ANSWER KEY CPNPP 2021 NRC SRO Exam

1	В	26	D	51	D	76	В
2	Α	27	С	52	D	77	Α
3	D	28	В	53	Α	78	D
4	Α	29	D	54	Α	79	С
5	D	30	D	55	D	80	D
6	В	31	С	56	Α	81	С
7	С	32	Α	57	D	82	С
8	Α	33	В	58	В	83	С
9	С	34	В	59	С	84	В
10	Α	35	Α	60	С	85	С
11	В	36	D	61	В	86	В
12	D	37	Α	62	С	87	Α
13	В	38	В	63	С	88	В
14	В	39	В	64	D	89	С
15	С	40	С	65	D	90	В
16	Α	41	С	66	D	91	В
17	D	42	В	67	В	92	В
18	D	43	A	68	С	93	D
19	Α	44	С	69	Α	94	D
20	Α	45	С	70	С	95	Α
21	С	46	Α	71	С	96	D
22	В	47	Α	72	В	97	D
23	D	48	Α	73	Α	98	D
24	D	49	D	74	D	99	Α
25	D	50	С	75	D	100	С
ROOverallA - 19A - 23B - 16B - 23C - 18C - 25D - 22D - 29				<u>SRO</u> A – 4 B – 7 C – 7 D – 7			

Examination Outline Cross-r	eference:	Level	RO		SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2			
		Group	1			
		K/A	003	.G.2.2.	.39	
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.9			
Reactor Coolant Pump: Knowledge of	less than or equal to one hour Techn	ical Specification action statemer	te for evetor	06		
Reactor Coolant 1 unp. Knowledge of			its for system	15.		
Question # 1						
Given the following condit	ions:					
 Unit 1 is in MODE 3 Reactor Trip Break Rod Drive MG sets An RCS dilution is in 	are operating	ture at 400ºF				
In accordance with TS 3.4 in operation.	I.5, RCS Loops – MODE	3, a MINIMUM of(1) RCF	Ps mus	st be	
If one of the minimum nun	nber of operating RCPs	were to trip, within 1 ho	our(2))		
A. (1) two (2) commence Eme	A. (1) two(2) commence Emergency Boration					
B. (1) two(2) make the Rod Control System incapable of withdrawal						
C. (1) four(2) commence Emergency Boration						
D. (1) four(2) make the Rod Control System incapable of withdrawal						
Answer: B						

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of a one-hour TS associated with the operation of the RCPs.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since various TS require boration be commenced in response to actions not being met.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Under the given conditions, with a dilution in progress, two RCS loops are required to be operating. Second part is correct. If one of the two operating loops stops operating, within 1 hour restore it to operating or make the rod control system incapable of withdrawal.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since MODES 1 and 2, TS 3.4.4, require all four loops operating. Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	TS 3.4.5	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given RCS parameter indications and plant conditions, **ASSESS** from memory any required TS/TR entries, including any actions which must be completed within one hour in accordance with Technical Specifications or TRM. (SYS.RC1.OB06)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	62575	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comment	omments / Reference: Bank 62575 Revision:					
• A R • B	 Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Refueling outage. All four Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loops are OPERABLE, with all four Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) in operation. Both Control Rod Drive Motor Generators are energized and Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED. 					
accorda Cold Sh	ince w iutdow	rips, which of the following identifies the MINIMUM RCP require vith LCO 3.4.5, RCS Loops MODE 3 and IPO-001A, Plant He vn to Hot Standby, Attachment 5, Checklist Required Prior to Cl Breakers?	atup from			
A	۹.	LCO 3.4.5 is satisfied with two RCPs OPERABLE, with one RC operation. IPO-001A is satisfied with two RCPs in operation.	CP in			
E	З.	LCO 3.4.5 is satisfied with two RCPs OPERABLE, with two RCPs in operation. IPO-001A is NOT satisfied with only three RCPs in operation.				
C	 LCO 3.4.5 is satisfied with two RCPs OPERABLE, with one RCP in operation. IPO-001A is NOT satisfied with only three RCPs in operation. 					
C	 LCO 3.4.5 is satisfied with two RCPs OPERABLE, with two RCPs in operation. IPO-001A is satisfied with two RCPs in operation. 					
Answer: B Answer Explanation						
Ľ						

omments / Reference: Ba	ank 62575	Revision:
 capable of rod withdra operation, however, or System is not capable loops remain in operationation operation operation operation operation. F. Correct. In MODE 3 without two RCS loops shall be LCO. IPO-001A require Control System capable of rod withdra operation. G. Incorrect. Plausible be capable of rod withdra operation, however, or System is not capable loops be in operation and thus IPO-001A is H. Incorrect. Plausible be capable of rod withdra operation and thus IPO-001A is 	ecause in MODE 3 with the Rod Control Syste awal, two RCS loops shall be OPERABLE with	th two in ntrol wo RCS not Control s. ithdrawal, TS 3.4.5 he Rod ot em th two in ntrol four RCS withdrawal em
remain in operation in rod withdrawal. This a	3.4.5 LCO IPO-001A only requires two RCS MODE 3 if the Rod Control System is not ca answer would be correct if the Rod Control Sy od withdrawal in the current conditions.	pable of
remain in operation in rod withdrawal. This a	MODE 3 if the Rod Control System is not ca answer would be correct if the Rod Control Sy	pable of
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remain in operation in rod withdrawal. This a were not capable of ro Question 186 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number:	MODE 3 if the Rod Control System is not cap answer would be correct if the Rod Control Sy od withdrawal in the current conditions. Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 0 4.00 62575 ILOT8719 SYS.RC1.OB06.017 Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Refueling outa	age. All
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remain in operation in rod withdrawal. This a were not capable of ro Question 186 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic: K/A:	MODE 3 if the Rod Control System is not cap answer would be correct if the Rod Control Sy od withdrawal in the current conditions. Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 0 4.00 62575 ILOT8719 SYS.RC1.OB06.017 Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Refueling outa	age. All
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remain in operation in rod withdrawal. This a were not capable of ro Question 186 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic: K/A: Question Reference: SRO:	MODE 3 if the Rod Control System is not cal answer would be correct if the Rod Control Sy od withdrawal in the current conditions. Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 0 4.00 62575 ILOT8719 SYS.RC1.OB06.017 Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Refueling outa four Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loops are 015/017.G.2.2.22	age. All

Comments / Reference: TS 3.4.5			Revision: 156	
			RCS Loops	MODE 3 3.4.5
3.4 REACTOR CO	OLANT SY	STEM (RCS)		
3.4.5 RCS Loops -	- MODE 3			
LCO 3.4.5	Two RC	S loops shall be OPERABLE, and either:)	
	a. T	wo RCS loops shall be in operation when apable of rod withdrawal; or	n the Rod Control	System is
		one RCS loop shall be in operation when ot capable of rod withdrawal.	the Rod Control	System is
		NOTE		
	8 hour p	or coolant pumps may be removed from eriod provided:	operation for ≤ 1 i	iour per
	ir	to operations are permitted that would ca no the RCS with boron concentration les DM of LCO 3.1.1; and		
		Core outlet temperature is maintained at le	east 10°F below s	saturation
APPLICABILITY:	MODE 3			
ACTIONS				
CONDITI	ON	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETI	ON TIME
A. One required R inoperable.	CS loop	A.1 Restore required RCS loop to OPERABLE status.	72 hours	
B. Required Actior associated Con Time of Condition met.	npletion	B.1 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours		
COMANCHE PEAK	(- UNITS 1	AND 2 3.4-8	Amendment N	o. 150, 156

mments / Reference: TS	Revision	
		RCS Loops MODE 3.4
FIONS (continued)	1	
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
One required RCS loop not in operation, with Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.	C.1 Restore required RCS loop to operation.	1 hour
	C.2 Place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.	1 hour
Four RCS loops inoperable.	D.1 Place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.	Immediately
No RCS loop in operation.	AND	
	D.2 Suspend operations that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.	Immediately
	AND	
	D.3 Initiate action to restore one RCS loop to OPERABLE status and operation.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.5.1	Verify required RCS loops are in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.4-9

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Amendment No. 450, 156

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-re	eference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier	2			
		Group	1			
		K/A	004.	<3.04		
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.7			
Chemical and Volume Control: Knowled	dge of the effect that a loss or malfu	nction of the CVCS will have on th	he following: RC	PS		
Question # 2						
Given the following conditi	ions:					
 RCP SEAL WTR IN Seal injection flow is 	TR INJ FLO LO (5A-1.6 JJ FILT 1 ΔΡ ΗΙ (5A-2.6)) is in alarm	nas been in	itiated		
RCPs are required to be tr MINIMUM of(1)	ripped if CCW Thermal I	3arrier heat exchanger	r flow is not	а		
Seal injection is isolated in result in(2)	n order to prevent therma	al shock to the seals w	hich could	directly		
A. (1) 35 gpm (2) excessive RCS	A. (1) 35 gpm(2) excessive RCS leakage					
B. (1) 35 gpm(2) voiding the CCW system						
C. (1) 64 gpm (2) excessive RCS leakage						
D. (1) 64 gpm(2) voiding the CCW system						
Answer: A						

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of a loss of seal injection flow from CVCS to the RCPs

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Per ABN-101, Section 7 (Loss of Seal Injection), if CCW is less than 35 gpm, you are directed to section 9 which will direct tripping the reactor, tripping RCPs and isolating seal injection and CCW thermal barrier return from the RCPs. Second part is correct. Thermal shocking the seals could result in seal damage (not seating correctly) which could result in excessive leakage.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (See A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because the CCW return valve from the RCPs, HV-4709, is manually closed on a loss of seal injection and CCW to the RCPs to prevent voiding in the CCW system.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because CCW flow at 64 gpm will result in isolating the CCW thermal barrier HX. Second part is correct (See A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-105	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-101	Comments / Reference
	RCS Study Guide	


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the response for a Loss of Seal Injection in accordance with ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip/Malfunction. (ABN.101.OB07)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	58153	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundan Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: Bank 58153	Revision:							
 Unit 1 Reactor power is 100% ANY RCP SEAL WTR INJ FLO LO (5A-1.6) is in alarm RCP SEAL WTR INJ FILT 1 ΔP HI (5A-2.6) is in alarm Seal injection flow is 0 gpm ABN-101, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTION has been initiated CCW Thermal Barrier heat exchanger flow indicates 30 gpm 								
Based on the above plant conditions, complete the following statements.								
 RCPs (1) required to be tripped. 								
 Seal injection is isolated in order to prevent thermal shock to the seals directly result in(2) 	which could							
A. (1) are (2) excessive RCS leakage								
B. (1) are (2) voiding the CCW system								
C. (1) are NOT (2) excessive RCS leakage								
D. (1) are NOT (2) voiding the CCW system								
Answer: A								
Answer Explanation								

Comments / Reference: Ban	k 58153	Revision:					
A 1 st part is correct. Per ABN-101, Section 7 (Loss of Seal Injection), if CCW is less than 35 gpm, you are directed to section 9 which will direct tripping the reactor, tripping RCPs and isolating seal injection and CCW thermal barrier return from the RCPs. 2 nd part is correct. Thermal shocking the seals could result in seal damage (not seating correctly) which could result in excessive leakage. Plausible because voiding CCW is a concern but is addressed by isolating CCW return from the thermal barrier heat exchanger.							
	A). 2 nd part is incorrect because the conce P seals, ultimately resulting in excessive lease A seals, ultimately resulting in exce						
is < 35 gpm with a loss of	cause the RCPs are required to be tripped in f seal injection. It is plausible because if flo correct. 2 nd part is correct (See A).						
D 1 st part is incorrect but (see B).	plausible (see C). 2 nd part is incorrect but	plausible					
Question 42 Info							
Question Type:	Multiple Choice						
Status:	Active						
Always select on test?	No						
Authorized for practice?	No						
Points:	1.00						
Time to Complete:	3						
Difficulty:	3.00						
0.1.10	50450						
System ID:	58153						
User-Defined ID:	ILOT						
Cross Reference							
Number:							
Topic: Unit 1 Reactor power is 100% ANY RCP SEAL WTR INJ FLO LO (5A-1.6) is in alarm RCP SEAL WTR INJ FIL							
K/A:	15/17 AA1.07						
Question Reference:	ABN-101						
SRO:							
Comments:	LC22 RO Retake NRC						



nments / Reference: ABN-105				Revision: 8	
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN		UNIT 1 AND 2		EDURE NO. 3N-105	
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTE MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE	E 8 OF 40		
3.3 Operator Actions					
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED		
Continued	to R HX(RIFY Component Coo CP Thermal Barrier s)-GREATER THAN u-FI-4678, RCP 1 TH	<u>35 GPM:</u>		
		RET FLO			
	•	u-FI-4682, RCP 2 TH RET FLO	BR CLR C	CW	
	• :	u-FI-4686, RCP 3 TH RET FLO	BR CLR C	CW	
	• !	u-FI-4690, RCP 4 TH RET FLO	BR CLR C	CW	
		hermal Barrier Flow : <u>N</u> RFORM ABN-101 whi procedure.		ng	
NOTE: IF NO Charging Pump available, THE to shutdown due to NO boration path.	EN Plant M	anagement should b	e notified p	prior	
2 VERIFY at least one Charging Pump - RUNNING	STA	RT a PD Pump per ۱،	SOP-103A/	/B.	
RONNING	<u>IF</u> C THE	harging pump will <u>NC</u> <u>N</u>	<u>OT</u> start,		
	GO	TO ABN-101.			
Sect	tion 3.3				
					-

Comments / Reference: ABN-101		Revision: 13	
	1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UAL UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-101	
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTI	ON REVISION NO. 1	B PAGE 46 OF 54	
9.3 Operator Actions			
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT (BTAINED	
CAUTION: With NO Seal Injection flow AND N must be secured PROMPTLY (Wit	NO Thermal Barrier cooling the thin approximately FOUR mines the second s	ne affected RCP nutes) to prevent	
damage to the RCP Seal.			
1 TRIP the Reactor <u>AND</u> GO TO EOP-0.0A/B while other operators			
continue this procedure.			
NOTE: IF all RCPs are stopped during the perf	formance of this procedure,	HEN Attachment 3	
should be PERFORMED to isolate dilut [C]	ion paths when time permits		
2 (STOP affected RCP(s).			
• 1/ <u>u</u> -PCPX1, RCP 1			
• 1/ <u>u</u> -PCPX2, RCP 2			
 1/<u>u</u>-PCPX3, RCP 3 			
 1/<u>u</u>-PCPX4, RCP 4 			
3 VERIFY the number 1 Seal Leakoff Valve for affected RCP(s) - OPEN			
• 1/ <u>u</u> -8141A, RCP 1 SEAL 1			
 1/<u>u</u>-8141B, RCP 2 SEAL 1 			
LKOFF VLV 1/ <u>u</u> -8141C, RCP 3 SEAL 1			
 1/<u>u</u>-8141D, RCP 4 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV 			
Sect	ion 9.3		<u>-</u>

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BNORI	CPNF MAL CONDITIONS F	PROCEDURES MANU	AL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-101
REACT	OR COOLANT PUM	P TRIP/MALFUNCTIO	N	REVISION NO. 13	PAGE 47 OF 54
.3 <u>C</u>	perator Actions				
ļ	ACTION/EXPECTED	RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
4	CLOSE the Seal I Valve to affected F				
[C]	• 1/ <u>u</u> -8351A,	RCP 1 SEAL WTR INJ VLV			
	 1/<u>u</u>-8351B, 				
	 1/<u>u</u>-8351C, 	RCP 3 SEAL WTR INJ VLV			
	• 1/ <u>u</u> -8351D,	RCP 4 SEAL WTR INJ VLV			
5	VERIFY RCP The CCW Return Valv RCP(s) - CLOSEE	es from affected	M	anually CLOSE valves a	as necessary.
	• <u>u</u> -HS-4691,	RCP 1 THBR CLR CCW RET VLV			
	• <u>u</u> -HS-4692,	RCP 2 THBR CLR CCW RET VLV			
	• <u>u</u> -HS-4693,	RCP 3 THBR CLR CCW RET VLV			
	• <u>u</u> -HS-4694,	RCP 4 THBR CLR CCW RET VLV			
6	VERIFY <u>u</u> -HS-470 RET ISOL VLV - 0	9, THBR CLR CCW CLOSED	Ma Ba	anually CLOSE the CCV arrier Return Isolation V	
		Sectio	n <u>9.3</u>		
					·

Comments / Reference: RCS Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.RC1

<u>Hi/Low lube oil level</u> - operator should monitor pump parameters. If the bearing temperatures reach 195°F, then the reactor and the affected RCP should be tripped.

<u>#1 seal failure</u> - This section is divided up into four different scenarios. If #1 seal leakoff flow on affected RCP is greater than 6.0 gpm with temperatures increasing or total seal leakoff flow exceeds 8 gpm, then the reactor and the affected RCP should be tripped immediately, and the leakoff valve closed when the RCP has stopped rotating (3-5 minutes). If greater than 6.0 gpm and temperatures are stable, then the unit must be shutdown within 8 hours. If the #1seal leakoff is less than .8 gpm, then the unit must be shutdown within 8 hours. If the RCP radial bearing or seal inlet temperature increases, then the reactor and the pump should be tripped immediately, and the #1 seal leakoff valve closed after the RCP has stopped rotating.

#2 or #3 seal failure - Pump operation is allowed to continue as long as other pump parameters (vibration, temperatures, etc.) stay within normal bands.

<u>Excessive RCP vibration</u> - A vibration of 20 mil shaft or 5 mil frame, or increase of \geq 1 mil/hr on the shaft when \geq 15 mils, or increase \geq 0.2 mil/hr on the frame when \geq 3 mils requires immediate tripping of the reactor and the RCP. Vibration \geq 15 mil shaft or 3 mil frame requires consulting management and engineering to determine if the unit is to be shutdown and the affected pump stopped.

<u>Loss of seal injection</u> - The operator verifies CCW flow to the thermal barrier heat exchanger, since this is required to cool the pump radial bearing and seal package. Other actions require a check of other parameters on the affected pump. If the pump radial bearing temperature increases to 225°F or seal inlet temperature increases to 235°F, then the reactor and the affected RCP should be tripped.

<u>RCP high temperature or loss of CCW to any RCP</u>. The operators verify that satisfactory seal injection flow is being supplied to the RCP. Temperatures for the pump and motor bearing and motor windings are monitored. If these temperatures exceed maximum limits, then the reactor is tripped and the pump is stopped.

RCP temperature limits are as follows:

Motor stator winding temperature - 300°F Motor upper radial bearing temperature - 195°F Motor upper thrust bearing temperature - 195°F Motor lower radial bearing temperature - 195°F Motor lower thrust bearing temperature - 195°F Lower seal water (pump radial) bearing temperature - 225°F

Loss of seal injection and thermal barrier cooling water - With no seal injection flow and no thermal barrier cooling the affected RCP must be secured within approximately FOUR minutes. The reactor is tripped and the affected pump(s) stopped. Seal injection and thermal barrier cooling return valves are closed. Isolating the RCP seal package from seal injection prevents the thermal shock that would be encountered by restoring seal injection to an abnormally hot RCP seal. RCS leakage is monitored and a cooldown to MODE 5 is initiated.

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO					
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2						
	Group	1						
	K/A	005.	A1.02					
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.3						
Residual Heat Removal: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: RHR flow rate								
Question # 3								
 Given the following conditions: RHR is in service in Mode 5 Instrument Air is lost to 2-FCV-618, RH ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal Syst Loss of RCS Temperature/flow Control 2-FCV-618 fails(1) when air is lost. ABN-104 directs manual control of the RHR H MINIMUM design RHR flow of(2) gpm. A. (1) OPEN (2) 2000 	em Malfunction, Section 4 RCS Filled, is in progress							
(2) 2900 B. (1) OPEN (2) 3800								
C. (1) CLOSED (2) 2900								
D. (1) CLOSED (2) 3800								
Answer: D								

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of flow requirements for the RHR system.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect because the valve fails closed. It is plausible because if it were the RHR HX Outlet Valve, it would be correct. Second part is incorrect because the minimum design flow to be established is 3800 gpm. It is plausible because it were asking about the minimum CCW flow through the HX, it would be correct.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (see A). Second part is correct. ABN-104 directs establishing between 3800 and 4000 gpm RHR flow.
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct. The RHR HX Bypass Valve fails closed upon a loss of air. Second part is incorrect but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-301	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-104	Comments / Reference
	DBD ME-260	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Loss of RCS Temperature/Flow Control in accordance with ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunctions. (ABN.104.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	81933	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

BNORMAL		EDURE NO. BN-301			
	MENT AIR SYSTE	M MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 14	PAGE	E 48 OF 130
		ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 4 OF 15			
	CONTROL BO	DARD AIR OPERATED VAL	VE FAILURE POSITIO	<u>DNS</u>	
	COMPONENT	NOMENCLATURE		FAILUF POSIT	
CB-04		RHR TO CL 3 TEST VLV		F.C.	
CB-04	1/ <u>u</u> -8879D	RHR TO CL 4 TEST VLV		F.C.	
CB-04	1/ <u>u</u> -8880	SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOI	L VLV	F.C.	
CB-04	1/ <u>u</u> -8882	CCP SI TEST VLV		F.C.	
CB-04	1/ <u>u</u> -8890A	RHR TO CL 1 & 2 TEST V	LV	F.C.	
CB-04	1/ <u>u</u> -8890B	RHR TO CL 3 & 4 TEST V	LV	F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -FK-618	RHR HX 1 BYP FLO CTRI		F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -FK-619	RHR HX 2 BYP FLO CTRI	_	F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HC-606	RHR HX 1 FLO CTRL		F.O.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HC-607	RHR HX 2 FLO CTRL		F.O.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HC-943	ACCUM 1-4 VENT CTRL		F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HS-6719	SRG TK DEMIN WTR SPL	Y VLV	F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HS-6720	SRG TK RMUW SPLY VL	v	F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HS-6712	SRG TK MU VLV		F.C.	
CB-04	<u>u</u> -HS-6713	SRG TK MU VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -7126	RCDT VENT ISOL VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -7136	RCDT DRN ISOL VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -7150	RCDT VENT ISOL VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8026	PRT VENT ISOL VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8027	PRT VENT ISOL VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8031	PRT DRN VLV		F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8032	RV SEAL LKOFF VLV		F.O.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8045	RMUW TO PRT SPLY VLV	/	F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8047	RMUW TO PRT/CNTMT S	PLY ISOL VLV	F.C.	
CB-05	1/ <u>u</u> -8141A	RCP 1 SEAL 1 LKOFF VL	V	F.O.	
		Attachment 1			

CPNPP				PROCEDURE	NO.
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL			UNIT 1 AND 2	ABN-104	
SIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL S	STEM MALFUNCTION	N	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 24 OF 1	34
Operator Actions					
ACTION/EXPECTED RE	SPONSE	R	ESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED	
INJ	10 GPM AND 2 TO CL 1 & 2) FLO 2 TO CL 3 & 4	Ma exc AN the ma <u>qpr</u> AN RC	RHR heat exchanger intain between <u>3,800</u> n	outlet valve to gpm and 4,000 ure ve: HX 1 BYP FLO HX 2 BYP FLO	
	b. c.	Ins TH alig val sec • • • • • • • • • • •	RHR HX outlet valve (RHR HX outlet valve (CTRI (CTRI) U-HC-607, RHR CTRI RHR flow control is los trument Air to flow cor EN gn emergency air supp ve(s) as follows while ction at Step 6: Unit 1 Train A, Attac Unit 2 Train B, Attac	EXAMPLE 2 FLO HX 2 FLO to be to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss of the to loss	1
	Section 4.2	,			
	Section 4.3	5] .

Comments / Reference	: DBD ME-260		Revision: 30
CPNPP UNITS 1 AND 2 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM			REVISION 30 PAGE 31 OF 131
		1 and 2 contain the RHR irve, respectively.	, pump shop test curves and
	The design ca	apacity requirement for th	ne RHR pump is the following:
	coold requir pump 7600	own as stated in the power ements Section 4.3-B. T is required to circulate o	o meet this requirement each ne-half of the required flow of through a <u>RHR</u> heat exchanger
	The runout ca	apacity requirement for th	ne RHR pump is the following:
	4900		de the minimum LHSI flow of o mitigate a large LOCA, (Refer dditional details.)
	Dther RHR p following:	umps capacity requireme	ents that are not limiting are the
		of the pumps is required for emergency cooldown.	to circulate the flow at 3800 (See Section 4.3-A)
	gpm t refuel	o maintain the RCS temp	to circulate the flow at 3800 perature at 140°F during a tile the other pump is being 3)

Examination Outline Cross-refere	nce:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3		Tier	2	
		Group	1	
		K/A	006.k	<1.02
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	4.3	
Emergency Core Cooling: Knowledge of the p systems: ESFAS	nysical connections and/or ca	ause-effect relationships between	the ECCS and t	he following
Question # 4				
Given the following conditions:				
 Unit 1 is operating at 10 Train A equipment is ru 	ining	to their alternate name	r oupply oo	0.1170
A slow transfer of both s	afeguards busses	to their alternate powe	r supply oc	curs
(1) will be started as a res	ult of the transfer.			
The PDP cannot be started fol(2) clears.	owing actuation of	the Blackout Sequence	ers until the	BOS
A. (1) Both CCPs(2) Operator Lockout				
B. (1) Both CCPs(2) Automatic Lockout				
C. (1) ONLY CCP 1-01 (2) Operator Lockout				
D. (1) ONLY CCP 1-01 (2) Automatic Lockout				
Answer: A				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the relationship between the ESFAS blackout sequencer and the CCPs.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Both CCPs are started by the sequencers. Second part is correct. The PDP is locked out from starting until the operator lockout clears.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because the PDP is prevented from starting by the operator lockout, not the automatic lockout. The operator lockout clears when the sequence completes timing and the automatic lockout clears when the operator resets the BOS.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since only CCP 1-01 was running prior to the transfer and it could be thought that only previously operating equipment would be started. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-602	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SI and BO Sequencer Study Guide	Comments / Reference	
	CVCS Study Guide		
	ABN-601		

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **PREDICT** the response of the instrumentation and controls of the Safety Injection and Blackout Sequencers in accordance with CP-0575-001, Solid State Safeguards Sequencers and associated Automation Industries drawings. (SYS. ES3.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

00100							
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-602					
RESPONSE TO A 6900/480V SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 77 OF 107					
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 4							
EQUIPMENT ACTUATED BY BLACK	OUT SEQUENCER						
e following is a list of components or systems actuated by Black proximate actuation sequence by unit and train.	out Sequencer. Items a	are ordered in					
Train A Blackout Sequencer							
a. Starts: CCP 1 (CB-06) RECIRC PMP 5 (CB-04)							
b. Switches Control Room Ventilation to Emergency Recircu	ulation						
c. Starts: BATT RM A EXH FN 7 (CV-01) BATT RM A EXH FN 8 (CV-01) BATT RM C EXH FN 11 (CV-01)							
d. Closes: <u>u</u> -HS-2484, CST DISCH VLV (CB-09) <u>u</u> -HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV (CB-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV (CB-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2400, SG 4 BLDN ISOL VLV (CB-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2401A, SG 1 DRUM ISOL VLV (CV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2401B, SG 1 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV (LV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2402B, SG 2 DRUM ISOL VLV (LV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2402B, SG 3 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV (LV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2403A, SG 3 DRUM ISOL VLV (LV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2403B, SG 3 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV (LV-08) <u>u</u> -HS-2404B, SG 4 DRUM ISOL VLV (LV-08)							
IOTE: SG 1-4 DRUM and BLDN SMPL VLV may be closed usin (CB-08) and verified using the associated (ZL) lights on C		IPL ISOL VLV					

mmer	nts / Re	ference: SI and BO Sequencer Study C	Guide	Revision: 6-10-
SI and	Blackou	t Sequencers		
Attac	hment 3	Equipment Affected by the Blackout Seque	encer Step Time Outp	ut Relays
Step	Relay	* Bus Under voltage relays would have previously tripped open the breaker **- Loss of voltage to the 480 V AC bus will have resulted in a loss of the stepped down 120 V AC control power energizing the motor contactor. With the motor contactor de-energized, the seal-in circuit for the contactor is broken and a new start signal must be received to restart the equipment. Electrical drawing for Unit 2 would be E2 unless otherwise noted, and for common equipment which will be E1.	Type of Relay- *** Reset at Step 11 (Type 1) ****Reset when BOS is Reset (Type 2)	Time- seconds
1	K035	CCP-01(02)- starts * E1-0031 sht. 53 (55)	Self-resetting***	0.0
1	K035	Chilled Water Recirc Pump 1-05 (1-06) - starts ** E1-0054 sht. 20 (21)	Self-resetting***	0.0
1	K037	HX-5877A(B), HX-5877A1(B1), HX- 5877A4(B4) These relays place their Train's Control Room Ventilation Equipment in Emergency Recirculation Mode. Either Units BOS will place CR Vent. in Emergency Recirc Mode. E1-0035 sht. 76 (77)	Operator reset****	0.0

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6-10-2011

Comments / Reference: SI and BO Sequencer Study Guide Revision: 6-10-2011 SI and Blackout Sequencers Attachment 2 Equipment Affected by Blackout Sequencer Operator Lockout Relays Equipment Affected by the BOS Operator Lockout Relay -Relay On a Unit's OL, this equipment is just prevented from being started by an Operator using a control switch, unless otherwise noted *- Bus Under voltage relays would have previously tripped open the breaker, so a start signal will be needed to reclose the breaker **- Loss of voltage to the 480 V AC bus will have resulted in a loss of the stepped down 120 V AC control power energizing the motor contactor. With the motor contactor de-energized, the seal-in circuit for the contactor is broken and a new start signal must be received to restart the equipment. On equipment powered from a common bus (XEB bus) power may not be lost and the equipment may not have stopped. Equipment actuated by a Train B sequencer relay is shown in "()" K091 HX-5878A1, HX-5878A2 - these CR HVAC relays are de-energized when the sequencer relay K091 A (B) energizes, and the HVAC relays N.O. contacts open to stop Emergency Ventilation mode if it was in progress. E1-0035 sht. 74 (75). Specifically, CR Makeup Supply Fan 37-stops, unless the switch is held in the start position. E1-0035 sht. 6 (8) CR Exhaust Fan 01-stops, unless the switch is held in the start position. E1-0035 sht. 25 (26). X-HV-5826 (5289), the damper won't open in automatic if the fan is running. The damper should close because the fan is not running (the damper would open if its control switch was held in the open position). E1-0035 sht. 3 (10) Kitchen and Toilet Exhaust Fan 03 (04)- stops. E1-0035 sht. 27 (28) - these relays basically prevent Emergency Ventilation while the OL is in. (Emergency Ventilation mode is stopped until the OL clears) Chilled Water Recirc Pump 05 (6)- ** E1-0054 sht. 20 (21). See E2-0054 sht. K093 20 (21) for Unit 2. PRZR Heater Group A (D) * E1-0033 sht. 35 (39). See E2-0033 sht. 35 (39) for K093 Unit 2. K093 PRZR Heater Group C (B)* E1-0033 sht. 33 (37). See E2-0033 sht. 33 (37) for Unit 2. K093 P.D. Pump * E1-0033 sht. 13. See E2-0033 sht. 13 for Unit 2.

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6-10-2011

Comments / Reference: CVCS Study Guide	Revision: 00-0000
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OP51.SYS.CS1

SYSTEM RESPONSE TO A BLACKOUT SIGNAL

If either train's safeguards bus deenergizes, bus undervoltage signals are sent to that train's blackout sequencer. When the bus is reenergized, either automatically or manually, the affected blackout sequencer functions to automatically start designated loads. These sequencers, one for Train A and one for Train B, are intended to ensure vital loads automatically restart in a manner that will not overload an emergency diesel generator. The designated loads include the centrifugal charging pumps, component cooling water pumps, station service water pumps and the instrument air compressors.

A loss of offsite power when operating at power will result in a reactor trip and the loss of all 6.9kv and 480v buses. Most loads will be shed from the buses by breaker undervoltage trips. The safeguards buses will reenergize almost immediately from the emergency diesel generators. Vital station loads will begin to sequence onto the buses over approximately the next 90 seconds. The system response related to the chemical and volume control system is that both centrifugal charging pumps will start and cooling flow will be reestablished to the system heat exchangers.

If, instead, a single safeguards bus loses and then immediately regains power, only that train of equipment will be affected. For example, assume the Train A CCP is in operation at power. Breaker <u>uEA2-1</u>, the normal feeder breaker for the Train B 6.9kv Safeguards Bus, trips spuriously. As a result, bus <u>uEA2</u> slow transfers to alternate power. The Train B Blackout Sequencer actuates because the bus deenergized and then reenergized. All equipment actuated by the Train B Blackout Sequencer starts, even if it was not previously running. In the chemical and volume control system, the Train B CCP starts. Following the sequencer actuation, one of the CCPs can be shutdown to return to the previous configuration of one CCP in operation.

When operating in a solid plant configuration, a reactor coolant system pressure excursion can be experienced if the safeguards bus which is powering the running CCP and RHR pump deenergizes and then reenergizes. The pressure excursion can occur because the blackout sequencer restarts the CCP but does not provide a start signal to the RHR pump. As described earlier, the loss of the RHR pump during solid plant operations can cause a pressure excursion because charging continues after letdown flow is lost.

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CPNPP UNIT 1 AND 2 PROCEDURE NO. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 PROCEDURE NO. ABN-601 RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 16 PAGE 5 OF 256 2.1 b. Plant Indications XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER Possible loss of Unit 1 safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses • Slow transfer of Unit 2 safeguard buses to their alternate supply XST2/IST/XST2A/345 KV FEEDER • XST2 QR XST2A low side breakers OPEN • • 1ST low side breakers OPEN • Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses • Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2ST • 2ST low side breakers OPEN • Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER • Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV F	nment	Revision: 16		
 2.1 b. Plant Indications XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER Possible loss of Unit 1 safeguard buses Slow transfer of Unit 2 safeguard buses to their alternate supply XST2/IST/XST2A/345 KV FEEDER XST2 OR XST2A low side breakers OPEN 1ST low side breakers OPEN Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2ST visual distribution of the safeguard buses 2ST visual distribution of the safeguard buses Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 	ABNO			
 XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER Possible loss of Unit 1 safeguard buses Slow transfer of Unit 2 safeguard buses to their alternate supply XST2/IST/XST2A/345 KV FEEDER XST2 OR XST2A low side breakers OPEN 1ST low side breakers OPEN Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 221 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 	RESPON	ISE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 16	PAGE 5 OF 256
 Possible loss of Unit 1 safeguard buses Slow transfer of Unit 2 safeguard buses to their alternate supply XST2/IST/XST2A/345 KV FEEDER XST2 <u>OR</u> XST2A low side breakers OPEN 1ST low side breakers OPEN Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 21 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 	2.1 b	. Plant Indications		
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 XST2/1ST/XST2A/345 KV FEEDER XST2 OR XST2A low side breakers OPEN 1ST low side breakers OPEN Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		Possible loss of Unit 1 safeguard buses		
 XST2 <u>OR</u> XST2A low side breakers OPEN 1ST low side breakers OPEN Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps <u>2ST</u> 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		Slow transfer of Unit 2 safeguard buses to the	ir alternate supply	
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 Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to their alternate supply Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		XST2 OR XST2A low side breakers OPEN		
 Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps <u>2ST</u> 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 Automatic Actions <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		1ST low side breakers OPEN		
 Possible loss of Unit 2 safeguard buses Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps <u>2ST</u> 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		 Slow transfer of Unit 1 safeguard buses to the 	ir alternate supply	
 Possible start of Diesel Fire Pumps <u>2ST</u> 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		Possible loss of Unit 1 non-safeguard buses		
 2ST 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 				
 2ST low side breakers OPEN Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 				
 Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 				
 2.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> <u>XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER</u> High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		 2ST low side breakers OPEN 		
 XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		Possible loss of Unit 2 non-safeguard buses		
 High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLOSED due to fault MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 	2.2 <u>A</u>	utomatic Actions		
 MOAS 8085 (DXST1) OR MOAS 8095 (DXST1A) opens due to fault 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		XST1/XST1A/138 KV FEEDER		
 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 2EA2-1 OPEN 		High speed ground switch 8083 (GXST1) CLC	OSED due to fault	
		lt		
 138 KV switchyard breakers 7030 and 7040 OPEN 		 6.9 KV breakers 1EA1-2, 1EA2-2, 2EA1-1 and 	d 2EA2-1 OPEN	
		 138 KV switchyard breakers 7030 and 7040 C 	PEN	
		Section 2.1		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	00	7.K5.	02
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.1		

Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR

Question # 5

Given the following conditions:

- After being used to draw a vacuum in the RCS, the PRT has been isolated from the PRZR
- RCS pressure is 5 psia
- RCS and PRZR temperatures are equalized at 130°F
- Actual PRZR level is 50%

Which of the following describes the PREFERRED method of establishing a steam bubble in the PRZR in accordance with SOP-101A, Reactor Coolant System?

Adjust Charging and Letdown to __(1)__.

Energize PRZR heaters to heat up the PRZR, establishing a steam bubble at approximately ___(2)__ in the PRZR.

- A. (1) raise PRZR level to 100%(2) 212°F
- B. (1) raise PRZR level to 100%(2) 162°F
- C. (1) maintain PRZR level constant(2) 212°F
- D. (1) maintain PRZR level constant(2) 162°F

Answer:

D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the method used to establish a bubble in the pressurizer.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since this is similar to an alternate method of establishing a bubble while solid. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since 212°F is saturation temperature for normal atmospheric pressure.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. Per SOP-101, during vacuum fill of the RCS a bubble in the PRZR is established while the RCS is at a vacuum. Charging and Letdown are adjusted as needed to maintain level and pressure constant in preparation for establishing a bubble. Second part is correct. The bubble is formed at 162°F which is saturation for the 5 psia condition established.

Technical Reference(s)	SOP-101	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Steam Tables	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>Steam Tables</u>


Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the steps required to fill the RCS and establish a pressurizer bubble in accordance with SOP-101A, Reactor Coolant System. (IPO.001.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23551	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	· ·	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: SOP-101A Revision: 18							
SYSTEM OPERA	CPNPP TING PRO	CEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-101A			
REACTOR	REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM			PAGE 39 OF 86			
<mark>5.5.2</mark>		2, PRZR LVL COLD C/ he level increase can b	AL approaches 50%, PERF be stopped.	ORM the following			
	THE	e RWST is being used <u>N</u> NSFER charging pump					
	1)	OPEN the VCT to cha	arging pump suction valves:	:			
			T TO CHRG PMP SUCT V				
				harging pump suction high point vent valves:			
		• 1-ZL-8220, CHAR	GING PMP SUCT HI POIN	T VENT VLV			
		• 1-ZL-8221, CHAR	GING PMP SUCT HI POIN	T VENT VLV			
	3)		charging pump suction val				
			VST TO CHRG PMP SUCT				
			ON HX OUT PRESS CTRL				
			ecessary to maintain Press v to each RCP between 6 <u>/</u>				

Comments / Reference: SOP-101A Revision: 18 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO. SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 SOP-101A **REVISION NO. 18** REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PAGE 42 OF 86 CONTINUOUS USE 5.5.11 DRAW a Pressurizer bubble by performing the following steps: Α. ENSURE Pressurizer spray valve controllers are in MANUAL AND at 0% demand. I-PK-455B, RC LOOP 1 PRZR SPR VLV CTRL 1-PK-455C, RC LOOP 4 PRZR SPR VLV CTRL Β. VERIFY 1/1-8145, RCS AUX SPR VLV is CLOSED. П C. ADJUST charging as necessary to MAINTAIN Przr level at 50%. (Actual Level) П D. ENSURE OPT-407 is being performed (TS SR 3.4.3.C). REMOVE Standard Clearance #00797 AND ENSURE the following E. breakers are RACKED IN to CONNECT: П 1PCPR, PRZR 1-01 HEATER BACKUP GROUP C ISOLATION XFMR 1-07 FEEDER BREAKER П 1PCPR1, PRZR 1-01 HEATER BACKUP GROUP A ISOLATION XFMR 1-05 FEEDER BREAKER 1PCPR2, PRESSURIZER 1-01 HTR GROUP B ISOL TRANSFORMER 1-06 FEEDER BREAKER 1PCPR3, PRESSURIZER 1-01 HTR GROUP D ISOL TRANSFORMER 1-08 FEEDER BREAKER

	erence: SOP-101A		Revision: 18			
STEM OPERA	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-101A					
REACTO	R COOLANT SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 18	PAGE 43 OF 86			
		CONTINUOUS USE				
CAUTION:	The pressurizer heatup rate is lim temperature differential of 320°F <u>AND</u> the Pressurizer liquid tempe	should NOT be exceeded be				
	ressurizer heatup should be condu ermitting step wise temperature inc		nge vice			
• A th	s RCS pressure increases, Pressu e S/G tubes. Experience has show	rizer level may decrease if a wn this decrease to be <5%.	ny voids remain in			
5.5.11	F. TURN Pressurizer heaters ≤100°F in one hour.	ON, as required, to initiate a	Pressurizer heatup			
	• 1/1-PCPR1, PRZR BA	CKUP HTR GROUP A				
	• 1/1-PCPR2, PRZR BA	CKUP HTR GROUP B				
	G. VERIFY 1-TI-453, PRZR LI present RCS pressure. (Sa	Q TEMP is at saturation tem turation temperature for 5 ps	perature for sia is ~162°F)			
5.5.12	WHEN RCS pressure is > 100 ps on 1-LI-462, PRZR LVL COLD C/ THEN	ig <u>AND</u> Pressurizer level is a AL,	> 35% as indicated			
_	PERFORM the following:					
	A. NOTIFY the OCC that "Loo	ps Not Filled" may be exited				
	B. OPEN the RCP Seal Water					
	□ • 1/1-8112, RCP SEAL \					
I/1-8100, RCP SEAL WTR RET ISOL VLV						
	 1/1-8141A, RCP 1 SEAL 1/1-8141B, RCP 2 SEAL 					
 1/1-8141C, RCP 3 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV 1/1-8141D, RCP 4 SEAL 1 LKOFF VLV 						
	 OPEN 1/1-81410, RCP 4 SEAL OPEN 1/1-8142, RCP SEAL 					
			SEAL 1 BYP VLV			
D. After approximately 5 minutes, CLOSE 1/1-8142, RCP SEAL 1 BYP VLV.						



C	Comments / Reference: SOP-101						Revision: 18	
	SYSTE				CEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-101A	
		BEACTO			T SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 18	PAGE 51 OF 86	
		REACTO		OLAN	I STSTEM	CONTINUOUS USE	FAGE 51 OF 66	
	<mark>5.6</mark>	Taking	the Pr	<mark>essuri</mark>	<mark>zer Solid prior to Estab</mark>	lishing a Bubble		
		RCPs /	<u>AND</u> e	stablis		e Pressurizer to a solid con <u>OT</u> the preferred method for med.		
		5.6.1			2, PRZR LVL COLD C/ he level increase can b	AL approaches 100%, PEF be STOPPED.	RFORM the following	
	A. <u>IF</u> the RWST is being used to fill the RCS, <u>THEN</u> TRANSFER charging pump suction to VCT.							
	1) OPEN the VC				OPEN the VCT to cha	VCT to charging pump suction valves:		
					• 1/1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV			
	• 1/1-LCV-1120			• 1/1-LCV-112C,	VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV			
	2) VERIFY the charging			VERIFY the charging	pump suction high point ve	ent valves are OPEN:		
					• 1-ZL-8220, CHAR	GING PMP SUCT HI POIN	IT VENT VLV	
					• 1-ZL-8221, CHAR	GING PMP SUCT HI POIN	IT VENT VLV	
				3)	CLOSE the RWST to	charging pump suction va	ves:	
	• 1/1-LCV-112D, RWST TC				• 1/1-LCV-112D, F	RWST TO CHRG PMP SU	CT VLV	
	• 1/1-LCV-				• 1/1-LCV-112E, F	, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV		
	B. Slowly OPEN 1-PK-131 L from RHR.				TDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to establish letdown			
	C. ADJUST charging flow as necessary to main AND RCP seal injection flow to each RCP be							
		5.6.2		ITINUE COLD		r level to 100% as indicated	on 1-LI-462, PRZR	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	008.A2.03		03
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.0		

Component Cooling Water: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low CCW temperature

Question # 6

Given the following conditions:

- Reactor power = 100%
- 1-ALB-1, 1.7, SSW TRN A/B HDR PRESS LO, alarms
- ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction, is entered for the low SSW header pressure condition
- CCW 1-01 HX outlet temperature is slowly rising

In accordance with ABN-501, when CCW HX Outlet Temperature FIRST reaches __(1)__, CCW Pump 1-01 is placed in PULL-OUT.

A subsequent trip of SSW Pump 1-02 would require __(2)__.

- A. (1) 122°F(2) a Reactor Trip ONLY
- B. (1) 122°F

(2) a Reactor Trip and Trip of ALL RCPs

C. (1) 140°F (2) a Reactor Trip ONLY

В

D. (1) 140°F(2) a Reactor Trip and Trip of ALL RCPs

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the CCW temperature limits and the actions to be taken in the event the limits are exceeded.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since CCW Pump 1-02 remains running supplying the RCPs but with no SSW flow on the same train the plant is required to be tripped and the RCPs secured.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. If CCW HX 1-01 outlet temperature reaches 122°F during these conditions, CCW pump 1-01 is to be stopped. Second part is correct. If both CCW pump 1-01 and SSW pump 1-02, opposite trains, are not operating, cooling is lost to CCW loads and the Reactor and RCPs are to be tripped.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible, because 140°F is from the design of the system (to lower RCS temperature from 350°F to 140°F in 24 hours). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0011A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-501	Comments / Reference
	ABN-502	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the response to Station Service Water Header Pressure Low in accordance with ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction. (ABN.501.OB102)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

mments / Reference: ALM-0011A		Revision: 10		
CPNPP ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ALM-0011A		
ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-1	REVISION NO. 10	PAGE 20 OF 143		
ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: SSW TRN A/B HDR F	PRESS LO	1.7		
PROBABLE CAUSES:				
Operating SSW pump malfunction 10" Safeguard loop out of service System startup				
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:				
The standby SSW pump <u>AND</u> associated CCW pump	starts.			
OPERATOR ACTIONS:				
 DETERMINE affected SSW pump: 1-HS-4250A, SSWP 1 A. <u>IF</u> an SSW pump tripped, <u>THEN</u> REFER to ABN-501 for Station Service Water B. <u>IF</u> Train A/B header pressure is low, <u>THEN</u> REFER to ABN-501 for Station Service Water 		2		
 <u>WITH</u> an SSW pump in service, <u>THEN</u> VENT the 10 inch safeguard header per SOP-501 condition. 	IA for Filling <u>AND</u> Venting	to clear alarm		
3. CORRECT the condition <u>OR</u> INITIATE a CR per S	STA-421, as applicable.	I		

Comments / Re	omments / Reference: ABN-501					0	
ABNORMAL	CPNPP PROCEDURE NO. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-501						
STATION SER	VICE WATER SYSTEM MALFUNC	PAG	E 9 OF 50				
3.3 Operato	or Actions		•				
ACTION	VEXPECTED RESPONSE	RI	ESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED			
Sh	e CCW Pump on the affected train r ift Manager. However, with this pun Auto Start Signal to it.						
□ 4 Ve □ 4 Ve • • •	rify equipment in the affected ain - <u>NOT</u> REQUIRED FOR PERATION: CCP Diesel Generator CCW Pump SI Pump Containment Spray Pumps	requi C(Di C(SI C(ated, with liesel perf safeguard the DG. ninutes) to	esel Generator <u>CW Pump</u> Pump ontainment Spray Pur load, for approximate ormance. I bus, the SSW pump The time this conditio	mps ely one mir will not be n exists si	nute		

Comments / Reference	Comments / Reference: ABN-501 Revision: 10)	
ABNORMAL CONDI	CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-501					
STATION SERVICE V	VATER SYSTEM MALFUNG	TION	REVISION NO. 10	PAGE	12 OF 50	
3.3 Operator Action	ns					
ACTION/EXPE	CTED RESPONSE	RE	SPONSE NOT OBT/	AINED		
	tus of affected CCW					
System; a. Verify	CCW Pump - RUNNING	a. Pe co	rform ABN-502, if rec ntinue with this proce	quired, <u>THE</u> dure at Step	<u>N</u> p 9.	
NOTE: Step b. is a	a continuous action step.					
perfor verify Outle Train	dically, during the mance of this procedure, CCW Heat Exchanger t Temperature on affected - LESS THAN <u>122°F</u> :		rform the following: (Stop the affected CO (-AND-			
	TI-4530, CCW HX 1 OUT TEMP TI-4534, CCW HX 2 OUT TEMP	2)	Place handswitch in Perform ABN-502, <u>1</u> with this procedure a	THEN contin		
9 Refer to E	PP-201.					
10 Refer to T	S listed in Section 6.1.					
	OPT-215 verification hour, if required.					
□ 12 Initiate a V 606 as rec	Vork Request per STA- juired.					
	END OF S					-

Comments / Reference: ABN-502 Revision: 11						
ABNO	CPNPP PROCEDURE NO. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-502					
COMPONE	COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS REVISION 11 PAGE 4 OF 75					
2.3	2.3 Operator Actions					
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	R	ESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED		
	VERIFY unaffected train CCW Pump - RUNNING Manually START the CCW Pump in the unaffected train. IF the pump fails to start, THEN GO TO Section 6.0 of this procedure.					
NOTE	Opposite train's SSW Pump and CC from the Ultimate Heat Sink.	W Pump D	O NOT provide cooli	ng to CC	CW loads	
	2 VERIFY unaffected train SSW Pump - RUNNING	a. N	n the following: Manually start the SS unaffected train.	W pump	o in the	
		(1 (1 (2 (3	E the SSW pump in the vill not start, <u>THEN</u> perform the fol TRIP the Reactor O GO TO EOP-0.0A/ qualified operators procedure. TRIP <u>ALL</u> RCPs. O TO ABN-501, 1	lowing: B while continu	other e this	
3 VERIFY unaffected train Safety Chiller Recirc Pump - RUNNING Manually START the unaffected Safety Chiller Recirc Pump.						
	Sectio	on 2.3				

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier	2			
		Group	1			
		K/A	010).K5.01		
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.5			
Pressurizer Pressure Control: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables						
Question # 7						
Given the following condition	tions:					
PRZR Pressure inc	dicates 335 psig					
 A malfunction in C' 	VCS causes an insurge	to the PRZR, resulting	in level ri	sing 4%		
 PRZR liquid space 	temperature indicates 4	00°F during the insurg	е			
During the insurge, the Pl	RZR liquid space is subc	cooled by approximatel	y(1)	·		
Any pressure rise during	the insurge into the PRZ	R is limited by(2)				
A. (1) 23°F						
(2) steam condensing into a liquid						
B. (1) 23°F	t					
(2) liquid flashing to steam						
C. (1) 32°F						
(2) steam condensing into a liquid						
D. (1) 32°F (2) liquid fleebing to steep						
(2) liquid flashing to steam						
Answer: C						

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring ability to determine the amount of subcooling in the pressurizer using steam tables.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since this value would be obtained if 335 psig is converted incorrectly to a value of 320 psia which has a saturation temperature of 423°F. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since this is the dynamics that occur on an outsurge and not an insurge.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. 335 psig is equivalent to approximately 350 psia and saturation temperature for this pressure is approximately 432°F. With temperature indication of 400°F, it is subcooled by 32°F. Second part is correct. A pressure rise from an insurge into the Pressurizer is limited by steam condensing into liquid.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	Steam Tables	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Pressurizer Pressure/Level Study Guide	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the instrumentation and controls of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System including the system response in accordance with the CPNPP FSAR and DBD-ME-250, Reactor Coolant System. (SYS.PP1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: Steam Table	es		Revision:
_			
Input Data		Units Imp	erial 🗸
— Steam Pressure		335 psi	g 🗸
	L	Show Advance	ed Option
;) — Ci	Calculate	Clear	
		<u>Clear</u>	
Saturated Steam Temperature	e 431.672	•F	~
Input Data			
			mperial 🗸
_ <mark>Steam Pressure</mark>		350	<mark>osi abs</mark> 🗸
		Show Adva	inced Optio
)			
	Calculate	<u>Clear</u>	
—			
_			
Saturated Steam Temperatur	e 431.7	<mark>54</mark>)	~
Input Data		Units	Imperial N
- Steam Pressure		320	psi abs 🗸
-		Show A	dvanced Optio
_			
-	Calculate		
	Calculate	<u>Clear</u>	
-			
Saturated Steam Temperatur	re 472	.331	
Saturated Steam Temperatur			°F 🗸

Comments / Reference: Pressurizer Pressure/Level Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.PP1

During normal plant operations, the pressurizer is filled with boiling water and steam. The temperature of the boiling (or saturated) water determines the pressure inside the entire RCS. Pressurizer temperature is controlled to regulate RCS pressure by energizing electric heaters in the bottom of the pressurizer to raise pressure, and by spraying the steam space (or steam bubble) in the top of the pressurizer with cooler water to reduce pressure.

Under normal operating conditions, the Pressurizer Pressure Control System will automatically maintain the plant at 2235 psig. Heaters maintain a saturated condition in the pressurizer and spray valves throttle open to hold pressure at the 2235 psig setpoint. Backup banks of heaters energize on decreasing RCS pressure. On increasing pressure, spray valves open automatically to cause partial steam bubble condensation. If pressure continues to increase, pneumatic Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and code safety valves open to relieve steam from the pressurizer and ensure that the integrity of the RCS is not lost due to high pressure conditions.

A constant pressurizer level indicates that a balance exists between the charging flow into the RCS and the letdown flow into the CVCS. During transients, pressurizer level will change because the reactor coolant will expand and contract as the plant temperature changes. The expansion and compression of the steam bubble in the pressurizer limits RCS pressure changes.

On an outsurge, or drop in pressurizer level, the expansion of the steam bubble causes a drop in pressure. As pressure decreases, some of the pressurizer liquid, which is at saturation (boiling) temperature, flashes to steam and limits the pressure drop. Conversely, on an insurge, or increase in pressurizer level, the compression of the steam bubble causes an increase in pressure, which is limited by the condensation of some of the steam.

Average RCS temperature (TAVG) increases from 557°F at 0% reactor power to 585.4°F (589.2°F) at 100% reactor power. Pressurizer level is programmed to change as a function of the TAVG change. This allows the water in the RCS to expand as temperature increases from 0 - 100% power, raising pressurizer level from 25% to 60% without having to drain water from the RCS. In the same manner, pressurizer level is allowed to decrease during power reduction as the RCS water cools without the need to add water to make up for the contraction. The RCS volume is allowed to change as a result of temperature changes, while the mass of the RCS water remains constant. This reduces transient response time and the amount of water required to be processed during normal operations.

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL

PRESSURE CONTROL COMPONENTS

Pressure Measuring Instruments

Pressure is a force exerted by some medium, usually a fluid, over a unit area (e.g. pounds per square inch). Pressurizer pressure instruments measure the difference between pressure in the pressurizer and in the containment building atmosphere. This measurement is referred to as gauge pressure and is expressed as pounds per square inch gauge (psig).

Five pressure detectors measure the pressure in the steam space at the top of the pressurizer. CPNPP uses bourdon tube instruments to provide pressurizer pressure signals. The bourdon tube elastic

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

Page 8 of 40

Rev. 00.0000

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2			
	Group	1			
	K/A	012	2.K6.06		
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.7			
Reactor Protection: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Sensors and detectors					
Question # 8					
Given the following conditions:					
 PRZR level transmitter LT-459 failed high (100%)				
 70 hours later the channel is being tripped 					
 The NCT switch LS/0459 BS-1 is in NORM. 	AL				
When the I&C Technician takes the Master Test C	ard (NMT) switch to C	LOSED f	or LT-459:		
LI-459, PRZR Level Channel I will indicate(1)_					
The TSLB for PRZR LVL HI LB-459 will(2)					
······································					
A. (1) 0%					
(2) remain LIT					
B. (1) 0%					
(2) change from DARK to LIT					
C. (1) 100%					
(2) remain LIT					
D. (1) 100% (2) show as from DADK to LT					
(2) change from DARK to LIT					
Answer: A					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how a failed transmitter will affect the reactor protection system indication.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Per ABN-706, indication will go to 0% as the transmitter is disconnected from the circuitry. Second part is correct. TSLB would light if dark, but TSLB PRZR LVL HI LB-459 was already lit from the failure high >92%.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because TSLB PRZR LVL HI LB-459 would light if dark, but it is already lit from the high failure.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because the indication was at 100% already, but will go to 0% when NMT is closed. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-706	Attached w/ Revision # See
	7300 Process Lesson Plan	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the 7300 Process Control system and **PREDICT** the system response in accordance with DBD-EE-021, Reactor Protection and NSSS Related Control Systems and Westinghouse Drawings 7247D05. (SYS.IC3.OB04)


Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	19173	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

mments / Referen	ce: ABN-706			Revision: 8
	CPNPP			PROCEDURE NO.
ABNORMAL CONE	ITIONS PROCEDURES	MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	ABN-706
	SSURIZER LEVEL	DN	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 10 OF 14
	AT	FACHMENT 3		
		AGE 1 OF 1		
	PRESSURIZ BISTABLE TRIP	<u>ER LEVEL CH/</u> SWITCH IDENT		
PROT SET I, CH 04	150			
	lowing NMT card test swi	tch in CLOSED		
_	CAB-FRAM-CARD	SWITCH	POSITIC	
<u>u</u> -UY/0761S	01-08-73	SW7	CLOSE	
2. ENSURE the T	iollowing NCT card switch	ies in NORM.		
_	CAB-FRAM-CARD	SWITCH	POSITIC	-
LS/0459	01-08-47	BS-1	NORM	
PROT SET II, CH 0	460			
	400 lowing NMT card test swi	tch in CLOSED		
	-			
CARD TAG #		SWITCH	POSITIC	-
<u><u>a</u> 0 1101020</u>		SW7	CLOSE	
2. ENSURE the t	ollowing NCT card switch	Ies In NORM.		
CARD TAG #	CAB-FRAM-CARD		POSITIC	
LJ LS/0460	02-08-47	BS-1	NORM	
	1461			
PROT SET III, CH (lowing NMT card test swi			
CARD TAG #	CAB-FRAM-CARD	SWITCH	POSITIC	
	03-08-73	SW7	CLOSE	D
	ollowing NCT card switch			
CARD TAG #	CAB-FRAM-CARD	<u>SWITCH</u>	POSITIC	
LS/0461	03-08-44	BS-1	NORM	
		ttachment 3		
	A	uacriment 3		1

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

nments / Reference: AB	3N-706		Revision: 8
CPN ABNORMAL CONDITIONS		UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-706
PRESSURIZ		REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 11 OF 14
	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 1 OF 1	· · · · · ·	
ANNU	INCIATOR ALARMS AND TRIP S	STATUS LIGHTS	
PROT SET I, CH 0459			
ALARM	ANN. WINDOW	PANEL	
PRZR 1 OF 3 LVL HI	4.2	ALB-50	;
TRIP STATUS	STATUS INDICATOR	TRIP STATUS	PANEL
PRZR LVL HI LB-459A	(1.1)	TSLB-5)
PROT SET II, CH 0460			
ALARM	ANN. WINDOW	PANEL	
PRZR 1 OF 3 LVL HI	4.2	ALB-50	;
TRIP STATUS	STATUS INDICATOR	TRIP STATUS	PANEL
PRZR LVL HI LB-460A	2.1	TSLB-5	5
PROT SET III, CH 0461			
ALARM	ANN. WINDOW	PANEL	
PRZR 1 OF 3 LVL HI	4.2	ALB-50	2
TRIP STATUS	STATUS INDICATOR	TRIP STATUS	PANEL
PRZR LVL HI LB-461A	3.1	TSLB-5	5
	Attachment 4		



SYSIC3			Page	17 of 105
	LESSON	זסו	-	
NOTES	LESSON	TL	LESSON OUTLINE	
	a.	tes	• NMT card Open/Closed switch is used to t jack and transmitter inputs and connect/dis table outputs to SSPS	
	b.	OP	EN position on the switch	
		1)	Test Jack is not in service and transmitter	is connected
		2)	Bistable card is connected to the SSPS inp	ut relays
		3)	SSPS input relays will be energized if Bist (NAL) is not in a tripped condition	table card
	с.	CL	OSED position on the switch	
		1)	Test Jack is in service and transmitter is de (Indication is failed low unless a test signative via test jack)	
		2)	Bistable card is disconnected from the SSI	PS input relays
		3)	SSPS input relays will be deenergized reg Bistable card (NAL) being in a tripped or condition, unless the NCT switch is closed is discussed later)	non-tripped
	d.	exa sin	ingle NMT switch is used for each channel mple, Loop 455, Pressurizer Pressure Chan gle NMT switch – placing switch in CLOSH following:	nel I, uses a
		1)	Disconnects PT-455 from Protection Cabi input failing to 0 mA, converted to a 0 VD the cabinet	-
		2)	Connects the test jack to the Protection Ca allowing I&C to input a test signal for test troubleshooting	-
		3)	Disconnects PB-455A output from both tr causing the Channel I Input Relay in each associated with Pressurizer High Pressure deenergize, indicating to SSPS that this se exceeded unless the associated NCT switc BYPASS (NCT switch is discussed later)	train of SSPS Rx Trip to tpoint has been
		4)	Disconnects PB-455B output from both tra- causing the Channel I Input Relay in each associated with Pressurizer P-11 to deener to SSPS that this setpoint has been exceed associated NCT switch is in BYPASS (NC discussed later)	train of SSPS gize, indicating ed (unless the

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
		Group	1	
		K/A	013	3.K2.01
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.6	
		· · · · ·		
Engineered Safety Features Actuation	: Knowledge of bus power supplies t	o the following: ESFAS/safeguard	ds equipment	control
Question # 9				
What effect does a loss o	f 2EC1 have on the Eme	rgency Diesel Generat	tors?	
A Train A EDG will n	ot start following a Safet	/ Injection		
	or start following a Salet	y mjecuon.		
B. Train B EDG will n	ot start following a Safety	y Injection.		
C. If Train A EDG is r	unning due to a loss of o	ffsite power, an 86-2 lo	ockout wi	ll actuate,
causing the DG to	•	•		
	unning due to a loss of o	fisite power, an 86-2 ic		ll actuate,
causing the DG to	trip.			
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the power supplies to the controls for the EDGs and the effect of a loss of power.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible as the DG will not start on a bus UV signal, but will start following a safety injection.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible (see A) and it is thought that the 2 in 2EC1 indicates a Train B power supply.
- C. Correct. The loss of 2EC1 will cause a loss of power to the EDG UV start relay and an 86-2 lockout will actuate due to loss of power to the generator outboard bearing high temperature relay and the DG will trip.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible (see C) and if it is thought that the 2 in 2EC1 indicates a Train B power supply.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-603	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Loanning Objective.	ANALYZE the response 603, Loss of Protection of		ent Bus in accordance with ABN- BN.603.OB02)
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	21915	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent)</pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive L	evel: Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Cont	ent: 55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ABN	CPNPP ORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE ABN-603	I
LOSS C	F PROTECTION OR INSTRUMENT BUS	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 16 OF	34
3.0 <u>LO</u>	SS OF INSTRUMENT BUS			
3.1 <u>Sy</u>	mptoms			
a.	The affected inverter trouble alarm:			
b.	 118V INV IVuEC1 TRBL (10B-1.15) 118V INV IVuEC2 TRBL (10B-2.15) 118V INV IVuEC3 TRBL (10B-2.18) 118V INV IVuEC4 TRBL (10B-3.18) 118V INV IVuEC1/3 TRBL (10B-1.18) 118V INV IVuEC2/4 TRBL (10B-4.18) The associated bus instruments alarming or faili uEC1 from IVuEC1 uEC2 from IVuEC2 uEC5 from IVuEC3 uEC6 from IVuEC4 	IVs close due to loss	of water	1
	cause overheating of the containment penetration contain actions should this occur.			
C.	(Unit 2 only) A feed isolation will occur, FWIVs	close (loss of 2EC1	or 2EC2).	→
d.	A DG 86-2 lockout relay (loss of <u>u</u> EC1 or <u>u</u> EC2) power. The DG will not emergency start due to loss of p The diesel generators can be manually started in	ower to its emergen	cy start relay.	P
e.	If diesel running due to a loss of offsite power, a normal trips and stop the diesel due to a DG 86-		C2 will restore	
f.	Thermal barrier return isolation (u-HV-4696) close	ses (loss of <u>u</u> EC1)		
g.	During the period <u>u</u> EC1 or <u>u</u> EC2 is powered from Sequencer is inoperable per TS 3.8.1	m bypass power, the	Black Out	
3.2 <u>Au</u>	tomatic Actions			
No	ne			
	Section 3.0			
	0000010.0			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	2	
	Group	1	
	K/A	022.	A4.05
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating	3.8	
		- () (
Containment Cooling: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the con humidity system	troi room: Containment readings	or temperature,	pressure, and
Question # 10			
(1) When determining if Adverse Containment Cor	nditions exist, which of	the follow	ing
Containment Pressure indications on the Cont	rol Board are to be use	ed?	0
(2) When determining Containment Temperature 1	for TS 3.6.5. Containm	ent Air Ter	mperature.
the meter reading used on the Control Board is			nporataro,
	0 the(2) 01.		
	יר		
• TE-5400, CNTMT TEMP DOME EL 1001'-	9		
• TE-5401, CNTMT TEMP EL 1001'-2 1/2"			
 TE-5403, CNTMT TEMP EL 905'-9" 			
 TE-5404, CNTMT TEMP EL 863'-6" 			
A. (1) Intermediate Range (PT-934, 935, 936	and 937)		
(2) average	,		
B. (1) Narrow Range (PT-5470A and 5470B)			
(2) average			
(2) average			
C (1) Intermediate Dance (DT 024 025 020			
C. (1) Intermediate Range (PT-934, 935, 936	and 937)		
(2) highest			
D. (1) Narrow Range (PT-5470A and 5470B)			
(2) highest			
Answer: A			

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the indications of containment temperature and pressure on the control board.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Intermediate range channels are used for determining adverse containment conditions as narrow range indications have a maximum value of 2.5 psig. Second part is correct. Containment temperature indicator is TI-5400A, CNTMT AVE TEMP, using average temperature.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since narrow range are typically read to ensure compliance with TS limits on pressure. Second part is correct (see A).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible as a high failure of any of the four containment temperature inputs will result in a high Containment temperature alarm.
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see C).

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0031A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ODA-407	Comments / Reference
	Containment Systems Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the components of the Containment system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops as described in DBD-ME-008 Containment Analysis. (SYS.CY1.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	21668	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundan Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

omments / Reference: Bar	nk 21668	Revision:
Which range of containmen protection scheme?	t pressure transmitters are used as inputs to the	e ESF
A. wide range (F	PT-938 and 939) ONLY	
B. narrow range	(PT-5470A and 5470B) ONLY	
C. intermediate	range (PT-934, 935, 936 and 937) ONLY	
D. both narrow r 939)	ange (PT-5470A and 5470B) AND wide range (PT-938,
Answer: C		
Answer Explanatio	n	
A. Incorrect - Plausi	ble as these are containment pressure channels SF protection system	s but they
	ble as these are containment pressure channels SF protection system	s but they
C. Correct - 7247D0	05 sheet 8	
	ible as these are containment pressure channel SF protection system	Is but they
Question 6 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	2	
Difficulty:	2.00	
System ID:	21668	
Jser-Defined ID:	ILOT	
Cross Reference		
Number:		
Topic:	Which range of containment pressure tran are used as inputs to the ESF protection	
K/A:	013.A3.01	conomo:
	7247D05	
Question Reference:	1/24/000	1
Question Reference: SRO:	1241005	
Question Reference: SRO: Comments:	R/S18E06	

Comments / Reference: ALM-0031A			Revision: 8	
CPNPP ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1		CEDURE NO. M-0031A	
ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-3A	REVISION NO. 8	PAG	E 7 OF 113	
ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: CNTMT TEMP HI			1.1	
PROBABLE CAUSE:				
Steamline break inside Containment Feedline break inside Containment Reactor coolant leakage Inadequate Containment cooling				
NOTE: 1-TE-5400, 5401, 5402 AND 5403 are averaged to CNTMT AVE TEMP. A single instrument malfunction	provide indication on on will invalidate these	1-TI-540 e indicatio	DA, ons.	
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None				
NOTE: 1-HV-6082, 1-HV-6083 AND 1-HV-6084 close on Pl	nase A Isolation.			
OPERATOR ACTIONS:				
 MONITOR Containment Pressure. 1-PI-934, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN IV 1-PI-935, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN II A. <u>IF</u> all channels are approximately 3 psig <u>AND</u> in <u>THEN</u> GO to EOP-0.0A. B. <u>IF</u> either narrow range channel is >1 psig, <u>THEN</u> REFER to TS 3.6.4. 	1-PI-5470A, CNTMT 1-PI-5470B, CNTMT	PRESS	(NR)	
2. DETERMINE affected temperature instrument from t	he Plant Computer.			
NOTE: Due to instrument inaccuracies, containment average be 10°F higher than indicated on the main control be determine if temperature is within Technical Specifie	bard. This value may			
3. MONITOR 1-TI-5400A, CNTMT AVE TEMP.				
		CONTI	NUED	
				-

Comments / Reference: ODA-407				17			
CPNPP		DBO	CEDURE NO.				
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL			DDA-407				
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE	REVISION NO. 17	PAG	E 39 OF 63				
ATTACHMENT	INFORMATION USE 8.A						
PAGE 21 OF 2							
ERG RULES OF U 10. (Adverse Containment parameters determine when a		tins to aff	ect				
instrumentation located inside containment. The fol ADVERSE CONTAINMENT values should be used	lowing indications identi						
 Containment pressure - Greater than 5 psig, or 							
 Containment radiation - Greater than 10⁵ R/hr, or 							
 Integrated containment radiation dose - Greater t Staff. 	han 10⁵ RADS (to be de	termined	by Plant				
ERGs are implemented using the ADVERSE CONT parameter values. If containment pressure decreas exceeded, the normal parameter values should be used	If either containment pressure exceeds 5 psig <u>or</u> containment radiation exceeds 10 ⁵ R/hr, the ERGs are implemented using the ADVERSE CONTAINMENT (post-accident) process parameter values. If containment pressure decreases below 5 psig after it has been exceeded, the normal parameter values should be used. Once the radiation has exceeded 10 ⁵ R/hr, the ADVERSE CONTAINMENT values are used until the integrated radiation dose						
already exists, the SRO may evaluate the step to de example, the ERG step to "Reset Containment Isola	11. When the ERG procedure instructs a step to be performed where the desired condition already exists, the SRO may evaluate the step to determine if it needs to be performed. For example, the ERG step to "Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B" groups both Phase A and Phase B together for convenience. If Phase B has <u>NOT</u> initiated, then reset is not required, however it may be reset if desired.						
12. ERGs direct the operating staff to "Start", "Stop", an without specifically identifying those actions be take When the words "per SOP" are omitted, the intent is the control room using operator training and knowle should be used either before or after the action is ta ensure all aspects of proper system operation are c actions should be taken by the operator before the or SOP can be accomplished. An "emergency start" or example of a procedure step requiring specific oper knowledge.							
EXAMPLE - An emergency start of a Centrifugal Ch as a start of the pump without first starting the Aux I designated in ERGs by directing the start of the CC The emergency start authorization only permits a pu	ube Oil Pump. This em P without a "per SOP-10	ergency 3A/B" ref	start is				

mm		
	ents / Reference: Containment Systems Study Guide	Revision: 5-2-2011
Con	tainment Systems	
The	sensors will be automatically recalibrated using known calibration gases 2% and 6 calibration cycle can be automatically initiated at regular intervals by the micropro manual initiation is also possible.	
Con	brogen Mixing All subcompartments are provided with vents to provide hydrogen nection paths through these compartments maintain the subcompartments at the sar centration as the rest of the containment. Containment spray (if used) also promote	ne hydrogen
INS	TRUMENTATION & CONTROL	
PRE	SSURE	
Thre	ee different ranges of containment pressure indicate on the MCB.	
• (Narrow range (2 channels) CNTMT PRESS (NR); PI 5470A (5470B)	
Dig	ital readouts on CB-03 Range -2.5 psig to 2.5 psig	
-	m) (CNTMT NR PRESS HI/LO, window 4.6 on ALB-3A, has a setpoint High of a setpoint Low of 0 - 0.2263 psig.)	1.2263 psig
•	and provides indication only. Intermediate range (4 channels), CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I (II, III, IV); PI-937 on CB-03, provides indication, alarms, and protection.	(936,935,934)
Indi	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig	af≥3.2 nsig on
Indi Alar		of >3.2 psig on
Indi Alar 1/3 (CN)	cation (Scale) -5 to 60 psig ms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of	g on 1/3)
Indi Alar 1/3 CNI char CNI	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig rms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4
Indi Alar 1/3 CNI char CNI char	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig ms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.) 2 psig on 1/4 annels.
Indi Alar 1/3 CN CN CN CN CN	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig rms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3
Indi Alar 1/3 (CNI char CNI char CNI char CNI char	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig rms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.1 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch IMT PRESS HI SI ACT, "First Out" annunciator on ALB-6C, has a setpoint > 3.2 p mels and uses channels II, III, IV. Actuates Reactor Trip, SI, and Phase A Isolation	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3 L
Indi Alan 1/3 CNI char CNI char CNI char CNI char	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig rms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.1 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch IMT PRESS HI SI ACT, "First Out" annunciator on ALB-6C, has a setpoint > 3.2	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3 L ig on 2/4
Indi Alar 1/3 CNT char CNT char CNT char gene	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig ms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch IMT PRESS HI SI ACT, "First Out" annunciator on ALB-6C, has a setpoint > 3.2 mels and uses channels II, III, IV. Actuates Reactor Trip, SI, and Phase A Isolation IMT ISOL PHASE B ACT, red window 4.11 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 18.2 psi mels and alarms on manual actuation as well as automatic initiation. Uses all four	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3 L ig on 2/4
Indi Alaa 1/3 CNI char CNI char CNI char CNI char gene Mar	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig ms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch IMT PRESS HI SI ACT, "First Out" annunciator on ALB-6C, has a setpoint > 3.2 mels and uses channels II, III, IV. Actuates Reactor Trip, SI, and Phase A Isolation IMT ISOL PHASE B ACT, red window 4.11 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 18.2 psi mels and alarms on manual actuation as well as automatic initiation. Uses all four ch erates CS Actuation and Phase B Isolation.	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3 L ig on 2/4
Indi Alaa 1/3 CNI char CNI char CNI char CNI char gene Mar	cation Scale -5 to 60 psig ms: CNTMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 1, yellow window 1.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of channels: HI 1 (2/3) generates SI. Uses channels II, III, IV, (936, 935, 934) IMT PRESS 1 of 3 HI 2, yellow window 2.10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 6.2 psig mels: HI 2 (2/3) generates Main Steam Line Isolation. Uses channels II, III, IV (93 IMT PRESS 1 of 4 HI 3, yellow window 3/10 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint of > 18.2 mels: HI 3 (2/4) generates CS and Phase B Containment Isolation. Uses all four ch IMT PRESS HI SI ACT, "First Out" annunciator on ALB-6C, has a setpoint > 3.2 mels and uses channels II, III, IV. Actuates Reactor Trip, SI, and Phase A Isolation IMT ISOL PHASE B ACT, red window 4.11 on ALB-2B, has a setpoint > 18.2 psi mels and alarms on manual actuation as well as automatic initiation. Uses all four ch erates CS Actuation and Phase B Isolation.	g on 1/3) 6,935,934.)) 2 psig on 1/4 annels. psig on 2/3 L ig on 2/4

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	026.A1.06		06
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating 2.7			

Containment Spray: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: Containment spray pump cooling

Question # 11

Given the following conditions:

- Both trains of Containment Spray have just actuated on HI-3
- Train B CCW Pump has tripped

Train B Containment Spray Pumps must be stopped due to a loss of cooling to the __(1)__.

Prior to stopping any equipment, Train B Containment Spray Pump room temperatures will ___(2)___.

A. (1) Seal Coolers

(2) be unaffected

- B. (1) Seal Coolers(2) approach design limits
- C. (1) Bearing Coolers (2) be unaffected
- D. (1) Bearing Coolers(2) approach design limits

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the operation of the containment spray pump controls to prevent exceeding design room temperature limits.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since chilled water would be supplied by CCW if a Hi-3 condition had not occurred, which splits the two CCW trains. In this case Train B CT Pump room temperatures would be unaffected.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. CCW supplies cooling to the pump seal coolers. Second part is correct. Upon a loss of CCW, due to the trip of the Train B CCW Pump and the split of the CCW trains, the chilled water system loses cooling and the room temperatures will approach limits due to the pump running.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since bearing coolers require cooling, but they are cooled by SSW, not CCW. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	SOP-204A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-503	Comments / Reference
	ABN-502	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the components of the Containment Spray system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops in accordance with the FSAR and DBD-ME-0232. (SYS.CT1.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

		Revision: 15
CPNPP SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-204A
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 15	PAGE 3 OF 55
	CONTINUOUS USE	
1.0 APPLICABILITY		
This procedure provides instructions for operating the	Containment Spray Syst	em.
2.0 PREREQUISITES		
2.1 Placing the System in Standby		
NOTE: CCW flow to the Containment Spray Pumps and provided system temperature is maintained ≤15 inoperable per TS 3.6.6.	Heat Exchanger is not re 0°F and the affected train	quired is declared
 CCW is available and aligned to the pump seal co 	olers.	
 CCW is available to the heat exchangers. 		
 SSW is available and aligned to the pump bearing 	coolers.	
 Nitrogen is available to the Chemical Additive Tan 	k.	
 The Chemical Additive Tank is available for chemi 	cal addition.	
 Both spray trains have been filled and vented and Risers are above the low level alarm. 	the respective Containm	ent Spray
 The RWST is filled and aligned to the SI header. 		
The following valve lineups are complete:		
 SOP-204A-CT-V01, Train A Valve Lineup 		
 SOP-204A-CT-V02, RWST Valve Lineup 		
 SOP-204A-CT-V03, Chem Add Tank Valve Lir 	neup	
 SOP-204A-CT-V04, Train B Valve Lineup 		
The following control switch lineups are complete:		
 SOP-204A-CT-C01, Train A Control Switch Lir 	neup	
 SOP-204A-CT-C02, Train B Control Switch Lir 	neup	
The following electrical lineups are complete:		
SOP-204A-CT-E01, Train A Electrical Lineup		
 SOP-204A-CT-E02, Train B Electrical Lineup 		

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ments / Reference: /	ABN-503			Revision: 2
	CPNPP NNS PROCEDURES MANU	JAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-503
SAFETY CHILLED WAT	ER SYSTEM MALFUNCT	ION	REVISION NO. 2	PAGE 11 OF 27
3.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPEC	TED RESPONSE	F	ESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
THEN e The tim Temper Contain minutes Steps 1 <u>NOTE</u> : Annunciator	room cooling is lost <u>AND</u> ti equipment room temperatu e to reach Pump Room EC ature Monitoring) varies by ment Spray and MD AFW). (Reference Attachment , 2 and 3 may be performe (<u>u</u> -ALB-4A-1.7) is commo	res will ris tempera y room. M Pump roo 1) ed in para n to Trair	se. ture limits (TS 13.7. lost limiting times ar oms (i.e., less than to lel. A and Train B chille	<mark>36, Area</mark> e for RHR, en (10)
local ver plant con 1 VERIFY Restor	niller status may be identific ification by dispatching a N mputer points Y2281D and ation of a Safety Chilled xpected within 1 hour.	NEO <u>OŘ</u> I Y2282D Reduce j		
			TS 3.0.3)	I
	Conti	202		
	Sectio	on 3.3		.

ents / Reference: ABN-502			Revision: 11
CPNPP BNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MA	NUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-502
PONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFU	JNCTIONS	REVISION 11	PAGE 6 OF 75
Operator Actions			
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	R	ESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
5 VERIFY required equipment, for existing conditions, supplied by unaffected train - IN OPERATION:	ALIGN	<u>AND</u> START require ary.	d equipment as
Control Room A/C Units			
Containment Spray System			
UPS HVAC Unit			
Excess Letdown			
RHR System			
6 Shutdown equipment on the affected Train as necessary:			
a. To prevent auto operation without necessary support, shutdown the following on the affected train:			
Containment Spray Pumps - PULL OUT			
• RHR Pump - PULL OUT			
"Step contin	nued next pa	ae"	
		30	
Secti	ion 2.3		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	03	9.K4.	05
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating	3.7		

Main and Reheat Steam: Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic isolation of steam line

Question # 12

Given the following conditions:

- A plant cooldown and depressurization is in progress
- RCS pressure is 1925 psig
- The RO has taken both 1/1-PPSIRBA, PRZR PRESS SI RESET / BLOCK, and 1/1-PPSIRBB, PRZR PRESS SI RESET / BLOCK, to the 'Block' position
- The BOP has taken both 1/1-SLSIRBA, MSL ISOL SI RESET / BLOCK, and 1/1-SLSIRBB, MSL ISOL SI RESET / BLOCK, to the 'Block' position

Assuming NO further operator actions, if a large steam break were to subsequently occur outside Containment:

Safety Injection __(1)__ occur.

A Main Steamline Isolation will occur on __(2)__.

- A. (1) will
 - (2) Low Steamline pressure
- B. (1) will
 - (2) Negative Steamline pressure high rate
- C. (1) will NOT(2) Low Steamline pressure

D

D. (1) will NOT(2) Negative Steamline pressure high rate

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the conditions which will cause a main steam line isolation.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Plausible since an SI could occur if the break were inside containment. Second part is incorrect. Plausible since action is taken to block the steamline low pressure isolation, but the blocking enables a negative pressure rate signal to close the MSIVs.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (See A). Second part is correct (See D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (See D). Second part is incorrect (See A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. SI will not occur on low steamline pressure when blocked. Second part is correct. Blocking enables a negative pressure rate signal to close the MSIVs.

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0065A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	IPO-005	Comments / Reference
	Reactor Protection Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems and predict the system response in accordance with DBD-EE-021, Reactor Protection and NSSS Related Control Systems and Westinghouse Drawings 7247D05. (SYS.ES1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23049	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	damental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		


nments / Reference: ALM-0065A		Revision: 4
CPSES ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ALM-0065A
ALARM PROCEDURE 1-PCIP	REVISION NO. 4	PAGE 55 OF 73
ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: MSL PRESS LO TRN A SI E	BLK	3.8
PROBABLE CAUSE		
Manual block of low steam line pressure safety injection duri		
NOTE: This window is normally illuminated in Modes 3-6	when plant cooldown is re	quirea.
Blocks the main steam line low pressure safety injection		
Enables the main steam line high pressure rate steam line iso OPERATOR ACTIONS:	lation	
None		

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		Revision: 27
CPNPP NTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. IPO-005A
PLANT COOLDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN	REVISION NO. 27 CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 77 OF 131
NOTE: If RCP 1 or 4 is stopped, the associated spray with zero demand to prevent bypassing of the		main in MANUAL
 5.2.7 B. OPEN Pressurizer spray valve(s), as ne to reduce RCS pressure: 1-PK-455B, RC LOOP 1 PRZR SPF 1-PK-455C, RC LOOP 4 PRZR SPF C. <u>WHEN</u> RCS pressure is less than 2185 (THEN) VERIFY the following annunciators are C 1-ALB-5B, 1.6, PRZR LO PRESS P 1-ALB-5B, 2.6, PRZR LO PRESS P 	R VLV CTRL R VLV CTRL psig, DN: PORV 456 BLK	/ Initials Date
D. WHEN PRZR PRESS channels approace pressurizer heaters and spray valves to between 1900 psig and 1950 psig UNTIL, Automatic Safety Injection Signal is block	th 1925 psig, ADJUST maintain RCS pressure ked.	Initials Date
CAUTION: Maintain Pressurizer level less than 30% u	ntil SI is blocked.	
 C] 5.2.8 WHEN RCS pressure is below 1960 psig, 22650] THEN b] PERFORM the following to block SI: A. VERIFY Measured RCS Boron Concent boron concentration are at or above the by prerequisite 2.14 A. for blocking SI. 	value required	/ Initials Date
22650] THEN b] PERFORM the following to block SI: A. VERIFY Measured RCS Boron Concent boron concentration are at or above the	value required BLK PERM P-11 is ON.	/ Initials Date / Initials Date
 Description of the second state o	value required BLK PERM P-11 is ON, FF:	/
 THEN PERFORM the following to block SI: A. VERIFY Measured RCS Boron Concent boron concentration are at or above the by prerequisite 2.14 A. for blocking SI. B. VERIFY 1-PCIP, 2.6, PRZR PRESS SI E C. VERIFY the following status lights are O 	value required BLK PERM P-11 is ON FF: ERM PB-455B	/

omments / Reference: IPO-005A		Revision: 27
CPNPP INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL PLANT COOLDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN	UNIT 1 REVISION NO. 27 CONTINUOUS USE	PROCEDURE NO. IPO-005A PAGE 78 OF 131
5.2.8 D. TURN BOTH MSL ISOL SI RESET/BLOC BLOCK AND RELEASE: 1/1-SLSIRBA, MSL ISOL SI RESET/ 1/1-SLSIRBB, MSL ISOL SI RESET/ E. VERIFY the following are ON: 1-PCIP, 3.8, MSL PRESS LO TRN A 1-PCIP, 4.8, MSL PRESS LO TRN B F. TURN BOTH PRZR PRESS SI RESET/BI BLOCK AND	BLOCK BLOCK SI BLK SI BLK	/ Initials Date / Initials Date
RELEASE: Image: 1/1-PPSIRBA, PRZR PRESS SI RES Image: 1/1-PPSIRBB, PRZR PRESS SI RES Image: G. VERIFY the following are ON: Image: 1-PCIP, 3.7, PRZR PRESS LO TRN Image: 1-PCIP, 4.7, PRZR PRESS LO TRN Image: 1-PCIP, 5.2.9 PERFORM the following to raise and maintain to 50%:	SET/BLOCK A SI BLK) B SI BLK)	/ Initials Date / Initials Date
 A. IF necessary, THEN PLACE 1-FK-121, CCP FLO CTRL in MAI AND RAISE charging flow. B. IF necessary, THEN START an additional CCP per SOP-103A Control System. 		/ Initials Date / Initials Date

nments / Reference: Reactor Protection Study Guide	Revision:	5-4-20
Reactor Protection and ESFAS		
NUCLEAR AT POWER PERMISSIVE, P-10		
When 2 out of 4 Power Range Detectors are $> 10\%$ power, P-10 is activat following functions:	ed. P-10 performs the	
Feeds P-7		
 Blocks the Source Range Detectors high voltage and trip 		
Allows blocking of the Intermediate Range Reactor Trip and Rod Stop	p	
Allows blocking of the Power Range High Flux Reactor Trip (Low Se	tpoint)	
When the Source Range detectors are deenergized, a SR HI VOLTS FAIL the condition. Since the Source Range detectors are designed to be de-energistic defeated whenever P-10 is present. Also, the SR HI Flux at Shutdown a Containment Evacuation alarm are defeated when a P-10 signal is present	ergized at power, this alarm annunciator and the	
When 3 out of 4 Power Range detectors are $<$ 10% power, then P-10 clear unblock the Intermediate Range Reactor Trip and Rod stop and the Power Reactor Trip.		
The Source Range detectors will remain blocked until the operator manual Range reactor trip or the Source Range Reactor trip is automatically unblo block of the SR HI Flux at Shutdown annunciator and the Containment Ex in until the SR reactor trip is unblocked.	ocked at \leq P-6 . Also, the	
When P-10 is clear, then P-7 will also clear (the PCIP window, RX &TUI lit), if P-13 is clear, blocking the following trips:	RB 10% PWR P-7 will be	
Pressurizer Low Pressure		
Pressurizer Hi Level		
Reactor Coolant Pump Under Voltage		
Reactor Coolant Pump Under frequency		
Low Flow in 2 Reactor Coolant Loops		
PRESSURIZER SI BLOCK PERMISSIVE, P-11		
P-11 set at <1960 PSIG on 2 out of 3 Pressurizer pressure detectors allow: low Pressurizer Pressure and low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection sig Line Pressure SI signal is blocked it arms the Steam Line Isolation for Nep High Rate (-100 psi with a 50 second time constant). Once pressure has in the alarms for the SI accumulator isolation valves (8808s) and RWST such to the SI pumps not being open are armed.	nals. When the low Steam gative Steam Line Pressure ncreased above 1960 PSIG,	
Page 63 of 94	5-4-2011	



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2	
	Group	1	
	K/A	059	.A4.11
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.1	
Main Feedwater: Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control roor Question # 13 Given the following conditions: • Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a P- • As the crew is working through the ERG ne restored • FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary • All S/G NR levels are ~ 2%	-14 on SG 1-02 stwork all AFW is lost a	ind canno	

During attempts to re-establish a MFW flow path by resetting the FWI, which of the following will be required IF the Reactor trip breakers are unable to be cycled?

A. Reset both trains of SI Sequencer, then reset the FWI signal

B. Pull universal logic card A213 from both trains of SSPS, then replace both cards

- C. Cycle the FWIV hand switches to the closed and open position to allow a FWI reset
- D. Open 1B3-1 and 1B4-1 breakers to remove control power from the reactor trip breakers

Answer: B B	Answer: B					
-------------	-----------	--	--	--	--	--

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the actions required to reset feedwater isolation signal.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible as this is part of step 7 RNO but this by itself will not reset the FWI signal.
- B. Correct. Per FRH-0.1 step 7.b RNO 1.b if the breakers cannot be cycled then if card A213 is pulled on both trains this will allow power to be removed from the circuit and therefor resetting the FWI signal to allow feeding with the feedwater system.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible as FRH-0.1 step 7 does have the operator place FWIV handswitches in auto after closed but this will not reset the FWI.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible as this is performed by FRH-0.1 for restoration of condensate flow but without cycling the trip breakers it will not reset the FWI.

Technical Reference(s)	FRH-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRH-0.1 in accordance with FRH-0.1, Loss of Heat Sink. (ERG.FH1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	24393	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam	nental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or	Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

omments / Reference: FRH-0.1A		Revision: 9
CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	FRH-0.1A
RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 7 OF 85
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED
<u>CAUTION</u> : If offsite power is lost aft be required to restart safes	ter SI reset. manual ac guards equipment.	ction may
7 (Establish Main FW Flow To At) (Least One SG:)		
a. Check Condensate system – IN SERVICE	a. Place Condensate service:	system in
	1) Start Condensa	ate pump.
	<u>IF</u> Condensate sys be placed in ser to Step 11. OBSI <u>AND</u> NOTES PRIOR (vice. <u>THEN</u> go ERVE CAUTION
b. Reset FW Isolation: 1) (Verify SI - NOT ACTUATED)	1) (Perform the fo	
-AND-	(reset FW Isola	ation:
Verify SG levels - HAVE REMAINED BELOW 84% (P-14 SG HI-HI LEVEL SETPOINT)	Perform the fo cycle Reactor breakers:	llowing to Trip
	A) Block SI s: applicable	ignal. if
	 Verify (pressure 3.0 psi) 	Containment e less than g.
	2. <u>IF</u> PRZR than 190 block:	pressure less 50 psig <u>THEN</u>
		teamline 1re SI signal
	• Low PI SI sig	RZR pressure gnal
	3. Reset S	τ.
-CONT 7-		

Comments / Reference: FRH-0.1A		Revision: 9
CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	FRH-0.1A
RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 8 OF 85
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT	C OBTAINED
7 b. 1)	 B) Cycle React breakers cl open. 	
	OR	
	If Reactor Tri can <u>NOT</u> be cyc Containment pr greater than 3 perform the fo pull Universal A213:	led. <u>OR</u> essure) .0 psig. <u>THEN</u>) llowing to) Logic Card)
	A) Reset SI. iB) Pull Univer	
	Card A213 i SSPS Logic	n both trains
	C) Replace Uni (Card A213 i (SSPS Logic	n both trains
 Place FW control and bypass valve controllers in manual and 0% demand. 		
 Place FW isolation valve handswitches in auto after closed position. 		
4) Reset FW Isolation.		
-CONT 7-		

nments	/ Reference: FRH-0.1A			Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1		DCEDURE NO. FRH-0.1A
RESPO	NSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAC	E 57 OF 85
	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 5 OF 33		L	
	BASES			
STEP 7:	Main FW is the next source of high press the operator to re-establish the second Main FW flow to the SGs. the operator w operation to ensure a source of water t Main FW isolation valve status is check occurred, various actions are required reopen the FW isolation valves. Reactor logic card A213 is pulled in order to r has actuated, or when FW isolation has Level) signal. Reactor Trip breaker of reset FW isolation due to the step bein However, if an active SI signal still e Trip breakers, the SI signal will be ac pressure greater than SI activation set with low temperature signal is the FW i Isolation will allow restoration of fee system cannot be placed in service or n opened, the operator is directed to Ste from any available low pressure source. Initial attempts are made to operate th This assumes the steps to reset the FW successful. If the FW Isolation signal will be required to be manipulated loca	ary heat sink. Pro- cerifies condensate to the Main FW pump- ed. If feedwater to reset FW isolation actuated from a P- yoling is the pref- g quicker and east- xists after cycling tivated again. (e.g point). When only solation signal, re- d flow. If either to FW isolation val- p 11 to try to esta- te FW valves from the Isolation signal in could not be reserved.	ior t syst s. T isola ion s e cyc signa 14 (S erred er to g the g C a Re esett the ves c ablis he Con	o restoring em hen the tion has ignals and led. or I when ST O HI HI method to perform. Reactor ontainment actor trip ing FW condensate an be h feed flow ntrol Room. p 7b were
	If the condensate system is operational then Main FW is established by the oper established, the operator is directed t flow.	ator. If Main FW	canno	t be
STEP 8:	Following actions to establish Main FW checks the SG narrow range level indica flow has been established to maintain t range level has been restored to at lea exists and the operator transfers to th level does not exist but feed flow is v by core exit thermocouple indications d increasing), then subsequent steps to e are not required and the operator trans	tions to determine the secondary heat a st one SG, an adequate procedure in effort erified to at least ecreasing or SG with stablish condensate	if a sink. uate ect. t one de ra e sys	dequate If narrow heat sink If this SG (e.g nge level tem flow
	It should be noted that accurate main f available at low flow rates and the SG not be accurate under adverse containme	wide range level in		

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
		Group	1	
		K/A	061.A	\3.03
Level of Difficulty: 4		Importance Rating	3.9	
Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater: Abilit	to monitor automatic operation of the	ne AFW, including: AFW S/G leve	el control on auto	matic start
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				
Question # 14				
Given the following condi	tions:			
 being controlled in The TDAFWP is se An AFW autostart MDAFWP flow control value 	ecured signal is received which lves will(1)		h flow to ea	ach SG
TDAFWP flow control val	ves will(2)			
A. (1) trip to AUTO ar (2) trip to AUTO ar	•			
B. (1) trip to AUTO ar(2) remain in MAN	nd go full open at the current position			
C. (1) trip to AUTO ar (2) trip to AUTO ar	nd throttle to maintain pro nd go full open	ogram SG level		
() 1	nd throttle to maintain pro at the current position	ogram SG level		
Answer: B				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge how an automatic start of the AFW system effects the flow control valves.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct. MDAFWP flow control valves trip to AUTO and go full open. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the MDAFWP valves trip to AUTO and go full open, it might be considered that the TDAFWP valves would respond the same.
- B. Correct. First part is correct (see A). Second part is correct. The TDAFWP valves remain in their current, fully open position on an autostart.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that MDAFWP FCVs tripped to Auto and controlled at program level similar to the MFW FCVs. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	AFW Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the system response in accordance with DBD-ME-206. (SYS.AF1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	

Comment	s / Re	ference: Bank 73907	Revision:
 Both 	h MFW	actor power = 100% / Pumps trip A&B, PV-2454 A&B, MD AFW Flow Control Valves are in MA	NUAL
Which o	of the	following correctly states how the AFW system will respond t	to the event?
MDAFV	N Pum	nps will start and their respective AFW Flow Control V	Valves will
	A.	immediately remain in MANUAL	
	В.	immediately shift to AUTO	
	C.	ONLY after SG levels lower to the appropriate setpoint remain in MANUAL	
	D.	ONLY after SG levels lower to the appropriate setpoint shift to AUTO	
1	Answe	er: B	
Γ	Answ	er Explanation	
-	A. Inc wh wil pla fur B. Cc AF an C. Inc au if i	correct. 1 st part is correct. MD AFW pump will start automation nen both MFW pumps trip. 2 nd part is incorrect because the fill shift to automatic and travel full open upon a start signal. It ausible because when most controls are in MANUAL, automatic ausible full open. correct. 1 st part is incorrect because both MD AFW pumps we tomatically start when both MFW pumps trip. It is plausible to the top and the top and th	FCVs t is atic the MD o AUTO vill because
	D. Inc	correct. 1 st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2 nd part is t plausible (see B).	correct

omments / Reference: Bar	nk 73907	Revision:
Question 188 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	0	
Difficulty:	2.00	
	•	
System ID:	73907	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT7478	
Cross Reference	SYS.AF1.OB05.055	
Number:	313.AF1.0B05.055	
	Unit 1 Reactor power = 100% Both MFW	
Topic:	PV-2453 A&B, PV-2454 A&B, MD AFW F	low Control
	Valv	
K/A:	061 A3.01	
Question Reference:		
SRO:		
Comments:	S/R26E32 (Comp), L27E24	
	Ref; AFW Study Guide	

Comments / Reference: AFW Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.AF1

MDAFWP FLOW CONTROL VALVES

Each MDAFW pump discharge line branches into individual lines feeding its two associated SGs. The individual AFW line to each SG is provided with a normally open, pneumatically operated flow control valve. Manual isolation valves are provided for maintenance and local flow control.

MDAFW pump flow to each SG is controlled by flow control valves, PV-2453A and B for the Train A pump, PV-2454A and B for the Train B pump. The flow control valves fail open on loss of air or electrical power.

Each flow control valve is provided with a safety class air accumulator sized for five full cycles, plus leakage and steady state consumption for 30 minutes. This allows the valve to control AFW flow following a loss of Instrument Air coincident with a plant condition which requires AFW operation, or to isolate a faulted SG when the normal motor operated isolation valves are not available. The manual isolation valves are then used to control the flow in the event the accumulators are exhausted prior to the restoration of Instrument Air.

Manual/Auto (M/A) controllers on the Main Control Board enable the operator to control flow manually from the Control Room. Upon automatic start of the MDAFW pumps, flow control valves PV-2453 A&B and PV-2454 A&B will automatically trip from manual to automatic control and position full open to ensure flow to the SGs. After a 10-second time delay the flow control valves can be manually positioned by the operator to adjust flow to the SGs. M/A controllers for these valves on the RSP enable the operator to control flow from the RSP when the RSP controllers are placed in manual. When in automatic, these controllers allow feed control to be accomplished at the Main Control Board.

A flow restricting orifice is provided downstream of each flow control valve. The orifice is designed to limit the maximum flow to a faulted SG to 700 gpm and prevent a pump runout condition.

MDAFWP ISOLATION VALVES

A check valve is located downstream of each flow control valve. RTDs in thermowells are provided on each discharge line just upstream of the check valve. These RTDs provide input to a dual indication temperature instrument with a range of 0-300°F located on CB-09. These temperature instruments are used to monitor for potential check valve back leakage from the Main Feedwater System and SGs into the AFW System piping.

A normally open, motor operated Containment isolation valve is located downstream of each check valve. Motor operated valves HV-2491A/B, HV-2492A/B, HV-2493A/B and HV-2494A/B are used to isolate AFW flow to the SGs. These valves are operated with two-position (OPEN-CLOSE) switches on the Main Control Board. Each switch simultaneously operates two motor operated valves associated with the same SG. For example, 1-HS-2491 operates both 1-HV-2491A and 1-HV-2491B. The valve from both the MDAFW pump and the valve from the TDAFW Pump operate simultaneously to isolate AFW to one SG.

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

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Rev. 00.0000

Comments / Reference: AFW Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.AF1

Power to the local control panel is supplied from 125 VDC distribution panel <u>u</u>ED1-1. Actuation of Train A Safety Injection deenergizes the power supply to the local TDAFWP turbine control panel, resulting in the loss of all indications powered from the panel or actuated by relays which are powered from the panel. This includes the T&TV valve position and overspeed trip indication lights, the digital turbine speed indication, locally and on the Main Control Board (CB-09), the turbine governor current/pneumatic transducer, the "TDAFWP OVRSPD TRIP" annunciator on ALB-8B, and the remote turbine trip solenoid. The net effect is that the TDAFW pump will start and accelerate to design speed without the capability to monitor turbine speed in the Control Room or to trip the turbine remotely. Until power is restored to the local control panel, the only means of stopping the turbine is by manually actuating the local trip device or by closing the steam supply valves from the main steam lines. Power to the local control panel can be restored by depressing the OPEN pushbutton (HS-2452H) on the AFWPT T&T VLV control switch on CB-09 once the SI signal (Train A) has been reset. Restoration of power to the local control panel will restore the indications, alarms, and trip capability.

TDAFWP TEST LINE

The TDAFW pump is provided with a test line similar to that of the MDAFW Pumps.

TDAFWP RECIRCULATION

The TDAFW pump is protected by a continuous minimum flow recirculation line containing a flow limiting orifice (100 gpm), a check valve whose internals have been removed, and isolation valves. This recirculation line joins the test line and the common minimum flow and test line from the MDAFW Pumps.

TDAFWP FLOW CONTROL VALVES

The TDAFW pump discharge line branches into individual lines feeding each of the four SGs. Each of the individual lines are provided with a normally open, pneumatically operated flow control valve. Manual isolation valves are provided for maintenance and local flow control.

TDAFW pump flow to each SG is controlled by flow control valves HV-2459, HV-2460, HV-2461, and HV-2462. The flow control valves fail open on loss of air or electrical power.

Each flow control valve is provided with a safety class air accumulator sized for five full cycles, plus additional 30 minutes. This allows the valve to control AFW flow following a loss of Instrument Air coincident with a plant condition which requires AFW operation, or to isolate a faulted SG when the normal motor operated isolation valves are not available. The manual isolation valves are then used to control the flow in the event of loss of air to the flow control valves.

Manual controllers on the Main Control Board for the TDAFW pump flow control valves enable the operator to manually control TDAFW pump flow from the Control Room. When the Control Room is inaccessible, manual flow control capability from the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) using M/A controllers is provided. When the RSP controllers are placed in automatic, the controllers on the RSP allow MCB control. When the RSP controllers are placed in manual, the RSP will be the overriding and controlling signal.

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	06	2.A2.	08
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	2.7		

AC Electrical Distribution: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Consequences of exceeding voltage limitations

Question #15

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safeguards 6.9 KV Buses are aligned normally
- A low voltage condition on Unit 1 6.9 KV Buses occurs

Assuming the plant responds as designed, which of the following identifies the response of Unit 1 to the low voltage?

Unit 1 transfers from transformer ...

- A. XST1 to XST2 and Unit 1 EDGs are NOT running.
- B. XST1 to XST2 and Unit 1 EDGs are running unloaded.
- C. XST2 to XST1 and Unit 1 EDGs are NOT running.
- D. XST2 to XST1 and Unit 1 EDGs are running unloaded.

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the response of Unit 1 to a low voltage condition.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since the Unit 1 EDGs will not be running and also if thought that the normal alignment is Unit 1 being supplied by XST1. This would be the correct response for Unit 2.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since it may be thought that the normal alignment is Unit 1 being supplied by XST1 and that the Unit 1 EDGs will be running.
- C. Correct. The normal power source to Unit 1 is XST2 so a transfer to XST1 will occur. A time delay of approximately one second will prevent the EDG from starting, allowing the buses to first be powered from XST1, the alternate supply.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since a transfer to XST1 from XST2 will occur and if there were no time delay to prevent the EDG from starting.

Technical Reference(s)	6.9Kv and 480V Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the 6.9 KV and 480 V Electrical Distribution system and **PREDICT** the system response in accordance with SOP-603, 604 and ABN-602. (SYS.AC2.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank #20740 New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowle	edge
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

Comments	Comments / Reference: Exam Bank 20740 Revision:			
	Which of the following are the indications that a slow transfer of 6900 V Safeguards bus 1EA1 has occurred after a loss of Startup Transformer XST2?			
Breaker 1E	A1-2, 1EA1 Alternate Feeder, is			
Α.	open DG1 running loaded			
В.	closed DG1 NOT running			
C.	C. closed DG1 running unloaded			
D.	open DG1 running unloaded			
Ans	Answer: B			
Ans	Answer Explanation			
	ncorrect - Plausible if thought that the slow transfer was to the E ld be running loaded after the BOS.	DG, which		
B. C	B. Correct - ABN-602 2.2 auto actions			
	C. Incorrect - Plausible if believes that the EDG receives a start signal prior to the slow transfer completing			
	D. Incorrect - Plausible if thought that the slow transfer was to the EDG, but does not ascertain that the BOS would have loaded the EDG.			

Question 44 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	2.00		
System ID:	20740		
User-Defined ID:	ILOT		
Cross Reference			
Number:			
Topic:	Which of the following are the indication transfer of 6900 V Safeguards bus 1EA		
K/A:	062.K1.02		
Question Reference:	ABN-601		
SRO:			
Comments:	LC16 Audit; LC22E16RM		



401	CENER 2021-06 NRC WILLEN EXAM WORSheet	F01111 E3-40
mments / Referen	nce: 6.9Kv and 480V Study Guide	Revision: 10-03-2013
6.9 kV and 480 V Ele	ectrical Distribution	
	system in conjunction with the two CPSES unit outputs. The XST of power source to Unit 1 Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 1EA2 during a	
Alternate Power So XST1	urces	
	ing supplies alternate power to Unit 1 Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 11 ons.)	EA2 during
XST2		
The XST2 "X" windi during normal plant of	ing acts as the alternate power source to Unit 2 Class 1E buses 2E. operations.	A1 and 2EA2
access offsite power a effect on the station e	1E buses of each unit can be supplied by two independent and reli sources. Sharing of these offsite power sources between the two u electrical system reliability. Each transformer is capable of supply of both units if it becomes necessary to safely shut down both units	units has no ing the required
Standby Power Sou	rces	
1E loads to ensure sa Each EDG is capable	wer is provided by four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) whi ife plant shutdown when preferred and alternate power sources are e of sequentially starting and supplying the minimum power requir he four EDGs are electrically and physically independent.	not available.
the alternate source v the alternate source is the bus powered by th the respective DG wi	of the normal power source to the 6.9KV AC Safeguards bus (bus will be initiated in addition to bus load shedding (slow transfer). It is successful, the respective DG will NOT start, and loads will be s the alternate power supply. If the transfer to the alternate source is ill receive a start signal (1.0 second time delay following loss of po- to the discourse of the direct.	f the transfer to equenced on to not successful,
During outages, one of site. They are connect previously spare bus requirements for eme another source of pow are available to feed to	to the bus supplied by the diesel. or more Alternate Power Diesel Generators (APDG's) are leased a cted to the 6.9KV Safeguards switchgear through a transfer switch breaker. This capability does not meet technical specification ope ergency power sources. However, it does contribute to plant safety wer, if needed, to the safeguards buses during shutdown operation the selected 6.9KV Class 1E bus in modes 5 and 6. They are only te power coincident with failure of both onsite Class 1E Emergence	n and a erability y by providing s. The APDG's used in the
Spare Transformer	XST2A	
A spare transformer i XST2 and 1ST. Jum	is connected on the high side to the 345Kv line which also supplie pers must be obtained from the warehouse in order to connect the ner to the bus. It is available for use in case of failure of a startup	6.9KV low side
	Page 12 of 81	10-03-2013

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO SRC		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	2 Tier			
	Group	1		
	K/A	063.G.2.2.38		2.38
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.6		

DC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.			
De Electrical Distribution. The weage of contantonic and initiations in the facility license.			

Question # 16

With Unit 1 in Mode 3 and Battery Charger BC1ED1-2 INOPERABLE, which of the following would require entry into TS 3.8.4, DC Sources – Operating, action statements?

- A. Battery BT1ED2 voltage is 125 VDC.
- B. Battery BT1ED3 float current is 0 amps.
- C. Battery Charger BC1ED1-1 "EQUALIZE" push button is depressed.
- D. Battery Charger BC1ED4-1 is placed under clearance after placing Battery Charger BC1ED4-2 in service.

Answer:	А	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of TS entry conditions for DC electrical systems.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Each battery is required to have a minimum float voltage of 2.13 volts per cell or 128 volts total.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since 0 amps may indicate that the battery is not performing its function, but a float current of 0 amps indicates that the battery charger has fully charged the battery and the battery charger is supplying all bus loads.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since battery charger BC1ED1-2 is already out of service, but depressing the equalize push button causes battery charger output voltage to be 138 140 VDC which is an operable condition.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since one battery charger is already out of service, but BC1ED4-1 is a different train and BC1ED4-2 would be placed in service prior to placing BC1ED4-1 under clearance.

Technical Reference(s)	TS 3.8.4	Attached w/ Revision # See
	MSE-S0-5000	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given system parameter indications and plant conditions, **ASSESS** from memory any required TS/TR entries, including any actions which must be completed within one hour in accordance with Technical Specifications or TRM. (SYS.DC1.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	19161	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2015 NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

	DC Sources - Operating
	3.8.4
STEMS	
	ems shall be
1, 2, 3, and 4	
REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A.1 Restore affected battery(ies) terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.	2 hours
AND	
A.2 Verify affected battery(ies) float current ≤ 2 amps.	Once per 12 hours
AND	
A.3 Restore required battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days
AND 2 3.8-23 Ame	endment No. 150, 170 _
	(minimum established float voltage.) <u>AND</u> A.2 Verify affected battery(ies) float current ≤ 2 amps. <u>AND</u> A.3 Restore required battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

mments / Refe	rence: TSB 3.8.4	Revision: 82	
		DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4	
		5.0.4	
BASES			
BACKGROUND (c	ontinued)		
	not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. redundant Class 1E subsystems, such as batt distribution panels.		
	Each battery has adequate capacity to meet the FSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 4). The battery is d capacity above that required by the design during temperature variations and other factors.	esigned with additional	
	The batteries for Train A and Train B DC elect sized to produce required capacity at 80% of r corresponding to warranted capacity at end of demand. During duty cycle the batteries main greater that will provide adequate voltage for o	nameplate rating, life and the 100% design tain a voltage of 105 V or	
	The battery cells are of flooded lead acid const gravity of 1.215. This specific gravity correspondence voltage of approximately 2.065 volts per cell (V is the voltage maintained when there is no cha fully charged with cell float voltage \geq 2.07 Vpc its capacity for 30 days without further chargin instructions. The battery float charge voltage per cell, which corresponds to a total minimum for a 60 cell battery. Optimal long term perform maintaining a float voltage 2.20 to 2.25 Vpc. The potential, which limits the formation of lead sul nominal float voltage of 2.20 Vpc corresponds of 132 V for a 60 cell battery as discussed in the	onds to an open circuit battery /pc). The open circuit voltage arging or discharging. Once , the battery cell will maintain g per manufacturer's limit is established as 2.13 V n float voltage output of 128 V nance however, is obtained by This provides adequate over- fate and self discharge. The to a total float voltage output	
	Each Train A and Train B DC electrical power has ample power output capacity for the stead loads required during normal operation, while its battery bank fully charged. Each battery ch excess capacity to restore the battery from the fully charged state within 24 hours while supply discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).	y state operation of connected at the same time maintaining narger also has sufficient design minimum charge to its	
	The battery charger is normally in the float-cha condition in which the charger is supplying the battery cells are receiving adequate current to This assures the internal losses of a battery ar maintained in a fully charged state.	connected loads and the optimally charge the battery.	
		(continued)	
COMANCHE PEAK	(- UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.8-46	Revision 82	

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Form ES-401-5

ATTACHMENT 10.3 PAGE 2 OF 2 DATA PACKAGE	nents / R	eference: MSE-S0-5000		Revision: 7
VERKLY-MONTHLY-QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TESTS REFERENCE USE PAGE 25 OF 31 ATTACHMENT 10.3 PAGE 2 OF 2 DATA PACKAGE DATA PACKAGE Work Order Number:	MAINTEN	CPNPP ANCE SECTION - ELECTRICAL MANUAL		
NEPERENCE OSE ATTACHMENT 10.3 PAGE 2 OF 2 DATA PACKAGE Mork Order Number:	C	CLASS 1E STATION BATTERIES	REVISION NO. 7	
PAGE 2 OF 2 DATA PACKAGE Mork Order Number:	EEKLY-MO	NTHLY-QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TESTS	REFERENCE USE	PAGE 25 OF 31
Mork Order Number: Battery Number: STEP NO. DATA RECORDING AREA INITIALS 6.0 PREREQUISITES INITIALS 6.4 Charger in FLOAT Charger PLACED in FLOAT				
STEP NO. DATA RECORDING AREA INITIALS 6.0 PREREQUISITES		DATA PACKAGE		
6.0 PREREQUISITES Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 6.4 Charger in FLOAT □ Charger PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 6.5 Battery Room ventilation VERIFIED operable. Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 6.6 Emergency eye-wash/shower station VERIFIED operable. Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 8.0 INSTRUCTIONS Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 8.2 Tech Spec Surveillance - WEEKLY Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 8.2.3 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT □ UNSAT □ Image: PlaceD in FLOAT □ 8.5.3 Charger position: □ FLOAT EQUALIZE (IF applicable) Image: PlaceD in FLOAT 8.5.3.1 Alarm condition: □ Actuated NOT actuated (IF applicable) Image: PlaceD in FLOAT 8.5.3.2 Alarm reset: □ Yes<	Vork Order N	lumber:	Battery Number:	<u>. </u>
6.4 Charger in FLOAT Charger PLACED in FLOAT	STEP NO.	DATA RECORDING ARE	A	INITIALS
6.5 Battery Room ventilation VERIFIED operable.	6.0	PREREQUISITES		
6.6 Emergency eye-wash/shower station VERIFIED operable.	6.4	Charger in FLOAT Charger PLACED in	FLOAT	
8.0 INSTRUCTIONS 8.2 Tech Spec Surveillance - WEEKLY 8.2.2 Battery float voltage:V 8.2.3 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT □ 8.2.4 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT □ 8.5 Battery Charger Adjustment	6.5	Battery Room ventilation VERIFIED operable.		
8.0 INSTRUCTIONS 8.2 Tech Spec Surveillance - WEEKLY 8.2.2 Battery float voltage:V 8.2.3 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT □ 8.2.4 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT □ 8.5 Battery Charger Adjustment	6.6	Emergency eye-wash/shower station VERIFIED op	perable.	
8.2.2 Battery float voltage:V	8.0			
8.2.3 Battery float voltage VERIFIED ≥ 128 volts SAT UNSAT	8.2	Tech Spec Surveillance - WEEKLY		
8.5 Battery Charger Adjustment 8.5.3 Charger position: FLOAT EQUALIZE (IF applicable) 8.5.3.1 Alarm condition: Actuated NOT actuated (IF applicable) 8.5.3.2 Alarm reset: Yes No Corrected (IF applicable)	8.2.2	Battery float voltage:V		
8.5.3 Charger position: FLOAT EQUALIZE (IF applicable) 8.5.3.1 Alarm condition: Actuated NOT actuated (IF applicable) 8.5.3.2 Alarm reset: Yes No Corrected (IF applicable)	8.2.3	Battery float voltage VERIFIED	SAT D UNSAT D	
8.5.3.1 Alarm condition: Actuated NOT actuated (IF applicable) 8.5.3.2 Alarm reset: Yes No Corrected (IF applicable)	8.5	Battery Charger Adjustment		
8.5.3.2 Alarm reset: Yes No Corrected (IF applicable)	8.5.3	Charger position: FLOAT EQUALIZE EQUALIZE	(IF applicable)	
	8.5.3.1	Alarm condition: Actuated NOT actuated	d (IF applicable)	
	8.5.3.2	Alarm reset:	ted (IF applicable)	
		COMMENTS		

ES-401 CPNPP 2021-06 NR	C whiten Exam worksheet	FOIII	1 E 3 - 40 1 - 5
Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2	
	Group	1	
	K/A	064.	K6.07
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.7	
Emergency Diesel Generator: Knowledge of the effect of a l	loss or malfunction of the following will have on	the ED/G svstem	: Air receivers
Question # 17			
'			
Given the following conditions:			
DG 1-01 in normal alignment			
• 1-ALB-10B Window 2.8, DG1 Tro	ouble, annunciates		
NEO reports the following:			
rize reporte the following.			
Low Press Starting Air Left Bank	in alarm		
Low Press Starting Air Right Ban			
Starting air pressure in both bank	ks 160 psig and lowering		
Per TS 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil,	and Starting Air, the required m	inimum star	rting air
pressure (1) satisfied.			
DG 1-01 will start <u>(2)</u> start signal.			
A. (1) is			
(2) ONLY on an emergency			
B. (1) is			
(2) on BOTH an emergency and	normal		
(),			
C. (1) is NOT			
(2) ONLY on an emergency			

D. (1) is NOT (2) on BOTH an emergency and normal

Answer:

D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of low air receiver pressure on the EDG operations.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. The minimum air pressure required by TS 3.8.3 is ≥ 180 psig, therefore the minimum starting air pressure is not satisfied. Second part is incorrect, but plausible because this is a common misconception that the emergency start would be available at lower air pressures than a normal manual start. However, with air pressure greater than approximately 90 psig the normal start signal is available and the emergency start will be blocked below 150 psig.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. The minimum air pressure required by TS 3.8.3 is not met. Second part is correct. The DG will start on both an emergency and normal start because only 90 psig of air is required for a normal start and 150 psig of air is required for an emergency start.

Technical Reference(s)	TS 3.8.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
	OPT-214A	Comments / Reference
	EDG Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given Emergency DG parameters and indications, **ASSESS** from memory any required TS/TR entries, including any actions which must be completed within one hour in accordance with Technical Specifications or TRM (SYS.ED1.OB24)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	67832	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension c	or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: TS :	3.8.3	Revision: 150
	Diesel Fuel Oil,	Lube Oil, and Starting Air (3.8.3)
		3.0.3
ACTIONS (continued)	1	
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. One or more DGs with stored fuel oil total particulates not within limit.	C.1 Restore fuel oil total particulates within limit.	7 days
D. One or more DGs with new fuel oil properties not within limits.	D.1 Restore stored fuel oil properties to within limits.	30 days
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	E.1 (Declare associated DG inoperable)	Immediately
OR		
One or more DGs diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other thar Condition A, B, C or D.		
	I	<u>I</u>
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.8-21	Amendment No. 150
		-

mments / Re	ference: TS 3.8.3	Revision: 156
	Diesel Fuel Oil, Lub	e Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3
SURVEILLANC	E REQUIREMENTS	
	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.3.1	Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains \geq a 7 day supply of fuel.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.8.3.2	Not required to be performed until the engine has been shutdown for > 10 hours.	
	Verify lubricating oil inventory is $\geq a 7$ day supply	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.8.3.3	Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
SR 3.8.3.4	Verify each required DG air start receiver pressure is ≥ 180 psig.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.8.3.5	Check for and remove accumulated water from each fuel oil storage tank.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
COMANCHE PE	EAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.8-22 Amendment	No. 150, 153, 156

ES-401

Comments / Reference: OPT-214A		Revision: 25
CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL	UNIT 1	OPT-214A
DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST	REVISION NO. 25	PAGE 15 OF 145
	CONTINUOUS USE	
5.2 Limitations (continued)		
 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical por MODES 5 <u>AND</u> 6 per TS 3.8.2: 	wer sources shall be OF	PERABLE in
 One circuit between the offsite transmissio Distribution subsystem required by LCO 3. 		te class 1E
 One diesel generator capable of supplying electrical power distribution subsystem req tank containing a minimum volume of 1440 	uired by LCO 3.8.10 wit	Class 1E AC h a fuel oil day
 The Stored Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil AND Star limits for each DG required to be OPERABLE 	ting Air Subsystem shal per TS 3.8.3 as follows:	l be within
- The Fuel Oil Storage Tank shall contain ≥8	36,000 gallons (MODES	1-6) of fuel.
 Lubricating oil inventory shall be ≥ a level ' on the lube oil dipstick. 	1.75 inches below the lo	w static level
- Either one of two, starting air systems satis operability. Required DG starting air receir (actual pressure) [The surveillance require <u>AND</u> drift per CALC # IC-CA-0215-5112.]	ver pressure shall be ≥ s ≥ 184 PSIG due to ins	180 PSIG.

SYSED1			Page 17 of 56
	LESSON P	LAN	0
NOTES		LESSON OUTLIN	NE
		major air start components the same between the two	s, except for the receivers, are units.
	3) Receiver pressure between	1 220 psig and 250 psig
	4) Receiver Relief Valves are relieve to the surrounding	
	5	with an initial receiver pre	at a diesel was started 5 times ssure of 210 psig and a final inimum of approximately 90 irred to start the engine.
	6) LOW PRESS STARTING	AIR annunciator - < 210 psig.
	7) Start Air Pressure Switche	s <u>≤ 150 psig.</u>
	8) Function to disable engine air pressure is low.	e <u>emergency</u> start signals when
	d. S	tart Air Admission	
	1	 Four solenoid operated sta start air header. 	rt air admission valves; two per
	2) located on the catwalk at t	he generator end of the engine.
	3	 Powered from the safegua each train (<u>u</u>ED1 for Train EDG). 	rds DC bus associated with 1 A EDG and <u>u</u> ED2 for Train B
	4) Start air admission valves start signal or at 200 rpm,	close 5 seconds after a normal whichever comes first.
	5	-	-
	e. S	tarting Air Distributors and C	ylinder Air Start Valves
	1		ting air distributor regulates the start valves for its side of the
	f. E	ingine Barring Device	
	1) It consists of a steel rod ex	tending from the cylinder.
	2) When air is admitted, the s approximately one foot.	steel rod is extended
	3) The engine must be placed use the barring device.	1 in the Maintenance Mode to
	FOR TRAINING U	ISE ONLY	Rev. 00.0000
	FOR TRAINING U	SE UNL I	Kev. 00.0000

LO21SYSED1		Page 18 of 56
	L FORON DI ANI	1 age 10 01 50
NOTES	LESSON PLAN LESSON OUTI	LINE
	 The barring device lock ensure that the barring of 	ing arrangement is intended to device is never engaged in a e engine is rotated with air as the
bjective 11	 EDG Starting Air System Operat 	tion
	a. Start Air System Startup	
	1) The compressor handsv	vitch is placed in AUTO.
	 The compressor pressur piping. At 75 psig rece associated air dryer is c 	rizes its associated receiver and iver pressure the breaker for the losed. The compressor will e receiver pressure reaches the
	at least one receiver is > 180	nded design function if pressure in) psig and that receiver's pable of maintaining receiver
TS required minimum ≥ 180 psig (OPT-214 req ≥ 184 psig due to inst error & drift)	-	ergency start signal unless the air receiver is greater than 150 sig is required in the receiver to
	to the air start header on eith During engine operation, a s the intake air headers throug headers and then leaves the drilled passage to atmospher the air start headers to that a through the closed air start to be removed by the purge air	small amount of air passes from gh these lines to the air start air start headers through a small re. This line continuously purges my combustion gas leaking back valves into the air start header will r flow. A continuous flow of air m the drilled passage in each air
Objective 12	F. EDG Lube Oil System	
Figure 15	1. Flowpath	
		or lubrication and cooling of ch include the engine bearing, the and the valve rocker arm
•	FOR TRAINING USE ONLY	Rev. 00.0000

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO			
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2				
		Group	1				
	K/A 073.K1.01						
Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.6							
Process Padiation Monitoring: Knowle	idea of the physical connections and	or cause offect relationships betw	woon the PPM ex	(stop and the			
Process Radiation Monitoring: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRM system and the following systems: Those systems served by PRMs							
Question # 18							
A MSL Radiation Monitor	trend has initially increased	sed above the normal	reading foll	owing a			
1.0 gpm SG tube leak.							
Assuming all procedures	are implemented:						
	are implemented.						
The trend on the MSL Ra	diation Monitor will(1)	as power is decrea	sed; and,				
When the MSIV is closed	When the MSIV is closed, the trend on the MSL Radiation Monitor will(2)						
A. (1) stabilize							
	v to a RED alarm						
(2) increase rapidly to a RED alarm							
R (1) stabilizo							
B. (1) stabilize(2) decrease to a value above the normal reading							
(2) decrease to a value above the normal reading							
C. (1) decrease							
(2) increase rapidly to a RED alarm							
(z) increase rapidly to a RED atality							
D. (1) decrease							
(2) decrease to a value above the normal reading							
Answer: D							

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of radiation monitor trends following actions taken due to high radiation levels.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since lowering load causes less steam flow to leave steam line, so it could be thought that leakage is being contained in the area of the rad monitor causing rad levels to stabilize. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since it could be thought that containing all the leakage upstream of the MSIV after it is closed will cause rad levels to increase.
- D. Correct. First part is correct. As power lowers for the same size leak the trend decreases due to less activity. Second part is correct. When the MSIV is closed no flow goes past the rad monitor so the rad monitor decreases back towards normal.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-106	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Main Steam Study Guide	Comments / Reference
	DRMS Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **PREDICT** the response of the instrumentation and controls of the Digital Radiation Monitoring System in accordance with DBD-EE-023. (SYS.RM1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	17676	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>11</u> 55.43		


 GPM) for Unit 1 and GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 GPD (0.0347 GPM) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 3.1 Symptoms a. Annunciator Alarms None b. Plant Indications Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u78), u-RE-2326</u> (MSL-<u>u79), u-RE-2327 (MSL-u80), and u-RE-2326</u> (MSL-<u>u175), u-RE-2327 (N16-u74), u-RE-2326A</u> (N16-<u>u77), u-RE-2327A</u> (N16-<u>u77), u-RE-2328A</u> (N16-<u>u77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A).</u> 	mer	its / Referen	ce: ABN-106			Revision: 11
 3.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75 GPD (0.052) GPM) for Unit 1 and GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 GPD (0.0347 GPM) for Unit 2 (Cycle 19) 3.1 Symptoms a. Annunciator Alarms None b. Plant Indications c Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u</u>78), <u>u-RE-2326</u> (MSL-<u>u</u>79), <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u</u>77), <u>u-RE-2325A</u> (N16-<u>u</u>77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). 3.2 Automatic Actions Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200</u> (SGS-<u>u</u>64). <u>u-HS-2397</u>, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u-HS-2398</u>, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u-HS-2398</u>, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV 		ABNORMAL CO		UNIT 1 AND 2		
 GPM) for Unit 1 and GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 GPD (0.0347 GPM) for Unit 2 (Cycle 19) 3.1 Symptoms a. Annunciator Alarms None b. Plant Indications Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess 1 of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u</u>78), <u>u-RE-2326 (MSL-u</u>79), <u>u-RE-2325A (N16-u</u>74), <u>u-RE-2326A (N16-u</u>75), <u>u-RE-2327A (N16-u</u>76), and <u>u-RE-2328A (N16-u</u>77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). 3.2 Automatic Actions Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200 (SGS-u</u>64). <u>u-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> 		HIGH SE	CONDARY ACTIVITY	REVISION NO. 11	PA	GE 13 OF 31
 3.1 <u>Symptoms</u> a. Annunciator Alarms None b. Plant Indications Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u18</u>), <u>u-RE-2326 (MSL-u179)</u>, <u>u-RE-2327 (MSL-u80)</u>, and <u>u-RE-2328</u> (MSL-<u>u191</u>) or leak rate indication on <u>u-RE-2325A (N16-u175)</u>, <u>u-RE-2327A (N16-u176)</u>, and <u>u-RE-2328A (N16-u177)</u>. Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). 3.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200 (SGS-u64)</u>. <u>u-HS-2398</u>, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u-HS-2399</u>, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 	.0	GPM) for Unit 1				
 None Plant Indications Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u78), u-RE-2326</u> (MSL-<u>u79), u-RE-2327</u> (MSL-<u>u80), and u-RE-2328</u> (MSL-<u>u81)</u> or leak rate indication on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u81</u>) or leak rate indication on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u81</u>) or leak rate indication on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u81</u>). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200</u> (SGS-<u>u64</u>). <u>u-HS-2397</u>, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u-HS-2398</u>, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u-HS-2399</u>, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 	.1					i
 b. Plant Indications Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u78), u-RE-2326</u> (MSL-<u>u79), u-RE-2327 (MSL-<u>u80), and u-RE-2328</u> (MSL-<u>u81) or leak rate indication on u-RE-2325A (N16-<u>u74), u-RE-2326A (N16-u75), u-RE-2327A (N16-u76), and u-RE-2328A (N16-u77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A).</u></u></u> 3.2 Automatic Actions Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200 (SGS-u64)</u>. <u>u-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> 		a. Annunciato	or Alarms			
 Steam Generator leakage in excess of 75 gpd (0.052 gpm) for Unit 1 and in excess of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u78), u-RE-2326 (MSL-u79), u-RE-2327 (MSL-u80), and u-RE-2328</u> (MSL-<u>u81) or leak rate indication on u-RE-2325A (N16-u74), u-RE-2326A (N16-u75), u-RE-2327A (N16-u76), and u-RE-2328A (N16-u77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A).</u> Automatic Actions Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200 (SGS-u64).</u> <u>u-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> 		None				
 of 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 as reported by Chemistry. The reported leak rate should be verified with a second independent radiation monitor or grab sample. Unidentified leakage in excess of TS Limits as determined by OPT-303 which is suspected to be Steam Generator tube leakage. An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-2325</u> (MSL-<u>u78), u-RE-2326 (MSL-u79), u-RE-2327 (MSL-u80), and u-RE-2328</u> (MSL-<u>u81) or leak rate indication on <u>u-RE-2325A (N16-u74), u-RE-2326A (N16-u75), u-RE-2327A (N16-u76), and u-RE-2328A (N16-u77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A).</u></u> 3.2 Automatic Actions Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u-RE-4200 (SGS-u64).</u> <u>u-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> <u>u-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV</u> 		b. Plant Indic	ations			
 An abnormal increase in main steamline radiation as indicated on <u>u</u>-RE-2325 (MSL-<u>u78)</u>, <u>u</u>-RE-2326 (MSL-<u>u79</u>), <u>u</u>-RE-2327 (MSL-<u>u80</u>), and <u>u</u>-RE-2328 (MSL-<u>u81</u>) or leak rate indication on <u>u</u>-RE-2325A (N16-<u>u74</u>), <u>u</u>-RE-2326A (N16-<u>u75</u>), <u>u</u>-RE-2327A (N16-<u>u76</u>), and <u>u</u>-RE-2328A (N16-<u>u77</u>). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). <u>Automatic Actions</u> Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u</u>-RE-4200 (SGS-<u>u</u>64). <u>u</u>-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 		of 50 g leak rat	pd (0.0347 gpm) for Unit 2 Cycle 19 te should be verified with a second	as reported by Chemist	try. The	reported
 (MSL-<u>u</u>78), <u>u</u>-RE-2326 (MSL-<u>u</u>79), <u>u</u>-RE-2327 (MSL-<u>u</u>80), and <u>u</u>-RE-2328 (MSL-<u>u</u>81) or leak rate indication on <u>u</u>-RE-2325A (N16-<u>u</u>74), <u>u</u>-RE-2326A (N16-<u>u</u>75), <u>u</u>-RE-2327A (N16-<u>u</u>76), and <u>u</u>-RE-2328A (N16-<u>u</u>77). Computer points R7749A(R7753A) thru R7752A(R7756A). 3.2 <u>Automatic Actions</u> Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u</u>-RE-4200 (SGS-<u>u</u>64). <u>u</u>-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 			_	-	-303 wh	ich is
 Steam Generator blowdown will isolate on high radiation as indicated on <u>u</u>-RE-4200 (SGS-<u>u</u>64). <u>u</u>-HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 		<mark>(MSL-<u>u</u> (MSL-<u>u</u> (N16-<u>u</u></mark>	<mark>178), <u>u</u>-RE-2326 (MSL-<u>u</u>79), <u>u</u>-RE-2 1<mark>81)</mark> or leak rate indication on <u>u</u>-RE 175), <u>u</u>-RE-2327A (N16-<u>u</u>76), and <u>u</u>-</mark>	2 <mark>327 (MSL-<u>u</u>80), and <u>u</u>-F -2325A (N16-<u>u</u>74), <u>u</u>-RE</mark>	RE-2328 E-2326A	
(SGS- <u>u</u> 64). • <u>u</u> -HS-2397, SG 1 BLDN ISOL VLV • <u>u</u> -HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV • <u>u</u> -HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV	.2	Automatic Actio	n <u>s</u>			
 <u>u</u>-HS-2398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV <u>u</u>-HS-2399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV 				h radiation as indicated (on <u>u</u> -RE-	-4200
		• <u>u</u> -HS-2 • <u>u</u> -HS-2	398, SG 2 BLDN ISOL VLV 399, SG 3 BLDN ISOL VLV			
Section 3.0			Section 3 ()		

ments / Reference: ABN-106			Re	Revision: 11	
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURE	s	UNIT 1 AND 2		OURE NO. 1-106	
HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY	HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY			15 OF 31	
3 Operator Actions					
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED		
OTE: Due to the minimum sensitivity of the leak rate of at least 3600 gpd (2.5 gpr		ion monitors, a valid a	larm indicate	es a	
1 Verify main steamline radiation alarms - CLEAR		Initiate power reduction 1 hour AND	n to	1	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2325 (MSL-<u>u</u>78) <u>u</u>-RE-2326 (MSL-<u>u</u>79) <u>u</u>-RE-2327 (MSL-<u>u</u>80) 	I	Be in MODE 3 in the n	ext 2 hours.		
• <u>u</u> -RE-2328 (MSL- <u>u</u> 81)	[C] b.	Calculate gross leak ra EPP-201.	ate, refer to		
	C .	GO TO Step 4.b.			
confirmed indications (i.e. N-1 monitor indication and sample CPNPP uses the CONSTANT	analyses):	METHOD.		_	
LEAKAGE/LEAK RATE		ACTION	-	_	
Primary to secondary leakage ≥75 gpd (0.0 for Unit 1 and ≥ 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for ≥1 hour		Normal shutdown to I 3 in ≤24 hours	be in MODE		
Primary to secondary leakage ≥ 100 gpd (0	.07 gpm)	Reduce power to ≤50 AND	0% in 1 hour		
OR					
OR Primary to secondary leakage ≥75 gpd (0.0 for Unit 1 and ≥ 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for ≥1 hour AND	nit 2,	Be in MODE 3 in the	next 2 hours	`	
Primary to secondary leakage ≥75 gpd (0.0 for Unit 1 and ≥ 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for ≥1 hour	nit 2, ailable		next 2 hours		
Primary to secondary leakage ≥75 gpd (0.0 for Unit 1 and ≥ 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for ≥1 hour <u>AND</u> NO condenser off-gas radiation monitor ava <u>AND</u> main steam line leak rate radiation monitor affected SG(s) - NOT OPERABLE	nit 2, ailable		next 2 hours		

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

omments / Reference: ABN-106				Revision: 11
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEE	UNIT 1 AND 2		CEDURE NO. ABN-106	
HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY	REVISION NO. 11	PAG	E 16 OF 31	
3.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED	
 Correlate monitor readings to leak rate (≥40% power) N16 leak rate indication. Contact Chemistry Personnel to determine current Pri-Sec leakage based on COG readings. CAUTION: The RNO action of Step 3 stress of the sector of the				
(.07 gpm) (i.e. from 75 gpd (gpm) to 100 for Unit 2 Cycle	0.052 gpm) to 10 19) during the 24	0 gpd for Unit 1 and 5 I hour shutdown wind	0 gpd (0. ow of ste	0347 p 3.a.
3 Verify leak rate <100 gpd (0.07 gpm):	Perform the f			
a. Be in Mode 3 in ≤24 hours.		ower to ≤50% in 1 ho AND DE 3 in the next 2 ho		
b. Continue monitoring leak rate and leak rate, rate of change.	[C] b. Refer to c. GO TO S			
	Section 3.3			

Comments / Reference: ABN-106 Revision: 11	
CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.]
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-106	-
HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY REVISION NO. 11 PAGE 21 OF 31	-
3.3 Operator Actions	
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
10 Verify <u>NO significant increase</u> Notify Rad Waste Operator,	
exists, as indicated on PC-11, from system(s) drains that -AND- discharge to the LVW:	
<u>u</u> -RE-4200, (SGS- <u>u</u> 64) Ensure any affected sump drains being discharged to LVW are STOPPED	
BLOWDOWN SMPL -OR-	
<u>u</u> -RE-2959, (COG- <u>u</u> 82) CONDENSER OFF GAS diverted to the Waste Water Holdup Tank.	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2325, (MSL-<u>u</u>78) MAIN STEAM LINE #1 	
 <u>u-RE-2326, (MSL-u79)</u> MAIN STEAM LINE #2 	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2327, (MSL-<u>u</u>80) MAIN STEAM LINE #3 	
 u-RE-2328, (MSL-u81)) MAIN STEAM LINE #4 	
 u-RE-2325A, (N16-u74) MAIN STEAM LINE #1 LEAK RATE 	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2326A, (N16-<u>u</u>75) MAIN STEAM LINE #2 LEAK RATE 	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2327A, (N16-<u>u</u>76) MAIN STEAM LINE #3 LEAK RATE 	
 <u>u</u>-RE-2328A, (N16-<u>u</u>77) MAIN STEAM LINE #4 LEAK RATE 	
Section 3.3	



Comments / Reference: DRMS Study Guide

Digital Radiation Monitoring System

These monitors can also be powered from Support Power during outages. SOP-613A(B) "Outage Power", provides instruction on how to shift the power supply.

AUXILIARY BUILDING TO LOW VOLUME WASTE POND


This liquid process monitor monitors the drains from the Auxiliary Building, Diesel Generator Sumps, and the CCW Drain Line. A high radiation alarm or an Operate Failure will divert the water from the Low Volume Waste Pond (X-HV-WM183 closes) to the Waste Holdup Tank (X-HV-WM182) opens.

BORON RECYCLE EVAPORATOR CONDENSATE MONITOR

This liquid monitor will annunciate on the Waste Boron Process Panel when the monitor is in an Alert condition or in Operate Failure. If the activity level increases to the High Radiation Alarm setpoint, X-RV-016 "Boron Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter X-01 Divert Valve" will divert to the Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers.

FAILED FUEL MONITOR

This liquid monitor uses a low level GM tube to detect fuel leakage (Figure 11). It uses system differential pressure for sample flow. No automatic actions are associated with this monitor.



These are a specialized area type monitors used for monitoring a process stream. The Main Steam Line monitors use GM tubes that are sensitive to a wide range of gamma energies. They monitor for gross primary to secondary leakage (~1 gpm or 3600 gpd). Or in other words greater that the tech spec limit. The MSL detectors are mounted on the Main Steam Line pipe immediately upstream of the MSIVs. It is important to understand that the readings will trend down, following the closure of the MSIVs or following a power reduction or shutdown. This is due to no flow going past the monitor

Page 33 of 56

4-28-2011

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	076.K4.06		
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	2.8		

Service Water: Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Service water train separation

Question # 19

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 is in MODE 6 with the Refueling Cavity flooded
- Unit 1 PDP is supplying RCP seal injection
- Unit 2 has tripped and during post-trip actions lost both trains of SSW
- The only available Unit 1 SSW Pump, 1-01, has been aligned to supply Unit 2 SSW Train B

Which of the following describes the flowpath for this alignment per SOP-501A, Station Service Water System?

Unit 1 SSWP 1-01 is running with its discharge valve full open. Flow to Unit 2 is adjusted by throttling the ___(1)___.

In this configuration, the Unit 2 Train B CCP lube oil cooler (2) be supplied with SSW.

- A. (1) Unit 2 SSWP (2-02) Discharge Valve (2) can
- B. (1) Unit 2 SSWP (2-02) Discharge Valve (2) cannot
- C. (1) Unit 1 to Unit 2 cross-tie valve (2) can
- D. (1) Unit 1 to Unit 2 cross-tie valve(2) cannot

А

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how SSW trains, normally maintained separated, can be cross-connected.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Per ABN-501, flow is from Unit 1 SSW Pump 1-01 through full open discharge, crosstie line and Unit 2 SSW Pump 2-02 discharge which is at 15% on initial pump start and then throttled full open or until pump runout flow of 18,600 gpm. Second part is correct. Unit 1 Train A CCW Heat Exchanger, Unit 2 Train B CCW Heat Exchanger, and Unit 2 Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump are aligned for flow.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the Unit 1 CCP cannot be supplied, but the Unit 2 CCP can be supplied.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see D). Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since flow is through cross-tie, but valve is opened fully. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-501	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SOP-501	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the response to a Loss of All Unit u Station Service Water in accordance with ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction. (ABN.501.OB104)

Question Source:	Bank # 36001 Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Com	ments / I	Ref	erence: ABN-501				Revision: 10	
			CPNPP			PRO	CEDURE NO.	
,	ABNORMA	LC	ONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UAL	UNIT 1 AND 2		ABN-501	
S	TATION S	ERV	ICE WATER SYSTEM MALFUNC	TION	REVISION NO. 10	PA	GE 23 OF 50	
5	5.3 <u>Oper</u>	ator	Actions					
	ACTI	ON/E	EXPECTED RESPONSE	R	ESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED		
	CAUTION:	C	ross connecting Station Service W	ater bet	ween units will render	cross co	nnected	
			ains of BOTH units INOPERABLE OF ross connecting Station Service W	२-		nit will re	ander	
		B	OTH trains INOPERABLE in MOD	E 1, 2, 3	, or 4.		ander	
	NOTE:	<u>IF</u> I	parriers designated as Fire or Sect	urity Barr	iers, such as manway	s, doors	5	
		hat <u>sha</u>	chcovers, slabs, etc. are to be bre <u>Ill</u> be notified and approval obtaine	ached, <u>T</u> d prior to	<u>HEN</u> the Shift Manage affecting the breach.	er and S	ecurity	
	7	Po	store SSW cooling flow by	Porf	orm the following:			
	'	CR	OSS-TIEING Train A <u>AND</u> in B as follows:	1)	Cross-tie SSW betwe		s per	
		a.	Verify at least one SSW Train - AVAILABLE.	2)	SOP-501A/B, as dire Refer to TS 3.7.8	cted.		
		b.		2) 3)		low avai	ilable.	
			Trains - REQUIRED BY EQUIPMENT CONDITIONS:		<u>AND</u>			
			1) Request permission From Emergency Coordinator to		 Cooling is require equipment, <u>THEN</u> 			
			cross-connect SSW Trains.		Attachment 2, Tra Attachment 3, Tra	ain A an ain B to	d/or align	
			 Cross Connect A and B SSW Trains per 		alternate cooling equipment	to requi	rea	
			SOP-501A/B.		 Cooling not availate methods is required. 	ed to th		
			 Declare unaffected train INOPERABLE <u>AND</u> INITIATE APPROPRIATE 		diesels, <u>THEN</u> pe Attachment 1, Fir Water Alignment	e Protec	tion	
			LCOAR.		Generators.	10 01030		
				ion 5.0				
			Sect	ion 5.3			J .	

Сс	omments / Ref	ereno	ce: SOP-501A			Revision: 20
Γ			CPNPP		PR	DCEDURE NO.
	SYSTEM OPE	ERATI	NG PROCEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1 & COMMON		SOP-501A
	STATION	SER	VICE WATER SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 20	PA	GE 72 OF 105
		_		CONTINUOUS USE		
	5.7.3		ngle Unit 1 SSW Pump Supplying			-
		Stati	section describes the steps to sup ion Service Water Pump. Worst C le 5 or 6 and Unit 2 in Mode 3 or 4.	ase Conditions are assu		
	CAUTION:	aco	is evolution should only be perform cordance with ABN-501. PERFOR erability of Unit 1 <u>AND</u> Unit 2.			he
		Α.	ENSURE the following condition	s for the Unit 2 SSW Tra	in:	
			Unit 2 is operating in MODE 3	3 <u>OR</u> 4.		
			Service Water is only required Charging Pump Lube Oil Coo		Exchan	ger <u>AND</u>
			A Safety Injection signal is <u>NO</u>	<u>DT</u> present.		
			A Loss of Offsite power has <u>N</u>	IOT occurred.		
			Steam Dumps are available.			
			One Reactor Coolant Pump is	s available.		
			RHR <u>NOT</u> being used for coo	ldown.		
		В.	ENSURE the following condition	s for the Unit 1 SSW Tra	in:	
			 Unit 1 is operating in MODE 5 	5 <u>OR</u> 6.		
			 Service Water is only required 	to supply the CCW Hea	at Excha	anger.
			 One pump is lined up <u>AND</u> op 			
			 A Safety Injection signal is <u>NC</u> 			
		Ц	 A Loss of Offsite power has <u>N</u> 	IOT occurred.		

CPNPP IYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL UNIT 1 & COMMON PROCEDURE NO. SOP-501A STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM REVISION NO. 20 CONTINUOUS USE PAGE 73 OF 105 5.7.3 C. PERFORM the following for the Unit 1 Service Water Train I) 1) PLACE the selected train handswitches in PULL-OUT: Train A SSW IIII - APSII, SIP 1 IIII - APSII, SIP 1 IIII - IIII - APSII, SIP 1 IIII - APSII, SIP 2 IIII - APSII, SIP 2 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII	nents / Reference: S	OP-501A		R	evision: 20
STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CONTINUOUS USE PAGE 73 OF 105 5.7.3 C. PERFORM the following for the Unit 1 Service Water Train: 1) PLACE the selected train handswitches in PULL-OUT: Train A SSW Image: Im			UNIT 1 & COMMON		
5.7.3 C. PERFORM the following for the Unit 1 Service Water Train: 1) PLACE the selected train handswitches in PULL-OUT: Train A SSW 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 1+IHS-4764, CSP 1 1+IHS-4765, CSP 3 1/1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW 1/1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1/1-APS4766, CSP 2 1/1-APS4767, CSP 4 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 10 SOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train. Train A SSW 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 11/1-APCH2, CCP 2 11/1-APCH2, CCP 2 1/1/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1 1/18W-0358, CCP 1-01 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV VLV Train B SSW 1/18W-0358, CCP 1-01 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV 1/1/1-02 IN SOL VLV 1/1/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/		MATER OVOTEM	REVISION NO. 20	BACE	72 OF 105
1) PLACE the selected train handswitches in PULL-OUT: Train A SSW □ • 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 □ • 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 □ • 1.HS-4764, CSP 1 □ • 1.HS-4765, CSP 3 □ • 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW □ □ • 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW □ □ • 1/1-APCH2, SIP 2 □ • 1.HS-4766, CSP 2 □ • 1.HS-4767, CSP 4 □ • 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 2) ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train. Train A SSW □ □ • 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV □ • 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL □ • 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW □ □ • 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Lain B SSW □ □ • 1SW-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV	STATION SERVICE	WATER STSTEM	CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE	73 OF 105
Train A SSW Image: Strain of the st	5.7.3 C. PER	RFORM the following for	the Unit 1 Service Water Tra	ain:	
 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1 1/1-S4764, CSP 1 1/1-S4765, CSP 3 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1/1-APG6, CSP 2 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 SICLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0399, CCP 1-01 LVO CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-02 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV 	1)	PLACE the selected t	rain handswitches in PULL-C	UT:	
 1-HS-4764, CSP 1 1-HS-4765, CSP 3 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 SOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LVO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV 	_	Train A SSW			
 1-HS-4765, CSP 3 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L/O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL //LV 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 L/O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL //LV 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L/O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL //LV 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L/O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL //LV 		• 1/1-APSI1, SIP 1			
 1/1-APCH1, CCP 1 Train B SSW 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 LIO CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV TSW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV SI SI PMP 1-02 LIO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV SI SW IN ISOL VLV 		• 1-HS-4764, CSF	<mark>' 1</mark>		
Image: Train B SSW Image: 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 Image: 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 Image: 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 Image: 1-HS-4767, CSP 2 2) ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Image: Image		• 1-HS-4765, CSF	<mark>' 3</mark>		
 1/1-APSI2, SIP 2 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 		1/1-APCH1, CCI	<mark>' 1</mark>		
 I - HS - 4766, CSP 2 1 - HS - 4766, CSP 2 1 - HS - 4767, CSP 4 1 / 1 - APCH2, CCP 2 (ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW (ISW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV (ISW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL (ISW-0358, CCP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW I SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV I SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 	_				
 I - HING 4760, CON 2 I -HS-4767, CSP 4 I - 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW I SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 LNO CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV I SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL I SW-0358, CCP 1-01 LNO CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW I SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 LNO CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV I SW-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 					
 Interface, construction, constructi					
 2) ISOLATE Service Water flow by Closing the following valves for the selected train: Train A SSW (1SW-0404,) SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL (1SW-0399,) CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL (1SW-0358,) CCP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW (1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL (1SW-0396,) CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 					
selected train: Train A SSW 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW . 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL . . . 1SW-0396, . .				ing values fr	or the
 1SW-0404, SI PMP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-01 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0399, CS PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SSW IN ISOL 1SW-0358, CCP 1-01 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV Train B SSW 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL 1SW-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 	2)		ter now by closing the follow	ing valves it	
Image: Structure of the control of	_	Train A SSW			
Image: Stress of the fourth of the bit of the				RN 1-01 IN IS	SOL
Train B SSW Image: Signal stress of the stress of		• 1SW-0399, CS	PMP 1-01/1-03 BRG CLR SS	W IN ISOL	
 1SW-0402, SI PMP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW STRN 1-02 IN ISOL VLV 1SW-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV 		• 1SW-0358, CCI	2 1-01 LIO CLR SSW IN ISO	L VLV	
• 15W-0396, CS PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SSW IN VLV		Train B SSW			
				RN 1-02 IN IS	SOL
• 1SW-0356, CCP 1-02 L\O CLR SSW IN ISOL VLV		• 1SW-0396, CS	PMP 1-02/1-04 BRG CLR SS	SW IN VLV	
		• 1SW-0356, CCI	9 1-02 L\O CLR SSW IN ISO	L VLV	

YSTEM OPE	RATI	CPNP NG PF	P ROCEDURE MAN	IUAL	UNIT 1 & COMMON		CEDURE NO. SOP-501A
STATION	QED		WATER SYSTEM		REVISION NO. 20	PAG	GE 74 OF 105
STATION	SER	VICE	WATER STOTEM		CONTINUOUS USE		E 14 01 103
5.7.3	C.	3)	ISOLATE flow to following valve f		ed Diesel Generator by cted train:	CLOSIN	<mark>G the</mark>
			Train A SSW				
			• 1-HS-4393,	DG 1 CL	R SSW RET VLV		
			Train B SSW				
			• 1-HS-4394,	DG 2 CL	R SSW RET VLV		
	D.	PER	FORM the follow	ing for the l	Jnit 2 Service Water Tra	in:	
		1)	PLACE the sele	ected train h	andswitches in PULL-O	UT:	
			Train A SSW				
			• 1/2-APSI1,	SIP 1			
			• 2-HS-4764,	CSP 1			
			• 2-HS-4765,	CSP 3			
			Train B SSW				
			• 1/2-APSI2,	SIP 2			
			• 2-HS-4766,	CSP 2			
			• 2-HS-4767,	CSP 4			
		2)	ISOLATE Servion selected train:	ce Water flo	ow by Closing the followi	ng valve	s for the
			Train A SSW				
			• 2SW-0362,	SI PMP 2	2-01 LIO CLR SSW IN IS		
			• 2SW-0420,	CS PMP	2-01/2-03 BRG CLR SS		v
			Train B SSW				
			• 2SW-0361,	SI PMP 2	2-02 LIO CLR SSW IN IS	OL VLV)
			• 2SW-0418,	CS PMP	2-02/2-04 BRG CLR SS	W IN VL	V
]

Comments / Reference: SOP-501A	Revision: 20					
CPNPP SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1 & COMMON	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-501A				
STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 20	PAGE 75 OF 105				
	CONTINUOUS USE					
5.7.3 D. 3) (ISOLATE flow to the select following valve for the select		CLOSING the				
Train A SSW						
• 2-HS-4393, DG 1 CLI	R SSW RET VLV					
(<u>Train B SSW</u>)						
4) OPEN the Power Supply to		Discharge Valve				
on the train that is to be su	pplied from Unit 1.					
	W PUMP 2-01 DISCHAF	RGE VALVE 4286				
MC	TOR BREAKER					
	Train B SSW O 2EB4-3/2E/BKR, SSW PUMP 2-02 DISCHARGE VALVE 4287					
	R BREAKER					
5) (PLACE the selected train h	andswitch in PULL-OUT	•				
□ <u>Train A SSW</u> □ 2-HS-4250A, SSWP 1						
Train B SSW						
2-HS-4251A, SSWP 2						
E. Manually OPEN the Discharge V (turns) on the train to be supplied	alve approximately 15% from Unit 1.	(approximately 15				
Train A SSW						
• 2-HV-4286, SSW PMP 2-01	I DISCH VLV					
	DIGGUNAN					
U ● 2-HV-4287, SSW PMP 2-02						

Comments / Reference:	SOP-501A			Revision: 20
	NPP PROCEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1 & COMMON		CEDURE NO. SOP-501A
	E WATER SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 20		GE 76 OF 105
	NLOCK AND OPEN Unit 1 SSV	CONTINUOUS USE	he selec	ted SSW
	ump. rain A SSW			
	(XSW-0008, (SSW PMP 1-01) ain <u>B SSW</u>	DISCH HDR TO XTIE	HDR ISC	DL VLV)
	XSW-0007, SSW PMP 1-02			
н. О	NLOCK <u>AND</u> OPEN XSW-0006 NLOCK <u>AND</u> OPEN the Unit 1/I Ipplied.			
L L	ain A SSW			
	XSW-0028, SSW PMP 2-01 ain <u>B SSW</u>	DISCH HDR TO XTIE I	HDR ISC	DL VLV
	XSW-0029, SSW PMP 2-02 owly CYCLE XSW-0033, U1 SS			
1	NT VLV until a steady stream of XSW-0033, U1 SSW PMP TO	water is verified.		
				ED
	anually slowly OPEN SSW Pun aced in service.	np Discharge Valve on th	he loop t	o be
	2-HV-4286, SSW PMP 2-01 2-HV-4287, SSW PMP 2-02			
•	2-HV-4287, SSW PMP 2-02			
] _

nents / Reference: SOP-501A						Revision: 20	
YSTEM OPE		CPNPP NG PROCEDURE	MANUAL	UNIT 1 & COMMON		CEDURE NO. SOP-501A	
STATION	SER	VICE WATER SYS	STEM	REVISION NO. 20	PAG	E 77 OF 105	
				CONTINUOUS USE			
5.7.3							
CAUTION:				discharge flow (flow indic all <u>NOT</u> exceed 18,600 g		Unit 1	
	К.	VERIFY system	pressure and flo	ow stabilizes.			
		Train A SSW					
		• 1-PI-4252A,	SSWP 1 DISC	CH PRESS			
		• 1-FI-4258A,	SSWP 1 DISC	CH FLO			
	Ц	• 2-FI-4258A,	SSWP 1 DISC	CH FLO			
		Train B SSW					
	П	 1-PI-4253A, 1-FI-4259A, 	SSWP 2 DISC				
		 2-FI-3259A, 					
	L.		flowrates per A	ttachment 3 to maintain t	he optim	ıum	
NOTE: IF sys	the ali stem s	gnment of the Scr tatus file <u>AND</u> the	eenwash Pump Locked Compo	Suction is changed, <u>THE</u> nent Deviation Log shoul	<u>N</u> the S d be upo	SW lated.	
	М.	ENSURE Station		Screenwash Pumps are Loop.	supplied	I from an	
	N.	VERIFY adequa	te Screenwash	System Operation per Se	ction 5.4	4.1.	
	0.	VERIFY the sele status at the PC		ation monitor returns to a	green O	PERATE	
		• 2-RE-4269,		ON SERVICE WATER T		то	
		• 2-RE-4270,		ON SERVICE WATER TH RAD MONITOR (SSW-		то	
COMMENTS	: <u> </u>						

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier	2		
		Group	1		
		K/A	07	8.A3.01	
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.1		
Instrument Air: Ability to monitor auton	natic operation of the IAS,	including: Air pressure			
Question # 20					
	()				
Given the following condi	tions:				
 IAC 1-01 is running in LEAD IAC 1-02 is in BACKUP with the Automatic Operation light ON An INSTR AIR HDR PRESS LO alarm is received at 85 psig The NEO isolates the leak, and IA header pressure is approximately 107 psig rising Which of the choices below describes the compressor status?					
A. Both compressors	are running loade	ed			
B. Both compressors are running unloaded					
C. IAC 1-01 is running loaded; IAC 1-02 is running unloaded					
D. IAC 1-01 is running unloaded; IAC 1-02 is running loaded					
Answer: A					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of starting and loading air pressure setpoints for IA compressors.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Lead started at 105, backup at 100 psig. Both will run loaded until 115 psig.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since both will be running, but compressors will not unload until 115 psig. Could think unload occurs at 105 psig.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since lead started at 105, backup at 100 psig, but both will continue to run loaded until 115 psig. Could think unload occurs at 105 psig.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since lead started at 105, backup at 100 psig, but both will continue to run loaded until 115 psig. Could think unload occurs at 105 psig.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-301	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SOP-509A	Comments / Reference
	Instrument Air Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Instrument Air system and the system response in accordance with DBD-ME-218. (SYS.IA1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	21692	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

nents / Reference: ABN	-301			Revision: 14
CPNPP BNORMAL CONDITIONS PRO	DCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 ANE		OCEDURE NO. ABN-301
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTE	M MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO	D. 14 PA	GE 4 OF 130
2.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED	RESPONSE	RESPONSE	NOT OBTAIN	IED
NOTE: Step 1 is a Continuou	is Action Step.			
OR control of system THEN manually trip t	DR 4 <u>AND</u> Instrument Air (s) is lost, he reactor <u>AND</u> GO TO I ire section starting with s	EOP-0.0A/B while		
IOTE: • Loss of Instrume and Unit 2.	nt Air in the Auxiliary Bu	ilding will affect co	mponents in	Unit 1
 Section 4.0 prov Air." 	ides actions for "Unit 2 R	esponse to Loss (of Unit 1 Instru	ument
pressure is sens	ssor is in an Auto-Start o ed (105 psig if in LEAD, ed, the Compressor will	100 psig if in BAC		
2 VERIFY at least <u>one</u> Compressor - ALIGN UNIT <u>AND</u> RUNNING • <u>u</u> -HS-3451, INS	ED TO THE 3: T AIR COMP 1	WHEN Instrument LESS THAN <u>100 THEN</u> ENSURE the back Instrument Air Col RUNNING.	<u>psiq,</u> kup <u>OR</u> stand	by
 <u>u</u>-HS-3463, INS X-ZL-3452, INS 	T AIR COMM	• <u>u</u> -PI-3488,	INST AIR AI PRESS	FTFILT OUT
• X-ZL-3463, INS	MPR 1 T AIR COMM	• <u>u</u> -HS-3451,	INST AIR C	OMP 1
	MPR 2	• <u>u</u> -HS-3463,		
		 X-ZL-3452, 	INST AIR C COMPR 1	OMM
		• X-ZL-3463,	INST AIR C COMPR 2	OMM

		Revision: 24
CPNPP SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-509A
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 24 CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 134 OF 175
[L] <u>ATTAC</u>	HMENT 2	
INSTRUMENT AIR COM and CP1-CICACO	IPRESSORS CP1-CICAC 02 DIAGNOSTIC GUIDE	<u>0-01</u>
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
F. COMPRESSOR RESTART		
<u>CAUTION</u> : • Motor starts are limited to ten (1) starts.	0) per hour with 6 minute i	ntervals between
 If system alignment and support following steps may be used who air compressor. 	systems are correct for op en plant conditions require	peration, the equick restart of an
F.1 PLACE the UNLOAD/NORMAL toggle switch in the UNLOAD position.		
F.2 DEPRESS the STOP pushbutton.		
F.3 DEPRESS the RESET/START pushbutton.		
F.4 MONITOR the compressor for proper operation. (noise, vibration, oil pressure)	STOP the compresso	r.
F.5 PLACE the LOAD/UNLOAD toggle switch in the LOAD position.		
 F.6 ENSURE air pressure is increasing toward the pressure band based on the operating Air Compressor indicated below: 105 to 115 psig (Lead) 100 to 115 psig (Backup) 		
	IMENT 2 D F	
Comments:		

Instrument Air Lead Setpoints • (105 PSIG Loads) • (115 PSIG Unloads) • 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load • Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints • (100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) • (115 PSIG Unloads) • 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load • Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes	 Lead Setpoints 105 PSIG Loads 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	me	ents / Reference: IA Study Guide	Revision: 5-7-2011
 105 PSIG Loads 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 105 PSIG Loads 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	Ins	trument Air	
 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	Le	ad Setpoints	
 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	•	105 PSIG Loads	
 Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only) Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	•	115 PSIG Unloads	
 Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 Backup Setpoints 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	•	20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load	
 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 100 PSIG Loads (Common IACs load 95 psig) 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	•	Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes (1-01 or 1-02 only)	
 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	 115 PSIG Unloads 20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load 	Ba	ckup Setpoints	
20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load	20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load			
		•		
 Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes 	 Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes 	•	20 Second Delay on Start of Compressor to load	
		•	Auto Shutdown if Running Unloaded > 20 Minutes	

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5-7-2011

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	103.K3.03		03
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.7		

Containment: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following: Loss of containment integrity under refueling operations

Question # 21

Per TS 3.9.4, Containment Penetrations, which of the following constitutes a loss of Containment Integrity during Refueling Operations and requires immediate termination of Core Alterations?

- A. The Emergency Airlock outer door is closed with the inner door open.
- B. The Steam Generator 1-01 manway cover is open with nozzle dam installed.
- C. The Equipment Hatch is open, capable of being installed and held in place with 3 bolts.
- D. The Personnel Airlock inner and outer doors are open with personnel staged to close either door.

Answer: C	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of containment integrity requirements during refueling operations with effect of the loss requiring termination of core alterations.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because one door of the Emergency Airlock is open, however, in accordance with TS 3.9.4, the Emergency Airlock is required to have one door closed, therefore the other door may be open.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because with the SG manway open it could be thought this created an opening from the primary to the secondary side and result in a direct air to air breach.
- C. Correct. In accordance with TS 3.9.4, the equipment hatch must be closed or capable of being closed with 4 bolts holding it in place. With only 3 bolts available this would constitute a loss of containment integrity during refueling operations.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because both doors of the Personnel Airlock are open resulting in a direct air to air breach of containment, however, per TS 3.9.4 this is allowed as long as one door of the PAL is capable of being closed.

Technical Reference(s)	TS 3.9.4	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** specific outage items related to reduced inventory in accordance with IPO-010. (IPO.010.0B05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	Х	_ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

omments / Referer	ice: TS 3.	9.4	Revision: Amd 150	
		c	Containment Penetrations 3.9.4	
3.9 REFUELING O	PERATION	S		
3.9.4 Containment	Penetration	s		
LCO 3.9.4	The cor	ntainment penetrations shall be in the follow	ing status:	
		The equipment hatch closed and held in pla open, capable of being closed;	ice by four bolts, or if	
		One door in the emergency air lock closed a personnel airlock capable of being closed; a		
		Each penetration providing direct access fro atmosphere to the outside atmosphere eithe		
		 closed by a manual or automatic iso or equivalent, or 	lation valve, blind flange,	
	(capable of being closed by an OPEF ventilation isolation valve. 	RABLE containment	
	atmosp	ation flow path(s) providing direct access fro here to the outside atmosphere may be unis strative controls.	m the containment	
APPLICABILITY:		CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies with	in containment.	
ACTIONS				
CONDITIO	N	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
A. One or more con penetrations not status.		A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately	
		A.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.	Immediately	
COMANCHE PEAK	- UNITS 1	AND 2 3.9-6	Amendment No. 150	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	004.K2.02		02
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	2.9		

Chemical and	Volume Control: Knowle	edge of bus power supplies to the following: Makeup pumps
Question	# 22	
Which of 1/1-APBA	-	curately states the bus power supply for Boric Acid Transfer Pump
Α.	1B1-1	
В.	1EB1-1	
C.	XB1-1	
D.	XEB1-1	
Answer:	В	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of power supplies to the BAT pumps for CVCS makeup.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since the power supply is unit related and the pump is not needed for emergency boration on an SI, so it could be a non-safeguards unit supply.
- B. Correct. This is the correct power supply per SOP-105.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since the pump takes a suction off the X-01 tank and the pump is not needed for emergency boration on an SI, so it could be a non-safeguards common supply.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since the pump takes a suction off the X-01 tank and the pump is safety related, so it could be a safeguards common supply.

Technical Reference(s)	SOP-105	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the components of the Reactor Makeup system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops IAW SOP-103, -104, and -105. (SYS.CS2.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	52512	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: SOP-105			Revisio	on: 11-29-04			
11/29/04 12:21	Revised P	rocedure: SOP-10	5-CS-E01, ELEC		EUP		Page 1 of
Type: OPS, Unit: X	, Revision: 0						
Step: SOP-105-CS-E01 == Equip Operator Id:	=> ELECTRICAL LINEUP Equip Description:	Equip Location:	Required Config:	Actual Config	: Verif:	Initials	;
1EB1-1/9M/BKR	BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 MOTOR BREAKER	UNIT 1 TRAIN A SWITCHGEAR ROOM // N. WALL	ON		IV		
1EB4-1/8M/BKR	BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 MOTOR BREAKER	BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP AREA // S. WALL	ON		IV		
2EB1-1/9M/BKR	BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 2-01 MOTOR BREAKER	UNIT 2 TRAIN A SWITCHGEAR ROOM // U2 TRN A ELEC SWGR AREA			IV		
2EB4-1/10M/BKR	BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 2-02 MOTOR BREAKER	AUXILIARY BUILDING 810 CORR // U2 END OF N-S HALLWAY	ON		IV		

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
Nev. Date. Nev. 2			1	
		Group		<u> </u>
		K/A	1	A1.01
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	2.8	
Component Cooling Water: Ability to p operating the CCWS controls including		in parameters (to prevent exceeding d	lesign limits) asso	ciated with
Question # 23				
 CCW Surge Tank CCW flow from RC CCW Thermal Bar 1-HS-4691, RCP 1-01 THCLR CCW RET ISOL VLY 1-HV-4696, THBR CLR C A. (1) closed (2) open B. (1) closed 	I Barrier cooler leak level 80% increasing CP 1-01 Thermal Bar rier return temperatu IBR CLR CCW RET V ORC, are currently	rier is 85 gpm increasing ire is 170ºF increasing TEMP CTRL VLV, and 1- y(1)		J1 THBR
(2) closed C. (1) open				
(2) open				
D. (1) open (2) closed				
Answer: D				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the flow rate which will cause the CCW valves to automatically close.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since flow remaining below a high setpoint will not close the valve, but setpoint not recalled.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since valves 4691 and 4709 close if temperature exceeds a high setpoint, but setpoint not recalled. Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. Valves 4691 and 4709 close if temperature exceeds 182.5°F, so they remain open. Second part is correct. Valve 4696 will close if flow is greater than 64 gpm.

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0032A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-502A	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the response to Leakage Into the CCW System in accordance with ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction. (ABN.501.OB106)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	31261	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments /	Reference:		Revision:			
	CPNPP ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ALM-0032A			
	ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-3B	REVISION NO. 7	PAGE 171 OF 189			
ANNUNC	ATOR NOM./NO.: ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW R	ET FLO HI	4.11			
PROBABL	E CAUSE:					
Thermal b	arrier cooler failure					
<u>NOTE</u> :	When thermal barrier cooler CCW return valve clifailure, CCW supply and return line to cooler is subarrier cooler CCW relief setpoint of 2485 psig is piping.	ubjected to RCS pressu	re. Thermal			
	TIC ACTIONS: 6, THBR CLR CCW RET ISOL VLV closes.					
NOTE:	If any thermal barrier cooler CCW outlet tempera cooler CCW return valve and 1-HV-4709, U1 THE will close.					
OPERATO	DR ACTIONS:					
2. Rt	2. REFER to ABN-502 for leakage into CCW System.					
RCP THBR CLR 2 RCP THBR CLR 3 RCP THBR CLR 4	CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 CCW RET FLOW $F \ge 64 \text{ GPM}$ 1-FB-4 SO 06 X-CI-06 P.S. XEC1-1/1/JBKR XEC1-1/1/JBKR	1682B F	4.11 ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW RET FLO HI			

Comments / Reference: ABN-502A			Revision: 11			
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PRC	DCEDURE NO. ABN-502			
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS REVISION 11 PAGE 23 OF 75						
4.2 Automatic Actions						
NOTE: Closure of u-HS-4709 or u-HS-4696 isolates CCW	return from <u>ALL</u> RCP	S.				
a. High thermal barrier cooler CCW return temperature	e (182.5°F) will cause	the fo	llowing:			
1) Auto closure of thermal Barrier Cooler CCW Ref		pump	i <mark>(s):</mark>			
 <u>u</u>-HS-4691, RCP 1 THBR CLR CCW RET VL <u>u</u>-HS-4692, RCP 2 THBR CLR CCW RET VL 						
 <u>u</u>-HS-4693, RCP 3 THBR CLR CCW RET VL 						
• u-HS-4694, RCP 4 THBR CLR CCW RET VL	V					
2) Auto closure of <u>u</u> -HS-4709, THBR CLR CCW R						
 High thermal barrier CCW return flow will cause aut CCW RET ISOL VLV (IRC). 	o closure of <u>u</u> -HS-469	6, TH	BR CLR			
Section 4.2						

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
		Group	1	
		K/A	012.	K5.01
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	3.3	
Reactor Protection: Knowledge of the	operational implications of the follow	ng concepts as the apply to the R		
Reactor i Totection. Rhowledge of the		ng concepts as the apply to the r		
Question # 24				
The OT N-16 Reactor Tri	p provides protection to p	prevent(1)		
Assuming the Reactor Tr	• •	•		OT, if
reactor power rises to 112	2%, the OT N-16 Reacto	r Trip (2) actuate.		
Λ (1) exceeding the	allowable Heat Concratic	n Pata		
A. (1) exceeding the allowable Heat Generation Rate				
(2) would				
B (1) exceeding the allowable Heat Generation Rate				
B. (1) exceeding the allowable Heat Generation Rate				
(2) would NOT				
C. (1) DNB				
(2) would				
D. (1) DNB				
(2) would NOT				
Answer: D				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of DNB reactor protection and setpoint.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see B). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see C).
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect because the Overtemperature N 16 trip prevents DNB from occurring. It is plausible because if it were the Overpower N 16 trip, it would be correct. 2nd part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see D). 2nd part incorrect because the nominal setpoint for Overtemperature N 16 trip is 115%. It is plausible because if it were the Overpower N 16 trip it would be correct.
- D. Correct. 1st part correct. The Overtemperature N 16 trip prevents DNB from occurring. 2nd part is correct. The nominal setpoint for Overtemperature N 16 trip is 115%.

Technical Reference(s)	TSB 3.3.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	COLR	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems and predict the system response in accordance with DBD-EE-021, Reactor Protection and NSSS Related Control Systems and Westinghouse Drawings 7247D05. (SYS.ES1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	73903	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>6</u> 55.43		


Comments / Reference: TS 3.3.1 Revision: 156 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 6) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ALLOWABLE SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE^(a) 5 SR 3.3.1.1 Source Range Neutron 2^(e) 2 IJ ≤ 1.4 E5 cps Flux SR 3 3 1 8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1 2 J,K ≤ 1.4 E5 cps 3(b) 4(b) 5(b) SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 6. Overtemperature 1,2 4 Е SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1(q)(r) SR 3.3.1.2 N-16 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 7. Overpower N-16 1,2 4 Е SR 3.3.1.1 ≤ 112.8% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 (q)(r) SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 8. Pressurizer Pressure 4 М SR 3.3.1.1 ≥ 1863.6 psig 1(0)a. Low SR 3.3.1.7 (Unit 1) ≥ 1865.2 psig SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 (Unit 2) b. High 4 Е SR 3.3.1.1 ≤ 2400.8 psig 1.2 (Unit 1) SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 ≤ 2401.4 psig SR 3.3.1.16 (Unit 2) (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Trip Functions 2a, 2b, 6, 7, and 14 (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Trip Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints. (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. (e) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

(g) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

(q) If the as-found channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but outside its predefined as-found acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. (r) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint or a value that

is more conservative than the Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoint, the methodology used to determine the as-found tolerance and the methodology used to determine the as-left tolerance shall be specified in the Technical Specification Bases.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.3-16 Amendment No. 150, 156



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Comments / Reference: U1 COLR
                                                                            Revision: 0
                         COLR for CPNPP Unit 1 Cycle 22
    2.9 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (F<sup>N</sup><sub>ΔH</sub>) (LCO 3.2.2)
          2.9.1 FNAH ≤ FRTPAH [1 + PFAH (1-P)]
                  where: P = \frac{THERMAL PUWER}{RATED THERMAL POWER}
           2.9.2 FRTP_AH = 1.60 for all Fuel Assembly Regions
          2.9.3 PF<sub>ΔH</sub> = 0.3
    2.10 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) (LCO 3.2.3)
          2.10.1 The AFD Acceptable Operation Limits are provided in
                  Figure 9.
    2.11 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) INSTRUMENTATION (LCO 3.3.1)
           2.11.1 The numerical values pertaining to the Overtemperature N-16
                  reactor trip setpoint are listed below;
                  K<sub>1</sub> = 1.15
                  \mathbf{K}_2
                      = 0.0139 /°F
                  K3
                      = 0.00071 /psig
                   T_°
                         = indicated loop specific T<sub>c</sub> at Rated Thermal Power, °F
                   P1
                        ≥ 2235 psig
                   \tau_1 \ge 10 \text{ sec}
                   \tau_2 \leq 3 \text{ sec}
                  f_1(\Delta q) = -2.78 \cdot \{(q_t-q_b) + 18\%\} when (q_t-q_b) \leq -18\% RTP
                         = 0% when -18% RTP < (q_e-q_b) < +10.0% RTP
                         = 2.34 \cdot \{(q_t-q_b) - 10.08\} when (q_t-q_b) \ge +10.08 RTP
                                                               ERX-20-002, Rev. 0
                                           6
```

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	02	6.K4.	09
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.7		

Containment Spray: Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover)

Question # 25

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power in a normal alignment
- CS actuation occurs due to a LOCA

Subsequently:

• The CS system is aligned for containment sump recirculation

Following the CS actuation, but prior to placing the system in containment sump recirculation, the CS Pump Recirculation Valves will be__(1)__.

Following realignment of the system for containment sump recirculation, these valves will __(2)__.

- A. (1) open (2) close
- B. (1) open(2) remain open

C. (1) closed (2) open

D. (1) closed(2) remain closed

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the interlock associated with the CS recirc valves preventing flow from containment to the RWST.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect since the valves close upon the opening of the CS HX outlet valves, but plausible since the valves will not open on an SI or CS actuation signal directly. Second part is correct (see D).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since CS signal may be reset prior to going to recirculation, but valve operation is based on position of CS HX outlet or sump recirculation valve position.
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. These recirc valves are normally in automatic and close automatically when the CS HX outlet valve opens on the CS actuation signal. Second part is correct. When the containment spray system is aligned for recirculation the valves will remain closed due to the heat exchanger outlet valves open, as well as the sump suction valves being opened.

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0022A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Containment Spray Lesson Plan	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the instrumentation and controls of the Containment Spray System and predict the system response in accordance with FRZ-0.1A/B and EOS-1.3A/B. (SYS.CT1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank #66447 New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	9
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	

Commer	nts / R	eference: Bank 66447	Revision:
		00% in normal alignment njection due to a large steam break	
Subsec	quently	r.	
• A c	ontain	ment spray actuation	
Which	ONE c	f the following completes the statements below?	
contain	ment s	safety injection signal and prior to the containment spray actuspray pump recirculation valves (1-HV-4772-1, 1-HV-4772-2, 1 73-2) will be	
Followi	ing rec	eipt of the containment spray actuation these valves will	
	A.	open close	
	В.	open remain open	
	C.	closed open	
	D.	closed remain closed	
	Answe	er: A	
[Answ	er Explanation	

omments / Reference: Bank 66447 Revision		
normally open. When t be in the open position	valves are normally in automatic and there he safety injection signal occurs the valve and will remain open. When the containn ated the valves will go closed as the heat	es will initially nent spray
applicant believes with wait for flow to rise to g	correct Second part is incorrect but plausil the valve in automatic (normal lineup) the greater than 1090 gpm. ncorrect, but plausible if the applicant beli	e valves will
valve is normally close	d. See A above. Second part is correct Se	ee A above.
D. Incorrect. Both parts a	re incorrect. See A and B above.	
Question 383 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	2.00	
System ID:	66447	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT1915	
Cross Reference Number:	SYS.CT1.OB05.012	
Topic:	Unit 1 at 100% in normal alignment A sa due to a large steam break Subsequent	
K/A:		
Question Reference:		
SRO:		
Comments:	REF: SYS.CT1	
	013K1.05 Knowledge of the physical cor and/or cause effect relationships betwee ESFAS and the following systems: CSS K/A Match: This question matches the KA by testing	en the

ES-401

CPNI ALARM PROCEDU		UNIT 1		CEDURE NO. LM-0022A
ALARM PROCED	URE 1-ALB-2B	REVISION NO. 10	PAG	E 17 OF 119
NUNCIATOR NOM./NO.:	CSP 1/3 RECIRC VLV FAIL	TO CLOSE		1.5
ROBABLE CAUSE:				
FV-4772-1, CS PMP 1-01 F FV-4772-2, CS PMP 1-03 F HV-4782, CNTMT SMP TC		OL VLV inadvertently	opened.	
JTOMATIC ACTIONS:	None			
1-HV-4776, CS H 1-01/1-03 SUCT	I 1-FV-4772-2, CS PMP 1-01/ IX 1-01 OUT VLV or 1-HV-47 ISOL VLV is open. When 1-I lated until 1-FV-4772-1 and 1	82, CNTMT SMP TO (HV-4782 opens, this al	CS PMP arm will	be
PERATOR ACTIONS:				
MONITOR Containment	Spray Pump discharge flow.			
• 1-FI-4772-1, CSP 1	DISCH FLO •	1-FI-4772-2, CSP 3 D	ISCH FI	LO
A. IF flow is <1100 GP	M, THEN STOP affected pum	p.		
 1-HS-4764, CSP 	1 •	1-HS-4765, CSP 3		
DETERMINE if 1-HS-478	2, CNTMT SMP TO CSP 1 &	3 SUCT ISOL VLV is	open.	
A. IF valve was opened	inadvertently, THEN RECLO	SE valve.		
	MP TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT ISO	L VLV is open,		
THEN ENSURE recirc valves ar	e CLOSED.			
• 1-HS-4772-1, CSP 1	RECIRC VLV •	1-HS-4772-2, CSP 3	RECIRC	VLV
A. IF either valve can N	OT be closed, THEN STOP a	affected CSP.		
 1-HS-4764, CSP 	1	 1-HS-4765, CSP 3 		
B. DISPATCH an NEO	to Train A ECCS Valve Room	n to manually close affe	ected val	lve(s).
REFER to TS 3.6.6.				
NOTIFY Chemistry to sar	mple RWST for possible incre	eased activity.		
		per STA-606.		

YSCT1	Page 13 of 28	
	LESSON PLAN	
NOTES	LESSON OUTLINE	
	 Both room coolers receive a start signal when either pump breaker closes 	
	8. Containment Spray Pump Recirculation Valves	
	a. (Each pump is provided with a normally open Recirc valve)	
	1) FV-4772-1, FV-4772-2, FV-4773-1 and FV-4773-2	
	b. The recirculation lines are downstream of the pumps and upstream of the heat exchangers	
	c. They feed into a common return line to the RWST	
	d. Motor operated supplied from train related 480 vac bus	
	e. Fail as-is on loss of power	
	f. Controlled from a three position (CLOSE-AUTO-OPEN) spring return to center hand switch with open and closed indication located on CB-02	
	g. Closed indication on MLB-4A3/4B3	
	h. AUTO CLOSE	
	(1) When either the heat exchanger outlet valve or the	
	containment recirc. sump suction valve begins to open i. <u>AUTO Open and Close</u>	,
	 AUTO Open - when CS discharge flow drops below approximately 1090 gpm 	
	 AUTO Close - when flow increases above approximat 120 gpm above 1090 gpm 	ely
	 If the valve is not full open with a low flow signal pres an alarm in annunciated on ALB-2B 	;ent
	 Interlocked with the heat exchanger outlet value to ensitive full flow is available from the pump 	ure
	 (a) The recirculation valve goes closed once the outle valve begins to open 	t
	 Also interlocked with the recirculation sump suctivative, receiving a close signal once the sump suctivative begins to open 	
	5) The recirculation flowpath is utilized to add pump hear the RWST during cold weather when necessary to maintain tank temperature above the minimum temperature	t to
	9. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers	

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
		Group	1	
K/A			039.k	<3.03
Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.2				
Main and Reheat Steam: Knowledge	of the effect that a loss or malfunction	of the MRSS will have on the foll	lowing: AFW pu	mps
Question # 26				
Given the following condi	tions:			
TDAFWP speed isCrew has entered	VPT STM SPLY VLV - M increasing ABN-305, Auxiliary Feed e Driven AFW Pump Sta	water System Malfund	tion, for an	
Based on plant conditions	s, turbine load(1) re	quired to be reduced b	oy 50 MW.	
To stop the TDAFWP, AB	3N-305 INITIALLY directs	s(2)		
A. (1) is(2) tripping the TDAFW pump				
B. (1) is(2) closing 2-HS-2452-1 by placing in PULLOUT				
C. (1) is NOT(2) tripping the TDAFW pump				
D. (1) is NOT (2) closing 2-HS-2452-1 by placing in PULLOUT				
Answer: D				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the requirements regarding the operation of the TDAFWP following a failure of the MS supply valves.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible. With the unit at 90% power, a power reduction is not required. If the unit was at 100%, a power reduction would be required. Second part is incorrect, but plausible because the operators are directed to trip the TDAFWP at Step 4 if the Steam Supply valve failed to close
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). The second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. With the unit at 90%, a 50 MW load reduction is not required to maintain power below 100%. Second part is correct. Operators are directed to close the steam supply valves for any steam admission valve that would not close at Step 1 of the ABN.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-305	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to Inadvertent Turbine Driven AFW Pump Start in accordance with ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. (ABN.305.OB06)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent) _</pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

Comments / Reference: Bank 72044	Revision:			
Unit 2 conditions:				
 Unit is at 90% power DG 2-02 is out of service for repair 2-HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV - MSL 4 indicates open 2-HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV - MSL 1 indicates open TDAFW speed in increasing Operators have entered ABN-305, (AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION), Section 6.0, (INADVERTENT TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP START (STEAM SUPPLY VLV FAILS OPEN) Operators attempt to close the AFWPT STM SPLY Valves, only 2-HS-2452-1 indicates closed. 				
Which ONE of the following completes the statements below	v?			
Based on plant conditions, operators(1)required to r MW. To stop the TDAFW pump, ABN-305 directs the opera				
Note: 2-MS-101= MSL 2-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV UPSTRM ISO	Note: 2-MS-101= MSL 2-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV			
(1) (2)				
A. are trip the TDAF	W pump			
B. are locally close 2-	MS-0101			
C. are NOT trip the TDAFW pump				
D. are NOT locally close 2-	MS-0101			
Answer: D	Answer: D			
Answer Explanation				

Comments / Reference: Bank 72044

Revision:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. With the unit at 90% power, a power reduction is not required. If the unit was at 100%, a power reduction would be required. Second part is incorrect. With DG 2-02 out of service, the operators are directed to close the local manual isolation valve, and skip the step that would trip the TDAFW pump.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. See A above. The second part is correct. With DG 2-02 out of service, it is not desirable to trip the TDAFW pump.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. See A above. Second part is incorrect. See A and B above

D. Correct. With the unit at 90%, a 50 MW load reduction is not required. Operators are directed to close the steam supply valves for any steam admission valve that would not close.

Question 178 Info	Multiple Choice
Question Type:	
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	2.00
System ID:	72044
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9516
Cross Reference	OVO A 51 OB05 000
Number:	SYS.AF1.OB05.009
Tania	Unit 2 conditions: Unit is at 90% power DG 2-02 is
Topic:	out of service for repair 2-HS-2452-1, AFWPT
K/A:	061 A2.04
Question Reference:	
SRO:	
Comments:	
	·

Commen	omments / Reference: ABN-305 Revision: 8			Revision: 8	
ABN	CPNPP PROCEDURES NANUAL PROCEDURE NO. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-305				
AUX	ILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTI	ON	REVISION NO. 8	P	AGE 76 OF 94
6.3	Operator Actions				
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	R	ESPONSE NOT OBTA	INE	D
	NOTE: If the Turbine Driven AFW Pump S 2452-1) are open due to a BOS ac applicable for addressing the open	tuation, th	e actions of ABN-601		or <u>u</u> -HS-
	1 CLOSE <u>affected</u> steam supply valve by placing handswitch in - PULL OUT	CONTI	NUE with Step 2.		
	U • <u>u</u> -HS-2452-2, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV - MSL1				
	• <u>u</u> -HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV - MSL4				
	IF affected steam supply valve is CLOSED, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 5.				
	CAUTION: A loss of efficiency due to stear initiation to the SGs could cau 100% RTP).				
	NOTE: Step 2 is a continuous action step.				
	2 VERIFY Reactor Power less than or equal to 100%.	PERFO	RM the following:		
			URE 1/u-RBSS, CONT BANK SELECT in AU		
			ATE a 50 MW Turbine ction.	Loa	d
	Section	1 6.3			

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	06	61.K6.	02
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.6		

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: Pumps

Question # 27

Given the following conditions:

- Reactor failed to trip when required
- A transition has been made to FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT
- MDAFWP 1-02 trips shortly after starting
- All SG NR levels are off-scale LOW

Placing 1-HS-2451A, MD AFWP 2 in the STOP or PULL-OUT position will reset the __(1)__ relay and may result in an automatic restart if the handswitch is returned to AUTO.

Per FRS-0.1A, the MINIMUM total AFW flow to be established is greater than __(2)__.

A. (1) 86M lockout(2) 460 gpm

- B. (1) 50/51 overcurrent(2) 460 gpm
- C. (1) 86M lockout (2) 860 gpm
- D. (1) 50/51 overcurrent (2) 860 gpm

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the AFW pump operation.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see C). 2nd part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

- B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect, but plausible (see D). 2nd part is incorrect because per FRS-0.1A, you are to establish > 860 gpm. It is plausible because if you were in EOP-0.0A, it would be correct
- C. Correct. 1st part is correct, per ABN-305 if the handswitch is taken to STOP or PULL-OUT and then returned to the AUTO position the 86M relay will reset and could result in an automatic pump re-start if there are no other dropped relays on the breaker. 2nd part is correct (see D).
- D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible because this pump does have a 50/51 overcurrent relay, however, in order to reset this relay it must be performed locally at the breaker. 2nd part is correct. FRS-0.1A directs verify that greater than 860 gpm AFW flow exists at all times until SG NR levels have reached 43% (50% adverse containment).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-305	ing
	FRS-0.1A	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Malfunction in accordance with ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. (ABN.305.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	81934	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC26 (Original Que	estion)
Question Cognitive	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension of	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comme	omments / Reference: Bank 81934 Revision:				
:	Unit 1 plant conditions: • Reactor tripped • A complete MFW Isolation has occurred • TDAFWP is tagged out for maintenance • MDAFWP 1-02 trips shortly after starting				
Base	ed on pl	ant conditions, complete the following statements.			
1)	placin the	BN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction, a "CAUTIO g 1 HS-2451A, MD AFWP 2 in the STOP or PULL-OUT positi (1) relay and may result in an automatic restart if the led to AUTO.	ion will reset		
2)		OP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the MINIMUM total stablished is(2)	AFW flow to		
	A.	(1) 50/51 overcurrent (2) > 460 gpm			
	В.	(1) 86M lockout (2) > 460 gpm			
	C.	(1) 50/51 overcurrent (2) > 860 gpm			
	D.	(1) 86M lockout (2) > 860 gpm			
Answer: B					
	Answer Explanation				

Comments / Reference: Bank 81934

Revision:

Explanation:

Incorrect: 1st part is incorrect but plausible because this pump does have a 50/51 overcurrent relay, however, in order to reset this relay it must be performed locally at the breaker. 2nd part is correct. EOP-0.0A directs you to verify that greater than 460 gpm AFW flow exists.

Correct: 1st part is correct, per ABN-305 if the handswitch is taken to STOP or PULL-OUT and then returned to the AUTO position the 86M relay will reset and could result in an automatic pump re-start if there are no other dropped relays on the breaker. 2nd part is correct (see A).

Incorrect: 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see A). 2nd part is incorrect because per EOP-0.0A, you are to establish > 460 gpm. It is plausible because if you were in FRS-0.1A, it could be correct.

Incorrect: 1st part is correct, see B above. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see C).

Question 315 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	4
Difficulty:	3.00
System ID:	81934
User-Defined ID:	ILOT
Cross Reference	
Number:	
Topic:	Unit 1 plant conditions: Reactor tripped A complete MFW Isolation has occurred TDAFWP is tagged ou
K/A:	061.K6.02
Question Reference:	
SRO:	
Comments:	KA Match: This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the AFW pump operation.

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

omments / Reference: ABN-305			Re	vision: 8
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	IUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2		EDURE NO. BN-305
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCT	ION	REVISION NO. 8	PAG	E 47 OF 94
3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RE	ESPONSE NOT OBTA	INED	
CAUTION: (Placing the pump handswitch in (white TRIP light) will reset the 8 (an automatic restart if the hands)	6M relay (v	vhite TRIP light) and m		
1 DETERMINE which MD AFW Pump is malfunctioning <u>AND</u> verify affected pump - TRIPPED.	hand • <u>L</u>	² affected pump <u>AND</u> F Iswitch in PULL-OUT: <u>J</u> -HS-2450A, MD AFW <u>J</u> -HS-2451A, MD AFW	P 1	
CAUTION: Do not exceed 800 gpm total flow Pump.	on one Mo	otor Driven Auxiliary Fe	edwate	r
2 VERIFY at least one AFW pump RUNNING		RT any available AFW -304A/B.	pump p	er
<u>CAUTION</u> : Do <u>NOT</u> operate both Motor-Drive time with the trains cross-connect		Feedwater Pumps at	the sam	e
3 VERIFY Steam Generator levels - NORMAL	STA the t	e TD AFW Pump in av RT the TD AFW Pump wo steam generators <u>N</u> lied by the MD AFW P	AND FE	ED
	THE	TD AFW Pump is <u>NO</u> N CROSS CONNECT Attachment 2 or 3 as ap	AFW tra	ains
	on 3.3			

Comment	s / Reference: FRS-0.1A		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. (FRS-0.1A)
RESPO	NSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT)	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 3 OF 33
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT	COBTAINED
(1)	<pre>Verify Reactor Trip: • Reactor trip breakers - AT LEAST ONE OPEN -AND- • Neutron flux - DECREASING -AND- • All control rod position rod bottom lights - ON Verify Turbine Trip: • All HP turbine stop valves - CLOSED</pre>	Ensure manual reacto attempted. • <u>IF</u> reactor <u>NOT</u> tri ensure control rod at rate greater th to 48 steps per mi Manually trip turbin <u>IF</u> turbine will <u>NOT</u> pull-out all EHC flu	pped. <u>THEN</u> s inserting an or equal nute. e. trip. <u>THEN</u>
3	Verify Total AFW Flow – GREATER THAN 860 GPM	<u>IF</u> turbine still <u>NOT</u> <u>THEN</u> close or verify steamline isolation Manually start pump(valves as necessary.	tripped. closed main valves. s) and align

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	2		
	Group	1		
	K/A	06	4.A2.	03
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.1		

Emergency Diesel Generator: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Parallel operation of ED/Gs

Question #28

Given the following conditions:

- Operators are in the process of conducting OPT-214A, Diesel Generator Testing
- They have started and loaded EDG 1-01 in accordance with the loading schedule
- After reaching the full load value required for the test, an SI occurs due to a technician error on an SSPS OPT

Which of the following describes the expected response of EDG 1-01 output breaker?

- A. The output breaker will open and immediately reclose due to the safeguards sequencer
- B. The output breaker will open and remain open with the EDG running unloaded
- C. The output breaker will remain closed until opened by the operator per the SI recovery procedures
- D. The output breaker will remain closed due to the control switch alignment of the diesel for the OPT

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of events occurring while the EDG is paralleled with offsite power.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since the breaker will immediately open, but it will remain open unless needed to power the bus.
- B. Correct. If the EDG is paralleled with offsite when an SI occurs, the EDG breaker opens and remains open unless needed to carry the bus.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since it may be incorrectly assumed that it is desirable to keep the safeguards bus energized by the EDG.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since it may be incorrectly assumed that it is desirable to keep the safeguards bus energized by the EDG.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-602	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Emergency Diesel Generator system including the system response in accordance with DBD-ME-011. (SYS.ED1.OB22)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	19341	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam	nental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or A	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

	25
CPNPP OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL UNIT 1 OPT-214A	
DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST REVISION NO. 25 CONTINUOUS USE PAGE 38 OF	145
8.1	
<u>CAUTION</u> : <u>DO NOT</u> EXCEED 6.0 MW until the DG load is 6.0 MW <u>AND</u> the DG has been running 45 minutes <u>OR</u> load has been maintained at 6.0 MW for at least 15 minutes.	
 Grid induced load swings may cause DG load to exceed 6.0 MW prior to meeting the necessary run-time. <u>IF</u> this occurs, <u>THEN</u> DG load should be promptly adjusted back to 6.0 MW. 	
NOTE: IF an SI occurs while paralleled to OFFSITE, <u>THEN</u> the DG Output Breaker will OPEN <u>AND</u> the DG will continue to run.	
 <u>IF</u> conditions hazardous to personnel <u>OR</u> equipment develop, <u>THEN</u> the DG can be immediately SHUTDOWN by placing the Emergency STOP/START Switch in PULLOUT. This does <u>NOT</u> require that the output breaker be opened first. 	
Y. LOAD the DG to 6.0 MW over the next 20 minutes using 65-1EG1, DG 1 SPD CTRL, unless otherwise directed by the Shift Manager.	
NOTE: DG load should be maintained as close to 6.4 MW as practical to ensure consistent data is taken for each DG run.	
Z. <u>WHEN</u> DG load has been stabilized at 6.0 MW for 15 minutes <u>OR</u> load is at 6.0W <u>AND</u> DG has been running ≥45 minutes, THEN:	
1) RAISE load to 6.4 MW (6.3 to 7.0 MW).	
2) RECORD time rated load is reached.	
3) NOTIFY Prompt Team <u>AND</u> Chemistry that the DG is at full load.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	00)2.K6.	07
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.5		

Reactor Coolant: Knowledge	e of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: Pumps
Question # 29	
A loss of RCP	results in the greatest loss of RCS pressure control.
A. 2-01	
B. 2-02	
C. 2-03	
D. 2-04	
Answer: D	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of an RCP trip on RCS pressure control.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because RCP 2-01 is connected to an RCS Spray valve, however, it is not as effective as RCP 2-04 as it is also connected to the PRZR surge line.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it will provide some spray flow with RCP 2-02 and RCP 2-03 running using either spray valve but not as effective as RCP 2-01 or RCP 2-04.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it will provide some spray flow with RCP 2-02 and RCP 2-03 running using either spray valve but not as effective as RCP 2-01 or RCP 2-04.
- D. Correct. RCP 2-04 is the most effective at providing spray flow and thus RCS pressure control as it is directly connected to a spray valve and the PRZR Surge Line.

Technical Reference(s)	EOS-0.2B	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the ERG background for performing Natural Circulation cooldown per EOS-0.2 Natural Circulation cooldown (ERG.E02.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ments / Reference: EOS-0.2B		F	Revision: 9	
EM	CPNPP REGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. EOS-0.2B	
NATU	RAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN	REVISION N	0. 9 PAGE 3 OF 60	
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPO	NSE NOT OBTAINED	
	: If SI actuation occurs durin REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJEC	TION, shall be	performed.	
CAUTION	: If RCP seal cooling had prev RCP(s) should not be started			
NOTE:		prior to a sta	tus evaluation.	

Form ES-401-5

mments / Reference: EOS-0.2B		Revision: 9		
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2		PROCEDURE NO. EOS-0.2B
1	NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN	REVISION NO.	9	PAGE 35 OF 60
	ATTACHMENT 6 PAGE 1 OF 26		1	
	BASES			
CAUTION:	When SI actuates, plant conditions exis covered in this procedure. Therefore, TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION is made.			
<u>CAUTION</u> : The potential for degradation in RCP seal performance and seal life increases with increasing temperature above 235°F. Hence, if RCP cooling is lost for a significant period of time, seal or bearing may occur. The potential non-uniform sealing surfaces and seal co- blockage that may exist prior to RCP start can aggravate bearing a damage if the RCP is started. Following restoration of seal cool: RCP should not be started prior to a complete RCP status evaluation order to minimize potential RCP damage on restart.			if RCP seal bearing damage seal crud earing and seal al cooling, the	
	IF RCP seal cooling is lost for only a water in the seal area should prevent e periods of time, seal and bearing tempe 235°F. If excessive temperatures devel restarted prior to a complete RCP evalu	xcessive seal h ratures may inc op, the affecte	neat u crease	up. For longer e greater than
	RCPs should not be started prior to a s (red) or severe (orange) CSF challenge challenge the "rules of usage" apply an instructed in the associated FRG. Unde damage is an acceptable consequence if CSF challenge (e.g., to mitigate an ina This is consistent with the intent of t establish support conditions to start a whether or not the support conditions a	is diagnosed. d an RCP should r a CSF challer RCP start is re dequate core co hese FRGs which n RCP, but ther	Under d be s nge, p equire ooling n atte n star	s such a CSF started if so potential RCP ed to address a g condition). empt to first
<u>NOTE</u> :	There are PRZR connections to one RCS h two RCS cold legs via the spray lines. that provides the best spray is preferr capability. The loop that provides the with connections to the PRZR via both a Experience has demonstrated that when R a connection to the PRZR via a spray li additional RCP should remain in operati head for spray flow.	Single pump of ed to obtain no most effective spray line and CP 4 is not ava ne only and at	perati prmal spra l a su nilabl least	on in the loop PRZR spray by is loop 4 inge line. Le, RCP 1 with one

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Form ES-401-5

Reference: EOS-0.2B			Revis	ion: 9
CPN EMERGENCY RESPO	NPP NSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2		PROCEDURE NO EOS-0.2B
NATURAL CIRCULAT	ION COOLDOWN	REVISION N	0.9	PAGE 36 OF 60
	ATTACHMENT 6 PAGE 2 OF 26			
	BASES			
may be higher t	nally, operating experie han normal when only one duced when a second RCP	RCP is runn	ing, a	nd that
RCP(s) Running	TABLE		luced?	
	TABLE	1 ay Flow Proc		ve Loop 4 OPEN
	TABLE Is Spi	1 ay Flow Proc		-
RCP(s) Running	TABLE Is Spr Spray Valve Loop 1 OP	1 ay Flow Proc	ay Valv	-
RCP(s) Running	TABLE Is Spr Spray Valve Loop 1 OP YES	1 ay Flow Proc	ay Valv YES	•
RCP(s) Running 4	TABLE Is Spr Spray Valve Loop 1 OP YES YES (1)	1 ay Flow Proc	ay Valv YES NO YES	•
RCP(s) Running 4 1 1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3	TABLE Is Spr Spray Valve Loop 1 OP YES YES (1) YES	1 ay Flow Proc	ay Valv YES NO YES MAYI	•
RCP(s) Running 4 1 1 AND 2 AND 3 1 AND 2	TABLE Is Spr Spray Valve Loop 1 OP YES YES (1) YES YES	1 ay Flow Proc	ay Valv YES NO YES MAYI MAYI)) 3E (1)

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	01	1.K1.	04
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.8		

Pressurizer Level Control: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR LCS and the following systems: RPS

Question # 30

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 with rods referenced in preparation for a Reactor Startup.

Which of the following failures will enable a Reactor Trip on PRZR High Water Level if level reaches the trip setpoint?

- A. Failure low of N-43, Power Range Channel
- B. Failure high of N-43, Power Range Channel
- C. Failure low of PT-505, First Stage Turbine Pressure
- D. Failure high of PT-505, First Stage Turbine Pressure

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the P-7 interlock associated with pressurizer high water level reactor trip.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since PR NIS input to P-10 which provides P-7, but the coincidence for P-10 is 2/4 above 10% power, although it may be confused because the associated PCIP window comes on when power is below 10%.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since PR NIS input to P-10 which provides P-7, but the coincidence for P-10 is 2/4 above 10% power.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since either first stage turbine pressure will give P-13 and P-7, but the failure low will not cause the turbine to be at power, although it may be confused because the associated PCIP window comes on when power is below 10%.
- D. Correct. Pressurizer high level trip is enabled above P-7 which receives an input from P-10 or P-13. Either first stage turbine pressure above 10% turbine load provides the at power condition for the turbine, providing P-13, and thus P-7, enabling the high level trip.

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0065A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Reactor Protection/ESFAS Study Guide	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems and predict the system response in accordance with DBD-EE-021, Reactor Protection and NSSS Related Control Systems and Westinghouse Drawings 7247D05. (SYS.ES1.OB04)


Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent) _</pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	⁻ Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

CPRES LINIT 1 PROCEDURE NO. ALMAN PROCEDURES MANUAL LARM PROCEDURES MANUAL PAGE 49 OF 73 ALMAN PROCEDURE REVISION NO. 4 PAGE 49 OF 73 MININCIATOR NOM.NO: RX & TURE 2 10% PWR P7 3.5 PROBABLE CAUSE Restor shutdown	Comments / Reference: ALM-0065A		Revision: 4
1-PCIP REVISION NO. 4 PAGE 49 OF 73 ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: RX & TURE ≤ 10% PWR P-7 3.5 PROBABLE CAUSE:		UNIT 1	
PROBABLE CAUSE: Reactor shutdown NOTE: This window is normally illuminated when reactor and turbine power is < 10%.		REVISION NO. 4	PAGE 49 OF 73
Reactor shutdown NOTE: This window is normally illuminated when reactor and turbine power is <10%.	ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: RX & TURB 210% PWR P-7		3.5
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: The following reactor trips are blocked: RCP undervoltage RCP underfrequency RCS low flow Low pressurizer pressure High pressurizer level OPERATOR ACTIONS:			
The following reactor trips are blocked: RCP undervoltage RCP underfrequency RCS low flow Low pressurizer pressure High pressurizer level	NOTE: This window is normally illuminated when reactor and	I turbine power is <10%.	
RCP undervoltage RCP underfrequency RCS low flow Low pressurizer pressure High pressurizer level OPERATOR ACTIONS:	AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:		
	RCP undervoltage RCP underfrequency RCS low flow Low pressurizer pressure High pressurizer level OPERATOR ACTIONS:		

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omments / Reference: ALM-0065A		Revision: 4
CPSES ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ALM-0065A
ALARM PROCEDURE 1-PCIP	REVISION NO. 4	PAGE 68 OF 73
ANNUNCIATOR NO .:		4.6
LOGIC:		
118V AC PWR 1C1 LIGHT POWER		
1-PT-505 TURB IMP PRESS P≥ 42.3 PSIG (10%) 1-PB-505A		
)	\rightarrow
1-PT-506 TURB IMP PRESS P ≥ 42.3 PSIG (10%) 1-PB-506A		4.6 RB <u><</u> 10% PWR P-13
118V AC PWR 1PC2		F-13
_1PC4_DEMULTIPLEXER PWR		
PLANT COMPUTER:		
	9A TURB IMP PRESS (CHAN II
LOCAL INSTRUMENTS: None		
REFERENCES:		
7247D05 Sh. 04,16 87600	D60 Sh. 70	

Comments / Reference: ALM-0065A		Revision: 4	
CPSES ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ALM-0065A	
ALARM PROCEDURE 1-PCIP	REVISION NO. 4	PAGE 48 OF 73	
ANNUNCIATOR NO.: LOGIC:		3.5	
118V AC PWR 1C1 LIGHT POWER			
$\frac{\text{NC-41M PR PWR CHAN I}}{118V \text{ AC PWR 1PC1}} \qquad $)A 3.5 RX & TURB ≤ 10% PWR P-7	
Y0002D TURB 10% PWR (P-13) CHAN II N0013	2D RX 10% PWR (P-10 3D RX 10% PWR (P-10 4D RX 10% PWR (P-10) CHAN III	
7247D05 Sh. 04,05,06,16 8760D	060 Sh. 69		



Comments / Reference: Reactor Protection/ESFAS Study Guide	Revision: 5-4-2011
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Reactor Protection and ESFAS

SOURCE RANGE REACTOR TRIP BLOCK PERMISSIVE, P-6

P-6 is generated from 1 out of 2 Intermediate Range channels $> 10^{-10}$ amps. This allows us to intentionally block the Source Range Reactor trip during startup. In order to block this trip, two block switches must be placed in the "blocked" position which will also de-energize the Source Range Detectors. Train A of SSPS must be blocked for N-31 to de-energize and Train B of SSPS must be blocked to de-energize N-32.

On a shutdown when power is $\sim 5 \ge 10^{-11}$ amps on 2 of 2 channels, **P-6** is automatically removed. The removal of **P-6** will automatically re-energize the Source Range as well as reinstate the SR trip and Flux Doubling Boron Dilution Protection.

AT POWER PERMISSIVE, P-7

The Nuclear At Power Permissive (P-10) or Turbine At Power Permissive (P-13) will generate the P-7 permissive. Above P-7 the following Reactor trips are automatically unblocked:

- Pressurizer Low Pressure
- Pressurizer Hi Level
- Reactor Coolant Pump Under Voltage
- Reactor Coolant Pump Underfrequency
- Low Flow in 2 Reactor Coolant Loops

Below the P-7 setpoint, the above Reactor trips are automatically blocked. These trips are only required when operating above the P-7 setpoint.

3-LOOP FLOW PERMISSIVE, P-8


2 out of 4 Power Range channels > 48% power generates P-8 which allows for automatic tripping of the Reactor when a low flow condition is sensed in any Reactor Coolant Loop. Above the P-8 setpoint, loss of flow in any one RCS loop might result in DNB conditions so the reactor must be tripped. Below the P-8 setpoint, loss of flow in only one RCS loop will not result in DNB conditions. Therefore, this permissive allows the orderly shutdown of the Reactor if flow is lost in a single loop when power is below P-8.

TURBINE TRIP PERMISSIVE, P-9

2 out of 4 Power Range channels greater than 50% power automatically arms the turbine trip/reactor trip. When 3 of 4 channels are less than 50% the Rx trip on the turbine trip is blocked. Above the P-9 setpoint, a turbine trip will cause a load rejection beyond the design capacities of the Steam Dump and Rod Control Systems. Therefore, a reactor trip is automatically initiated on a turbine trip when it is above the P-9 setpoint, to minimize the transient on the reactor.

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Examination Outline Cross-refe	erence:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3		Tier	2	
		Group	2	
		K/A	015	5.K5.04
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	2.6	
Nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the accuracy and reliability of calorimetric calib		e following concepts as they apply t	o the NIS: Fa	ctors affecting
Question # 31				
During the performance of O used, the LEFM Main Display If FW temperature points util FW temperature and PR NI a be(2) ACTUAL power. A. (1) yellow	y will have the " $$ " sy ized for the calorime	vmbol in(1) etric are reading 10ºF LC	OWER that	an actual
(2) greater thanB. (1) yellow(2) less than				
C. (1) red (2) greater than D. (1) red				

(2) less than

Answer:	C	
Answer.	C	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how an inaccuracy in the calorimetric calibration affects the indication of power range channels.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since yellow is the color used for many other indications to show an alert status. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see D).
- C. Correct. First part is correct. A red check mark indicates that the LEFM is not available to be used and the feedwater venturis should be used. Second part is correct. Using a lower feedwater temperature indicates that more heat must be added to the feedwater to raise it to saturation due to having a lower enthalpy, so the indicated power will be greater than actual power.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that lower feedwater temperature used would cause the actual power to be greater than indicated.

Technical Reference(s)	OPT-309	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Heat Transfer Generic Fundamentals	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:


Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** IPO-003, Power Operations, to include the following: Applicability; Precautions; Limitations; Notes; Instructions. (IPO.03B.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowle	edge
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43	

Comments /	Reference: OPT-309			Revision: 18		
CPNPP OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL		UNIT COMMON	PR	OCEDURE NO. OPT-309		
	UNIT CALORIMETRIC		P	AGE 5 OF 34		
	Sin Silenane into	MULTIPLE USE				
5.2.4	Per Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.2, the calorimetric shall be performed every 24 hours when THERMAL POWER is \geq 15% RTP. However, the calorimetric is not required to be performed until 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is \geq 15% RTP.					
5.2.5	.2.5 If Calculated RTP exceeds Indicated RTP (NIS and N-16 power indications) by more than +2% RTP, the NIS and N-16 functions are not declared inoperable, but the channel gains must be adjusted consistent with the calorimetric power. If the NIS or N-16 channel outputs can NOT be properly adjusted, the channel(s) is declared inoperable.					
5.2.6	5.2.6 Adjustment of NIS gain with the Rod Control System in AUTO can cause inadvertent rod motion. Rod control should be placed in manual when adjusting Power Range NIS gain or N-16 power channel.					
5.2.7	The LEFM is checked available prior to perform valid (TRS 13.3.34.1). The following listing pro- in determining if the LEFM is OPERABLE (ava	ovides criteria that may	/ be use	ed to assist		
	The LEFM is available for performance of SR 3 are observed (normal condition of LEFM):	3.3.1.2 when the follow	ing ind	ications		
	 LEFM Main display - the " v" icon is display displayed in light gray. 	/ed in green and the "v	vrench"	icon is		
	<u>WHEN</u> the LEFM is in alert condition with the f LEFM can be considered available for perform		played	, <u>THEN</u> the		
	 LEFM Main display - the " " " icon is displayed in green and the "wrench" icon is displayed in yellow. If the "wrench" icon is displayed in yellow on the LEFM Main display, notify System Engineering of the condition. 					
	The LEFM is <u>NOT</u> available for performance of SR 3.3.1.2 when the following indications are observed:					
	 LEFM Main display - the " " icon is displayed in red and the "wrench" icon is displayed in yellow. 					
	The LEFM is not available, and is in a failed co self-diagnostics have failed.	ondition when the follow	wing			
	 LEFM system fails the Uncertainty Performance test. The LEFM is unable to calculate feedwater mass flow and temperature with the accuracy sufficient to support determination of thermal power within 0.6%. 					
	 The meter has failed self-diagnostics on calculations, measurements, and electronics which includes meter path tests and meter velocity profile tests. 					
	The pressure transmitter input has failed.					

		UNIT COMMON		EDURE NO.	
OPERATIONS TESTING MANUAL		REVISION NO. 18		OPT-309 PAGE 6 OF 34	
5.2.8 The Plant Computer POWERL display may be used to perform the Unit Calorime calculation provided the thermal power value on the Plant Computer POWERL di					
 Is displayed in green or cyal If the thermal power valucyan, notify System Eng 	ie on the Plant		en is disp	layed in	
 The thermal power value used to perform the Unit displayed in dark blue. 		Computer POWERL displ alculation if the thermal p			
.2.9 If LEFM indication becomes performance, plant operatio and N-16 systems.				ne NIS	
The LEFM shall be returned Reactor power must be redu performed with the Feedwat	iced to < 98.6%	6 RTP (3562MWt) <u>AND</u> ti	he calorim		
When the Feedwater Ventu core thermal power is limited safety analysis.					
TRM 13.3.34 provides instruinoperable (not available for				LEFM is	
i.2.10 The condition and instructio have been evaluated for bot conditions of a UPFA exist of N16 adjustments based on not be used during a UPFA.	h units individu luring the perfo calorimetric dat	ally. These instructions a mance of a Unit calorim	apply whe etric <u>AND</u>	n the during	
On Unit 1, the UPFA is char going high 2% to 3% and or 3%, simultaneously. The du minutes. The average dura going high and the channel not affected.	e channel (cha iration of the U tion is about 3 i	annel 1 or 2) of N16 pow PFA ranges from a few s minutes. During this perio	er going lo econds to od the cha	w 2% to several nnel	
On Unit 2, the UPFA is char and channel 3 N16 power g UPFA ranges from a few se minutes. During this period other, so Tavg is not affecte	oing low 2% to conds to sever channel 2 and	3%, simultaneously. The al minutes. The average	duration duration is	of the s about 3	
The following evaluations co EVAL-2002-4113-01 (Unit 1 2), EVAL-2008-1434-01 (Un), EVAL-2003-(01 (Unit	

nme	ents /	Reference: OPT-309			Revision: 18
	O	CPNPP PERATIONS TESTING MANUAL	UNIT COMMON		CEDURE NO. OPT-309
UNIT CALORIMETRIC		REVISION NO. 18 MULTIPLE USE	PAGE 11 OF 34		
5.2.11 When operating above 15% Rated Thermal Power (RTP), TS SR 3.3.1.2 requires the daily adjustment of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Power Range and N-16 Power Monitor channel outputs when the power indication exceeds the secondary side calorimetric power by more than +2% RTP. Even though the accuracy of the LEFM-based calorimetric measurement is relatively insensitive to power level, the accuracy of the secondary side calorimetric using the feedwater venturis decreases as the reactor power decreases. In addition, decreases in the downcomer temperature increase the shielding effect and reduce the NIS power indication ; this effect is less important during normal operations than the decrease in the FW-venturi-calorimetric uncertainty. Thus, during reduced power operations following normalization of the power indications to the calorimetric measurement at a higher power level, the power indications should not be normalized to a daily calorimetric power. If a normalization is performed at reduced power against a FW-venturi-based calorimetric measurement, caution should be employed during the power ascension as the power indication may not reflect the actual power.					
	5.2.12	Performance of the calorimetric using venturis POWERV, or MANUAL with venturis)) during e RTP <u>AND</u> a subsequent reduction in NIS Powe potential to place the Unit in a condition outsid trip originating from Power Range or N-16 indix in the safety analysis). Therefore, additional co performance of a calorimetric using FW ventur power operation below 55% RTP.	extended power operation of Range or N-16 chan the safety analysis lin cation may be above the cation sexist in ODA-30	ion belou nel outp nit (i.e., ne value)8-13.3.3	ut has the reactor assumed 34 for
		During NI or N16 adjustments, there should be maintenance to ensure adjustments in multiple			
5.3	Notes	L			
	5.3.1	This procedure is common to both units. The s represented within these instructions by the sy be substituted for the symbol to obtain the Unit <u>u</u> -TI-2158 represents 1-TI-2158 for Unit 1 and	mbol " <u>u</u> ". The appropr t specific equipment nu	iate unit	digit may
	5.3.2	When Feedwater Venturi computer points (F59 calorimetric, a correction factor may be used to The correction factor is automatically calculate every 24 hours. The Plant Computer Feedwate (POWERC) uses the correction factor in the ca	o compensate for foulin d by the Plant Comput er Venturi calorimetric p	ig of the er and u program	venturis. pdated
	5.3.3	If desired, when chemistry conditions permit, S secured for greater accuracy.	team Generator Blowd	lown ma	iy be



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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	2			
	Group	2			
K/A		016.K3.02			
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.4			
Non-nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfur	ation of the NNIS will have on the	following: D	70100		
		Tollowing. P2			
Question # 32					
Given the following conditions					
• Unit 2 100% power					
 1/2-LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SEI 	ECT switch. is selecte	ed to 459/	/460		
• The reference leg for level transmitter 2-LT	•				
leak		,	olopo a		
loan					
2-FCV-121, CCP Flow Control Valve will throttle _	(1) in response to	the erron	eous level		
indication.					
Pressurizer level transmitter(2) will be selec	ted for control on 1/2-L	S-459D,	PRZR LVL		
CTRL CHAN SELECT switch.		·			
A. (1) closed					
(2) 2-LT-461					
B. (1) closed					
(2) 2-LT-462					
C. (1) open					
(2) 2-LT-461					
D. (1) open					
(2) 2-LT-462					
Answer: A					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how a failure of a detector effects pressurizer level control system.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. 1st part is correct. As level in the reference leg lowers, DP will lower. In the Przr level detector, this will result in indicated Przr level rising. FCV-0121 will throttle close in an attempt to reduce Przr level. 2nd part is correct. LT-461 is the only option as a substitute for LT-459. LT-462 is cold calibrated and used for indication only.
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see A). 2nd part is incorrect because LT-461 is the only option as a substitute for LT-459. It is plausible because there are 4 pressure transmitters for Pressurizer pressure with each channel having its own standby transmitter. Level is different in that there is only one back which can be substituted for either LT-459 or LT-460.
- C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect because a leak in the reference leg will cause FCV-0121 to close due to indicated Przr level rising. It is plausible because the effects of a reference leg leak are commonly mistaken. 2nd part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	PRZR Press & Lvl Control Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-706	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfunction in accordance with ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfunction. (ABN.705.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	74093	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundan	nental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: PRZR Press & Lvl Control Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.PP1

Each of the four level detectors is associated with a level transmitter that develops an electronic signal for remote indication. Three of the detectors, <u>u</u>-LT-459, 460 & 461, are calibrated for the normal operating pressurizer temperature of 653°F. These instruments provide signals used for indication, control and protection. The other detector, <u>u</u>-LT-462, is calibrated for 70°F and is used only for indication. This cold-calibrated instrument is the primary indication used when pressurizer temperature is below 450°F.

When pressurizer temperature is not at the calibration temperature, the level instruments will be inaccurate. This is because of the change in the density of the water in the pressurizer associated with a change in temperature. A change in pressurizer temperature results in a change in water volume, and therefore level, but no change in the pressure exerted on the variable input to the d/p detector, which is relative to the mass of the water in the pressurizer. The water in the external reference leg is at containment ambient temperature regardless of pressurizer temperature, and therefore provides a constant pressure to the d/p detector. Reducing pressurizer temperature causes the hot-calibrated instruments to read erroneously high. The volume and level of water in the pressurizer decreases as it becomes denser, while the pressurizer temperature causes the cold-calibrated instruments to read erroneously high. The volume and level of calibrated instruments to read erroneously high and level of water in the pressurizer temperature to the d/p detectors remains unchanged. Increasing pressurizer temperature causes the cold-calibrated instruments to read erroneously low. The volume and level of water in the pressurizer increases as it becomes less dense, while the pressure exerted on the variable input to the d/p detectors remains unchanged. However, the operator should realize that both hot and cold-calibrated instruments indicate accurately at approximately 20% for any temperature. Graphs comparing indicated to actual pressurizer level for various temperatures are located in the Integrated Plant Operating Procedures.

The proper level of water in the reference leg is crucial for accurate indication. Low level in a reference leg can be identified by comparing the level channel indications. If a reference leg leaks, its pressurizer level channel will read erroneously high. If the RCS suffers a rapid depressurization, hydrogen or other gasses coming out of solution could displace water in the reference leg, resulting in a level indication higher than actual. This could potentially affect all channels at the same time. There is another way to lose reference leg level during accident conditions. If steam inside containment significantly raised ambient temperature, the water in the reference leg could boil away and cause the indication to be erroneously high. This also could potentially affect all channels at the same time.

The 118 VAC instrument buses supply power to the level transmitters as follows: $\underline{u}PC1$ to $\underline{u}-LT-459$, $\underline{u}PC2$ to $\underline{u}-LT-460$, $\underline{u}PC3$ to $\underline{u}-LT-461$, and $\underline{u}PC4$ to $\underline{u}-LT-462$. Each transmitter supplies 0-100% meters on Main Control Board panel \underline{u} -CB-05 and inputs to the plant computer. $\underline{u}-LT-459$ & 460 are also indicated on the Remote Shutdown Panel. A switch on the control board selects one of the hotcalibrated channels to supply a chart recorder on \underline{u} -CB-05. Signals from the three hot-calibrated level channels are sent to a channel selector switch $(1/\underline{u}-LS-459D)$ on \underline{u} -CB-05. Channels 459 and 460 are normally selected, and channel 461 can be used in place of either channel, but not simultaneously.

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

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Rev. 00.0000

nments /	Reference: ABN-706			Revision: 8
ABNOR	CPNPP IAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES IN	MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-706
I	PRESSURIZER LEVEL	N	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 4 OF 14
2.2 <mark>Auto</mark>	omatic Actions			
NOTE:	For the pressurizer level and high le	vel heater cont	rol circuits:	
	CH I 0459 is the normal input.			
	CH III 0461 is the alternate input.			
	CH II 0460 has no input.			
	For the low level heater cutoff and le	etdown isolatior	n circuits:	
	CH I 0459 is the normal input to 1	1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-459.		
	CH II 0460 is the normal input to	1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-460.		
	CH III 0461 is the alternate input	to 1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-459	or 1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-460.	
a.	Control response for a selected pres	ssurizer level cl	hannel failure high.	
	1) Charging flow is reduced, lowe level heater block and letdown			7% level, low
	 Backup heaters come on if pre- greater than or equal to 5% from due to actual level increase). 			
	• <u>u</u> -LR-459, PRZR LVL/PRZ	ZR LVL SETPT		
b.	Control and interlock responses for	a selected pres	surizer level channel f	ailure low.
	1) Charging flow is increased, rais	sing pressurize	r level.	
	 Low level heater block and letd equal to 17% pressurizer level. 		ccur if channel fails to	less than or

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Comments / Reference: ABN-706		Revision: 8
CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
	UNIT 1 AND 2	ABN-706
PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 5 OF 14
2.3 Operator Actions		
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE R	ESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
CAUTION: To avoid thermal shock of the reactor coolant p be stopped without also stopping the charging temperature is greater than 350°F.	piping, the letdown flo flow when the reactor	w should not coolant
NOTE: Channels 459 and 460 are normally the control Refer to Attachment 7 for program versus Tav		
A Manually CONTROL <u>u</u> -LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL <u>OR u</u> -FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL to maintain level at program.		
2 TRANSFER 1/ <u>u</u> -LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SELECT to an operable alternate controlling channel.		
3 ENSURE 1/ <u>u</u> -LS-459E, <u>u</u> -LR-459 PRZR LVL SELECT selected to a valid channel.		
17%, <u>THEN</u>	ressurizer level is grea RE letdown per Attachi	
5 If necessary, RECLOSE 1/u-PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUP C by placing the control switch in the "ON" position.		
6 If desired, PLACE controller used in Step 1 in AUTO.		
Section 2.3		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2			
	Group	2			
	K/A	001.A	44.06		
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.9			
Control Rod Drive System: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in th	e control room: Control rod drive	disconnect/conn	ect		
Question # 33					
Given the following conditions:					
 Control Rod M-4 in CBD is misaligned by 1 	8 steps				
 Actions are being performed to realign the 	rod IAW ABN-712, Ro	d Control S	ystem		
Malfunction, using the DRPI method					
Control Dod M 4 is realigned to the remaining rea	la in Control Bonk D hu	, placing th	Dod		
Control Rod M-4 is realigned to the remaining roc Selector Switch to the(1) position and openi	•				
(2).			5) 101		
(²)					
A. (1) CBD					
(2) control rod M-4					
B. (1) CBD					
(2) the remaining rods in Control Bank D					
C. (1) MAN					
(2) control rod M-4					
D. (1) MAN					
(2) the remaining rods in Control Bank D					
Answer: B					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the operation of the rod disconnect switches when realigning a misaligned rod.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since opening only disconnect switch M4 would allow the other rods in the group to be realigned to the misaligned rod, but procedure has only the misaligned rod move.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Per ABN-712, the misaligned rod is selected by using the individual bank position, CBD. Second part is correct. The disconnect switches for all other Bank D rods are opened to assure only the misaligned rod moves.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since the switch is in the MAN position when the rod is determined to be misaligned, but is placed in CBD when aligning the rod. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-712	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective:	DISCUSS the response (ABN.712.OB02)	to a Dropped or Misa	aligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	20872	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive L	evel: Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent: 55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / R	eference: ABN-712				Revision: 13
ABNORMAL	CPNPP CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANU	AL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PR	OCEDURE NO. ABN-712
ROD C	ONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 13	PA	AGE 17 OF 63
3.3 Operat	or Actions				
ACT	ION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINE	D
CAUTION:	 Affected rod withdrawal should only requirements have been met unless Do <u>NOT</u> withdraw an RCCA that h during power operation without Enderse 	ss appro	oved by Engineering. In misaligned for greate		
Note:	 The last movement of affected rod movement of affected group. When recovering a dropped rod us dropped rod should initially be mov so as not to drive the misaligned ro be added during recovery. 	sing the ved outv	DRPI method the gro ward to the next DRPI	oup with step u	n the I p vice in I
usi	STORE Rod to OPERABLE Status) ng DRPI realignment method:)				
∐ a.	TRANSFER 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT, to the affected bank.				
D b.	RECORD positions for affected rod: Affected Rod (DRPI) Bank (DRPI) Group 1 step counter				
□ c.	Group 2 step counter MOVE affected bank outward to the desired DRPI Light				•
	"Step continued	d next p	age"		
	Sectio	n 3.3			

Comments / Reference: ABN-712	Revision: 13			
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANU	UAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PRC	OCEDURE NO. ABN-712
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 13	PA	GE 18 OF 63
3.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINE	D
CAUTION: Do NOT make any changes in plant or rod that would require a change in base of the two provides of two	ank posi	tion.		
I. IE restoring a Control Bank rod, THEN Locally POSITION AND MAINTAIN P/A Converter Auto-Manual selector switch (SFGD 832 Rm <u>u</u> -096) - MANUAL				
"Step continue	ed next p	age"		
Secti	on 3.3			

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 PROCEDURE NO. ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 13 PAGE 19 OF 63 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE: When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. • At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 g. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 1 g. WHEN moving the affected rod for ref by controling the following, as necessary: • Turbline Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod is moving. 3) ENSURE last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected bank. • NUTHDRAW the affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication.	comments / Re	eference: ABN-712				Revision: 13		
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-712 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 13 PAGE 19 OF 63 3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE: • When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. • At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 □ g. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 11 Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod for affected rod is moving. • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod for Treatignment for affected rod is moving. • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod for Treatign the following as necessary: • Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod is in same directed rod in comments until aligned with its group by DRP1 indication. <td></td> <td>CPNPP</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>PR</td> <td>OCEDURE NO.</td>		CPNPP			PR	OCEDURE NO.		
3.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE: • When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. • At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 g. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 1) MAINTAIN Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary: • Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod affected rod is moving. 1) In. SUBJE Last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected bank. n n. (wiTHDRAW the affected rod in controlling increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication;	ABNORMAL							
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE: • When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and a power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. • At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 g. 9. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 1) 11 MAINTAIN Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: • Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod as movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected bank. • N. w/ITHDRAW the affected rod in controlling increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication,	ROD CO	ONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 13	P/	AGE 19 OF 63		
NOTE: When moving affected rod, a CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL alarm will be received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. • At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 g. g. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 1) MAINTAIN Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary: • Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod in affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication.	3.3 Operati	or Actions						
received in control room and at power cabinet containing the other group of affected bank. This is normal and will prevent the other group's step counter from operating. At low RCS boron concentration, excessive boration may delay return to desired power level after rod recovery. 14 g. 14 g. 14 Image: the state of the s	ACT	ION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINE	D		
g. WHEN moving the affected rod for realignment, THEN PERFORM the following: 1) MAINTAIN Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary: • Turbine Power • Steam Dumps • Boration • Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod is moving. 3) ENSURE last movement of affected rod is name direction as last movement of affected bank. I h. WITHDRAW the affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication.	•	received in control room and at power bank. This is normal and will preven At low RCS boron concentration, exe	er cabine nt the oth	t containing the other er group's step counte	group er from	of affected operating.		
Step continued next page	□ g.	 realignment, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: 1) MAINTAIN Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following, as necessary: Turbine Power Steam Dumps Boration Dilution 2) VERIFY that only the affected rod is moving. 3) ENSURE last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected bank. WITHDRAW the affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication. 				1		
Section 3.3		Secti	ion 3.3					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	033	.G.2.′	1.28
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating	4.1		

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

Question # 34

Given the following conditions:

- SFP Cooling Water Pump X-02 and HX X-02 are aligned to and cooling the X-01 SFP
- Level is lowering in the X-01 SFP due to a pipe rupture downstream of SFP Cooling Water Pump X-02 discharge valve

After SFP Cooling Water Pump X-02 loses suction, draining the pool via the break will be terminated by ...

A. uncovering the X-01 SFP suction piping anti-siphon hole.

B. uncovering the X-01 SFP discharge piping anti-siphon hole.

C. closure of the discharge valve on SFP Cooling Water Pump X-02.

D. tripping SFP Cooling Water Pump X-02 on a low level in X-01 Spent Fuel Pool.

Answer:

В

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the function of the anti-siphon holes on the discharge piping located in the SFPs.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible based on the location of the leak once the pump loses suction water will continue to drain out the SFP until the anti-siphon hole is uncovered on the discharge piping.
- B. Correct. The pump must first lose suction, with no discharge pressure the SFP water will backflow through the discharge piping until the anti-siphon hole is uncovered.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since closing the discharge valve would prevent forward flow out of the downstream break, but the valve is upstream of the leak and would have no effect since the leak is downstream siphoning water out from the bottom of the pool.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the pump will trip on low level in its associated SFP.

Technical Reference(s)	SFP Cooling and Cleanup Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the function of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup system IAW FSAR. (SYS.SF1.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	34602	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: SFP Cooling and Cleanup Study Guide

Revision: 5-2-2011

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

Cooling Return Line and Connections

Return flow from the Purification loop rejoins the main flow returning to the Spent Fuel Pools. The return header enters the pool just below the normal surface level and is routed down to a sparger located six feet above the fuel assemblies. Each return line is provided with one 1/2" anti-siphon hole located one foot below the normal pool level (858'6" normal level). The primary purpose of these holes is to prevent an inadvertent draining of the pool should a upstream line break occur on a idle line. A flow indicating switch in each return line activates an alarm on the Spent Fuel Pool panel if flow is <1600 gpm to its associated pool (windows 1.2, 1.6).

PURIFICATION LOOP (FIGURE 2)

Refueling Water Purification Pumps

There are two Refueling Water Purification Pumps located on the 790' elevation of the Auxiliary Building. These pumps have a design pressure of 150 psig, a design temperature of 200 °F, and a design flow of 250 gpm. Their primary function is to circulate Refueling Water Storage Tank water or Refueling Cavity water through the Spent Fuel Pool Filters and Demineralizers. The pumps are controlled via three position handswitches located on the Spent Fuel Pool local control panel (LV-06). A pump trip due to overload is also alarmed on this panel (windows 1.3, 1.7).

Purification suction connections

The Refueling Water Purification Pumps can be aligned to either unit's Refueling Cavity or RWST. The Wet Cask Pit or the Fuel Transfer Canals can also be sent through the Purification Loop using the Cask Pit and Transfer Canal Drain Pump.

Spent Fuel Pool Filters

The Spent Fuel Pool Filters provide mechanical filtration for the Purification Loop flow before it enters the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer. They are removable cartridge filters will provide 100% retention of particles from 0.45 to 6 microns. Isolation valves for the filters are operated remotely from the Auxiliary Building 852' elevation on the east side of the filter/demineralizer area. A bypass valve around each filter is provided to permit filter change out without affecting Purification Loop flow. A differential pressure indicating switch provides local indication of the filter condition. An alarm is activated on the SFP panel if the ΔP is greater than 25 psid (Windows 3.1, 3.5).

Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizers

Two demineralizers, one for each purification loop, are provided. Each demineralizer has a design flow of 250 gpm (max. 273 gpm), a design pressure of 150 psig, and a design temperature of 200 °F. They are flushable mixed bed demins with a 50 cubic foot resin volume. A pressure indicating switch provides local indication and an alarm on the Spent Fuel Pool Panel if the demin. ΔP reaches \geq 25 psid (Windows 4.1, 4.5)

A resin trap is located just downstream of each demineralizer to remove resin fines that may have passed through the demineralizer retention elements.

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5-2-2011

Comments / Reference: SFP Cooling and Cleanup Study Guide	Revision: 5-2-2011
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Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

contamination levels. During this time it will be necessary to closely monitor SFP temperature and realign the SFP Cooling and Cleanup System as required to limit the temperature increase.

OPT-223, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

This procedure satisfies Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System testing for Technical Specification 4.0.5 (ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components) requirements.

Section 8.1 of OPT-223 tests the SFP Cooling Pumps. Section 8.1.1 tests the X-01 SFP Cooling Pump while section 8.1.2 tests the X-02 pump. The pump to be tested is placed in service per SOP-506. Basically, the procedure has the operator establish a 3950 to 3975 gpm flow rate and record information on the data sheet. Flow greater than 3600 gpm indicates that the associated pump discharge check valve (XSF-0003 or XSF-0004) has fully stroked open. Suction pressure and discharge pressure are obtained from test gauges and a differential pressure is calculated and compared to Action Limit Low and High values. The vibration amplitude is recorded and compared to Alert and Action Limits. If Alert limits are exceeded for vibration, ODA-308-37 (LOCAR for Tech Spec 4.0.5 items) is initiated and the Shift Manager and System Engineer are notified. When alert limits are exceeded, the SFP Cooling Pump test frequency is increased. Restoration is performed in accordance with section 9.1 which has the operator align the SFP Cooling Water System per SOP-506 as directed by the Shift Manager. Maintenance is notified to remove test gauges which were installed to support the test.

Section 8.2 tests the Makeup Flowpath. Section 8.2.1 tests the flowpath from Unit 1 Reactor Makeup Water to the SFP Cooling System and section 8.2.2 tests the Unit 2 Reactor Makeup Water flowpath. Prior to each test, a portable flow meter is installed on a horizontal length of Reactor Makeup piping for the check valve to be tested. The applicable line number is listed in the procedure. Basically the makeup valve from each RMUW source is opened and the flow rate recorded. If the recorded flow rate is \geq 51 gpm, the associated check valve has cycled full open. Following the test, the flow meter is removed and Chemistry notified to sample the Spent Fuel Pool for boron concentration if needed.

ABNORMAL

SPENT FUEL POOL AND REFUELING CAVITY WATER LEVELS

Tech Specs 3.7.15 requires that at least 23 feet of water be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks. This is to ensure removal of 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.

To protect against loss of water from the Spent Fuel Pool, the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump suction lines penetrate the pool wall and terminate approximately four feet below the normal water level and the return lines terminate six feet above the fuel assemblies. The return lines contain anti-siphon holes at the 857'6" elevation (approximately one foot below the normal level). The anti-siphon holes prevent gravity draining of the pool and ensure sufficient shielding is maintained. There are no drain lines connected to the pool.

Several things can affect Spent Fuel Pool level. Of course there is normal evaporation which is made up by using either Reactor Makeup Water (preferred source) or Demineralized Water (alternate

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5-2-2011

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	045.A3.08		08
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.3		

Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including: Steam pressure

Question # 35

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 is performing a cooldown
- RCS loop Tave:
 - Loop 1: 552°F
 - Loop 2: 553°F
 - Loop 3: 552°F
 - Loop 4: 550°F
- Steam Dump Mode Selector switch STM PRESS MODE
- Steam Dump Controller MAN set at 50% demand
- All Steam Dump valves closed
- The operator momentarily places the Train A and Train B Steam Dump Bypass Interlock switches to Bypass and then releases them

What is the status of the Steam Dump valves following the operator's actions?

- A. ONLY Bank 1 valves fully open.
- B. Bank 1 and 2 valves go 50% open.
- C. ONLY Bank 1 valves go 50% open.
- D. Bank 1 and Bank 2 valves fully open.

Answer: A

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the steam dump system controls when operating in the steam pressure mode.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Bypassing the P-12 interlock allows the Bank 1 valves to open. With demand at 50%, the Bank 1 valves will be fully open (at 25%), all others are prevented from opening.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be the condition above P-12 and since the controller is set to 50% demand it could be thought the valves will only open to 50%.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since only Bank 1 valves open below P-12 and since the controller is set to 50% demand it could be thought the valves will only open to 50%.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be the condition above P-12, but only the Bank 1 valves can be opened below P-12.

Technical Reference(s)	IPO-005A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ALM-0065A	Comments / Reference
	Steam Dumps Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **PREDICT** the response of the instrumentation and controls of the Steam Dump system in accordance with ABN-304, 704 and 709. (SYS.SD1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	19303	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

nents / Reference: IPO-005A		Revision: 27		
CPNPP NTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. IPO-005A		
PLANT COOLDOWN FROM REVISION NO. 27 HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN CONTINUOUS USE PAGE 23 OF 131				
NOTE: Pressurizer level will lower as the RCS is cooled in the following step. [C] 5.1.6 E. IF desired to cooldown with the Steam Dumps, THEN PERFORM the following steps. THIS IS THE PREFERRED METHOD. [] 1) VERIFY 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS. [] 2) ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL. CAUTION: • When opening the Steam Dump Valves, a rate compensated steam line low pressure Safety Injection or Main Steamline Isolation (if blocked below P-11) can result from the valves opening too quickly. • Above P-11, Plant computer point U5533, MS SI MARGIN can be used to monitor margin to SI signal. • Below P-11, Plant computer point U5534, MS ISOLATION RATE MARGIN can be used to monitor margin to main steamline rate isolation signal. • 3) ADJUST 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL demand to establish an RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F in one hour.				
IOTE: When RCS temperature drops below 553°F, only available.	the Steam Dump Cooldov	vn valves are		
4) WHEN RCS Tavg approaches Lo-L THEN HOLD both STM DMP INTLK SELE		LK.		
5) VERIFY the following status lights a				
 (1-TSLB-8, 1.8, STM DMP TRN) (1-TSLB-8, 2.8, STM DMP TRN) 				
6) WHEN 1-PCIP, 3.6, Tavg LO-LO P-12 is ON, THEN, RELEASE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches. / Initials Date				

Со	mments / Reference: ALM-0065A		Revision: 4
	CPSES		PROCEDURE NO.
	ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	ALM-0065A
	ALARM PROCEDURE 1-PCIP	REVISION NO. 4	PAGE 51 OF 73
		•	2.6
	ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: TAVE LO-LO P-12 PROBABLE CAUSE:		3.6
	RCS cooldown and depressurization		
	NOTE: This window is normally illuminated in Mode 4-6.		
	AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:		
	Blocks operation of all steam dumps		
	NOTE: Auctioneered LO-LO-T _{AVE} <553°F enables C-16 Sto	p Turbine Loading.	
	OPERATOR ACTIONS:		
	 To continue cooldown using steam dump cooldown val DMP INTLK SELECT, and 43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTLD 		8/1-SDA, STM

Comments / Reference: Steam Dumps Study Guide

Revision: 5-4-2011

Steam Dumps

SUMMARY

The Steam Dump System is designed to absorb the excess energy created from a load rejection which is greater than or equal to either a 10% step change or a rate of 5% per minute. The system works with the automatic Rod Control System to restore RCS temperature to the programmed value for the current reactor power. The Steam Dump System accomplishes its function by allowing steam which has bypassed the Main Turbine to enter the upper portion of the Main Condenser. The steam flow removes heat from the SG's which in turn remove heat from the RCS. The system also absorbs the excess energy from a plant trip. When the reactor trip breakers open, the reactor goes to a subcritical state. RCS temperature is at an elevated temperature compared to the desired temperature for a subcritical reactor. The Steam Dump System removes this heat and allows RCS temperature to reach 557°F which is the desired temperature for Hot Standby conditions.

The Steam Dump System's piping taps into the Equalization Header on the 803' level of the Turbine Building. The piping runs toward the <u>outside</u> wall of the Turbine Building and along this wall the length of the Main Condenser. Each pneumatic valve is attached to a piping run which taps into the piping along the outside wall of the Turbine Building. The pneumatic Steam Dump Valve has a manually operated isolation upstream and downstream of it. The piping run then enters the upper portion of the Main Condenser shells.

The Steam Dump System is comprised of 12 pneumatic valves which modulate in banks of three valves to control the amount of steam which bypasses the Main Turbine. The valve positioners use electrical signals from the three controllers within the system to position the pneumatic valves to their desired position. The Load Rejection Controller determines Steam Dump Valve position during load rejection conditions. The Plant Trip Controller is placed into service by the P-4 signal generated by the opening of the Reactor Trip Breakers. This controller controls Steam Dump Valve position during a plant trip. The Steam Pressure Controller requires manual action to place it in service. The controller is used during periods of shutdown and low power operation (<15% power). The Steam Pressure Controller maintains a desired SG pressure. The pressure of the SG increases or decreases with changes in Reactor Coolant System temperature; therefore the controller actually maintains Reactor Coolant System temperature.

The Steam Dump Valves are modulated in banks of three valves. Bank 1 valves are the first to open. These valves should be fully open when the system controller's demand is 25%. Bank 2 valves start to open at 25% demand and are fully open at 50% demand and so on. The valves close in the same manner as they open. Bank 4 valves are fully closed when Bank 3 valves start to modulate closed and so on. Bank 1 valves are designated the cooldown valves and are provided with a feature which allows bypassing the 553°F (P-12) temperature interlock. The other banks of valves are not afforded this option. The cooldown valves are used for plant cooldowns-hence the name.

The Steam Dump Valves receive air pressure to open from the Instrument Air System. Air flow must pass through four solenoid valves before the valve actuator can receive air pressure. The last two solenoid valves in the series of four solenoid valves are the protection grade solenoids. Their function is to prevent the Steam Dump System from lowering RCS temperature below 553°F. When temperature falls to 553°F, the solenoids de-energize and block the passage of air to the valve actuator. The second solenoid valve in the series is a control solenoid which is said to "arm" the Steam Dump Valves. This solenoid remains de-energized blocking air flow until one of its "arming" signals is received. One arming signal which must always exist is the Condenser available signal. The

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	045.A3.07		07
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.5		

Main Turbine Generator: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MT/G system, including: Turbine stop/governor valve closure on turbine trip

Question # 36

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power when a Reactor Trip occurs
- EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, entered
- While performing Immediate Operator Actions, Main Turbine HP Stop Valve 2 indicates both RED and GREEN lights lit
- All other Main Turbine HP Stop Valves indicate GREEN Lights lit and RED lights extinguished
- All Main Turbine Control Valves indicate 0% open on the Turbine Digital Control system

Based on the above plant conditions, the turbine is __(1)__.

The reason for ensuring the turbine is tripped is to (2).

A. (1) tripped

D

- (2) prevent steaming the SGs dry
- B. (1) tripped
 - (2) prevent an excessive RCS cooldown
- C. (1) NOT tripped(2) prevent steaming the SGs dry
- D. (1) NOT tripped(2) prevent an excessive RCS cooldown

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the indications to verify the turbine has tripped.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect because EOP-0.0 step 2 requires that all HP turbine stop valves are closed. It is plausible because with the control valves closed virtually all steam flow to the turbine is stopped. Second part is incorrect because the reason for tripping the turbine is to stop the cooldown which would add positive reactivity and possibly initiate SI. It is plausible because analysis during an ATWT has shown that a turbine trip is necessary within 30 seconds to conserve SG inventory.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. Turbine is verified tripped by ALL HP stop valves indicating closed. Second part is correct. The reason for tripping the turbine on a Reactor Trip is to prevent excessive RCS cooldown.

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-0.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the immediate operator actions of EOP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (ERG.E0A.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	58149	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension c	or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ments / Reference: EOP-0.0A		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-0.0A
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 5 OF 121
TEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE N	OT OBTAINED
 Verify Reactor Trip: a. Verify the following: Reactor trip breakers - AT LEAST ONE OPEN -AND- 	a. Manually trip re both trip switch <u>IF</u> reactor will momentarily de-e	nes. not trip, <u>THEN</u> energize 480V
• Neutron flux - DECREASING	normal switchges <u>IF</u> reactor <u>NOT</u> t go to FRS-0.1A. NUCLEAR POWER GE Step 1.	ripped. <u>THEN</u> RESPONSE TO
 b. All control rod position rod bottom lights - ON Verify Turbine Trip: All HP turbine stop valves - CLOSED 	(Manually trip turbi (<u>IF</u> the turbine will (<u>THEN</u> pull-out all E (pumps.)	NOT trip.
	<u>IF</u> turbine still <u>NC</u> <u>THEN</u> close or verif steamline isolation	y closed main
3 Verify Power To AC Safeguards Busses:		
 a. AC safeguards busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED AC safeguards bus voltage- 6900 Volts(6500-7100 Volts) 	a. Go to ECA-0.0A, POWER, Step 1.	LOSS OF ALL AC
b. AC safeguards busses – BOTH ENERGIZED	b. Restore power to AC safeguards bu RESPONSE TO A 13 SYSTEM MALFUNCTI ABN-602, RESPONS 6900/480 VOLT SY MALFUNCTION when	as per ABN-601. 18/345 KV CON or DE TO A CSTEM

ments	/ Reference: EOP-0.0A		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-0.0A
RI	EACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 86 OF 121
	ATTACHMENT 10 PAGE 3 OF 38		
	BASES		
	 Turbine Building area switchgear hea aligned to operate based on area tem restored to 1B4.) 		
	If MG sets are tripped to insert contro until the flywheels on the MG sets coas hold the rods out. Actual plant experi delay will vary from several seconds to dependent on the amount of rod motion w coast down. All rods will drop in seve occurring during flywheel coast down. flywheel coast down. it may take approx drop into the core. (Reference DW-88-0	t down enough so the ence demonstrates one minute. This hile the flywheels ral seconds if rod If there is no rod imately one minute 04)	hat they cannot that this time time delay is of the MG sets motion is motion during before all rods
	When 1B3 and 1B4 are de-energized to in insertion (initiate reactor trip). the reactor trip and bypass breakers will n P-4 signal results in other automatic a trip of the Main Turbine from a Reactor Feedwater Isolation signal from Low Tay may result in a prolonged RCS cooldown actuation. Tripping the Main Turbine is limit the RCS cooldown.	P-4 signal generate ot be present. The ctions not being a Trip will not be p g with P-4 will no and a Safety Inject	ed from the e absence of the vailable. The present and the t occur, which tion signal
	Steam Generator level and feed flow sta recovery actions. The reactor trip and opened in order to generate the P-4 sig Reset SI). Subsequent actions in this 0.1A. REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE (Step 2) wi reactor trip and bypass breakers.	bypass breakers m nal for subsequent procedure (Attachme	ust still be actions (e.g., ent 2) or EOS-
	If the reactor cannot be tripped (e.g., from control room), a transition is mad POWER GENERATION/ATWT, to deal with ATW	e to FRS-0.1A, RES	
STEP 2:	The turbine is tripped to prevent an un to steam flow that the turbine would re		n of the RCS due
	The action to verify Main Steam isolati include the actions to verify the Main closed, in the event the bypass valves operation (e.g., Main Steamline warmup)	Steam isolation by have been opened du	pass valves
STEP 3:	AC power must be verified from either o generators to ensure adequate power sou equipment. At least one train of safeg deal with emergency conditions, if not, ECA-0.0A, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER.	rces to operate the uards equipment is	e safeguards required to

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	2		
	Group	2		
	K/A	075.A2.02		02
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating	2.5		

Circulating Water: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of circulating water pumps

Question # 37

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 18% power
- ALB-9A, Window 8.9 CNDSR PIT LVL TRIP/TRIP BYP, has just alarmed
- The Turbine Building NEO has just reported that leakage from a CW expansion joint has resulted in flooding in the condenser pit and level is rising
- ALL Circulating Water Pumps have tripped

Per ABN-304,	Main Condenser	and	Circulating	Water	Malfunction,	the	(1)	is to be
tripped and the	e MSIVs are to	(2)_	·					

- A. (1) Reactor
 - (2) be closed
- B. (1) Reactor(2) remain open
- C. (1) Turbine ONLY (2) be closed
- D. (1) Turbine ONLY(2) remain open

А

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the actions to be taken in the event of a loss of all circ water pumps.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. With reactor power above 10%, the reactor is to be tripped. Second part is correct. With no circ water pumps available, the condenser is not available for steam dumps so the MSIVs are closed to control steam demand with the ARVs.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see D). Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since for all other conditions only a turbine trip is required up to P-9, 50% power. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since MSIVs are typically left open following a reactor or turbine trip.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-304	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Circulating Water Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-304, Main Condenser and Circulating Water System Malfunction. (ABN.304.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	17645	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

Form ES-401-5

nments / Reference: ABN-304			Revision: 9
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-304
MAIN CONDENSER AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 4 OF 34
2.3 Operator Actions			
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
 CAUTION: Operation with one Circulating insufficient waterbox level, when equipment cooled by TPCW, pequipment damage and possil 1 VERIFY Circulating Water Pumps - AT LEAST ONE OPERATING <u>u</u>-HS-2800A, CWP 1 <u>u</u>-HS-2801A, CWP 2 <u>u</u>-HS-2802A, CWP 3 <u>u</u>-HS-2803A, CWP 4 	ich may mps ope per ABN- ble Main •	cause condenser tube rating, a rapid shutdov 306, may be necessa	degradation. vn of y to prevent elease. greater than or GOTO hers continue this ess than 10%, erform ABN-403 procedure. SR PIT LVL G.3, this procedure, section. ter Pumps lary plant per CW Section, as n affected imits.
Section	n 2.3		

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	2	
		Group	2	
		K/A	01	7.K4.01
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	3.4	
In-Core Temperature Monitor System to subcooling monitors	(ITM): Knowledge of ITM design feat	ure(s) and/or interlock(s) which p	rovide for the	following: Input
Question # 38				
Concerning the Subcoole	d Margin Monitor:			
(1) Which of the following	CET temperatures are a	in input to the monitor;	and,	
(2) Assuming all other par Subcooling Margin to		which of the following w	will cause	∍ RCS
A. (1) Highest CET te (2) Rising RCS pre	•			
B. (1) Highest CET te (2) Rising RCS ten	•			
C. (1) Average CET te (2) Rising RCS pre	•			
D. (1) Average CET te (2) Rising RCS ten	•			
Answer: B				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the temperature inputs to the subcooling monitor.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that being further from boiling would cause subcooling margin to get larger.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Along with RCS loop pressure, Pressurizer pressure, and RCS loop RTD temperatures, the Highest CET temperature is also an input. Second part is correct. Higher temperature indicates closer to boiling, so subcooling margin gets smaller.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible as it could be thought that the average CET would be used as a general indication of the temperature of the RCS. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	Core Cooling Monitor/RVLIS Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Core Cooling Monitor/RVLIS LP	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Core Cooling Monitor/Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) IAW DBD-EE-004. (SYS.RC3.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank #1 Modified Bank # New	9377	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental K	nowledge	
	Comprehension or Analysi	S	<u> </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: Core Cooling Monitor/RVLIS Study Guide

Revision: 4-27-2011

Core Cooling Monitor/RVLIS

SUBCOOLED MARGIN MONITOR (SMM)

In addition to the highest CET temperature, the SMM function of the CCM makes use of various other RCS measurements. Signal flow paths from the RVLIS instruments will be described later. Redundant, diverse temperature measurements are provided by RTD's located such that each SMM train employs the hot or cold leg RCS temperature from each of the four reactor coolant loops. As illustrated in Figure 5, Train A employs the hot leg temperatures from Loops 1 and 2 and the cold leg temperatures from Loops 3 and 4. Train B employs the cold leg temperatures from Loops 1 and 2 and the hot leg temperatures from Loops 3 and 4. Also employed are the Loop 4 hot leg RCS wide-range pressure measurements for Train B and redundant narrow-range pressurizer pressure measurements. Train A uses a wide range pressure transmitter which senses Reactor vessel thimble tube pressure.

These temperature and pressure measurements are used in conjunction with a stored steam table

algorithm to compute the saturation margin. Conservatively, the computation is based upon the highest valid RCS temperature and lowest valid RCS pressure. Thus, under normal operating subcooled conditions, the SMM output signal represents the minimum possible margin to saturation. In the event of depressurization due to a small break LOCA, this output signal will provide the earliest indication of the existence of saturation conditions.

Subcooled Margin is a readout in EF which indicates the current temperature margin between actual highest temperature and the temperature for current RCS pressure. For example, control board display for RCS saturation margin, which indicates from -300EF to +300EF, could indicate -25EF, which is a normal value for power operations. This value means that if the hottest water in the coolant loops or core was increased greater than 25EF while maintaining RCS pressure constant, then that water would flash to steam.

The CCM microprocessor provides Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) and Subcooled Margin Monitor (SMM) output temperature signals in EF which are indicated by the side-by-side meters (Figure 6). Each meter covers the entire functional range of the corresponding instrument measurement. The CET measurement (left-side meter) provides the maximum valid core exit temperature on a scale of 0-2300EF (50 degree minimum scale intervals). The SMM measurement (right-side meter) indicates the computed RCS saturation margin on a scale ranging from 300°F subcooled, to saturation (0°F), to 300°F superheated.

During normal reactor operations, each CCM meter indicator can be expected to always remain in the bottom-half portion of the scale, giving redundant indication of adequate core cooling (i.e., CET readings significantly below the threshold for impending ICC and SMM readings well within the subcooling region). Subsequently, the CET reading would also rise (at a slower rate). The threshold of impending ICC is considered to be a CET reading of 1200°F. Since the monitored CET reading represents the maximum measured core exit temperature, it can be expected that adequate core cooling would exist as long as the CET reading does not rise well into the top-half portion of the CET scale.

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1SYSRC3			Page 6 of 16
/215151603			Page 6 of 16
NOTES	LESSON PLAN	LESSON OUTLINE	
	a Two m	edundant trains	
		CCM is designed to indicate Core I	First Thermocouple
	temper	ratures (CET function) and to mon oling Margin Monitor (SMM funct	itor the RCS
	1) Co	ore Exit Thermocouples:	
	a)	Provide data to the CCM micro	processor.
	b)	Fifty CET's divided into two sep trains with each set having a dis representative of all four quadra core exit area.	tribution
	c)	Type K (chromel-alumel) therm within an aluminum-oxide insul sheathed cable (1/8" OD).	
	d)	Each train routed into a separate box which contains three plating	
	e)	2 of the 3 RTDs are used for ref measurements	erence temperature
	f)	Other RTD is an installed spare	
	g)	Reference measurements permit chromel-alumel leads to copper transmission to the CCM microg	conductors for signal
	h)	 CET signals used to monitor co- over the entire range including r conditions and extending to bey extremes. 	normal operating
	i)	Highest valid CET signal is disp Board and is also employed by t determine the RCS saturation m	the microprocessor to
	c. Subcor	oled Margin Monitor	
		MM function of the CCM makes u	se of:
	_	Highest CET temperature	
	(b)	 Hot or Cold leg RCS temperature four reactor coolant loops. 	re from each of the

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-refere	nce:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3		Tier	1	
		Group	1	
		K/A	000009.	.EA2.36
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	4.2	
Small Break LOCA: Ability to determine or int	erpret the following as they a	pply to a small break LOCA: Differ	rence between ov	vercooling and
Question # 39				
Given the following conditions:				
 EOP-1.0A, Loss of Rea RCS WR Pressure 800 RCS WR Thot Tempera RCS WR Tcold Tempera SG Pressures 800 psig SG NR Levels 35% risin CCP SI Injection flow 38 SI Pump flow 600 gpm RHR Pump flow 0 gpm 	psig stable atures 520°F stable atures 520°F stable stable ng 50 gpm stable each stable		med	
The event causing the above i	ndications is a			
A. LBLOCA				
B. SBLOCA				
C. Feedline Break				
D. Steamline Break				
Answer: B				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the difference in RCS and secondary parameters during a SBLOCA events to properly diagnose the event.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because a LOCA is in progress, however, not a LBLOCA because RCS pressure is above the pressure at which RHR pumps begin injecting.
- B. Correct. SBLOCA is in progress as RCS pressure has stabilized at a pressure above RHR injection flow. A secondary break is not evident by indications provided because SG pressures have stabilized.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because a Feedline break will cause a resultant drop in RCS pressures and temperatures and on a Feedline Break SG pressure will remain elevated until the break is uncovered, however, on a Feedline Break when the break is uncovered continued depressurization of the SGs will occur.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because RCS pressures and temperatures will drop below normal no-load values on a Steamline break, however, a Steamline Break will result in continued depressurization of the SGs.

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-1.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the bases for operator actions, notes and cautions from EOP-1.0 in accordance with EOP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (ERG.E1A.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

CPNPP PROCEDURE EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 PROCEDURE LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 10 OF STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner to less than 325 PSIG	4
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 10 OF STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure	_
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure	44
CAUTION: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure	
(425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.	
* 8 Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:	
a. Check RCS pressure:	
1) RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1) Go to Step 10. 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)	
2) RCS pressure - STABLE OR 2) Go to Step 9. INCREASING	
b. RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH b. Go to Step 9. SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST	
c. Stop RHR pumps and place in standby.	
d. Reset RHR auto switchover.	
9 Check RCS And SG Pressures: Return to Step 1.	
Check RCS Pressure - STABLE <u>OR</u> DECREASING	
- AND -	
Check Pressure in All SGs - STABLE <u>OR</u> INCREASING	

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

nments	/ Reference: EOP-1.0A		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-1.0A
LOS	SS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT	REVISION NO. 9	9 PAGE 14 OF 44
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE	NOT OBTAINED
R] 11	 d. Evaluate plant equipment: Consult Plant Staff to determine equipment that should be available or 		
12	started to assist in recovery. Check If RCS Cooldown And		
12	Depressurization Is Required:	a. <u>IF</u> RHR pump fl	ow greater than
	(325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE) CONTAINMENT)		go to Step 13.
	b. Go to EOS-1.2A. POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION. Step 1.		
13	Check If Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation Is Required:		
	a. RWST level - LESS THAN LO-LO LEVEL	a. Return to Step NOTE PRIOR TO	
	b. Go To EOS-1.3A, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.		

	/ Reference: EOP-1.0A		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-1.0A
LOSS	OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 30 OF 44
	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 7 OF 21		
	BASES		
<u>STRP 9</u> .	Since procedure #OP-1.0A is used to rec secondary side break, a second check on there is a faulted SG which was not ful SI termination criteris were checked. necessary in case the SG pressures are which is depressurizing at the time the checked. If there is a faulted SG which uncontrolled manner or if the RGS press directed to return to Step 1, since the be rechecked.	80 pressure is nearly depressurized and there is stable and the stable an	cessary in case t the time the ssure is also s a faulted SG iteria were urizing in an the operator is
	Eventually, the faulted SG will blow do out, RCS pressure will stabilize or inc criteria in EOP-1.0A should be met. If in EOP-1.0A with a depressurizing SG, h POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION SI termination criteria than necessary.	trease, and all SI the operator proc the could be directe N, and encounter mo	termination eeds past Step 9 d to EOS-1.2A.
	With a LOCA and <u>no</u> faulted SG the SG pr slightly. This is considered a "stable addressed by this step is the presence the faulted SG is still depressurizing this is the case, the SI flow reduction time the check is encountered, and the in EOP-1.0A, and not proceed to EOS-1.2 DEPRESSURIZATION, until all SG pressure	" SG pressure. The of a secondary side in an uncontrolled a criteria may not operator should re CA. POST LOCA COOLD	e concern e break in which manner. If be met at the turn to Step 1 OWN AND
	increasing and RCS pressure has stabili		
		ized or is decreasi crol of the operato	ng. r. AND incapable
STEP 10:	increasing and RCS pressure has stabili "Uncontrolled" means not under the cont	ized or is decreasing trol of the operato ing available equip be run for more the an SI signal, but are supplying the	ng. r. AND incapable ment. an 30 minutes will not load safeguards
<u>STEP 10</u> :	<pre>increasing and RCS pressure has stabili "Uncontrolled" means not under the cont of being controlled by the operator usi It is recommended that the diesels not unloaded. Diesels should auto-start on if offsite power is available. If DGs busses, then possibly some additional end if additional end in the start of the start of</pre>	ized or is decreasing and of the operatoring available equips be run for more the an SI signal, but are supplying the equipment should be they are placed in	ng. r. AND incapable ment. an 30 minutes will not load safeguards loaded to aid

Comments /	Reference: EOP-1.0A		Revision: 9	
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-1.0A	
LOSS	OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 33 OF 44	
	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 10 OF 21			
	BASES			
	The process sampling system is used to step. The ability to obtain RCS. or re on RCS activity conditions, and the res be incurred while collecting and analyz conditions prohibit obtaining a sample. room personnel of the inability to obta should be notified to determine the app accident recovery sequence. Alternate assist in applying engineering judgment If it is determined that a sample is re actions, then the Contingency Sampling Chemistry Accident Assessment Sampling Plant Staff approval. Use of the Conti evaluated against the requirements of 1 An evaluation of plant equipment availa to determine long-term recovery actions initiated at this time and any addition the plant recovery is started.	circulation sump s ulting radiation er ing the samples. Chemistry will no in the sample and ropriate action to indications may be for assessing Uni- quired to support Plan per CHM-111. Program may be ini- ngency Sampling Pl OCFR50.54x prior to ble following a LO . Hence, this eva	amples depends xposure that may If radiological tify control the Plant Staff support the available to t conditions. recovery Primary tiated with an should be o use. CA is necessary luation is	
STEP 13:	STEP 12: The operator should stay in EOP-1.0A only for loss of reactor coolant accidents for which the RCS pressure is less than the RHR pump shutoff head and flow from the RHR pumps has been verified. The RHR pump flow should be verified even though the RCS pressure is less than 425 PSIG, which is the shutoff head pressure of the pumps plus allowances for normal channel accuracy and (with an adverse containment) post accident transmitter errors. Since the post accident transmitter errors are <u>added</u> on to determine the pressure requirement, the actual plant pressure may be significantly less. For any break in the RCS for which the RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head pressure of the RHR pumps, the operator should transfer to procedure EOS 1.2A, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRRESURIZATION. If the RCS pressure is less than the RHR pump shutoff head but RHR pump flow into the RCS cannot be verified, the operator should also transfer to EOS 1.2A. From this point on EOS 1.2A would be used for plant recovery. STEP 13: Since the RHR pumps are injecting at this time, this indicates the presence of a large break LOCA and, hence, the eventual transfer to cold leg recirculation. When the switchover level in the RWST is reached, the operator should immediately go to EOS 1.3A, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, to maintain coolant flow to the core. If, however, the switchover setpoint has not been reached when the operator encounters			
	this step he is instructed to return to his evaluation of plant status while wa switchover setpoint.			 _

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	00004	40.Al	K1.02
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.2		

Steam Line Rupture: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Leak rate versus pressure change

Question # 40

Unit 1 is in Mode 3. A Safety Valve has failed open on SG 1-02.

- RCS pressure indicates 2200 psig
- SG 1-02 pressure indicates 1000 psig
- Main Steam flow on SG 1-02 indicates 200,000 lbm/hr

Subsequently:

- A complete MSL Isolation has occurred
- RCS pressure lowers to 1700 psig
- SG 1-02 pressure lowers to 500 psig

Neglecting any change in steam density, Main Steam flow on SG 1-02 will indicate approximately __(1)__.

In accordance with EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, AFW flow to SG 1-02 should be reduced to __(2)__.

A. (1) 100,000 lbm/hr

(2)	0 gpm	
-----	-------	--

- B. (1) 100,000 lbm/hr(2) 100 gpm
- C. (1) 141,000 lbm/hr (2) 0 gpm
- D. (1) 141,000 lbm/hr(2) 100 gpm

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring the ability to determine the reduction in leak rate of a SG as SG pressure lowers.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. 1^{st} part is incorrect but plausible because the square root of the SG DP is not taken into account (500/1000) x 200 = 100. 2^{nd} part is correct (See C).
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see A). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible because if all SGs were Faulted ECA-0.2A, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SGs would direct reducing AFW flow to 100 gpm.
- C. Correct. 1st part is correct, the DP between SG 1-02 and atmospheric pressure has dropped from 1000 psid to 500 psid. Taking the square root of this ratio results in a leak rate of 141 gpm (500/1000)^{1/2} x 200 = 141. 2nd part is correct, EOP-2.0A directs reducing AFW flow to zero on a faulted SG.
- D. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see C). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	Generic Fundamentals	Attached w/ Revision # See
	EOP-2.0A	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given an event that results in an excessive increase in secondary steam flow transient, **DISCUSS** accident analysis assumptions, predicted plant response, and analysis conclusions as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. (MCO.TA8.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledg	е
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Steam Generator tube leak occurred. A manual Safety Injection was initiated. The conditions just prior to the Safety Injection were: • RCS pressure 2200 psig and decreasing • SG pressures at 800 psig • Primary to secondary leakage was calculated to be 200 gpm. The conditions following the Safety Injection are: • RCS pressure 1700 psig and decreasing • SG pressures at 1000 psig Primary to secondary leakage following the SI is approximately A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer: C Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared	
 RCS pressure 2200 psig and decreasing SG pressures at 800 psig Primary to secondary leakage was calculated to be 200 gpm. The conditions following the Safety Injection are: RCS pressure 1700 psig and decreasing SG pressures at 1000 psig Primary to secondary leakage following the SI is approximately A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 SG pressures at 800 psig Primary to secondary leakage was calculated to be 200 gpm. The conditions following the Safety Injection are: RCS pressure 1700 psig and decreasing SG pressures at 1000 psig Primary to secondary leakage following the SI is approximately A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer: C Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 RCS pressure 1700 psig and decreasing SG pressures at 1000 psig Primary to secondary leakage following the SI is approximately A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 SG pressures at 1000 psig Primary to secondary leakage following the SI is approximately A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 A. 100 gpm. B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared	
 B. 124 gpm. C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 C. 141 gpm. D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
 D. 176 gpm. Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	
Answer: C Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared	
Answer Explanation A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared	
 A. Plausible if the square root of the DP is not taken into account (700/1400) x 200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared 	_
200 = 100. B. Plausible if the differences between SG and RCS pressures are compared	-
(800/1000) x (1700/2200) x 200 = 124.	
C. The DP has dropped from 1400 psid to 700 psid. Taking the square root of this ratio results in a leak rate of 141 gpm (700/1400) ^{1/2} x 200 = 141.	
D. Plausible since this is taken from a ratio, but the ratio is only RCS pressure (1700/2200) ^{1/2} x 200 = 176.	
	-

Comments / Reference: Bank 23157

Revision:

Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	0
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	23157
User-Defined ID:	ILOT
Cross Reference	
Number:	
Topic:	Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Steam
-	Generator tube leak occurred. A manual Safety Inj
K/A:	038.EK1.02
Question Reference:	
SRO:	
Comments:	R/S20E15; R/S22E16; R/S23E25; R/S24E25;
	R/S25E25, S27E26
	REF: EOP-3.0A; MCO.TAB

nments / Reference: Generic Fundamentals	Revision: 3.5
Example:	
A pipe with a 4 inch inner diameter contains water that flows at an average velocity of 14 feet per second. Calculate the volumetric flow rate of water in the pipe.	
Solution:	
Using the volumetric flow rate equation:	
$\dot{V} = (\pi r^2) \mathbf{v}$	
Volumetric Flow Rate and Pressure Relationship	
Velocity is a function of the square root of the change in pressure drop; doubling the flow velocity doubles the volumetric flow rate, which quadruples the pressure drop. This relationship holds well for water, but less accurately for gases.	
$\dot{V} \propto \sqrt{DP}$ or $\frac{\dot{v}_{final}}{\dot{v}_{initial}} = \frac{\sqrt{DP_{final}}}{\sqrt{DP_{final}}}$	
Other considerations such as the friction factor, Reynolds number, and viscosity, influence this relationship but not significantly for small pressure drops and flow rates, which are discussed in more detail later in this module. Example:	
A 20 gpm leak to atmosphere has developed from a cooling water system that is operating at 200 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). If pressure decreases to 50 psig, what is the new leak rate?	
Solution:	
The change in pressure is now one quarter of what it was. The square root of 0.25 is 0.5. Therefore, flow and velocity decrease by half or to 10 gpm.	
Mathematically:	
$\frac{v_{final}}{v_{initial}} = \frac{\sqrt{DP_{final}}}{\sqrt{DP_{initial}}} \text{ therefore } \frac{v_{final}}{20} = \frac{\sqrt{50}}{\sqrt{200}}$	
$\dot{V}_{final} = (20) \frac{\sqrt{50}}{\sqrt{200}} = (20)(0.5) = 10$	
Mass Flow Rate	
The mass flow rate (m) of a fluid system is a measure of the mass of fluid passing a point in the system per unit time. The mass flow rate relates to	

Comments / Reference: EOP-2.0A		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-0.0A
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 20 OF 121
ATTACHMENT 1.4 PAGE 1 OF 1	<u>A</u>	
FOLDOUT FOR EOP-0.0A REACTOR TRIP	OR SAFETY INJECTIO	<u>N</u>
1. RCP TRIP CRITERIA		
NOTE: ABN-101, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP/MALFUN RCP is applicable during use of the Emerg		tripping an
Trip all RCPs if <u>BOTH</u> conditions listed below	w occur:	
a. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOF b. CCP or SI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING	ADVERSE CONTAINMEN	NT)
 <u>SHUTDOWN MARGIN CRITERIA</u> Emergency borate per ABN-107 if <u>either</u> of the 	e following conditi	ons below occur:
 Two or more control rods <u>NOT</u> fully insert boric acid for <u>each</u> control rod not fully 	ed (1800 gallons o	
 Control rod position indication is NOT available (3600 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid). 		
NOTE: During the performance of the immediate of		FW FOP
verbalization is neither required nor exp 3. CONTROL AFW FLOW TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE HEAT S		
 Ensure both MDAFWPs started following a F) Blackout or SI
 actuation. (Start TDAFWP, if necessary) Ensure AFW flow throttled following a Real 	ator Trin(ST (norm	11. 150
200 gpm). AND	letor irip/or (norma	illy 190 Kbm co
Maintain total AFW flow GREATER THAN 460 greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINS		ONE SG NR Level
 <u>IF</u> any SG identified as faulted, <u>THEN</u> store 		so.
 <u>IF</u> any SG identified as ruptured. <u>THEN</u>: Stop AFW flow <u>after</u> ruptured SG level gree CONTAINMENT). 	ater than 43%(50% :	for ADVERSE
AND Control AFW flow to <u>maintain</u> ruptured SG ADVERSE CONTAINMENT).	level greater than	43%(50% for
 <u>IF BOTH</u> MDAFWPs are running with flow <u>THE</u> 	<u>N</u> . secure the TDAF	NP.
 AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION <u>IF</u> CST level decreases to less than 10%, <u>THE</u> supply per ABN-305, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYST. 		te AFW water
 <u>RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION</u> Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to actions. 	o all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> i	solated by ERG
		_

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 4		Tier	1	
		Group	1	
		K/A	0000	15.AK1.01
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	4.4	
Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions: Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow)		al implications of the following concepts as clear reactor power plant	s they apply to	Reactor Coolant
Question # 41				
Given the following condi	tions:			
 While operating at EOS-0.1A, Reactor SG levels are 40% SG pressure is 10% 	r Trip Response, is			
Indication that Natural Cirtemperatures indicating _ To enhance Natural Circu	_(1)	OT ADEQUATE is supported (2) should be raised.	I by RCS	cold leg
A. (1) 552°F (2) level		、 /		
B. (1) 552°F (2) pressure				
C. (1) 561°F (2) level				
D. (1) 561°F (2) pressure				
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of indications of natural circulation flow flowing a loss of all RCPs.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since the RCS must be subcooled by more than 25°F, but that is based on RCS pressure, not SG pressure. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since changing SG pressure could enhance natural circulation, but by lowering it due to increasing steaming rate.

C. Correct. First part is correct. To support indication of natural circulation, RCS cold leg temperatures should be at saturation temperature for SG pressure, so cold leg temperature being 9°F above saturation is indication that natural circulation does not exist. Saturation temperature for 1047 psig is 552F. Second part is correct. Raising SG level adds cold water to the SG, increasing the difference in temperature between the heat source and heat sink, increasing the likelihood of natural circulation.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B)

Technical Reference(s)	EOS-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the Natural Circulation generic issue in the ERG network and proper operator response per the applicable Executive Volume. (ERG.XD5.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

comments / Reference: Banl	< 23172	Revision:
In accordance with EOS-0.1 the indication that natural cir	A, Reactor Trip Response, which of the follow culation is occurring?	ving supports
A. SG pressure r	ising and Pressurizer pressure rising	
B. SG pressure r	ising and Pressurizer pressure stable	
C. RCS hot leg te	emperatures at saturation temperature for SG	pressure
D. RCS cold leg	temperatures at saturation temperature for SC	G pressure
Answer: D		
Answer Explanation	1	
A. Incorrect - Plausit this	ble as these are parameters that are reference	ed but not for
B. Incorrect - Plausit this	ble as these are parameters that are reference	ed but not for
C. Incorrect - Plausi this D. Correct - EOS-0.1	ble as these are parameters that are referenc	ed but not for
Question 78 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
	1.00	
Time to Complete:	2	
Time to Complete: Difficulty:		
Difficulty:	2 2.00	
Difficulty: System ID:	2 2.00 23172	
Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID:	2 2.00	
Difficulty: System ID:	2 2.00 23172	
Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic:	2 2.00 23172 ILOT In accordance with EOS-0.1A, Reactor T Response, which of the following suppor indication	-
Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number:	2 2.00 23172 ILOT In accordance with EOS-0.1A, Reactor T Response, which of the following support	-
Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic:	2 2.00 23172 ILOT In accordance with EOS-0.1A, Reactor T Response, which of the following suppor indication	-
Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic: K/A:	2 2.00 23172 ILOT In accordance with EOS-0.1A, Reactor T Response, which of the following suppor indication E09.EK2.2	-

С	Comme	ents / Reference: EOS-0.1A		R	evision: 9	
1		CPNPP		PROCE	DURE NO.	
		EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1		-0.1A	
		REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE	25 OF 40	
		ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 1 OF 1				
		NATURAL CIRCULATION VE	RIFICATION			
	The	following conditions support or indicate nat	ural circulation fi	ow:		
		RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25°F.				
		SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING.				
		RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECRE	ASING.			
		Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING.				
		RCS cold leg temperatures = AT SATURATION	TEMPERATURE FOR SG	PRESSUR	₽.	

Form ES-401-5

 Immediately following a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, RCS pressure and temperature undergo transient variations depending upon the specific initiating event and automatic control system response. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, the RCS should reach an equilibrium condition as the free convection heat transfer rates from core to reactor coolant and reactor coolant to secondary coolant begin to equilibrate. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the ERGs after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is in operation, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm Natural Circulation. Met following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow: <u>RCS subcooling</u> should be greater than instrument inaccuracies. <u>The core exit TCS, RCS hot leg temperatures and SC pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off.</u> With SC pressures held relatively constant, the RCS cold teg temperatures should remain relatively constant at or slightly above the sourceton temperature for the SC pressures being minimed. In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following symptoms can provide additional confirmation of natural circulation flow: the <u>hot-to-cold leg temperature difference</u> should be approximately equal to the full-power forced convection temperature difference, and the <u>core exit average temperature</u>, and SC pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the tark loops. To facilitate the verification of pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium stainment in the ERGs. 	nents / Reference: EOS-0.1A		Revision: 9
ATACHMENT 4 PAGE 15 OF 15 BASES TACHMENT 3 Immediately following a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, RCS pressure and temperature undergo transient variations depending upon the specific initiating event and automatic control system response. Approximately to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, the KCS should each an equilibrium condition as the free convection heat transfer rates from core to reactor coolant and reactor coolant flow. The KCS should experi to equilibrate. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the RGS after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is in operation, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm tural Circulation. Immediately following should be greater than instrument inaccuracies. The core exit TCS. RCS hot leg temperatures and SG pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat fails off. With 80 pressures held telatively constant at or whightly showe to surrention temperature for the SD pressures changed by the full power forced convection temperature difference, and the core exit average temperature of the SD pressure reading) should be hot-to-cold leg temperature difference, find all on the syntemes cold be gremerature difference. This averaged reading should be hold also decrease as core decay heat fails off, in step with core exit average temperature, and SC pressure reading, should be higher than the average cold leg temperature. This averaged reading should be higher than the average cold leg temperature difference, and lea core loopes. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the should also decrease as core decay heat fails off, in step with core exit average temperature, and SC pressure reading in all active loopes. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the should also decrease as core decay heat fails off, in step with core exit average temperature in the the step temperature. This averaged reading in the step the store average		UNIT 1	
<section-header> PAGE 15 0F 15</section-header>	REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 40 OF 40
ATTACEMENT 1 Immediately following a loss of forced reactor coolant flow. RCS pressure initiating event and automatic control system response. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, the RCS should each an equilibrite. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the RCS after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is no peration, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm thrue. If the CCS automatic control system response. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant to secondary coolant begin to equilibrite. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the ERCS after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is no peration, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm thrue. If the CCS exceeding should be greater than instrument inaccuracies. The core exit TCS, RCS hot leg temperatures and S0 pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off. With S0 pressures held relatively constant <u>the RCS cold teg</u> temperatures should remain relatively constant at or slightly above the acutation temperature for the S0 pressures being maintend. In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following flow from the hort-or cold leg temperature of the S0 pressure being maintend. In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following flow the hort-or cold leg temperature difference, should be approximately equal to the full-power forced convection temperature difference, and the core exit average temperature, dore exit TCS averaged reading) should be higher than the average cold leg temperature. This averaged reading higher than the average cold leg temperature difference, should be pressed at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the texture lorent. MIDEMENT 1 MIDEMENT 1 Desses attachment provides a discussion for the steps and attachments of the high produce. The information the MCC EKE	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 15 OF 15		
 and temperature undergo transient variations depending upon the specific initiating event and automatic control system response. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, the RCS should reach an equilibrium condition as the free convection heat transfer rates from core to reactor coolant and reactor coolant to secondary coolant begin to equilibrate. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the ERGs after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is in operation, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm Natural Circulation. The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow: <u>The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow:</u> <u>The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow:</u> <u>The core exit TCs, RCS hot leg temperatures and SC pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off.</u> <u>With SC pressures held relatively constant at or slightly showe the saturation temperature for the SC pressures being maintained.</u> In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following symptoms can provide additional confirmation of natural circulation flow: the <u>hot-to-cold leg temperature difference</u> should be higher than the average cold leg temperature. This averaged reading should also decrease as core decay heat falls off. In step with core exit TC, hot leg temperature, and SC pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the natural circulation process, the Natural Circulation parameters should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ECC and the text of the SC pressure should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ECC and the text of this procedure. The information that forms the basis steps and attachments has been taken from the WOG ERC Background Informat	BASES		
 and temperature undergo transient variations depending upon the specific initiating event and automatic control system response. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after a loss of forced reactor coolant flow, the RCS should reach an equilibrium condition as the free convection heat transfer rates from core to reactor coolant and reactor coolant to secondary coolant begin to equilibrate. The action to verify natural circulation flow is included in the ERGs after ECCS flow is terminated. If the ECCS system is in operation, ECCS flow may affect the indications used to confirm Natural Circulation. The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow: <u>The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow:</u> <u>The following symptoms are used to verify natural circulation flow:</u> <u>The core exit TCs, RCS hot leg temperatures and SC pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off.</u> <u>With SC pressures held relatively constant at or slightly showe the saturation temperature for the SC pressures being maintained.</u> In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following symptoms can provide additional confirmation of natural circulation flow: the <u>hot-to-cold leg temperature difference</u> should be higher than the average cold leg temperature. This averaged reading should also decrease as core decay heat falls off. In step with core exit TC, hot leg temperature, and SC pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the natural circulation process, the Natural Circulation parameters should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ECC and the text of the SC pressure should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ECC and the text of this procedure. The information that forms the basis steps and attachments has been taken from the WOG ERC Background Informat	TTACHMENT 3		
 <u>RCS subcooling</u> should be greater than instrument inaccuracies. <u>The core exit TCs. RCS hot leg temperatures and SG pressures</u> should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off. With SG pressures held relatively constant. <u>the RCS cold leg</u> temperatures should remain relatively constant at or slightly above the saturation temperature for the SO pressures being maintained. In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following symptoms can provide additional confirmation of natural circulation flow: the <u>hot-to-cold leg temperature difference</u> should be approximately equal to the full-power forced convection temperature difference, and the <u>core exit average temperature</u> (core exit TCs averaged reading) should be higher than the average cold leg temperature. This averaged reading should also decrease as core decay heat falls off. in step with core exit TC, hot leg temperature, and SG pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the natural circulation process, the Natural Circulation parameters should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ERGs. 	and temperature undergo transient varia initiating event and automatic control to 10 minutes after a loss of forced re reach an equilibrium condition as the f from core to reactor coolant and reacto begin to equilibrate. The action to ve included in the ERGs after ECCS flow is is in operation. ECCS flow may affect t	ations depending up system response. eactor coolant flow free convection hea or coolant to secon erify natural circu s terminated. If t	on the specific Approximately 5 , the RCS should t transfer rates dary coolant lation flow is he ECCS system
 <u>The core exit TCs, RCS hot leg temperatures and SC pressures should be decreasing slowly with time, as core decay heat falls off.</u> With SO pressures held relatively constant at or slightly above the saturation temperature for the SC pressures being maintained. In addition to the symptoms used in this attachment, the following symptoms can provide additional confirmation of natural circulation flow: the <u>hot-to-cold leg temperature difference</u> should be approximately equal to the full-power forced convection temperature. This averaged reading should also decrease as core decay heat falls off, in step with core exit TC, hot leg temperature, and SC pressure readings in all active loops. To facilitate the verification of transient equilibrium attainment in the natural circulation process, the Natural Circulation parameters should be recorded at regular intervals beginning as soon as instructed in the ERCs. 	The following symptoms are used to veri	fy natural circula	tion flow:
The Bases attachment provides a discussion for the steps and attachments of this procedure. The information that forms the basis steps and attachments has been taken from the WOG ERG Background Information or	 The core exit TCs. RCS hot leg temp be decreasing slowly with time, as With SG pressures held relatively of temperatures should remain relative the saturation temperature for the In addition to the symptoms used in thi symptoms can provide additional confirm the hot-to-cold leg temperature differe to the full-power forced convection tem <u>exit average temperature</u> (core exit TCs higher than the average cold leg temper should also decrease as core decay heat TC. hot leg temperature, and SG pressur To facilitate the verification of trans natural circulation process, the Natura recorded at regular intervals beginning 	peratures and SG pr core decay heat fa constant. the RCS c aly constant at or SG pressures being as attachment, the mation of natural c ence should be appr operature differences averaged reading) ature. This avera i falls off, in ste readings in all cient equilibrium a al Circulation para	essures should lls off. old leg slightly above maintained. following irculation flow: oximately equal e. and the <u>core</u> should be ged reading p with core exit active loops. ttainment in the meters should be
of this procedure. The information that forms the basis steps and attachments has been taken from the WOG ERG Background Information or	TTACHMENT 4		
	of this procedure. The information tha attachments has been taken from the WOG	t forms the basis ; ERG Background In	steps and

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 4	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	0000	25.G.	2.4.4
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	4.5		

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

Question # 42

Given the following conditions:

- RCS in Mid-Loop operations in preparation for Refueling Outage
- RCS cooldown on Train A RHR in progress
- RCS temperature 150°F stable
- Mansell indication 78" above core plate lowering
- RCS leakage has been reported

Based on the above conditions, which of the following procedures should be entered?

- A. ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
- B. ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction
- C. ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant
- D. ABN-909, Spent Fuel Pool/Refueling Cavity Malfunction

Answer:

В

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of entry conditions to ABNs for an RCS leak occurring while operating on RHR.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since ABN-103 is entered for an RCS leak in MODES 1, 2, and 3 with pressure above 1000 psig, but the unit is in MODE 5 or 6.
- B. Correct. ABN-104 is entered for an RCS leak in MODE 5 with the RCS not filled or any time at reduced inventory.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since the RCS is Mode 5 or 6 and ABN-108 would be the correct procedure for an RCS leak if the RCS was still full.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since ABN-909 would be entered if the Refueling Cavity was filled and refueling activities were actually in progress.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-103	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-104	Comments / Reference
	ABN-108	
	ABN-909	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DETERMINE** the appropriate procedural section of ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction or ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant for an RCS or RHR malfunction. (ABN.104.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	32761	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2018 NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u>		

Comments / Reference: 2018 NF	RC Exam Q91		Revision:
Examination Outline Cross-Reference	Level	SRO	
072 Area Radiation Monitoring	Tier # Group # K/A #	2 2 2.4.8	
2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal ope procedures are used in conjunction wit EOPs.	rating Rating	4.5 6	
Question 91			
Unit 1 has just transitioned to Mode 4 i 345°F. The RO has just validated incr and humidity. Coincident with the valid tripped the running RHR pump.	easing containment radiat	ion, temperature, pres	sure,
As the US you are expected to initially	enter which of the following	ng procedures?	
A. ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coola	int		
B. ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal	System Malfunction		
C. ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coola	ant Leakage		
D. EOP 0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Inj	jection		
Answer: A			
Explanation: A is correct because since you've just correct procedure. Also, the loops wou inventory yet. B is wrong because this would be the p C is wrong because this is the correct D is wrong because see A. This is pla into Mode 3 they may need to enter thi or Secondary Coolant. EOP are allow line analysis is done while performing to ABN should have sufficient guidance.	uld be assumed to be fille procedure if in Mode 5 an procedure if in Modes 1, 2 usible if an applicant think is initially to allow an entry ed to be used outside of M	d due to not being at re d RCS loops not filled , 3 and RCS >1000 ps s they're going to heat into EOP-1, Loss of F lode 1, 2, and 3 if a lin	educed sig t up Reactor ne by
Technical References: ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, I	Rev 4, p. 2		
References to be provided to applic	ants during exam: None		
Learning Objective: DETERMINE the Heat Removal System Malfunction or A RHR malfunction. (LO21.ABN.104.OB)	ABN-108, Shutdown Loss		
Question Source: (note changes; attach parent)	Bank # Modified Bank # New	x	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	No	-
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analy		
	55.43(b)(5)		

Com	ments / Reference: ABN-103					Revision: 10	
	CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES M	ANUAL	UNI	T 1 AND 2	PRC	OCEDURE NO. ABN-103	
	EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT LEAKA	AGE	REVIS	SION NO. 10	P/	AGE 2 OF 37	
	1.0 APPLICABILITY						
	This procedure specifies the actions to be taken in the event of excessive reactor coolant leakage and applies to MODES 1, 2 and 3 with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig.						
	This procedure is common to both units represented within these instructions by substituted for this symbol to obtain the <u>u</u> -FK-121 represents 1-FK-121 for Unit	the symbol unit specific	" <u>u</u> ". Th cequipn	e appropriate nent number.	unit digi		
	NOTE: The applicable recovery proce MODES are as follows:	dures for RC	CS <u>leaka</u>	<u>aqe</u> in various o	operatio	nal	
	 MODES 1, 2, 3 (RCS PRESS > 1000 psig) 	ABN	<u>-103</u> ,	Excessive R Leakage	eactor (Coolant	
	 MODE 3 (RCS PRESS <1000 psig) MODES 4, 5 (RCS Loops filled) 	ABN	<u>-108,</u>	Shutdown Lo	oss of C	oolant	
	 MODE 5 (RCS Loops <u>NOT</u> filled including anytime at reduced inventory) 	<u>ABN</u>	<u>-104</u> ,	Residual Hea System Malf			
	MODE 6 (Cavity <u>NOT</u> filled)	ABN	<u>-104</u> ,	Residual Hea System Malf			
	MODE 6 (Cavity flooded)	ABN	<u>-909</u> ,	Spent Fuel F Cavity Leaka		ueling	

Comments / Reference: ABN-104 Revision: 9 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO. ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 ABN-104 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION **REVISION NO. 9** PAGE 2 OF 134 1.0 APPLICABILITY [C] This procedure describes the actions to be taken in the event of an RHR malfunction or loss of decay heat removal capacity in MODES 4, 5 and 6. This procedure also describes the actions to be taken for a loss of RCS inventory when the RCS is NOT filled (RCS Level at less than 872'10" (866'3") which is approximately 35% (17%) cold Calibrated Pressurizer Level OR RCS pressure < 100 psig) and when the RCS is at reduced inventory (RCS level less than 80 inches above core plate 829'8"). Once the RCS has been drained, the loops are not considered filled until vacuum fill has been performed AND RCS pressure has been raised >100 psig. This procedure applies to Unit 1 and Unit 2. This procedure is common to both units. The specific unit designator (1 or 2) is represented within these instructions by the symbol "u". The appropriate unit digit may be substituted for this symbol to obtain the unit specific equipment number. (Example u-FK-121A represents 1-FK-121A for Unit 1 and 2-FK-121A for Unit 2). Other differences between units may be identified by including Unit 2 information in parentheses immediately after Unit 1 information. The symbol [R] has been located throughout this procedure where real or potential radiation hazards are positively identified. This identification technique should not preclude workers from following good radiation work practices throughout this procedure to ensure their occupational exposure is maintained As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). NOTE: The applicable recovery procedures for RCS leakage in various operational MODES are as follows: MODES 1, 2, 3 (RCS Press greater ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coolant than 1000 psig) Leakage MODE 3 (RCS press less than ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant 1000 psig)MODES 4, 5, (RCS Loops filled) MODE 5 (RCS Loops NOT filled This Procedure including anytime at reduced inventory) MODE 6 (Cavity NOT filled) This Procedure MODE 6 (Cavity flooded) ABN-909, Spent Fuel Pool/Refueling Cavity Leakage I Section 1.0

Comments / Reference: ABN-108			Revis	sion: 4		
00000			DROOFPU			
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROC	EDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDU ABN-1			
SHUTDOWN LOSS OF C	SHUTDOWN LOSS OF COOLANT REVISION NO. 4 PAGE 2 OF 63					
1.0 <u>APPLICABILITY</u> [C] [02494] This procedure describes actions for excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage in MODE 3 (below 1000 psig), 4, or 5 (RCS not drained). (RCS loops are filled when RCS level is greater than 872'10" (866'3") which is approximately 35% (17%) Cold Calibrated Pressurizer Level <u>AND</u> RCS Pressure ≥100 psig. This procedure is common to both units. The specific unit designator (1 or 2) is represented within these instructions by the symbol " <u>u</u> ". The appropriate unit digit may be substituted for this symbol to obtain the unit specific equipment number. (Example <u>u</u> -FK-121 represents 1-FK-121 for Unit 1 and 2-FK-121 for Unit 2.)						
Other differences between units m immediately after Unit 1 informatio		Unit 2 information in pare	ntheses			
NOTE: The symbol [R] has been loc hazards are <u>positively</u> identif from following good radiation occupational exposure is ma	ied. This identification techni work practices throughout the	que should not preclude is procedure to ensure hi	the worker is or her			
NOTE: The applicable recovery proc follows:	edures for RCS leakage in v	arious operational MODE	s are as			
 MODEs 1, 2, 3 (RCS Press greater than 1000 psig) 	<u>ABN-103</u> Leakage	, Excessive Reactor Coo	lant			
 MODE 3 (RCS press less than 1000 psig) MODES 4, 5, (RCS Loops filled)) <u>ABN-108</u>	, Shutdown Loss of Cool	ant			
 MODE 5 (RCS Loops <u>NOT</u> fills including anytime at reduced inventory) 		, Residual Heat Removal Malfunction	I			
MODE 6 (Cavity <u>NOT</u> filled)	ABN-104 Malfuncti	, Residual Heat Removal	System			
MODE 6 (Cavity flooded)	ABN-909 Leakage), Spent Fuel Pool/Refuel	ing Cavity			
Shutdown Loss of Coolant (Se	ection 2.0)					
					-	

Comments	/ Reference:	ABN-909		Revision: 9	
ABNO		CPNPP ONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-909	
SPENT F	UEL POOL/REF	UELING CAVITY MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 2 OF 36	
1.0 4					
t	he refueling cavi nalfunction occu	escribes the actions to be taken in th ty and spent fuel pools, loss of spent rs. This procedure is applicable whe refueling cavity or spent fuel pool(s).	t fuel pool cooling, or never spent fuel is be	a level instrument	
v t	vithin these instr his symbol to ob	s common to both units. The specific uctions by the symbol " <u>u</u> ". The appro tain the unit specific equipment numl nit 1 and 2-PI-5470A for Unit 2).	opriate unit digit may	be substituted for	
		between units may be identified by rediately after Unit 1 information.	including Unit 2 inforr	mation in	
•	Section 2.0,	Refueling Cavity/SFP Leakage			
•	Section 3.0,	Loss of SFP Cooling			
•	Section 4.0,	Level Instrument Malfunction			
		Section 1.0			
					-

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	00002	26.G.2	2.2.44
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	4.2		

Loss of Component Cooling Water: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

Question # 43

Given the following conditions:

- The Unit is in MODE 5
- RCS temperature is 165°F
- PRZR is solid
- RCS pressure is being maintained between 260 and 285 psig
- RHR System is in service at this time
- CCW to the RHR System is lost
- RCS temperature begins to rise
- ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction, in progress

Based on conditions above, PCV-131, Letdown Pressure Control Valve, will throttle __(1)__ to maintain RCS pressure constant.

In accordance with ABN-104, the crew must stop all running RHR Pumps and isolate RHR if RCS temperature exceeds (2).

A. (1) OPEN

(2) 350°F

- B. (1) OPEN(2) 400°F
- C. (1) CLOSED (2) 350°F
- D. (1) CLOSED (2) 400°F

Α

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how the plant components will respond to a loss of CCW water and understanding of what is required per the procedure when RCS temperature exceeds a certain value.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Loss of CCW to the RHR System will cause RCS temperature to rise which will cause pressure to rise. When solid plant pressure control in progress, PCV-131 must be opened to maintain Reactor Coolant System pressure constant. Second part is correct, per ABN-104, Section 4, Step 3 and RNO, RHR pumps must be secured and RHR isolated when RCS temperature exceeds 350°F.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because per ABN-104 RCS pressure is required to be maintained below 400 psig. 350°F and 400 psig could be easily confused.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible if thought PCV-131 throttles to control pressure downstream of the valve instead of upstream. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-104	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a loss of RCS Temperature/Flow Control in accordance with ABN-104, RHR System Malfunctions. (ABN.104.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23349	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: Bank 23349	Revision:					
Given the following conditions:						
 The Unit is in MODE 5. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 165°F. The Pressurizer is solid. Reactor Coolant System pressure is being maintained between 260 and 285 psig. Residual Heat Removal System is in service at this time. Component Cooling Water to the Residual Heat Removal System is lost. 						
Which of the following describes:						
 How PCV-131, Letdown Pressure Control Valve, will respond in attempt maintain RCS pressure constant; and, 	ing to					
2) How the value of letdown flow changes?						
 A. 1) PCV-131 will throttle CLOSED 2) Letdown flow from RHR will decrease 						
 B. 1) PCV-131 will throttle CLOSED 2) Letdown flow from RHR will increase 						
C. 1) PCV-131 will throttle OPEN 2) Letdown flow from RHR will increase						
D. 1) PCV-131 will throttle OPEN 2) Letdown flow from RHR will decrease						
Answer: C						
Answer Explanation						
	-					

Comments / Reference:	Bank 23349	Revision:			
	lausible because PCV-131 will open, however, letdo w will increase.	wn			
	lausible if thought that a loss of CCW flow would clos CV-131, in this case Letdown flow would decrease.	se			
te m					
	lausible because letdown flow will increase, however CV-131 will open because RCS temperature is rising				
Question 94 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	-			
Status:	Active	—			
Always select on test?	No	—			
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	0	—			
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	23349				
User-Defined ID:	ILOT6161				
Cross Reference Number:	IPO.005.OB04.004				
Topic:	Given the following conditions: The Unit is in MOD 5. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 165°				
K/A:	SF2.004.K1.30				
Question Reference:					
SRO:					
Comments:	LC18 Audit; R/S21E13; R/S22E14; R/S23E23; R/S24E23, R/S27E23				
	REF: ABN-104; ABN-121; OP51.SYS.RH1.LN				

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Form ES-401-5

Comments / Reference: ABN-104			Revision: 9			
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES M/	ANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-104			
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFU	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 9 P/					
2.3 Operator Actions	2.3 Operator Actions					
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RE	SPONSE NOT OBT	AINED			
1 Verify RCS pressure - STABLE	(IE RCS) (from Ri flow to a. (Ma ap) (flow (RC <u>6 -</u> 0 • • •	is water solid <u>AND</u> le HR system, <u>THEN</u> red minimum as follows: mually adjust the follor plicable, to slowly redu w to 32 GPM <u>WHILE</u> r P seal injection flows <u>13 gpm</u> : CCP running - use <u>i</u> CCP FLO CHRG C PDP running - use <u>i</u> PDP SPD CTRL <u>u</u> -HC-182, RCP SE PRESS CTRL UT PRESS CTRL inually control <u>u</u> -PK-1: JT PRESS CTRL, to s issure.	tdown is aligned uce charging uce charging naintaining between 1-FK-121A, TRL 1-SK-459A, AL WTR			
Sec	tion 2.3					

Comments / Reference: ABN-104	Revision: 9			
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UNIT 1 AND 2		PROCEDURE NO. ABN-104	
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNC	TION	REVISION	NO. 9	PAGE 23 OF 134
4.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	R	ESPONSE N	IOT OB	TAINED
CAUTION: The RCS temperature must be main is in service. The RCS pressure sh				
3 b. Verify RCS temperature does <u>NOT</u> - EXCEED <u>350°F</u> .	b. Per	rform the follo		IR pumps
	2)		RHR su	ction from the
		● <mark>1/<u>u</u>-870</mark>	R	HRP 1 HL ECIRC ISOL -V
		● <mark>1/<u>u</u>-870</mark>	R	HRP 1 HL ECIRC ISOL -V
		● <mark>1/<u>u</u>-870</mark>	R	HRP 2 HL) ECIRC ISOL -V
		● <mark>1/<u>u</u>-870</mark>	R	HRP 2 HL ECIRC ISOL -V
	3)	GO TO Sec	tion 2.0	, this procedure.
4 Verify cold leg injection valve for running RHR pump - OPEN:	Manuall	y open valve(s) as ne	cessary.
 1/<u>u</u>-8809A, RHR TO CL 1 & 2 INJ ISOL VLV 				
 1/<u>u</u>-8809B, RHR TO CL 3 & 4 INJ ISOL VLV 				
Section	n 4.3			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	0000	27.Ak	(2.03
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.6		

Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners

Question # 44

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power
- RCS Pressure 2190 psig lowering
- RC Loop 1 PRZR Spray Valve 455B RED light extinguished and GREEN light lit
- RC Loop 4 PRZR Spray Valve 455C RED Light lit and GREEN light lit
- PRZR Master Pressure Controller demand 40% lowering
- All PRZR Backup and Control Heaters ON

Per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction...

the Reactor Operator should take manual control of __(1)__.

if RCS pressure continues to lower, trip the Reactor and __(2)__.

- A. (1) 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Controller(2) stop RCPs
- B. (1) 1-PK-455A, PRZR Master Pressure Controller(2) initiate Safety Injection
- C. (1) 1-PK-455C, RC Loop 4 PRZR Spray Valve Controller(2) stop RCPs
- D. (1) 1-PK-455C, RC Loop 4 PRZR Spray Valve Controller(2) initiate Safety Injection

Answer:

С

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of actions required in the ABN for a Pressurizer Pressure malfunction related to a failed Spray valve controller.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is correct (see C).

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that the Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller had failed, however, in this case the Master controller has responded to turn on all PRZR heaters in response to the lowering RCS pressure. Second part is incorrect, but plausible because with RCS pressure lowering it is reasonable to believe the ABN would direct SI initiation, however, the ABN directs stopping of RCPs as necessary to stop RCS Spray flow.

C. Correct. First part is correct. With only one spray valve indicating in the intermediate position and all PRZR heaters on the failure is an indication of an individual spray valve controller failure. The ABN directs taking manual control of the failed spray valve controller and attempting to close. Second part is correct. Step 1 RNO of the ABN directs stopping RCPs as necessary to stop RCS spray flow and stop the pressure reduction.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-705	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction in accordance with ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. (ABN.705.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: ABN-705		Revision: 13
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-705
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO	0. 13 PAGE 8 OF 26
3.0 Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure		
3.1 Symptoms		
a. Annunciator Alarms		
PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO	(5B-3.4)	
PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO	(5B-4.4)	
PRZR LO PRESS PORV 456 BLK	(5B-1.6)	
PRZR LO PRESS PORV 455A BLK	(5B-2.6)	
b. Plant Indication		
Spray valve indicated open when not called for a second	or by master cor	ntroller.
3.2 Automatic Actions		
a. Control response for failed open spray valve(s)		
(1) Control and backup heaters come on.		
• 1/ <u>u</u> -PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUF	<mark>°C</mark>	
1/ <u>u</u> -PCPR1, PRZR BACKUP HTR GRO	OUP A	
• 1/ <u>u</u> -PCPR2, PRZR BACKUP HTR GRC	OUP B	
1/u-PCPR3, PRZR BACKUP HTR GRC	OUP D	
NOTE: A reactor trip at high power and low pressure flow.	may result in ar	sI due to AFW
2) Reactor trip at 1880 psig.		
3) Safety Injection at 1820 psig.		
b. Control response for failed close spray valves.		
PRZR PORV may open on a pressure transie	ent.	
Section 3.0		
Secuon 3.0		

Comments / Reference: ABN-705			Revis	sion: 13
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-705
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE MALFUNCTION	I	REVISION NO	D. 13	PAGE 9 OF 26
3.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NO	OT OBT	TAINED
 CLOSE Pressurizer Spray Valve(s) <u>u</u>-PK-455B, RC LOOP 1 	an u	essurizer press ncontrolled mar FORM the follo	ner, Th	
PRZR SPR VLV CTRL	<mark>(1)</mark>	TRIP the React	tor	
<u>u</u> -PK-455C, RC LOOP 4 PRZR SPR VLV CTRL		STOP RCP(s); spray flow.	as nece	essary to stop
CTRL	3)	GO TO EOP-0.	.0A/B.	
		ATE load reduc 003A/B as direc ager.		
	c. ENS	URE <u>ALL</u> Press	surizer	Heaters - ON
		TACT I&C to do v valve(s) (Fail		
		REMOVE <u>u</u> -PC PRESS CONTI (<u>u</u> -RK-05 card	ROL DI	
		REMOVE <u>u</u> -PC PRESS CONTI (<u>u</u> -RK-05 card	ROL DI	
Sectio	n 3.3			

Examination Outline Cross-rel	ference:	Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 2 Tier 1					
		Group	1		
		K/A	000029	.EK1.03	
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	3.6		
Anticipated Transient Without Scram: Kno Effects of boron on reactivity	owledge of the operational implicat	tions of the following concepts as	they apply to th	e ATWS:	
Question # 45					
Unit 1 100% power when a	Turbine Trip occurs wit	thout a Reactor Trip.			
The RO adds negative read	ctivity by Emergency Bo	prating per(1)			
The boration is achieved ut	ilizing(2) Boric Ac	id Transfer Pump(s).			
A. (1) ABN-107, Emerg (2) BOTH	ency Boration				
B. (1) ABN-107, Emerg (2) EITHER	ency Boration				
C. (1) FRS-0.1A, Respo (2) BOTH	onse to Nuclear Power	Generation/ATWT			
D. (1) FRS-0.1A, Respo (2) EITHER	onse to Nuclear Power	Generation/ATWT			
Answer: C					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the operational requirements to add negative reactivity (effects of boron on reactivity) from an emergency boration during an ATWT.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because ABN-107 would be utilized to Emergency Borate in all other conditions except during an ATWT. Second part is incorrect, but plausible because two pumps are available and it could be thought that ABN-107 requires both pumps the same as FRS-0.1A.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because ABN-107 only requires one pump, however, ABN-107 is not the correct procedure to execute the emergency boration.
- C. Correct. First part is correct, during an ATWT, the US will direct Emergency Boration via FRS-0.1A, Attachment 1.F, Initiation Emergency Boration. This is the only time Emergency Boration is initiated not using ABN-107. Second part is correct, FRS-0.1A, Attachment 1.F requires the use of all available Boric Acid Transfer Pumps to initiate Emergency Boration.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because the 1-02 Boric Acid Transfer Pump is normally in Pull-Out as it is aligned to draw suction from the X-02 Boric Acid Tank which is dedicated to Unit 2. It could be thought that this pump would only be used during a failure of the 1-01 Boric Acid Pump.

Technical Reference(s)	FRS-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-107	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRS-0.1A/B, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWT in accordance with FRS-0.1. (ERG.FS1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	77177	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>8</u> 55.43		

CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES		UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. FRS-0.1A
RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT	R	EVISION NO. 9	PAGE 4 OF 33
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED
F] 4 (Initiate Emergency Boration Of RCS:)			
	b	art one CCP.] started. <u>THEN</u> performing the	start PD pump
	1	Establish CCW non-safeguards	s loop flow.
	2	<u>IF</u> CCW flow to barriers is lo isolate seal : affected RCP(s starting PD po	ost. <u>THEN</u> injection to s) before
	3	Open charging isolation valu and 1/1-8106.	
	4	<u>IF</u> the PD pump from the VCT. pump suction v	THEN open PD
		• 1/1-8202A an	nd 1/1-8202B
	5	Place PD pump controller in 55% demand.	speed manual for
	6	Ensure 1/1-810	09 - OPEN
		Start PD pump	
		Adjust PD pure	
	9	Adjust PD pump establish chan GREATER THAN 3	rging flow -
	10	<u>IF</u> seal inject isolated. <u>THEN</u> flow to RCPs 1 between 6 gpm	<u>N</u> adjust seal to maintain
-CONT 4	-		

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 FRS-0.1A RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 5 OF 33 STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4 b. Verify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM b. Perform ONE of the following to establish charging flow: 4 b. Verify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM b. Perform ONE of the following to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM 4 D. TP CD pump running. THEN adjust PD pump speed to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM IF Charging flow path can NOT be establish charging pump suction to the RNST by performing the following: 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D. 3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path. 1) Start all available boric ecid transfer pump(s). C. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open walves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D. 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D. 2) Open mergency boration tiow. 0 Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D. 3) Werlfy mergency boration tiow. 0 Adjust charging flow control valve to establish maximm charging flow.	CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
EF ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4 b. Warify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM b. Perform ONE of the following to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM 4 b. Userify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM b. Perform ONE of the following to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM 4 b. Userify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM c. IF CCP running, THEN adjust charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM 4 IF PD pump running, THEN adjust charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM IF PD pump speed to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM 6 IF Charging flow path can NOT be established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C. 3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Open emergency boration (valve, 1/1-8104,	EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	FRS-0.1A
 4 b. Verify Charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM b. Perform ONE of the following to establish charging flow: • IF CCP running, THEN adjust charging flow control valve to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM • IF PD pump running, THEN adjust provestoring flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM • IF CD pump running, THEN adjust provestoring flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM • IF CD pump running, THEN adjust provestoring flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM • IF Charging flow path can NOT be established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flows. b. Perform ONE of the following: b. Perform ONE of the following: c. Close valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D. c. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open mergency boration valve, 1/1-8104. 3) Werify emergency boration flows point of the control valve to establish 	RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 5 OF 33
 THAN 30 GPM to establish charging flow: IE CCP running, THEN adjust charging flow control valve to establish charging flow - GRATER THAN 30 GPM IF PD pump running, THEN adjust PD pump speed to establish charging flow - GRATER THAN 30 GPM IF Charging flow path can NOT be established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 0 Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. C. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-804. Verify emergency boration flow, Start all available toric to the RWST by performing the following: Adjust charging flow control valve to establish 	TEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	OT OBTAINED
 charging flow control value to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GFM IF PD pump running. THEN adjust PD pump speed to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GFM IF Charging flow path can <u>NOT</u> be established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open values 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Close values 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112E. 3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration value. 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration tlow. c. Adjust charging flow control value to establish 	, , ,		
 adjust PD pump speed to establish charging flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM IP Charging flow path can NOT be established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 0 pen valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 0 Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C. 0 pen the CCP High Head injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric (acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flow. c. Adjust charging flow control valve to establish 		charging flow to establish c	control valve harging flow -
NOTbe established. THEN shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following:1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E.1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E.2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C.3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path.4) Go to Step 5.c. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following:1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s).c. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following:2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104.1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E.3) Verify emergency boration flow.2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C.3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish		adjust PD pump establish char	speed to ging flow -
 and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C. 3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). c. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration valve. 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flow. 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish 		<u>NOT</u> be establi shift charging to the RWST by	shed. <u>THEN</u> pump suction performing
 and 1/1-LCV-112C. 3) Open the CCP High Head injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104, 3) Verify emergency boration flow. and 1/1-LCV-112C. 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish 			
<pre>injection flow path. 4) Go to Step 5. c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration valve. 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flow. 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish</pre>			
 c. Align boration flowpath by performing the following: 1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s). 2) Open emergency boration valve. 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flow. c. Shift charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the following: 1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E. 2) Open emergency boration valve. 1/1-8104. 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish 			
performing the following:the RWST by performing the following:1) Start all available boric acid transfer pump(s).1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E.2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104.2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C.3) Verify emergency boration flow.3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish		4) Go to Step	5.
acid transfer pump(s).1) Open valves 1/1-LCV-112D and 1/1-LCV-112E.2) Open emergency boration valve, 1/1-8104.2) Close valves 1/1-LCV-112B and 1/1-LCV-112C.3) Verify emergency boration flow.3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish	(performing the following):	the RWST by perf	
<pre>valve. 1/1-8104. 3) Verify emergency boration flow. 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish</pre>	acid transfer pump(s).		
(flow.) 3) Adjust charging flow control valve to establish	valve. 1/1-8104.		
		control valve	to establish

EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 FRS-0.1A RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 19 OF 33 ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 3 OF 17 PAGE 19 OF 33 BASES THE MDAFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal or SG low level to provide feed to the SGs for decay heat removal. If SG levels drop below the appropriate setpoint, the TDAFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to trip provides acceptable results. (Review of background documents indicate that this time is only used to show procedure step priority and is assumed to occur from automatic signals. There is no requirement for manual operator action to satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm flow requirement is indicative of adequate Auxiliary Feedwaterflow (AFW pumps) to meet the minimum flow assumption for an ATWT.		CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
ATTACEMENT 3 PAGE 3 OF 17 BASES STEP 1: The MDAFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal or SG low level to provide feed to the SGs for decay heat removal. If SG levels drop below the appropriate serpoint, the TDAFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to trip provides acceptable results. (Review of background documents indicate that this time is only used to show procedure step priority and is assumed to occur from automatic signals. There is no requirement for manual operator action to satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm flow requirement is indicative of adequate Auxiliary Feedwaterflow (AFW pumps) to meet the minimum flow assumption for an ATWT. STEP 4: After control rod crip and tod insertion functions, boration is the next most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The intended boration path here is the most direct one available. not requiring SI initiation. Ensuring that charging flow is > 30 gpm will ensure capability of delivering boron to the core. Starting all available bord acid pumps will ensure that the "mergency boration" flowpath for delivering the maximum available boron to the charging flow > 30 gpm. If charging flow cannot be varified through the normal flowpath. direction is given in the RNO column to established the operator manually shifts charging suction to the RWST and opens the high head injection values. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists, which allows the actions for initiating emergency bor			UNIT 1	
FACE 3 OF 17 BASES STEP 3: The MDAFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal or SG low level to provide feed to the SGs for decay heat removal. If SG levels drop below the appropriate setpoint. the TDAFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to trip provides acceptable results. (Review of background documents indicate that this time is only used to show procedure step priority and is assumed to occur from automatic signals. There is no requirement for manual operator action to satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm flow requirement is indicative of adequate Auxiliary Peedwaterflow (AFW pumps) to meet the minimum flow assumption for an ATW. STEP 4: After control tood trip and rod insertion functions: boration is the next most direct memore of adding negative reactivity to the core. The intended boration path here is the most direct one awaitable, not requiring of initiation. Ensuring that charging flow is > 30 gpm will ensure capability of delivering boron to the core. Steating elle will be boric acid pumps will ensure that the "Beargency Boration" flowpath is delivering the maximum avaitable boron to the charging system. The intend is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum systeme rate using the normal charging flowpath. If charging flow cannot be verified through the normal flowpath. direction is given in the RNO column to established the operator manually shifts charging mytering the stream. SI and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 pm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum avoided in order to maintain Main Peedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1. F exists, which allows the actions for initiating emergency boration to be delegated to a Reactor Operator by banding of the attachment in a step wise manner may benefit the overall ERO performance (e.g.,	RESPONS	SE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 19 OF 33
 STEP 3: The MDAFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal or SG low level to provide feed to the SGs for decay heat removal. If SG levels drop below the appropriate setpoint, the TDAFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to trip provides acceptable results. (Review of background documents indicate that this time is only used to show procedure step priority and is assumed to occur from automatic signals. There is no requirement for manual operator action to satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm flow requirement is indicative of adequate Auxiliary Peedwaterflow (AFW pumps) to meet the minimum flow assumption for an ATWT. STEP 4: After control tod trip and rod insertion functions: boration is the next most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The most direct one does not be delivering born to the core at the maximum achievable rate using the normal tharging flow is > 30 gpm. If charging flow cannot be verified through the normal flowpath, direction is given in the RNO column to established the operator manually shifts charging glowpath cannot be established the operator musully shifts charging suct no the RWST and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists. which allows the accton Operator by handing off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution, having the RO perform the evolution usin				
 the appropriate setpoint. the TDAPW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT analyses have shown that actuation of ATW within 60 seconds after the failure to trip provides acceptable results. (Review of background documents indicate that this time is only used to show procedure step priority and is assumed to occur from automatic signals. There is no requirement for manual operator action to satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm flow requirement is indicative of adequate Auxiliary Fedwaterflow (AFW pumps) to meet the minimum flow assumption for an ATWT. STEP 4: After control rod trip and rod insertion functions, boration is the next most direct manner of adding negative reactivity to the core. The intended boration path here is the most direct one available, not requiring ST initiation. Ensuring that charging flow is > 30 gpm will ensure capability of delivering boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using the moreal charging flowpath. If charging flow cannot be verified through the normal flowpath. direction is given in the RNO column to establish charging flow > 30 gpm. If a normal charging flowpath cannot be established the operator manually shifts charging suction to the RWST and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists, which allows the accing provides and operator by anding off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution, having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this sevolution, having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to		BASES		
<pre>intended boration path here is the most direct one available, not requiring SP initiation. Ensuring that charging flow is > 30 gpm will ensure capability of delivering boron to the core. Starting all available boric acid pumps will ensure that the "Emergency Boration" flowpath is delivering the maximum available boron to the charging system. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using the normal charging flowpath. If charging flow cannot be verified through the normal flowpath, direction is given in the RNO column to establish charging flow > 30 gpm. If a normal charging flowpath cannot be established the operator manually shifts charging suction to the RWST and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists, which allows the actions for initiating emergency boration to be delegated to a Reactor Operator by handing off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution, having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment in a step-wise manner may benefit the overall ERG performance (e.g., minimize communications, permit SRO directing response and recovery activities to maintain higher level view of effort, provide termination criteria to RO</pre>	STEP 3:	provide feed to the SGs for decay heat the appropriate setpoint. the TDAFW pum supplement the MD pumps. The ATWT anal AFW within 60 seconds after the failure results. (Review of background documen used to show procedure step priority an automatic signals. There is no require satisfy this time.) The 860 gpm gpm fl adequate Auxiliary Feedwaterflow (AFW p	removal. If SG le p will also automa yses have shown the to trip provides a ts indicate that the d is assumed to oc- ment for manual op- ow requirement is	vels drop below tically start to at actuation of acceptable his time is only cur from erator action to indicative of
<pre>direction is given in the RNO column to establish charging flow > 30 gpm. If a normal charging flowpath cannot be established the operator manually shifts charging suction to the RWST and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists. which allows the actions for initiating emergency boration to be delegated to a Reactor Operator by handing off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution. having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment in a step-wise manner may benefit the overall ERG performance (e.g., minimize communications, permit SRO directing response and recovery activities to maintain higher level view of effort, provide termination criteria to RO</pre>	STEP 4:	most direct manner of adding negative r intended boration path here is the most requiring ST initiation. Ensuring that ensure capability of delivering boron t available boric acid pumps will ensure flowpath is delivering the maximum avail system. The intent is to deliver boron	eactivity to the contract one availated of the core availated of the core. Start that the "Emergence that the core at the to the core at t	ore. The ble. not > 30 gpm will ing all y Boration" charging
<pre>shifts charging suction to the RWST and opens the high head injection valves. This will ensure maximum flow of 2400 ppm boron without initiating SI. The intent is to deliver boron to the core at the maximum achievable rate using this flowpath. SI initiation should be avoided in order to maintain Main Feedwater. The symbol [1F] has been utilized to identify that Attachment 1.F exists. which allows the actions for initiating emergency boration to be delegated to a Reactor Operator by handing off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution. having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment in a step-wise manner may benefit the overall ERG performance (e.g., minimize communications, permit SRO directing response and recovery activities to maintain higher level view of effort, provide termination criteria to RO</pre>		If charging flow cannot be verified thr direction is given in the RNO column to	ough the normal fl establish chargin	owpath. g flow > 30 gpm.
which allows the actions for initiating emergency boration to be delegated to a Reactor Operator by handing off the attachment. Since the action involves multiple specific actions to accomplish this evolution. having the RO perform the evolution using the attachment in a step-wise manner may benefit the overall ERG performance (e.g., minimize communications, permit SRO directing response and recovery activities to maintain higher level view of effort, provide termination criteria to RO		shifts charging suction to the RWST and valves. This will ensure <u>maximum</u> flow initiating SI. The intent is to delive achievable rate using this flowpath. S	opens the high he of 2400 ppm boron r boron to the cor	ad injection without e at the <u>maximum</u>
		which allows the actions for initiating delegated to a Reactor Operator by hand action involves multiple specific actio having the RO perform the evolution usi manner may benefit the overall ERG perf communications, permit SRO directing re maintain higher level view of effort, p	emergency boration ing off the attach ns to accomplish the ng the attachment ormance (e.g., min sponse and recover	n to be ment. Since the his evolution. in a step-wise imize y activities to

	CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
ABNOR	MAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	ABN-107
	EMERGENCY BORATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 9 OF 32
	ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 1 OF 1		
	EMERGENCY BORATION THROUG BORATE VALVE u-810		
[L]	 ENSURE a charging pump is running: 1/<u>u</u>-APCH1, CCP 1 		
	 1/<u>u</u>-APCH2, CCP 2 1/<u>u</u>-APPD, PDP 		
2.	START a Boric Acid Transfer Pump:		
□ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. 7. □ 8.	 1/<u>u</u>-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 - AUTO (AFTE 1/<u>u</u>-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2 - AUTO (AFTE OPEN 1/<u>u</u>-8104, EMER BORATE VLV VERIFY flow on <u>u</u>-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO VERIFY flow on <u>u</u>-FI-121A, CHRG FLOW IF EMER BORATE FLOW <u>OR</u> CHRG FLOW <u>CAI</u> <u>THEN</u> INITIATE Emergency Boration Flow per another to <u>WHEN</u> desired to terminate Emergency Boration <u>THEN</u> SECURE Emergency Boration by PERFORMING a) CLOSE 1/<u>u</u>-8104 EMER BORATE VLV. b) STOP the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started i 1/<u>u</u>-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 - AUTO (A 1/<u>u</u>-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2 - AUTO (A GO TO Step 8 of ABN-107. 	R <u>START</u>) NNOT be verified, method of ABN-107. (Reference Attachm 6 the following: in step 2. AFTER <u>STOP</u>)	
	Attachment 1		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	1	
	Group	1	
	K/A	000038	.EA1.16
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	4.4	
Steam Generator Tube Rupture: Ability to operate and monitor th secondary PORV controllers and indicators	ne following as they apply to a SGTR: S/G	atmospheric relie	of valve and
Question # 46			
Given the following conditions:			
 A SGTR has occurred 			
The crew has identified the affected	SG		
The ruptured SG ARV controller setp			
	C ,		
The SG ARV controller setpoint should be s	set to(1) to prevent(2	2)	
A (1) 1160 paig			
A. (1) 1160 psig	a while minimizing etmosph	orio rologgo	•
(2) challenging the code safety valve	es while minimizing atmosphe	silc release	5
$P_{1}(1)$ 1160 pairs			
B. (1) 1160 psig			d e une
(2) the ruptured SG from depressuriz	zing during the RCS maximul	m rate cool	down
$C_{-}(1)$ 1125 pairs			
C. (1) 1125 psig		nia rologoa	-
(2) challenging the code safety valve	es while minimizing atmosphe	and release	S
D. (1) 1125 psig			
(2) the ruptured SG from depressuriz	Ling during the RCS maximul	in rate cool	uown
Answer: A			

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how to control the SG ARV during a SGTR event.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. 1160 psig is the setpoint selected. Second part is correct. The setpoint should be greater than no-load pressure to minimize atmospheric releases from the ruptured steam generator and less than the minimum safety valve setpoint to prevent lifting of the code safety valves.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since it is desirable to prevent the SG from depressurizing as a result of the cooldown, but this is accomplished by isolating the SG from the intact SGs.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since this is the setpoint normally maintained on the ARVs except during SGTRs and cooldowns. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-3.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps from EOP-3.0, **STATE** the purpose/basis for the step(s), in accordance with EOP-3.0, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. (ERG.E3A.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # 18507 Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowled	ge
	Comprehension or Analysis	<u> </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	

Comments / Reference: EO	P-3.0A		Revision: 9
CPN	9p		PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPON		UNIT 1	EOP-3.0A
STEAM GENERATOR T	UBE RUPTURE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 5 OF 112
STEP ACTION/EXPECT	ED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED
flow, ste	DAFW pump is the only a cam supply to the TDAFW east one SG.		
initial H available	two SG(s) must be main RCS cooldown. At least e for the subsequent RC g conditions.	one SG must be mai	ntained
notified.	mospheric opens the Pl	ant Staff should be	
[R] 3 Isolate Flow From a. Adjust rupture atmospheric co (setpoint to 1)	ed SG(s)) ontroller		
b. <mark>Check ruptured (atmospheric -</mark>	SG(s) b	. <u>WHEN</u> ruptured SG than 1160 psig, <u>T</u> atmospheric close closed, <u>THEN</u> plac atmospheric contr manual and close <u>IF</u> SG atmospheric closed, <u>THEN</u> loca atmospheric block	<u>HEN</u> verify SG d. <u>IF NOT</u> e SG oller in atmospheric. can <u>NOT</u> be lly close SG
	-CONT 3-		

mments	/ Reference: EOP-3.0A		F	Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1		CEDURE NO. OP-3.0A
	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE	59 OF 112
	ATTACHMENT 6 PAGE 4 OF 57		I	
	BASES			
	As an alternative cooldown method, one generator. In addition to increasing ra result in continued primary-to-secondar large, the reactor coolant makeup supply system cooling can be established. This generator overfill condition. Hence, b generator, one must consider potential including availability of the condenser meteorological conditions, and also the the ruptured steam generator and reactor	diological release y leakage. If the y could be deplete s may also result efore steaming a r radiological conse , reactor coolant rate of accumulat	s. thi tube d befo in a s upture quence activi ion of	s will failure is re RHR team d steam s. ty, and water in
NOTE:	The analysis for radiological consequen stuck open Atmospheric Relief Valve is minutes of identifying the stuck open A	closed within appr		
STEP 3:	Isolation of the ruptured steam generator(s) effectively minimizes release of radioactivity from this generator. In addition, isolation is necessary to establish a pressure differential between the ruptured and non-ruptured steam generators in order to cool the RCS and stop primary- to-secondary leakage.			
	[R] has been identified to alert operat by changing radiation fields in plant. plant areas where radiation levels are actions (i.e. limited stay times, conti coverage). If the accident involves fa in high radiation areas.	Local actions to high could require nuous Radiation Pr	alter alter	formed in native on
	In order to remove heat generated in th steam generator pressure and RCS pressu the non-ruptured steam generator pressu differential increases, so is the subco sufficient pressure differential cannot RCS will continue since RCS pressure wi ruptured steam generator pressure in or case, the operator is directed to ECA-3 COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED to m stop primary-to-secondary leakage, the to a value equal to that of the rupture	re must be maintain res. As this press oling in the prima be maintained, le ll remain greater der to remove deca .1A, SGTR WITH LOS inimize this leaka primary pressure m	ned gr sure ry sys akage than t y heat S OF R ge. In	eater than tem. If from the he . In that EACTOR order to
	The ARV on the ruptured steam generator steam generator pressure unless it fail challenges to the code safety valve.			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	WE12.EA2.02		2.02
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.4		

Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments

Question #47

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 was at full power when a MSL Break occurred OUTSIDE Containment
- MSIVs will NOT close from the control room
- An Operator was dispatched to locally close the MSIVs per EOP-0.0B, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
- ECA-2.1B, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is entered

A CAUTION statement before Step 2 of ECA-2.1B directs the operator to control AFW flow to maintain a minimum flow of 100 gpm to __(1)__SG with less than a setpoint value of __(2)__.

- A. (1) Each (2) 10% NR level
- B. (1) Each(2) 18% NR level
- C. (1) ONLY one (2) 10% NR level
- D. (1) ONLY one(2) 18% NR level

А

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the actions to be taken in response to all SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. All SGs to be fed at a minimum of 100 gpm with all SGs faulted. Second part is correct. With no indication of adverse containment conditions, with the break outside containment, the level required is 10%.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible if adverse containment conditions existed, but with break outside containment, no adverse conditions should exist.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since any SG level above the minimum value meets heat sink requirements, but all SGs are to be fed. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ECA-2.1B	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the bases for operator actions, notes and cautions in ECA-2.1 in accordance with ECA-2.1. (ERG.C21.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	82372	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC26	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comments /	Reference: Bank 82372	Revision:				
Containmen • MSIV • An O	at full power when a Main Steam Line Break occurred OUTSIE t. 's will NOT close from the control room perator was dispatched to locally close the MSIVs per EOP-0 Or Safety Injection					
Subsequent		, is entered				
	statement after step one of this procedure directs the operate maintain a minimum flow of 100 gpm to SG with less					
Α.	Each 10 % Narrow Range level					
Β.	At Least One 10 % Narrow Range level					
C.	Each 18 % Narrow Range level					
D.	At Least One 18 % Narrow Range level					
Ansv	ver: A					
	wer Explanation					
Note for A is ma SG v	anation: : because this is manual control of a normally automatic feature level control at minimum levels) it meets the intent of EK2.1. correct because it states "A minimum AFW flow of 100 gpm maintained to each with a narrow range level less than 10% (18% FOR ADVERSED) NTAINMENT)." There are no adverse containment conditions	ust be				
B is of EA	eak is outside containment. wrong because (see A above). Plausible because could think heat sink but this caution is to prevent tube damage so it is all ICH).	of it in terms four SG's (ie				
	 EACH). C is wrong because there are no adverse containment conditions given so 18% is wrong but plausible if they don't recognize this from stem information. D is correct because both parts are incorrect (see discussion on other distracters and answer above). 					

Comments / Reference: Bank 82372

Revision:

Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	4
Difficulty:	3.00
System ID:	82372
User-Defined ID:	ILOT
Cross Reference	
Number:	
Topic:	Unit 2 was at full power when a Main Steam Line Break occurred OUTSIDE Containment. MSIVs will NOT
K/A:	
Question Reference:	
SRO:	
Comments:	KA Match: This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the relationship between the uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and AFW pumps (components).

ment	s / Reference: ECA-2.1B		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-2.1B
UNCONT	TROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS	REVISION NO.	9 PAGE 4 OF 69
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE	E NOT OBTAINED
	UTION: A minimum AFW flow of 100 gp SG with a narrow range level ADVERSE CONTAINMENT).	l less than 10% (18	% FOR
NO	TE: Shutdown margin should be monit	cored during RCS co	oldown.
* 2	Control AFW Flow To Minimize RCS Cooldown:		
	a. Check cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR		<mark>flow to 100 gpm</mark> Go to Step 2c.
	b. Check narrow range level in all SGs - LESS THAN 50%		level less than
	c. Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING	c. Control AFW f to stabilize i temperatures.	RCS hot leg
* 3	Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:		
	a. RCS subcooling -LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)	a. Go to Step 4. PRIOR TO STEP	OBSERVE CAUTION 4.
	b. ECCS pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING	b. Go to Step 4. PRIOR TO STEP	
	• CCP		
	- OR -		
	• SI pump		
	c. Stop all RCPs.		

С	omments	/ Reference: ECA-2.1B		Revision: 9			
ſ		CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-2.1B			
	UNCONTR	OLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 40 OF 69			
		ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 2 OF 31					
		BASES					
	CAUTION:	If AFW flow to a SG is isolated and the subsequent reinitiation of feed flow to thermal stress conditions on SG compone verifiable AFW flow to the SG allows th condition. thereby minimizing any therm increased.	the SG could creat nts. Maintaining a e components to rem	e significant minimum ain in g "wet"			
	<u>NOTE</u> :	This note advises the operator to monit verify adequate shutdown margin during Note that since ECCS was in service. RC to be sufficient.	the cooldown to col	d shutdown.			
		Periodic samples should be taken to mon operator should not wait for the sample		n, however the			
	STEP 2:	 STEP 2: Depending upon the size of the effective break areas for the steam generators, the cooldown rate experienced after reactor trip could exceed 100°P/hr. A reduction of AFW flow to the steam generators has three primary effects: 1) To minimize any additional cooldown resulting from the addition of AFW. 					
		 To prevent steam generator tube dry flow to the steam generators, and 	out by maintaining (a minimum APW			
		3) To minimize the water inventory in t eventually is the source of addition the environment.					
		The 100 gpm value is representative of a steam generator.	a minimum measurabl	e feed flow to			
	As steam flow rate drops, the feed flow will eventually increase the steam generator inventory. Feed flow is controlled to maintain steam generator narrow range level less than 50% to prevent overfeeding the steam generators.						

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	000054.AA1.02		1.02
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	4.4		

Loss of Main Feedwater: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW pumps

Question # 48

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 20% power
- MDAFWP 1-01 out of service for maintenance
- Reactor is tripped due to trip of BOTH MFPs
- SG NR Levels are 40%

Upon entry into EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the TDAFWP __(1)__ started.

While performing the step to "Verify AFW Alignment" in EOP-0.0A, if AFW flow cannot be maintained > 460 gpm, go to FRH-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink __(2)__.

A. (1) must be manually(2) immediately

А

- B. (1) must be manually(2) upon completion of Attachment 2, Safety Injection Actuation Alignment
- C. (1) should have automatically(2) immediately
- D. (1) should have automatically(2) upon completion of Attachment 2, Safety Injection Actuation Alignment

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of which AFW pumps require a manual start during a loss of MFW pumps event.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. The TDAFWP does not automatically start on a trip of both MFPs. It will require a manual start under the given SGWLs provided. Second part is correct, per EOP-0.0A, Step 6 RNO, if AFW flow cannot be maintained greater than 460 gpm and no SG NR levels are greater than 43% then a transition to FRH-0.1A is required immediately.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because a direct entry into FRH-0.1A did not exist in the CPNPP ERGs at EOP-0.0 step 6 until Rev 9 of the ERGs (current rev). In Rev 8 and previous an entry into FRH-0.1A could not be performed until Att 2 was complete.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because an automatic start signal to the MDAFWPs will exist due to a trip of BOTH MFPs, often the MDAFWP and TDAFWP auto start signals are confused. Additionally, because since SG NR levels are below 43% it could be thought that an auto start signal would be present to the TDAFWP. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-0.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ODA-407	Comments / Reference
	AFW Study Guide	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:


Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the instrumentation and controls of the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the system response in accordance with DBD-ME-206. (SYS.AF1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension c	imental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Form ES-401-5



Comments / Reference: AFW Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.AF1

The main steam line to the TDAFW pump is equipped with condensate traps to remove any moisture buildup in the lines. Turbine steam is exhausted to the atmosphere through a safety related roof vent. The turbine steam exhaust line on Unit 1 is equipped with a condensate trap to eliminate moisture buildup in the exhaust line and turbine. These traps are routed to a flash tank located in the pipe trench outside the TDAFW pump room. In both Units, selected traps are provided with level switches which provide signals to actuate annunciator window 2.6, "ANY TD AFWP D\POT LVL HI" alarm on ALB-8B on the Main Control Board. This annunciator provides indication of excessive condensation and/or moisture buildup in the steam supply line to the TDAFW Pump turbine.

The TDAFW Pump may be started or stopped from the Control Room by opening or closing the steam supply valves. The TDAFW Pump steam supply valves, HV-2452-1 and HV-2452-2, are operated using three-position (OPEN-AUTO-CLOSE) handswitches on CB-09 which spring return to Auto and Pull-To-Lock in the STOP position.

When Control Room switches are inaccessible, manual operation from the RSP is provided. Local manual control from the RSP overrides all other signals. Manual control is switched from the Main Control Board to the RSP with installed hand switches on the Switch Transfer Panel (STP) for the Train A valve (HV-2452-1 from main steam line 4) or the RSP for the Train B valve (HV-2452-2 from main steam line 1). When control is transferred, an alarm for local override is sounded in the Control Room.

The TDAFWP steam supply valves will automatically open, admitting steam to the TDAFW Pump turbine, due to:

- Low-low SG NR level at 38% (35.4% for Unit 2) on two of four detectors in any two SGs,
- Blackout Sequencer operator lockout signal, or
- AMSAC signal

Downstream of the steam supply valves is a motor operated turbine Trip & Throttle Valve (T&TV). The motor operator has been de-terminated and is not provided with electrical power due to equipment qualification concerns associated with the TDAFW pump local control panel. Since the panel is located in the TDAFW pump room, a high energy line break in the room could cause a fault condition if the motor was energized which might prevent operation of the turbine. The T&TV is used to trip the turbine by isolating the steam supply. Although Terry Turbines Co. furnishes the valve as a fail closed valve, it will be latched open at all times to ensure the ability of the turbine to start in the event of an emergency.

The turbine may be manually tripped by depressing the AFWPT TRIP pushbutton <u>u</u>-HS-2452F on the Main Control Board. This pushbutton energizes a solenoid which actuates the local turbine trip device, unlatching the valve from the operator and allowing the T&TV to close. The trip pushbutton on the Main Control Board requires that the trip solenoid have power available in order to function. Power to the trip solenoid is supplied from the local turbine control panel. The TDAFWP can also be locally tripped by actuating the local manual trip device attached to the T&TV linkage. A mechanical emergency overspeed trip mechanism isolates the main steam supply by tripping the T&TV closed at 116% of rated speed. The overspeed trip mechanism will reposition itself after turbine speed decreases below 3000 rpm. The T&TV must be manually reset by an operator to restart the turbine.

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

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Rev. 00.0000

mments / Reference: ODA-407			Revision: 9
CPNPP OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MAI	NUAL		PROCEDURE NO. ODA-407
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		REVISION NO. 18	PAGE 29 OF 64
PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE		INFORMATION USE	
	HMENT 8. 10 OF 25		
ERG RULE	ES OF US	AGE	
Scenarios Affecting FRZ-0.1A/B Status	Requ	irements for Implemen	ting FRZ-0.1A/B
Containment Spray initiates during EOP-0.0A/B performance as Containment Pressure reaches 18 psig (FRZ-0.1A/B ORANGE priority condition exists). Step 7 of EOP-0.0A/B is performed to verify proper Containment Spray alignment. The FRZ ORANGE condition <u>HAS CLEARED</u> when FRG implementation is initiated.	EOP-0.0A action veri FRZ-0.1A Containm EOP-0.0A	RANGE condition has <u>CLEA</u> tation is initiated (transition o /B step initiates CSF monito fication complete), <u>THEN</u> per B is <u>NOT</u> required. Proper n ent Spray actuation has beer /B actions <u>AND</u> there is <u>NOT</u> tainment barrier.	ut of EOP-0.0A/B <u>OR</u> ring <u>AND</u> automatic rformance of esponse for n verified with
Containment Spray initiates during EOP-0.0A/B performance as Containment Pressure reaches 18 psig (FRZ-0.1A/B ORANGE priority condition exists). Step 7 of EOP-0.0A/B is performed to verify proper Containment Spray alignment. The FRZ ORANGE condition <u>STILL EXISTS</u> when FRG implementation is initiated.	EOP-0.0A action veri is required has been	ORANGE condition exists v tation is initiated (transition o /B step initiates CSF monito fication complete), <u>THEN</u> FF I. Proper response for Conta verified with EOP-0.0A/B act tainment barrier <u>may</u> exist.	ut of EOP-0.0A/B <u>OR</u> ring AND automatic RZ-0.1A/B performance inment Spray actuation
Containment Spray initiates during EOP-0.0A/B performance as Containment Pressure reaches 18 psig (FRZ-0.1A/B ORANGE priority condition exists). Step 7 of EOP-0.0A/B is performed to verify proper Containment Spray alignment. The FRZ ORANGE condition exists when FRG implementation is initiated <u>AND</u> clears prior to FRZ-0.1A/B entry.	Implement EOP-0.0A verification <u>THEN</u> FR Proper res verified with Containment	ORANGE condition exists v tation is initiated (transition o /B initiates CSF monitoring <u>/</u> n complete) <u>BUT</u> clears prior 2-0.1A/B performance is <u>NO</u> sponse for Containment Spra th EOP-0.0A/B actions <u>AND</u> ent barrier does not exist as ontainment pressure.	ut of EOP-0.0A/B <u>OR</u> <u>ND</u> automatic action to FRZ-0.1A/B entry. <u>T</u> required. ty actuation has been a challenge to the
EOP-0.0A/B is performed without Containment Spray actuation (Step 7 of EOP-0.0A/B identifies Containment Spray NOT required/NOT verified). The appropriate recovery actions are initiated with transition out of EOP-0.0A/B. The FRZ ORANGE condition <u>COMES IN AND</u> remains in during implementation of recovery actions (after FRG implementation initiated).	the rules of the highes exists, <u>TH</u> challenge response	s are monitored and FRGs of usage. FRG implementation of the second state of the secon	n is initiated based on RANGE condition e is required. A xists <u>AND</u> proper tion is verified to
EOP-0.0A/B is performed without Containment Spray actuation (Step 7 of EOP-0.0A/B identifies Containment Spray NOT required/NOT verified). The appropriate recovery actions are initiated with transition out of EOP-0.0A/B. The FRZ ORANGE condition <u>COMES IN</u> after FRG implementation has been initiated, <u>THEN</u> clears prior to entering FRZ-0.1A/B.	the rules on on the hig has previo performed Proper res	Is are monitored and FRGs of usage. FRG implementat hest CSF priority. IF an FR busly existed AND FRZ-0.1/ 1, <u>THEN</u> FRZ-0.1A/B perfor sponse for Containment Spi challenges to the Containm d.	ion is initiated based Z ORANGE condition VB has <u>NOT</u> been mance is required. ray actuation is verified
11. Monitoring of the CSFSTs and implementation instructions to ensure appropriate priority is us	sed for E	RG response and reco	-
 <u>CSFST Monitoring</u> is initiated by any of the The step in EOP-0.0A/B directs the op The operator transitions out of EOP-0. 	erator to	initiate monitoring of the	ne CSFSTs, or
 B. <u>FRG Implementation</u> is initiated when: 1) directed by ERG procedure step, or 2) when CSFST monitoring criteria is sat verification is complete (example: EOF EOP-0.0A/B Steps 1 through 4 following 	P-0.0A/B	Attachment 2 following	SI actuation,

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier	1		
		Group	1		
		K/A	000055.	G.2.4.35	
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	3.8		
Station Blackout: Knowledge of local a	uxiliary operator tasks during an er	mergency and the resultant operation	onal effects.		
Question # 49					
During a Station Blackout, an NEO is directed to locally perform additional load shedding per ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2C, DC Load Shed when DC Voltage Less than 110V.					
This attachment is perform	med to allow for(1)	_ and(2)			
A. (1) battery charger restoration with portable generator(2) Containment Phase A isolation capability					
 B. (1) battery charger restoration with portable generator (2) Safeguards Bus supply breaker closure 					
C. (1) Diesel Generator field flashing(2) Containment Phase A isolation capability					
D. (1) Diesel Generator field flashing(2) Safeguards Bus supply breaker closure					
Answer: D					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of local actions taken during a station blackout.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because Attachments 2.A and 2.B when performed ensure sufficient time to restore battery chargers using a portable generator, however this is not what is accomplished by Attachment 2.C. The second part is incorrect but plausible (See C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (See A). Second part is correct (See D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (See D). The second part is incorrect but plausible because load shedding per Attachment 2.B is not performed until Phase A is verified, but Phase A does not require DC power to perform, only to verify.
- D. Correct. If battery voltage lowers to less than 110 volts the associated bus is further load shed to ensure adequate voltage remains for flashing the diesel generator field or closing safeguards bus supply breakers for power restoration.

Technical Reference(s)	ECA-0.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:


Learning Objective: Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps from ECA-0.0, **DISCUSS** the purpose/basis for the step(s) in accordance with ECA-0.0. (ERG.C00.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75812	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC24	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

	Reference: Bank 75812	Revision:
	ation Blackout additional load shedding is performed when safe age is less than 110 volts to allow fora 	eguards and
A.	battery charger restoration with portable generator plant monitoring and control until AC power restored	
В.	battery charger restoration with portable generator Safeguards Bus supply breaker closure	
C.	Diesel Generator field flashing plant monitoring and control until AC power restored	
D.	Diesel Generator field flashing Safeguards Bus supply breaker closure	
Ansv	ver: D	
Ans	wer Explanation	
	wer Explanation Incorrect. Plausible because Attachments 2.A and 2.B when ensure sufficient time to restore battery chargers using a pol generator, however this is not what is accomplished by Attac The second part is incorrect but plausible (See C below).	rtable
Ans	Incorrect. Plausible because Attachments 2.A and 2.B when ensure sufficient time to restore battery chargers using a po- generator, however this is not what is accomplished by Attac	rtable chment 2.C.
Ans A.	Incorrect. Plausible because Attachments 2.A and 2.B when ensure sufficient time to restore battery chargers using a po- generator, however this is not what is accomplished by Attac The second part is incorrect but plausible (See C below). Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (See A above).	rtable chment 2.C. Second part rt is incorrect monitoring

Comments / Reference: Ban	k 75812 Revision:
Question 177 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	3.00
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
System ID:	75812
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9441
Cross Reference Number:	ERG.CO0.0B05.014
	•
Topic:	During a Station Blackout additional load shedding
ropic.	performed when safeguards battery voltage is
K/A:	performed when safeguards battery voltage is EPE 054 AK3.01
•	performed when safeguards battery voltage is EPE 054 AK3.01
K/A:	EPE 054 AK3.01
K/A: Question Reference:	performed when safeguards battery voltage is EPE 054 AK3.01 LC24 NRC
K/A: Question Reference: SRO:	EPE 054 AK3.01

ES-401



		E	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1		CEDURE NO. ECA-0.0A
			LOSS OF ALL AC POWER	REVISION NO. 9	PAG	E 52 OF 136
			ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 4			
			DC LOAD SHED WHEN DO VOLTAG	B LESS THAN 410V		
to e	ons	erv	Voltage is LESS THAN 110 VOLTS AND P1 re Battery BTIED1 or BTIED2 for subseq ower breaker closure. THEN perform the	uent Diesel Generat		
			in A Safeguards bus is most probable ing load shed of 1ED1:	to be restored. <u>THE</u>	<u>N</u> perf	form the
	a.	Ref	ference ABN-603. LOSS OF PROTECTION OF	R INSTRUMENT BUS to:	:	
I		•	Evaluate equipment and indication th are de-energized.	at will be lost whe	n 1PC1	l and 1EC1
I		•	Verify equipment and indication supp is available.	lied from BT1ED2 vi	a 1PC2	2 and 1EC2
I		•	\underline{IF} sufficient equipment and indicati (via 1PC2, 1EC2) is \underline{NOT} available, \underline{T} plant conditions to determine which	HEN Plant Staff sho		
1	b.	Due	e to loss of input signals. place Pres	surizer PORV handsv	witche	s to CLOSE:
I		•	1/1-PCV-455A. PRZR PORV			
I		•	1/1-PCV-456. PRZR PORV			
ECB	792	U1	Train A UPS Room			
	c.	Pla	ace following breakers in OFF:			
I		•	1ED1/2-10/BKR. IV1PC1 SPLY			
I		•	1ED1/2-11/BKR. IV1EC1/3 DC BUS 1 SPL	Y		
I		•	1ED1/2-13/BKR, IV1EC1 SPLY			
	d.		ace 1ED1/1-7/DSW. 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION SCONNECT SWITCH in OFF.	PANEL 1ED1-1 PREF	ERRED	FUSED
	e.		ace 1ED1/1-5/DSW. 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION ITCH in OFF.	PANEL 1ED1-2 FUSE	DISC	ONNECT

nts / Reference: E	UA-U.UA		Revision: 9
	PNPP PONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-0.0A
LOSS OF ALL	AC POWER	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 123 OF 136
	ATTACHMENT 9 PAGE 45 OF 58		
	BASES		
CHMENT 2			
loads in order restore AC pow necessary to m to remove larg soon as practi CPNPP Station heaviest loade has sufficient period, but al flashing.	nts provides instructions to conserve capacity to er. while maintaining tha onitor plant conditions. e loads not necessary for cal. However. the specifi Blackout shows that, even d battery with an assumed capacity to not only car so provide sufficient DC	assist in future a at minimum instrume The intent of DC the Loss of All A c battery sizing c without load shed electrolyte tempe ry its loads for a power for Diesel G	ctions to ntation load shedding is C Power event as alculation for ding. the rature of 65°F. four (4) hour enerator field
The load shed	strategy is separated int	o 4 sub-attachment	s:
	Shedding of loads not es strategy involves attemp Unit 2 when possible pri The attachment is separa of the possible situatio 1) both Unit 2 safeguard 2) 2EA1 energized and 2E 3) 2EA1 de-energized and 4) both Unit 2 safeguard	ting to transfer c for to de-energizin ted into 4 section ons: busses de-energiz A2 de-energized. 1 2EA2 energized. busses energized.	ommon loads to g equipment. s. one for each ed.
Attachment 2.B	Shedding of loads no lon equipment has reposition Phase A and Containment	ed following Conta	inment Isolation
Attachment 2.0	Shedding of loads in the 110 Volts. Each safegua all loads for a period o of All AC Power conditio Attachments 2.A & 2.B wi is maintained. The mini equipment operation is a ensures a sufficient DC diesel generator field a output breaker for the d will de energize DO Bus for subsequent power res bus most likely to be re	ands battery is cap of 4 hours in the e on. Load shedding 11 extend the time mum system voltage pproximately 105 v voltage is availab of operate the desel generator. T 18D1 <u>OR</u> 18D2 to co toration activitie	able of carrying vent of a Loss performed in battery voltage required for olts. This le to flash the associated his attachment nserve 90 power
Attachment 2.D	Restoration of DC power. additional consideration were shed in Attachments	is for recovering t	he DC loads that

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	0000	56.Ak	(3.02
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	4.4		

Loss of Offsite Power: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power

Question # 50

Given the following conditions:

- LOOP has occurred
- Bus 1EA1 de-energized
- EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, in progress
- RCS temperature 561°F stable
- Letdown has been lowered to 45 gpm with CCP 1-02 charging and FCV-121, Charging Flow Control Valve, full open
- RCS pressure 1920 psig trending down slowly
- Pressurizer level 5% slowly lowering

Which of the following actions is required per EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Fold Out Page?

- A. Due to the loss of RCPs, verify Natural Circulation per EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.
- B. Due to the loss of 1EA1, attempt to restore Bus 1EA1 per ABN-602, Response to a 6900V/480V System Malfunction.
- C. Due to the low pressurizer level, manually actuate SI and return to EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- D. Due to the high RCS temperature, increase AFW flow to the Steam Generators per EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.

Answer:

С

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the reason for actions required following a loss of offsite power.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because Natural Circulation would be verified if SI was not required per the Foldout Page.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it would have been performed in EOP-0.0A, however, priority is Safety Injection (SI).
- C. Correct. EOS-0.1A Foldout Page requires manual initiation of SI when PRZR level cannot be maintained greater than 6% and a transition back to EOP-0.0A.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because RCS temperature is above the no-load value of 557F, and increasing AFW flow would serve to cooldown the RCS, however, 561F RCS temperature is expected for the given conditions and this is not an action required per the FOP of EOS-0.1A.

Technical Reference(s)	EOS-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the recovery technique used and the procedure steps of EOS-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. (ERG.E01.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	34861	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC21	
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundar	nental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comments /	/ Reference: Bank 34861	Revision:
 Bus 1EA EOS-0.1 Reactor RCS pression 	of Offsite Power has occurred A1 is de-energized IA, Reactor Trip Response, is in progress Coolant System (RCS) temperature is 561ºF and stable essure is 1920 psig and trending down slowly izer level is 5% and slowly lowering	
Which of the	e following actions is required per EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Res	ponse?
Α.	Raise Condenser Steam Dumps to maintain T _{AVE} at 557ºF p 0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.	er EOS-
В.	Attempt to restore Bus 1EA1 per ABN-602, Response to a 6 System Malfunction.	900\/480\
C.	Manually actuate Safety Injection and return to EOP-0.0A, R or Safety Injection.	leactor Trip
D.	Isolate Letdown and verify Natural Circulation per EOS-0.1A Trip Response.	, Reactor
Ans	wer: C	
Ans	wer Explanation	
5	Plausible because this is a Step 1 RNO action of EOS-0.1A, ho Steam Dump will not be available without Circulating Water Pun where it should be for the conditions.	
	Plausible because it would have been performed in EOP-0.0A, priority is Safety Injection (SI).	however,
	EOS-0.1A Foldout Page requires manual initiation of SI when P cannot be maintained greater than 6% and a transition back to I	
r	Plausible because Natural Circulation would be verified if SI was equired per the Foldout Page. Additionally, letdown is isolated Pressurizer Level is less than 17%.	
		J

Comments / Reference: Bank	< 34861	Revision:
Overstien 04 Info		
Question 94 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	2	
Difficulty:	2.00	
System ID:	34861	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT	
Cross Reference		
Number:		
	A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred	
Topic:	Bus 1EA1 is de-energized	
, opio:	EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, is	
K/A:	056.AA1.05	
Question Reference:	EOS 0.1	
SRO:	200 0.1	
Comments:	LC16 NRC; LC21 NRC; R/S22E14; R/S2	23E23-
Comments.	R/S24E23, LC25 Comp(Remedial), R/S2	
	10024E20, E020 Comp(Remedial), 1002	1225

CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. EOS-0.1A
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 18 OF 40
ATTACHMENT 1. PAGE 1 OF 1	<u>A</u>	
FOLDOUT FOR BOS-0.1A, REACTO	R TRIP RESPONSE	
. ST ACTUATION CRITERIA		
Actuate SI and go to EOP-0.0A, REACTOR TRIP <u>BITHER</u> condition listed below occurs:	OR SAFETY INJECTION	. Step 1. if
 RCS subcooling = LESS THAN 25°P 		
 PRZR level = CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER 	R THAN 6%	
. SHUTDOWN MARGIN CRITERIA		
Emergency borate per ABN-107 if <u>either</u> of th	e following conditi	ions below occur:
 Two or more control rods <u>NOT</u> fully inser- boric acid for <u>each control rod not full</u> 		of 7000 ppm
 Control rod position indication is <u>NOT</u> as boric acid). 	vailable (3600 gall	ons of 7000 ppm
. SG LEVEL/AFW FLOW CONTROL CRITERIA		
Control AFW total flow as necessary to maint Range level greater than 43% in any SG \underline{OR} AF	ain an adequate Hea W total flow GREATH	at Sink (Narrow ER THAN 460 gpm).
IF not required, secure TDAFWP.		
AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION		
<u>IF</u> CST level decreases to less than 10%. <u>THE</u> supply per ABN-305. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYST		ate AFW water
. RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION		
Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow t actions.	o all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> i	isolated by ERG

CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	EOS-0.1A
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 36 OF 40
ATTACHMENT PAGE 11 OF	<u>4</u> 15	
BASES		
T 1.A <u>ST ACTUATION CRITERIA</u> = If RCS subcoo cannot be maintained, control of the (necessary. Although SP Actuation Cri- found in the SI Reinitiation Criteria operator is instructed to actuate saf- pumps as necessary.	Unit is lost and SI teris are identical , the actions are di	actuation is to the ones fferent. The
<u>SHUTDOWN MARGIN CRITERIA</u> - If two or a or the operator cannot verify that the instructed to emergency borate. The conservative value based upon a bound worth:	e rods are inserted. amount of boration p	the operator is rovides a
 Two or more control rods NOT full gallons (130 ppm) of 7000 ppm bo fully inserted. Control rod position indication i 3600 gallons (260 ppm) of 7000 pp verified rod bottom lights. then become unavailable. proper insert and emergency boration is not required. 	ric acid for each co s NOT available requ m boric acid. If th the rod bottom light ion of the rods has	ontrol rod not dires boration of de operator has as subsequently
These values have been made conservat worth which changes from cycle to cyc		t reactive rod
SG LEVEL/AFW FLOW CONTROL CRITERIA - requirements for heat sink. The oper intact SG levels as necessary to miti- accident conditions.	ator should take act	ion to control
AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION - Thi to remind the operator that the supply suction of the AFW pumps is limited. suction supply of water to the AFW pu	y of water from the and if it is deplete	CST to the
RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERIA - Th seal is not affected by pump rotation of the seal, cool filtered water shou the required flow band.	. To ensure continu	ed performance

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1	
	Group	1	
	K/A	0000	58.AA2.03
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.5	
Loss of DC Power: Ability to determine and interpret the following to operate and monitor plant systems	as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: D	IC loads lost; i	impact on ability
Question # 51			
 Given the following conditions: Unit 2 100% power Steam Break occurs outside containr Reactor Trip and Safety Injection initi Battery Charger 2D2 load sheds 			
Crew is performing EOP-2.0B, Faulted Stea SG(s) Break Inside Containment."	m Generator Isolation, Step	6 "Verify	Faulted
Per Step 6, the crew will direct an NEO to a ensure the(2) remain closed.	lign Battery Charger(1)	to DC B	us 2D2 to

A. (1) 2D4 (2) ARVs

- B. (1) 2D4 (2) MSIVs
- C. (1) 2D24 (2) ARVs
- D. (1) 2D24 (2) MSIVs

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of a loss of a component supporting DC power (load shed of BC 2D2) on equipment monitored in the control room (MSIVs).

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, it is plausible to think BC 2D4 could supply DC Bus 2D2 since BC 2D24 may supply DC Bus 2D2, however, BC 2D4 cannot supply DC Bus 2D2. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the ARVs are located within the same room, however, their DC solenoids are controlled by Safeguards DC power which are environmentally qualified.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. EOP-2.0B Attachment 2 directs alignment of BC 2D24 to DC Bus 2D2 after a Fault outside of containment to assure power is maintained to the batteries that supply power to the MSIV hydraulic oil pump solenoid operated valves. The SOVs open to align air to the hydraulic oil pump, which is required to open the MSIVs. Ensuring Battery 2D2 is powered from Battery Charger BC2D24 will ensure that the solenoids for the air to the oil pump remain closed. Second part is correct. The MSIVs are the affected component.

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-2.0B	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **GIVEN** a procedure step, or sequence of steps from EOP-2.0, state the purpose/bases for the step in accordance with EOP-2.0. (ERG.E2A.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ES-401

Comments / Reference: EOP-2.0B		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-2.0B
FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 4 OF 14
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT	OBTAINED
<u>CAUTION</u> : If the TDAFW pump is the only flow. steam supply to the TDA from at least one SG.		
4 Isolate Faulted SG(s):	<u>IF</u> SG atmospheric(s) closed. <u>THEN</u> dispatch	n operator to
 Isolate main feedline. Isolate AFW flow. Place TDAFW Pump steam supply valve(s) in PULL-OUT. (SG 1 or 4) 	Incally close block we have block block we have block block we have block bloc	NOT be h operator to
 Isolate blowdown and sample lines. 		
 Ensure SG atmospheric(s) - CLOSED Ensure main steamline drippot isolation valve(s) - CLOSED 		
5 Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%	Perform ABN-305, AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALI while continuing with procedure.	FUNCTION
6 (Verify Faulted SG(s) Break Inside Containment	Perform Attachment 2.	

Comments / Reference: EOP-2.0B		Revision: 9
CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	EOP-2.0B
FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 7 OF 14
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 2		
MSIV ELECTRICAL REQUIREMEN	T VERIFICATION	
To prevent inadvertent opening of the MSIVs, the performed to maintain power aligned to Battery 9		wuld be
1. Locally verify 2D2/2-6/BKR, 125 VDC BATT SWBD 2D2 POS FEEDER BKR is CLOSED to con Switchboard 2D2 is powered from Battery Unit 2 Train C UPS Room).	firm the Positive-N	eutral side of
 <u>IF</u> necessary to align Battery Charger BC (Battery BT2D2), <u>THEN</u> perform the follow 		chboard 2D2
 Ensure the following breakers on BC2I Train C UPS Room). 	24 in OFF (ECB 792.	X-126. Unit 2
 BC2D24/CB1/BKR, 480 VAC MCC 21 INPUT BREAKER 	31-1 TO BATTERY CHAN	RGER BC2D24
 BC2D24/CB2/BKR. BATTERY CHARGE SWITCHBOARD 2D2 OUTPUT BREAKED 		VDC
b. Ensure BC2D24 AC feeder breaker in ON Pumps).	I (TB 803, Near Mair	Feedwater
□ • 2B1-1/6BR/BKR. 125 VDC BATTER	CHARGER BC2D24 SU	PPLY BREAKER
□ c. Place 2D2/2-6/BKR. 125 VDC BATTERY CH 2D2 POS FEEDER BKR in ON (This will a		
d. Place BC2D24 AC INPUT breaker in ON.		
 BC2D24/CB1/BKR. 480 VAC MCC 21 INPUT BREAKER 	31-1 TO BATTERY CHAN	RGER BC2D24
e. Ensure the following indications on H	C2D24:	
 FLOAT light (green) is LIT. 		
 DC VOLTS indicates FLOAT volta 	age. 128-135 VDC.	
 EQUALIZE TIMER set to Zero (0) 		
f. Place BC2D24 DC OUTPUT breaker in ON.		
 BC2D24/CB2/BKR, BATTERY CHARGE SWITCHBOARD 2D2 OUTPUT BREAKED) VDC
L		I _

Comments / Reference: EOP-2.0B		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. EOP-2.0B
FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 11 OF 14
ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 3 OF 6		<u> </u>
BASES		
STEP 6: The intent of this step is to determin MSIV electrical requirement verificati break is located inside the MSIV rooms adverse to the equipment located in the alignment of Attachment 2 is necessary the MSIVs is maintained. Determinatio located inside containment is a relati containment pressure, containment temp eliminate the need for performance of Attachment 2. If the secondary break is then performance of Attachment 2 is in maintained to MSIV solenoids without a secondary fault in the MSIV rooms. In confirm the secondary break location N in personnel entering into a hazardous intent of the step. The action to per is only required when the secondary br rooms; however, it is performed anytim as a general recourse to minimize the harsh environments (e.g., steam atmosp MSIVs are opened by an air operated of a solenoid operated valve, energized t The MSIVs also have a solenoid operate (energizes) to dump oil and allow the solenoid valve is not qualified for ex- environment, such as a main steamline hydraulic dump valve solenoid may de- unless the air is isolated to the oil powered from Battery Charger BC2D2 or solenoids for the air to the oil pump	on of Attachment 2. . the environmental e area, and the elec- to ensure the close n that the secondary vely simple check (a erature, etc.) and of the electrical align s not located inside itiated to assure po- dditional actions to terpretation of the OT in the MSIV rooms environment, which form the MSIV electrical e the leak is located inside potential for person here, radioactivity l pump. The air is o close. d hydraulic dump val- MSIVs to close. The tended periods in a break in the MSIV rooms mergize and allow th pump. Ensuring Batta	If the steam conditions are ctrical ed position of y break is e.g., can be used to nment of e containment. ower is o check the actions to s could result is not the rical alignment de the MSIV de containment nnel exposure to , etc). The controlled from lve which opens hydraulic dump harsh poms. The he MSIVs to open ery 2D2 is

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	0000	62.Ak	(3.03
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	4.0		

Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of nuclear service water

Question # 52

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 70% power
- 86-2 LOR fault occurs on Safeguards Bus 1EA2
- Both 1EA2-1, INCOMING BKR, and 1EA2-2, INCOMING BKR trip open
- DG 1-02 automatically starts and DG 2 BKR 1EG2 automatically closes
- 1-ALB-1, Window 1.8 SSWP 1/2 OVERLOAD/TRIP, alarms
- SSW Pump 1-02 handswitch indications are as follows:
 - o Amber MISMATCH light LIT
 - White TRIP light LIT

	3N-501, Station Sei I be taken?	vice Water System Malfunction, which of the following actions
A.	to EDG 1-02	ckout Sequencer to complete its timing and verify proper SSW flow
	(2) Continue plant	operations at approximately 70% power
В.	(1) Wait for the Bla to EDG 1-02	ckout Sequencer to complete its timing and verify proper SSW flow
	(2) Enter and perfo	rm the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
C.		EMER STOP/START handswitch in PULL-OUT rm the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
П	. , .	EMER STOP/START handswitch in PULL-OUT
D.	()	operations at approximately 70% power
Answe	r: D	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the actions to be taken in the event of a loss of SSW.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because the BOS will fire to load the EDG and the SSW Pump will have an amber MISMATCH light until the sequencer sends a signal to start the pump, however, the white TRIP light is not expected and this is an indication that the pump has tripped and will not start on the sequencer timing. The immediate action per ABN-501 is to place the EDG in PULLOUT. Second part is correct (see D).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the unit would be tripped if both buses were lost.
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B)..
- D. Correct. First part is correct. With the SSW Pump tripped, the EDG must be immediately tripped whether or not it is carrying the bus. Second part is correct. A loss of a single Safeguards Bus does not require the Unit be tripped.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-501A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the response to Station Service Water Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction. (ABN.501.OB101)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23103	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2018 NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar	nental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Form ES-401-5

nments / Reference: ABN-501A			Revision	1:
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAN	UAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE N ABN-501	NO.
STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MALFUNC	TION	REVISION NO. 10	PAGE 4 OF 5	50
2.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RI	ESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED	
NOTE: The diesel generator can be operate without SSW flow and not affect diese without SSW flow and not affect diese without SSW flow and not affect diese of the second state of the second	sel perfor feguard I: The time t is) to prev	mance, ous, the SSW pump w his condition exists sh rent damage to the D0	ill not be running) hould be	
2 Verify unaffected train SSW Pump - RUNNING NOTE: Opposite train's SSW Pump and CCW F	unaff <u>IF</u> the <u>THEN</u> GO T	O Section 5.0 of this	procedure.	
from the Ultimate Heat Sink.				
3 (Verify unaffected train CCW Pump - (RUNNING)		rm the following:		
		anually start the CCW affected train.	pump in the	
	tra	the CCW pump in the iin will not start, <u>IEN</u> perform the follow		ļ
	1)	TRIP the Reactor		
	2)	GO TO EOP-0.0A/B qualified operators o procedure.		
	3)	TRIP <u>ALL</u> RCPs.		
	4)	GO TO Section 5.0	of this procedure	İ
	n 2.3			

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CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Form ES-401-5

(Comments / Reference: ABN-501A				Revision:	
	CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MA	NUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2		CEDURE NO. ABN-501	
	STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MALFUN	CTION	REVISION NO. 10	PAG	GE 20 OF 50	
	5.3 Operator Actions	5.3 Operator Actions				
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED				
	 4 Verify Standby Service Water Pump - RUNNING Perform the following: Manually start Standby SSW pump. Check discharge pressure on operating pump. U-PI-4252A, SSWP 1 DISCH PRESS U-PI-4253A, SSWP 2 DISCH PRESS U-PI-4253A, SSWP 2 DISCH PRESS IF discharge pressure on operating pump does <u>NOT</u> increase to greater than 32 psig. <u>THEN</u> STOP the affected pump <u>AND</u> place handswitch in PULL OUT. IF the standby pump does <u>NOT</u> start, <u>THEN</u> perform the following: Manually TRIP the Reactor <u>AND</u> GO to EOP-0.04/B while other operators continue this procedure. Trip <u>ALL</u> RCPs: 					
	"Step continued next page" Section 5.3					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	0000	65.Ak	(3.08
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.7		

Loss of Instrument Air: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air

Question # 53

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power
- After maintenance, the TDAFWP is recirculating to the CST at 2000 rpm per SOP-304A, AFW System, when:
 - Unit 1 experiences a Loss of Instrument Air
 - o Instrument Air pressure is 34 psig and lowering

Which of the following:

(1) Identifies the impact on TDAFWP speed?

(2) What action should be taken to mitigate the situation?

- A. (1) TDAFWP speed rises to maximum(2) Trip the Reactor and enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
- B. (1) TDAFWP speed rises to maximum
 (2) Maintain plant conditions stable and manually control SG level by controlling the MFW Flow Control Valves
- C. (1) TDAFWP speed lowers to minimum(2) Trip the Reactor and enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
- D. (1) TDAFWP speed lowers to minimum
 (2) Maintain plant conditions stable and manually control SG level by controlling the MFW Flow Control Valves

Answer:

Α

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how the TDAFWP responds to a loss of instrument air and the actions needed to be taken as IA pressure lowers.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. TDAFW Pump speed rises to maximum. Second part is correct. Given the listed instrument air pressure, the Reactor should be tripped and EOP-0.0A entered
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, plausible because it could be thought that the MFW Flow Control valves have accumulators to allow continued operation after a loss of instrument air similar to the accumulators for the AFW flow control valves.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since if thought that the TDAFW Pump speed will lower vice rise on a loss of air. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-301	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to Loss of Instrument Air in accordance with ABN-301 Instrument Air System Malfunction. (ABN.301.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	32803	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis		X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comr	Comments / Reference: ABN-301						Revision: 14	
A	CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL				UNIT 1 AND		OCEDURE NO. ABN-301	
	INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION				REVISION NO	D. 14 P/	AGE 4 OF 130	
	2.3 Operator Actions ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAIN							
					RESPONSE	NOT OBTAIN		
	NOTE: Step 1 is a Continuous Action Step.							
	 I IF in MODE 1, 2, 3, <u>OR</u> 4 <u>AND</u> Instrument Air Header pressure decreases to <u>35 psig</u> <u>OR</u> control of system(s) is lost, <u>THEN</u> manually trip the reactor <u>AND</u> GO TO EOP-0.0A/B while other operator(s) continue this procedure section starting with step 7. 							
	NOTE:	 Loss of Inst and Unit 2. 	rument Air in the Auxilian	y Buildi	ng will affect co	omponents in	Unit 1	
	 Section 4.0 provides actions for "Unit 2 Response to Loss of Unit 1 Instrument Air." 							
 <u>IF</u> an air compressor is in an Auto-Start condition, <u>THEN</u> it will <u>NOT</u> start until low pressure is sensed (105 psig if in LEAD, 100 psig if in BACKUP). Once low pressure is sensed, the Compressor will restart and load. 								
	□ 2	Compressor - Al UNIT <u>AND</u> RUN	one Instrument Air LIGNED TO THE NING: INST AIR COMP 1	D TO THE LESS THAN <u>100 psiq</u> , <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the backup <u>OR</u> standby				
		_ ,	INST AIR COMP 2	•		INST AIR A PRESS	FTFILT OUT	
		• X-ZL-3463,	COMPR 1	•		INST AIR C		
			COMPR 2	•		INST AIR C		
				•	X-ZL-3463,	COMPR 1 INST AIR C COMPR 2	ОММ	
	Section 2.3							

nments / Reference: ABN-301				Revision: 14	
	CPNPP			PR	OCEDURE NO.
ABNORMAL CO		EDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2		ABN-301
INSTRUME	NT AIR SYSTEM I	MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 14	PA	GE 86 OF 130
		ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 27 OF 47			
	AIR OPER	ATED EQUIPMENT FAI			
	- art or Er		201121-001110110		FAILURE
BLDG		EQUIPMENT			POSITION
Rm u-067, TRN	A ECCS VLV RM	RHR HX u-01 FLO CT			F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -FCV-0618	RHR HX u-01 BYP FLO	D CTRL VLV		F.C.
<u>Rm u-070, HALI</u>					
SFGD 790 SFGD 790		RHR HX 01 FLO CTRL RHR HX 01 BYP FLO	CTRI		INOP INOP
SFGD 790	2-HV-5660B	SI PMP 2-01 RM VENT	EXH DMPR 2-13 OF	PER	F.C.
	2-HV-5663B				F.C.
Rm u-072, AFW SFGD 790			0011 TO 00 04		F.0
SFGD /90	<u>u</u> -r ⁻ v-2453A	MD AFW PMP <u>u</u> -01 DI FLO CTRL VLV	SCH 10 SG U-01		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -PV-2453B	MD AFW PMP u-01 DI FLO CTRL VLV	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -02		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -FV-2456	MD AFW PMP u-01 TC	CST RECIRC FLO	VLV	F.O.
<u>Rm u-073, AFW</u>					
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -PV-2454A	MD AFW PMP <u>u</u> -02 DI FLO CTRL VLV	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -03		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -PV-2454B	MD AFW PMP u-02 DI FLO CTRL VLV	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -04		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -FV-2457	MD AFW PMP <u>u</u> -02 TC FLO VLV) CST RECIRC		F.O.
<u>Rm u-074, TD A</u>	FW PMP RM				
SFGD 790	u-SY-2452	TDAFWP SPEED CTR			MAX
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -HV-2459	TD AFW PMP u-01 DIS FLO CTRL VLV	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -01		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -HV-2460	TD AFW PMP u-01 DIS	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -02		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -HV-2461	TD AFW PMP u-01 DIS	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -03		F.O.
SFGD 790	<u>u</u> -HV-2462	FLO CTRL VLV TD AFW PMP <u>u</u> -01 DIS FLO CTRL VLV	SCH TO SG <u>u</u> -04		F.O.
		Attachment 2			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 3 4	Tier	1				
	Group	1				
	K/A	000077.AK2.06				
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.9				
Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Disturbances and the following: Reactor power						
Question # 54	Question # 54					
Given the following conditions:						
Unit 2 90% power						
Main Generator load 1140 MWe						
Grid frequency has lowered from 60 H	lz to 59.7 Hz					
When the Turbine Load Control system has i	restored Main Genera	tor load	to 11	140		
MWe, reactor power will be(1) than 90%	6.					
Per ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV Sy	stem Malfunction, if C	Grid Free	queno	су		
continues to lower, an IMMEDIATE Reactor	Trip is FIRST required	d at(2	2)			
A. (1) higher						
(2) 57.5 Hz 57.2 Hz						
B. (1) higher						
(2) 59.4 Hz 58.5 Hz						
C. (1) lower						
(2) 57.5 Hz 57.2 Hz						
D. (1) lower						
(2) 59.4 Hz 58.5 Hz						
Answer: A						

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of changing grid frequency on turbine load and reactor power.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Generator load will decrease with decreasing frequency (due to reduction in generator efficiency) and automatic load control will restore the load to the set load. This will result in increasing steam flow and increased reactor power. Second part is correct. An immediate Reactor Trip will be required as Grid Frequency lowers to 57.5 57.2 Hz per ABN-601, Section 9, Step 3 table.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because this is a recent change to ABN-601 in which continued operation at 59.4 Hz is now allowed automatic grid frequency relays provide for load shedding at frequency between 59.3 Hz and 58.5 Hz. In previous revisions a Reactor Trip was required if Grid Frequency had lowered to 59.4 Hz for 9 minutes. There are also significant actions taken in the ABN at this Hz level to divorce the Safeguards Busses from the grid.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because it could be thought Grid Frequency lowering would cause less load on the generator and therefore cause Reactor power to lower as Main Generator Control valves throttle down. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-601	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective:	ANALYZE the response to events described in accordance with ABN- 601, Response to 138/345 kV System Malfunction and ABN-602, Response to 6900/480 V System Malfunction. (ABN.601.OB00)					
Question Source:	Bank #					
	Modified Ba	nk #	44282	(Note changes or attach parent)		
	New			, 		
Question History:	Last NRC	Exam _				
Question Cognitive	,		mental Knowle r Analysis	edge X		
10 CFR Part 55 Co	ntent: 55.41	7				

	55.43					
Comments / Reference:	Bank 44282		Revision:			
Given the following condi	tions:					
 Unit 2 is in MODE 1, Reactor power is 90%. Main Generator load is 1140 MWe. Main Generator reactive load is 270 MVAR. ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction, Section 9.0, Grid Frequency Fluctuations/Loss of QSE Generation Controller Communications, is in progress. Grid frequency has lowered from 60 Hz to 59.5 Hz. 						
Main Generator reactive	oad will	due to generato	r			
A. increase	over-excitation					
B. decrease	over-excitation					
C. increase	under-excitation					
D. decrease	under-excitation					
Answer: A						
Answer Explanat		e main generator will b	ecome over			
 A. Correct. If Grid Frequency lowers the main generator will become over excited and reactive load will increase. Grid frequency lowering also causes terminal voltage to decrease which leads to an increase in reactive load. B. Incorrect. Plausible if it is thought that over-excitation cause reactive load to lower. C. Incorrect. Plausible if it is thought that as grid frequency lowers the main generator will become under excited and reactive load will increase. D. Incorrect. Plausible because under excitation will cause reactive load to decrease, however, grid frequency lowering causes over excitation. 						

omments / Reference: E	3ank 44282	Revision:
Question 429 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	0	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	44282	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT8484	
Cross Reference	ABN.601.OB00.001	
Number:	ABN.001.0B00.001	
Topic:	Given the following conditions: Un	
	Reactor power is 90%. Main Gener	ator load i
K/A:		
Question Reference:		
SRO:		
Comments:	LC20 NRC	
	Ref: ABN-601 Sect. 9; GFC.MTR	

CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2 PROCEDURE NO. ABN-601 RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REVISION NO. 17 PAGE 132 OF 256 9.3 Operator Actions	Revision: 16-17				/ Reference: ABN-601	Comments
			UNIT 1 AND 2	NUAL		ABNOR
9.3 <u>Operator Actions</u>	32 OF 256	PAGE 132	REVISION NO. 17		E TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUN	RESPONS
					perator Actions	9.3 <u>C</u>
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED		TAINED	RESPONSE NOT OB		CTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	4
NOTE: • Automatic grid frequency relays provide for load shedding at frequency between 59.3 Hz and 58.5 Hz. If the grid frequency has not recovered after 9 minutes, other plants under-frequency protection may lead to additional lowering of grid frequency.	other	9 minutes, oth	as not recovered after	equency h	59.3 Hz and 58.5 Hz. If the grid fro	(NOTE:
 <u>IF</u> frequency recovers to >59.4 Hz, STOP the timer <u>AND</u> RESET. START a new 9 minute timer if frequency drops below 59.4 Hz. 		· ·	e timer <u>AND</u> RESET.	, STOP th	 IF frequency recovers to >59.4 Hz 	
 Reactor trip will occur on Reactor Coolant Pump under-frequency trip at 57.2 Hz (2 of 4 RCPs) when power is above P-7(10%). 	Hz I	trip at 57.2 Hz	ump under-frequency 6).	Coolant Pr e P-7(10%	 Reactor trip will occur on Reactor (2 of 4 RCPs) when power is above 	
CHECK Frequency- GREATER THAN 59.4 Hz (1782 rpm) IF Frequency is LESS THAN 57.2 Hz THEN ENSURE Reactor Tripped AND GO TO EOP-0.0A/B			I JRE Reactor Tripped	THEN ENSU	GREATER THAN 59.4 Hz (1782	<mark></mark> 4
PERFORM the following steps for both units.	units.	eps for both un	ORM the following ste	PERF		
A. START 9 minute timer AND CALL QSE.	. QSE.					
B. STABILIZE plant power level. C. <u>IF</u> Grid Frequency is still <59.4 Hz after 2 minutes, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following to divorce the safeguards busses from the grid:		till <59.4 Hz aft ng to divorce th	E Grid Frequency is s 2 minutes, FHEN PERFORM the followir	C. 1		
 PERFORM an Emergency Start of the Train A diesel generator. 	art of			1		
 TURN ON the synchroscope for the Train A diesel output breaker <u>AND</u> PARALLEL the diesel with off-site power. 	aker	output breaker	the Train A diesel AND PARALLEL t	2		
3) CLOSE the diesel output breaker <u>AND</u> TURN OFF the synchroscope.	aker		AND TURN OFF t	3		
"Step continued next page"			age"	ued next p	"Step contine	
Section 9.3				tion 9.3	Sec	



ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	WE11.EA1.03		1.03
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.7		

Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation: Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations

Question # 55

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

- ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, entered following a LOCA
- RCS subcooling margin 88°F
- One Train of ECCS equipment has been secured
- RWST Make-up is being initiated

Per ECA-1.1A, makeup to the RWST may be accomplished utilizing __(1)__.

Subsequently, ECA-1.1A directs the RCS be depressurized to establish a subcooling margin between 25°F and 35°F in order to ___(2)___.

- A. (1) RHUT X-01(2) maximize CCP injection flow prior to RWST depletion
- B. (1) U2 RWST(2) maximize CCP injection flow prior to RWST depletion
- C. (1) RHUT X-01(2) minimize RCS break flow
- D. (1) U2 RWST(2) minimize RCS break flow

D

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of loss of coolant recirc procedures to obtain desired results.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because this is a borated makeup source utilized in other procedures to provide a makeup volume (i.e. SFPs). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since this would provide maximum makeup to RCS, but conflicts with objective to conserve RWST inventory.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. ECA-1.1A, Attachment 3 allows use of U2 RWST as a source of makeup to the U1 RWST. Second part is correct. Depressurizing to minimize subcooling margin while cooling down ensures that the RCS is at the minimum pressure allowable while still maintaining the RCS subcooled. This minimizes RCS break flow and thereby minimizes the amount of makeup flow required to the RCS.

Technical Reference(s)	ECA-1.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps from ECA-1.1, **STATE** the purpose/basis for the step(s). (ERG.C11.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		



omments	/ Reference: ECA-1.1A		Revision: 9
	CPNPP		DDOCEDUDE NO
	EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-1.1A
LOSS C	OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 69 OF 83
	ATTACHMENT 7 PAGE 15 OF 29		
	BASES		
<u>CAUTION</u> :	One of the goals of ECA-1.1A is to mining depletion and delay the time until inject to increase ECCS or makeup flow is based core cooling. The criteria to increase indication is the same criteria that is cooling in the Critical Safety Function vessel cannot be maintained above the to matter of time before the core will stat makeup flow is needed. Using the RVLIS conflict between the Orange path based IN Core Cooling Critical Safety Function reinitiation criteria in ECA-1.1A. Rest should first be attempted in ECA-1.1A at successful in restoring RVLIS level to transfer to the FRGs on low RVLIS level actions.	ction flow is lost d on the prevention makeup flow based used to diagnose of Status Trees. If op of the core, the rt to heat up and a criterion creates on RVLIS indication n Status Tree and toration of ECCS of nd, only if the op- greater than 11 IN	. The criterion n of inadequate on RVLIS degraded core level in the en it is only a additional an ERG priority n less than 11 the ECCS r makeup flow erator is not , then the
STEP 26:	This step instructs the operator to ver- not required by checking that the RVLIS the core and that core exit TCs are stal that the makeup flow reduction performer properly: i.e., if the makeup flow is no of Steps 21 through 25, it will be deter will be increased.	indication is abo ble or decreasing. d in the previous ow inadequate due	ve the top of This ensures steps was done to the actions
	This is a Continuous Action Step.		
NOTE :	Without RCPs running, there is very lit region. Liquid in that region remains liquid temperature in the active region significantly reduced during the RCS co- subsequently depressurized, the hotter to steam, forming an upper head void. will displace water into the PRZR, causs with the potential for water relief thr fill with water within a few minutes. the potential for this condition, so the stopped quickly to avoid a water solid	relatively hot even s of the RCS has bo oldown. As the RCS liquid in the upper Steam formation in ing rapidly increa. ough the PRZR PORV This note informs at RCS depressuriz. PRZR.	n though the een S is r head may flash the upper head sing PRZR level s. The PRZR may the operator of ation can be
STEP 27:	The RCS pressure reduction that is perf- decrease RCS break flow for small break		
	subcooled condition. The purpose of the RCS pressure to the lowest pressure post For large break LOCAs, the RCS would all subcooling would not exist and this step this step is entered. RCS subcooling is is not adequate, the operator will be di- step will not be performed. If RCS sub- will proceed on and perform this step.	e depressurization sible without losi ready be depressur p should not be pe checked first. I irected to the nex	is to decrease ng subcooling. ized and RCS rformed. When f RCS subcooling t step and this

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С	omments / Reference: ECA-1.1A			Revision: 9	
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUID	ELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-1.1A	
	LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECI	RCULATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 35 OF 83	
		ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 3 OF 17			
	1	RWST MAKEUP METH	IODS		
	[R] 2. Makeup to Unit 1 RWST From Unit rooms). CAUTION: Reducing water volume initiations (TS 3.5.4, restrictions should be	in Unit 2 RWST m and TRM 13.1.31	ay exceed Unit 2 op and 13.1.32). Uni	erating t 2 operating	
	restrictions should be RWST. Notify the Plan 2 RWST to Unit 1 RWST				
	 a. Ensure the following valv 2SI-0047. RWST 2-01 T ISOL VLV (Unit 2 RWST room). 	O SI			
	 2SI-8977. RWST 2-01 TV WTR PURIF PMP X-01/X-1 VLV (AB 790 in overhead) 	02 ISOL			
	 Open Unit 2 RWST Isolatic (Unit 2 MCB, CB-02) 	n valves			
	 1/2-8800A, RWST TO SF VLV 	PCS DRN			
	 1/2-8800B, RWST TO SF VLV 	PCS DRN			
		-Cont 2-			
- '				I	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	1		
	K/A	WE	05.EK	2.01
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.7		

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features

Question # 56

Given the following conditions:

Time = 0800:

- Reactor power = 100%
- Loss of all MFW occurs

Time = 0820:

- FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, in progress
- Condensate flow is to be established to the SGs
- CVCS Letdown is isolated

In accordance with FRH-0.1A, before SG pressure is reduced, RCS pressure will be reduced to approximately ___(1)__ to allow blocking of automatic SI actuation signals.

The PREFERRED method of RCS depressurization is to use __(2)__.

- A. (1) 1910 psig(2) a Pressurizer PORV
- B. (1) 1910 psig(2) Auxiliary Spray
- C. (1) 1880 psig (2) a Pressurizer PORV
- D. (1) 1880 psig(2) Auxiliary Spray

Answer: A

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the method of RCS depressurization during a loss of heat sink event.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. 1st part is correct. RCS pressure is reduced to ~ 1910 psig to allow blocking of the low steam line pressure and low Przr pressure SI signals. 2nd part is correct. If letdown is not in service, the PORV is used to reduce pressure.
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see A). 2nd part is incorrect because with letdown not in service, the PORV is used to reduce pressure. It is plausible because if letdown were in service, it would be correct.
- C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect because FRH-0.1A directs you to reduce RCS pressure to ~ 1910 psig. It is plausible because 1880 psig is the trip value and above the value where the SI signal occurs. 2nd part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	FRH-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRH-0.1 in accordance with FRH-0.1, Loss of Heat Sink. (ERG.FH1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	77325	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar	nental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ES-401

nments / Reference: FRH-0.1A		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. FRH-0.1A
RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 12 OF 85
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE N	OT OBTAINED
<u>CAUTION</u> : Following block of automatic S actuation may be required if c		SI
NOTE: After the low steamline pressure steam isolation will occur if the setpoint is exceeded.		
9 Establish Feed Flow From Condensate System:		
a. Depressurize RCS to less than (1910 psig:)		
1) Turn off all PRZR heaters.		
2) <mark>Check letdown – IN SERVICE</mark>	2) <mark>Use one PRZR</mark> <u>THEN</u> use auxi Go to Step 9b	liary spray.
3) Use auxiliary spray.	3) Use one PRZR	PORV.
b. Block SI signals:		
• Low steamline pressure SI		
• Low PRZR pressure SI		
c. Depressurize at least one SG to less than 500 psig:		
 Dump steam to condenser at maximum rate and avoid main steam isolation. 		s using intact c(s). <u>IF NOT</u> . ep 11. ON <u>AND</u> NOTES
-CONT 9-		

Comr	nents	/ Reference: FRH-0.1A	Revision: 9		
		CPNPP		PROCEDURE NO.]
		EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	FRH-0.1A	-
	RESPON	NSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 58 OF 85	
		ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 6 OF 33			1
		BASES			
CA	UTION:	The next step blocks the low steamline pressure SI signals in order to depress condensate flow to the SG. Blocking th steamline isolation on low steam pressu could hamper or delay recovery.	urize a SG, and est e SI signal prevent	ablish s feedline and	
		Operator attention to plant conditions not required. Manual SI actuation may deteriorate.			
		The level of plant condition degradatio actuation is based on operator judgment parameters of RCS subcooling and PRZR 1 indicators for the level of degradation requirements of SI Reinitiation used th	after assessing th evel. Using these is consistent with	e plant parameters as the parameter	
NO	NOTE: Following low steamline pressure SI signal block, the high steam pressure rate main steamline isolation signal will be enabled. If automatic MSIV closure occurs, steam flow to condenser is terminated requiring SG depressurization to be continued by dumping steam to the atmosphere. In addition to delaying recovery, closure of the MSIVs increases the radiological releases and reduces feedwater supply. With RCPs off, establishing the steaming rate will need to be performed more slowly. If MSIV closure occurs, the rapid cooldown should be continued using the SG atmospherics.				
ST	EP 9:	The condensate system is the next sourc the operator for use in re-establishing			
		In order to depressurize at least one S pressure of the condensate system pumps 1910 psig (Conservatively below the P-1 blocking of the low steamline pressure signals. If these signals were allowed steamline isolation actuation signals m isolation may still occur on a reactor low Tavg signal.	, the RCS must be d 1 setpoint of 1960 SI and low PRZR pre to actuate, feedli ay have to be reset	epressurized to psig) to allow ssure SP ine and Feedline	
		Auxiliary spray is used to depressurize service, since it provides a maximum co allowing no loss of primary water inven available since ROPs are stopped. If 1 PORVs are used to avoid thermal stresse However, if the PRZR PORVs cannot be us If SI is actuated for RCS bleed and fee be effective since the charging flow pa flowpath, and it is not desired to isol	oling to the primar tory. Normal spray etdown is not in se s to the auxiliary ed, auxiliary spray d, auxiliary spray th is aligned throu	y system while is not rvice. PRZR spray nozzles. must be used. flow will not	
L					L

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	0000	01.Ak	(2.06
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.0		

Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: T-ave./ref. deviation meter

Question # 57

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 60% power
- Rod Control in AUTO
- PT-505, First Stage Pressure Instrument fails, causing the Tave Tref Deviation Meter to indicate -10°F
- Control rods begin stepping
- Crew enters ABN-709, Steam Line, Steam Header & Turbine 1st Stage Pressure & Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction

Contro	l rods	are	stepping	(1)
--------	--------	-----	----------	----	---

Per ABN-709, Control Rods should be placed in MANUAL and __(2)__.

A. (1) inward

(2) are required to remain in MANUAL until the failed Turbine First Stage Pressure channel is repaired

B. (1) inward

(2) may be placed in AUTO after the alternate Turbine First Stage Pressure channel is selected

C. (1) outward

(2) are required to remain in MANUAL until the failed Turbine First Stage Pressure channel is repaired

D. (1) outward

D

(2) may be placed in AUTO after the alternate Turbine First Stage Pressure channel is selected

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the relationship between the Tave-Tref deviation meter and rod movement.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since a Tave-Tref deviation will cause rod motion, but indication of -10°F will result in outward rod motion. Second part is incorrect, but plausible because other systems that utilize first stage pressure (i.e. Steam Dumps) are required to be maintained in off-normal condition (steam dumps must be maintained in Steam Pressure Mode vs Tave Mode). Also, on a Tcold failure the rods must remain in Manual until the failed Tcold channel is repaired.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D)
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. Tave-Tref deviation meter indicating -10°F will result in outward rod motion. Second part is correct, per ABN-709 after selecting the alternate channel on 1-PS-505Z rods may be placed back in AUTO.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-709	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Rod Control Study Guide	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument Malfunction in accordance with ABN-709 Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction. (ABN.710.0B07)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

	Reference: ABN-709		Revision: 10
ABNO	CPNPP RMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-709
	LINE, STM HDR & TURB 1st STAGE PRESS. FEED HDR PRESS. INSTR MALFUNCTION	REVISION NO. 10	PAGE 13 OF 35
4.0 <u>TL</u>	JRBINE IMPULSE PRESSURE INSTRUMEN	IT MALFUNCTION	
4.1 <u>Sy</u>	/mptoms		
a.	Annunciator Alarms		
	AVE Tave-Tref DEV	(6D-1.10)	
	Tref - AUCT LO Tave MISMATCH	(6D-3.13)	
b.	Plant Indications		
	Turbine impulse pressure channels not	indicating the same.	
	1) <u>u</u> -PI-505, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN	NI	
	2) <u>u</u> -PI-506, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN	N II	
4.2 <u>Au</u>	utomatic Actions		
	 Pressure Transmitter <u>u</u>-PT-505 (normally s <u>u</u>-PT-505 failing high will cause control <u>u</u>-PT-505 failing low will cause control r dumps if an arming signal is present an AMSAC BLK TURB <40% PWR C-20, I Pressure Transmitter <u>u</u>-PT-506 <u>u</u>-PT-506 failing high will prevent steam <u>u</u>-PT-506 failing low will arm the steam AMSAC actuation (PCIP 1.3, AMSAC B 	rods to withdraw if in automatic, nods to insert if in automatic, nd disable AMSAC actuation LIT). n dump actuation on an actua dumps (the signal seals in) a	open steam (PCIP 1.3, al loss of load . and disable

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Comments / Reference: ABN-709 Revision: 10						
CPNPP			PROCEDURE NO.			
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUA		UNIT 1 AND 2	ABN-709			
STM LINE, STM HDR & TURB 1st STAGE PRESS & FEED HDR PRESS. INSTR MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 10	PAGE 14 OF 35			
4.3 Operator Actions						
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED			
1 PLACE 1/ <u>u</u> -RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in - MANUAL NOTE: The following step will prevent automative rejection, if RNO step is applied.	c steam de	ump actuation on an	actual load			
2 VERIFY Steam Dumps - CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND a. <u>u</u> -UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND, indicating <u>0%</u> DEMAND. b. STM DMP VLV ZL lights indicating - CLOSED.	WITH NO OPEN DEMAND THEN PLACE at least one steam dump interlock select switch - OFF: a. u-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND, indicating 0% DEMAND. • 43/u-SDA, STM DMP INTLK SELECT b. STM DMP VLV ZL lights • 43/u-SDB, STM DMP INTLK SELECT					
<u>CAUTION</u> : A briefing should be conducted to eva contingency actions should a subseq 4.2.						
NOTE: • If transferring dumps to steam pressuning high if PT-505 is failed low.	ire mode,	steam demand will b	e erroneously			
 The following step ensures steam du trips. 	mps availa	able for subsequent r	unbacks or			
 Attachment 8 is available to aid in bri 	ef (L)					
3 RESTORE steam dump availability by placing Steam Dumps in STM PRESS Mode per Attachment 7.	by placing Steam Dumps in STM					
4 TRANSFER <u>u</u> -PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to operable channel						
5 ENSURE Tave within 1°F of Tref.						
Section	4.3					

nments / Re	eference: ABN-709			Revision: 10
ABNORM	CPNPP IAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAI	L	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-709
	IE, STM HDR & TURB 1st STAGE PRESS. ED HDR PRESS. INSTR MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 10	PAGE 15 OF 35
4.3 <u>Op</u>	erator Actions			
A	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED
F	RETURN 1/ <u>u</u> -RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch to AUTO, if desired.			
7 0	CHECK Reactor Plant in - MODE 1	NOT att	tor Plant is in MODE empt to enter MODE is repaired.	
	CHECK Turbine Power - GREATER THAN <u>10%</u> POWER.		E affected channel bi hment 5 - RESET (no	
	The following step will prevent the autom Reactor power is below <u>10%</u> power.	natic block	of several reactor tri	ps when
v F e	Within 1 hour, VERIFY PCIP vindow 4.6, TURB ≤10% PWR 2-13 - IN PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions. TS Table 3.3.1-1, item 18.f)	PERFORM the following: a. Within 1 hour, HAVE an I&C Technician place bistable test switches for failed channel in CLOSE utilizing Attachments 1 and 3.		
		statu	IFY appropriate alarm s lights ON per Attacl E this verification in U	hment 5 AND
		Reactor	echnician <u>NOT</u> avail Operator may perfor ft Manager/Unit Supe ence.	m this step
E	/ERIFY PCIP window 1.3, AMSAC 3LK TURB <40% PWR C-20 - IN PROPER STATE for actual turbine power.	power > Actions	AC actuation blocked 40%, <u>THEN</u> ENSURi of ALB-9B 3.7, AMSA necessary.	E Automatic
□ 11 II S	NITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421, as applicable.			
END OF SECTION				
	Section 4	4.3		

Comments / Reference: Rod Control Study Guide

Revision: 00-0000

OP51.SYS.CR1

Failure of PT-505, Turbine First Stage Pressure

Indications of this condition are receipt of the AVG Tave-Tref DEV or Tref-AUCT LO Tave MISMATCH alarms and/or inadvertent rod motion. If PT-505 fails high, the control rods would withdraw if in the automatic mode. If PT-505 fails low, the control rods will insert and, with the presence of an arming signal, operate the steam dumps. Response to this condition is in accordance with ABN-709 and includes placing the control rod in manual to prevent inadvertent operation.

Abnormal Control Rod Response

The indications of this condition include abnormal rod speed, failure to achieve rod motion when called for, inadvertent rod motion, abnormal changes in plant parameters for a rod motion, improper rod sequencing, or improper bank overlap. This condition could lead to other plant actions such as a reactor trip, turbine runback, or steam dump operation. Because of this, immediate operator response is necessary. Response to this condition is in accordance with ABN-712 Section 2.0.

Dropped or Misaligned Rod in Mode 1 or 2

A control rod is considered to be misaligned when two DRPI's in the same group disagree by greater than or equal to 12 steps or one DRPI disagrees with its group step counter by greater than or equal to 12 steps. Possible annunciator alarms that would indicate a misaligned rod(s) condition are PR Chan Dev, DRPI Rod Dev and/or a Quadrant PWR Tilt. The procedure for a misaligned rod recovery is ABN-712.

The recovery procedure initially places the reactor in a safe condition by verifying various plant parameters and taking actions accordingly to bring these back into operating bands. These include Tavg-Tref, Reactor Power and the Axial Flux Difference. The Axial Flux Difference is defined as the difference in the normalized flux signals between the top and the bottom halves of a four section excore neutron detector. Basically it is the relationship of how the neutron flux is distributed across the core from top to bottom. The Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) is then verified to be within specifications by verifying the alarm clear. The Quadrant Power Tilt is defined as the ratio of the maximum upper half excore detector calibrated output, to the average of the upper half excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower half excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower half excore calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. If the alarm is in, the QPTR is calculated in accordance with OPT-302 or by the plant computer.

The cause of the misaligned or dropped control rod is investigated and must be determined within an hour or else implement the requirements of Tech. Spec. 3.1.4.1.

To retrieve a dropped rod, the operator places the bank selector switch to the affected group and records the position of that group (and P/A converter value). At the back of the control board, the lift coil disconnect switches are placed in the open position for all rods in the affected bank with <u>exception</u> of the affected rod. The operator then recovers the dropped rod using either the DRPI recovery method or the referencing method.

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

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Rev 00.0000

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	0000	24.AA	1.10
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.3		

Emergency Boration: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Boric acid storage tank

Question # 58

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 Reactor has tripped
- During the Reactor Trip, the RO notes the following indications on DRPI:
 - o Control Rod F-14 at 212 steps
 - o Control Rod H-2 at 228 steps
 - Control Rod M-12 at 6 steps
 - All other rods at bottom
- 1-ALB-6B, Window 3.1 BAT 1 LVL LO-LO, in alarm
- Boric Acid Tank X-01 level 54%

The crew is required to Emergency Borate __(1)__ in response to these conditions.

BAT X-01 __(2)__ have the required Technical Specification MINIMUM level for the given plant conditions.

A. (1) 3600 gallons

(2) does

B. (1) 5400 gallons

(2) does

- C. (1) 3600 gallons (2) does NOT
- D. (1) 5400 gallons(2) does NOT

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the BAT operability requirements.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

- B. Correct. First part is correct. Three rods not fully inserted requires 5400 gallons of boric acid to ensure adequate SDM. Second part is correct. Minimum required volume is 50%.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since a rod stuck at 6 steps could be considered to be fully inserted, but the requirement is that 1800 gallons of boric acid is required for any rod not fully inserted. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since it could be thought that the LO-LO level alarm is indicative of the BAT being inoperable.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see C).

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-0.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
	OPT-104A-1	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given the Reactor Makeup system parameter indications and plant conditions, **ASSESS** from memory any required Technical Specification/TRM entries, including any actions which must be completed within one hour in accordance with Technical Specifications and TRM. (SYS.CS2.OB06)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowled	ge X
	Comprehension or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

CPNPP UNIT 1 PROCEDURE NO. EXPROCEMENT ENSPONSE GUIDELINES REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 20 OF 121 ATTACHMENT 1.A PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE 20 OF 121 NOTE: ABN-101. REACTOR COLANT FUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTION criteris for tripping an RCP tasplicable during use of the Emergency Procedures. Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur: a. RCS subcoling - LESS THAN 25°P (55°P FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) b. CCP or SI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 9 <th>ments / Reference: EOP-0.0A</th> <th></th> <th>Revision: 9</th>	ments / Reference: EOP-0.0A		Revision: 9	
ATTACHMENT 1.A PAGE 1 OF 1 FOLDOUT FOR EOP-0.0A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 1. REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTION criteria for tripping an RCP Tas applicable during use of the Emergency Procedures. Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur: a. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) b. CCP or SI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 2. SHUTDOWN MARCH CRITERIA Emergency borate per MEN-100 ff <u>wither</u> of the following conditions below occur: • Two or more control rods MOD fully inserted (1800 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid for more control rods MOD fully inserted). • Control rod position indication is NOT available (3600 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid). NOTE: During the performance of the immediate operator actions. AFW FOP verbalization is neither required nor expected. • Shoure AFW FLOW TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE HEAT SINK • Ensure both MDARWS started following a Reactor Trip with NO Blackout or SI actuation. (Start TDAFWP, if necessary) • Ensure AFW flow throttled following a Reactor Trip/SI (normally 150 gpm to 200 gpm). AND Maintain total AFW flow GREATER THAN 460 gpm UNTIL at least ONE SG NR Level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). • IF any SG identified as faulted, <u>THEN</u> stop AFW flow to the SG. • IF any SG identified as ruptured, <u>THEN</u> : Stop AFW flow after ruptured SG level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT).		UNIT 1		
PAGE 1 OF 1 POLDOUT FOR EOP-0.0A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION INTER EOP-0.0A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION INTER ADVICTOR COOLANT FUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTION criteris for tripping an RCP is applicable during use of the Emergency Procedures. Trip all RCPs if <u>BOTE</u> conditions listed below occur: a. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) b. CCP or SI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING SHUTDOWN MARCIN CRITERIA Tempset and ROM TO THE STIP of the following conditions below occurt • No or more control rode MOP fully inserted (1800 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid for each control rode not fully inserted). • Control rod position indication is NOT available (3600 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid). NOTE: During the performance of the immediate operator actions. AFW FOP verbalization is neither required nor expected. OUTROL AFW FLOW TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE HEAT SINK • Ensure both MDAFWPs started following a Reactor Trip with NO Blackout or SI actuation. (Start TDAFWP. if necessary) • Ensure AFW flow thortotled following a Reactor Trip/SI (normally 150 gpm to 200 gpm). Maintain total AFW flow GREATER THAN 460 gpm UNTIL at least ONE SG NR Level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). <td colspa<="" td=""><td>REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION</td><td>REVISION NO. 9</td><td>PAGE 20 OF 121</td></td>	<td>REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION</td> <td>REVISION NO. 9</td> <td>PAGE 20 OF 121</td>	REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 20 OF 121
 <u>RCP TRIP CRITERIA</u> NOTE: ABN-101, REACTOR COOLANT FUMP TRIP/MALFUNCTION criteria for tripping an RCP is applicable during use of the Emergency Procedures. Trip all RCPs if <u>BOTH</u> conditions listed below occur: a. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) b. CCP or SI pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING CONTROL ARM CONTROL FOR RUNNING CONTROL ARM CONTROL FOR RUNNING Control rod position indication is NOT available (3600 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid for <u>each control rod not fully inserted</u>). Control rod position indication is NOT available (3600 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid). NOTE: During the performance of the immediate operator actions. AFW FOP verbalization is neither required nor expected. CONTROL AFW FLOW TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE HEAT SINK Ensure both MDAFWPs started following a Reactor Trip with NO Blackout or SI actuation. (Start TDAFWP, if necessary) Ensure AFW flow throttled following a Reactor Trip/SI (normally 150 gpm to 200 gpm). AND Maintain total AFW flow GREATER THAN 460 gpm <u>UNTIL</u> at least ONE SG NR Level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). IF any SG identified as faulted, <u>THEN</u> stop AFW flow to the SG. IF any SG identified as faulted, <u>THEN</u>: Stop AFW flow flow fitter ruptured SG level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). IF BOTH MDAFWPs are running with flow <u>THEN</u>, secure the TDAFWP. ARW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION IF BOTH MDAFWPs are running with flow <u>THEN</u>, secure the TDAFWP. ARW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION IF BOTH MDAFWPS are running with flow <u>THEN</u> supply to allerase AFW water supply per ABN-305, AUXILIARY FERDWATER	ATTACHMENT 1.4 PAGE 1 OF 1	A	·	
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 Stop AFW flow <u>after</u> ruptured SG level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). <u>AND</u> Control AFW flow to <u>maintain</u> ruptured SG level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). <u>IF BOTH</u> MDAFWPs are running with flow <u>THEN</u>. secure the TDAFWP. <u>AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION</u> <u>IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. <u>THEN</u> switch to alternate AFW water supply per ABN-305. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.</u> <u>RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION</u> Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> isolated by ERG 		op AFW flow to the	SG.	
Control AFW flow to <u>maintain</u> ruptured SG level greater than 43%(50% for ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). • <u>IF BOTH</u> MDAFWPs are running with flow <u>THEN</u> , secure the TDAFWP. 4. <u>AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION</u> <u>IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, <u>THEN</u> switch to alternate AFW water supply per ABN-305, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. 5. <u>RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION</u> Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> isolated by ERG</u>	Stop AFW flow <u>after</u> ruptured SG level gre CONTAINMENT).	eater than 43%(50%	for ADVERSE	
 AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. <u>THEN</u> switch to alternate AFW water supply per ABN-305. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. <u>RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION</u> Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> isolated by ERG 	Control AFW flow to maintain ruptured SG	level greater than	43%(50% for	
IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. <u>THEN</u> switch to alternate AFW water supply per ABN-305. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. 5. <u>RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CRITERION</u> Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> isolated by ERG	IF BOTH MDAFWPs are running with flow TH	<u>EN</u> , secure the TDAF	WP.	
Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> isolated by ERG	IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. THE		ate AFW water	
	Ensure 6 gpm to 13 gpm seal injection flow t	o all RCPs <u>UNLESS</u> i	isolated by ERG	

Comments / Reference: OPT-104A-1

Revision: 21

			OPERATIONS W	EEKLY SURVEILLANCE	ES				
MODE	TECH SPEC	PARAMETERS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	CHANNEL NUMBERS	READING	NOTES			
ALL	3.5.4.2 13.1.32.7	REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK	LEVEL ≥ 95% IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. LEVEL ≥ 24% IN MODES 5 AND 6 (CCP).	1-LI-930 (CB-02)		IN MODE 5 OR 6, EITHER THE BORIC ACID STOR TANK OR THE RWST MUST BE OPERABLE.			
	(7 DA*)	LEVEL (%)	LEVEL ≥ 15% IN MODE 6 (SIP with RPV head removed).	1-LI-931 (CB-02)					
				1-LI-932 (CB-04)					
				1-LI-933 (CB-04)					
ALL	13.1.31.3 13.1.32.4 13.1.32.5	BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK LEVEL (%)	LEVEL ≥ 50% IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. LEVEL ≥ 10% IN MODES 5 AND 6.	X-LI-102 (CB-06) BA TK 1 LVL		IN MODE 5 OR 6, EITHER THE BORIC ACID STOR TANK OR THE RWST MUST BE OPERABLE.			
	(7 DA*)		INDICATE THE BAT USED FOR UNIT 1 BY CIRCLING THE OPERABLE LIS. N/A THE	X-LI-104 (CB-06)		+			
			BAT READINGS FOR THE TANK USED FOR UNIT 2.	BA TK 1 LVL					
				X-LI-105 (CB-06)		1			
				BA TK 2 LVL					
				X-LI-106 (CB-06)					
				BA TK 2 LVL					
ALL	13.1.31.1	BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK	TEMPERATURE ≥ 65°F.	X-TI-103 (1-CB-06)					
	(7 DA*)				TEMPERATURE (*F) INDIC	EMPERATURE (-F) INDICATE THE BAT USED FOR UNIT 1 BY CIRCLING THE OPERABLE TI. N/A THE	BA TK 1 TEMP		
			BAT READING FOR THE TANK USED FOR UNIT 2.	X-TI-107 (1-CB-06)					
			01112	BA TK 2 TEMP					
ALL	13.1.31.1 13.1.32.2 (7 DA*)	PATH TEMPERATURE(<u>•F</u>)	ALL TEMPERATURES IN THE FLOW PATH ARE ≥ 65°F.	ХНТ-8В (АВ 832) ХНТ-9В (АВ 832)		CHECK EACH CHANNEL BY PLACING THE CAL/R IN THE RD POSITION. ONLY REQUIRED IF THE E ACID STORAGE TANKS ARE BEING USED AS ON			
		(RECORD <u>SAT</u> OR <u>UNSAT</u>)	XHT-9B CIRCUITS ARE BACKUP CIRCUITS FOR XHT-8B. EITHER CIRCUIT FROM XHT-8B OR XHT-9B MAY BE USED TO SATISFY THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.	List non functioning circuits:	1	REQUIRED SOURCES OF BORATED WATER. CIRCUITS REQUIRED ON XHT-8B OR 9B ARE: 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 31, 32, 33.			
ALL	3.8.1.1 3.8.2.1 3.8.7.1 3.8.8.1 3.8.9.1 3.8.10.1 (7 DA*)	AC AND DC POWER SOURCES (<u>SAT</u> OR <u>UNSAT</u>)	AC AND DC POWER ALIGNED PER THE APPLICABLE SECTIONS OF OPT-215.	PERFORM OPT-215-1 AND OPT-215-11					

REFERENCE USE

OPT-10 PAGE REV. 2

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	0000	37.Ak	(3.05
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.7		

Steam Generator Tube Leak: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Actions contained in procedures for radiation monitoring, RCS water inventory balance, S/G tube failure, and plant shutdown

Question # 59

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power
- Current plant conditions as follows:
 - PRZR level 60% stable
 - Letdown flow 130 gpm
 - CCP 1-01 in service
 - COG-182, Condenser Off-Gas Radiation Monitor, in RED alarm
 - N16-175, # 2 Main Steam Line N16 Radiation Monitor, in RED alarm
 - MSL-179, # 2 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, in RED alarm
- ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, in progress

Subsequently:

• Unit 1 performed a rapid shutdown in accordance with IPO-003A, Power Operations

Based on indications	s provided,	the primary-to-se	econdary leak rate is	(1)
----------------------	-------------	-------------------	-----------------------	-----

Per ABN-106, the subsequent RCS cooldown is to be__(2)__.

- A. (1) \geq 75 gpd, but < 3600 gpd (2.5 gpm) (2) limited to a rate of 100°F per hour
- B. (1) ≥ 75 gpd, but < 3600 gpd (2.5 gpm)
 (2) established at maximum achievable rate without causing a MSLI
- C. (1) ≥ 3600 gpd (2.5 gpm)
 (2) limited to a rate of 100°F per hour
- D. (1) ≥ 3600 gpd (2.5 gpm)
 (2) established at maximum achievable rate without causing a MSLI

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the indications of a SG tube leak and the reason for actions taken to recover.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since N16-175 minimum sensitivity is 1 gpd and has a range up to 150 gpd. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the initial cooldown during a SGTR, during the performance of EOP-3.0, is at the maximum achievable rate.
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is correct. The cooldown rate used in ABN-106 is limited to 100°F per hour.
- D. Correct. First part is correct. MSL-179 minimum sensitivity and being in alarm indicates the leak is greater than 2.5 gpm (3600 gpd). Second part is incorrect (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-106	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Steam Generator Tube Leakage greater than or equal to 75 gpd in accordance with ABN-106, High Secondary Activity. (ABN.106.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowle	edge
	Comprehension or Analysis	<u> </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u> </u>	

nents / Reference: ABN-106			Revisio	on: 11
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURE	ES	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE ABN-106	
HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY		REVISION NO. 11	PAGE 15 OF	31
.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OB	AINED	\mathbb{I}
<u>NOTE:</u> Due to the minimum sensitivity of the leak rate of at least 3600 gpd (2.5 gp		tion monitors, a valid a	larm indicates a]
 Verify main steamline radiation alarms - CLEAR <u>u</u>-RE-2325 (MSL-<u>u</u>78) <u>u</u>-RE-2326 (MSL-<u>u</u>79) 		Initiate power reduction 1 hour <u>AND</u> Be in MODE 3 in the n		
 <u>u</u>-RE-2327 (MSL-<u>u</u>80) <u>u</u>-RE-2328 (MSL-<u>u</u>81) 		Calculate gross leak ra EPP-201.	ate, refer to	
	C.	GO TO Step 4.b.		
NOTE: Leakage is qualitatively confir trend in the same direction wit confirmed indications (i.e. N- monitor indication and sample CPNPP uses the CONSTANT	th the same 16 and CO(e analyses):	e order of magnitude. V 3 monitors or other cor METHOD.	Vith two mbination of	
LEAKAGE/LEAK RATE		ACTION		
Primary to secondary leakage ≥ 75 gpd (0. for Unit 1 and ≥ 50 gpd (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for ≥ 1 hour		Normal shutdown to t 3 in ≤24 hours	be in MODE	ł
Primary to secondary leakage $\ge 100 \text{ gpd}$ (0 <u>OR</u> Primary to secondary leakage $\ge 75 \text{ gpd}$ (0. for Unit 1 and $\ge 50 \text{ gpd}$ (0.0347 gpm) for U Cycle 19 sustained for $\ge 1 \text{ hour}$ <u>AND</u> NO condenser off-gas radiation monitor av <u>AND</u> main steam line leak rate radiation monitor affected SG(s) - NOT OPERABLE	052 gpm) Jnit 2, /ailable	Reduce power to ≤50 <u>AND</u> Be in MODE 3 in the		}

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Comments / Reference: ABN-106 Revision: 11									
CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.									
	ABN	DRM	IAL CONDITIONS PROCEDUR	ES	UNIT 1 AND 2		ABN-106		
		ню	GH SECONDARY ACTIVITY		REVISION NO. 11	PA	GE 25 OF 31		
:	3.3 <u>Op</u>	erato	or Actions						
	AC		VEXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED			
		•	Control cooldown to maintain p PZR level shall not be raised to The RCS shall not be cooled d SI shall not be blocked until ad verified. (Provide Attachment 2 to RO to An initial cooldown rate of 30-6 control and allow time to adjust	o >30% until : lown below 5 lequate SDM o track cooldo 60 deg/hr is re t AFW flow.	SI is blocked. 10 deg prior to SI bloc for 350 deg, xenon fr own requirements) ecommended to enhal	:k. ee, has l nce PZR	t level		
			Just prior to commencing coold each deg/hr of cooldown rate,			nately 1g	pm for		
	17	Co	oldown the RCS:						
		a.	RCS pressure AND	THEN cool do	mps to condenser can own the RCS using in mospheric Relief(s)				
		b.	Ensure Steam Dumps in STM PRESS mode in manual.						
		c.	Adjust <u>u</u> -PK-507, STM) DMP PRESS CTRL to maintain Cooldown Rate - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO <u>100°F/hr</u>						
	d. <u>WHEN</u> P-12 (553° F TAVG) is reached, <u>THEN</u> select bypass interlock on Steam Dumps and continue cooldown.								
		e.	Adjust charging flow as needed to control PZR level 17%-30%.						
	Section 3.3								

Comments / Reference: ABN-106			Revision: 11
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES	UNIT 1 AND 2		CEDURE NO. ABN-106
HIGH SECONDARY ACTIVITY	REVISION NO. 11	PA	GE 31 OF 31
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 1			
COOLDOWN LIMITATI	ONS		
Prior to SI Block			
 Maintain PZR level >17% but < 30% Maintain PZR pressure 1900 - 1950 psig Maintain RCS temperature >510°F Control non-affected SG levels 60-75% Control leaking SG level > 43% (10% Unit 2) Max cooldown rate is 100°F/Hr (but should be less After SI Block Maintain sub-cooling 60-70°F Maintain RCS pressure >900 psig until the accumt Control non-affected SG levels 60-75% Control leaking SG level > 43% (10% Unit 2) Max cooldown rate is 100°F/Hr 			
Attachment 2			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	0000	59.AA	1.01
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.5		

Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Radioactive-liquid monitor

Question # 60

PC-11, Digital Radiation Monitoring System is alarming and the display for 1-RE-5100, Turbine Building Sump 1-02 Radiation Detector is RED.

1-RE-5100, Turbine Building Sump 1-02 Radiation Detector has a(an) __(1)__ alarm.

In accordance with ALM-3200, Alarm Procedure DRMS, the Radwaste Operator should verify Turbine Building drains have shifted to the ___(2)___.

- A. (1) OPERATE FAILURE(2) Co Current Waste System
- B. (1) OPERATE FAILURE(2) Low Volume Waste Pond
- C. (1) HIGH(2) Co Current Waste System
- D. (1) HIGH(2) Low Volume Waste Pond

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring the ability to monitor radiation monitor alarms during liquid waste releases.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because PC-11 can have an OPERATE FAILURE alarm with automatic actions but has a BLUE display. Second part is correct. Procedure ALM-3200 directs the crew to verify the proper automatic actions have occurred per Attachment
 3. RE-5100 in alarm or with an OPERATE FAILURE diverts from LVW to Cocurrent Waste.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the path is shifted between LVW and Cocurrent Waste, but from LVW to Cocurrent Waste, not the reverse.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. Red alarm is indication of an actual high radiation condition. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-3200	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-903	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the response to an Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquid in accordance with ABN-903, Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquid. (ABN.201.0B13)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	36101	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2009 NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension of	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

ES-401

CPNPP BNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-903
	REVISION NO. 8	B105 0 05 10
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID	CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 3 OF 16
2.0 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUI	<u>D</u>	
2.1 Symptoms		
a. Annunciator Alarms		
Main Control Board		
LWPS PNL TRBL	(6B-4.7)	
LWPS PANEL		
LWPS EFFLUENT MONITOR ALERT	(2.6)	
b. Plant Indications		
1) An unexpected increase in any of the following	ng liquid process effluent	t monitors:
 X-RE-5251A (ABP074) LVW/EVAP PON DETECTOR 5251A 	D VNT & DRN HDR RAI	DIATION
 X-RE-5253 (LWE076) LIQUID WASTE P DETECTOR 	ROCESSING DISCHAR	GE RADIATION
 <u>u</u>-RE-4269 (SSW<u>u</u>65) UNIT <u>u</u> STATION CANAL RAD DETECTOR 	SERVICE WATER TRAI	N A TO DISCH
 <u>u</u>-RE-4270 (SSW<u>u</u>66) UNIT <u>u</u> STATION CANAL RAD DETECTOR 	SERVICE WATER TRAI	N B TO DISCH
 1-RE-5100 (TBD172) TURBINE BUILDIN 	IG SUMP 1-02 RADIATI	ON DETECTOR
 2-RE-5100 (TBD272) TURBINE BUILDIN 	IG SUMP 2-04 RADIATI	ON DETECTOR
2) Waste Water Hold-up Tank or piping leak or	spill reported by Plant P	ersonnel.
2.2 Automatic Actions		
 A High Alarm on X-RE-5251A will realign sump COW system. 	discharge from the LVW	system to the
 A High Alarm on X-RE-5253 the Liquid Waste di X-RV-5253 Liquid Waste Discharge Isolation Va 		n monitor closes
 A High Alarm on the Turbine Building Sump 1-02 realign sump discharge from the LVW system to 		<u>u</u> -RE-5100 will)
Section 2.0		
Section 2.0		<u>_</u>

2.3 Operator Actions	REVISION NO. 8 CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 7 OF 16
2.3 Operator Actions		
1		
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT OF	BTAINED
 CHECK Radioactivity in turbine building sump. a. VERIFY turbine building sump monitor on PC11 - <u>NOT</u> IN ALERT OR HI ALARM (GREEN/OPERATE) Unit 1 only, TBD172 (1-RE-5100), TURBINE BUILDING SUMP 1-02 RADIATION DETECTOR Unit 2 only, TBD272 (2-RE-5100), TURBINE BUILDING SUMP 2-04 RADIATION DETECTOR 	sump discharg	urrent WWHUT ly, ted turbine building e aligned per E-5100 Radiation (Channel #)
 b. CONTACT Chemistry to sample affected sump for confirmation of indicated increase in activity. c. NOTIFY Radiation Protection of possible contamination in turbine building. 5 VERIFY Low Volume Waste Oil Colexer - <u>NOT</u> IN OPERATION. (U2 TB 778 NE Wall) 	STOP oil colexer per R	WS-107.
Section	2.3	

Plant Vent Stack Wide Range Gas MonitorX-RE-5570A S. X-RE-5570B N.Closes HCV-014 on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREEAuxiliary Building ExhaustX-RE-5701Closes HCV-014 on High Exhaust Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREELiquid Waste to Circulating WaterX-RE-5253Closes discharge to Circulating Water Circulating Water (X-RV-5253) on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREETurbine Building DrainsU-RE-5100Closes the discharge to Low Volume Waste (U-RV-5100A) and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREE	PROCEDURE ALM-3200 PAGE 89 OF 1 ssociated PRINT E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22 E1-0065 Sh 29
ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NOTE: A loss of power to the RM-80 will result in the Automatic Actions for the as monitor. TITLE CHANNEL FUNCTION P Plant Vent Stack Wide X-RE-5570A S. Closes HCV-014 on High E Range Gas Monitor X-RE-5570B N. Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Auxiliary Building X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Exhaust X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5703 Closes HCV-014 on High E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Circulating Water X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Turbine Building U-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Volume Waste (U-RV-5100A) and opens discharge to E Drains Coloses the discharge to A E	ssociated <u>PRINT</u> E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22
Page 1 of 1 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NOTE: A loss of power to the RM-80 will result in the Automatic Actions for the as monitor. TITLE CHANNEL FUNCTION P Plant Vent Stack Wide X-RE-5570A S. Closes HCV-014 on High E Range Gas Monitor X-RE-5570B N. Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Auxiliary Building X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Exhaust X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Circulating Water X-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Turbine Building U-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Drains U-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Addition or any OPERATE FAILURE E FAILURE E	<u>PRINT</u> E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22
NOTE: A loss of power to the RM-80 will result in the Automatic Actions for the as monitor. TITLE CHANNEL FUNCTION P Plant Vent Stack Wide X-RE-5570A S. Closes HCV-014 on High E Range Gas Monitor X-RE-5570B N. Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Auxiliary Building X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Exhaust X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Liquid Waste to X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Circulating Water Water Circulating Water Water Circulating Water E Turbine Building U-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Drains U-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low E Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE E E	<u>PRINT</u> E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22
monitor.EunctionTITLECHANNELFUNCTIONEPlant Vent Stack WideX-RE-5570A S. X-RE-5570B N.Closes HCV-014 on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREEAuxiliary BuildingX-RE-5701Closes HCV-014 on High ExhaustEAuxiliary BuildingX-RE-5701Closes HCV-014 on High Exhaust Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREELiquid Waste to Circulating WaterX-RE-5253Closes discharge to Circulating Water Circulating Water (X-RV-5253) on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREETurbine Building DrainsU-RE-5100Closes the discharge to Low Volume Waste (U-RV-5100A) and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREE	<u>PRINT</u> E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22
Plant Vent Stack Wide Range Gas MonitorX-RE-5570A S. X-RE-5570B N.Closes HCV-014 on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILUREEAuxiliary Building ExhaustX-RE-5701Closes HCV-014 on High Exhaust Radiation or any 	E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0065 Sh 22
Range Gas Monitor X-RE-5570B N. Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Auxiliary Building X-RE-5701 Closes HCV-014 on High Exhaust Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Liquid Waste to Circulating Water X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating E Water Circulating Water (X-RV-5253) on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Turbine Building u-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low Volume Waste (u-RV-5100A) and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE	E1-0065 Sh 22
Exhaust Exhaust Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Liquid Waste to Circulating Water X-RE-5253 Closes discharge to Circulating Water (X-RV-5253) on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Turbine Building u-RE-5100 Closes the discharge to Low Volume Waste (u-RV-5100A) and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE	
Circulating Water Water Circulating Water (X-RV-5253) on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE Turbine Building <u>u-RE-5100</u> Drains Closes the discharge to Low E Volume Waste (<u>u-RV-5100A</u>) E and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE	E1-0065 Sh 29
Drains Volume Waste (<u>u</u> -RV-5100A) E and opens discharge to Co-Current Waste on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE	
Containment Air U-RE-5503 Causes Containment E	E1-0055 Sh 61/6 E2-0055 Sh 61/6
<u> </u>	E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E2-0046 Sh 62/6
	E1-0046 Sh 62/6 E1-0035 Sh 76/7
	E1-0040 Sh 97 E2-0040 Sh 97
Common dischargeX-RE-5251ADiverts to Cocurrent WasteEAB, DG Sumps andSystem Wastewater HoldupCCW Drain TanksTanks on High Radiation or any OPERATE FAILURE	E1-0065 Sh 58

omments / Refer	ence: ALM-3200				Revision: 5
ALAR	CPNPP M PROCEDURES MANUAL		COMMON		EDURE NO. LM-3200
ALA	RM PROCEDURE DRMS	REVISI	ON NO. 5	PAGE	E 99 OF 100
	ATTACHMENT 8 PAGE 2 OF 2	<u> </u>			
	GENERAL INFORM	ATION			
The PC-11 console are used to flag wh follows:	e alarm conditions may also be printed on en alarms are received and cleared. The	the alarn se alarm	n printer. Spec codes are sum	ific alar Imarize	m codes d as
					RM PRINTER
	PC-11 INDICATION			ALAR	CLEAR
PC-11 POLL STATUS	MONITOR OFFLINE		WHITE	ALM	RN
PC-11 COMMUNICATIONS	MONITOR COMMUNICATIONS FAILUF CHANNEL NOT RESPONDING TO POI		MAGENTA MAGENTA	blank blank	
OPERATE FAILURE	MONITOR DATA BASE UNKNOWN MONITOR LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW CHANNEL OUT OF SERVICE CHANNEL FILTER NOT MOVING CHANNEL NO PULSES RECEIVED CHANNEL CHECK SOURCE TEST FAI CHANNEL LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW CHANNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE CON CHANNEL OPERATE FAILURE		BLUE BLUE BLUE BLUE BLUE BLUE BLUE BLUE	ALM ALM blank ALM ALM ALM 	RN blank RN blank RN RN RN
CHANNEL HIGH ALARM	CHANNEL IN HIGH ALARM		RED	ALM	RN
CHANNEL ALERT ALARM	CHANNEL IN ALERT ALARM		YELLOW	ALM	RN
EQUIPMENT FAILURE	MONITOR LOSS OF PROCESS FLOW MONITOR IN SCAN OVERLOAD MONITOR LOSS OF FLOW CONTROL MONITOR LOSS OF RM-23 COMMUNI MONITOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE MONITOR LOW PRESSURE ALARM MONITOR HIGH PRESSURE ALARM		LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE LIGHT BLUE	blank EF EF EF	blank not logged blank blank blank blank
blank -Return to BRD -Broadcast DSA -Buffer una DWN -System di	vailable to complete request RN sc error during data base change t failure alarm RTE	-Leavin -Opera -Monito to norr -Comm	le request inco lg condition tor request reje or or channel st mal unications rout en PC-11s	ected atus ref	2

Examination Outline Cross-r	eference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	1	
		Group	2	
		K/A	000068	3.G.2.4.34
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	4.2	
Control Room Evacuation: Knowledge operational effects.	of RO tasks performed outside the n	nain control room during an emer	gency and the	resultant
Question # 61				
			reading R	oom is
In accordance with ABN-8	303A:			
ONLY the(1)Sa	afeguards Bus will be en	ergized by its associat	ted EDG v	when
The EDG is started from the	he(2)			
A. (1) Train A (2) RSP				
B. (1) Train A (2) EDG room				
C. (1) Train B (2) RSP				
D. (1) Train B (2) EDG room				
Answer: B				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of specific RO tasks performed outside the control room for control room evacuation as well as the resultant operational effect.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. 1st part is correct. Only 1EA1 will be energized with the EDG. 2nd part is incorrect because the EDG is started locally. It is plausible because the EDG breaker and bus feeder breaker controls are located at the RSP.
- B. Correct. 1st part is correct (see A). 2nd part is correct. The EDG is started locally before the operator at the RSP gains control of it.
- C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect because ONLY the Train A EDG will be powering its respective bus. It is plausible because both 1EA1 and 1EA2 are de energized in the procedure prior to energizing Train A from its associated EDG. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see A).
- A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2nd part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-803A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Fire in the Electrical or Control Building in accordance with ABN-803, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room. (ABN.803.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		



CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

ents / Reference: ABN-803A		Revision: 13	
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-803A	
RESPONSE TO A FIRE IN THE CONTROL ROOM OR CABLE SPREADING ROOM	REVISION NO. 13	PAGE 31 OF 67	
ATTACHMENT PAGE 1 OF 4			
RELIEF REACTOR OPERATOR ACTIONS	TO ACHIEVE HOT SHU	JTDOWN	
SFGD 832 (Rm 1-096)			
a. PROCEED to the Remote Shutdown Panel, <u>A</u> need an ABA1 key to get into panel).	ND OBTAIN a copy of t	his procedure (will	
b. ENSURE 43/1-456FT, PRZR PORV CTRL XF	ER - HSP		
SFGD 810 CP1-ECPRLV-15, Trn A Electrical Switchge	ar Room, (Rm 1-083)		
C. PROCEED to Shutdown Transfer Panel (will n	eed a CAT60 key to ge	t into panel).	
NOTE: All transfer switches are located in the two right	nt hand panels.		
d. Rapidly TRANSFER ALL transfer switches at	Shutdown Transfer Par	nel	
e. NOTIFY RO at RSP that all transfer switches I			
SFGD 810 TRN A Diesel Room			
f. PLACE 1-HS-3413-3B, RLMS (MASTER SWI	TCH) (1-DG-01B) - LO(CAL.	
g. PERFORM the following to ensure proper Trai	in A Diesel Generator o	peration:	
1) PLACE 1-HS-3413-4B LOCAL EMERG S START.	TOP OFF START swite	ch (1-DG-01B) -	
<u>IF</u> Train A Diesel Generator does not star <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:	t,		
PLACE 1-HS-3413-2B LOCAL NORI	MAL STOP-START swit	tch - START	
WHEN Diesel Generator running,	and offer offer swit		
THEN PLACE 1-HS-3413-4B LOCAL EMER START.	RG STOP OFF START	switch (1-DG-01B) -	
2) VERIFY proper voltage and frequency (1-	DG-01B).		
• AC VOLTS, 6.6 - 7.2 kv			
• FREQUENCY, 59.5 - 60.5 Hz			
h. NOTIFY RO at RSP that Train A Diesel Gener necessary.	ator is running and may	/ be loaded as	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	0000	76.Ak	(2.01
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	2.6		

High Reactor Coolant Activity: Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following: Process radiation monitors

Question # 62

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 in Mode 3 during a cool down for a mid-cycle outage to replace a damaged seal package on an RCP
- RCS temperature 390°F and pressure 780 psig
- CCP 1-01 in operation with one 75 gpm orifice isolation valve open
- 1-RE-0406 (FFL160), Gross Failed Fuel Monitor, has alarmed
- Chemistry reports RCS specific activity has increased steadily over the past several days

Per ABN-102, High Reactor Coolant Activity, letdown flow should be _____ to minimize personnel radiation exposure during the outage.

A. lowered to 0 gpm

- B. lowered to 45 gpm
- C. raised to 120 gpm
- D. raised to 195 gpm

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the response of the radiation monitoring system to high RCS activity.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since isolating letdown will prevent the activity from circulating in the Auxiliary and Safeguards Buildings, but it will not reduce RCS activity impacting future dose.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since reducing letdown will minimize the activity circulating in the Auxiliary and Safeguards Buildings while still allowing some cleanup of the RCS, but it will not maximize the reduction in RCS activity impacting future dose.
- C. Correct. Letdown flow should be increased to a maximum value, but less than 140 gpm, to allow mechanical filtration of the letdown flow via the mixed bed demineralizers, minimizing future dose.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible as all letdown valves open would give this value but flow is limited to 140 gpm when RCS temp is ≥ 500 degrees.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-102	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SOP-103A	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective:	DISCUSS the response to High Reactor Coolant Activity in accordance with
	ABN-102, High Reactor Coolant Activity. (ABN.103.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75843	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC-24	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension of	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments /	Reference: Exam Bank 75843	Revision:
 1-RE-04 Chemistre 	100% flow is 75 gpm 06 (FFL160), GROSS FAILED FUEL MONITOR, has alarmed ry reports that Reactor Coolant System specific activity has incre over the past several days	eased
	2, High Reactor Coolant Activity letdown flow should be	to
Α.	lowered to 0 gpm	
В.	lowered to 45 gpm	
C.	raised to 120 gpm	
D. Ansv	raised to 195 gpm ver: C	
Ansv	wer: C wer Explanation Incorrect. Plausible since isolating letdown will prevent the ad circulating in the Auxiliary and Safeguards Buildings, but it wil	
Ansv	wer: C wer Explanation Incorrect. Plausible since isolating letdown will prevent the ad	Il not reduce activity I allowing
Ansv Ansv A.	wer: C wer Explanation Incorrect. Plausible since isolating letdown will prevent the ad circulating in the Auxiliary and Safeguards Buildings, but it will RCS activity impacting future dose. Incorrect. Plausible since reducing letdown will minimize the circulating in the Auxiliary and Safeguards Buildings while still some cleanup of the RCS, but it will not maximize the reduction	Il not reduce activity I allowing on in RCS lue, but less

omments / Reference: Exa	m Bank 75843	Revision:
Question 59 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	2	
Difficulty:	2.00	
	T	
System ID:	75843	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9451	
Cross Reference	ABN.103.0B01.012	
Number:		
	1	
	Unit 1 at 100% Letdown flow is 75 gpm 1	
Topic:	(FFL160), GROSS FAILED FUEL MONIT	FOR, has
	alarmed C	
K/A:	APE 076 AA2.02	
Question Reference:		
SRO:		
Comments:	LC24 NRC	
	K/A Match:	
	The question is a K/A match as it require	s the
	applicant to understand the ABN procedu	ire and
	know what corrective action is taken base	ed on
	evaluation of current plant conditions (RC	S high
	activity).	

Form ES-401-5

AB	NORM	CPNPP MAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-102
	н	IGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 4 OF 6
2.3	Op	erator Actions		
NO	<u>TE</u> :	 Reactor Coolant System transients such as changes, pressure changes, and starting a temporary increases in RCS activity. Monitor spiking and return to normal is not as such does not require sampling. A stead would be a real indication of failed fuel/RCS 	nd stopping RCPs can a real indication of faile dy or sustained increase	cause
	1.	REQUEST additional reactor coolant specific act with CHM-111 for isotopic content analysis per T SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.		
	2.	NOTIFY Chemistry to review chemistry data and review chemistry data and core follow trends. Ch burst has occurred. Core Performance Engineeri activity is failed fuel and the extent of failed fuel,	emistry will determine in ng will determine if the	fa "CRUD"
	3.	INCREASE letdown flow to 120-140 gpm as follo	ws:	
		 a) <u>IF</u> PDP is in operation, <u>THEN</u> START a centrifugal charging pump <u>AND</u> SH b) INCREASE letdown flow to 120-140 gpm per 		DP-103A/B.
	4.	NOTIFY Radiation Protection that radiation levels Safeguards Buildings AND on any ARMs.		ary and
	5.	MAKE a plant announcement via Gai-Tronics of i Activity <u>AND</u> a possibility of increased radiation in		
NO	<u>TE</u> :	A rapid increase of RCS fission product isotope indicate fuel cladding damage. (e.g., Xe-133, K 90, Iodine).		
	6.	IF Core Performance Engineering Review of the THEN PROCEED as follows:	chemistry data indicate	s failed fuel,
		a) REFER to EPP-201.		
		b) REFER to Technical Specifications 3.4.16.		
		c) REVIEW logs for any known RCS to Second	lary Leakage.	
		Section 2.3		

	CPNPP SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-103A		
		REVISION NO. 18			
	CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM	CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 11 OF 164		
4.1	Limitations (continued)				
[C]	 The PDP suction stabilizer gas supply and vent valves should be closed and the PDP should be stopped if the charging pump suction is switched from the VCT to the RWST due to VCT low-low level or operator action. This is applicable when VCT pressure is greater than RWST pressure. Higher VCT pressure will disable the PDP stabilizer vent path and may cause gas binding of the CCP's if 1CS-8200, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB VNT CHK VLV leaks. 				
[C]	 When the PDP is running and 1/1-8204, H2/N2 SPLY VLV indicates open (red light on), 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV and 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV may be opened no more than 10 seconds to clear the high level (1/1-8204 green light on). When 1-ALB-6A, 1.8 "PDP SUCT STAB LVL HI-HI" alarms, operator actions will provide steps to start a CCP and stop the PDP. 				
	 Charging flow through the Regenerative Heat Exchanger is limited to 300 gpm. Due to indication (1-FI-121A), flow is limited to 270 gpm. 				
	 The minimum charging flow from the CCP's with 1-FK-121 in AUTO is 55 gpm. Any charging flow less than 55 gpm will require placing 1-FK-121 in MANUAL. 				
	 Seal injection to the RCP No. 1 seals should not exceed 130°F. 				
	Seal injection to any RCP No. 1 seal should not	exceed 13 gpm.			
[C]	Seal injection to any RCP No. 1 seal shall not be	e less than 6 gpm.			
	 When RCS temp is ≥ 500 degrees, letdown flow orifice and ONE 75 gpm orifice in service. 	is limited to 140 gpm w	ith the 45 gpm		
	 Letdown flow is limited to 170 gpm (when RCS temp is < 500 degrees) with 1 Mixed Bed Demineralizer in service. (Reference EVAL-2005-001409-01-00) 				
	 Letdown flow is limited to 195 gpm (when RCS t demineralizers are in service. (Reference FDA-2) 		when 2		

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	WE)2.EK	1.02
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.4		

SI Termination: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SI Termination: Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with SI Termination.

Question # 63

Given the following conditions:

- An SI has occurred due to a fault on SG 1-02
- The operators have completed the actions of EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and transitioned to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
- Containment pressure 7 psig slowly decreasing
- Total AFW flow to the intact SGs is 480 gpm
- All intact SG levels between 7% and 22%
- PRZR pressure 1725 psig rapidly increasing
- All PRZR level channels indicate between 23% and 28%
- CETs indicating 540°F stable

Which of the following would PROHIBIT terminating Safety Injection under these conditions?

- A. Subcooling
- B. RCS pressure
- C. RCS inventory
- D. Secondary heat sink

Answer:	С	
Answer.	0	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the parameters used to determine if SI Termination can be implemented.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible since this is one of the parameters required to be met to terminate SI (> 55°F), but it is met as subcooling is approximately 76°F.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since this is one of the parameters required to be met to terminate SI (stable or increasing), but it is met as pressure is increasing.
- C. Correct. RCS inventory is not adequate since 34% level is required with adverse containment conditions. The crew would be directed to stabilize pressure and transition to EOS-1.1A when SI flow restores adequate pressurizer level.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since this is one of the items required to be met to terminate SI (> 460 gpm or at least one intact SG level > 26%), but it is met as AFW is 480 gpm.

Technical Reference(s)	EOP-1.0A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables

Learning Objective: **IDENTIFY** the proper transitions out of EOP-1.0 in accordance with EOP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (ERG.E1A.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # 62538 Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

CPNPP			PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES		UNIT 1	EOP-1.0A
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT		REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 8 OF 44
EP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED
6 Check If ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced:			
 a. (Secondary heat sink:) Total AFW flow to intact SGs GREATER THAN 460 GPM 		<u>IF</u> neither condit satisfied. <u>THEN</u> g OBSERVE CAUTIONS STEP 7.	o to Step 7.
-OR- • Narrow range level in at (least one intact SG -) (GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR) (ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)			
b. (RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN (25°F(55°F FOR ADVERSE) (CONTAINMENT))		Go to Step 7. OE CAUTIONS PRIOR TO	
c. (RCS pressure - STABLE OR (INCREASING)	с.	GO to Step 7. OE CAUTIONS PRIOR TO	SERVE STEP 7.
d. (PRZR level - GREATER THAN 13%) ((34% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)		Stabilize RCS pre normal PRZR spray Step 7. OBSERVE PRIOR TO STEP 7.	CAUTIONS
e. Go To EOS-1.1A. SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION. Step 1.			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	WE [,]	13.EK	3.02
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating	2.9		

Steam Generator Overpressure: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Overpressure: Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Steam Generator Overpressure.

Question # 64

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 entered FRH-0.2A, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure, due to high pressure in SG 1-01
- Attempts to lower SG 1-01 pressure are unsuccessful
- The crew is directed to cool down the RCS using the remaining three SGs

Which of the following describes the reason for cooling the RCS hot leg temperature to less than 535°F?

Ensure ...

- A. SG pressure is below the highest SG safety valve setpoint.
- B. adequate subcooling in the RCS exists to continue RCP operation.
- C. steam pressure supplied to the TDAFW pump is within design limits.

D. excessive heat transfer from the RCS is not the cause of the overpressure.

ver: D	
--------	--

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the reasons for performing actions in response to a SG overpressure condition.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible since it is preferred to not lift a safety valve, but maintaining the SG at normal temperature would keep the pressure below the safety setting.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since it is desirable to operate RCPs, but higher pressure would assure adequate subcooling.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since the TDAFWP may be the supply of AFW to the SGs, but higher pressure will not affect the TDAFWP capability.
- D. Correct. Cooling down the RCS to less than 535°F ensures excessive heat transfer from the RCS is eliminated thereby reducing temperature and pressure of the affected SG.

Technical Reference(s)	FRH-0.2A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRH-0.2 in accordance with FRH-0.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure. (ERG.FH2.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	32622	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		



 this does not occur, the operator is directed to Step 6. If pressure is decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing stream. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure in effect. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. CAUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. STEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG since the AFW system is a high pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG(s) to wid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the affected SG(s). STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s). utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. 	mments	nments / Reference: FRH-0.2A Revision: 9				
ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 2 OF 6 Bases TEP 5: Steam release should result in affected SG(s) pressure decreasing. If this does not occur, the operator is directed to Step 6. If pressure is decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure in effect. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous performance; therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. AUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. TEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. TEP 7: Streestive heat transfer from the primery system may be the cause of the affected SG(s) or add in reducing the temperature and pressure in the affected SG(s). TEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. TEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a po			UNIT 1			
 PAGE 2 OF 6 <u>Bases</u> STEP 5: Steam release should result in affected SG(s) pressure decreasing. If this does not occur, the operator is directed to Step 6. If pressure is decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure in effect. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous performance: therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. CAUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. STEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG over pressurization. Therefore, a check on RGO hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. If RGS hot leg temperatures are greater than 555°F, a cooldown is intriated by dumping steam from the unaffected SG(s). utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigste the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigste a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator step operator is and pressure in the scient appendice of secondary integrity. Therefore, the mathematical process are steam from the affected SG(s). 	RESPON	SE TO STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE	REVISION NO. 9	PA	GE 9 OF 13	
 TEP 5: Steam release should result in affected SG(s) pressure decreasing. If this does not occur, the operator is directed to Step 6. If pressure is decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure in effect. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. AUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. TEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. TEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release pressurization. Therefore, a check on ROS hot leg temperatures is made to determine thris. If ROB hot leg temperatures are greater than 55°T, a cooldown for initiated by dumping sceam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant based. TEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure continuous action step. TEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure continuous performance: therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. 						
 this does not occur, the operator is directed to Step 6. If pressure is decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure in effect. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. CAUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a stam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. STEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator is only on the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG(s) to aid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the unaffected SG(s). utilizing the four alternative release path plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release stam for the unaffected SG(s). utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected SG(s) and may prevent in the affected SG(s). 		Bases				
 performance: therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. CAUTION: If AFW flow is re-established to an affected SG prior to establishing a steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. STEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG since the AFW system is a high pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG over pressurization. Therefore, a check on RCS hot leg temperatures are greater than 535°F. a cooldown is initiated by dumping steam from the unaffected SG(s). STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the 	decreasing but is not below 1235 psig, the operator is directed to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release drops the affected SG(s) pressure to less than 1235 psig, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is					
 steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG pressure. STEP 6: If the operator has been unsuccessful in releasing steam to lower the affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG since the AFW system is a high pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG over pressurization. Therefore, a check on RGS hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. If RGS hot leg temperatures are greater than 535°F, a cooldown is initiated by dumping steam from the unaffected SG(s) to aid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the affected SG(s). STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the 		performance: therefore, this step has b				
 affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG since the AFW system is a high pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure of secondary integrity. STEP 7: Excessive heat transfer from the primary system may be the cause of the affected SG over pressurization. Therefore, a check on ROS hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. If ROS hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. The ROS hot leg temperatures is made to determine the temperature and pressure in the unaffected SG(s) to aid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the affected SG(s). STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the 	CAUTION:	steam release path, the AFW flow could further increase the affected SG				
<pre>affected S0 over pressurization. Therefore, a check on RCS hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. If RCS hot leg temperatures are greater than 535°F, a cooldown is initiated by dumping steam from the unaffected SG(s) to aid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the affected SG(s). </pre> STEP 8: The operator should continue attempts to manually or locally release steam from the affected SG(s), utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous performance; therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the	STEP 6:	affected SG pressure below design pressure, the operator should proceed to isolate AFW flow to the affected SG since the AFW system is a high pressure water source. This eliminates an additional source of over pressurization of the affected SG(s) and may prevent a potential failure				
<pre>steam from the affected SG(s). utilizing the four alternative release paths plus any plant specific means identified until the challenge to the SG pressure boundary is mitigated. This action contains the action verb "control" which implies continuous performance: therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the</pre>	STEP 7:	affected SG over pressurization. Therefore, a check on RCS hot leg temperatures is made to determine this. If RCS hot leg temperatures are greater than 535°F, a cooldown is initiated by dumping steam from the unaffected SG(s) to aid in reducing the temperature and pressure in the				
performance; therefore, this step has been identified as a continuous action step. STEP 9: The operator has done everything possible to mitigate the overpressure condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the	STEP 8:	steam from the affected $SG(s)$, utilizin paths plus any plant specific means ide	g the four alternat	tive	release	
condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the		performance; therefore, this step has b				
	STEP 9:	condition and has isolated AFW flow to the affected steam generator to mitigate a potential failure of secondary integrity. Therefore, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the				

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	1		
	Group	2		
	K/A	WE09.EA2.02		2.02
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.4		

Natural Circulation Operations: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Natural Circulation Operations: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Question #65

During EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation Cooldown, following a reactor trip, which of the following criteria determines if the amount of RCS subcooling required is 75°F or 125°F?

- A. Pressurizer level
- B. RCS cooldown rate
- C. Number of CCPs running
- D. Number of CRDM fans running

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the subcooling limit based on plant conditions during a natural circulation cooldown.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible since ERG decisions are based upon pressurizer level, but the subcooling required in EOS-0.2A is based upon the amount of vessel head cooling available from the CRDM fans.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since ERG decisions are based upon RCS pressure, but the subcooling required in EOS-0.2A is based upon the amount of vessel head cooling available from the CRDM fans.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since ERG decisions are based upon the number of CCPs operating, but the subcooling required in EOS-0.2A is based upon the amount of vessel head cooling available from the CRDM fans.
- D. Correct. The amount of subcooling required in EOS-0.2A is based upon the amount of vessel head cooling available, which is dependent on the number of CRDM fans running.

Technical Reference(s)	EOS-0.2A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the recovery technique used and the procedure steps of EOS-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown. (ERG.E02.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	62529	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	amental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension c	or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		



CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN <u>ATTACHMENT 6</u> PAGE 14 OF 26 <u>BASES</u>	UNIT 1 REVISION NO. 9	PROCEDURE NO. EOS-0.2A PAGE 48 OF 60
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN <u>ATTACHMENT 6</u> PAGE 14 OF 26		EOS-0.2A
ATTACHMENT 6 PAGE 14 OF 26	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 48 OF 60
PAGE 14 OF 26		
BASES		
STEP 14: The core exit thermocouples (TCs) and th temperatures are monitored to verify tha cooled by the discharge of steam from th cooldown rate previously described. In subcooling of the reactor coolant is inc adequate core cooling is being provided. use of RCS wide range pressure, RCS wide thermocouples.	t the reactor cool as steam generators addition, it is ve reasing. This ens The subcooling i	ant is being s at the erified that the sures that is determined by
After the natural circulation cooldown h coolant hot leg temperature should trend pressure.		
Trended readings for core exit thermocou TCOLD readings should be used to monitor readings at 10-15 minute intervals recom temperatures and temperature differences to vary from loop-to-loop and may deviat These variations of individual readings normal, and therefore only trended value possible problematic conditions in nature	cooldown and subc mended. The obser (THOT. TCOLD.) ca te at any single of from the nominal r as are useful for d	cooling with eved loop an be expected eservation. esponses are liagnosis of
These conditions are expected to be moni- cooldown, therefore, this step has been : Step.		
<u>NOTE</u> : From this point onward the operator has if a need to cooldown and depressurize m rate exists. Procedure EOS-0.3A NATURAL VOID IN VESSEL (WITH RVLIS). or EOS-0.4A WITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL (WITHOUT RVLIS depending upon the availability of RVLIS growth.	ore quickly than a CIRCULATION COOLI NATURAL CIRCULATI S) should be used i	own WITH STEAM ON COOLDOWN In this case
The major factor which could require a m cooldown/depressurization than this proc condensate storage.		imited
STEP 15: To prevent possible void formation in th subcooling should be maintained. With G margin of at least 75°P should be mainta Without the availability of CRDM fans, m 125°P during depressurization.	RDM fans available ined during depres	surization.

Comments	/ Reference: EOS-0.2A			Revision: 9	
	453555		D.D.C	ARAIDE NA	
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1		CCEDURE NO. EOS-0.2A	
	NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN	REVISION NO. 9	PAG	E 49 OF 60	
	ATTACHMENT 6 PAGE 15 OF 26				
	BASES				
	RCS pressure is maintained between 1910 required subcooling is established, to Once subcooling is established, pressur be decreased to maintain the reactor co temperature relationship in accordance and the minimum subcooling requirement.	prevent upper head izer pressure shoul olant and pressuriz with the Technical	void d per er p	formation. riodically ressure-	
	The analysis supporting the strategy in "all" or no CRDM fans are operating whe initiated in this step. If some, but 1 operating, the conservative subcooling step for no CRDM fans operating will ap this procedure.	n RCS depressurizat ess than "all", CRI requirements specif	ion M fa ied	is ns are in this	
STEP 16:	Once subcooling is established. RCS coo continue while maintaining the minimum remaining within the Technical Specific The depressurization should be accompli spray or pressurizer PORVs. depending u The RCS cooldown rate must be maintaine loops are active or in accordance with with an inactive loop(s). Attachment 5 determine the maximum cooldown rate ver least one RCS loop is inactive. If at cannot be maintained, the RCS depressur the required subcooling is reestablishe When Auxiliary spray flow is used for R auxiliary spray flow may be reduced if (FCV-121) is not fully open. In additio and 455C) and the charging loop isolati be closed in order to achieve maximum a pressure control can be obtained by thr (455B and 455C). Throttling closed the auxiliary spray into the pressurizer an open the normal spray valves will reduc pressurizer and raise flow into the RCS Pressure control may be more precise if (455B or 455C) is fully closed and the Pressurizer inventory can be regulated (FCV-0121). When auxiliary spray flow consider gathering pertinent data to as charging nozzle thermal cycles.	subcooling requirem ation pressure-temp shed using pressuri pon whether letdown d less than 50°F/hr the requirements for provides a curve w sus the active loop any time the requir ization should be s d. CS depressurization the charging flow of n, the normal spray on valves (8146 and uxiliary spray flow ottling the normal normal spray valves d reduce RCS pressu e auxiliary spray f loops to increase one of the normal other is modulated with charging flow is initiated, the F	ent a eration of the set of the s	and ure limits. auxiliary in service. All RCS S cooldown is used to AT when at ubcooling ed until e amount of ol valve ves (455B 7) should recise RCS y valve(s) 1 force Throttling into the pressure. y valves ed. rol valve Staff may	
	pressurizer and raise flow into the RCS Pressure control may be more precise if (455B or 455C) is fully closed and the Pressurizer inventory can be regulated (FCV-0121). When auxiliary spray flow consider gathering pertinent data to as	loops to increase one of the normal other is modulated with charging flow is initiated, the F	RCS pray close cont: lant	pressure. y valves ed. rol valve Staff may	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO				
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	3					
	Group						
	K/A	2.1	.23				
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	4.3					
Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.							
Question # 66							
Procedures or work instructions with complex or ir	nfrequent work activitie	s for which					
consequences of an improper action could have ir	nmediate, possibly irre	versible im	pact on				
safety, production or reliability are classified as	(1) procedures.						
(2) are generally classified as these type of p	rocedures.						
A. (1) Information Use							
(2) Operations Department Work Instruction	าร						
B. (1) Information Use							
(2) System Operating Procedures							
C. (1) Continuous Use							
(2) Operations Department Work Instruction	าร						
D. (1) Continuous Use							
(2) System Operating Procedures							
Answer: D							

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how procedures are be implemented in accordance with administrative requirements.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since these are procedures or work instructions with work activities, but are performed frequently and have no immediate consequences if performed improperly. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since OWIs are considered Information Use procedures.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. Continuous Use procedures are procedures or work instructions with complex or infrequent work activities for which consequences of an improper action could have immediate, possibly irreversible impact on safety, production or reliability. Second part is correct. SOPs are considered to be Continuous Use.

Technical Reference(s)	STA-201	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ODA-407	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** requirements for Procedure Use and Adherence in accordance with ODA-102, ODA-407, STA-201 and Operations Guideline 3. (ADM.XA3.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive	Memory or Funda	amental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension c	or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43)	

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Comments	/ Reference: STA-201			Revision: 18		
12	CPNPP ATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PRO	DCEDURE NO. STA-201		
	CEDURE AND WORK INSTRUCTION USE AND ADHERENCE	REVISION NO. 18 INFORMATION USE	P/	AGE 6 OF 48		
4.8	<u>Critical Step</u> - A procedure step, series of step will cause irreversible harm to plant equipmen operation.	os, or action that, if perfor				
	starting DG 1–01 i measure resistand 8.10 <u>IF</u> DG 1-01 starting air pressure ₂ 150 psig, <u>T</u>	nce in the following step f the test equipment is no e prior to installation of the receiver 1-01 is <u>NOT</u> in so <u>HEN</u> verify the K609A cor	ot select he test l ervice v ntact in	ted to leads. vith the		
4.9	across terminals TB621 Cabinet No. 1. (OPT-4		A SSP	S Output		
4.9	eSPOC - electronic Smart Procedure Organiz to manage procedure life cycle including: auth requesting changes, and retirement.					
4.10	Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPT Manager to participate in the pre-evolution bri Responsibility for Management Oversight. (Re	efing and to exercise Cor				
4.11	Intent - The overall objective or purpose of a procedure or procedure section.					
4.12	Level of Use - A procedure or work instruction minimum requirements for procedure use duri procedure require classification of procedures	ing an activity. The instru				
	 <u>CONTINUOUS USE</u> - procedure or work i activities for which consequences of an im possibly irreversible impact on safety, proceeding 	proper action could have				
	<u>REFERENCE USE</u> - procedure or work in consequences of an improper action are n	struction with work activit ot immediate and are no	ties for v t irrever	which rsible.		
	 <u>INFORMATION USE</u> - procedure or work administrative in nature, that do not involve performed frequently, have no immediate and are within the knowledge and skills of 	e direct contact with plan consequences if perform	t equipr ed impr	ment, are		
	 <u>MULTIPLE USE</u> - procedures or work inst are designated with different level of use. 	ruction in which sections	or subs	sections		
L				J _		

Form ES-401-5

omments / Reference	e: ODA-407				Revision: 17
	CPNPP				CEDURE NO.
OPERATIONS DEPARTME	OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL			(ODA-407
	NS DEPARTMENT SE AND ADHERENC	E	REVISION NO. 17	PAC	GE 62 OF 63
	Δ	TTACHMENT 8.	D		
	-	PAGE 2 OF 3	_		
O	PERATIONS PROCE	DURE LEVEL O	F USE DESIGNATIONS		
Procedure Group	Level of Use (1)	Exceptions / In	dividual Procedure Desig	nations (1)	
Operation Department Work	USE	Section 6.3.2 - C Section 6.3.3 - I Section 6.3.3 - I Section 6.3.3.2 - Attachment 8.E Attachment 8.E Attachment 8.H Attachment 8.H Attachment 8.H Attachment 8.P Attachment 9.F Attachment 9.F Attachment 9.F All other Section <u>OWI-802</u> : MULT Section 6.1 - RE All other Section <u>OWI-912</u> : MULT Section 6.2 thm Attachments 1 tf Attachments 5 tf All other Section	CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS USE NFORMATION USE CONTINUOUS USE CONTIN	ISE RMATION U RMATION U RMATION U RMATION U SE ISE	JSE JSE JSE
Station Refueling Procedures (RFOs) *	See →	RF0-102: CONT RF0-401: REFE RF0-402: REFE RF0-403: REFE RF0-404: CONT RF0-501: REFE RF0-502: REFE	RENCE USE RENCE USE RENCE USE FINUOUS USE RENCE USE		
Radwaste System Procedures (RWSs)	CONTINUOUS USE	None			
System Operating Procedures (SOPs)			ULTIPLE USE with ALL CO ent 5 which is INFORMATIC		SUSE

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier	3		
		Group			
		K/A		2.1.29	
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	4.1		
Knowledge of how to conduct syst	tem lineups, such as valves, brea	kers, switches, etc.			
		,			
Question # 67					
As part of a clearance, se	everal normally locked clo	sed valves were tagge	ed.		
During restoration, a	locking tab should b	be reapplied to these v	alves.		
A. Red					
B. Green					
C. Blue					
D. Yellow					
Answer: B					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of how to identify locked closed valves during clearance restorations.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used to identify normally locked open or off positions.

B. Correct. This is the color used to identify normally locked closed positions.

C. Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used to identify normally locked throttled positions.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used for personal safety.

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-403	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the administrative controls of valves, breakers and other equipment required to be secured-in-position in accordance with ODA-403 and OWI-103. (ADM.XA1.OB10)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75848	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or	Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comment	s / Reference: Bank 75848	Revision:
	f a clearance several normally sealed throttled valves were close on, a seal should be reapplied to these valves.	ed. During
A	Red	
B	Green	
C	. Blue	
D	. Yellow	
	nswer: C	
Δ	nswer Explanation	
A	 Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used to identify norm open or off positions. 	ally sealed
B	 Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used to identify norm closed positions. 	ally sealed
C	. Correct. This is the color used to identify normally sealed the positions.	rottled
D	. Incorrect. Plausible as this is the color used for personal saf	fety

Comments / Reference: Ba	nk 75848	Revision:
Question 27 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	2	
Difficulty:	2.00	
Difficulty.	2.00	
System ID:	75848	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9457	
Cross Reference Number:	ADM.XA1.OB09.007	
Topic:	As part of a clearance several normally seale	
-	throttled valves were closed. During restorat	ion, a
K/A:	G.2.2.13	
Question Reference:		
SRO:	1.004 NIDO	
Comments:	LC24 NRC	
	K/A Match:	
	The question is a K/A match as it requires th	e
	applicant to demonstrate knowledge the colo	
	that would be applied when restoring a clear	

Comme	ents / Reference: ODA-403		Revision: 8
OPERA	CPNPP TIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL	UNIT COMMON	PROCEDURE NO. ODA-403
OPE	RATIONS DEPARTMENT LOCKED COMPONENT CONTROL	REVISION NO. 8 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 3 OF 16
3.0			I
	STA-602, "Temporary Modifications"		
	STA-605, "Clearance and Safety Tagging"		
	STA-694, "Station Verification Activities"		
	 STA-696, "Hazard Barrier Controls" 		
	 STA-738, "Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Im 		
	 TDM-901A/B, "Systems Data Throttled Valves/Fig 	ow Rates"	
4.0	DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS		
4.1	Component - Any valve or circuit breaker determined procedure. This definition only applies to ODA-403 a	to be administratively co and OWI-103.	ntrolled by this
4.2	Design or Licensing Document - Document which co plant design or licensing criteria. Design or Licensing limited to M1 and M2 drawings, Design Basis Docum Calculation Manual (ODCM), Technical Requirement and Technical Specifications.	Documents include, but ents (DBD), FSAR, Offsit	are not e Dose
4.3	Locked Component Deviation Log - A log containing required to be secured-in-position, but have been un	information about compo locked or repositioned (O	nents that are WI-103-3).
4.4	Operations Locked Component List - Current listings to be secured-in-position, found in OWI-103.	of all components which	are required
4.5	Lock - A device used to secure-in-position a valve, but can be a padlock, plastic seal, lead seal or other devisteel cables, chain or permanently installed clasps.		
	Red - The red color is used to identify normally	sealed open or off positio	ns
	Green - The green color is used to identify norma	ally sealed closed position	1 <mark>S</mark>
	Blue - The blue color is used to identify normally	v sealed throttled position	s
	 Yellow - The yellow color is used for personal saf procedure 	ety and is not covered by	this

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	3	
		Group		
		K/A	2.1	.43
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	4.1	
Ability to use procedures to detern temperature, secondary plant, fue	nine the effects on reactivity of pl I depletion, etc.	ant changes, such as reactor	coolant syster	n
Question # 68				
In accordance with ODA-	•	ons, Attachment 8, Op	erations Re	eactivity
Management, complete the	ne following statements.			
When performing a reactor RO is required to inform t PRIOR TO each 50 step	he designated Reactivity	•	•	•
Informing the designated movement is COMPLETE	•	ne Unit Supervisor whe	each coi	ntrol rod
A. (1) AND (2) is				
B. (1) AND (2) is NOT				
C. (1) OR (2) is				
D. (1) OR (2) is NOT				
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the administrative procedures governing reactivity manipulations of the plant.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because the Unit Supervisor is in charge of the startup so it would make sense that they are informed prior to the first rod pull. Second part is correct. Notification after each rod pull is required.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because if performing multiple rod pulls (example given in ODA-102 is for restoring CBD after an instrument failure), notification of completion of the last movement is required.
- C. Correct. ODA-102 states the Reactor Operator informs the Unit Supervisor or the designated SRO providing reactivity oversight prior to moving control rods and at the completion of rod movement.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-102	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the requirements for manipulating reactor controls in accordance with ODA-102, STA-102 and STA-601. (ADM.XA1.OB06)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	72316	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension of	or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	·	

Т

C	Comme	nts / R	eference: ODA-102		Revision: 34		
1							
	OPERA	TIONS	CPNPP DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. ODA-102		
			CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS		PAGE 46 OF 151		
				INFORMATION USE			
			ATTACHMENT 8. PAGE 5 OF 19	В			
			OPERATIONS REACTIVITY M	ANAGEMENT			
	5.3	REAC	TIVITY MANAGEMENT DURING NORMAL AT	-POWER OPERATION			
		5.3.1	The RO/BOP should:				
			Conduct Control Board / Equipment Monit	oring per Attachment 8.C.			
			 Reactivity manipulations are performed by procedures in-hand. Exceptions to the us manipulations may be specified by Operat 	e of procedures in-hand for			
	-		 Peer-checks are provided for all planned a impact on reactivity. Peer-checks are con manipulations commensurate with availab operator response actions during transien 	ducted for reactivity control le resources and the need	ol		
			 Inform the Unit Supervisor prior to any dilu load changes. Include the magnitude and change. 				
		5.3.2	The Unit Supervisor is expected to monitor re	activity manipulations.			
			The degree of monitoring depends on the complexity of the reactivity manipulation.	experience level of the op	perator and the		
			 As a minimum, visually spot check switch adjustments. 	positions/manipulations a	ind control		
			 Position in proximity to the Reactor Opera known to have an impact on reactivity and evolution is complete. 				
			 During transient conditions, overview reac as necessary to ensure methods for monit and requested manipulations are appropri 	toring reactor power are b			
			 Both the Unit Supervisor and the Reactor proposed reactivity manipulation (change manipulation occurs, AND determine whet after the manipulation is performed. 	in power/temperature) bet	fore the		

	Reference: ODA-102		Revis	sion: 34
	CPNPP		PROCEDU	
	CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	REVISION NO. 34	ODA-	
	ATTACHMENT 8. PAGE 6 OF 19	В		
	OPERATIONS REACTIVITY M	ANAGEMENT		
5.3.3	There are times when additional reactivity over startup, shutdown, testing, and ramping the un SRO" may be assigned to assist the Unit Sup WHEN a Reactivity SRO is assigned, THEN	nit). During these times a ervisor in providing this o	"Reactivity	
	The Reactivity SRO may provide peer che	ecks for reactivity manipul	ations.	
	 These peer checks should not be routinely when there isn't an additional RO available 		uring times	
	The Unit Supervisor provides additional ov is not required to be positioned in the prox			and
5.3.4	For reactivity manipulations which are require malfunctions, the RO verbalizes the action as for the Unit Supervisor to intervene if necessa performed in a controlled and deliberate man	s it is being taken, allowing ary. Such manipulations a) a brief pau	ise
5.3.5	Expectations for adherence with BEACON Re downpowers, rapid shutdown and scheduled Recommendation, CR-2010-001177).			d
	 Trust but verify Core Performance Engine collaborate with Operation's management not fully understood. 	ering (CPE) projections, A and CPE if the projection	ND stop an is suspect o	d or
	 CPE ensures the projections are conserva projected boration amount will maintain co over borate the core for the current burnup BOS briefing and using the RXM Projectio amount of boron per the projection. 	ontrol rods above the RIL, p. Therefore, when borati	but will not ng per the	
	 CPE updates the BEACON projections for shutdowns monthly until RCS boron is < 1 			y.
	CPE tracks BEACON projection performant licensed operators in LORT during Core C			s.
5.3.6	During steady-state operation with fully condit be operated in automatic. Rod control may be minor adjustments to AFD or at the discretion reactivity changes from other sources.	taken to manual as nece	ssary to ma	ke

Comme	nts / R	eference: ODA-102		Revision: 34		
		CONIDO				
OPER/	ATIONS	CPNPP DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. ODA-102		
	CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS			PAGE 51 OF 151		
			INFORMATION USE			
		ATTACHMENT 8. PAGE 10 OF 19				
		OPERATIONS REACTIVITY M	ANAGEMENT			
5.5	REAC	TIVITY MANAGEMENT DURING A REACTOR	R STARTUP			
	5.5.1	Prior to conducting a reactor startup, all contri- startup ensure they are familiar with the preca management contained in IPO-002A/B.				
	5.5.2	A pre startup brief should be conducted by the and IPO-002A/B.	e Unit Supervisor utilizing	STI-429.04		
	5.5.3	Multiple methods for anticipating criticality are	e to be used, such as:			
-	 ECC ICRR plot 5-7 doublings of source range counts 					
	5.5.4	No other responsibilities are assigned to the F	Reactor Operator during a	startup.		
	5.5.5 The Reactor Operator informs the Unit Supervisor or the designated SRO providing reactivity oversight prior to moving control rods and at the completion of rod movement.					
		 If direction provided requires multiple increasing 215 after instrument failure), the Unit Supereactivity oversight is to be informed prior directed movements. 	ervisor or designated SRC) providing		
	5.5.6	For non-refueling startups the Shift Manager s calculation" to ensure a sanity check of the E		the envelope		
	5.5.7	The Unit Supervisor and Reactor Operator me Gamma metrics indications during the startup		ent, NIS, and		
	 Monitoring by the Unit Supervisor includes ensuring that other methods of controlling RCS temperature (steam dumps, turbine load, SG blowdown flow, feed flow, etc.) are being utilized as necessary to limit changes in RCS temperature. 					

Examination Outline Cross-re	eference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier	3	
		Group		
		K/A	2.2	2.4
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating	3.6	
Ability to explain the variations in co between units at a facility.	ontrol board/control room layout	s, systems, instrumentation, a	and procedural	actions
Question # 69				
Unit 1 plant equipment lab	els are(1)			
Common equipment/alarm	is are normally controlle	ed by(1)		
A. (1) blue				
(2) Unit 1				
B. (1) yellow				
(2) Unit 2				
C. (1) blue				
(2) Unit 2				
D. (1) yellow				
(2) Unit 1				
Answer: A				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of differences between units.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Unit 1 uses blue labeling and Unit 2 uses yellow labeling. Second part is correct. Common systems are normally controlled by Unit 1.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since yellow is used for labeling for one of the units, but it is Unit 2. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since only one of the units normally controls common equipment, but it is Unit 1, not Unit 2.
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is correct (see A).

Technical Reference(s)	OWI-402	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ODA-102	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the administrative requirements for operating plant equipment; performing routine watchstanding evolutions and maintaining system status and plant configuration control in accordance with ODA-106, STI-604.03, OWI-207, ODA-102, ODA-410, ODA-407, OWI-107, STA-694, STA-601 and OWI-409. (ADM.XA1.OB09)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	Х	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2017 NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Form ES-401-5

omments / Reference: 2017 NRC Exa	m Q69		Revis	sion:
Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier	3		
	Group			
	K/A		G2.2.3	
evel of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	3.8		
nulti-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural	, and operational differences between u	nits.		
Question # 69				
nitial Unit 1/2 plant conditions: Unit 1 100% power 14 days from R Unit 2 100% power and stable for 1				
 Both Units are responding to event 	s in the ERGs			
Complete the statements below regarding Operations Department Procedure Use an 1(1) has the lead for monitoring equipment in the ERGs.	nd Adherence.			
 Based on the severity of the event to the common equipment, this responsibility(2) 		-		ing
A. (1) Unit 1 (2) Shift Manager				
B. (1) Unit 1 (2) Shift Ops Manager				
C. (1) Unit 2 (2) Shift Manager				
D. (1) Unit 2				
(2) Shift Ops Manager				

Comments / Reference:	2017 NRC Exam Q69		Revision:				
K/A Match:							
The question matches the while both units are operation	K/A as it requires knowledge of operational o ting in the ERGs.	differences betw	een units				
Explanation:							
A. Correct. 1 st part is correct, with both units responding to events in the ERGs, Unit 1 will monitor and operate common equipment. 2 nd part is correct, with both units responding to events in the ERGs the Shift Manager may request responsibility of monitoring and operating common equipment transferred to Unit 2 based on the severity of the event on Unit 1.							
Manager is responsible	B. Incorrect. 1 st part is correct (see A above). 2 nd part is incorrect but plausible as the Shift Ops Manager is responsible for directing station operations for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 per ODA-102, Conduct of Operations.						
refueling outage IPO-0 However, this is specif and not the unit that w	correct but plausible as with Unit 1 14 days fr 103A will have directed transferring common of fically referring to which unit will provide power ill be responsible for monitoring and operation RGs. 2 nd part is correct (see A above).	equipment to Un er to the common	it 2. n equipment				
D. Incorrect. 1 st part is in B above).	correct but plausible (see C above). 2 nd part	is incorrect but p	plausible (see				
Technical Reference(s)	ODA-407	Attached w/ R	evision # See				
	ODA-102	Comments / R	eference				
	IPO-003A/B						
Proposed references to be	e provided during examination:						
	CUSS the operator role in plant operation incl edures. (LO21.ERG.XG1.OB101)	uding the interfa	ce with				
Question Source:	Bank # (I Modified Bank # (I New X	Note changes or	attach parent)				
Question History:	Last NRC Exam						
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X					
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>41.10</u> 55.43						
-			-				

ES-401

omments / Reference: OWI	-402		Revision: 5
CPNPF OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT WO	PROCEDURE NO. OWI-402		
LABEL STANDA	RD GUIDE	REVISION NO. 5 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 16 OF 21
	ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 2 OF 2		
Label Border (Color Coding		
UNIT	OUTER BORDER	OUTER BORD	ER TEXT
Unit 1	Blue	White	
Unit 2	Yellow	White	
Common	White with Black border	Black	
No Unit	White	N/A	
TRAIN/CHANNEL	INNER BORDER	INNER BORD	ER TEXT
Train A	Orange	White	
Train B	Green	White	
Train A/B	Orange/Green	White	
Associated Train A	Orange	White	
Associated Train B	Green	White	
Train C	Black	White	
Channel I	Red	White	
Channel II	White with Black border	Black	
Channel III	Blue	White	
Channel IV	Yellow	Black	
Associated Channel I	Red	White	
Associated Channel II	White with Black border	Black	
Associated Channel III	Blue	White	
Associated Channel IV	Yellow	Black	

ES-401

Comme	nts / Reference: ODA-102	Revision: 35				
	CPNPP	PROCEDURE NO.				
OPERA	TIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL	ODA-102				
	CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	ISION NO. 35 PAGE 17 OF 152				
	INFO	RMATION USE				
[C]6.5	O. Conduct a meeting of representatives of work groups on s in the shift to ensure groups are working together to comp [4401800].					
	P. Coordinate all power changes with the Generation Control output requested by the Generation Controller, to the exter procedures, equipment availability and Technical Specific	ent allowed by operating				
[C]	Q. Review routine operating data to assure safe plant operation	tion. [08292]				
	R. As time permits, notify the Security Shift Supervisor of em that may impact safety related plant equipment or site phy STA-919.					
[C]6.6	Duties/Responsibilities of the Unit Supervisor (US) [01076, 0	1078]				
	 The US is responsible to the SM for the operation of the assigned unit and the supervision of the operating personnel on that shift. The Unit 1 US is responsible for Unit 1 and common systems operation. The Unit 2 US is responsible for Unit 2. 					
[C]	 Implement the ERGs and direct the required procedure st following an emergency or abnormal condition. [09447] 	teps to stabilize the plant				
[C]	 Monitor or assign another Licensed Operator to monitor the affected unit following a reactor trip. [27148] 	he Plant Computer for the				
	 Maintain cognizance of the current status of the Critical S updates as required. 	afety Functions and provide				
	 It is necessary for the Unit Supervisor to identify the critical parameters necessary for control of the unit. Once these are identified, the US should establish a band within which the critical parameter should be controlled, with a specific owner for each critical parameter. 					
	Assist in the review and modification of operating procedu	ures as required.				
	Assist in on-shift training of operating personnel.					
	Approve changes in equipment and system operational st	tatus.				
	Approve changes to locked/sealed valves or breaker positive changes to locked/sealed valves or breaker positive changes are searched by the searched by t	tions on his assigned unit.				
	 Be cognizant of all clearances which affect the unit and conclearance on any Technical Specification LCO and its effect operations. 					
	Ensure the SM is aware of any unanticipated changes in	plant conditions as they occur.				
[C]	The US's normal station is in the Control Room. The US Room Staff when leaving the "At The Controls" area. [082]					
L		J				

Examination Outline Cross-reference	: Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	3		
	Group			
	K/A		2.2.14	-
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.9		
Knowledge of the process for controlling ec Question # 70	pment configuration or status.			
The Shift Manager has directed	Verification Lineup performed on a sy	vstem.		
While performing the Verificatior required to be completed.	ineup, independent verification of the	lineup	_(1)	_

If a valve is found out of position, the operator performing the lineup should __(2)__.

- A. (1) is
 - (2) obtain specific permission prior to repositioning the valve
- B. (1) is

(2) position the valve to the required position and document the repositioning on the lineup attachment

C. (1) is NOT

(2) obtain specific permission prior to repositioning the valve

D. (1) is NOT

(2) position the valve to the required position and document the repositioning on the lineup attachment

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of procedures associated with maintaining system configuration control.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since independent verification is required for Initial Lineups. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since this is how an Initial Lineup would be performed.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. Independent verification is not required for Verification Lineups unless a component must be repositioned. Second part is correct. Component repositioning requires specific permission prior to being operated.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-410	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the administrative requirements for operating plant equipment; performing routine watchstanding evolutions and maintaining system status and plant configuration control in accordance with ODA-106, STI-604.03, OWI-207, ODA-102, ODA-410, ODA-407, OWI-107, STA-694, STA-601 and OWI-409. (ADM.XA1.OB09)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

mme	nts /	Reference: ODA-410		Revision: 16
OPER/		CPNPP IS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. ODA-410
		SYSTEM STATUS CONTROL	REVISION NO. 16 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 12 OF 22
6.3	Verif	fication Lineups		
	A.	Verification Lineups are performed at the Shift C ensure that systems are properly aligned and ca function. Component positioning should not be p Verification Lineups without specific authorizatio Supervisor, or Work Window Manager, as applic component positioning activities are to be accon "Station Verification Activities", OWI-206, "Guide Power Operated Valves", and this procedure.	pable of performing their performed during the per n of the Shift Manager, U cable. Once directed to d nplished in accordance w	intended formance of Init Io so, ith STA-694,
	В.	The attachments performed for Initial System Lir performed for Verification Lineups on certain sys be independently verified for completion.		
	C.	Verification Lineup attachments need only be co following valves may be marked N/A (not applica Verification Lineup attachments at the Shift Man	able) during the performa	
		Vent valves		
		Drain valves		
		Test connection valves		
		Sample valves		
		Throttle valves during "at power, system in-s	ervice" verification lineup	
	D.	RT valves do not require lineup, but are to be pu "alternate verification used" to confirm position.	It on the discrepancy she	et with

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	3		
	Group			
	K/A	2	2.2.35	
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.6		
Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.				\neg
				_
Question # 71				
If a Unit is in the process of cooling down for refue	ling, complete the follo	owing sta	tements	
regarding the Mode of operation:				
If average coolant temperature = 195°F, the plant	is considered to be in	(1)		
Mode 6 is INITIALLY declared when the(2) F	Reactor Vessel Head C	Closure B	olt is	
detensioned.				
A. (1) MODE 4, Hot Shutdown				
(2) first				
B. (1) MODE 4, Hot Shutdown				
(2) last				
C (1) MODE E Cold Shutdown				
C. (1) MODE 5, Cold Shutdown				
(2) first				
D. (1) MODE 5, Cold Shutdown				
(2) last				
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the definitions of different modes of operation.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since if it were 5 degrees hotter, it would be correct. Second part is correct. With one RPV head bolt not fully tensioned, the unit is considered to be in Mode 6.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because it could be thought that all RPV head closure bolts must be detensioned to enter Mode 6 as this is similar to exit when all bolts must be tensioned.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. If RCS temperature is < 200°F, the unit is considered to be in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). 2nd part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	TS 1.1-1	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DISCUSS** the terms defined in Technical Specifications. (RLS.SL1.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	71459	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comments /	Reference: Bank Question 71459	Revision:
6	71459	
	the process of cooling down for refueling, complete the following regarding the Mode of operation:	
, i	bolant temperature = 195°F, the plant is considered to be in Mode if a MINIMUM ofReactor Vessel Head Closure Bolts are asioned, the plant is considered to be in Mode 6.	less
A.	4, Hot Shutdown one	
В.	4, Hot Shutdown four	
C.	5, Cold Shutdown one	
D.	5, Cold Shutdown four	
Answ	ver: C	
A. In are o were head B. In	wer Explanation correct: 1 st part is incorrect because if RCS temperature is < 200°F considered to be in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). It is plausible because 5 degrees hotter, you could be correct. 2 nd part is correct. With or I bolt not fully tensioned, you are considered to be in Mode 6. correct: 1 st part is incorrect but plausible (see A). 2 nd part is incorre- use only one head bolt detensioned makes you in Mode 6 by defini	e if you ne RPV ect
is pla C. Co cons	use only one head bolt detensioned makes you in Mode 6 by defini ausible because 4 bolts is used at Equipment hatch closure criteria. ORRECT: 1 st part is correct. If RCS temperature is < 200°F, you ar idered to be in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). 2 nd part is correct (see A) correct: 1 st part is correct (see C). 2 nd part is incorrect but plausible	re
		- -

Question 6 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	2.00	
System ID:	71459	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT8387	
Cross Reference Number:	RLS.SL1.OB01.005	
Topic:	If a unit is in the process of cooling down for refueling, complete the following statements re	ar
K/A:		×
Question Reference:		
SRO:		
Comments:	R/S27E12	
	This question matches the KA by requiring the to determine the TS mode of operability.	ability
	TS 1.1-1	
Question 6 Table-Item L IOCFR55-41 41.7	<u>.inks</u>	

Initial

Comments / Reference: TS 1.1-1

Revision: 150

Definitions

1.1

		Table 1.1-1 (page MODES		
MODE	TITLE	REACTIVITY CONDITION (k _{eff})	% RATED THERMAL POWER ^(a)	AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE (°F)
1	Power Operation	≥ 0.99	> 5	NA
2	Startup	≥ 0.99	≤ 5	NA
3	Hot Standby	< 0.99	NA	≥ 350
4	Hot Shutdown ^(b)	< 0.99	NA	350 > T _{avg} > 200
5	Cold Shutdown ^(b)	<mark>< 0.99</mark>	NA	<u>≤ 200</u>
6	Refueling ^(c)	NA	NA	NA

(a) Excluding decay heat.

(b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

(c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 1.1-8

Amendment No. 150

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	3	
	Group		
	K/A		2.3.4
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.2	
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergen	cy conditions.		
Question # 72			
Der CTA CEE Europeuro Manitarian Dramana da		4	
Per STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program, the limit that can be received, without an administrati			
by an operator is(1) mRem Total Effective I			i Exposure,
Per EPP-305, Emergency Exposure Guidelines a	and Personnel Dosimeti	ry, the En	nergency
Exposure limit to save a life is(2) Rem.			
A. (1) 2000			
(2) 10			
P (1) 2000			
B. (1) 2000			
(2) 25			
C. (1) 4000			
(2) 10			
D. (1) 4000			
(2) 25			
(2) 20			
Answer: B			

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of annual and emergency radiation exposure limits.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because 10 REM is the emergency limit for protecting valuable property.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Per STA-655 ATT 8.A the administrative limit without an extension has been set at CPNPP for operators at 2000 mrem. Second part is correct. Per EPP-305, the emergency dose limit to save a life is 25 REM.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since 4000 mrem is the limit with an approved extension but no extension is allowed in the stem of the question. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	STA-655	Attached w/ Revision # See
	EPP-305	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a known total exposure, **CALCULATE** the remaining exposure permitted before exceeding an administrative exposure limit in accordance with STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program, and an NRC exposure limit in accordance with 10CFR20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation. (ADM.RAD.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75850	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>12</u> 55.43		

Reference: Bank 75	5850			Revision:
			MUM annual	
liation Worker (with	DLR) is	mRem Deep	Dose Equiva	lent.
mRem Total	Effective Dose	e Equivalent.		
2000 2000				
2000 4000				
4000 2000				
4000 4000				
rrect. Per STA-655	ATT 8.A these	e are the admini	strative limits	set for
ect but plausible as P until 2008. It is p	4000 mrem w	as the previous ieve that the eso	administrativ	e limit at on worker
008 at CPNPP for I tor. It is plausible the es that the limits for pary assignee of a oles. Prior limits we	Escorted Radia hat the applica r CPNPP full ti vendor based	ation Worker. Pa nt knows their a me employees a on the site's stric	art 2 is correct dministrative are lower than ct adherence	t for the limit and n a to ALARA
orrect Part 1 is pla	ausible as desc	cribed in 'C'. Par	t 2 is plausib	le as
	e exposure levels the diation Worker (with mRem Total 2000 2000 2000 4000 4000 4000 4000 400	e exposure levels that can be rece diation Worker (with DLR) is mRem Total Effective Dose 2000 2000 2000 4000 4000 4000 4000 400	e exposure levels that can be received by an diation Worker (with DLR) is mRem Deep mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent. 2000 2000 2000 4000	diation Worker (with DLR) is mRem Deep Dose Equival mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent. 2000 2000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 400

Comments / Reference: Bank 75850

Revision:

Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	2
Difficulty:	2.00
System ID:	75850
User-Defined ID:	ILOT
Cross Reference	
Number:	
	Per STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program, the
Topic:	normal MAXIMUM annual administrative exposure
	levels
K/A:	2.3.4
Question Reference:	STA-655
SRO:	
Comments:	LC24 NRC

STATION	CPNPP ADMINISTRATION			PROCEDURE STA-655
EXPOSURE M	IONITORING PROCRAM +	REVISIO INFORM	N NO. 23 ATION USE	Page 22 of 28
	ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 1 OF 2			
	ADMINISTRATIVE EXPOSURE	ELEVEL	s	
PERIOD	RADIATION WORKER CALCULATION	s	LE	VEL
Annual	TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equival	ent)	2000	mrem
Annual	Skin Dose		40 RE	EM/year
Annual	Extremities		40 RE	EM/year
Annual	Lens of the Eye		12 REM/year	
Annual	Total Organ Dose		40 REM/year	
PERIOD	EVENT		LE	VEL
Annual	Planned Special Exposure (PSE)		4000	mrem
	NOT TO EXCEED:			
Lifetime	Planned Special Exposure (PSE)			s the annual limit.

Comments / Reference: EPP-305

Revision: 14

CPNPP EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. EPP-305
EMERGENCY EXPOSURE GUIDELINES	REVISION NO. 14	
AND PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY	INFORMATION USE	PAGE 10 OF 11

ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 1 OF 1

EMERGENCY EXPOSURE GUIDELINES

Dose Limit ¹ (rem)	Activity	Condition
5	All	
10	Protecting valuable property	Lower dose not practicable
25	Life saving or protection of large populations	Lower dose not practicable
>25	life saving or protection of large populations	Only on a voluntary basis to persons fully aware of the risks involved (See Attachment 2)

¹ This is the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) to non-pregnant adults from exposure and intake during an emergency condition at CPNPP. Workers performing services during emergencies should limit dose to the lens of the eye to three times the listed value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) to ten times the listed value. These limits apply to all doses received from an incident, except those received in unrestricted areas as members of the public during the intermediate (ingestion) phase of the incident.

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3		Tier	3	
		Group		
		K/A	2.3	5.15
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating	2.9	
Knowledge of radiation monitoring personnel monitoring equipment, e		n monitors and alarms, portab	le survey instru	uments,
Question # 73				
You are exiting an RCA a background radiation.	nd approach the portable	e frisker which is readi	ng 275 cpn	n
(1) Are you allowed to per this level?	form your whole body fri	isk in an area with bac	kground ra	diation at
(2) You should be conside MINIMUM value of(ntamination if the frisk	er rises to a	a
A. (1) NO (2) 100 cpm above	background			
B. (1) NO (2) double the back	kground			
C. (1) YES (2) 100 cpm above	background			
D. (1) YES (2) double the back	kground			
Answer: A				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of personnel monitoring equipment use.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. Frisking may only be performed in areas with the background radiation < 200 cpm. Second part is correct. Contamination is identified by being 100 cpm above background.
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see A). 2nd part is incorrect. It is plausible because this would be indication of contamination in this case, but minimum level to be considered contaminated is 100 cpm above background.
- C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect because background count rates are > 200 cpm, therefore NO (not allowed). It is plausible because it is well over the preferred background level (100 cpm). 2nd part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). 2nd part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	STA-653	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a set of contamination conditions, **DETERMINE** the posting requirements for the area in accordance with RPI-304, Radiological Posting and Labeling. (ADM.RAD.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	82575	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>12</u> 55.43		

comments / Re	eference: Bank 82575	Revision:
	ing an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading radiation. Based on this information, answer the following que	
	allowed to perform your whole body frisk in an area with backgr at this level?	round
2. When yo	u do perform a whole body frisk (in this area or another) you sł	hould:
Α.	(1) NO(2) Start on the lowest scale and move up one scale at a time meter is on scale.	e until the
В.	(1) NO(2) Start on the highest scale and go down one scale at a timmeter is on scale.	ne until the
C.	 (1) YES (2) Start on the lowest scale and go up one scale at a time up is on scale. 	ntil the meter
D.	 (1) YES (2) Start on the highest and go down one scale at a time unti up on scale. 	I the meter is
Ansv	ver: A	
	ver Explanation	
B.A ra C.B b th 11 11	xplanation: is correct. Frisking may only be performed in areas with the ba adiation < 300 cpm. Frisking should be started on the X1 (lowes is wrong. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is incorrect because frisk e started on the X1 scale. It is plausible because scales are set at they go up by a factor of 10 for every scale. Using that know ow the scales work, it would figure that the applicant could thin 0), X10 (0-100), X100 (0-1000) cpm. With this philosophy, it wo that they would start on the highest scale so as not to "peg" the is wrong 1st part is incorrect because background count rates om, therefore NO (not allowed). It is plausible because it is well	st) scale. sing should t up such vledge of k that X1 (0- puld reason meter. are > 300

Question 61 InfoQuestion Type:Multiple ChoiceStatus:ActiveAlways select on test?NoAuthorized for practice?NoAuthorized for practice?NoPoints:1.00Time to Complete:0Difficulty:2.00System ID:82575User-Defined ID:ILOTCross ReferenceADM.XA1.0B03.032Number:You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radiaK/A:G.2.3.5Question Reference:SRO:Comments:LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Status: Active Always select on test? No Authorized for practice? No Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 2.00 System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Status: Active Always select on test? No Authorized for practice? No Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 2.00 System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 2.00 System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.0B03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 2.00 System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Time to Complete:0Difficulty:2.00System ID:82575User-Defined ID:ILOTCross Reference Number:ADM.XA1.OB03.032You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radiaK/A:G.2.3.5Question Reference: SRO: Comments:LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Difficulty: 2.00 System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
System ID: 82575 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.0B03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Cross Reference Number: ADM.XA1.0B03.032 Topic: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Number: ADM.XA1.OB03.032 Topic: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Number: You are exiting an RCA and approach the portable frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
frisker which is reading 350 cpm background radia K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: SRO: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
K/A: G.2.3.5 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
SRO: Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
Comments: LC22 RO Retake NRC; R/S25E31 (Admin)
REF: STA-653

Comments / Refe	erence: STA-653		Revision: 21		
STAT	CPNPP ION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. STA-653		
CONT	Page 12 of 20				
[C] 6.7 <u>Personnel Monitoring</u> [00816]					
6.7.	6.7.1 Contamination monitoring requirements should be posted at the exit of Satellite/Alternate RCA's. [CR-2011-005658]				
6.7.	6.7.2 Unless otherwise posted or authorized, all personnel shall monitor themselves after handling contaminated materials or exiting a contaminated area, at the nearest available frisker or PCM, and when exiting at the access control point.				
NOTE:	Where available, Personnel Portal Monitors of	can be used in lieu of fri	sking.		
 6.7.3 Personnel exiting from the following RCA's into an outside RCA should perform a frisk of the hands and feet prior to proceeding. [AI-CR-2016-002617-9] 					
	 Fuel Building door 100 when the Protected Area RCA Yard is posted as an RCA Warehouse C Building RCA when entering into the Posted Yard Area. Entry into the Protected Area RCA Yard via the Radioactive Protection Building (3J43). 				
6.7.	6.7.4 The frisker is most commonly used for monitoring after exiting a contaminated area or after handling contaminated material. Frisking should be done with a background count rate of less than 200 counts per minute (cpm).				
6.7.	6.7.5 The Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM) is most commonly used at the access control point, although it may be used to replace the frisker at locations such as the Reactor Building Personnel Air Lock.				
6.7.6 Hand-held friskers should be available at or near normally established step-off pads when PCM's are not readily available. [CR-2011-005658]					
6.7.7 Hand held friskers should be available at or near each normally established RCA egress point for RP Technician use to respond to quantify contamination alarms. [CR-2011-005658]					
6.7.	 Portal Monitors will most commonly be used (e.g., PAP, AAP). 	when exiting the protec	ted area		
6.7.	9 See Attachment 3 for guidelines on the use of	f friskers, PCMs and por	tal monitors.		

Commer	nts / Refe	erence: STA-653			Revision: 21
	STATIO	CPNPP DN ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PRO STA-	CEDURE NO. -653
	CONTAN	MINATION CONTROL PROGRAM	REVISION NO. 21 INFORMATION USE	Page	18 of 20
		ATTACHMENT PAGE 1 OF 2	3		
		GUIDELINES FOR PERSONAL	MONITORING		
<u></u>	Monitoring V	<u>With a Frisker</u>			
	NOTE:	Due to background radiation levels some count rate greater than 200 cpm. These : gross contamination check. In-plant low provided as necessary.	riskers may be used to pe	form	a
1		re meter is turned on and the scale switch is entarily.	et at X1. Observe backgr	ound l	level
2		out picking up the probe, frisk both sides of away from the surface area being frisked.	one hand. The probe shou	ld be a	about ½
3	shall	up probe and frisk remainder of body, scann be given to the face, soles of feet, hands, know sed while wearing protective clothing and do	es, posterior, and any sur		
4	and v	increase in the count rate is noted (visual or erify count rate. A significant and abrupt ris resence of a DRP. Notify Radiation Protecti	e/drop in the count rate m		
5	noted	frisker alarms or a continuous count rate of , remain at that point and notify, or have a cosistance. If contamination is not detected, p	-worker notify, Radiation		
					<u>_</u>

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier	3		
	Group			
	K/A		2.4.6	
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.7		

Knowledge of EOP mitigation stra	tegies.
Question # 74	

Which of the following actions should NOT be performed prior to direction from the US in an Emergency Response Guideline?

- A. Isolating AFW flow to a single faulted SG.
- B. Throttling AFW flow to control a ruptured SG level within the required band.
- C. Adjusting RCP seal injection flow to maintain within the required range of flow.
- D. Securing a CCP to prevent overfilling the Pressurizer following an inadvertent SI.

Answer: D		
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Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOP-2.0, but the ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOP-3.0, but the ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOS-0.1, but the ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.
- D. Correct. Performing steps out of sequence is allowed, but must be done with caution to prevent masking symptoms or defeating the intent of the EOP being used. Although terminating SI early might be beneficial to prevent filling the Pressurizer if the only event is a spurious SI, this may result in further degradation of the plant if another undiagnosed event is in progress.

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-407	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the requirements associated with deviating from an ERG in accordance with ODA-407, Operations Department Procedure Use and Adherence. (ERG.XD2.OB25)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23501	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC20	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comments	/ Reference: Bank 23501	Revision:
	he following actions would be INAPPROPRIATE to perform prior rgency Response Guideline?	to direction
Α.	Isolating Auxiliary Feedwater flow to a single faulted Steam	Generator.
В.	Throttling Auxiliary Feedwater flow to control a ruptured Stea level within the required band.	am Generator
C.	Securing a Centrifugal Charging Pump to prevent overfilling Pressurizer following an inadvertent Safety Injection.	the
D.	Closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves to isolate a steam I which has not resulted in a Safety Injection.	ine break
An	swer: C	
	swer Explanation Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOP-2.0) but the
	ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.	
В.	Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOP-3.0 ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.), but the
	Correct. Performing steps out of sequence is allowed, but must caution to prevent masking symptoms or defeating the intent of being used. Although terminating SI early might be beneficial to filling the Pressurizer if the only event is a spurious SI, this may further degradation of the plant if another undiagnosed event is Incorrect. Plausible because this is a numbered step in EOS-0.1 ERG Rules of Usage addresses this as being acceptable.	the EOP prevent result in in progress.
	Enternande en couge addresses and de being acceptable.	

Comments / Reference: Bank 23501 Revision: Question 22 Info Question Type: Multiple Choice Status: Active Always select on test? No Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 0.00 System ID: 23501 User-Defined ID: ILOT6313 Cross Reference ERG.XD2.OB11.003 Number: Which of the following actions would be INAPPROPRIATE to perform prior to direction in an Topic: Emergenc K/A: G.2.4.12 Question Reference: SRO: Comments: LC20 NRC; R/S22E14; R/S23E24 REF: ODA-407 Att. 8.A General Question

Comprehension / Higher

Initial

LC20 NRC

Commer	nts / Reference: ODA-407			Revision: 17	
	CENER		00		
OPERA	CPNPP TIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PR	OCEDURE NO. ODA-407	
	OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	REVISION NO. 17	P	AGE 34 OF 63	
	PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE	INFORMATION USE			
	ATTACHMENT 8. PAGE 16 OF 25				
	ERG RULES OF US	AGE			
15. •	When performing YELLOW status FRGs, continue ORGs are monitored and implemented as required are considered to be performed in parallel. If ORG YELLOW path FRG may be suspended.	I, therefore, YELLOW	path pro	ocedures	
	EXAMPLE 3 - While in EOS-1.1A/B, the SRO make due to SG low level. Subsequently, RCS subcoolin SRO should terminate activities of FRH-0.5A/B unl exists, and implement actions of EOS-1.1A/B foldo	ng is lost while in FRH- less adequate personn	-0.5A/B. iel cove	The rage	
•	Operators may take action to control the AFW Sys with the intent of the ERGs, prior to steps directing include but are not limited to throttling flow and sto	such action in the ER			
	If excessive cooldown is observed before reaching should be stopped or AFW flow should be throttled Stopping AFW flow to a faulted SG prior to entry in with meeting requirements of >(Unit 1, 43%)(Unit 2 2, 18% adverse) or 460 gpm minimum as specific permissible to stop AFW flow to a ruptured SG but NR (Unit 1, 50% adverse)(Unit 2, 18% adverse) in consistent with meeting requirements of >(Unit 1, 4	as the step directs. to EOP-2.0A/B, is allo 2, 10%) NR (Unit 1, 50 ed in EOP-0.0A/B. Sin maintain >(Unit 1, 439 that SG, prior to entry	wed col 0% adve nilarly, it %)(Unit into EC	nsistent erse)(Unit t is) 2, 10%)) IP-3.0A/B,	
	adverse)(Unit 2, 18% adverse) or 460 gpm minimu				
16. Th	ne following rules apply to the use of instrumentation	during ERG performa	nce:		
•	ERG response and recovery actions should not be when more than one of the same parameter is ava instruments exposed to post LOCA environments e instruments if possible.	ilable. Indications from	n non-q	ualified	
•	For Control Board analog meters, the most precision distance between the face plate increment marking		tain is o	ne-half the	
	Example: a tank level indicator face plate has 2 pe indicator pointer is between 66% and 68%, the acc				

Question #75

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier	3		
	Group			
	K/A		2.4.17	7
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating	3.9		

Knowledge of EOP terms and defi	nitions.

While performing an Emergency Operating Procedure, the Unit Supervisor observes an asterisk next to a step number.

The asterisk indicates the step...

A. is only applicable under Adverse Containment conditions.

B. is to be performed from memory and verbalized upon completion.

C. must be completed in its entirety before the subsequent step is started.

D. is a continuous action that applies until superseded or no longer applies.

Answer: D					
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K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of symbols used in the ERG network.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible as Adverse containment parameters are specified in ERG's by parentheses.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible as Initial Action are designated by diamond symbol.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible as steps in ABNs and ERGs do not have to be completed prior to proceeding to next step. They just have to be started and have assurance that it is progressing. Step where this does not apply have to be designated.
- D. Correct. An asterisk designates a continuous action step, which applies from that point in the procedure until superseded or no longer applies.

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-407	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the expectations associated with performing immediate action, continuous action and radiation hazard steps and how each is identified in the Emergency Response Guidelines. (ERG.XD2.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	41924	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

			Revision: 17
CPNPP		PRO	CEDURE NO.
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL	REVISION NO. 17		ODA-407
PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE	INFORMATION USE	PAC	GE 20 OF 63
ATTACHMENT 8 PAGE 2 OF 25			
ERG RULES OF US	SAGE		
 Some ERGs contain a foldout page which provides in applicable <u>at any step</u> in the related procedure. Some apply after performance of a certain procedure step, monitored during ERG performance. 	e foldout page actions r	nay be st	tated to
Copies of the foldout page are maintained in the proc separate locations for the RO and BOP positions. The activities identifies when foldout page information is a member of the operating crew reviews the foldout page implemented as required during recovery actions.	e SRO directing emerge pplicable upon entry int	ency resp to the ER	onse G. Each
Only the foldout page for the current controlling proce applicable after a transition is made to a different con foldout page of EOP-0.0 does not apply when either F procedure and EOP-0.0 steps are to be performed for	trolling procedure. For FRS-0.1 or FRH-0.1 is t	example he contro	, the
5. Additional information may be displayed by the ERG performance of the associated step.	Step numbers to assist	the opera	ator in
A. ERG steps that are performed in an area where ra or which, when performed, create a radiation haza by using a [R]. A substep is included when a plant Staff is required by the ERG action, and information Bases to identify the radiological concern.	ard, should be specified announcement or notif	in the le	ft margin f Plant
When ERG instructions require local actions to be should inform personnel being dispatched of the a required for the current plant conditions.			
B. Some steps require "continuous" performance thre Continuous Action Steps are identified by an aster chart, by an asterisk next to the step number in th Continuous Action Step listing on Attachment 1.B examples of Continuous Action Steps:	risk (*) and shading on e procedure, and as pa	the proce rt of the	edure flow
 Step instruction uses action verbs such as mo 	nitor, maintain, or contr	ol.	
 Step instruction to perform action when contine <u>THEN</u>). 	gent condition satisfied	(e.g., <u>W</u>	HEN,
A note precedes a step to identify that the step	o is applicable during su	ubsequer	nt steps.

CPNPP RATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL PROCEDURE NO. OD4.407 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE REVISION NO. 17 INFORMATION USE PAGE 21 OF 63 ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 3 OF 25 PAGE 21 OF 63 INFORMATION USE B A Continuous Action Step is applicable from the point at which it is first encountered until superseded by alternate instruction QR stated to be no longer applicable. The course of direction stated by the Continuous Action Step should be followed until subsequent procedure instruction QB a change in the response and recovery strategy is encountered that supercedes the previous instruction. EXAMPLE 1 - EOP-1.0A/B, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" Step 3 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Check Intact SG Levels". The continuous instructions for the step include: • Maintain total AFW flow greater than 460 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 2 in at least one intact SG. • Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 1. • The continuous instruction for AFW flow and SG level maintenance applies with the subsequent transition to EOS-1.1A/B, "Safety Injection Termination" until specific instruction in EOS-1.1A/B, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" Step 5 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Verify Pumps Aligned From Containment Recirculation Sump NOT Affected By Sump Blockage". The continuous instructions for the step requires reporting of abhormatic parameters of any ECCS Sump or Containment Spray pump so that proper actions can be taken to protect the affected ECCS pump(s) and Containment Spray pumps. </th
DEPENATIONS DEPARTMENT INFORMATION USE PAGE 21 OF 63 PAGE 21 OF 63 ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 3 OF 25 BER RULES OF USAGE 8 A Continuous Action Step is applicable from the point at which it is first encountered until superseded by alternate instruction QR stated to be no longer applicable. The course of direction stated by the Continuous Action Step should be followed until subsequent procedure instruction QR a change in the response and recovery strategy is encountered that supercedes the previous instruction. EXAMPLE 1 - EOP-1.0A/B, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" Step 3 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Check Intact SG Levels". The continuous instructions for the step include: Maintain total AFW flow greater than 460 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 2 in at least one intact SG. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 2. The continuous instruction for AFW flow and SG level maintenance applies with the subsequent transition to EOS-1.14/B, "Safety Injection Termination" until specific instruction in EOS-1.14/B, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" Step 5 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Verify Pumps Aligned From Containment Recirculation Sump NOT Affected By Sump Blockage". The continuous instructions for the step requires reporting of abnormal operating parameters of any ECCS pump or Containment Spray pump so that proper actions can be taken to protect the affected ECCS pump(s)
 FAGE 3 OF 25 ERG RULES OF USAGE 8. A Continuous Action Step is applicable from the point at which it is first encountered until superseded by alternate instruction OR stated to be no longer applicable. The course of direction stated by the Continuous Action Step should be followed until subsequent procedure instruction OR a change in the response and recovery strategy is encountered that supercedes the previous instruction. EXAMPLE 1 - EOP-1.0A/B, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" Step 3 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Check Intact SG Levels". The continuous instructions for the step include: Maintain total AFW flow greater than 460 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 1. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 50% for Unit 1. The continuous instruction for AFW flow and SG level maintenance applies with the subsequent transition to EOS-1.1A/B, "Safety Injection Termination" until specific instruction in EOS-1.1A/B provides guidance for AFW flow and SG level maintenance. EXAMPLE 2 - EOS-1.3A/B, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" Step 5 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Verify Pumps Aligned From Containment Recirculation Sump NOT Affected By Sump Blockage". The continuous instruction sfor the step requires reporting of ahormal operating parameters of any ECCS pump or Containment Spray pump so that proper actions can be taken to protect the affected ECCS pump(s) and Containment Spray pumps.
 B. A Continuous Action Step is applicable from the point at which it is first encountered until subgerseded by alternate instruction <u>OR</u> stated to be no longer applicable. The course of direction stated by the Continuous Action Step should be followed until subsequent procedure instruction <u>OR</u> a change in the response and recovery strategy is encountered that supercedes the previous instruction. <u>EXAMPLE 1</u> - EOP-1.0A/B, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" Step 3 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Check Intact SG Levels". The continuous instructions for the step include: Maintain total AFW flow greater than 460 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 2 in at least one intact SG. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 1. The continuous instruction for AFW flow and SG level maintenance applies with the subsequent transition to EOS-1.1A/B, "Safety Injection Termination" until specific instruction in EOS-1.1A/B, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" Step 5 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Verify Pumps Aligned From Containment Recirculation Sump NOT Affected By Sump Blockage". The continuous instructions for the step requires reporting of abnormal operating parameters of any ECCS pump or Containment Spray pump so that proper actions can be taken to protect the affected ECCS pump(s) and Containment Spray pumps.
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 step include: Maintain total AFW flow greater than 460 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) for Unit 2 in at least one intact SG. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60% for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 50% for Unit 1, and 10% (18% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 50% for Unit 2. The continuous instruction for AFW flow and SG level maintenance applies with the subsequent transition to EOS-1.1A/B, "Safety Injection Termination" until specific instruction in EOS-1.1A/B, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" Step 5 provides a Continuous Action Step to "Verify Pumps Aligned From Containment Recirculation Sump NOT Affected By Sump Blockage". The continuous instructions for the step requires reporting of abnormal operating parameters of any ECCS pump or Containment Spray pump so that proper actions can be taken to protect the affected ECCS pump(s) and Containment Spray pumps.
procedure being implemented and in a separate location for the RO and BOP positions. The SRO directing emergency response activities identifies when a continuous action is applicable upon performance of the step. The operating crew has responsibility to ensure the action is performed when it is required by applicable Unit conditions. The Continuous Action Step attachment provides a summary of the continuous action attribute for each

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1 Tier				2
	Group			1
	K/A	00	6.A2.	13
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating			4.2

Emergency Core Cooling: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadvertent SIS actuation

Question #76

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 in MODE 3 waiting to enter MODE 2
- An Inadvertent Train A Safety Injection occurs

The Unit Supervisor ___(1)__ expected to exercise procedure expediency as described in Operations Guideline 3, Attachment 6, Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation.

An Inadvertent Safety Injection places a challenge on the __(2)__.

- A. (1) is NOT(2) PRZR safeties
- B. (1) is(2) PRZR safeties
- C. (1) is NOT (2) RCS cooldown rate
- D. (1) is (2) RCS cooldown rate

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the procedural strategy in response to an inadvertent safety injection.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible as no accident has occurred and it may be thought that terminating SI is secondary to stabilizing the plant. Second part is correct (see B).
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Procedure expediency is required to prevent overfilling the pressurizer. Second part is correct. Overfilling the pressurizer could result in water damage to the pressurizer safety valves.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since adequate heat removal existed without SI and it could be thought that the additional heat removal would result in an excessive RCS cooldown condition.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see C).

Technical Reference(s)	Ops Guideline 6, Att 3	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: LIST three beneficial functions and one possible problem caused by SI flow during accident conditions. (ERG.XD4.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank #75863 New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge)
	Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5	



Comments / R	Revision:			
	 Unit 1 in MODE 3 waiting to enter MODE 2 An Inadvertent Safety Injection occurs 			
	w protection for any running Centrifugal Charging Pump is provide to the	vided by		
Unit Supervi Operations (sor expected to exercise Procedure Expediency as Guideline 3, Attachment 6, Strategies for Successful Transient	described in Mitigation.		
Α.	Refueling Water Storage Tank is NOT			
В.	Refueling Water Storage Tank is			
C.	C. Charging Pump suction header is NOT			
D.	D. Charging Pump suction header is			
Answer: B				
Answer Explanation				

Comments / Reference: Bank 75863 Revision: A Incorrect. First part is correct (See B below). Second part is incorrect but plausible if believed that in Mode 3 the procedure expediency is not required in the ERG network to satisfy the inadvertent SI event. B Correct. First part is correct in that with a Safety Injection actuation the CCP discharge aligns such that normal miniflow and charging lines are isolated and safety injection line and an alternate miniflow back to the RWST are opened. As the RCS pressure remains high (2235 psig) and will increase as fluid is injected from the inadvertent SI, the CCPs are protected by the alternate miniflow lines back to the RWST. Second part is correct per OPGD 3, Att. 6, procedure expediency is expected to be used by the Unit Supervisor to prevent the pressurizer from going solid. C Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because normal miniflow from the CCPs is directed back to the Charging Pump suction header. Second part is incorrect but plausible (See A above). D Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible (See C above). Second part is correct (See B above). Question 43 Info Question Type: Multiple Choice Status: Active Always select on test? No Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 3 2.00 Difficulty: System ID: 75863 User-Defined ID: ILOT Cross Reference Number: Unit 1 in MODE 3 waiting to enter MODE 2 An Topic: Inadvertent Safety Injection occurs Minimum flow prot K/A: 006 A2.13 Question Reference: EOS 1.1 SRO: YES Comments: R/S27E28 (Comp)

Comments / Reference: Ops Guideline 6, Att 3	Revision: 10-21-2019
Operations Guideline 3 Attachment 6	
7.3. Procedure Expediency	
The Unit Supervisor's pace through ERGs / ABNs is always critical Reactor has been placed in a stable condition.	until the
The Unit Supervisor should consider temporarily suspending expect may otherwise be in effect during ERG/ABN performance (e.g. Crew any time delay in working through the procedures may contribute to severity. The following are examples of conditions associated with performance.	v Briefings). the event
 Inadvertent SI: To preclude overfilling the pressurizer with the in of damaging the pressurizer safeties, the ERG network should be expeditiously to the point of re-establishing letdown (terminating pressurizer fill.) 	e worked
 <u>SGTR</u>: In the event of a SGTR in which an uncontrolled level ris observable in the ruptured SG, any unnecessary delay prior to R depressurization and termination of ECCS flow (closing u-HV-88 increases the probability of SG overfill and a radioactive release 	RCS 801 A & B)
 <u>Main Steam Break</u>: To preclude overfilling the pressurizer with risk of damaging the pressurizer safeties, the ERG network shou expeditiously to the point of re-establishing letdown (terminating pressurizer fill.) 	uld be worked the
 <u>Transition and Completion of EOS 1.3 Cold Leg Recirculation</u> preclude uncovering the fuel during a large break LOCA. 	<u>m</u> . 10
 <u>Transition to FRH-0.1 upon loss of Heat Sink</u>: The need to es Feed & Bleed upon loss of a Heat Sink is critical to ensuring comproperly maintained. 	
 <u>Response to Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading R</u> mitigate the potential for inadvertent component operation (POR cooling flow to SSCs, and provide controls for RCS Inventory an Heat Removal. Actions taken should be performed expeditiousl that CCWP A is started from the RSP. 	Vs), provide d Decay
Additional methods:	
 The direction to complete Attachment 2 of EOP-0.0 should take over the completion of throttling AFW. This can be accomplishe interrupting the BOP while throttling AFW and providing direction performance of Attachment 2. The BOP can then quickly compl with AFW and proceed with Attachment 2 while the US and RO EOP-0.0. 	d by n for the ete actions
Page 9 of 34	-

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier		2
		Group		1
		K/A	013.G.2	2.2.25
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating		4.2
Engineered Safety Features Actuation limits.	: Knowledge of the bases in Technic	cal Specifications for limiting condi	tions for operatior	ns and safety
Question # 77				
In accordance with TSB 3	,	,	ollowing sigr	nals use
a 2 of 4 logic to actuate, vice a 2 of 3 logic to actuate, is: Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection logic(1)				
High-3 Containment Pressure logic(2)				
A. (1) is used for both protection and control functions(2) requires additional redundancy because it energizes to trip				
B. (1) is used for both protection and control functions(2) is used for both protection and control functions				
C. (1) requires additional redundancy because it energizes to trip(2) requires additional redundancy because it energizes to trip				
D. (1) requires additional redundancy because it energizes to trip(2) is used for both protection and control functions				
Answer: A				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of TS bases for ESFAS instrumentation.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS-required actions and terminology.

Explanation:


- A. Correct. First part is correct. Pressurizer pressure provides both control and protection functions and actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to control system, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four channels are required to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. Second part is correct. This is one of the only functions that requires the bistable output to energize to perform its required action. Four channels are used in a two-out-of-four logic configuration because this function is energize to trip.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that reason for pressurizer pressure logic also applied to high-3 logic.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible if thought that pressurizer pressure was energized to actuate. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	TSB 3.3.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given ESFAS operability status or parameter indications, various plant conditions, and a copy of regulatory requirements (TS, TRM, etc.), **ASSESS** any LCO entries, applicable conditions, and required actions (including completion time) in accordance with the associated regulatory requirement(s) and their bases. (SYS.ES1.OB08)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.432		



Comments / Reference: TSB 3.3.2		Revision: 77	
BASES	ESFA:	S Instrumentation B 3.3.2	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. I	.CO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)		
	Containment Pressure-High 1 provides no in functions. Thus, three OPERABLE channels satisfy protective requirements with a two-ou The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics a outside of containment with the sensing line side of the transmitter) located inside contain	s are sufficient to it-of-three logic. ire located (high pressure	
	Thus, the high pressure Function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.		
	Containment Pressure-High 1 must be OPEI MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is sufficient of primary and secondary systems to pressuriz containment following a pipe break. In MOD there is insufficient energy in the primary or systems to significantly pressurize the contained	energy in the e the /ES 4, 5, and 6, secondary	
d.	Safety Injection - Pressurizer Pressure-Low		
	This signal provides protection against the for accidents:	ollowing	
	 Inadvertent opening of a steam gene or safety valve; 	rator (SG) relief	
	• SLB;		
	 A spectrum of rod cluster control ass accidents (rod ejection); 	embly ejection	
	 Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer valve; 	relief or safety	
	LOCAs; and		
	SG Tube Rupture.		
	The pressurizer pressure provides both contr functions: input to the Pressurizer Pressure reactor trip, and SI. Therefore, the actuation able to withstand both an input failure to con which may then require the protection function	Control System, logic must be trol system,	
		(continued)	
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2	B 3.3-67	Revision 77	

Comments / Reference: TSB 3	.3.2	Revision: 77
	E	SFAS Instrumentation B 3 3 2
		В 3.3.2
BASES		
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)	
	a single failure in the other channels pro function actuation. Thus, four OPERAB required to satisfy the requirements with logic.	LE channels are
	The transmitters are located inside conta in the vapor space region of the pressur possibly experiencing adverse environm (LOCA, SLB inside containment, rod ejec Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of bot adverse environmental instrument uncer	izer, and thus ental conditions ction). Therefore, the h steady state and
	This Function must be OPERABLE in M (above P-11 and below P-11, unless the Pressurizer Pressure-Low Function is blo consequences of an HELB inside contai may be manually blocked by the operato setpoint. Automatic SI actuation below t is then performed by the Containment P signal.	Safety Injection - bocked) to mitigate the nment. This signal or below the P-11 his pressure setpoint
	This Function is not required to be OPEI below the P-11 setpoint. Other ESF fun detect accident conditions and actuate to this MODE. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, this needed for accident detection and mitiga	ctions are used to he ESF systems in Function is not
e.	Safety Injection - Steam Line Pressure-L	.ow
	Steam Line Pressure-Low provides proto following accidents:	ection against the
	• SLB;	
	Feed line break; and	
	 Inadvertent opening of an SG rel valve. 	ief or an SG safety
	Steam Line Pressure-Low provides no in functions. Thus, three OPERABLE char line are sufficient to satisfy the protective two-out-of-three logic on each steam line	nnels on each steam e requirements with a
		(continued)
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND	2 B 3.3-68	Revision 77

Comments / Reference: TSB 3.3.2	Revision: 77
ESFAS	Instrumentation B 3.3.2
BASES	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)	
for an accident to occur, and sufficient energy or secondary systems to pose a threat to cont integrity due to overpressure conditions. Man also required in MODE 4, even though automs not required. In this MODE, adequate time is manually actuate required components in the e However, because of the large number of con actuated on a containment spray, actuation is the use of the manual actuation hand switches actuation logic and actuation relays must be C MODE 4 to support system level manual initia MODES 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy ir and secondary systems to result in containme overpressure. In MODES 5 and 6, there is als time for the operators to evaluate unit conditio respond, to mitigate the consequences of abn conditions by manually starting individual com	ainment ual initiation is atic actuation is available to event of a DBA. nponents simplified by s. Automatic DPERABLE in tion. In n the primary ent so adequate ons and ormal
c. <u>Containment Spray - Containment Pressure</u> This signal provides protection against a LOC inside containment. The transmitters (d/p cell outside of containment with the sensing line (H side of the transmitter) located inside containment transmitters and electronics are located outside containment. Thus, they will not experience a environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoin	s) are located nigh pressure nent. The le of ny adverse
steady state instrument uncertainties. This is one of the only Functions that requires output to energize to perform its required action desirable to have a loss of power actuate com- since the consequences of an inadvertent actor containment spray could be serious. Note that also has the inoperable channel placed in byp trip to decrease the probability of an inadvertee Four channels are used in a two-out-of-four lo	on. It is not tainment spray, uation of at this Function ass rather than ent actuation.
configuration. This configuration is called the Pressure-High 3 Setpoint.	
	(continued)
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.3-71	Revision 77

Comments / Reference: T	SB 3.3.2	Revision: 77
	ESFAS II	nstrumentation B 3.3.2
BASES		
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANAL	YSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)	
	Additional redundancy is warranted because th energize to trip. Containment Pressure-High 3 OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there energy in the primary and secondary sides to p containment following a pipe break. In MODES there is insufficient energy in the primary and se to pressurize the containment and reach the Co Pressure-High 3 setpoint.	must be is sufficient ressurize the 3 4, 5, and 6, condary sides
3.	Containment Isolation	
	Containment Isolation provides isolation of the contain atmosphere, and all process systems that penetrate co from the environment. This Function is necessary to p the release of radioactivity to the environment in the ev break LOCA.	ontainment, revent or limit
	There are two separate Containment Isolation signals, Phase B. Phase A isolation isolates all automatically is process lines, except component cooling water (CCW) coolant pumps, at a relatively low containment pressur primary or secondary system leaks. For these types of forced circulation cooling using the reactor coolant pum and SGs is the preferred (but not required) method of or removal. Since CCW is required to support RCP oper- isolating CCW on the low pressure Phase A signal enh safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS circulat unit. Isolating CCW on the low pressure signal may for feed and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficu	solable to the reactor e indicative of f events, nps (RCPs) decay heat ation, not nances unit ion to cool the rce the use of
	Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatical manually via the automatic actuation logic. All process penetrating containment, with the exception of CCW, a	lines
	CCW is not isolated at this time to permit continued op RCPs with cooling water flow to the thermal barrier hea motor air coolers, and upper and lower bearing coolers lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valve manually closed, or otherwise isolated, prior to reaching	t exchangers, . All process es are
	Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplishe two switches in the control room. Either switch actuate	
		(continued)
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 B 3.3-72	Revision 77

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 4	Tier			2
	Group			1
	K/A	022	.G.2.4	4.18
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			4.0

Containment Cooling: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

Question # 78

Given the following conditions:

- A LOCA has occurred inside Unit 1 Containment
- Containment pressure rose to 21.8 psig, resulting in a Containment Spray actuation
- Containment pressure has subsequently lowered to 9.4 psig and is continuing to lower slowly
- Due to multiple RHR malfunctions, entry has been made to ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
- All Containment Fan Coolers were stopped by the SI signal

Per ECA-1.1A, Containment Fan Coolers may	, WITHOUT consulting Plant Staff.
---	-----------------------------------

- A. be restarted, under the above conditions
- B. be restarted, once Containment pressure drops below 5 psig
- C. NOT be restarted, due to a lack of CCW flow to HVAC Chill Water
- D. NOT be restarted, due to potential water hammer damage to HVAC Chill Water

Answer: D	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the bases when non-safety containment cooling equipment can be started in the event of an accident.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible since CS is to be secured and it is desirable to restore some form of containment cooling and a step in the procedure directs restarting the coolers, but only if pressure has remained below 5 psig (without consulting plant staff).
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since CS is to be secured and pressure must be below 5 psig to operate the fan coolers and a step in the procedure directs restarting the coolers, but it must have remained below 5 psig for the duration of the event otherwise a Plant Staff evaluation is required prior to starting the coolers.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since CCW flow must be verified to the Chillers or they cannot be started, but there is no reason to think that CCW flow cannot be restored.
- D. Correct. With containment pressure above 5 psig, the cooling water for the containment coolers may be saturated and water hammer may occur in the system if chill water is restored. Plant Staff must be consulted to evaluate the effects of water hammer prior to restarting.

Technical Reference(s)	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps from ECA-1.1, **STATE** the purpose/basis for the step(s). (ERG.C11.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		



ments	s / Reference: ECA-1.1A			R	evision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES		UNIT 1		DURE NO. -1.1A
LOSS	OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION	I	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE	5 OF 83
TEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NO	T OBTAIN	ED
5	Reset SI Sequencers If Necessary.				
6	Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B	2			
7	Reset Containment Spray Signal				
8	Reset RHR Auto Switchover.				
9	Check If Containment Fan Coolers Should Be Started				
	a. Verify containment pressure -) (HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 5 PSIG.		Notify Plant Staf determine if Cont Coolers should be provide containme Go to Step 10.	ainment started	i to
	b. Ensure 1-ALB-3B Window 1.16 SEAL WTR HX CCW RET FLO LO - DARK.				
	c. Open VENT CHLR CCW SPLY & RET VLV:				
	• 1-HS-4650				
	d. Start HVAC Ventilation Chillers as necessary.				
	e. Open CH WTR SPLY & RET ISOL VLVS:				
	• 1-HS-6084				
	• 1-HS-6083				
	• 1-HS-6082				
	f. <mark>Start Containment Fan Coolers</mark>				
	g. Start CRDM Fans				
10	Check RWST Level - GREATER THAN RWST EMPTY	G	o to step 33.		

			Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-1.1A
LOSS O	F EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 59 OF 83
	ATTACHMENT 7 PAGE 5 OF 29		
	BASES		
	by using containment fan coolers when a NOT adverse (i.e., LOCA outside contain coolers and its associated ventilation qualified for post accident operation. inside containment can cause flashing/a water to containment should not be all consequently. the containment fan cool- these conditions. A check that contain than 5 psig ensures that the chilled we coolers cooling supply will not be und cooling water is realigned. If contain psig prior to reaching this step, the a supply may be under saturated condition to evaluate the potential for the cool: the subsequent waterhammer that may be realigned.	nment). The contain chilled water cool High temperature waterhammer to occur gned under these content ers should not be so ment pressure has ater inside the content er saturated condit ment pressure incre containment fan coot ns and the Plant St ing water flashing	nment fan ing are not conditions r and chilled nditions, and tarted under remained less tainment fan ions when eased above 5 lers cooling aff is notified to steam, and
	A check of the alarm for the Seal Water in the Non-Safeguards loop of the CCW a available to the HVAC Centrifugal Water not available, any indication of flow : sufficient to satisfy the substep. For the reset of the Containment isolar automatic logic requires a deliberate of "close" signal. No valve will reposit: but subsequent control actions will op remain closed, unless necessary process	system to ensure co r Chillers. If thi in the Non-Safeguar tion signals, this operator action to ion upon actuation en the valves. The	oling flow is s component is ds loop is part of the remove the of the resets. se valves should
	until the cause of the SI is determined The maximum CCW pump flow is 17,500 GPM CCW pump runs out during performance of loads will need to be isolated to preve	d or corrected. M to prevent pump r f this alignment, n	unout. If the on-essential CCW
<u>TEP 10</u> :	If the RWST is not empty, the operator which are concerned with minimizing the extending time that fluid for core cool. This is accomplished by stopping the co- decreasing the ECCS pumps flow rates. operator is instructed to skip to Step from the empty RWST.	e RWST outflow and. ling is providing b ontainment spray pu However. if the RW	therefore. y the RWST. mps and ST is empty. the

Examination Outline Cross-r	reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2		Tier		2
		Group		1
		K/A	063.A	2.02
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating		3.1
DC Electrical Distribution: Ability to (a) based on those predictions, use proceed ventilation during battery charging				
Question # 79				
Civen the following condit	iono			
Given the following condit				
 Battery Room Exha RO reports Battery not AUTO start and 	QUALIZE on 125 VDC B aust Fan 7 running with B Room Exhaust Fan 7 tri d will NOT manually start perature 81°F stable	Battery Room Exhaust ipped and Battery Roo	t Fan 8 in sta	
Which of the following cor	mpletes the statement be	elow?		
To ensure(1) is m (2)	aintained within limits, th	ne battery should be pl	laced in FLC	OAT per
A. (1) room temperatu (2) ALM-0112A, 2.4	ure 4, BATT RM EXH FN 8 A	AUTO START FAIL		
B. (1) room temperatu (2) ALM-0112A, 2.3	ire 3, BATT RM TRN A TEN	/IP HI/LO-LO		
C. (1) hydrogen conce (2) ALM-0112A, 2.4	entration 4, BATT RM EXH FN 8 A	AUTO START FAIL		
D. (1) hydrogen conce (2) ALM-0112A, 2.3	entration 3, BATT RM TRN A TEN	/IP HI/LO-LO		
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the concern of a loss of ventilation while charging a battery and the procedure and actions required to address this.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to requiring an assessment of plant conditions and then the selection of a section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed.


Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect, but plausible because there is a TRM limit for temperature and the exhaust fan draws air through the battery room, however, the reason for placing the battery on float is for hydrogen concentration. 2nd part is correct. The procedure that directs placing the battery on float is correct, ALM-0112A, 2.4.
- B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). 2nd part is plausible since room temperature would direct starting a second fan, but the correct procedure is ALM-0112A, 2.4.
- C. Correct. The battery should be placed in FLOAT to minimize the buildup of hydrogen gas. This is directed by ALM-0112A, Window 2.4, BATT RM EXH FN 8 AUTO START FAIL.
- A. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (see C). 2nd part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ALM-0112A, 2.4	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SOP-805A	Comments / Reference
	ALM-0112A, 2.3	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective:		bution system in ac SOP 605A 125 V BATTERIES ANI SOP 606A 24/48 DISTRIBUTION	cordance with proced /DC SWITCHGEAR A D BATTERY CHARGE V & 125/250 VDC SW SYSTEMS, BATTERII	ND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, ERS
	0)	SYSTEMS. (SYS		
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	50415	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam	2020 Retake (Prev	vious)
Question Cognitive I	Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Con	ntent:	55.41 55.435		



CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

	ALARM	CPNPP ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL					U	NIT 1		EDURE	
		LARM PROCED				RE	VIS	ION NO. 6	PAG	E 2 OF	155
			ALARM	1 DIAGE	RAM						
ŀ	1	2	3			4		5	6	6	ŧ
1	UPS & DISTR RM EXH FN 5 DMPR CLOSE	UPS & DISTR RM FN 5/6 START	ERF CMPTR BAT EXH FN DISCH PRES LO		EXI	TT RM H FN 7 MPR LOSE		BATT RM EXH FN 9 DMPR CLOSE	BATT EXH F DMI CLO	FN 11 PR	I
2	UPS & DISTR RM EXH FN 5 ΔP LO	UPS & DISTR RM FN 5/6 TRIP	BATT RM TRN A TEMP HI/LO-LO		EXI AUTO	TT RM H FN 8 D STAR FAIL	π	BATT RM EXH FN 10 AUTO START FAIL	BATT EXH F AUTO S FA	FN 12 START	
3	UPS & DISTR RM EXH FN 6 DMPR CLOSE	ANY BATT RM HTR TRIP	BATT RM TRN B TEMP HI/LO-LO		EXI	TT RM H FN 8 MPR LOSE		BATT RM EXH FN 10 DMPR CLOSE	BATT EXH F DM CLO	PR 12	
4	UPS & DISTR RM EXH FN 6 ΔP LO	ANY BATT RM EXH FN TRIP	BATT RM TRN C TEMP LO-LO		BA EXI AUTO	TT RM H FN 7) STAR	π	BATT RM EXH FN 9 AUTO START FAIL	BATT EXH F AUTO S FA	FRM FN 11 START	
Ŀ	7	8	9		10			11	12		ŧ
İ	SFGD BLDG	SFGD BLDG	SFGD BLDG					SFGD BLDG	ROD CTR	RL CAB	Ť
1	SWGR RM ANY FN CLR FN LOC CTRL	MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH DMPR CLOSE	ELEC AREA INTK FILT ΔP HI					& FW PIPE AREA INTK FILT ΔP HI	TEN		-
2	SFGD BLDG SWGR RM ANY FN CLR FN TRIP	SFGD BLDG MS & FW PIPE AREA HDR PRESS HI	SFGD BLDG ELEC AREA SPLY FN 15 ΔP LO	MS & FV SPL	BD BLDG V PIPE AF Y TEMP HI/LO	REA	SFGD BLDG MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 17 ΔP LO		SFGD E ANY EXH F TEM HI	PLENUM IP	
3	SFGD BLDG SWGR RM TRN A TEMP HI-HI	SFGD BLDG MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 3/4 TRIP	SFGD BLDG ELEC AREA SPLY FN 16 ΔP LO	ELE	D BLDG C AREA K DMPR LOSE		SFGD BLDG MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 18 ΔP LO		AN RHRP/SIP/A FN CLF TRI	AFWP RM R FN	
4	SFGD BLDG SWGR RM TRN B TEMP HI-HI	SFGD BLDG ELEC AREA EXH FN 1/2 TRIP	SFGD BLDG ELEC AREA SPLY FN 15/16 TRIP	SFG ELE SPL	D BLDG C AREA Y TEMP HI/LO		MS 8	SFGD BLDG & FW PIPE AREA PLY FN 17/18 TRIP	AN RHRP/SIP/A FN CLI LOC C	Y AFWP RM R FN	
	13	14	15		16			17	18		-
1	SIP 1 RM TEMP HI/LO	CSP 1 & 3 RM TEMP HI/LO	ANY CSP RM FN CLR FN LOC CTRL	APE	BLDG PA PROACHI MOS PRE	NG		ANY DG RM TEMP LO-LO	DG 1 RN TEMP HI	4	
2	SIP 2 RM TEMP HI/LO	CSP 2 & 4 RM TEMP HI/LO	ANY CSP RM FN CLR FN TRIP					O/A TEMP LO	DG 2 RM TEMP HI	٨	
3	RHRP 1 RM TEMP HI/LO	AFWP 1 RM TEMP HI/LO	HP CHEM FD RM 100 TEMP HI-HI		ANY DG RM FN ΔP LO			ANY DG RM FN TRIP	ANY DG RM FN LOC CTR		
•	RHRP 2 RM TEMP HI/LO	AFWP 2 RM TEMP HI/LO	HP CHEM FD RM 100 SPLY/EXH FN TRIP				VE	DG BLDG ENT CTRL SW MISALIGN	200 011		
Ĺ										<u>1</u>	

CPNPP ALARM PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 PROCEDURE 0. ALARM PROCEDURE ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-11B REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 51 OF 155 ANNUNCIATOR NOM.NO: BATTRM EXH FN 8 AUTO START FAIL 2.4 PROBABLE CAUSE Fan 1-08 NOT operating with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07 Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 NOT operating 2.4 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None NOTE: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: None 1. DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 NOT operating. • 1-16-55494, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, NOT in AUTO • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08. 3. DETERMINE cause of Iow ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-08 MIL 4. If Fan 1-08 will NOT start AND Fan 1-07 can be started, THEN START Fan 1-07. 5. If eventilation can NOT be restored, THEM START Fan 1-07. 6. CORRECT the condition <u>OR</u> INITIATE a condition report per STA-421.	nments / Reference: ALM-0112A, 2.4			Revision: 6	i
ALARM PROCEDURE ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-11B REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 51 OF 155 ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.: BATT RM EXH FN 8 AUTO START FAIL 2.4 PROBABLE CAUSE: Fan 1-08 NOT operating with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07 Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 NOT operating 2.4 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None None NOTE: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1 DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 NOT operating. • 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, NOT in AUTO • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) 2 2. If conditions permit, THEN START Fan 1-08. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) 3. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) 4 4. IF Fan 1-08 will NOT start <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 can be started, THEN START Fan 1-07. 5 5. IF eventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, THEN THEN START Fan 1-07.		UNIT 1]
ANNUNCLATOR NOM./NO.: BATT RM EXH FN 8 AUTO START FAIL 2.4 PROBABLE CAUSE: Fan 1-08 NOT operating with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07 Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 NOT operating AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None NOTE: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1 DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 NOT operating. • 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, NOT in AUTO • Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) 2. IE conditions permit, THEN THEN START Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) 4. IE Fan 1-08 will NOT start AND Fan 1-07 can be started, THEN START Fan 1-07. IE wentilation can NOT be restored, THEN START Fan 1-07. IE wentilation can NOT be restored, THEN START Fan 1-07.<	ALARM PROCEDURE	REVISION NO. 6			
PROBABLE CAUSE: Fan 1-08 NOT operating with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07 Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 NOT operating AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None NOTE: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 AND Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1 1. DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 NOT operating. • 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, NOT in AUTO • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-07 intel damper failed to open (Window 3.4) 2. If conditions permit, THEN START Fan 1-08. • DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 intel damper closed (Window 1.4) 4. If Fan 1-08 will NOT start AND Fan 1-07 can be started, THEN START Fan 1-07. • If ventilation can NOT be restored, THEN START Fan 1-07. 5. If eventilation can NOT be restored, THEN • SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries.					-
 Fan 1-08 <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 <u>NOT</u> operating <u>AUTOMATIC ACTIONS</u>: None <u>NOTE</u>: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. <u>OPERATOR ACTIONS</u>: DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 <u>NOT</u> operating. 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, <u>NOT</u> in AUTO Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) If conditions permit, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-08. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) If Fan 1-08 will <u>NOT</u> start <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 can be started, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. If ventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07.		S START FAIL		2.4	
 NOTE: Fan 1-08 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 <u>NOT</u> operating. 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, <u>NOT</u> in AUTO Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) IF conditions permit, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-08. DETERMINE cause of Iow ΔP on Fan 1-07. Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) IF conditions permit, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2)					
Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-08. Fan 1-08 <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 will trip if associated intake damper fails to open. OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 <u>NOT</u> operating. • 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, <u>NOT</u> in AUTO • Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) 2. IF conditions permit, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-08. 3. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) 4. IF Fan 1-08 will <u>NOT</u> start <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 can be started, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. 5. IF eventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. 5. IF eventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, <u>THEN</u> SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries.	AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None				
 DETERMINE cause of Fan 1-08 <u>NOT</u> operating. 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, <u>NOT</u> in AUTO Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-08 inlet damper failed to open (Window 3.4) IE conditions permit, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-08. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) IE Fan 1-08 will <u>NOT</u> start <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 can be started, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. IE ventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, <u>THEN</u> SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries. 	Fan 1-07 will auto start with a low ΔP on Fan 1-	-08.	open.		
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THEN START Fan 1-08. 3. DETERMINE cause of low ΔP on Fan 1-07. • Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) • Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) 4. IF Fan 1-08 will NOT start AND Fan 1-07 can be started, THEN START Fan 1-07. 5. IF ventilation can NOT be restored, THEN SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries.	 1-HS-5949, BATT RM A EXH FN 8 & EXH DMPR, Exhaust Fan 1-08 tripped (Window 4.2) 				
 Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) Exhaust Fan 1-07 inlet damper closed (Window 1.4) IF Fan 1-08 will <u>NOT</u> start <u>AND</u> Fan 1-07 can be started, <u>THEN</u> START Fan 1-07. IF ventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, <u>THEN</u> SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries. 	THEN				
THEN START Fan 1-07. 5. IE ventilation can <u>NOT</u> be restored, THEN SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries.	 Exhaust Fan 1-07 tripped (Window 4.2) 	4)			
THEN SECURE any equalizing charge in progress on Train A Batteries.	THEN	d,			
6. CORRECT the condition <u>OR</u> INITIATE a condition report per STA-421.	THEN	Batteries.			
	6. CORRECT the condition <u>OR</u> INITIATE a condition repo	ort per STA-421.		L	
					1

Comments / Reference: ALM-0112A, 2.3

Revision: 6

PROBABLE CAUSE: High Temperature Battery room cooling malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IE temperature is high, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: I 2. A. IE temperature is high, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: I 3. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. I NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window <u>3.2</u>) 3. IE temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	ALARM PROCEDURE 1-ALB-11B REVISION NO. 6 PAGE 49 OF 155 ANNUNCIATOR NOM/NO.: BATT RM TRN A TEMP HI/LO-LO 2.3 PROBABLE CAUSE:	CPNP ALARM PROCEDU		UNIT 1	PROCEDURE N ALM-0112A	10.
PROBABLE CAUSE: High Temperature Battery room cooling malfunction OR NOT in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction OR NOT in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high OR low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IF temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS AND Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 AND Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, THEN a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IF temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	PROBABLE CAUSE: High Temperature Battery room cooling malfunction OR NOT in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction OR NOT in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high OR low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IF temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS AND Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 AND Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, THEN a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IF temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.			REVISION NO. 6	PAGE 49 OF 1	55
High Temperature Battery room cooling malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None DPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IF temperature is high, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IF temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. A. EXPORT THE NONTOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. A. EXPORT the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	High Temperature Battery room cooling malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None DPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IF temperature is high, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IF temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. A. EXPORT THE NONTOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. A. EXPORT the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	ANNUNCIATOR NOM./NO.:	BATT RM TRN A TE	MP HI/LO-LO	2.3	
Battery room cooling malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: I. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. I. A. IE temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: E. NONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, THEN a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) I. I. E temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal.	Battery room cooling malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. A. IE temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) I. IE temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal.	PROBABLE CAUSE:				
Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. If temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. If temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	Low Temperature Battery room heater malfunction <u>OR NOT</u> in operation AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. If temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. If temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	High Temperature				
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AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: . 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. . NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. . 2. A. IE temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: . . 9. ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. . 8. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. . NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IE temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1. DISPATCH an operator to determine if temperature is high <u>OR</u> low. NOTE: The TR limit for UPS/Battery Rooms is 104 °F. 2. A. IF temperature is high, THEN PERFORM the following: • ENSURE UPS <u>AND</u> Distribution Room Cooling operating per SOP-803 <u>AND</u> Battery Room Ventilation operating per SOP-805A. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. NOTE: IF power is lost to the heater, <u>THEN</u> a heater trip alarm will not actuate. (Window 3.2) 3. IE temperature is low, THEN PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6.	Low Temperature				
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 3. <u>IE</u> temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6. 	 3. <u>IE</u> temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater control switch is in automatic. B. MONITOR room temperature to ensure it is returning to normal. 4. REFER to TS 3.8.6. 	NOTE: IF power is lost to		-	ite. (Window	
5 CORRECT the condition OR INITIATE a condition report per STA-421	5. CORRECT the condition <u>OR</u> INITIATE a condition report per STA-421.	3. <u>IF</u> temperature is low, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE heater con B. MONITOR room tem				
		5 CORRECT the condition	OR INITIATE a conditio	n report per STA-421		

nments	/ Referer	nce: SOP-805A		Revision: 11
SYSTE	M OPERA	CPNPP TING PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. SOP-805A
BAT	TERY RO	OM VENTILATION SYSTEM	REVISION NO. 11 CONTINUOUS USE	PAGE 3 OF 13
1.0	APPLIC	ABILITY		
	This pro System.	cedure describes the steps for opera	tion of the Battery Room	√entilation
2.0	PREREC	QUISITES		
2.1	Startup			
	2.1.1	Startup of the Battery Room Exhau	st Fans	
		The control switch lineup per S	Section 1.0 of Attachment	1 is complete.
		The electrical lineup per Section	on 1.0 of Attachment 2 is	complete.
		I&C has completed the instrum	nent lineup per INC-2100/	A. J
		The instrument air valve lineup	per Attachment 3 is com	plete.
	2.1.2	Startup of the Battery Charger Dist	ribution Panel Exhaust Fa	ins
		The control switch lineup per S	Section 2.0 of Attachment	1 is complete.
		The electrical lineup per Section	on 2.0 of Attachment 2 is	complete.
		I&C has completed the instrun	nent lineup per INC-2100/	A. J
		The instrument air valve lineur	per Attachment 3 is com	plete.
3.0	PRECAU	<u>UTIONS</u>		
	•	One exhaust fan shall be in service times to prevent excessive hydroge		
4.0	LIMITAT	IONS AND NOTES		
4.1	Limitatio	ns		
	•	Battery Room temperatures shall n TR 13.7.36.	ot exceed 104°F for more	e than 8 hours per
	•	Battery Room temperatures shall n TR 13.7.36.	ot exceed 113°F at any ti	me per
4.2	Notes			
	•	Battery Room Exhaust Fans 1-08 a The steps to align these fans to an SOP-613A.		
		SOP-613A.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier		2
	Group		1
	K/A	103./	A2.05
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating		3.9
Containment: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mathoes predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate containment entry			
Question # 80			
 Unit 1 is operating in Mode 1. A confirmed report of sabotage has INOPERABLE due to damaged hing The PAL OUTER door remains OPE No further sabotage has occurred The Security threat has ended An Emergency Containment Entry h 1) Per STA-620, CONTAINMENT ENTRY, completed PRIOR to EMERGENCY COMPLEX PRIOR to EMERGENCY COMPLEX PRIOR to EM	ges inside containment ERABLE as been approved to repair , which of the following is rec ntainment Entry?	the PAL INN quired to be	IER door
 Per Technical Specification Bases 3.6.2 method of Containment Entry to repair t 			
A. (1) RWP issuance(2) the PAL from the OUTER door			
B. (1) RWP issuance(2) through the EAL and access the	PAL from inside containmer	it	
C. (1) Containment briefing by Shift Ma	inager		

- (2) the PAL from the OUTER door
- D. (1) Containment briefing by Shift Manager(2) through the EAL and access the PAL from inside containment

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of procedures used for emergency containment entry requirements.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis, assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selection of a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed, as well as requiring knowledge of Tech Spec bases.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since STA-620 allows for the RWP to be completed after entry has occurred in a timely manner consistent with related emergency response activities. Second part is incorrect, but plausible as TS allows entry and exit of affected Airlock doors to perform repairs, however, an SRO must understand that TSB 3.6.2 Bases states this is not the preferred method to access the affected component.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A)
- D. Correct. First part is correct. STA-620 states that a Containment briefing should be held by the Shift Manager. Each RWO entering into Containment should ensure that all questions on the checklist have been reviewed and that all entry members understand their responsibilities. Second part is correct. TSB 3.6.2 explicitly states that it is preferred the air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering through another operable airlock door.

Technical Reference(s)	TS 3.6.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
	TSB 3.6.2	Comments / Reference
	STA-620	


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **APPLY** the administrative requirements of the Containment system including Technical Specifications, TRM and ODCM: 3) Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 (SYS.CY1.OB05)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	82582	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2018 NRC Exam C	289
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.435/2		







Comments / Reference: 2017 NRC Q89			Revision:
Examination Outline Cross-Reference 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) A2.05 Emergency containment entry	Level Tier # Group # K/A # Rating QREV	SRO 2 1 A2.05 3.9 6	
Question 89			
Unit 1 is operating in Mode 1.			
 A confirmed report of sabotage has occur INNER door INOPERABLE. The Personnel Air Lock OUTER door rer No further sabotage has occurred. The s An Emergency Containment Entry has b (1) Per STA-620, CONTAINMENT ENTRY, completed PRIOR to emergency contain (2) Per Technical Specification Bases 3.6.2, via the Personnel Air Lock outer door INNER door. 	nains OPERABLE. Security threat has e een approved which of the followin ment entry? Containment Air Lo	nded. g is required to be cks, Containment i	Entry
 A. (1) Containment briefing by Shift Manager (2) IS NOT permitted 			
B. (1) RWP issuance(2) IS permitted			
C. (1) Containment briefing by Shift Manager (2) IS permitted			
D. (1) RWP issuance (2) IS NOT permitted			
Answer: C			
Explanation:			

	Reference: 2017 NRC Q89	Revision:
NOTE:	During emergencies, an RWP need <u>NOT</u> be completed or issued prior to entry. The required paperwork is expected to be completed in a timely manner consistent with related emergency response activities.	
ACTIONS	The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perepairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoper then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. It is preferred that to lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering throug other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if rejeither door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not in	rable, he air gh the bairs on t is means
	(co	ntinued)
ACTIONS (co	ntinued)	
	(during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to open th OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is tem not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that co pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPER door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERAB must be immediately closed. If ALARA conditions permit, entry and should be via an OPERABLE air lock.	porarily ould ABLE LE door
is wrong beca e operable ou	use TSB 3.6.2 explicitly makes an allowance to enter an affected air loot ter door.	ck via
timely manne ow for the ou	use STA-620 allows for the RWP to be completed after entry has occur r consistent with related emergency response activities. TSB 3.6.2 doe ter door of the affected air lock to be briefly opened then closed if neces ffected inner door.	s
anager. Each lecklist have l lere is no NO	A-620 states that "A Containment briefing should be held by the Shift RWO entering into Containment should ensure that all questions on th been reviewed and that all entry members understand their responsibilit TE stating that this need not occur. Also, TSB 3.6.2 explicitly makes an ter an affected air lock via the operable outer door.	ies."
	ause STA-620 allows for the RWP to be completed after entry has occu r consistent with related emergency response activities.	rred in
	rences: ification Bases 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks TAINMENT ENTRY	
eferences to	be provided to applicants during exam: None.	
	ctive: APPLY the administrative requirements of the Containment	
arning Obje		

Comments / Reference: 2017	NRC Q89	Revision:	
system including Technical Specific (LO21.SYS.CY1.OB05)	ations, TRM and ODCM: 3) Contain	ment Air Locks 3.6.2	
Question Source: (note changes; attach parent)	Bank # Modified Bank # New	x	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	No	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis	3	
10CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43(b)(5) / (b)(2)		
Definitions:			
	nment to prevent actual or potential p r as requested by the Shift Manager		
	limited to Operator tours, inspection a , or initial entries to evaluate equipme		
4.12 Scheduled Entry - Entry into Concessary to support unit operations	ntainment for the purpose of conduc	ting routine tasks	
4.13 Unplanned Entry - Entry into Co POD/Outage schedule.	ntainment that has NOT been includ	led in the	

Comments / Referen	nce: TS 3.6.2		Revision: 150
			Containment Air Locks 3.6.2
3.6 CONTAINMENT	SYSTEM		
3.6.2 Containment A	Air Locks		
LCO 3.6.2	Two containment air I	ocks shall be OPERABLE.	
APPLICABILITY:	MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4	ı	
ACTIONS			
		repairs on the affected air lock cor	nponents.
	on entry is allowed for e		
		ed Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containr containment leakage rate.	nent," when air lock
COMANCHE PEAK	- UNITS 1 AND 2	3.6-2	Amendment No. 150
			<u>.</u>

Comments / Refe	erence: TS Bases 3.6.2	Revision: 74
	Containment A	Ir Locks B 3.6.2
BASES		
APPLICABLE SAFE	TY ANALYSES (continued)	
	containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment interna pressure P _a = 48.3 psig, following a DBA. This allowable leakage rate the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated v air locks.	e forms
	The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(II).	
LCO	Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure bound As part of the containment pressure boundary, the air lock safety fun related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DE Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essent the successful mitigation of such an event.	iction Is 3A.
	Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be com- OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and i lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air loo of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both do kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into o from containment.	the air both air ck door a gross to be provide bors are
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containmen locks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive m from containment. The requirements for the containment air locks du MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Penetrations."	nt air nateriai
ACTIONS	The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perepairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoper then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. It is preferred that the lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering throug other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if replicither door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not in	rable, he air gh the pairs on t is means
	(00	ntinued)
COMANCHE PEAK	- UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.6-6 Revis	ion 74

STATIO	CPNPP N ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDUR STA-62		
(CONTAINMENT ENTRY	REVISION NO. 15			
		INFORMATION USE	PAGE 26 0	XF 38	
3 <u>Emerge</u>	ency Containment Entry Requirements				
NOTE 1:	Personnel are not allowed to enter Con Integrated Leakage Rate Test (ILRT).	tainment when pressuri	zed for an		
IOTE 2:	Some NPRCS are too large to adequat Containment and Main Condenser She atmosphere is sampled near the entran should carry an instrument with them to which they are working, prior to beginni	lls). In these cases, afte ce and entry is made, p sample the atmospher	er the ersonnel		
6.3.1	A minimum of two people are required to should be a Radiation Protection Techni		e of which		
6.3.2	All personnel entering Containment shou clothing recommended by Radiation Proi self contained breathing apparatus if airt unknown or subject to change due to wo Nitrogen or other gas leaks are suspecte and analyzed for Class C Atmosphere as Respiratory Protection may <u>NOT</u> be requi operational type emergency (e.g., medic	tection. Personnel shou come concentration leve rsening plant conditions ed. <u>IF</u> Containment has s defined by STI-211.01 uired if entry is made for	Id also wear els are <u>OR IF</u> been sample , <u>THEN</u>	a	
6.3.3	A Containment briefing should be held by entering into Containment should ensure have been reviewed and that all entry me responsibilities.	that all questions on th	e checklist		
6.3.4	The Shift Manager shall approve all entr	les.			
6.3.5	IF the Containment PIG (1/2RE5502, 1/2 operable, the Shift Manager should notify Containment air samples in accordance	y Radiation Protection to	oobtain		
6.3.6	The Shift Manager should also notify Sec Containment through the Emergency Air		ency entry into		

nts / Refere	ence: STA-620		Revision: 15
STATIO	CPNPP N ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. STA-620
CONTAINMENT ENTRY		REVISION NO. 15	
		INFORMATION USE	PAGE 27 OF 38
NOTE:	During emergencies, an RWP need <u>NC</u> The required paperwork is expected consistent with related emergency resp	to be completed in a	
6.3.7	Containment entry should be documente should be filled out by Radiation Protect		. The RWP
6.3.8	A back-up team should be ready for Containment entry to provide assistance, If required.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier		2	
	Group		2	
	K/A	03	4.K4.03	
Level of Difficulty: 4	Importance Rating		3.3	
Fuel-Handling Equipment: Knowledge of design feature(s) and	nd/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:	Overload p	rotection	
Question # 81				
· · ·				
In accordance with TR LCO 13.9.33, Re	fueling Machine bases, the Refu	eling Ma	achine	
Auxiliary Monorail Hoist is used for(1)	and has a load indicator used	d to prev	ent lifting of	
loads in excess of(2)				
A. (1) latching, unlatching and move	ment of control rod drive shafts			
(2) 2800 pounds				
B. (1) lifting a fuel assembly with a c	ontrol rod inserted			
(2) 2800 pounds				
(=) 2000 poundo				
C. (1) latching, unlatching and move	ment of control rod drive shafts			
(2) 600 pounds				
D. (1) lifting a fuel assembly with a control rod inserted				
(2) 600 pounds				
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the overload protection associated with refueling cranes.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to being addressed by 10 CFR 55.43(b)(7), assessment of surveillance requirements for the refueling mode.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since the main hoist is used for lifting a fuel assembly with a control rod inserted. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since 2800 pounds is the overload limit for the main hoist.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. The auxiliary hoist is typically used for latching, unlatching and movement of control rod drive shafts. Second part is correct. 600 pounds is the cutoff limit for the auxiliary hoist.
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is correct (see C).

Technical Reference(s)	TR/TRB 13.9.33	Attached w/ Revision # See
	RFO-102	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given access to Technical Specifications and a refueling activity, **APPLY** the appropriate specification. (OPD1.G16.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundan	nental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension or	Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 7		

	Refueling Machine TR 13.9.33				
13.9 REFUELING (OPERATIO	DNS			
TR 13.9.33 Refuelir	ng Machin	9)			
TR LCO 13.9.33		eling machine main hoist and auxiliary mo ment of drive rods or fuel assemblies and			
		he refueling machine main hoist used for ssemblies having:	movement of	ffuel	
	1.	A minimum capacity of 2850 pound	ls, and		
	2	An overload cutoff limit less than or	equal to 280	0 pounds.	
		he auxiliary monorail hoist used for latchin ovement of control rod drive shafts havin		g and)	
	1.	A minimum capacity of 610 pounds	, and		
	2.	A load indicator which shall be used excess of 600 pounds.	l to prevent lif	ting loads in	
		- NOTE - volutions may require the use of hoists a o the auxiliary monorail hoist.	nd load indic	ators in	
APPLICABILITY:	_	ovement of fuel assemblies and/or latchin nt of control rod drive shafts within the rea		g or	
ACTIONS					
CONDITIC	N	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLET	TION TIME	
A. Requirements fo OPERABILITY n satisfied.		A.1 Suspend use of any inoperable hoist from operations involving the movement of fuel assemblies and/or latching, unlatching or movement of control rod drive shafts within the reactor vessel.	Immediately		
CPSES - UNITS 1 A	AND 2 - TR	M 13.9-3		Revision 77	

Comments / Reference: TRB 13.9.3	33	Revision: 77
	Dat	ioling Machine
	Reit	eling Machine TRB 13.9.33
B 13.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS		
TRB 13.9.33 Refueling Machine		
BASES		
hoist ensure that: (1) the main hoist w auxiliary monorail hoist will typically be drive shafts, (3) the main hoist has suf rods), (4) the auxiliary monorail hoist h control rod drive shafts, and (5) the con excessive lifting force in the event they	The refueling machine main hoist and auxiliar ill be used for movement of fuel assemblies used for latching, unlatching and movement ficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly (v as sufficient load capacity to latch, unlatch a re internals and reactor vessel are protected v are inadvertently engaged during lifting oper des for the use for additional hoists and load pent control rod drive shaft.	(2) the of control rod with control and move the I from erations. The
CPSES - UNITS 1 AND 2 - TRM	B 13.9-3	Revision 77

Commer	nts / Ref	erence: RFO-102			Revision: 13
	STA	CPNPP TION REFUELING MANUAL	UNIT COMMON	PRO	RFO-102
	F	REFUELING OPERATION	REVISION NO. 13	PA	GE 11 OF 95
			CONTINUOUS USE		
	4.1.5	Direct communications shall be maintaine personnel at the Refueling Station during The primary means of communications w the Intraplant Radio System will be the ba	CORE ALTERATION	S (TR 1	3.9.32).
	4.1.6	During movement of fuel assemblies and			
		control rod drive shafts within the reactor hoist and auxiliary hoist shall be used for	movement of drive roo		
		assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with	n (TR 13.9.33);		
		A. The refueling machine main hoist us movement of control rod drive shafts		ning and	1
		 A minimum capacity of 2850 po An overload cutoff limit less that 	ounds	nde	
		B. The auxiliary monorail hoist used for			rods
		(having:) (1) (A minimum capacity of 610 pou			
		 A load indicator which shall be excess of 600 pounds 	used to prevent the lifti	ng of lo	ads in
[C]	4.1.7	Loads in excess of 2150 pounds shall be assemblies in the storage pool (TR 13.9.	-	over fu	el I
	4.1.8	At least one Residual Heat Removal (RH operation when the water level above the feet (TS 3.9.5).			
		The basis for requiring one RHR loop ≥2 core from boiling in the event of a loss of determined that when upper internals are insufficient communication with the water heat removal by natural circulation if deca Core Performance/Safety Analysis). The cooling equipment (e.g., the other RHR to level to ensure redundant cooling capabil installed.	RHR cooling. Howeve installed in the reactor above the core for ad- ay heat is >7.6 MWth (refore, the availability of rain) is necessary above	r, it has r vesse equate as dete of additio ve this c	been I, there is decay rmined by onal Jecay heat
	4.1.9	Two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop: RHR loop shall be in operation when the Vessel Flange is less than 23 feet with in (TS 3.9.6).	water level above the t	op of th	ne Reactor
					-

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier			2
	Group			2
	K/A	05	6.A2.	04
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			2.8

Condensate: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of condensate pumps

Question # 82

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 80% power
- B Condensate Pump trips
- ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, entered
- During the runback:
 - MFP suction pressure lowers to 210 psig for 35 seconds and recovers to 350 psig and stable
 - 1-ALB-6D, window 2.7 ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO-LO LIMIT, alarms

Per ABN-302, the US should ensure __(1)__.

In accordance with TS 3.1.6, Control Bank Insertion Limits, rods must be restored above the rod insertion limit within __(2)__.

- A. (1) Main Feedwater Pump A has tripped(2) 2 hours
- B. (1) Main Feedwater Pump A has tripped(2) 4 hours
- C. (1) 1-PV-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV has opened(2) 2 hours
- D. (1) 1-PV-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV has opened(2) 4 hours

Answer: C

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the effect of a loss of a Condensate Pump will have on the condensate system.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring application of required actions (TS Section 3) and SRs (TS Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (TS Section 1) and 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5).

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because MFP A would have tripped if Feedwater pressure had lowered to 190 psig for 30 seconds. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since many more TS actions are 4 hour requirements than 2 hour requirements.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. When Feedwater pressure falls below 250 psig, ABN-302, Section 3.0, Step 2.b RNO requires the US to ensure PV-2286 is open. Second part is correct. Rods are to be restored above RIL within 2 hours.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-302	Attached w/ Revision # See
	TS 3.1.6	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Condensate Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drains System Malfunction. (ABN.302.OB02)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	41844	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 2/5		



Comments / Reference: Bank 41844	Revision:
248 41844	
 Unit 1 is operating at 90% power with Rod Control behavior of the automatic control circuity. B MFP trips The Reactor Operator begins inserting control ALB-06D, 2.7, ANY CONTROL ROD BANK / T-ave is approximately 8°F greater than T-reference. 	y ol rods in MANUAL AT LO-LO LIMIT, alarms
Which of the following actions is to be taken?	
A. Stop inserting rods and initiate eme	ergency boration
B. Continue inserting rods until Tave i	is within 1°F of Tref
C. Continue inserting rods until Tave i	is within 5°F of Tref
D. Stop inserting rods and start withd	rawing rods to restore SDM
Answer: C	
Answer Explanation A Plausible since rods are below the rod	
requiring further rod insertion, but this is a above the rod insertion limit within TS allo would allow rods to be withdrawn now to	tted times and emergency boration
B Plausible since it is desirable to have T control rods in this far will result in an ove	
C Correct - When driving rods manually f reduction, good technique would be a corr approximately 5 degrees high. This ensu (via steam dumps) while preventing an ov Guideline #3 ATT6)	ntinuous insertion until temperature is res a timely reduction in steam flow
D. Incorrect - Plausible as rods below the SDM but rods are not withdrawn to restor	

Comments / Reference: Bank 41844

Revision:

Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	3.00
System ID:	41844
User-Defined ID:	LORT
Cross Reference Number:	
Topic:	Unit 1 is operating at 90% power with Rod Control in MANUAL due to troubleshooting the automatic c
K/A:	054.AA2.10
Question Reference:	OPGD-03
SRO:	
Comments:	

Comments / Reference: ABN-302			Revision: 14
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MAI	NUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-302
FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, HEATER DRA SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	AIN	REVISION NO. 14	PAGE 13 OF 80
3.3 Operator Actions			
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
 b. Main Feedwater pump suction pressure - GREATER THAN 250 PS u-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRES u-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRES 	I <mark>G</mark> •	erform the following: Ensure <u>u</u> -HS-2286, I VLV - OPEN Verify both HDP - RU	
NOTE: Differential pressure between feedwater a Runback. The following computer points • U5002A FW-MS HDR DP • U5003A DELTA PROGRAM-ACT • P5446A FW STM FLOW SETPO	may aid the op TUAL DP INT		g a Turbine
C. Feedwater header pressure - MAINTAINED GREATER THAN MAI STEAM HEADER PRESSURE.	IN in	djust the Main Feed Pu dividual speed controlle lequate differential pres	er to maintain
d. Main Feedwater - ALIGNED	d. Er	nsure Main Feedwater	aligned
3 Verify SG water level - STABLE <u>OR</u> TRENDING TO NORMAL OPERATING RANGE.	a. M G ar b. <u>IF</u> av us bo	Irm the following: anually control feedwat enerator to maintain lev and 75%. Reactor Power is above vailable feed flow, <u>THEI</u> sing rod control, turbine pration until steam gene e maintained while cont ocedure.	vel between 60% ve the capability of <u>vertice power</u> control or erator levels can
s	ection 3.3		

ments / Reference: ABN-302			Revision: 14
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES N	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-302		
FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, HEATER D SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	RAIN	REVISION NO. 14	PAGE 14 OF 80
3.3 Operator Actions			
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
NOTE: Control Rod insertion should be allowed	ed to continue ev	ven if AL is outside the b	and Continued
rod insertion is required to return Tave reduced.			
4 Verify Tave - TRENDING TO TREF.	Perf	orm the following:	
• <u>u</u> -TI-412A, AVE TAVE - TREF D)EV a. E	insure rods stepping in.	
		Operate steam dumps to lant conditions.	maintain stable
CAUTION: Reactor power must be establishe Auxiliary feedwater pumps can sup			able feedwater.
5 Stabilize Reactor using one or more of following:	fthe		
Control rods			
Steam dumps			
Boration			
Turbine Load			
6 Verify SG FW FLO CTRL Valves - AU		e SG FW FLO CTRL Va	
<u>u</u> -FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL		or monitor steam generat per response of control v	
• <u>u</u> -FK-520, SG 2 FW FLO CTRL			
• <u>u</u> -FK-530, SG 3 FW FLO CTRL			
• u-FK-540, SG 4 FW FLO CTRL			
	Section 3.3		

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

ments / Reference: ABN-302				Revision: 14
CPNPP			PR	DCEDURE NO.
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2				ABN-302
FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 14	PA	GE 15 OF 80
3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OBT/	AINED	
7 (Verify the following:) a. (Rods - ABOVE ROD INSERTION) LIMIT	SI	erify SDM or initiate bor DM within 1 hour and <mark>re</mark> sertion limits within 2 he	estore Ro	ods above
 NOTE: The PPC plot for AFD Limits utilizes NIS significantly following large transient condition of actual reactor power to evaluate the second	itions. For	the step below consid		
b. ΔFlux - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS	wi m	orate as necessary to re thin limits or reduce po inutes while continuing ocedure. Refer to TS 3	wer with with this	in 30
8 WHEN steam dumps have closed, <u>THEN</u> reset steam dump arming signal (C-7 interlock)				
 43/<u>u</u>-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT 				
9 Verify <u>u</u> -HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV - CLOSED.		rm Section 7.0 of this p nuing this section.	procedure	e while
10 Notify QSE Generation Controller and update GAPS to "Create Current Condition" for the down power.				
11 Initiate equipment repairs per STA-606.				
12 Check Chemistry Sampling Requirement:				
a. SG ARVS - REMAINED CLOSED		otify Chemistry that a re		
AND		curred and for Chemis release permit is requir		
TDAFW Pump - REMAINED STOPPED				
C] b. Verify Reactor Power change - LESS THAN 15% RTP WITHIN ONE HOUR.	ar	otify Chemistry to perfo nalysis for iodine betwe ter power change.		
Section	on 3.3			

Comments / Reference: TS 3.1.6			Revision: 156				
	Control Bank Insertion Limits 3.1.6						
3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL S	YSTEMS						
3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Li	mits						
	anks shall be within the Insertion, sequence In the COLR.	e, and overla	ap limits				
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODE 2	with k _{eff} ≥ 1.0.						
This LCC) is not applicable while performing SR 3.1.4	4.2.					
ACTIONS	1						
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLE	TION TIME				
A. Control bank insertion limits not met.	A.1.1 Verify SDM to be within the limits provided in the COLR.	1 hour					
	OR A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.	1 hour					
	AND						
	A.2 Restore control bank(s) to within limits.	2 hours					
	•						
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.1-13	Amendment	t No. 150, 156				

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO			
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier		2			
	Group		2			
	K/A	086.G.	.2.1.20			
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating		4.6			
Fire Protection: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.						
Question # 83						
Given the following conditions:						
 Due to a fire, the Shift Manager has directed the Control Room evacuated A Unit 1 Natural Circulation cooldown is to be performed The cooldown should be performed using(1) per the guidance contained in(2) A. (1) Steam Dumps (2) ABN-803A, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room 						
B. (1) Steam Dumps(2) EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation Cooldo	wn					
 C. (1) SG ARVs (2) ABN-803A, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room D. (1) SG ARVs 						
(2) EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation Cooldown						
Answer: C						

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the content of procedures related to fires in the Control Room or cable spreading room.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) analysis involves both (1) assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then (2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed. One area of SRO-level knowledge (with respect to selecting a procedure) is knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since a cooldown via the steam dumps is normally preferred over using the ARVs. Second part is correct. ABN-803A contains a note that once the decision to evacuate the control room is made, ERGs are no longer applicable.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible because if control room evacuation was not performed, the natural circulation cooldown would be performed per the guidance of EOS-0.2A.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. Any plant cooldown performed from outside the control room is performed using the SG ARVs. Second part is correct (see A).


D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-803A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to a Fire in the Electrical or Control Building in accordance with ABN-803A, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room . (ABN.803.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	Х
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.435		



Form ES-401-5

	eference: ABN-803A		Revision: 16
BNORMAL	CPNPP CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-803A
	ESPONSE TO A FIRE IN THE ROOM OR CABLE SPREADING ROOM	REVISION NO. 16	PAGE 6 OF 68
2.3 <u>Op</u>	perator Actions	•	
CAUTION:	 Use of this procedure may result in abn review of steps performed is necessary and restoration. 		
	The Control Room should be evacuated	d for any of the following	ng conditions:
	 SCBAs should not to be used to st an evacuation should be performed 		needed, then
	 Fire induced failure of any of the for CVCS, CCW, SSW or electrical (A 		ns. AFW,
	 Fire induced component/system fa inventory control, RCS inventory of BAT 		
	(See Attachment 18 for additional i	information, as time al	lows)
•	should not be used for Reactor Trip Response A fire in this area will require simultaneous so In this event Unit 1 will control manipulation of both units unless otherwise directed by the S Evaluate the necessity of donning SCBAs, if Control Room. The symbol [R] has been located throughout potential radiation hazards are <u>positively</u> ider should not preclude the worker from followin throughout this procedure to ensure his/her of maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievate Three two-way radios are maintained at the performance of this procedure. This procedure is written assuming minimum should additional personnel be available, con supporting timely completion of Attachments down secondary plant equipment when cond referred to for general guidance on securing	hutdown of both Unit 1 of system(s)/equipmer Shift Manager. I not already worn, prio t this procedure where ntified. This identificati g good radiation work occupational exposure ole (ALARA). Remote Shutdown Pa n staffing requirements nsideration should be (s 2, 3, and 4 followed b ditions permit. IPO-009	nt common to r to leaving real or on technique practices is nel for s. However, given to by shutting
1. RE	FER to appropriate Fire Preplan Instruction.		
	Section 2.3		

Form ES-401-5

nents / Reference: ABN-8	03A		Revision: 16
CPNPP BNORMAL CONDITIONS PROC	EDURES MANUAL	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ABN-803A
RESPONSE TO A FIRI CONTROL ROOM OR CABLE S		REVISION NO. 16	PAGE 12 OF 68
2.3 Operator Actions			
 SI Actuation will of Low Main Stea 	ng conditions exist <u>AND</u> ccur if EITHER of the fol m Line pressure at 605 er pressure at 1820 psig	lowing occurs:	reset, <u>THEN</u>
NOTE: The RSP controllers fo differently than Control valve response.	r Steam Generator Atmo Room controllers. An O	ospheric Relief valves n perator may be sent to	nay operate verify relief
 16. a. (THROTTLE the S cooldown rate in the standard strength of the standard strength of the strenge strength of the strength of the strength of the strength of	SG 1 PRESS SG 1 ATMOS RLF VL SG 2 PRESS	VCTRL	stablish 25°F/hr
NOTE: Steam tables may be u	sed to determine SG pr	essures based on loop	temperatures.
THEN	s 400 psig above other s eam by manually openir		erator Atmospheric
 1-HC-2325, 	SG 1 ATMOS RLF VL	V CTRL	
 1-HC-2326, 	SG 2 ATMOS RLF VL	VCTRL	
 1-HC-2327, 	SG 3 ATMOS RLF VL	VCTRL	
• FFIG-2320,	SG 4 ATMOS RLF VL	, one	
	Section 2.3		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier			1
	Group			1
	K/A	000007.EA2.04		2.04
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			4.6

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip: If reactor should have tripped but has not done so, manually trip the reactor and carry out actions in ATWS EOP

Question # 84

Given the following conditions:

- An ATWT event occurred on Unit 1
- FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, in progress and the Reactor still NOT tripped
- Boration CANNOT be initiated because of blockage in the Boration flowpaths
- All Power Range Channels indicate 6%
- Startup rate is zero on BOTH Intermediate Range Channels
- Average CET temperature 580°F slowly lowering

Which of the following describes the operator actions under these conditions and the reason for taking these actions?

- A. Exit FRS-0.1A because the zero startup rate on the Intermediate Range channels indicate actions taken in FRS-0.1A have been successful.
- B. Remain in FRS-0.1A, and allow the RCS to heat up, adding negative reactivity, while continuing efforts to establish Emergency Boration.
- C. Exit FRS-0.1A because the lowering CET temperatures indicate actions taken in FRS-0.1A have been successful.
- D. Remain in FRS-0.1A, and lower RCS temperature, establishing DNBR margin, while continuing efforts to establish Emergency Boration.

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the actions taken in response to an ATWT condition.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose and knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible since a zero startup rate would not meet the entry conditions for FRS-0.1A if power ranges were below 5% so it could be considered that exit conditions are met.
- B. Correct. Exit conditions have not been met in FRS-0.1A, as power range is still above 5%. While attempting establish boration, the RCS is allowed to heat up to add negative reactivity.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since a there is a transition from FRS-0.1 based on CET temperatures, though it is to SAMGs on high temperature.
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible as conditions to exit FRS have not been met. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since it is a true statement but has no bearing on the performance of FRS-0.1A.

Technical Reference(s)	FRS-0.1A	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRS-0.1A/B, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWT in accordance with FRS-0.1. (ERG.FS1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	33641	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC20 (Original Mo	dified)
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension of	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		



-

Comment	s / Re	ferenc	e: Bank 33641	Revision:		
	An An	ticipate	conditions: ed Transient Without Trip (ATWT) event is in progress o esponse to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT is in prog			
:	React Borati All Po Startu	or is st on CAI wer Ra p rate i	ill NOT tripped. NNOT be initiated because of blockage in the Boration f ange Channels indicate 6%. is zero on both Intermediate Range Channels. e Exit Thermocouple temperature is 580°F and slowly k	lowpaths.		
Which	of the	followi	ng describes:			
1)	The o	perator	r actions under these conditions; and,			
2)	The re	eason f	or taking these actions?			
	A.	1) 2)	Transition to FRS-0.2A, Response to Loss of Core Shi Step 1, Verify Containment Pressure Less Than 5 PSI It is now the procedure and step in effect			
	B.	1) 2)	Remain in FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT, and allow RCS temperature to lower while continuing efforts to establish Emergency Boration. A lower temperature will maintain an appropriate DNBR margin.			
	C.	1) 2)	Transition to FRS-0.2A, Response to Loss of Core Sh This is required by the Critical Safety Function SUBCR Status Tree based on the current YELLOW path condi	RITICALITY		
	D.	1) 2)	Remain in FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Ger ATWT, and allow the RCS to heat up while continuing establish emergency boration. The heatup will insert negative reactivity.			
	Answ		D			

omments / Reference: Ban	k 33641	Revision:
	iew of the SUBCRITICALITY Status Tree oossible transition, however, exit conditions t.	
	ocedure entry is correct, however, actions i eat up and add negative reactivity.	nclude
	iew of the SUBCRITICALITY Status Tree e current CSFST condition, however, exit c in met.	
D. Remaining in FRS-0.1 reactivity.	and allowing the plant to heat up will inse	rt negative
Question 200 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	0	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	33641	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT7280	
Cross Reference Number:	ERG.FS1.OB02.001	
	Civen the following conditions: An Antio	insted
Topic:	Given the following conditions: An Antic Transient Without Trip (ATWT) event is i	
K/A:	EPE.029.EK3.12	ii piogress
Question Reference:	LT E.023.EN3.12	
SRO:	Yes	
Comments:	R/S18E17; LC17 Audit; LC18 NRC; LC1 R/S20E16; R/S20E18 (Comp); R/S21E1 NRC; SD29.SC3.EE1 (2013 SRO Cert); R/S23E25; R/S24E25	6; LC20
	REF: FRS-0.1A, CSFST	
	IDEE EDS II IN I SEST	

ents / Reference: FRS-0.1A		Revision: 9
CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. FRS-0.1A
SPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 10 OF 33
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE N	OT OBTAINED
 7 Verify Reactor Subcritical: a. Power range indication - LESS THAN 5% b. Intermediate range channels - NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE 8 Check if RCPs Should be stopped: a. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) b. ECCS pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING b. CCP -OR- 	-	ate.) (<u>IF</u> ailable, <u>THEN</u>) at up.) of other FRGs do not erwise add <i>r</i> ity to the
 SI pump Stop all RCPs and proceed to Step 19. RCP operating parameters - WITHIN LIMITS UTION: Boration should continue to margin during subsequent action Return To Procedure And Step In Effect. -EN 	o obtain adequate shuto ctions.	

Form ES-401-5

CENPT UNIT 1 PROCEDURE NO. FRS-0.1A RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 25 OF 33 ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 20 OF 17 BASE STEP 16: If the operator enters this step and core exit TC temperatures are greater than 1200°F and indicates that all attempts to restore core colling have failed and core damage cannot be prevented. STEP 16: If the operator enters this step and core exit TC temperatures are less than 1200°F or core exit TC temperatures are greater than 1200°F and indicates that all attempts to take the loop between Steps 4 and 17 to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity. STEP 17: If the operator enters this step and core exit TC temperatures are less than 1200°F or core exit TC temperatures are greater than 1200°F and continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity. STEP 17: If the operator will stay in the loop between Steps 4 and 17 to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity addition to the RCS have been performed. Futuremore, the boration initiated in Step 4 may already have had some effect in returning the core to a subcritical condition. Hence, a check no subcritical will be source and prove marked autoritical with the associate the boration for subcriticality is startistic, the there to a subcritical to degree of subcriticality is startistic, the there the RCS and the boratom is available from either post content continue will be allowed to hear on temperatures. More the bowe condincon fo	nments / Reference: FRS-0.1A			Revision: 9
EMERCENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES UNIT 1 FRS-0.1A RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR FOWER CENERATION/ATWT REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 25 OF 33 ATTACEMENT 3 PAGE 9 OF 17 BASES STEP 16: If the operator entrish is step and core exit TC temperatures are greater than 1200°F and increasing, the operator should transition to SAC-1.0. This condition indicates that all attempts to restore core cooling have failed and core damage cannot be prevented. If the operator enters this step and core exit TC temperatures are less than 1200°F or core exit TC temperatures are greater than 1200°F and decreasing the operator will stay in the loop between Steps 4 and 17 to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity. Step 10: By this time all attempts to identify and isolate the most obvious sources of positive reactivity addition to the RCS have been performed. Ffeet in returning the core to a subcritical condition. Hence, a check on subcriticality is in order. This step specifies two conditions which there the sectorized to verify that the reactor is indeed subcritical for the sectorized to verify that the reactor is indeed subcritical for the sectorized to verify that the reactor is indeed subcritical for the sectorized to verify that the isocondities which have simptive intermediate mage startup rate is acceptable. If mether of the Bove conditions for subcriticality is specified and therefore, any negative startup rate is acceptable. If mether of the ROS should be allowed to heat up in order fow the suberefore				
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<pre>operator is directed to continue the boration. If boration is not available, then the RGS should be allowed to heat up in order for the negative reactivity feedback mechanisms (moderator temperature coefficient and Doppler effect) to take effect in reducing nuclear power. Notice that Power Range indication is available from either post accident qualified instrumentation and the normal instrument which is not post accident qualified. If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 5 psig, then all normal excore indications are no longer qualified and the Neutron Flux Wide Range instruments should be used. In addition, actions of other Function Restoration Guidelines in effect can be performed at this time (even though the Subcriticality Status Tree may still indicate a RED or ORANGE priority) as long as they do not cool down or otherwise add positive reactivity to the core. The operator is then returned to Step 4 of FRS-0.1A to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity.</pre>	sources of positive reactivity addit Furthermore, the boration initiated effect in returning the core to a su on subcriticality is in order. This must both be satisfied to verify tha Power range indication below 5% ensu heat sinks is just the decay heat le flow. The negative intermediate ran is subcritical. Notice that no degr	ion to the RCS in Step 4 may bcritical cond step specifie t the reactor res that the h wel normally a ge startup ration	have been already have ition. Ho s two con- is indeed eat load commodate e ensures cality is	n performed. ave had some ence, a check ditions which subcritical. to available ed with AFW the reactor
qualified instrumentation and the normal instrument which is not post accident qualified. If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 5 psig, then all normal excore indications are no longer qualified and the Neutron Flux Wide Range instruments should be used. In addition, actions of other Function Restoration Guidelines in effect can be performed at this time (even though the Subcriticality Status Tree may still indicate a RED or ORANGE priority) as long as they do not cool down or otherwise add positive reactivity to the core. The operator is then returned to Step 4 of FRS-0.1A to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity. Other FRGs in effect can mean previous FRGs in effect or lower priority	operator is directed to continue the available, then the RCS should be al negative reactivity feedback mechani	boration. If lowed to heat sms (moderator	boration up in ord temperat	is not er for the ure
can be performed at this time (even though the Subcriticality Status Tree may still indicate a RED or ORANGE priority) as long as they do not cool down or otherwise add positive reactivity to the core. The operator is then returned to Step 4 of FRS-0.1A to continue efforts to emergency borate the RCS and check for sources of positive reactivity. Other FRGs in effect can mean previous FRGs in effect or lower priority	qualified instrumentation and the no accident qualified. If Containment 5 psig, then all normal excore indic	rmal instrument pressure is greations are no	t which is eater than longer qua	s not post n or equal to
	can be performed at this time (even may still indicate a RED or ORANGE p down or otherwise add positive react then returned to Step 4 of FRS-0.1A	though the Sub- riority) as loc ivity to the co to continue eff	criticali ng as the ore. The forts to e	ty Status Tree y do not cool operator is emergency

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier			1
	Group			1
	K/A	000008.G.2.4.21		2.4.21
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating			4.6

Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

Question #85

Given the following on Unit 1:

- A Reactor Trip and SI have occurred
- EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, in progress
- Attachment 2 of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection complete
- All RCPs have been stopped
- RVLIS All lights are DARK
- CNTMT PRESS (IR) indicating 6.5 psig stable
- PRZR LVL indicating > 100%
- RCS HL PRESS (WR) indicating 1400 psig stable
- CORE EXIT TEMP indicating 765°F rising
- RCS HL TEMP (WR) indicating 685 °F rising

A(an) (1) break has occurred.

A transition to (1) is required.

- A. (1) RCS cold leg
 - (2) FRC-0.2A, Response to Degraded Core Cooling
- B. (1) RCS cold leg

С

- (2) FRC-0.1A, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling
- C. (1) PRZR steam space(2) FRC-0.2A, Response to Degraded Core Cooling
- D. (1) PRZR steam space(2) FRC-0.1A, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the parameters used to determine the conditions of the RCS following a PRZR steam space break.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since all indication other than PRZR level support indication of a cold leg break on the RCS. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since an ORANGE path condition exists and for all CSFSTs except FRC, a RED and an ORANGE path condition direct entry into the highest FRG associated with the function.
- C. Correct. First part is correct, with RVLIS dark and PRZR level full, this indicates a steam space break. Second part is correct, with RCS less than 1200°F, superheated, No RVLIS indication, and temp >750°F, FRC-0.2 entry conditions have been met.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).


Technical Reference(s)	FRC-0.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis LP	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EXPLAIN** the operational implications associated with all cautions, notes and actions of the "Response to Inadequate Core Cooling" procedure in accordance with FRC-0.1 (ERG.FC1.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	18479	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.435		





1MCOTAA NOTES	Page 16 of 28 LESSON PLAN
NOTES	LESSON PLAN
NOTES	LESSON OUTLINE
	LESSON OUTLINE
	b. Single PORV or safety valve fails.
	 Analysis assumptions minimize the DNBR.
	 FSAR analysis bounded by small break LOCA analysis.
	One safety valve stuck open.
	a. RCS depressurizes throughout transient.
	 Pressurizer fills as the hot legs and core reach saturation and flash.
	 Core mixture level reaches top of the hot leg.
	 Due to mass flow into the pressurizer, steam generator cold side mixture level drains.
	e. Loop seal and downcomer remain full.
	 RCS inventory is stabilized as safety injection flow matches the break flow.
	g. Core remains covered.
	3. Conclusions
	 Vapor space breaks are not limiting breaks.
	 No core uncovery.
oortant)	c. *Pressurizer level is not a valid indication of core
	inventory.
	FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Rev. 00.0000

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier			1
	Group			1
	K/A	0000	22.AA	2.02
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			3.7

Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Charging pump problems

Question #86

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 100% power
- CCP 1-01 in service
- VCT level 50%
- 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO 130 gpm stable
- 1-FI-132, LTDN FLO 120 gpm stable
- 1/1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV spuriously closes
- The following alarms are received;
 - 1-ALB-6A, Window 1.4 REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP HI
 - 1-ALB-6A, Window 3.4 CHRG FLO HI/LO

What action must be taken and the procedure used?

- A. Stop CCP 1-01 and then isolate letdown per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.
- B. Stop CCP 1-01 and then isolate letdown per ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
- C. Isolate letdown and then stop CCP 1-01 per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.
- D. Isolate letdown and then stop CCP 1-01 per ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunctions.

Answer:

В

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring diagnostic of charging problems and required actions.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selection of a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the actions stated are correct, however, ABN-105 is the correct procedure to use.
- B. Correct. This is a symptom of pump cavitation due to suction valve being closed. The RNO actions of ABN-105 direct the operator to stop the CCP and isolate Letdown.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because actions stated are correct, however, they must be performed in the opposite order in accordance with ABN-105.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because actions stated are correct, however, they must be performed in the opposite order.

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-105	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **EVALUATE** plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrumentation while responding to a Chemical and Volume Control System malfunction.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	2103 NRC Q77	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	2013 NRC	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		



Comments / Reference: ABN-105			Revision: 8	
CDNDD			PROCEDURE NO.	
	CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 AND 2			
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTE MALFUNCTION	EM	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 27 OF 40	
7.3 Operator Actions				
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	F	RESPONSE NOT OB	TAINED	
<u>CAUTION</u> : Operating a CCP with symptoms pump failure.	of cavitation	on or gas binding ma	y cause rapid	
1 VERIFY VCT conditions - NORMAL a. VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLVs - OPEN: • (1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-112B)	1) E	FORM the following: ENSURE <u>ALL</u> chargir STOPPED.		
● 1/ <u>u</u> -LCV-112C	[C] 3) (<mark>ENSURE letdown iso</mark> DPEN <u>BOTH</u> VCT TO SUCT VLVs.		
		<u>F</u> either valve does <u>N</u> <u>OPEN,</u> <u>AND</u> charging pump is nee mmediately, <u>FHEN</u> PERFORM the follow	ded	
	,	 <u>OPEN</u> RWST TO SUCT VLVs: 1/<u>u</u>-LCV-112D 1/<u>u</u>-LCV-112E 		
	E	3) <u>CLOSE</u> 1/<u>u</u>-LCV- 1/<u>u</u>-LCV-112C	112B <u>AND</u>	
	(C) VERIFY <u>u</u> -ZL-822 <u>u</u> -ZL-8221, CHRG POINT VENT VLV	PMP SUCT HI	
	[D) ENSURE 1/ <u>u</u> -820 1/ <u>u</u> -8202B, VNT \		
		<u>WHEN</u> charging pum aligned, <u>CHEN</u> START a centrifugal (per SOP-103A/B.		
"Step continue	ed next pag	je"		
Section 7.3				

Rev. Date: Rev. 2 Tier					
	1				
Group	1				
K/A 00005	7.G.2.2.42				
Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating	4.6				
Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Spec	ifications.				
Question # 87					
Given the following conditions:					
Unit 2 at 800 MWe					
Loss of 118 VAC Instrument Distribution Inverter IV2EC1 occurs					
 ABN-603, Loss of Protection or Instrument Bus, in progress 					
Per ABN-603, the Unit Supervisor INITIALLY directs energizing 2EC1 by aligning	(1) to				
supply 2EC1.	(1) to				
Per TS 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, the above action is required to be	completed				
within a MAXIMUM of(2)					
A. (1) 120 VAC Bypass Distribution Panel 2EC3					
(2) 2 hours					
B. (1) 120 VAC Bypass Distribution Panel 2EC3					
(2) 8 hours					
(_) • · · • • •					
C. (1) TRN A 118 VAC RPS/SFGD BOP Installed Spare Inverter IV2EC1/3					
(2) 2 hours					
D. (1) TRN A 118 VAC RPS/SFGD BOP Installed Spare Inverter IV2EC1/3					
(2) 8 hours					
Answer: A					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of abnormal condition procedures which contain the guidance for restoring power to a Vital AC Instrument Bus and the associated Technical Specification.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring application of required actions (TS Section 3) and SRs (TS Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (TS Section 1).

Explanation:

- A. Correct. First part is correct. In accordance with ABN-603, the US will direct an operator in the field to energize 2EC1 via its alternate power supply, 2EC3, by sliding the manual transfer switch to the alternate position at the bottom of the instrument panel. Second part is correct. In accordance with TS 3.8.9, Condition 'B', the AC Vital bus subsystem will be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours. Per TS 3.8.9 Bases re-energizing Instrument Panel 2EC1 via its alternate power supply will restore it to OPERABLE status.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible as TS 3.8.9 Condition 'A' requires an AC electrical power distribution subsystem to be restored within 8 hours. Condition 'A' applies to 6900V and 480V distribution subsystems and is commonly confused with Condition 'B'.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since the next step of ABN 603 is to initiate actions to place the swing inverter, IV2EC1/3, in service. However, this must be performed per SOP-607B and will take some time to perform. Per TS 3.8.9 Bases re-energizing Instrument Panel 2EC1 via the swing inverter will also restore it to OPERABLE status. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ABN-603	Attached w/ Revision # See
	TS/TSB 3.8.9	Comments / Reference
	208/120 VAC, 118 VAC., Inv. & Lighting LP	


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **ANALYZE** the response to Loss of a Protection Bus in accordance with ABN-603, Loss of Protection or Instrument Bus. (ABN.603.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75858	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC24	
Question Cognitive	Memory or Fundar	nental Knowledge	
Level.	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41		

Page 37 of 66 CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 81-90 Rev. 5

55.43 2



Comments	s / Reference: Bank 75858	Revision:
 Loss of 	at 800 MWe i 118 VAC Instrument Distribution Panel 2EC1 occurs 03, Loss of Protection or Instrument Bus in progress	
Per ABN-6	03 the Unit Supervisor first directs energizing 2EC1 by aligning to supply 2EC1.	
	ical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, the above a be completed within a MAXIMUM of hours.	ction is
A.	120 VAC Bypass Distribution Panel 2EC3 2	
В.	120 VAC Bypass Distribution Panel 2EC3 8	
C.	TRN A 118 VAC RPS/SFGD BOP Installed Spare Inverter IV2EC 2	1/3
D.	TRN A 118 VAC RPS/SFGD BOP Installed Spare Inverter IV2EC 8	1/3
Ans	swer: A	
An	swer Explanation	
ar 26 th TS O In	orrect. Part 1 is correct in accordance with ABN-603 the US will n operator in the field to energize 2EC1 via its alternate power s EC3, by sliding the manual transfer switch to the alternate posit e bottom of the instrument panel. Part 2 is correct in accordan S 3.8.9 Condition 'B' the AC Vital bus subsystem will be restore PERABLE status within 2 hours. Per TS 3.8.9 Bases re-energiz strument Panel 2EC1 via its alternate power supply will restore PERABLE status.	supply, ion at ce with d to zing
bu di to	correct. Part 1 is correct as described in 'A' above. Part 2 is inductive at plausible as TS 3.8.9 Condition 'A' requires an AC electrical particular stribution subsystem to be restored within 8 hours. Condition 'A 6900V and 480V distribution subsystems and is commonly con th Condition 'B'.	oower \'applies
to He to th	correct. Part 1 is incorrect but plausible as the next step of ABN initiate actions to place the swing inverter, IV2EC1/3, in service owever, this must be performed per SOP-607B and will take so perform. Per TS 3.8.9 Bases re-energizing Instrument Panel 2 e swing inverter will also restore it to OPERABLE status. Part 2 prrect as described in 'A' above.	e. ome time 2EC1 via
	correct. Part 1 is incorrect but plausible as described in 'C' abo is incorrect but plausible as described in 'B' above.	ve. Part

Comments / Reference: Ban	k 75858	Revision:
Question 84 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	3.00	
System ID:	75858	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9468	
Cross Reference Number:	ABN.603.OB02.007	
Topic:	Unit 2 at 800 MWe Loss of 118 VAC Ins Distribution Panel 2EC1 occurs ABN-60 Prote	
K/A:	057 G.2.4.11	
Question Reference:		
SRO:	YES	
Comments:	LC25 NRC	
	K/A Match: The question is a K/A match as it require applicant to demonstrate knowledge of a condition procedures which contain the restoring power to a Vital AC Instrument	bnormal guidance for
	associated Technical Specification. SRO Only: The question is SRO only because it req applicant to demonstrate knowledge of t application of Required TS actions and a plant conditions and then selecting a ste procedure to recover.	uires the he issessing

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Form ES-401-5

Com	ments / F	eference: ABN-60	3		Revi	sion: 8
	ABNO	CPNPP RMAL CONDITIONS P	ROCEDURES	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDU ABN-6	
	LOSS O	F PROTECTION OR IN	STRUMENT BUS	REVISION NO. 8	PAGE 9 (DF 34
	2.3 <u>C</u>	perator Actions				
	A	TION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE	RESPONSE NOT	OBTAINED	
	CAUTIO	<u>Neenergizing the controlling channe</u>	affected protection bus i els which may in turn init	may cause instrumentiate unwanted actions	tation spikes or s.	n
	6	Verify Unit - IN MODE	1	GO TO Step 8.		
	NOTE:	Rod Control should ren	nain in MANUAL until al	I Tave channels are o	perable.	
		a. Place Control Rods	s in MANUAL			
		b. Select failed chann T _{AVE} CHAN DEFEA	el on <u>u</u> -TS-412T, T switch.			
		c. Dispatch an Opera the affected protec moving the manual close the alternate feeder breaker (bot panel).	tion bus by sliding bar to power supply			
		d. <u>IF</u> C-7 Armed (PCI select RESET on 4 DMP MODE SELE	3/ <u>u</u> -SD, STM			
		e. Undefeat affected (<u>u</u> -TS-412T	channel on			
	CAUTION	To prevent rods fro circuitry to stabilize control to Auto.	m potentially stepping, following manipulation	allow a minimum of 2 of <u>u</u> -TS-412T before	minutes for Ta returning rod	vg
		f. Restore Control roo	ds to AUTO.			
		g. Investigate and init action on loss of po bus.	iate corrective ower to protection			
			Section 2.3			

LO21SYSAC3	Page	8 of 24
	LESSON PLAN	
NOTES	LESSON OUTLINE	
	 Bus is normally powered from inverters and has bypas alternate power supplied from a 480v bypass transform to as dirty power.) Inverter takes a 125 VDC input and delivers regulated, 	ner (referred
	single phase 118 VAC output	, micrea,
	Uninterruptible by:	
	a. Inverters connected to a DC bus fed from a 480 V charger if power is lost to the chargers the bus will from a 125 VDC battery.	-
	b. If inverter fails due to a malfunction or the 125 VI then a static switch on the inverter panel will auto unregulated 120 VAC bypass power source.	
Objective 4	F. Class 1E 118 VAC Vital Instrument Power	
	1. Two trains	
	 Each has four busses (panels) per train - 2 Reactor pro 2 for BOP systems, each supplied by an inverter. 	tection and
	 1 installed spare inverter can align to any one of the for that train. 	ur panels on
	a. DC to the spare needs to be the same as substitute	d power.
	 Manual transfer at the bottom of each panel for inverte transformer feed. 	r feed or
	a. Transformer feed is uEC3 or uEC4.	
	b. Slide bar Mechanical interlock to prevent closing breakers at the same time.	both supply
	 Bumpless transfer to bypass power accomplished inverter on bypass then removing slide bar, swapp then replacing the slide bar. 	
	 Allowed by procedure because inverter bypass po distribution panel bypass power are from the same 	
	5. Operated per SOP-607A/B (see current revision.)	
	6. 118 VAC Vital distribution panels are <u>uPC1-4</u> , <u>uEC1</u> ,	2 & 5, 6.
	a. Located in the Cable Spreading Room (CSR.)	
	b. Only operable when supplied from DC bus via inv	verter.
	c. When <u>u</u> EC1 and <u>u</u> EC2 are on bypass the BO sequence not operable because on a loss of offsite power the will de-energize.	
	FOR TRAINING USE ONLY	Rev. 01 0001

Comments / Reference: TS	3.8.9	Revision: 156	;
	Distribu	ution Systems - Operating 3.8.9	
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SY	STEMS		
3.8.9 Distribution Systems - O	perating		
	nd Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electri ns shall be OPERABLE.	cal power distribution	
APPLICABILITY: MODES	1, 2, 3, and 4		
ACTIONS			
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
A. One AC electrical power distribution subsystem Inoperable.	A.1 Restore AC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours	
B. One AC vital bus subsystem inoperable.	B.1 Restore AC vital bus subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours	
C. One DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.	C.1 Restore DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours	
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	D.1 Bein MODE 3. AND	6 hours	
	D.2 Be In MODE 5.	36 hours	
E. Two trains with inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of safety function.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately	
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.8-37	Amendment No. 150, 1 56	

Comments / Referen	nce: TSB 3.	8.9		Revision: 82
			Distribution Syste	ems - Operating B 3.8.9
BASES				
ACTIONS (continued)				
	<u>B.1</u>			
	are capable down the uni reliability is n in the minimu required AC by powering	of supporting the mir t and maintain it in th educed, however, sir um required ESF fun vital bus must be res	the remaining OPERABLE / nimum safety functions neces he safe shutdown condition. nce an additional single failu ctions not being supported. stored to OPERABLE status sociated inverter via inverted a 1E transformers.	ssary to shut Overall re could result Therefore, the within 2 hours
	DC power. I complete los the operator' for loss of no	n this situation, the us s of all non-interrupti s attention focus on s	ital bus without non-interrupt init is significantly more vulni ible power. It is, therefore, ir stabilizing the unit, minimizin r to the remaining vital buses bsystems.	erable to a mperative that ng the potential
	vast majority Taking excep power, that v	of components that otion to LCO 3.0.2 fo vould have the Requ	ative than Completion Times are without adequate vital A r components without adequ ired Action Completion Time acceptable because of:	C power. iate vital AC
	condi		ed safety by requiring a chan a shutdown) and not allowing	
	Appli adeq opera	cable Conditions and uate vital AC power a	ed safety by requiring entry in I Required Actions for comp and not providing sufficient ti necessary evaluations and a ected train; and	onents without ime for the
		ootential for an event idant component.	in conjunction with a single	failure of a
	restoring the afforded by t	AC vital bus to OPE	es into account the importance RABLE status, the redundar E vital buses, and the low pro	nt capability
				(continued)
COMANCHE PEAK - U	JNITS 1 AND	2 B 3.8-79		Revision 82

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier		1
	Group		1
	K/A	WE04	4.EA2.01
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating		4.3
LOCA Outside Containment: Ability to determine and interpret th	e following as they apply to the LOCA Outs	side Containme	nt: Facility
conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnor			
Question # 88			
Given the following conditions:			
 Unit 1 Reactor has been tripped due Indications are that an RCS leak has ECA-1.2A, LOCA Outside Containment 	s occurred outside containme		
In accordance with ECA-1.2A, cycle(1)_	_ closed, then open.		
If RCS pressure continues to lower, GO TC	D(2)		
A. (1) 1/1-8809A and B, RHR TO CL IN (2) EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Se			
B. (1) 1/1-8809A and B, RHR TO CL IN (2) ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency C			
C. (1) 1/1-8840, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ (2) EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Se			
D. (1) 1/1-8840, RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ (2) ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency C			
Answer: B			

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring the ability to determine the selection of appropriate procedures during a LOCA outside containment.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis involving both 1) assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed, including knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is correct. These valves are normally open, so you are directed to close them and check RCS pressure to see if the leak has stopped. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since a loss of reactor coolant exists. If the leak has not been stopped, you are directed to GO TO ECA-1.1A.
- B. Correct. First part is correct (see A). Second part is correct. If the leak still exists, you are directed to GO TO ECA-1.1A.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since these valves are verified closed. They are normally closed so it would not be prudent to open them to check for a leak. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	ECA-1.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **IDENTIFY** the proper transitions out of ECA-1.2 (ERG.C12.OB06)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	72564	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension o	r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		



	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-1.2A	
	LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 3 OF 6	
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED	
[R] 1	Verify Proper Valve Alignment:	Manually close valve		
	a. RHRP 1 & 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLVS - CLOSED	valve(s) can <u>NOT</u> be closed. <u>THEN</u> locally valve(s).	close	
	• 1/1-8701A			
	• 1/1-8702A			
	• 1/1-8701B			
	• 1/1-8702B			
	b. RHR TO HL 2 & 3 INJ ISOL VLV - CLOSED			
	• 1/1-8840			
	c. SI TO HL INJ ISOL VLVS - CLOSED			
	• 1/1-8802A			
	• 1/1-8802B			
2	Identify And Isolate Break:			
	 a. Sequentially close and open the following valves and monitor for an RCS pressure increase: 			
	1) RHR TO CL INJ ISOL VLVS:			
	• (1/1-8809A)			
	• (1/1-8809B)			
	2) SI to CL 1+4 INJ ISOL VLV			
	• 1/1-8835			
			I	



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier			1
	Group			1
	K/A	WE0	5.G.2	.2.40
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			4.7

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

Question #89

Given the following conditions:

- 1/2-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV, is stuck in mid-position and will not cycle
- 1/2-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV, is CLOSED and deenergized

In accordance with TS 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), 1/2-8000A __(1)__.

Approximately twenty-four hours later:

- The Unit has experienced a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink following a reactor trip from 100% power
- FRH-0.1B, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, in progress

When Bleed and Feed operations are established, 1/2-8000A should(2)	
A. (1) can remain in this condition indefinitely(2) be re-energized and opened to ensure adequate bleed path	
 B. (1) can remain in this condition indefinitely (2) remain de-energized and closed to comply with Technical Specification 	ons
C. (1) must be restored to operable within 72 hours(2) be re-energized and opened to ensure adequate bleed path	
 D. (1) must be restored to operable within 72 hours (2) remain de-energized and closed to comply with Technical Specification 	ons
Answer: C	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring application of TS conditions associated with components used for bleed and feed during a loss of secondary heat sink event.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring application of required actions (TS Section 3) and SRs (TS Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (TS Section 1) and 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selection of a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since PORV block valve does not have to be deenergized for seat leakage and indefinite operation is permitted for these conditions, per condition A of TS. Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since PORV is closed in accordance with Tech Specs and re-opening will violate Tech Specs.
- C. Correct. First part is correct, with a PORV stuck and unable to be manually cycled, the PORV block valve is required to be closed and deenergized. The PORV must be restored to an operable condition within 72 hours. These are all part of condition B of TS. Second part is correct. FRH-0.1B requires re-energizing and opening a previously de-energized and closed PORV Block valve regardless of Tech Spec implications to ensure adequate Bleed path.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	TS/B 3.4.11	Attached w/ Revision # See
	FRH-0.1	Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, **DISCUSS** the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRH-0.1 in accordance with FRH-0.1, Loss of Heat Sink. (ERG.FH1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	Х	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	lamental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.432/5		







Comments / Reference: TS	Comments / Reference: TS 3.4.11		Revision: 156
Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11			
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYS	STEM (RCS)		
3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Oper	ated Relief Valves (PORVs)		
LCO 3.4.11 Each PO	RV and associated block valve shall be OP	ERABLE.	
APPLICABILITY: MODES	1, 2, and 3		
ACTIONS			
Separate Condition entry is allo	wed for each PORV.		
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPL	ETION TIME
A. One or more PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled.	A.1 Close and maintain power to associated block valve.	1 hour	
B. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.	B.1 Close associated block valve.	1 hour	
	B.2 Remove power from associated block valve.	1 hour	
	AND B.3 Restore PORV to OPERABLE status.	72 hours	
	D.5 THESIDIE FORM TO OF ERADLE SIGILIS.	12 Hours	
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.4-22	Amendmer	nt No. 150, 156

Comments / Reference: TSB 3.4.11		Revision: 80
	Press	Burizer PORVs B 3.4.11
B 3.4 REACTOR C	OOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)	
B 3.4.11 Pressurize	r Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)	
BASES		
BACKGROUND	The pressurizer is equipped with two types of devices for press pressurizer safety valves and PORVs. The PORVs are nitroge valves that are controlled to open at a specific set pressure wh pressurizer pressure increases and close when the pressurizer decreases. The PORVs may also be manually operated from to room.	en operated len the r pressure
	Block valves, which are normally open, are located between th and the PORVs. The block valves are used to isolate the POR excessive leakage or a stuck open PORV. Block valve closure accomplished manually using controls in the control room. A s PORV is, in effect, a small break loss of coolant accident (LOC block valve closure terminates the RCS depressurization and c inventory loss.	RVs in case of e is stuck open CA). As such,
	The PORVs and their associated block valves may be used by operators to depressurize the RCS to recover from certain tran normal pressurizer spray is not available. Additionally, the seri arrangement of the PORVs and their block valves permit perfor surveillances on the valves during power operation.	isients if ies
	The PORVs may also be used for feed and bleed core cooling multiple equipment failure events that are not within the design as a total loss of feedwater.	
	The PORVs, their block valves, and their controls are powered buses that normally receive power from offsite power sources, capable of being powered from emergency power sources in the loss of offsite power. Two PORVs and their associated block we powered from two separate safety trains (Ref. 1).	but are also he event of a
	The plant has two PORVs, each having a relief capacity of 210 2335 psig. The functional design of the PORVs is based on m pressure below the Pressurizer Pressure - High reactor trip set and including the design step-load decrease. In addition, the F minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety valves and also r for low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP). See LCO Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."	aintaining tpoint up to PORVs may be used

mments / Refer	ence: TSB 3.4.11	Revision: 80
	F	Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11
BASES		
LCO (continued)		
	 RCS identified leakage cannot be maintained less LCO 3.4.13 without closure of the associated POR 	
	PORV tail pipe temperature cannot be restored to within the limit (Ref. 7).	or maintained
	Satisfying the LCO helps minimize challenges to fission p	roduct barriers.
APPLICABILITY	BILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORV and its block valve are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power and pressure conditions of MODES 1 and 2.	
	The PORVs and block valves are also required to be OPE 1, 2, and 3 for manual actuation to mitigate a steam gener event. If a PORV is blocked, the PORV Block Valve is rea manually opened to enable the PORV. The PORV Block required to be able to close against the maximum differen associated with a failed open PORV during the SGTR ever	rator tube rupture quired to be valves are only tial pressure
	Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high. Therefore applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The LCO is not applicable and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place when both pre- energy are decreased and the pressure surges become m significant. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORV requirement MODES.	ore, the LCO is ole in MODES 4, 5, essure and core nuch less
ACTIONS	Note 1 has been added to clarify that all pressurizer POR separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i. Time is on a component basis).	
	<u>A.1</u>	
	PORVs may be inoperable and capable of being manually excessive seat leakage). In this condition, either the POR restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The asso	Ws must be
	·	(continued)

Comments / Referen	nce: TSB 3.4.11	Revision: 80
	Pres	surizer PORVs B 3.4.11
BASES		
ACTIONS (continued)		
	B.1, B.2, and B.3	
	is required to be closed, but power must be maintained to the block valves, since removal of power would render the block v inoperable. This permits operation of the plant until the next re (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the POR' the problem condition.	/alve fueling outage
	Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 on plant operating experience that has shown that minor prob corrected or closure accomplished in this time period. If one P inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must restored, or isolated by closing the associated block valve and power to the associated block valve. The Completion Times of reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this tim provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it must be isol specified time. Because there is at least one PORV that rema OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided to restore the PORV to OPERABLE status. If the PORV cannot be restored additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which not apply, as required by Condition D.	hour is based lems can be ORV is be either d removing the of 1 hour are ne period, and the inoperable ated within the ains inoperable
	C.1 and C.2	
	If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either it block valve to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time place the associated PORV in manual control. The prime implication capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PC Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABL 1 hour, the Required Action is to place the PORV in manual co preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve The Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable, based on the si for challenges to the system during this time period, and provi operator time to correct the situation. Because at least one POPERABLE, the operator is permitted a Completion Time of 7 restore the inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status. The to restore the block valve is based upon the Completion Time an inoperable PORV in Condition B, since the PORVs may not mitigating an event if the inoperable block valve is not fully operator valve is restored within the Completion Time of 72 hours, the restored and the PORV restored to OPERABLE status. If it ca restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought	of 1 hour or ortance for the DRV. E status within ontrol to to avoid the is inoperable. mall potential des the ORV remains '2 hours to time allowed for restoring t be capable of en. If the block power will be annot be
		(conunued)

mment	s / Reference: FRH-0.1		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. FRH-0.1A
RESI	PONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 22 OF 85
STEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	T OBTAINED
1D] 18	Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B.		
1D] 19	Reset Containment Spray Signal.		
1 D] 20	Establish Instrument Air And Nitrogen To Containment:		
	a. Establish instrument air:		
	 Verify air compressor running. 	 Manually start compressor and as appropriate 	align valve
	- AND -		
	 Establish instrument air to containment. 		
	b. Establish nitrogen:		
	 Verify ACCUM 1.4 VENT CTRL. 1-HC-943 - CLOSED 	1) Manually close	valve.
	 Open SI/PORV ACCUM N₂ ISOL VLV. 1/1-8880. 		
21	Establish RCS Bleed Path:		
	a. Verify power to PRZR PORV (block valves - AVAILABLE)	a. Locally restore p valve(s).	ower to block
	b. (Verify PRZR PORV block valves) (- BOTH OPEN)	<pre>b. Manually open bot valve(s).</pre>	h block
	c. Open PRZR PORVs.)		
22	Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:	Open vents on reacto and on the PRZR to c	
	• PRZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN	and on the rMAK to t	on comment.
	 PRZR PORV block valves - BOTH OPEN 		
23	Verify Steps 1 through 8 of EOP-0.0A. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. Have Been Completed.	Perform Steps 1 thro EOP-0.0A, REACTOR TR SAFETY INJECTION, wh continuing with this	IP OR ile

Comments	/ Reference: FRH-0.1		Revision: 9	
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 2	PROCEDURE NO. FRH-0.1B	
RESPON	NSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 69 OF 86	
	ATTACHMENT 4 PAGE 16 OF 33			
	BASES			
STEP 20:	The restoration of Instrument Air and N operation of pneumatically operated val nitrogen for the operation of PRZR PORV While opening the containment isolation nitrogen to containment. it might also compressor to restore Instrument Air to	ves in containment 's is of particular valves is suffici- be necessary to st	(in this step. interest). ent to restore	
<u>STEP 21</u> :	The operator ensures that all pressuriz all pressurizer PORVs to establish an R be maintained in the open position unti	CS bleed path. Th	ese valves must	
	The Pressurizer PORV block values are of available and that the values are open Pressurizer PORVs. It is preferred to the RCS bleed path for this procedure t capability. If a PORV block value has satisfy Technical Specification require realigned and the block value should be value is not available but the block va open in order to align the bleed path. to be available to a block value prior does not assume the block value has to the PORV in subsequent recovery actions	to confirm the ava- open all PORVs when o maximize heat re- been closed and de- ments, then power opened. If power lve is open, the Por This step does NO to opening the POR be available in or	ilability of all n establishing moval energized to should be to a block DRV should be I require power V (e.g., step	
	Once the pressurizer PORVs are open, the RCS will depressurize and the CCPs and/or SI pumps will deliver subcooled flow to the RCS. This will provide adequate RCS heat removal until flow can be established to the steam generators to restore secondary heat sink.			
	The operator may observe increasing pre pressurizer PORVs are opened. Eventual water solid with water relief occurring	ly the pressurizer	may become	
STEP 22:	After manually opening the PRZR PORVs. both PRZR PORVs and block valves are ma both bleed paths are maintained open. s permit RCS heat removal.	intained in the op	en position. If	
	If both PRZR PORVs or block values are not depressurize sufficiently to permit flow to remove core decay heat. If cor feed heat removal capability. the RCS w reducing the feed of subcooled ECCS flo decrease of RCS inventory.	adequate feed of a e decay heat exceed ill repressurize re	subcooled ECCS ds RCS bleed and apidly, further	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier			1
	Group			2
	K/A	0000	32.AA	42.09
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			2.9

Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Effect of improper HV setting

Question # 90

Given the following conditions:

- Reactor Startup in progress on Unit 1
- Control Rods at 150 steps on Bank A
- SR counts on channels N-31 and N-32 differ by approximately 60 cpm
- Core Performance determined High Voltage adjustment is required on SR channel N-31
- While adjusting SR channel N-31, 1-ALB-6D, Window 1.1 SR HI VOLT FAIL alarms
- Reactor Startup is suspended in accordance with TS 3.3.1, RPS Instrumentation

The SR HI VOLT FAIL alarm indicates SR Channel N-31 counts will be __(1)__ than actual counts.

If N-31 is NOT restored to OPERABLE within 48 hours, in accordance with TS 3.3.1, __(2)__ must be fully inserted.

- A. (1) lower
 - (2) Control Bank rods ONLY
- B. (1) lower(2) Control and Shutdown Bank rods
- C. (1) higher(2) Control Bank rods ONLY

В

D. (1) higher(2) Control and Shutdown Bank rods

Answer:

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of actions to be taken in response to failed SR high voltage.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring application of required actions (TS Section 3) and SRs (TS Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (TS Section 1).

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since actions taken during startup, if the startup is aborted, are to insert control bank rods to CBO and shutdown rods do not have a CBO position.
- B. Correct. First part is correct, the improperly set SRHV power supply (110 volts below normal cause the alarm) causes less interactions between the core and the BF3 detector, causing counts to lower. Second part is correct. Per TS 3.3.1, if the inoperable SR is not returned to operable status within 48 hours, all rods, both control bank and shutdown bank rods, must be fully inserted.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible if thought SRHV supplied compensating voltage, as is done in the IR channels, which would then cause counts to increase upon the loss. Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).


Technical Reference(s)	Excore Nuclear Instrument Study Guide	Attached w/ Revision # See
	ABN-701	Comments / Reference
	TS 3.3.1	

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given Excore Instrumentation system operability status or parameter indications, various plant conditions, and a copy of the Technical Specifications or Technical Requirements Manual, **ASSESS** any LCO entries, applicable conditions, and required actions (including Completion Time) in accordance with the associated regulatory requirements and their bases. (SYS.EC1.OB07)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.432		





The characteristic curve will vary for each detector design. Similarly the curve will change relative to the field intensity and the ionization level of the incident radiation in the lower regions. No shift will be seen in the Geiger-Mueller region where complete discharge occurs.

Incident charged particles or gamma radiation will cause ionization, but neutrons, uncharged particles, will not. Boron is added in gas or solid form to cause a neutron interaction. This results in charged products, which will then cause the desired ionization.

 $_{0n}^{1} + _{5}B^{10} \rightarrow ^{*}[_{5}B^{11}] \rightarrow ^{++}_{3}Li^{7} + ^{++}_{2}He^{4} + Energy$

The boron gas detector (Figure 4) contains BF3 gas and operates in the proportional range. Highly sensitive, it detects both gammas and neutrons thermalized in a polyethylene cover. Gamma signals are smaller in pulse amplitude and therefore can be discriminated (removed) in the electrical circuit (discussed in next section).

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5-1-2011

iments / Reference: ABN-701				Revision: 12	
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUA	L	UNIT 1 AND 2	PRO	OCEDURE NO. ABN-701	
SOURCE RANGE INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION		REVISION NO. 12	P/	AGE 4 OF 12	
2.3 Operator Actions					
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT (IED	
				<u>4</u>	
<u>CAUTION</u> : • Removing Source Range (SR Trip even with the LEVEL TRI manually blocked <u>OR</u> unless a	P swite	h in BYPASS, unless			
 Removing SR instrument pow LEVEL TRIP switch in BYPAS above P-10. 					
NOTE: • The higher count rate indication	n ie oci	sumed to be valid unit	lan AC	TOT	
CHANNEL CALIBRATION, or I confirmed otherwise. With both neutron flux may be monitored	Interme h N-31	ediate Range cross-re and N-32 inoperable,	ference source	e has e range	
See TR 13.3.32 for Gamma-Me	etrics F	Tux Monitoring System	n applio	cability.	
1 VERIFY NO Core Alterations, RCS Dilution, <u>OR Reactor</u> Startup in progress.	req TH SU	less than P-6 <u>AND</u> les juired SR channels op <u>EN</u> SPEND <u>ALL</u> core alte sitive reactivity additio	erable, erations		
2 (VERIFY at least one required SR channel operable.)	in S IF I TH CO	FER to Technical Spe Section 5.1 of this pro- below P-6, EN MPLETE Attachment blicable time limits.	cedure.		
3 <u>IF</u> the audible count rate was in service prior to the failure, <u>THEN</u> RESTORE by switching to the other SR channel at the AUDIO COUNT RATE CHANNEL DRAWER.					
4 RESTORE both required SR channels operable within 48 hours <u>OR</u> PERFORM Attachment 1 within the following hour.					
Section	2.3				

om	ments / Referen	ce: TS 3.3.1				Revision: 156
					RI	S Instrumentation 3.3.1
		Re	Table 3.3.1-1 (p actor Trip System			
	FUNCTION	APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED	CONDITIONS	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE ^(a)
5.	Source Range Neutron Flux	2 ^(e)	2	l,I	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11	≤ 1.4 E5 cps
		(<mark>3(b)</mark> , 4(b), 5(b)	2	J,K	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11	≤ 1.4 E5 cps
6.	Overtemperature N-16	1,2	4	E	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.10	Refer to Note 1 ^{(q)(r)}
7.	Overpower N-16	1,2	4	E	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16	≤ 112.8% RTP (q)(r)
8.	Pressurizer Pressure					
	a. Low	1(0)	4	м	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16	≥ 1863.6 psig (Unit 1) ≥ 1865.2 psig (Unit 2)
	b. High	1,2	4	E	SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16	≤ 2400.8 psig (Unit 1) ≤ 2401.4 psig (Unit 2)
() () () () () () () () () () () () () (The Allowable Value define: Setpoint defines the limiting With Rod Control System ca Selow the P-6 (Intermediate Above the P-7 (Low Power I f the as-found channel setp criteria band, then the chann The instrument channel setp s more conservative than the methodology used to determ specified in the Technical Sp	safety system settin spable of rod withdra Range Neutron Flu Reactor Trips Block) oint is conservative nel shall be evaluate point shall be reset to ne Trip Setpoint; othe nine the as-found tol	g for these Trip Fi wal or one or mor x) interlock. with respect to the d to verify that it it a value that is with erwise, the channe	unctions). See the re rods not fully ins e Allowable Value to s functioning as rec thin the as-left toler el shall be declared	Bases for the Nominal erted. out outside its predefine quired before returning ance of the Nominal Tri d inoperable. The Nomi	Trip Setpoints. d as-found acceptance the channel to service. p Setpoint or a value that inal Trip Setpoint, the
ON	MANCHE PEAK - UI	NITS 1 AND 2	3.3-16		Amendi	ment No. 150, 156

omments / Reference: TS 3.3.1			Revision: 150		
		RTS In:	strumentation 3.3.1		
ACTIONS (continued)		1			
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLE	TION TIME		
H. Not used.					
 One Source Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. 	NOTE Limited boron concentration changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed.				
	I.1 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.	Immediatel	у		
J. Two Source Range Neutron Flux channels inoperable.	J.1 Open reactor trip breakers (RTBs).	Immediatel	у		
K. One Source Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.	K.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.	48 hours			
	K.2.1 Initiate action to fully insert all rods.	48 hours			
	AND				
	K.2.2 Place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.	49 hours			
L. Not used.					
	1	1			
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.3-5	Amend	ment No. 150		

Examination Outline Cross-refe	rence:	Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier		1
		Group		2
		K/A	000036	.G.2.4.49
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating		4.4
Fuel-Handling Incidents: Ability to perform w	vithout reference to procedures	those actions that require immed	iate operation o	f system
components and controls.				
Question # 91				
Given the following conditions	S:			
Unit 2 in MODE 6 reloa	ading core			
Control Room notified	an irradiated fuel ass	embly has been dropp	bed into the	e core
 ABN-908, Fuel Handlin 	ng Accident, in progre	ess		
Per ABN-908,				
the Fuel Handling Supervisor		fer cart is in the(1)_	_ Building	with Fuel
Transfer Tube gate valve clos	sed.			
Containment Purge may have	e to be stopped to en	able(2)		
A. (1) Fuel				
(2) closing the Fuel Tra	anefor Tubo gato val	10		
	ansier rube gale val			
B. (1) Fuel				
(2) installation of the e	quinmont hatch			
	quipment natch			
C. (1) Containment				
(2) closing the Fuel Tra	anefor Tubo gato valv	10		
	ansier rube gale van			
D. (1) Containment				
(2) installation of the e	quinmont hatch			
Answer: B				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring the ability to take action to control the event in accordance with ABN-908.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of tasks performed by the Fuel Handling Supervisor which is an SRO position. It also requires knowledge of the content of the procedure and not just the overall mitigation strategy. Also due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(7) Analysis requiring refueling floor SRO responsibilities.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since it may be thought that the DP between the Containment and Fuel buildings would prevent closing the fuel transfer tube gate valve.
- B. Correct. First part is correct. Per ABN-908, Step 2.3.8, the Fuel Handling Supervisor has the specific responsibility to ensure the cart is in the Fuel Buildig. Second part is correct. A note in ABN-908 states it may be necessary to secure Containment Purge to enable installation of the equipment hatch.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since it may be thought that the transfer car should be left in Containment in preparation for putting the damaged assembly in the transfer car. Second part is part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is correct (see B).


Technical Reference(s)	ABN-908	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given that a Fuel Handling accident is in progress, **SUMMARIZE** the expected control room response in accordance with ABN-908, "Fuel Handling Accident." (OPD1.G16.OB03)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75869	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC24	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.435/7		





commen	nts / Reference: Bank 75869		Revision:
 Conti 	2 in MODE 6 reloading core trol Room notified an irradiated fuel assem -908, Fuel Handling Accident in progress	bly has been dropped into	the core
Per ABN	V-908		
	ndling Supervisor should ensure transfer c el Transfer Tube gate valve closed.	art is in the	Building
Containr	ment Purge may have to be stopped to en	able	·
A	A. Fuel closing the Fuel Transfer Tube gate	valve	
B	 Fuel installation of the equipment hatch 		
C	C. Containment closing the Fuel Transfer Tube gate		
C	D. Containment installation of the equipment hatch		
A	installation of the equipment hatch Answer: B		
A	installation of the equipment hatch		
A. 1 4. 1	installation of the equipment hatch Answer: B	ve that the ?P between t	the
A. I B. (installation of the equipment hatch Answer: B Answer Explanation Incorrect. First part is correct (See B be but plausible as the applicant may belie Containment and Fuel buildings would p	ve that the ?P between to prevent closing the fuel to 08, Step 2.3.8; the Fuel I ty. Second part is correct may be necessary to se	the ransfer Handling ct as a ecure
A. A. B. () C.	installation of the equipment hatch Answer: B Answer Explanation Incorrect. First part is correct (See B be but plausible as the applicant may belie Containment and Fuel buildings would p tube gate valve. Correct. First part is correct per ABN-9 Supervisor has this specific responsibili note in ABN-908 informs the user that it	ve that the ?P between to prevent closing the fuel to 08, Step 2.3.8; the Fuel I ty. Second part is correct may be necessary to se n of the equipment hatch will be as the applicant ma eft in Containment in pre- e transfer car. Second p	the ransfer Handling ct as a ecure n. ay paration

Comments / Reference: Bar	ık 75869	Revision:
Question 90 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	3.00	
System ID:	75869	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT9479	
Cross Reference Number:	RFO.FH2.OB01.009	
	Unit 2 in MODE 6 reloading core Control	Room
Topic:	notified an irradiated fuel assembly has l	
	dropped	
K/A:	SF8 034 A2.01	
Question Reference:		
SRO:	YES	
Comments:	LC24 NRC	
	K/A Match:	
	The question is a K/A match as it require applicant to demonstrate the ability to tal control the event in accordance with ABN	ke action to
	SRO Only: The question is SRO only in that it requir applicant to demonstrate knowledge of ta performed by the Fuel Handling Supervis an SRO position. It also requires knowle content of the procedure and not just the mitigation strategy.	asks sor which is edge of the
	content of the procedure and not just the	

nments / Reference: ABN-908			Revisior	n: 5
CPNPP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDU	RES MANUAL	UNIT 1 AND 2	PROCEDURE ABN-908	NO.
FUEL HANDLING ACCIDE	NT	REVISION NO. 5	PAGE 5 OF	15
2.3 Operator Actions				1
NOTE: Containment entry shall all personnel have exited		er authorization. Sec	urity should ensur	e
7 DIRECT Security to control a	occess to containme	ent.		
NOTE: Personnel exiting Contai than Containment Contro Radiation Protection.				
8 The Fuel Handling Superviso allow, while taking appropria			wing as conditions	
 INFORM personnel exiting Containment. 	g Containment to as	semble in controlled a	area outside	
NOTE: • Temporary storage of an no stored assembly is fai least one open location b corners of the stored ass	ce-adjacent to any o between the core as	other stored assembly semblies and all inwa	and there is at	
It may be necessary to sequipment hatch.	top Containment Pu	irge to enable installa	tion of the	
 ENSURE <u>ALL</u> fuel assembly progress <u>AND</u> the fuel assembly source range counts should be assembly as a source range counts should be as a source range counts should be source range counts should be as a source range counts shoul	embly is being stor	ed temporarily in the o	core, THEN	I
ENSURE <u>NO</u> loads are su	spended from the r	nanipulator crane.		
 ENSURE upender is in ho 	rizontal position.			
 ENSURE transfer car is in closed. 	Fuel Building AND	Fuel Transfer Tube g	ate valve is	
• ENSURE Containment Eq	uipment Hatch inst	alled with a minimum	of 4 bolts.	
ensure all personnel are	e exiting Containme	nt to Safeguards Build	ding control point.	
"Ste	p continued next pa	age"		
	Ocation 2.2			
	Section 2.3			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier			1
	Group			2
	K/A	WE [,]	14.EA	2.01
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			3.8

High Containment Pressure: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Containment Pressure: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations

Question # 92

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 LBLOCA
- EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, entered at RWST LO-LO Level

Subsequently:

- An ECCS flowpath from the containment sump to the RCS could NOT be established
- Efforts to add makeup to the RWST in progress
- RWST level 18% lowering slowly
- Containment pressure 40 psig slowly rising
- CSP suction aligned to the RWST

(1) The	US should	operate	CSPs pe	r(1)
---------	-----------	---------	---------	------

(2) How many Containment Spray Pumps should be run for the stated conditions above?

- A. (1) FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure
 (2) Operate TWO CSPs until containment pressure less than 18 psig or RWST level is ≤ 9%
- B. (1) ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
 (2) Operate TWO CSPs until containment pressure less than 18 psig or RWST level is ≤ 9%
- C. (1) FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure(2) Operate NO CSPs to conserve RWST level
- D. (1) ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation(2) Operate NO CSPs to conserve RWST level

Answer: B

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of procedures to transition to, as well as implementation of the detailed steps of the procedure.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selection of a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed. Also requires knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since an orange path on Containment does exist and FRZ-0.1A implementation may be required (if not already implemented). Second part is correct (see B).
- B. Correct. First part is correct, ECA-1.1A would be the procedure governing CSP operation regardless of procedure currently being implemented (FRZ-0.1A or ECA-1.1A). If examinee thought FRZ-0.1A was required due to the orange path, then step 4.d of FRZ-0.1A states to operate CSPs per ECA-1.1A. Second part is correct, with Containment pressure above 18 psig but less than 50 psig, two CSPs would be run until Containment pressure lowered to less than 18 psig or RWST level lowered to ≤ 9% (Empty)
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is incorrect, but plausible since ECA-1.1 would require no CSPs be run if RWST level were below 9% or if pressure were below 18 psig.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see B). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see C)

Technical Reference(s)	ECA-1.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	FRZ-0.1	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the bases for the procedure steps, NOTEs and CAUTIONs contained in FRZ-0.1A/B. (ERG.FZ1.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	52583	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		



Comments / Reference: Bank 52583	Revision:
 Unit 1 LBLOCA EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation was entered at RWST An ECCS flowpath from the containment sump to the RCS could NOT established ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation in progress Efforts to add makeup to the RWST are in progress RWST level is 8% and stable Containment pressure has just risen from 38 psig to 52 psig CSP suction aligned to the RWST 	
Which of the following describes the expected procedure use and actions based on the given conditions?	necessary
A. Transition to FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pro operate all CSPs until containment pressure is less than 50 RWST level is 6%.	
B. Remain in ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recircul operate all CSPs until containment pressure is less than 50 RWST level is 6%.	
C. Transition to FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pro operate NO CSPs in accordance with ECA-1.1A, to conser level.	
D. Remain in ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recircul operate NO CSPs in accordance with ECA-1.1A, to conser level.	
Answer: C Answer Explanation	

Comments / Reference: Bank 52583 Revision: Incorrect. Plausible because entry into FRZ-0.1A is required but running all 4 containment spray pumps is not IAW with the procedural guidance provided in ECA-1.1A Step 10 or Step 32. J. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that with RWST level below EMPTY (9%) and the fact that FRZ-0.1A had already been implemented that re-entering FRZ-0.1A is not required however ERG rules of usage do require entering FRZ-0.1A on the RED path and ECA-1.1A Step 10 and Step 32 requires NO containment spray pumps to be in operation when the RWST level is below Empty. K. Correct. The RED path entry criteria requires re-entering FRZ-0.1A and ECA-1.1A Step 10 and Step 32 dictates running NO containment spray pumps based on RWST level being below Empty. L. Incorrect. Plausible because NO containment spray pumps in operation is required by ECA-1.1A Step 10 and Step 32 but the transition to FRZ-0.1A is required due to the RED path. Question 193 Info Question Type: Multiple Choice Status: Active Always select on test? No Authorized for practice? No Points: 1.00 Time to Complete: 0 Difficulty: 4.00 System ID: 52583 User-Defined ID: ILOT1570 Cross Reference ERG.C11.OB06.003 Number: Unit 1 LBLOCA EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation was entered at RWST LO-LO Level An Topic: ECCS 4.5E11.EA2.2 K/A: Question Reference: SRO[.] Yes Comments: LC22 Audit; S24E24, S25E24, S26E24 Ref: ECA-1.1A Steps 10 & 32; FRZ-0.1A Step 4d; ODA-407 Att. 8A

ES-401

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

Comments / Reference: ECA-1	.1		Revision: 9
CPNP EMERGENCY RESPON	-	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. ECA-1.1A
LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLA	NT RECIRCULATION	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 6 OF 83
STEP ACTION/EXPECT	ED RESPONSE	RESPONSE N	OT OBTAINED
ll Determine Contain Requirements (Suc			
a. <mark>Containment sp</mark> - ALIGNED TO R		 <u>IF</u> containment a suction aligned go to Step 13. 	
b. <mark>Determine numb</mark> containment sp required from	ray pumps		
	TABLE 1		
RWST LEVEL	CONTAINMENT PRESSU	JRE PU	RAY MPS JIRED
GREATER	GREATER THAN 50 PS BETWEEN 18.0 PSIG AND		4 2
THAN RWST EMPTY	LESS THAN 18.0 PSI		0
LESS	-		
THAN			D
RWST EMPTY			
c. Containment sp running – EQUA REQUIRED	ray pumps c. L TO NUMBER	. Manually operate spray pumps as r	
		<u>IF</u> containment a stopped. <u>THEN</u> cl affected train's spray heat excha valve.	ose the containment

CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5

ents / Reference: FRZ-0.1		Revision: 9
CPNPP	111170 4	PROCEDURE NO.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	FRZ-0.1A
RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 4 OF 26
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	r obtained
NOTE: Component Cooling Water supply to compressors isolates on a Phase B		air
4 (Check If Containment Spray Is) (Required:)		
a. Containment pressure - HAS a INCREASED TO GREATER THAN 18.0 PSIG	. Return to procedu in effect.	re and step
 1-ALB-2B window 1-8. CS ACT ILLUMINATED 		
- OR -		
 1-ALB-2B window 4-11 CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - ILLUMINATED 		
- OR -		
 Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 18.0 PSIG 		
b. Verify all RCPs - STOPPED b	. Manually stop all	RCPs.
c. Verify Containment Isolation c Phase B Valves- CLOSED	. Manually actuate	Phase B.
 Verify 1-MLB-4A3 and 4B3 - ORANGE LIGHTS LIT 	<u>IF</u> valve(s) <u>NOT</u> c manually close va (Refer to Attachm	lve(s).
d. (Verify ECA-1.1A, LOSS OF) d (EMERGENCY COOLANT) (RECIRCULATION is <u>NOT</u> in) (effect.)	. Operate containme (ECA-1.1A, LOSS OF (COOLANT RECIRCULA (Step 5.)	EMERGENCY
-CONT 4-		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 3	Tier			1
	Group			2
	K/A	WE0	7.G.2	.4.20
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			4.3

Saturated Core Cooling: Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Question # 93

Given the following conditions:

- SGTR occurred on Unit 1
- Due to equipment failures, ECA-3.2A, SGTR with a Loss of Reactor Coolant-Saturated Recovery Desired, being performed
- The STA informs you the CSFSTs all GREEN with the exception of the following:
 - CORE COOLING CSFST YELLOW based on Loss of Subcooling
 - INVENTORY CSFST YELLOW based on Reactor Vessel Level

Which of the following describes the implementation of procedures for this event?

- A. Address both CSFST YELLOW paths, as desired based on operator judgement.
- B. Do NOT address either CSFST YELLOW path as implementation is NOT allowed in the ECA procedures.
- C. Address CORE COOLING actions, as desired based on operator judgement, and do NOT perform the actions for INVENTORY due to conflict with ECA-3.2A actions.
- D. Address INVENTORY actions, as desired based on operator judgement, and do NOT perform the actions for CORE COOLING due to conflict with ECA-3.2A actions.

Answer:	D	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of cautions stated in procedure ECA-3.2.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selection of a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate or recover, or with which to proceed. Also requires knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because normally YELLOW path procedures are addressed at the discretion of the US, but CORE COOLING actions conflict with ECA-3.2 actions and should not be performed.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because CORE COOLING actions conflict with ECA-3.2 actions and should not be performed, but INVENTORY actions could be taken.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since actions from one of these procedures is not to be performed due to conflicts with ECA-3.2 actions, but the conflicting procedure addresses CORE COOLING.
- D. Correct. Per the guidance contained in FRC-0.3A, Response to Saturated Core Cooling. FRC-0.3A directs a reestablishment of RCS subcooling via Safety Injection Flow. This is inconsistent with the actions of ECA-3.2A which reduce RCS subcooling via ECCS flow reduction in order to minimize primary to secondary leakage during a SGTR.


Technical Reference(s)	FRC-0.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
	OCA-407	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** the bases for operator actions, notes and cautions from ECA-3.2. (ERG.C31.OB12)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	18539	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		

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iments / Reference: ODA-407		Revision: 17
CPNPP OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. ODA-407
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE	REVISION NO. 17 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 27 OF 63
ATTACHMENT 8. PAGE 9 OF 25	A	
ERG RULES OF USA	AGE	
10. If an FRG is in progress due to an ORANGE priority for that same procedure goes to a RED priority con continue in the procedure from the current step. The regardless of color status (e.g., RED or ORANGE p FRZ-0.1A/B based on Containment pressure); ther from the current step through completion to the pole	idition, the operating or he procedure actions ar priority for FRS-0.1A/B, efore, recovery actions	ew should e the same , FRP-0.1A/B, should proceed
 YELLOW FRG status implementation is based on a determined that adequate time exists to implement have to implement a YELLOW condition FRG. If a juinappropriate based on available time or current plapropriate based on available time or current plapropriate based on available time or current plaproprinty is in progress, the operator should attend to implementing a YELLOW condition FRG. In the proORGs (including applicable foldout pages) have priWhile performing actions of a YELLOW condition, of tems of the ORG in effect are still applicable and s by the operator. In some cases the YELLOW statu developing RED or ORANGE condition. In general, performance of the FRGs is dependent or ORANGE priority condition comes in and clears the FRG need not be performed. If conditions degibecome a continuous RED or ORANGE condition; directed to the appropriate FRG. An exception to this rule is made for entry into FRZ <u>EOP-0.0A/B</u>. The corresponding containment press of FRZ-0.1A/B is also the Containment Spray initial pressure value impacts FRG status and implement summary of requirements for FRZ-0.1A/B. 	the procedure. The op udgement has been ma ant status; and, if an ev o the more important m foritization scheme of t foritization scheme of t for current plant param before FRG implement rade, the safety function at which time, the oper source for an ORANGE p tion setpoint; thus, the	perator does not ade that it is rent of higher atters prior to he ERGs, the th FRG(s). oldout page d implemented ty indication of a neters. If a RED itation is initiated, n status will rator will be

ES-401

nents	/ Reference: FRC-0.3		Revision: 9
	CPNPP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES	UNIT 1	PROCEDURE NO. FRC-0.3A
RI	SPONSE TO SATURATED CORE COOLING	REVISION NO. 9	PAGE 3 OF 11
TEP	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NO	OT OBTAINED
NO	TE: If ECA-3.2A. SGTR WITH LOSS OF RECOVERY DESIRED, is in effect performed.		
* 1	Check RWST Level - GREATER THAN LO-LO LEVEL	Go to EOS-1.3A. TRA LEG RECIRCULATION.	NSFER TO COLD
2	Check RHR System Status:		
	a. RHR System - HAS BEEN PLACED IN SERVICE FOR COOLDOWN	a. Go to Step 3.	
	b. Go to ABN-104, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.		
3	Verify ECCS Flow:		
	a. CCP safety injection flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW	 a. Start pumps and as necessary. 	align valves
	b. SI pump flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW	b. Start pumps and as necessary.	align valves
	c. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)	c. Go to Step 4.	
	d. RHR pump flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW	d. Start pumps and as necessary.	align valves

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier			3
	Group			
	K/A		2.1.35	
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating			3.9

Knowledge of the fuel-handling res	sponsibilities of SROs.
Question # 94	
Which of the following is a	a direct responsibility of the Fuel Handling Supervisor during CORE
ALTERATIONS in accorda	ance with RFO-101, Refueling Organization.
A. Performing fuel ass	sembly and insert component inspections.
B. Providing approved	Fuel Shuffle Sequence Sheets to the Refueling Crew.
5	assemblies to be loaded into the reactor have been properly
processed and insp	pected and are available for loading.
5	nmunications are maintained between the refueling area in
Containment, the fu	uel building, and the Control Room.
Answer: D	

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of direct responsibilities of the refueling SRO.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(7) Analysis requiring refueling floor SRO responsibilities.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because Performing fuel assembly and insert component inspections is a responsibility contained in RFO-101 but it is for the Core Performance Manager not the Fuel Handling Supervisor.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because providing approved Fuel Shuffle Sequence Sheets to the Refueling Crew is a responsibility contained in RFO-101 but it is for the Core Performance Manager not the Fuel Handling Supervisor.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because ensuring new fuel assemblies to be loaded into the reactor have been properly processed and inspected and are available for loading is a responsibility contained in RFO-101 but it is for the Core Performance Manager not the Fuel Handling Supervisor.
- D. Correct. Maintaining direct communication between the refueling area in Containment, the fuel building, and the Control Room during core alterations is a direct responsibility of the Fuel Handling Supervisor per RFO-101.

Technical Reference(s)	RFO-101	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given RFO-101, Refueling Organization, **DISCUSS** the Precautions, Limitations and major procedural actions IAW RFO-101. (OPD1.G16.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 7		

ommen	ts / Reference: RFO-101		Revision: 9
	CPNPP STATION REFUELING MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. RFO-101
	REFUELING ORGANIZATION	REVISION NO. 9 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 4 OF 11
5.0	Responsibilities During Refueling Operations		
5.1	Shift Operations Manager		
	 Designating qualified individuals to act as Fue refueling outage. 	el Handling Supervis	sors during a
5.2	Refuel Work Window Manager		
	 Coordinating and organizing qualified person Crews. 	nel for the Operation	ns Refueling
	 Coordinate efforts of contract personnel used Crews. 	d to support Operatio	ons Refueling
	 Provide oversight of the Control Room, Conta activities at least once per shift during core al 		uilding
	During core reload, provide oversight of shoe	ehorn operations.	
	 Coordinate additional oversight, particularly in supervision, off-duty Fuel Handling Superviso necessary. 		
[C] <mark>5.3</mark>	Fuel Handling Supervisor (SRO) [00860]		
	 Providing <u>direct supervision</u> of fuel handling ac reactor core and refueling cavity. 	ctivities and core alte	erations in the
	 Suspending Core Alterations and/or initiating a judgment, any conditions exist which threaten p fuel. 		
	 Ensuring that direct communications are maintained between the refueling area in Containment, the fuel building, and the Control Room when CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. 		
	 Coordinating fuel movement in the Containment and the Fuel Building in accordance with RFO-106. 		
	Overall responsibility for fuel movement.		

Examination Outline Cross-	reference:	Level	RO	SRO		
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier		3		
		Group				
		K/A	2.1.	.36		
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating		4.1		
Knowledge of procedures and limit	itations involved in core alteration	IS.				
Question # 95						
Given the following condi	tions:					
 Unit 1 performing a 	an off-load of the core du	ring refueling outage				
 ODA-308-3.9.0-S0 	1, Refueling Special Cor	ndition Surveillances. S	Section 2.			
	uired for Core Alterations			ng		
	the following information:			5		
•	or OPERABLE and the o					
	letrics SR monitor OPER		operable			
			operable			
(1) Which of the following	describes the operability	y status of the Nuclear	Instrument	ation?		
(2) Refueling cavity water	level OPERABLITY req	uires at least 23 feet al	bove the	_(2)		
A (1) Nuclear Instrum	nentation OPERABILITY	ic mot				
. ,		IS MEL				
(2) Reactor Vessel	nange					
D (1) Nuclear Instrum		in mont				
	nentation OPERABILITY	is met				
(2) top of the irradi	ated fuel assemblies					
C. (1) Nuclear Instrumentation OPERABILITY is NOT met						
(2) Reactor Vessel flange						
D. (1) Nuclear Instrun	D. (1) Nuclear Instrumentation OPERABILITY is NOT met					
(2) top of the irradi	ated fuel assemblies					
Answer: A						
	1					

K/A Match: K/A match due to

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS-required actions and terminology and 10 CFR 55.43(b)(6) Analysis requiring knowledge of TS bases for reactivity controls.

Explanation:


- A. Correct. First part is correct (see B). Second part is correct. Cavity level must be 23 feet above the vessel flange.
- B. Incorrect. First part is correct, any 2 of the 4 NIs, consisting of the SR NIs and the Gamma Metrics, are required to be operable. Second part is incorrect, but plausible as level would be required to be 23 feet above the fuel if the requirement was in the fuel building.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since until recently the operability of the nuclear instrumentation for refueling was based on either the SR NIs or the Gamma Metrics being operable in pairs, such that both of one set were required. Second part is correct (see A).
- D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	TS/B 3.9.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
	TS/B 3.9.7	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: Given access to Technical Specifications and a refueling activity, **APPLY** the appropriate specification. (OPD1.G16.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	52607	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.432/6		



Comments /	Comments / Reference: Bank 52607 Revision:		
 ODA-308 Surveilla implement So So So Go O 	preparing to commence off-load of the core for a refueling out 3-3.9.0-S01, Refueling Special Condition Surveillances, Section nces Required for Core Alterations/Movement of Irradiated Functed with the following information: bource Range Neutron Flux Monitor 1-NI-31 is OPERABLE. bource Range Neutron Flux Monitor 1-NI-32 is inoperable. amma-Metrics Source Range Flux Monitors 1-NI-50A and 1-N PERABLE. efueling Cavity water level is 856.5 feet and stable.	on 2, iel is being	
Which of the	e following describes:		
Whether or I	not the core off-load may commence or NOT?		
The reason	for making this decision?		
Α.	Core off-load may commence Nuclear Instrumentation OPERABILITY is met		
В.	Core off-load may NOT commence Nuclear Instrumentation OPERABILITY is NOT met		
C.	Core off-load may commence Refueling cavity water level OPERABILITY is met		
D.	Core off-load may NOT commence Refueling cavity water level OPERABILITY is NOT met		
Answer: D Answer Explanation			

mments / Reference: Bank	52607	Revision:
	ould be thought that the Gamma-Metrics for core off-load however refueling cavity	
	ould be thought that both N31 and N32 m the core however the Gamma-Metrics p for core off-load.	
to be ≥ 846 feet based	ould be thought that refueling cavity level on 23 feet above the top of the fuel asse 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange (NS.	mblies
	F begin because to move irradiated fuel a LTERATIONS) water level must be ≥ 857	
Question 541 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	0	
Difficulty:	3.00	
	1	
System ID:	52607	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT1586	
Cross Reference Number:	ADM.XA1.OB01.057	
Topic:	Unit 1 is preparing to commence off-loa for a refueling outage. ODA-308-3.9.0-S	
K/A:	G.2.1.36	
Question Reference:		
SRO:	Yes	
Comments:	LC22 Audit; S23E31 (Admin); S24E31 (S25E31 (Admin)	Admin);
	Ref: TS 3.9.3; TR 13.9.35; ODA-308-3.9	

omments / Reference: TS 3.9.3 Revision: 150				
		Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.3		
3.9 REFUELING OPERATION	s			
3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation				
LCO 3.9.3 Two sou	urce range neutron flux monitors shall be O	PERABLE.		
APPLICABILITY: MODE	6.			
ACTIONS	1			
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME		
 A. One required source range neutron flux monitor inoperable. 	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. AND	Immediately		
	A.2 Suspend operations that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.	Immediately		
 B. Two required source range neutron flux monitors inoperable. 	B.1 Initiate action to restore one source range neutron flux monitor to OPERABLE status.	Immediately		
	AND			
	B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1.	Once per 12 hours		
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1	AND 2 3.9-4	Amendment No. 150		

mments / Refere	nce: TSB 3.9.3	Revision: 78
		Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3
3.9 REFUELING O	PERATIONS	
B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instru	umentation	
BASES		
BACKGROUND	The source range neutron flux monitors and to monitor the core reactivity condition. The to the reactor vessel and detect neutrons four source range neutron flux monitors in The installed Westinghouse BF ₃ source ra- of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (N	ese detectors are located external leaking from the core. Any two of ay be used. ange neutron flux monitors are part
	neutron flux monitors are BF ₃ detectors o of the gas filled detector characteristic cur neutron flux in counts per second. The las of neutron flux (1E+6 cps). The detectors indication in the control room. The NIS is oriteria presented in Reference 1. Each p range neutron flux monitors has two trains independent Class 1E electrical train. The electrically separated in accordance with a	perating in the proportional region ve. The detectors monitor the strument range covers six decades also provide continuous visual designed in accordance with the ortion of the Westinghouse source and each is assigned to an ese trains are physically and
	A separate Gamma-Metrics Neutron Flux Installed to satisfy the requirements of Re "Instrumentation For Light-Watered-Coole Plant And Environs Conditions During An Gamma-Metrics NFMS monitors neutron 200% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) during system utilizes two separate Safety Catego neutron detectors for all ranges of neutron the Gamma-Metrics Instrumentation has to separate Class 1E electrical train. These electrically separated in accordance with a	gulatory Gulde 1.97, d Nuclear Power Plants To Assess d Following An Accident." The flux from the source range through all Modes of plant operation. This jory I (Class 1E) fission chamber in flux indication. Each portion of wo trains and each is assigned to a trains are physically and
	The source range neutron flux monitors d System function in Mode 6.	o not provide a Reactor Protection
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Two OPERABLE source range neutron flu a visual signal to alert the operator to une such as with a boron dilution accident (Re assembly.	xpected changes in core reactivity
	The source range neutron flux monitors s 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(II).	atisfy Criterion 3 of
		(continued)
COMANCHE DEAK -	UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.9-8	Revision 78

Comments / Reference: TS 3.	9.7	Revision: 156
	Refu	eling Cavity Water Level 3.9.7
		0.0.1
3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS		
3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Le	evel	
	g cavity water level shall be maintained ≥ 2 /essel flange.	3 ft above the top of
APPLICABILITY: During n	novement of irradiated fuel assemblies with	in containment.
ACTIONS		
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Refueling cavity water level not within limit.	A. Refueling cavity water level A.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel Imm not within limit. A.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel Imm	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN	NTS	
s	URVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.7.1 Verify refuelir reactor vesse	ng cavity water level is ≥ 23 ft above the top el flange.	of In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 A	AND 2 3.9-12 A	Amendment No. 150, 156

nments / Referenc	ce: TSB 3.9.7		Revision: 78	8
			Refueling Cavity Water Leve B 3.9	
			20.0	
3 3.9 REFUELING OF				
3 3.9.7 Refueling Cav	ity Water Level			
BASES				_
BACKGROUND	minimum water le During refueling, t Sufficient water is water in the event iodine activity wou	vel of 23 ft above the t this maintains sufficien necessary to retain io t of a fuel handling acc uld be retained to limit 100 limits, as provided	blies, within containment requires a op of the reactor vessel flange. t water level in the containment. dine fission product activity in the ident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient offsite doses from the accident to by the guidance of Reference 3 and	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	refueling cavity is fuel handling accid 1.195 (Ref. 1). A factor of 200 to be the assumption th cladding gap of al refueling cavity wa the following fraction 0.08 for I-131, 0.1 The fuel handling minimum water le Technical Require and test programs fuel handling accid are maintained with	an initial condition des dent in containment, a minimum water level of e used in the accident iat 99.5% of the total io I the dropped fuel asso ater. The fuel pellet to ions of the total fuel ro 0 for Kr-85, 0.05 for al accident analysis is de vel of 23 ft and a minin ements Manual (Ref. 7 s demonstrate that the dent is adequately cap thin allowable limits (R	I other iodines and noble gases. escribed in Reference 2. With a num decay time as described in the) prior to fuel handling, the analysis iodine release due to a postulated tured by the water and offsite dose	9
.co	flange is required postulated fuel ha	to ensure that the rad	of 23 ft above the reactor vessel ological consequences of a containment are within acceptable eference 3.	
			(continued	d)
COMANCHE PEAK - U	JNITS 1 AND 2	B 3.9-26	Revision 78	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:		Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier		3	
		Group			
		K/A	2.2.7	11	
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating		3.3	
Knowledge of the process for cont	trolling temporary design change	 S.			
Question # 96					
In accordance with STA-6	602, Temporary Modificat	tions,			
(1) Who is represented to		of a otivia Tampananan M	adificationa	and	
(1) Who is responsible for	r performing waikdowns (of active Temporary IV	odifications,	and	
(2) How often is the walk	down required to be perf	ormed?			
A. (1) Work Control C (2) Monthly	perations Supervisor				
B. (1) Work Control C(2) Quarterly	perations Supervisor				
C. (1) System Engine	C. (1) System Engineer				
(2) Monthly					
D. (1) System Engine (2) Quarterly	er				
Answer: D					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of the procedures associated with Temporary Modifications.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(3) requiring knowledge of administrative processes for temporary modifications.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since this individual maintains and files copies of Temporary Modifications including clearances. Second part is incorrect, but plausible as monthly is a reasonable period of time compared to quarterly.
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see A). Second part is correct (see D).
- C. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see A).
- D. Correct. First part is correct, per STA-602, 5.7.2, the System Engineer is responsible for performance of a quarterly walkdown of TMs associated with their system to ensure proper installation. Second part is correct, the walkdown is required quarterly.

Technical Reference(s)	STA-602	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the administrative requirements for operating plant equipment; performing routine watchstanding evolutions and maintaining system status and plant configuration control in accordance with ODA-106, STI-604.03, OWI-207, ODA-102, ODA-410, ODA-407, OWI-107, STA-694, STA-601 and OWI-409. (ADM.XA1.OB09)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	35501	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.433		

Comments /	Reference: Ba	ank 35501	Revision:		
In accordance with STA-602, Temporary Modifications, who is responsible for performing walkdowns of active Temporary Modifications, and how often is the walkdown performed?					
A.	Work Contro	ol Operations Supervisor; monthly			
В.	System Eng	ineer; monthly			
C.	Temporary I	Modification Coordinator; quarterly			
D.	Shift Manag	er; quarterly			
	Answer: C				
Answer Explanation					
	A.	Incorrect. Plausible since this individual maint copies of Temporary Modifications including of Action performed on a quarterly basis.			
	B.	Incorrect. Plausible since this individual review concurs with Temporary Modification requests coordinates, plans, designs, installs, tests and from Temporary Modifications. Action perform quarterly basis.	s. Also I restores		
	C. Correct. In accordance with STA-602, Step 6.9.2.				
D. Incorrect. Plausible since this individual maintains active and installed Temporary Modification files. Reviews and approves installation of Temporary Modifications.					

Comments / Reference: Bank 35501

Revision:

Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	0
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	35501
User-Defined ID:	ILOT8151
Cross Reference Number:	ADM.XA1.OB02.023
	·
	In accordance with STA-602, Temporary
Topic:	Modifications, who is responsible for performing
	walkdowns o
K/A:	G.2.2.11
Question Reference:	
SRO:	Yes
Comments:	LC16 NRC
	REF: STA-602

	STATION	CPNPP ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. STA-602
		RARY MODIFICATIONS AND IT EQUIPMENT PLACEMENTS	REVISION NO. 20 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 10 OF 39
NO	602-1 and a Resp Mana	al restoration is allowed <u>ONLY</u> if the "Partia 16 form is marked "YES", the scope is spec addressed in the Engineering evaluation. <i>A</i> onsible Engineer block is signed to indicat ager block of STA 602-15 form should be s orization of the partial restoration.	cifically defined in STA-6 After the scope is identifi e Engineering approval,	602-15 form ied and the , the Shift
	5.6.3	Authorizing restoration or partial restora STA-606 and Section 6.6 of this proced Operator of the TM restoration.		
	5.6.4	Ensuring marked up copies of drawings the Temporary Modification drawings st	-	
2]	5.6.5	The Shift Manager shall ensure that aud performed as determined by the Shift O affected drawings are attached. [25490]	perations Manager, ver	
.7	The Sys	tem Engineer is responsible for:		
	5.7.1	Reviewing and concurring with TM requ procedure, with the exception of leak re		this
	5.7.2	Being a point of contact (TM-owner) for during its life cycle. This includes the p ensure the TM is installed as described procedure. The SE will have the respon of planning, design, installation, testing,	erformance of a quarter in the TM Design Chan nsibility to ensure prope	ly walkdown to ge and this r coordination
	5.7.3	Performing a post installation and pre-re	estoration review of the	TM packages.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 2	Tier			3
	Group			
	K/A		2.2.12	2
Level of Difficulty: 3	Importance Rating	4.1		

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.				
Question # 97				

While operating at 100% power, it is discovered a 31 day Surveillance Requirement on a piece of Tech Spec equipment was overlooked and has NOT been performed for over 6 weeks.

What is the proper course of action?

- A. Delay calling the equipment INOPERABLE for up to 24 hours to allow performance of the Surveillance.
- B. Declare the equipment INOPERABLE at the time of discovery and delay complying with the LCO ACTION(s) for up to 24 hours.
- C. Declare the equipment INOPERABLE and enter LCO 3.0.3.
- D. Delay calling the equipment INOPERABLE for up to 31 days to allow performance of the Surveillance.

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of surveillance procedure administrative requirements.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) Analysis requiring knowledge of generic LCO requirements (LCO 3.0.1 through 3.0.7 and SR 4.0.1 through 4.0.4).

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible since 24 hours would be the time frame if the surveillance period were less than 24 hours, but the greater interval is permitted.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since the surveillance is used to determine operability, but the LCO does not need to be implemented until the extended time granted by SR 3.0.3 expires.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since the surveillance is used to determine operability, but SR 3.0.3 permits delaying the surveillance.
- D. Correct. If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is GREATER. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

Technical Reference(s)	TS SR 3.0.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
Comments / I		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DELINEATE** the role of surveillances into Operability in accordance with the Technical Specifications. (ADM.XA5.OB04)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	19387	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.432		



Comments / F	Reference: TS SR 3.0.3	Revision: 150
	SR Applic	cability 3.0
3.0 SURVEILL	ANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY	
SR 3.0.1	SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Fail meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveill shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance withi specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipme variables outside specified limits.	lure to lance, in the lin SR
SR 3.0.2	The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is perfor within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured fr the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified con of the Frequency is met.	rom
	For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does apply.	not
	If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per" I the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the in performance.	
	Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specification	s.
SR 3.0.3	If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specific Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the ill the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is per- to allow performance of the Surveillance.	ot met imit of
	If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO mu Immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must i entered. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delay (greater than 24 hours and the risk impact shall be managed.)	be
	When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.	, and
COMANCHE P	EAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.0-4 Amendment N	0. 150

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO		SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1	Tier			3
	Group			
	K/A	2.3.13		
Level of Difficulty: 2	Importance Rating			3.8

Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Question # 98

A clearance is to be implemented with the following conditions:

- Contact radiation on a piece of equipment is 5 R/hr
- Radiation level is 500 mrem/hr at 1 foot from the piece of equipment
- General area radiation for the room is 125 mrem/hr
- An operator must close and place a clearance tag on a valve which is located 8 feet away from the equipment
- It will take the operator 3 minutes to close the valve and place the clearance tag

The proper classification for the room is (1).

A waiver of the independent verification of the tag placement is __(2)__ by the Shift Manager.

A. (1) High Radiation Area(2) NOT allowed

B. (1) Radiation Area(2) NOT allowed

C. (1) Radiation Area (2) allowed

D. (1) High Radiation Area(2) allowed

Answer: D

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of radiological safe practices to minimize total exposure to personnel and authority of Shift Manager regarding waivers due to radiation levels.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(4) Analysis requiring analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to the selection of administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is correct (see D). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible since a radiation area is defined as an area where an individual can receive a dose equivalent in excess of 5 mrem in 1 hour at 30 cm (12 inches) from the radiation source, but being in excess of 100 mrem in 1 hour upgrades the classification to a High Radiation Area. Second part is incorrect, but plausible since the total dose that the operator will receive is below threshold of 10 mrem to waive (dose received will be approximately 2.6 mrem total), however dose rate is sufficient to allow waiver.
- C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is correct (see D).
- D. Correct. First part is correct. A high radiation area is defined as an area where an individual can receive a dose equivalent in excess of 100 mrem in 1 hour at 30 cm (12 inches) from the radiation source. Second part is correct. The dose rate of >100 mrem/hr allows this verification be waived. .halving the distance from a point source causes the intensity to increase by a factor of four. , although total exposure for verification is 8 mrem (160 mrem/hr for 3 minutes, 1/20th of hour), the dose rate of >100 mrem/hr allows this verification be waived.

Technical Reference(s)	Radiation Protection Practices LP	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	STA-694	Comments / Reference	
	STA-650		

Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **DESCRIBE** the administrative requirements for operating plant equipment; performing routine watchstanding evolutions and maintaining system status and plant configuration control in accordance with ODA-106, STI-604.03, OWI-207, ODA-102, ODA-410, ODA-407, OWI-107, STA-694, STA-601 and OWI-409. (ADM.XA1.OB09)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	33141	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis		X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 4		

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omments / Reference: Ba	nk 33141	Revision:			
A surveillance is to be perfor	rmed on a piece of equipment with the following o	conditions:			
Contact radiation on any	in montin E. D./hr				
	em/hr at 12 inches from equipment or the room is 125 mrem/hr				
Which of the following is the	proper classification for the room?				
A. Radiation Area	a				
B. High Radiation	n Area				
C. Locked High F	Radiation Area				
D. Very High Rac	diation Area				
Answer: B					
Answer Explanation	1				
•	ole as this is an area with > 5mr/hr				
A. Incorrect - Flausible as this is an area with > 5mi/m					
	_				
B. Correct - STA-650	D				
C. Incorrect - Plausil	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr				
C. Incorrect - Plausil					
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test?	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice?	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No				
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C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2				
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C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT A surveillance is to be performed on a piec				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT A surveillance is to be performed on a piec equipment with the following conditions: Contact				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT A surveillance is to be performed on a piec equipment with the following conditions:				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic: K/A: Question Reference:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT A surveillance is to be performed on a piec equipment with the following conditions: Contact				
C. Incorrect - Plausil D. Incorrect - Plausil Question 57 Info Question Type: Status: Always select on test? Authorized for practice? Points: Time to Complete: Difficulty: System ID: User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number: Topic:	ble as this is an area with > 1R/hr ble as this is an area with >500R/hr Multiple Choice Active No No 1.00 2 2.00 33141 ILOT A surveillance is to be performed on a piec equipment with the following conditions: Contact 2.3.13				

	Radiation Protection Practices LP Revision: 00-0001
021ADMRAD	Page 12 of 17
	LESSON PLAN
NOTES	LESSON OUTLINE
	 In accordance with the policy of minimizing total dose equivalent, respiratory protection equipment may be used to minimize internal exposure and protective clothing may be used to minimize skin contamination; and
	 Limit exposures received under these conditions to once in a lifetime.
bjective 7	E. Heat Stress
	1. Heat Stress Action Time (AT)
	A time point at which a supervisor or observer initially asks for explicit confirmation from individual workers that they can safely continue to work. This should be repeated at intervals called Check Times (CT). The AT may be compared with Anticipated Work Time for job planning.
	2. Heat Stress Check Time (CT)
	CT will be either five (5) minutes, for AT of 30 minutes or less, or ten (10) minutes for AT greater than 30 minutes.
	3. Heat Stress Stay Time
	 a. Two times the Action Time. The maximum time that workers will be <u>allowed</u> to continue working in the permitted work location. b. Example: AT is 27 minutes - Stay Time would be 2×27 = 54 minutes.
bjective 8	F. Time/Distance/Shielding Calculations
ojecuve o	1. Dose: Point source
	$D = Distance$ $DR = Dose rate (DR_1)(D_1)^2 = (DR_2)(D_2)^2$
00 mrem / 2000 hrs =	Airborne dose =
5 mr/DAC-hr	(DACs)(time)(2.5mr/DAC-hr)/(p.f.) or (DAC-hrs)(2.5mr/DAC-hr)/(p.f.) p.f. = respirator protection factor
	3. Stay time =
	(Dose limit)/(Dose Rate)
	4. Shielding
	 a. ½" lead blankets will reduce radiation levels by ~24% (RPI- 608)
	DOD TRADIDIC LICE ONLY Rev. 00 0001
	FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Rev 00.0001

	CPNPP STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. STA-650
	GENERAL HEALTH PHYSICS PLAN	REVISION NO. 9 INFORMATION USE	Page 4 of 13
4.3	<u>Annual Limit on Intake (ALI)</u> – means the derived li material taken into the body of an adult worker by in is the smaller value of intake of a given radionuclide would result in a committed effective dose equivaler dose equivalent of 50 rems (0.5 Sv) to any individua	halation or ingestion in a in a year by the referenc it of 5 rems (0.05 Sv) or a	year. ALI e man that
4.4	<u>Contaminated Area</u> – an area having smearable conta 1000 dpm/100 cm ² (100 net counts per minute using gamma or 20 dpm/100 cm ² alpha.		
4.5	<u>DAC-Hour</u> – the product of the concentration of radia a fraction or multiple of the derived air concentration of exposure to the radionuclide, in hours. 2,000 DAC	1 for each radionuclide) a	•
4.6	<u>Derived Air Concentration (DAC)</u> – the concentration which, if breathed by the reference man for a workin conditions of light work, results in an intake of 1 AL Appendix B, Table 2.	g year of 2,000 hours un	der
4.7	<u>High Contamination Area (HCA)</u> – An area where the surface contamination equal to or greater than 100,00		
4.8	High Radiation Area (HRA) - any area, accessible to		
4.0	levels from radiation sources external to the body co dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 rem in 1 hour at 30 30 cm from any surface that the radiation penetrates.	uld result in an individua om from the radiation sou	l receiving a
4.0	levels from radiation sources external to the body co dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 rem in 1 hour at 30 (uld result in an individua om from the radiation sou essible to individuals in m per hour (but less than	1 receiving a arce or which deep 1 500 rads in
4.9	 levels from radiation sources external to the body co dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 rem in 1 hour at 30 (30 cm from any surface that the radiation penetrates. <u>Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA)</u> – any area acc dose equivalent rates are greater than or equal to 1 re one hour at 1 meter) 30 cm from the source of radiat 	uld result in an individua om from the radiation sou essible to individuals in om per hour (but less than ion or from any surface to n which radiation levels of s of 5 mrem in 1 hour at 2	1 receiving a arce or which deep a 500 rads in hat the could result
4.9	levels from radiation sources external to the body co dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 rem in 1 hour at 30 of 30 cm from any surface that the radiation penetrates. <u>Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA)</u> – any area acc dose equivalent rates are greater than or equal to 1 re one hour at 1 meter) 30 cm from the source of radiat radiation penetrates. <u>Radiation Area</u> – an area, accessible to individuals, if in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess the radiation source or from any surface that the radia	uld result in an individua om from the radiation south esssible to individuals in om per hour (but less than ion or from any surface to n which radiation levels of s of 5 mrem in 1 hour at 2 ation penetrates. sed radioactive material if ix C, 10CFR20, is used of d within process equipm	1 receiving a rce or which deep 500 rads in hat the could result 30 cm from n an amount r stored. ent or

	STATI	CPNPP ON ADMINISTRATION MANUAL		PROCEDURE NO. STA-694			
	STATION VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES		REVISION NO. 8 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 24 OF 68			
6.6	Exceptions to Verification Performance						
	6.6.1 The Shift Manager may waive requirements for Independent Verification or Concurrent Verification under any of the following conditions:						
	 (If significant radiation exposures (>10 mrem) are likely 						
		In areas of high radiation dose rates	(>100 mrem/hr)				
		In areas where other personnel haza	ards exist				
		In Containment during MODES 1, 2,	3 or 4				
	6.6.2	Independent Verification and Concurren performance of, or in response to abnor manipulation of plant systems prescribe (ERGs), Abnormal Condition Procedures (ALMs).	mal operating conditions. E d by the Emergency Operati	xamples include ing Procedures			
	6.6.3		ification activities should not routinely be required on a system components which in an "out-of-service" condition or are being placed into an "out-of-service" indition.				
			ep 6.1.5.G describes circumstances that may warrant Independent Verification ivities when components are placed in an out of service condition.				
	6.6.4	6.6.4 Verification of a component position which has previously been aligned and verified in accordance with another station procedure (e.g., the locked valve program or a clearance) is not required.					
		The procedure used to establish that the aligned and verified should be reviewed locked valve position is verified by the Li Component Deviation Log should be rev	to ensure the controls are in ocked Component List, the I	n place (e.g., lf a Locked			
	6.6.5	Vent, drain and test connection valve po Attachment 8.A during the initial lineup o isolation valve boundary described in St	or when they are within the C				
		Subsequent to the initial lineup, Indepentest connections are not required unless isolation valve boundary described in St	they are located within the				
	6.6.6		rtment Directors/Managers should make the final determination whether specific nstances warrant additional exceptions to the requirements listed in Sections 6.2				

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:		Level	RO	SRO	
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier		3	
		Group			
		K/A	2.4	.22	
Level of Difficulty: 3		Importance Rating		4.4	
Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.					
Question # 99					
Civen the following condit	iono				
Given the following condit	ions:				
 Unit 1 responding t 					
	G status tree ORANGE p	ath causes a transition	to FRC-0	20	
Response to Degra				273,	
	e of FRC-0.2A, the COR	E COOLING status tre	e changes	from	
ORANGE to YELL			ve enangee		
An ORANGE path	exists on the CONTAIN	MENT status tree			
•	se to High Containment		dure refere	nced by	
the CONTAINMEN	0	, I		,	
Which of the following is the	he required action?				
A Complete EDC 0.2	A and than as to EDZ A				
•	A and then go to FRZ-0.	TA SINCE CONTAINIVIE	INT IS A IOV	ver	
priority path than C	ORE COOLING.				
		o o bighor priority thou		1/ noth	
	nce an ORANGE path ha	as a higher phonty that	Ta YELLOV	n pain.	
Completion of FRC	-0.2A is NOT needed.				
C Complete EBC 0.2	A ap antry into ED7 0 1	ia NOT poodod aipoo i	t would have	va haan	
•	A as entry into FRZ-0.1		t would hav	e been	
addressed by the p	performance of steps in E	:OP-1.0A.			
	Dea an ORANCE noth he	a bighor priority that		// nath	
	nce an ORANGE path ha		TA TELLO	n pain.	
Return to complete	FRC-0.2A after FRZ-0.	A IS addressed.			
Answer: A					

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring the ability to prioritize safety functions during an event.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Upon entry to a RED or ORANGE path FRG, the procedure is performed to completion unless a higher RED or ORANGE path procedure is encountered, even if the path clears or becomes YELLOW before completion. Since CORE COOLING is a higher priority than CONTAINMENT, FRC-0.2 is completed before FRZ-0.1 is addressed.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible since if these conditions had been identified prior to entering FRC-0.2, then FRZ-0.1 would be the higher priority, but incorrect since FRC-0.2 is to be completed even though it has turned YELLOW.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible since entry into FRZ-0.1 would not be required if the steps were performed in EOP-1.0 and an ORANGE path did not exist. The crew would enter FRZ-0.1 and immediately transition out at Step 1 in this case.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible since if these conditions had been identified prior to entering FRC-0.2, then FRZ-0.1 would be the higher priority, but incorrect since FRC-0.2 is to be completed even though it has turned YELLOW.

Technical Reference(s)	ODA-407	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:

Learning Objective: **STATE** when an operator is allowed/required to exit an FRG and the requirements for completion of an FRG exited before it is complete in accordance with ODA-407, Operations Department Procedure Use and Adherence. (ERG.XD2.OB18)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	23165	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	LC26	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		

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CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet



Comments /	Comments / Reference: Bank 23165 Revision:						
Given the fol	Given the following conditions:						
 A COI Response During ORAN An OF FRZ-0 	 The crew is responding to a large break LOCA A CORE COOLING status tree ORANGE path causes a transition to FRC-0.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling. During performance of FRC-0.2, the CORE COOLING status tree changes from ORANGE to YELLOW. An ORANGE path exists on the CONTAINMENT status tree. FRZ-0.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, is the procedure referenced by the CONTAINMENT status tree. 						
Which of the	following is the required action?						
Α.	A. Complete FRC-0.2 and then go to FRZ-0.1 since CONTAINMENT is a lower priority path than CORE COOLING						
В.	B. Go to FRZ-0.1 since an ORANGE path has a higher priority than a YELLOW path. Completion of FRC-0.2 is NOT needed						
C.	Complete FRC-0.2 after completing FRZ-0.1, since the CORE COOLING status tree had been in an ORANGE path						
D.	D. Perform FRC-0.2 and FRZ-0.1 together, since FR procedures of the same priority can be executed together.						
Answ							
	ver Explanation						
 Explanation: A is wrong. Must complete the core cooling first, even though its color did change to lower status after you entered it. B is wrong. You must finish the core cooling FRG first. C is correct. Per the ODA-407 you must complete the core cooling FRG and then go back to containment since it is a lower priority D is wrong. Orange on containment does not take priority over orange (when you entered it) for core cooling. 							

Comments / Reference: Bank 23165 Revision:		
Question 55 Info		
-	Multiple Chains	
Question Type: Status:	Multiple Choice Active	
	No	
Always select on test? Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	0	
Difficulty:	0.00	
Difficulty.	10.00	
System ID:	23165	
User-Defined ID:	ILOT5977	
Cross Reference		
Number:	ERG.XD2.OB15.001	
	Given the following conditions: The crew	
Topic:	responding to a large break LOCA A CO	RE
	COOLING statu	
K/A:	G.2.4.16	
Question Reference:		
SRO:	YES	
Comments:	R21E13RM; R/S22E14; R24E23RM	
	REF: ERG.XD2.LN; ODA-407	
	KA Match: This question matches the k	(A by
	requiring the ability to prioritize safety fur	nctions
	during an event.	
	SRO ONLY: NUREG 1021, ES-401, Att	achment 2
	E Assessment of Facility Conditions and	
	of Appropriate Procedures during Norma	al, Abnormal,
	of Appropriate Procedures during Norma and Emergency Situations	
		<u>-</u>

OPERATIO	NS DEPARTN	CPNPP IENT ADMINIST	RATION MANUA	L.	PROCEDURE NO. ODA-407
P		INS DEPARTME		REVISION NO. 17 INFORMATION USE	PAGE 25 OF 63
			ATTACHME PAGE 7 C		
			ERG RULES O	FUSAGE	
pre-de		I Safety Functio		Ts) are used to evaluate th and Cladding, Reactor Co	
				der of priority: Subcriticality (Z), Inventory (I).	y (S), Core Cooling
• Th	e CSFSTs a	re statused with	h color-coding a	ind line pattern-coding with	the following
	2	t to least priorit	·	ed to describe the status th	at represents an
ex	treme challe	nge of the parti	cular safety fun	ction.	ac represents an
<u>OF</u> re	RANGE (Da presents a <u>se</u>	shed line with a evere challenge	two-thirds share of the particula	ded pie) - Used to describe ar safety function.	the status that
				d ple) - Used to describe th	e status that
				ticular safety function. Used to describe the status	s that represents a
83	tisfied condit	ion of the partic	ular safety fund	ction.	-
an	e answered t	based on plant (conditions at the	ree with a branch of question e time, and the appropriate raluation is complete when	branch line
		ied status is de		and the complete when	
_					
c	OLOR	LINE	SYMBOL CODE	STATUS/RESPONSE	
F	ED	—	\bullet	The critical safety function is under e challanges: immediate operator actio required.	
	RANGE			The critical safety function is under s challinges: prompt operator action is required.	
	ELLOW	••••		The critical safety function condition satisfied. Operator action may be to	
-			\cap	The critical safety function is staffer No operator action is needed.	1.
Y	REEN		\square		

Comments / Reference: ODA-407 Revision: 17 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION MANUAL ODA-407 REVISION NO. 17 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PAGE 26 OF 63 PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.A PAGE 8 OF 25 ERG RULES OF USAGE 10. The CSFST evaluation determines the condition of Critical Safety Functions. The following Rules of Priority describe the appropriate operator action based on the CSFST conditions. IF a RED status is encountered, <u>THEN</u> the operator is required to immediately stop (do not complete the step in progress) any Optimal Recovery Guideline (ORG) in progress AND perform the required Functional Restoration Guideline (FRG). IF during performance of a RED condition FRG, a RED status of higher priority arises, THEN the higher priority condition should be addressed first AND the lower priority RED condition FRG suspended (complete the step in progress). After the higher priority FRG is completed and guidance is given to "return to procedure and step in effect", the previous FRG which was being performed prior to the transition should be re-entered (performed). Performance (re-entry) to the previous FRG being performed is required even if the lower priority condition has cleared in order to complete response and recovery actions that had previously been started. IF any ORANGE status is encountered, the operator is expected to monitor all of the remaining CSFSTs, THEN if no RED status is encountered, suspend any ORG in progress (complete the step in progress) AND perform the FRG required by the ORANGE status. <u>IF</u> during performance of an ORANGE condition FRG, a RED status or higher priority ORANGE status arises, THEN the RED or higher priority ORANGE condition is to be addressed first AND the original ORANGE condition FRG suspended (complete the step in progress). IF a FRG specifically states that a higher priority condition should NOT be addressed, this requirement does not apply. After the higher priority FRG is completed and guidance is given to "return to procedure and step in effect", the previous FRG which was being performed prior to the transition should be re-entered (performed). Performance (re-entry) to the previous FRG being performed is required even if the lower priority condition has cleared in order to complete response and recovery actions that had previously been started. Once a FRG is entered due to a RED or ORANGE condition, that FRG is performed to the point of a defined transition regardless of whether the RED or ORANGE has cleared.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:		Level	RO	SRO
Rev. Date: Rev. 1		Tier		3
		Group		
		K/A	2.4	.44
Level of Difficulty: 2		Importance Rating		4.4
Knowledge of emergency plan pro	atactivo action recommondations			
Knowledge of emergency plan pro				
Question # 100				
Per EPP-304, Protective	Action Recommendation	c initial DARs are issue	ad at the	(1)
				()
Emergency Classification			Emergend	,y
Coordinator and the(2	.)·			
A. (1) Site Area				
(2) STA				
D (1) Site Area				
B. (1) Site Area				
(2) US				
C (1) Conorol				
C. (1) General				
(2) STA				
D. (1) General				
(2) US				
	1			
Answer: C				

K/A Match: K/A match due to requiring knowledge of when emergency plan protective action recommendations are implemented and the positions that formulate the PAR.

SRO Only: SRO Only due to 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Analysis requiring knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible (see B). Second part is correct (see C).
- B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, but plausible because a Site Area Emergency is the next lower classification below the General Emergency when PARs are required and it is plausible that PARs would be issued at this EAL Classification. Second part is incorrect, but plausible if it is assumed that the US on the affected unit would function as the second SRO concurrence on PARs as is the case for other activities such as ERG deviations, etc.
- C. Correct. First part is correct. In accordance with EPP-304, PARs are issued upon declaration of a GE. Second part is correct. The STA aids the EC in developing PARs from the Control Room.
- D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see C). Second part is incorrect, but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s)	EPP-304	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination:


Learning Objective: **IDENTIFY** the ERO position holders responsible for PARs in each facility, in accordance with EPP-304. (PAR.OW5.OB01)

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	62572	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.435		

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CPNPP 2021-08 NRC Written Exam Worksheet





Comments / Reference: EPP-304	Revision: 22				
CPNPP EMERGENCY PLAN MANUAL		PROCE EPP-30	EDURE NO. 4		
PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS	REVISION NO. 22	PAGE	10 OF 27		
REFERENCE USE 4.10.6 A PAR to Shelter-in-Place should be for the shortest time possible and then a new PAR developed per Attachment 1.F (Expanded PAR Flowchart). 4.11 Developing a PAR Exceeding 10-Mile EPZ 4.11.1 If dose projections exceed EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the outer boundary of the 10-Mile EPZ, then • Complete the PAR and notify the Department of Public Safety (DPS), Hood County, and Somervell County. • Once the PAR has been issued, contact the Texas Department of State Health Services / Radiological Control 24-hour emergency number listed in the ERF Phone Directory and notify them of the dose projections outside of the 10-Mile EPZ. The CPNPP ERO, with the Texas Department of State Health Services / Radiological Control, should provide information for a PAR outside of the 10-Mile EPZ. • Verify dose projection with field team measurements as quickly as possible. • If field team measurement supports the dose projection, then recommend to the					
Emergency Coordinator that PARs be e the downwind sectors greater than 10-M not exceeded. 4.12 <u>Responsibilities</u> 4.12.1 The Emergency Planning Manager is responsib procedure current. 4.12.2 The Emergency Coordinator is responsible to p	Miles in 2-mile increment	nts until	PAGs are		
Recommendations (PARs) for areas within the agencies as quickly as possible, but in no case classifying and/or reclassifying an emergency, In the Control Room, the Emergency (Advisor formulate PARs) 	10-Mile EPZ to County later than fifteen (15) m or after a change in the	and Sta inutes a PARs.	fter		
 In the Technical Support Center (TS) Facility (EOF), the On-site Radiologic Off-site Radiological Assessment Coor Protection Coordinator (RPC) respectiv action recommendations for the Emergy responsible to coordinate or designate s recommendations related activities. 	al Assessment Coordina dinator (OffRAC), and rely are responsible to for ency Coordinator. They	tor (On the Radi ormulate are also	RAC), the ation protective		