limits by a significant amount could cause brittle cracking of the reactor vessel. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," requires administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature during heatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report limits.

TS 3.4.12 provides RCS overpressure protection by having a minimum coolant input capability and having adequate pressure relief capacity. Limiting coolant input capability requires all safety injection pumps and all but one centrifugal charging pump incapable of injection into the RCS and isolating the accumulators. The pressure relief capacity requires either two redundant power-operated relief valves (PORVs) or a depressurized RCS and an RCS vent of sufficient size. One PORV or the open RCS vent is the overpressure protection device that acts to terminate an increasing pressure event.

Administrative procedures aid the operator in controlling RCS pressure during low temperature operation. To provide a back-up to the operator and to minimize the possibility of RCS overpressurization, an automatic low temperature over pressure protection (LTOP) system, when manually armed from the main control room, will mitigate the pressure excursion within the allowable pressure limits. The LTOP mitigation system is required only during low temperature operation and is manually enabled for automatic actuation. The LTOP system for pressure relief consists of two PORVs with reduced lift settings, or a depressurized RCS and an RCS vent of sufficient size.

2.2 Licensee's Proposed Changes

The licensee proposed to add the following one-time Note 4 to LCO 3.4.12:

> During the Unit 2 Cycle 24 Refueling Outage, for the purpose of testing the 2A-A safety injection pump, the 2A-A safety injection pump and one charging pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS with the RCS depressurized and the pressurizer manway cover removed. This Note expires when the Unit ascends into MODE 4 from MODE 5.

2.3 Regulatory Review

Under 10 CFR 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses to the extent applicable and appropriate. Both the common standards for licenses in 10 CFR 50.40(a) (regarding, among other things, consideration of the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals) and those specifically for issuance of operating licenses in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3), provide that there must be reasonable assurance that the activities at issue will not endanger the health and safety of the public, and that the applicant will comply with the Commission's regulations.

Section 50.36, "Technical specifications," of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) establishes the regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs. Paragraph 50.36(a)(1) requires an application for an operating license to include proposed TSs. A summary statement of the bases or reasons for such specifications, other than those covering administrative controls, shall also be included in the application, but shall not become part of the TSs.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs for operating reactors are required, in part, to include items in the following five specific categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) Surveillance Requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

Paragraph 50.36(c)(2)(i) of 10 CFR states that LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility, and when an LCO of a reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met.

Sequoyah, Unit 2, was designed to meet the intent of the Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits published in July 1967 (Proposed GDC). The Sequoyah Unit 2 construction permit was issued in May 1970. Section 3.1.2 of the Sequoyah Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML20321A061), however, addresses the general design criteria published as Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" (GDC), to 10 CFR Part 50 in July 1971. Each criterion is followed by a discussion of the design features and procedures that meet the intent of the criteria. Any exception to the 1971 GDC resulting from the earlier commitments is identified in the discussion of the corresponding criterion. However, the UFSAR indicated no exceptions to the 1971 GDC used by the staff in its review.

The 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC applicable to this LAR are as follows:

- GDC 14 - Reactor coolant pressure boundary
- GDC 15 - Reactor coolant system design
- GDC 31 - Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary

The NRC staff's guidance for the review of TSs is in NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition" (SRP), Chapter 16.0, "Technical Specifications," Revision 3, dated March 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100351425).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff evaluated the LAR to determine if the proposed changes are consistent with the guidance, regulations, and plant-specific design and licensing basis information discussed in Section 2.3 of this safety evaluation. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's statements in the LAR, the relevant sections of the licensee's UFSAR, and TS Bases to determine if the proposed changes are acceptable.

Evaluation of Proposed Configuration

The existing TS 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," allows a maximum of one charging pump and no safety injection pumps capable of injecting into the RCS during MODES 4, 5 and 6. To provide overpressure protection, LCO 3.4.12 requires one of the following pressure relief capabilities:

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR [pressure and temperature limits report]; or
b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of ≥ 3.0 square inches.

The analyses described in Section 5.2.2.4.2 of the Sequoyah UFSAR demonstrate that a single PORV can maintain RCS pressure below limits when a single charging pump is actuated. The NRC staff notes that two PORVs are required in the LCO to account for a single failure of one

PORV. Based on the UFSAR analysis, the current LCO allows only one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS when the LTOP system is required to be operable. As specified in LCO 3.4.12.b, in place of the PORVs, a depressurized RCS with a vent area of ≥ 3.0 square inches (in^2) may also be used. Both a PORV and a 3.0 in^2 vent have limited overpressure relief capability and may not be capable of maintaining the pressure below the limits if additional mass is injected into the RCS. For the purposes of testing the 2A-A safety injection pump, the licensee is requesting the ability to have the 2A-A safety injection pump, in addition to the one charging pump, capable of injecting into the RCS while the unit is in MODES 5 or 6 provided the pressurizer manway is opened as a vent.

Table 6.3.2-1 of the Sequoyah UFSAR shows that the maximum flow rate for a charging pump and a safety injection pump are 550 gallons per minute (gpm) and 650 gpm, respectively. In order to accommodate this additional flow, the LTOP system would have to be capable of relieving both the mass input of its design basis transient from the charging pump in addition to the safety injection pump. Rather than performing a reanalysis of the LTOP system with potential changes to the setpoints for the pressurizer PORVs, the licensee stated that the RCS will instead be vented to the containment atmosphere through the pressurizer manway for the duration that the safety injection pump will be capable of injecting into the RCS.

The licensee performed calculations using two methods from CRANE Technical Paper No. 410, “Flow of Fluids through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe,” and determined that opening of the pressurizer manway (approximately 16-inch diameter) provides several orders of magnitude more relief capacity than needed to pass flow from both the charging pump and safety injection pump injecting into the RCS simultaneously.

The NRC staff independently performed calculations to determine an updated vent area that accounts for the increase in mass injected into the RCS from the safety injection pump. The calculations are scoping in nature and not intended to compute an exact vent area, rather, the intent is to determine the order of magnitude of the change. The staff calculated that a vent area would need to be increased from 3 in^2 to approximately 7 in^2. Given that an open pressurizer manway has a flow area of approximately 201 in^2, the NRC staff finds that the RCS will not be challenged due to overpressure from the additional mass injected by the additional safety injection pump in MODES 5 or 6.

The GDCs applicable to this LAR are GDCs 14,15, and 31, as identified above in Section 2.3. In Section 4.1 of the enclosure to the LAR, the licensee stated that compliance with each of these GDCs is described in Section 3.1.2 of the Sequoyah UFSAR. While the proposed change to TS 3.4.12 is not a design change, the addition of a safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS during LTOP operation has the potential to challenge the RCS pressure boundary; therefore, the NRC staff considered the effect of the proposed change on these GDCs. The staff reviewed the appropriate section of the UFSAR and determined that the proposed change to TS 3.4.12 does not change how the licensee meets the requirements of the specific GDCs identified above in Section 2.3. These GDCs are met primarily by material selection and fabrication techniques. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the licensee continues to meet the requirements of GDCs 14, 15, and 31.

4.0 Technical Conclusion

Based on the need to perform testing on the 2A-A safety injection pump in MODES 5 or 6, the licensee proposed the addition of a note to TS 3.4.12, which would allow both a single charging pump and the 2A-A safety injection pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS provided the RCS is depressurized with the pressurizer manway cover removed. The licensee performed calculations to demonstrate that the flow area of the pressurizer manway is large enough to avoid overpressurization of the RCS during LTOP operation. The NRC staff performed independent hand calculations and confirmed that the vent area (i.e., pressurizer manway) is sufficiently large enough to prevent overpressure in the RCS during LTOP operation. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed change is acceptable, and that the TS, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) in that it meets the lowest functional capability of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.

5.0 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The NRC's regulations contain provisions for issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day public comment period cannot be met. These provisions are applicable when both exigent circumstances exist and the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), exigent circumstances exist when a licensee and the NRC must act quickly, and time does not permit the NRC to publish a *Federal Register* notice allowing 30 days for prior public comment. As discussed in the licensee's application, the licensee requested that the proposed amendment be processed by the NRC on an exigent basis.

In its October 22, 2021, LAR, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provided the following timeline and justification for the exigent circumstances:

- On October 8, 2021, during performance of a bearing inspection for the 2A-A safety injection pump, TVA identified pump shaft and bearing degradation at both inboard and outboard radial bearings.

- Following coordination between TVA, industry expertise, and the pump vendor, TVA initiated three repair paths.

- Following extensive analysis and remediation attempts, TVA decided to replace the shaft utilizing a replacement provided by the vendor.

- As a result, reactor re-assembly was delayed by almost seven days.

- Following the shaft replacement and pump rebuild, comprehensive post maintenance and surveillance testing is required that typically is performed with the reactor vessel head off and the refueling cavity flooded to accommodate low-temperature over-pressure protection conditions.

- Supporting this testing is currently encumbering scarce and specialized contract and vendor resources required for reactor re-assembly at Sequoyah, Unit 2, that are also needed for transition to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, refueling outage scheduled to begin October 29, 2021.

- The delay of these scarce and specialized reactor resources to Watts Bar, Unit 1, is delaying the start of Watts Bar, Unit 1, outage activities and directly impacting TVA's winter grid reliability reserve margin requirements for later November and early December 2021 as submitted to TVA's reliability council stakeholders.

TVA concluded that its request to modify the TS to permit the post maintenance testing with the reactor re-assembled but vented via the pressurizer manway is exigent based on the above conditions being unanticipated and unavoidable, and thereby inducing impact on management of contract and vendor reactor outage resources and its required margin for the winter reliability period.

Summary

The NRC staff confirmed the above circumstances and finds that the licensee made a timely application for the proposed amendment following identification of the issue. In addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee could not avoid the exigency because the condition the licensee identified for safety injection pump 2A-A was only recently identified, and it pursued three simultaneous paths that ultimately resulted in the need to replace the pump shaft. The timing to procure the replacement shaft, install it, and perform the required post-maintenance testing, and to avoid causing grid stability issues in late November and early December led to the exigent circumstances. Based on these findings and the determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration as discussed in Section 6.0 below, the NRC staff has determined that a valid need exists for issuance of the license amendment using the exigent provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6).

6.0 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), when a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis about the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92. Under 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee's determination of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?

   Response: No.

   The safety analysis of the plant is unaffected by the proposed change. Because the safety analysis is unaffected, the calculated radiological releases associated with the analysis are not affected. Additionally, removing the pressurizer manway while a safety injection pump (SIP) is capable of injecting into the RCS has been shown to provide adequate low-temperature over-pressure protection. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not adversely alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated. No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of allowing operation of one safety injection pump capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system (RCS) with the RCS depressurized and the pressurizer manway cover removed. The proposed change does not challenge the performance or integrity of any safety-related systems or components. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The margin of safety is related to the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following an accident. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment. Removing the pressurizer manway during the post-maintenance testing of the SIP has been shown to provide adequate protection against low-temperature over-pressure of the RCS. Thus, the performance of the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant system is unaffected by the proposed change. The margin of safety associated with the acceptance criteria of any accident is unchanged. The proposed change will have no effect on the availability, operability, or performance of safety-related systems and components. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

Under the provisions in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), where the Commission finds that exigent circumstances exist, in that a licensee and the Commission must act quickly and that time does not permit the Commission to publish a Federal Register notice allowing 30 days for prior public comment, and it also determines that the amendment involves no significant hazards considerations, it: will either issue a Federal Register notice providing notice of an opportunity for hearing and allowing at least two weeks from the date of the notice for prior public comment; or (B) will use local media to provide reasonable notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's amendment and of its proposed determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved, consulting with the licensee on the proposed media release and on the geographical area of its coverage. In this case, a notice was published on October 26, 2021, in the *Chattanooga Times Free Press* requesting comment by 4:00 p.m. on October 27, 2021.

7.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on October 25, 2021. The State official had no comments.

8.0 PUBLIC COMMENTS

On October 26, 2021, in the *Chattanooga Times Free Press*, the NRC staff published a public notice associated with the proposed amendment request. In accordance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for an exigent amendment, the notice provided until 4:00 p.m. October 27, 2021, for public comment on the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. No comments were received.

9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The NRC has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, published in the *Chattanooga Times Free Press* on October 26, 2021, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

10.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: R. Beaton, NRR
S. Smith, NRR

Date: October 27, 2021

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 350 REGARDING ONE-TIME CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.12, "LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM," (EPID L-2021-LLA-0194) DATED OCTOBER 27, 2021

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DATE	10/25/2021	10/25/2021	10/24/2021	10/24/2021
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