

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

SEG

SITE:	PBNP	Revision #: 0	
LMS ID:	PBN LOI NRC 22E	LMS Rev. Date:	
SEG TITLE:	2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1		
SEG TYPE:	□Training	⊠ Evaluation	
PROGRAM:	□ LOCT ⊠ LOIT □ Other:		
DURATION:	90 minutes		
Developed by:	-		
Reviewed by:	Instructor/Developer Jeff Hinze	Date	
	Instructor (Instructional Review)	Date	
Validated by:	John Rogers SME (Technical Review)	 Date	
Approved by:	Adam Moore		
	Training Supervision	Date	
Approved by:			
	Training Program Owner (Line) Date		



SEG Page 2 of 30

Facility: _	Point Bead	<u>ch</u> S	Scenario No.:	1	Op-Test No.: <u>2021</u>		
Examiner	s:			Operators:			
				-			
Initial Con	ditions: Re	actor power	is 28% for flu	x mapping. G03	3, EDG is out of service due to		
		-			transmitter (Red) removed from		
			-		, ,		
service.	service.						
Turnover:_	Raise powe	er to 50% at	15% per hour	per OP 1C, Sta	artup to Power Operations.		
Critical Ta	Critical Tasks:_CT-24, Energize At Least One Emergency Bus						
	 						
_C1-25, N	CT-25, Manually Start SW Pump For EDG Cooling						
Event	Event Malf. Event Event						
No.	No.	Type*		[Description		
		R-RO	Normal Up F	Power			
1		N-BOP					

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1		R-RO N-BOP N-SRO	Normal Up Power	
2		R-BOP C-RO C-SRO TS-SRO	Single Dropped Rod 2019 Repeat	
3		C-BOP C-SRO TS-SRO	1HC-478, SG B Atmospheric Steam Dump controller fails in auto, valve fully opens, in manual will only close to 10%, requiring local manual isolation valve operation New	
4		M-ALL	Loss of All AC Power 'A' Train EDG success path	
5		C-BOP C-SRO	P-32A/B SW Pumps do not Auto Start after Restoration of 'A' Train EDG New	
6		C-RO C-SRO	Multiple (4) Stuck Rods Post Trip, requires boration 2017 Repeat	
* (1	N)ormal, (R)eactivity,	(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor	



SEG

Page 3 of 30

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS

Terminal Objective:

Given the site simulator and specific plant conditions, the students will be able to respond to various plant abnormal and emergency events, in accordance with site procedures and technical Specifications.

Enabling Objectives:

1. None.

Prerequisites:

1. Simulator available

2. Students enrolled in Initial License Program

Training
Resources:

1. Floor Instructor as Shift Manager / Shift Technical Advisor

2. Simulator Booth Operator

3. Communicator

4. NRC Evaluators

References:

1. OP 1C, Startup to Power Operation

2. AOP-1D, CVCS Malfunction

3. AOP-2A, Secondary Coolant Leak

4. AOP-6A, Dropped

5. AOP-24, response to Instrument Malfunction

6. EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

7. EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response

8. ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power

9. OM 3.7, AOP And EOP Procedure Usage For Response To Plant

Transients

10. Technical Specifications Manual

11. Technical Requirements Manual

Protected Content:

None

Evaluation Mothers

Simulator performance will be evaluated in accordance with

Method: NUREG 1021.

Operating Experience:

None

Risk Significant Operator Actions:



SEG Page 4 of 30

UPDATE LOG: Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions made to the material after initial approval.

#	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	REASON FOR CHANGE	AR/TWR#	PREPARER REVIEWER	DATE DATE
0	Developed for the 2021 ILT NRC Exam				



SEG Page 5 of 30

OVERVIEW / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

OVERVIEW

Initial conditions for the scenario are: reactor power is stable at approximately 28%, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) G03 is out of service for maintenance with G04 aligned to 1A-06 and 2A-06, and 1LT-426 Pressurizer Level channel is removed from service.

Examinees will initiate a power ascension per OP-1C. The crew will then be required to respond to a dropped rod and an instrument failure per AOPs. The crew will also respond to a loss of all AC safeguards power, Service Water pump failures, and stuck control rods using emergency procedures.

The scenario will be terminated when the crew completes through Step 6 of EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

	OLQUEITO LA			
Event #	Description			
1.	OP 1C Power Ascension			
	The crew will raise reactor power approximately 3% to 5% utilizing the provided reactivity plan.			
2.	Dropped Rod – K9			
	 Rod K9 will drop to the bottom of the core, causing automatic outward rod motion. The crew will respond per AOP-6A, Dropped Rod, to stop outward rod motion and stabilize the plant. The SRO will address Technical Specifications 			
3.	1HC-478, Loop B ADV Hand Controller, Fails High			
	 The S/G B ADV Controller fails high causing the associated atmospheric steam dump valve (ADV) to open. The crew will respond per AOP-2A, Secondary Leak, and AOP-24, Response to Instrument Malfunction to isolate the 'B' S/G ADV and stabilize the plant. The SRO will address Technical Specifications. 			
4.	Loss of All AC Safeguards Power to Unit 1			
	 The loss of Station Transformer 1X-04 and the failures of Emergency Diesel Generators to automatically restore safeguards power results in a loss of all AC safeguards power to Unit 1. The crew will respond per ECA-0.0 to trip Unit 1 reactor and restore power to a safeguards bus. 			



SEG Page 6 of 30

5.	'A' Train Service Water Pumps Fail to Start				
	 Upon power restoration, 'A' Train Service Water pumps will fail to automatically start. The crew will start Service Water pumps to ensure adequate Service Water cooling flow per ECA-0.0. 				
6.	Stuck Rods (4)				
	 When the reactor is tripped, rods B6, B8, C5, and E11 will be stuck at their initial fully withdrawn positions. The crew will respond by borating the RCS to ensure adequate shutdown margin per EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. 				
	Terminate the scenario when crew has completed Step 6 of EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, or per Lead Evaluator.				



SEG Page 7 of 30

SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS

Perform simulator set up per the site specific Simulator Setup Checklist.

Check	Action		
1.	Reset to IC-30		
2.	Perform Simulator Setup Checklist		
3.	Open schedule file. Z:\2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files\ILT NRC Scenario 1		
4.	To record SBT data:		
	Launch "SBT Report" from Thunderbar		
	2. Open "Scenario Validation Checklist.sbt" (TRex_PB\Lightning)		
5.	Take schedule(s) to run		
6.	Verify required event file(s) open if required		
7.	Take sim to run		
8.	Place turnover sheets on RO desk		
9.	Place reactivity sheets on RO desk		
10.	Guard the following:		
	J G01, G02, G04 EDG's		
	Place the following OOS:		
	J G03 EDG		
) 1LT-426 Pressurizer Level		
	Place red dots on the G03 alarm and PZR Level:		
	J C02 E 2-1		
	C02 E 2-2		
) 1C04 1C 3-3		
11.	Conduct simulator crew pre-scenario brief using TR-AA-230-1007-F06, Simulator		
	Instructor Pre-Exercise Checklist.		
	Brief the scenario evaluators		
) Brief surrogates using TR-AA-230-1007-F11, Surrogate Brief Checklist, if		
	necessary		
12.	Run Scenario		
13.	To save SBT Data:		
	1. In the SBT Report program click the Generate Report icon (green arrow)		
	2. In Test Title enter a unique test title, to be same as file name		
	3. In report name enter the location the test files are to be saved, use same file name		
	as Test Title		
	4. Click "Generate" (generates and saves two files in the selected folder)		
	5. Verify files saved in the selected folder		
	6. The generated report and SBT Report program may now be closed		
	7. Collect procedure markups for SBT		
	8. Save any InSight, Alarm, Event, Schedule Files to the secure drive that were in		
14.	USE		
14.	Reset simulator to appropriate IC.		

SEG Page 8 of 30

BOOTH OPERATOR BRIEFING:

Review the scenario sequence, event triggers and expected field communications.

Z:/2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC Scenario 1.sch

At Time	On Event	Action	Description
		Preloads / Initial Conditions	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1DSG001B	DIESEL G03 FAILURE TO START
00:00:00		Insert malfunction XMT1RCS007C to -15	1-LT426 PRZR NARROW RANGE LEVEL FIXED BIAS
		Event 2: Dropped Rod	
	1	Insert malfunction MAL1CRF002-K9 on event 1	ROD DROP K9
		Event 3: SG B ADV Controller (HC-478) fails High	
	3	Insert malfunction CNH1PCS013E to 100.00000 on event 3	1-HC478 LOOP B ATM SD HAND CONTROLLER FIXED AUTO ONLY
	4	Insert malfunction VLV1SGN009D to 0.10000 on event 4	1-MS-2015 SG B ATMOSPHERIC STM DMP CONTROL FAIL POSITION
		Insert remote LOA1SGN026 to 0 in 10	1MS-244 SG B ATMOS STM DMP INLET
		Event 4: Loss of AC	
	5	Insert malfunction MAL1EPS002 on event 5	LOSS OF LOW VOLTAGE STATION AUX TRANSFORMER X04
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1DSG001 to Failasis	1-A5260 DIESEL GEN NO. G01 TO BUS 1-A05
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1DSG007A	EDG G01 FAILURE TO AUTOSTART
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1DSG004 to Failasis	1-A5286 G04 TO 1A06 BRK 86
		Event 5: SW Pumps DO not Auto Start	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1SWS001 to Fail_Auto_CI	1-B5210C P-32A SERVICE WATER PUMP CKTBKR
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1SWS002 to Fail_Auto_CI	1-B5211C P-32B SERVICE WATER PUMP CKTBKR
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1SWS006 to Fail_Auto_CI	2-B5234B P-32F SERVICE WATER PUMP CKTBKR
		Event 6: Stuck Rods Post-Trip	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1CRF001-B6 to Non-Trippable	STUCK ROD B6
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1CRF001-B8 to Non-Trippable	STUCK ROD B8
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1CRF001-C5 to Non-Trippable	STUCK ROD C5
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1CRF001-E11 to Non-Trippable	STUCK ROD E11
		Insert remote LOA1CVC054 to 1.0000 in 5	1CV-350 BA TO CHG PP SUCT MOV 1-350
00:00:00		Event Z:/2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC 1.evt	

Event file: Trigger 4 inserts when 1HC-478 is in MANUAL (x13i263m == 1)

SEG Page 9 of 30

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS

Bolded steps are Verifiable Actions taken by the Operators.

(IA) actions are those allowed to be taken from memory, before referencing the procedure, as allowed by OM 3.7, Attachment F, AOP Actions Allowed From Memory.

Event # 1	OP 1C Power Ascension				
ACTION	Booth: None				
STUDENT RESPONSE	BOP/RO Derform actions as directed.				
	SRO J Implements OP 1C starting at Step 5.37.				
	 Crew 5.37 Commence Load Escalation (Per the crew's reactivity plan.) 5.37.1 ESTIMATE the amount of dilution/rod motion needed for desired load change, and REFER to PPCS Xenon program for timing estimates. (SRO directs; RO performs) 5.37.2 IF rate of load escalation is to be greater than or equal to 15% per hour, THEN CONTACT Chemistry for primary sampling requirements. (no actions needed) 5.37.3 PERFORM the following to begin raising load: (SRO directs, BOP performs) a. ENSURE EH Control in OPER AUTO, 1st Stage IN. b. ENSURE the Valve Position Limiter (VPL) is set to the desired position. c. SET Turbine Controls for desired ramp rate per table below: 				
	% per Thumbwheel INITIAL Hour Setting or N/A 3 6 12 8				
	15 10 30 15 (The setting depends on the decision of the crew)				
	 d. ADJUST Turbine Setter to desired turbine load AND DEPRESS GO pushbutton. (BOP uses the up/down arrow buttons, in the Reference Control section of Turbine Control, to set the desired end point.) 5.38 Continuous Action During Power Increase 5.38.1 MAINTAIN controls in AUTO as practicable: Blender controls (RO) Turbine controls (BOP) 5.38.2 MAINTAIN Control Banks within the insertion, sequence, and overlap limits specified in the COLOR. LCO 3.1.6 (RO) 5.38.3 MAINTAIN Tavg within 1.5°F of Tref. (RO) SET desired quantity on 1YIC-11A, Dilution Flow Counter SET desired flow rate on 1HC-111, Reactor Makeup Water Flow Controller 				



SEG Page 10 of 30

	PLACE Reactor Makeup Mode Selector Switch in DILUTE ENSURE SHUT CV-110A, BA to Z-1 Blender Flow Control Valve PLACE Reactor Makeup Control Switch to START ENSURE Dilution Flow Counter functions properly upon start MONITOR system for proper response		
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Brief the crew to maintain rod control in AUTO. Rod control may be taken to MANUAL to make adjustment to Tavg or AFD, but should be returned to AUTO following rod motion. Direct the crew to proceed with power ascension as briefed.		
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After a power increase of approximately 3% to 5%, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.		



SEG Page 11 of 30

Event # 2	Dropped Rod – K9		
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator		
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: Rod Bottom Light control rod K-9, Control Bank A Control rod K-9 IRPI at approximately 0 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION (1C04 1A 3-3) POWER RANGE ROD DROP (1C04 1A 4-5) ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP (1C04 1A 1-4) Power Range NIs drop to between 19% and 24%		
	BOP/RO Diagnoses the dropped rod and takes manual control of rods. (RO) Suspends the load ramp if in progress. (BOP)		
	SRO J Implements AOP-6A, Dropped Rod		
	Crew (SRO directs) 1. Check Only One Rod Dropped (RO) 2. Check Main Turbine – ON LINE (BOP) 3. (IA) Place Control Rod Bank Selector Switch in – MANUAL (RO) 4. (IA) Check Tavg – TRENDING TO PROGRAM VALUE; RNO: Restore Tavg to program value by adjusting turbine load. (BOP) This may be completed by either of b or c (as determined by the SRO): a. Determine the amount of load reduction needed. b. Select TURBINE MANUAL and use GV down pushbutton c. In OPER AUTO, set the reference setter to the desired value by using the Reference Control down and up buttons; then press GO. 5. Maintain RCS Tavg: (Continuous Action Step [C.A.S.] for RO to monitor throughout the procedure) 6. Notify the following personnel: (SRO directs SM to make notifications) Reactor Engineering RC Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor 7. Place Lift Coil Disconnect Switch For Dropped Rod In – DISCONNECT (BOP or RO) 8. Check Axial Flux Difference – IN OPERATING BAND (RO) 9. Perform PBF-2513, Shutdown Margin For an Operating Reactor WITHIN 1 HOUR (Shift Manager discuss with SRO to hand off to U2 to perform) 10. Check Quadrant Power Tilt – LESS THAN 2%; RNO: Perform AOP-6H, Quadrant Power Tilt, while continuing with this procedure. (RO. AOP-6H may be handed off to Unit 2 to perform, but no actions due to initial power level) 11. Reset Dropped Rod Alarms on NIS Power Range Cabinets (BOP) 12. Reduce Reactor Power – TO LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 75% WITHIN 2 HOURS OF DROPPED ROD (No actions required due initial power level) 13. Check Changes in Reactor Power - LESS THAN 15% IN ANY		



SEG Page 12 of 30

Event # 2	Dropped Rod – K9			
	1 HOUR (RO) 14. Confirm Dropped Rod (RO) 15. Check Dropped Rod Confirmed (RO) 16. Direct Maintenance to Make Necessary Repairs (SRO directs SM to call) Note: The temperature transient caused by the dropped rod may result in an automatic letdown isolation. Letdown restoration per AOP-1D, CVCS Malfunction, is not required to meet the objectives of this scenario. Assess Technical Specifications: (SRO performs)			
	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
	TS 3.1.4 Rod Group A	lignment Limits		
B. One rod not within limits B.1.1 Verify SDM to be within limits provided in COLR				
	TS 3.4.1 RCS Pressur			
	A. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits.		2205 psig) 2 hours	
	Booth Communications			
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: J Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 			
	 SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required. When SDM calculation called for, discuss with OS to pass it off to Unit 2 so Unit 1 can focus on the event. 			
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After the crew has restored Tavg to program and address Technical Specifications, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.			



SEGPage 13 of 30

Event # 3	1HC-478, Loop B ADV Hand Controller, Fails High
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: 1MS-2015, B ADV, indicating lights – red on, green off PPCS alarms Rising reactor power Lowering Tavg Lowering Pzr Level and Pressure
	BOP (IA) Diagnoses controller failure and attempt to shut 1MS-2015, Atmospheric Dump Valve, from the control room.
	SRO J Implements AOP-2A, Secondary Coolant Leak
	Crew (SRO directs) AOP-2A, Secondary Coolant Leak 1. Determine Secondary Leakage Not Hazardous to Personnel or Equipment (BOP monitors) Plant habitability Containment Pressure < 2 psig Safeguards bus fault Equipment Operability 2. Maintain Plant Within Limits (C.A.S. for RO and BOP to monitor throughout the procedure) Rx power 100% per NIs (RO) SG levels stable of trending to 64% (BOP) Feed pump suction pressure > 180 psig (BOP) Condensate Pump motor current < 185 amps (BOP) 3. Maintain RCS Tavg (C.A.S. for RO to monitor throughout the procedure) Note: Steps 4 through 10 are diagnostic steps to determine the source of the leak. These steps may be performed in any order. No actions 5. Check No Secondary Leakage to Atmosphere a. Steam Generator Safety Valves Shut (BOP may contact Security or the PAB AO) b. Steam Generator atmospheric steam dump valves shut i. 1MS-2015 for S/G B (BOP) RNO: Perform the following: (SRO directs) 1) Manually shut valve(s) (BOP) Place 1HC-478 to Manual Take manual potentiometer to full close Note valve position lights do not indicate fully closed 2) IF valve(s) will NOT shut, THEN locally shut associated isolation valve: 0 1MS-244 for 1MS-2015 (BOP directs AO) 15. Check Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Required (SRO)



SEG Page 14 of 30

Event # 3	1HC-478, Loop B ADV Hand Controller, Fails High
	RNO: Return to Procedure and Step in Effect Note: Steps 11 through 14 do not require any operator action.
	CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION TIME ACTION
	A. One required ADV flowpath required ADV flowpath required ADV flowpath required ADV flowpath o OPERABLE status.
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: PAB AO: 5 minutes after inserting trigger 3, or 2 minutes after being directed to investigate, report flow noise at the Unit 1 'B' Atmospheric Dump Valve. PAB AO: If asked, after the crew attempts to shut the 'B' ADV from the CR, report that 1MS-2015 is 10% OPEN and not moving. PAB AO: When directed, use LOA1SGN026 to SHUT 1MS-244, Isolation for 1MS-2015, as directed by the crew. Report that flow noise has stopped when 1MS-244 is shut. PAB AO: If asked, report that all S/G Safety Valves are shut. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary.
	SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After the crew isolates the 'B' ADV and assesses Technical Specifications, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.



SEGPage 15 of 30

Event # 4	Loss of All AC Safeguards Power
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 5 per Lead Evaluator
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: Dimming of lights in the Control Room UNIT 1 4.16 KV BUS UNDER VOLTAGE (C02D 1-4) UNIT 1 480 V BUS UNDER VOLTAGE (C02D 2-1) 13.8 KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP (C02E 2-8)
	BOP Diagnoses loss of AC power to both trains of safeguards busses and performs immediate actions of ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
	SRO J Implements ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power
Conditions for CT-24 event start here	Crew (ECA-0.0) (SRO directs) 1. Verify Reactor Trip (RO) Reactor Trip and By-Pass Breakers – OPEN RNO: Manually trip reactor (RO) 2. Verify Turbine Trip (RO) 3. Secure RCPs (RO) a. Ensure both RCPs – STOPPED (RO) Places 1P-1A and 1P-1B handswitches in STOP. b. Place steam dump mode control – MANUAL (BOP) 4. Check if RCS is Isolated (RO) a. PZR PORVs – BOTH SHUT b. Letdown orifice outlet valves – SHUT c. Letdown containment isolation valves – SHUT (RO) 1CV-371A



SEG

Page 16 of 30

Event # 4	Loss of All AC Safeguards Power
	6. TRY TO RESTORE POWER TO ANY SAFEGUARDS BUS (BOP) BOP or RO may call TH AOs to investigate EDGs (G01 fails to start, can be manually started but will not close onto bus 1A-05; G02 is running; G03 is OOS; G04 is running but fails to close onto bus 1A-06) a. Emergency Diesel Generators – ALL RUNNING a. RNO: Try to start non-running EDGs 1) Ensure diesel mode selector switch in AUTO 2) Place control switch to START (G-01) 3) Ensure generator field flash occurs 4) Ensure green READY TO LOAD light is energized 5) IF No diesel is running, THEN Go to Step 10 b. AC Safeguards buses – AT LEAST ONE TRAIN ENERGIZED b. RNO: IF NO 4160v SAFEGUARDS BUS is energized, THEN Go to Step 7 7. Restore Power to 'A' Safeguards Bus: (BOP) a. Check G-01 – RUNNING 1) IF G-01 is running AND breaker 1A52-60, G-01 to Bus 1A-05 Breaker, is NOT closed, THEN perform the following: a) Ensure 1A52-57, 1A-03 to 1A-05 Bus Tie Breaker, is open. b) Try to auto close breaker by placing control switch to trip position then release. c) IF breaker will NOT auto close, THEN perform the following: 1. Place Mode Selector switch in EXERCISE. 2. Turn sync switch ON 3. At C-02, manually CLOSE breaker control switch. 4. Turn sync switch OFF. d) IF 1A-05 and 1B-03 are energized, THEN Go to Step
CT-24 action. Conditions for CT-25 event start here	 a. RNO: Check G-02 – RUNNING 2) IF G-02 is running AND 1A-05 is still NOT energized, THEN perform the following: a) Ensure 1A52-57, 1A-03 to 1A-05 bus tie breaker is OPEN. b) Ensure 1A52-60, G-01 to 1A-05 breaker, is OPEN and in PULLOUT. c) (CT) Unlock (Key 43) and place 1A52-66, G-02 to 1A-05 breaker control switch in auto. (Energizes 1A-05) e) IF 1A-05 and 1B-03 are energized, THEN Go to Step 9.
	 (or Step 46 per FOP) Verify One Train of Safeguards Bus Energized (subsequent steps listed below in Event #5) (BOP)



SEG Page 17 of 30

Event # 4	Loss of All AC Safeguards Power
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: TH AO: If directed to investigate G-01 failure to start, wait 2 minutes and report all conditions appear normal for G-01. TH AO: If directed to investigate output breakers for G-01 and/or G-04 failure to close, wait 2 minutes and report that conditions appear normal locally. TH AO: If directed to investigate the 1X-04 lockout, wait 3 minutes and report there is no apparent cause locally. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	



SEG

Page 18 of 30

Event # 5	'A' Train Service Water Pumps Fail to Start
ACTION	Booth: None
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: J SW Header pressure, north and south, approximately 30 psig J NORTH OR SOUTH SERVICE WATER HEADER PRESSURE LOW (C01A 3-5) J 1P-30A OR B (2P-30A OR B) CIRC PUMPS COOLING WATER FLOW LOW (C01A 3-7 and 4-7) J G-01 (G-02) EMER DIESEL COOLER LOW FLOW (C02D 3-6 and C02F 3-1)
	BOP J Starts Service Water pumps to restore SW system pressure.
	SRO J Implements ECA-0.0, Loss of ALL AC Power
c. CT-25 action	 Verify One Train of Safeguards Bus Energized (BOP) BOP or RO may call TH AOs to investigate SW Pumps and their breakers (1B-03, 1B-04, 2B-04, and 2B-03) a. AC Safeguards buses – AT LEAST ONE TRAIN ENERGIZED b. Monitor running EDG status c. Service Water header pressure – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 psig. c. (CT) RNO: Manually start pumps and align valves as necessary to establish service water header pressure greater than or equal to 50 psig. Place control switch for P-32A, P-32B, and/or P-32F to start to raise pressure greater than 50 psig P-32C has no power. d. Trip and close contactor(s) for tripped battery chargers aligned to supply DC buses D-07 e. Return to procedure and step in effect and implement CSPs as necessary.
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. If asked, all pumps are ready for start. Also, all pumps started are sat.
	SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.



SEGPage 19 of 30

Event # 5	'A' Train Service Water Pumps Fail to Start
NOTES	



SEG Page 20 of 30

Event # 6	Stuck Rods (4)
ACTION	Booth: None
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: Control Rods B6 and B8, in Shutdown Bank A, and C5 and E11, in Control Bank A at 225 steps on IRPIs B6, B8, C5, and E11 rod bottom lights NOT LIT
	RO Recognize not all rods fully inserted, uses backup indications to verify the reactor is tripped.
	SRO J Implements EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response
	Crew EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (SRO directs) 1. Verify Reactor Tripped; RNO: Manually trip reactor. (RO performs since not all rods on the bottom) 2. Verify Turbine Trip (RO) 3. Verify power to AC Safeguards Buses (RO) a. Check safeguards buses – At least one train ENERGIZED b. Check safeguards buses – All ENERGIZED; RNO: Try to restore power to de-energized buses while continuing with this procedure. (Shift Manager will discuss with SRO having Unit 2 restore power to B Train using the AOP-18 and 19 procedures.) 4. Check If SI actuated (RO) a. Any SI annunciators – LIT No lights lit b. RNO: Check if SI is required: SI not required (Pzr Pressure, Containment Pressure, SG Pressures) IF SI is not required, THEN perform the following: 1) Notify STA to MONITOR and IMPLEMENT CSP Status per CSP-ST.0 Unit 1, CSF Status trees. (SRO) 2) Go to EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
	EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (SRO directs) 1. Check RCS Temperature Place Steam Dump Mode Selector in MANUAL (BOP) With NO RCPs running, Check RCS WR Cold Leg temp stable at or trending to 547°F (RO) 2. Check feedwater status a. Main feedwater regulating control valves – BOTH SHUT (BOP) b. Transfer feedwater control to bypass regulating valves: (BOP) 1) Check main feedwater pumps – AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 2) Control feedwater flow using regulating bypass valves: 3) Maintain both S/G levels – BETWEEN 33% and 63%. 4) Reset Loss of Feedwater Turbine Trip



SEG Page 21 of 30

Event # 6	Stuck Rods (4)
	5) Stop any running AFW pumps. 3. Verify all control rods – FULLY INSERTED (RO) RNO: IF two or more control rods are NOT fully inserted, THEN initiate emergency boration: a. Record initial level for in service BAST (RO or BOP) b. Perform the following to adjust charging flow: (RO) 1) Control charging pump speed as necessary to maintain flow GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 60 gpm. Places AUTO Charging Pump in MANUAL and dials
	manual pot to achieve 60 gpm 2) Control charging flow as necessary to maintain labyrinth seal PGREATER THAN 20 inches. Manipulates 1HC-142 dial to maintain > 20 inches on Lab Seal DP.
	c. Start one boric acid transfer pump (RO) d. Open emergency borate valve: 1CV-350. (No power to open valve) Evaluator's note: If the crew decides to have the PAB AO locally open 1CV-350, steps e. and f. apply. If the crew does not locally open the valve and continues with the RNO column, steps e. and f. have no actions. e. Borate 2825 gallons for each control rod not fully inserted. (11,300 gallons) f. WHEN emergency boration is complete, THEN control charging as necessary to establish desired charging flow. g. IF emergency boration can NOT be established, THEN perform boration per OP-5B while continuing with this procedure. (RO) RO may direct the PAB AO to locally open 1CV-350 a. Determine desired output concentration. b. Set 1HC-111, RMUW Flow Control, to desired flowrate and in AUTO c. Set 1HC-110, Boric Acid Flow Control to desired flowrate and in AUTO d. Verify valves in AUTO: 1CV-111, 1CV-110A, 1CV-110B, 1CV-110C e. Place Makeup Mode Selector to AUTO f. Place Makeup Control Switch to START g. Monitor VCT level and ensure automatic operation. 4. Check PZR level control a. PZR Level – GREATER THAN 12%. (RO verifies) b. Charging – IN SERVICE; RNO: Place charging in service. (RO) 1) Ensure RCS cold leg normal charging isolation valve is open: 1CV-1298. (valve is open but with no power for indication) 2) IF no charging pumps are running AND component cooling water flow to any RCP thermal barrier is lost, THEN locally shut affected RCP seal injection throttle valve before starting
	 IF no charging pumps are running AND component cooling water flow to any RCP thermal barrier is lost, THEN locally



SEG Page 22 of 30

Event # 6	Stuck Rods (4)
	Place handswitch to START and hold, or START and release then START again (for the VFD logic) 4) Start additional charging pumps as necessary to establish desired charging flow. Dials manual pot to achieve desired flow 5) Maintain labyrinth seal P greater than 20 inches. 1HC-142 Manipulates 1HC-142 dial to maintain > 20 inches on Lab Seal DP. c. Letdown – IN SERVICE; RNO WHEN PZR level is greater than 12%, THEN place letdown in service: (RO) 1) Open letdown line containment isolation valves 1CV-371 and 1CV-371A 2) Open RCS cold leg letdown isolation valve. 1RC-427 3) Ensure component cooling flow to non-regenerative heat exchanger is established. 1HC-130 4) Ensure charging flow is at least 21 gpm 5) Adjust backpressure as necessary and open letdown isolation valves to establish desired letdown flow. Manipulates 1CV-135 to achieve desired backpressure Opens one of the Letdown Orifice Valves, 1CV 200A/B/C d. PZR Level – TRENDING TO 20% (RO)
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: J PAB AO: If directed to locally open 1CV-350, wait 2 minutes, use LOA1CVC054 to open 1CV-350, report when complete. J Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: J Respond to reports from crew members as required. J When EOP-0 directs trying to restore power to deenergized buses, discuss with the SRO having Unit 2 restore power with the AOP-18 and AOP-19 procedures.
NOTES	
	Scenario Termination
	Terminate the scenario when the crew has completed Step 4 of EOP-0.1, or per Lead Evaluator.



SEGPage 23 of 30

Event # 6	Stuck Rods (4)
NOTES	 Freeze the simulator Determine if the NRC has any follow up questions Save SBT Data (see sim setup instructions)



SEG

Page 24 of 30

QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

Malfunctions: Before EOP Entry: Dropped rod (K9) 1HC-478 Loop 'B' ADV controller fails high After EOP Entry: 'A' train Service Water pumps fail to auto start 4 stuck rods Abnormal Events:

Secondary Coolant leak to atmosphere via ADV

Major Transients:

Dropped Rod

Loss of All AC to Safeguards Buses

Critical Tasks:

1.	CT-24	Energize at least one emergency bus
2.	CT-25	Manually start service water pumps for EDG cooling

Major Procedures:

AOP-6A AOP-1D (potential) AOP-2A AOP-24 (potential) ECA-0.0 EOP-0 EOP-0.1



SEG

Page 25 of 30

CT-24

Energize at least one AC emergency bus

Critical Task:

Energize at least one AC emergency bus prior to placing safeguards equipment switches in pull-out.

Plant Conditions:	Plant	Conditions:
-------------------	--------------	--------------------

	Reactor trip
	Station blackout
J	At least one EDG can be connected to an AC emergency bus

Cues:

Indica	ation and/or annunciation that all AC emergency buses are de-energized
	Bus energized lamps extinguished
Ĵ	Circuit breaker position
Ĵ	Bus voltage
ĺ	EDG status

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required to energize at least one ac emergency bus

| Bus energized lamp(s) illuminated
| Circuit breaker position lamps indicate closed
| Bus voltage indication shows nominal voltage present

Feedback:

Indication that at least one ac emergency bus is energized

J Safeguards equipment sequences onto the energized bus

J EDG status

Basis:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded ... emergency power capacity." Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless "degradation of any barrier to fission product release," specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.



SEG

Page 26 of 30

CT-25

Manually start Service Water pump for EDG cooling

Critical Task:

Manually start service water pump(s) such that the EDG does not fail due to damage from overheating.

Plant Conditions:

- Station blackout with subsequent restoration of ac power from one EDG
- SW pumps aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG fail to start automatically when the associated ac emergency bus is reenergized by the EDG
- An SW pump aligned to provide cooling for the running EDG can be started, provided that manual action is taken as necessary
- All other EDGs inoperable

Cues:

Indication and/or annunciation that one ac emergency bus is energized by an EDG

- Circuit breaker position lamps indicate breaker closed
- Bus voltage indication shows nominal voltage present
- EDG status

AND

Indication and/or annunciation that no SW pump is running

- Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for all SW pumps are open
- SW header pressure indicator reads < 50 psig

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required to start the SW pump(s) powered from the ac emergency bus energized by the EDG

Control switch indication that the circuit breaker or contactor for a SW pump aligned to supply cooling water to the running EDG is closed

Feedback:

Indication and/or annunciation that a SW pump is running, aligned to supply cooling water to the running EDG

- SW low flow condition clear (G-02 Emerg Diesel Cooler Low Flow alarm clear)
- SW low pressure condition clear (SW Header Pressure Low alarm clear)

Basis:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded... emergency power capacity."



SEG

Page 27 of 30

Booth Summary

Event #1	OP-1C Power Ascension	
Action	Booth: None	
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.	

Event #2	Dropped Rod		
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator		
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.		

Event #3	'B' ADV Stuck Open		
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator		
	Trigger 4 inserts when 1HC-478 is placed in MANUAL.		
Role Play	 PAB AO: 5 minutes after inserting trigger 3, or 2 minutes after being directed to investigate, report flow noise at the Unit 1 'B' Atmospheric Dump Valve. PAB AO: If asked, after the crew attempts to shut the 'B' ADV from the CR, report that 1MS-2015 is 50% OPEN and not moving. PAB AO: When directed, use LOA1SGN026 to SHUT 1MS-244, Isolation for 1MS-2015, as directed by the crew. Report that flow noise has stopped when 1MS-244 is shut. PAB AO: If asked, report that all S/G Safety Valves are shut. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 		

Event #4	Loss of All AC Safeguards Power Booth: Insert TRIGGER 5 per Lead Evaluator		
Action			
Role Play	 TH AO: If directed to investigate G-01 failure to start, wait 2 minutes and report all conditions appear normal for G-01. TH AO: If directed to investigate output breakers for G-01 and/or G-04 failure to close, wait 2 minutes and report that conditions appear normal locally. TH AO: If directed to investigate the 1X-04 lockout, wait 3 minutes and report there is no 		
	apparent cause locally.		
	Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary.		

Event #5	'A' Train Service Water Pumps Fail to Auto Start	
Action	Booth: None	
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.	

Event #6	Stuck Rods (4)		
Action	Booth: None		
Role Play	 PAB AO: If directed to locally open 1CV-350, wait 2 minutes, use LOA1CVC054 to open 1CV-350, report when complete. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 		



SEG

Page 28 of 30

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

PLANT CONDITIONS:

UNIT 1

Time in core life (MWD/MTU): 1500

Reactor power (%): 28%

Boron concentration (ppm): 1786 ppm

Rod height, CBD @: 141

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION CONDITIONS IN EFFECT:

TSAC Description Required Action & Completion Time

U1 3.3.1.A/K RPS one channel inoperable Place channel in trip – 1 hour

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE:

G03 Emergency Diesel Generator for maintenance.

1LT-426 Pressurizer Level Transmitter.

PLANNED EVOLUTIONS:

Power ascension per OP 1C, Startup to Power Operation. Startup is following a short forced outage. The crew has been maintaining the current power for about two hours for flux mapping.

TURNOVER INFORMATION:

- G04 Emergency Diesel Generator is aligned to both 1A06 and 2A06 4160 Safeguards Busses.
- On line risk is GREEN.
- Today is Tuesday, day shift.



SEG Page 29 of 30

Pre-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	SRO	
	1st Check	2 nd Check
AOP-1D		
AOP 2A		
AOP 6A		
AOP 6H		
AOP 24		
EOP 0		
EOP-0.1		
ECA-0.0		
Specific ARP/ARBs to be second checked – All Others first checked		
	1st Check	2 nd Check
1C04 1A 1-5		
1C04 1A 1-7		
1C04 1A 3-3		
1C04 1A 4-5		
1C03 1E2 1-2		
1C03 1E2 1-5		



SEG Page 30 of 30

Post-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	SRO	
	1st Check	2 nd Check
AOP-1D		
AOP 2A		
AOP 6A		
AOP 6H		
AOP 24		
EOP 0		
EOP-0.1		
ECA-0.0		
	1st Check	2 nd Check
1C04 1A 1-5		
1C04 1A 1-7		
1C04 1A 3-3		
1C04 1A 4-5		
1C03 1E2 1-2		
1C03 1E2 1-5		
RESET IC		N/A
Booth Cleared Exam Material		
Magnets Replaced		



SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

SEG

SITE:	PBNP	Revision #: 0
LMS ID:	PBN LOI NRC 23E	LMS Rev. Date:
SEG TITLE:	2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2	
SEG TYPE:	☐ Training	⊠ Evaluation
PROGRAM:	□ LOCT ⊠ LOIT □ Other:	
DURATION:	90 minutes	
Developed by:	John Rogers Instructor/Developer	
Reviewed by:	Jeff Hinze Instructor (Instructional Review)	 Date
Validated by:	John Rogers SME (Technical Review)	 Date
Approved by:	Adam Moore Training Supervision	 Date
Approved by:	Joe Krear	
	Training Program Owner (Line)	Date



SEG Page 2 of 33

Facility: _	Point Beach_	Scenario No.:	2	Op-Test No.:2021
Examiners	s:		Operators:	
			_	
			_	
Initial Cond	ditions: <u>0% power N</u>	1ode 2. G02, ED	G is OOS with	G01, EDG is aligned, 1W-3A,
_Containm	nent Shroud Fan OO	S, 1PT-949, Con	tainment Pressi	ure transmitter removed from service.
Turnover:_	A plant up power to	the POAH is pla	nned per OP 1B	Reactor Startup
Critical Ta	sks: <u>CT-5, Manually</u>	Start At Least O	ne Low-Head E	CCS Pump
_CT-36, T	ransfer to Cold Leg F	Recirculation		

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1		R-RO N-BOP N-SRO	Raise Power to POAH
2		C-BOP C-SRO TS-SRO	1A06, 4160 Safeguards Bus Feeder Breaker trip – Does NOT auto restore, needs to be manually restored. NEW
3		C-RO C-SRO TS-SRO	1P-1B RCP thrust bearing failure/vibrations requiring manual reactor trip (degradation of flow or a trip of the pump) NEW
4		C-RO C-SRO	Reactor Trip breakers fail to auto open and buttons on 1C04 are unsuccessful (C01 still works) 2017 Repeat
5		M-ALL	Design Basis LBLOCA
6		C-RO C-SRO	1P-10B RHR pump trips, 1P-10A RHR pump fails to auto start 2017 Repeat
* (1	N)ormal, (I	R)eactivity,	(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor



SEG

Page 3 of 33

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS

Terminal Objective:

Given the site simulator and specific plant conditions, the students will be able to respond to various plant abnormal and emergency events, in accordance with site procedures and technical Specifications.

Enabling Objectives:

1. None

Prerequisites:

1. Simulator available

2. Students enrolled in Initial License Program

Training
Resources:

1. Floor Instructor as Shift Manager / Shift Technical Advisor

2. Simulator Booth Operator

3. Communicator

4. NRC Evaluators

References:

1. OP 1B, Reactor Startup

2. OP 1C, Startup to Power Operation Unit 1

OP 5E, Establishing and Securing Excess Letdown, Bypass of CV-135, or Head Vent Letdown

4. AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction

5. AOP-18A, Train 'A' Equipment Operation

6. AOP-19B, Train 'B' Safeguards Bus Restoration

7. EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

8. EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant

9. EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection

10. CSP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition

11.OM 3.7, AOP and EOP Procedure Usage for Response to Plant Transients

12. Technical Specifications Manual 13. Technical Requirements Manual

Protected Content:

None

Evaluation

Simulator performance will be evaluated in accordance with

Method: NUREG 1021.

Operating Experience:

None



SEG Page 4 of 33

Risk Significant Operator Actions:

UPDATE LOG: Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions made to the material after initial approval.

#	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	REASON FOR CHANGE	AR/TWR#	PREPARER REVIEWER	DATE DATE
0	Developed for the 2021 ILT NRC Exam				



SEG

Page 5 of 33

OVERVIEW / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

OVERVIEW

Initial conditions for the scenario are: unit 1 is in MODE 2 with reactor power below the POAH, 1W-3A, Containment Shroud Fan is OOS, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 is OOS with EDG G-01 aligned to 1A-05 and 2A-05, and 1PT-949, Containment Pressure instrument has been removed from service.

Examinees will start the scenario by raising reactor power to the POAH. Then the crew will respond to a loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06 and Reactor Coolant Pump high vibrations. RCP vibrations will exceed criteria requiring the crew to manually trip the reactor. Coincident with the reactor trip, a LB LOCA will occur. The crew will respond per EOPs to establish containment sump recirculation.

The scenario will be terminated when the crew has established one train of containment sump recirculation.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Event #	# Description			
1.	Raise Reactor Power to POAH			
	The crew will raise power to the POAH per OP-1B, Reactor Startup			
2.	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06			
	 A loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06 will occur due to feeder breaker trip. The emergency diesel (G-03) aligned to the bus fails to automatically start. The crew will respond per AOP-18A, Train 'A' Equipment Operation, and AOP-19B, Train 'B' Safeguards Bus Restoration, to stabilize the plant and restore power to bus 1A-06. 			
3.	High Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration – 1P-1B			
	 High vibration levels will occur on 1P-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump due to a bearing failure. The Crew will respond to the high vibrations per AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction. Conditions with the RCP will degrade, requiring the crew to trip the reactor and trip the RCP. 			
4.	Reactor Trip – Trip Pushbuttons Fail			
	 When the crew attempts to manually trip the reactor, the first set of trip pushbuttons will not work. The second set of pushbuttons will trip the reactor. Coincident with the reactor trip, a LBLOCA will occur. 			



SEG Page 6 of 33

5.	RHR Pump Failures
	 Safety Injection will automatically actuate due to the LOCA. 1P-10A RHR Pump will fail to auto start, may be manually started. 1P-10B RHR Pump will auto start, but trip and be unavailable for the reminder of the scenario.
6.	 LB LOCA – Containment Sump Recirculation A LB LOCA occurs coincident with the reactor trip. The crew will implement EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection, and establish one train of sump recirculation.
	Terminate the scenario when crew has established one train of containment sump recirculation, or per Lead Evaluator.



SEGPage 7 of 33

SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS

Perform simulator set up per the site specific Simulator Setup Checklist.

Check	Action	
1.	Reset to IC-31	
2.	Perform Simulator Setup Checklist	
3.	Open schedule file. Z:/2021 NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC Scenario 2.sch	
4.	To record SBT data:	
	Launch "SBT Report" from Thunderbar	
	2. Open "Scenario Validation Checklist.sbt" (TRex_PB\Lightning)	
5.	Take schedule(s) to run	
6.	Verify required event file(s) open if required	
7.	Take sim to run	
8.	Place turnover sheets on CO1 desk	
9.	Place reactivity sheets on CO1 desk	
10.	Guard the following:	
	• G01, G03, G04 EDG's	
	1W-3B Shroud Fan	
	Place the following OOS:	
	• G02 EDG	
	1W-3A, Shroud Fan	
	1PT-949, Containment Pressure	
	Place red dots on the G02 alarms and Containment Pressure Channel Alert:	
	• C02 F 2-1	
	• C02 F 2-2	
	• C01 B 1-5	
	Set recorder NR 45 to Low Power page at 30 sec/div	
	Socresorasi fut to to zon f ener page at ee eee, an	
11.	Conduct simulator crew pre-scenario brief using TR-AA-230-1007-F06,	
	Simulator Instructor Pre-Exercise Checklist.	
	Brief the scenario evaluators	
	 Brief surrogates using TR-AA-230-1007-F11, Surrogate Brief Checklist, if 	
	necessary	
12.	Run Scenario	
13.	To save SBT Data:	
	In the SBT Report program click the Generate Report icon (green arrow)	
	2. In Test Title enter a unique test title, to be same as file name	
	3. In report name enter the location the test files are to be saved, use same file name	
	as Test Title	
	4. Click "Generate" (generates and saves two files in the selected folder)	
	5. Verify files saved in the selected folder	
	The generated report and SBT Report program may now be closed	



SEG Page 8 of 33

	7. Collect procedure markups for SBT8. Save any InSight, Alarm, Event, Schedule Files to the secure drive that were in use
14.	Reset simulator to appropriate IC.

SEG Page 9 of 33

BOOTH OPERATOR BRIEFING:

Review the scenario sequence, event triggers and expected field communications.

Z:/2021 NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC Scenario 2.sch

At Time	On Event	Action	Description
		Preloads / Initial Conditions	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL2DSG001A	DIESEL G02 FAILURE TO START
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1CNM017 to Fail_Cntrl_Fuse	1-B523A W-3A CTL ROD SHROUD FAN CKTBKR
00:00:00		Insert malfunction XMT1CNM016A to -6	1-PT949 LOOP B CONT PRESSURE XMTR FIXED OUTPUT
00:00:00		Event Z:/2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC 2.evt	
		Event 2: Loss of 1A-06	
	1	Insert malfunction BKR1EPS015 to Trip on event 1	1-A5277 4160V BUS TIE 1-A04 TO 1-A06
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1DSG003 to Failautocl	1-A5280 G03 TO 1A06 BRK 80
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1DSG007B	EDG G03 FAILURE TO AUTOSTART
		Event 3: RCP High Vibration	
	3	Insert malfunction MAL1RCP007B to 89.7 in 600 on event 3	RCP MOTOR THRUST BEARING FAILURE PUMP B
	3	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP015A to 2.3 in 600 on event 3	1-YVPNBFH RCP B FRAME HORIZ VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
	3	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP016A to 2.4 in 600 on event 3	1-YVPNBFV RCP B FRAME VERT VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
	3	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP017A to 17.2 in 600 on event 3	1-YVPNBSH RCP B SHAFT HORIZ VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
	3	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP018A to 17.3 in 600 on event 3	1-YVPNBSV RCP B SHAFT VERT VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
		After pump trip	
	7	Insert malfunction MAL1RCP007B to 48.79930 in 100 on event 7	RCP MOTOR THRUST BEARING FAILURE PUMP B
	7	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP015A to 0.49829 in 10 on event 7	1-YVPNBFH RCP B FRAME HORIZ VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
	7	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP016A to 0.49829 in 10 on event 7	1-YVPNBFV RCP B FRAME VERT VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
	7	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP017A to 3.98335 in 10 on event 7	1-YVPNBSH RCP B SHAFT HORIZ VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT



SEG Page 10 of 33

	7	Insert malfunction XMT1RCP018A to 3.98335 in 10 on event 7	1-YVPNBSV RCP B SHAFT VERT VIBRATION FIXED OUTPUT
		Event 4: DBA LOCA	
	5	Insert malfunction MAL1RCS001 to Hot_Leg_A on event 5	DBA LOCA
		Event 5: Trip pushbutton Failure	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1PPL001A to Fails_To_Open	REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 52/RTA FAILURE
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1PPL001B to Fails_To_Open	REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 52/RTB FAILURE
	15	Insert malfunction MAL1PPL001B to Trip on event 15	REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 52/RTB FAILURE
	15	Insert malfunction MAL1PPL001A to Trip on event 15	REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 52/RTA FAILURE
		Event 6: RHR Pump Fail to Start	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BKR1RHR001 to Fail_Auto_Cl	1-B5212A P-10A RH REMOVAL PUMP CKTBKR
	5	Insert malfunction MOT1RHR002 after 30 to Winding_Ground on event 5	1-P10B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP MOTOR
		EOP-1.3 LOAs	
	9	Insert remote LOA1SWS048 after 60 to 0.38000 in 30	SW-322 1HX-12A CC HTEXCH OUTLET
	9	Insert remote LOA1SWS051 after 180 to 0.10000 in 30	SW-360 HX-12B CCW SW OUTLET
	9	Insert remote LOA1CCW018 after 270 to 0 in 30	1CC-744B CCW BYPASS/TEST LOOP OUTLET STOP VALVE
	9	Insert remote LOA1CCW016 after 420 to 0 in 30	1CC-740A NON-REGEN HX-3A&B INLET VALVE
	9	Insert remote LOA1CCW021 after 450 to 0 in 30	1CC-750A SEAL STR HX-5 INLET VALVE
	11	Insert remote LOA1SIS030 after 60 to 0 in 30	1SI-897A HANDWHEEL GAG
	11	Insert remote LOA1SIS031 after 180 to 0 in 30	1SI-897B HANDWHEEL GAG

Event file:

Trigger 7 Unit 1 Reactor Trip (JCRFTR)

Trigger 15: trigger 16 AND trigger 17 (et_array(16) & et_array(17))

Trigger 16: 1C04 Trip Pushbuttons (x14i057a == 1 | x14i055a == 1)

Trigger 17: C01 Trip Pushbuttons (x01i142a == 1 | x01i141a == 1)

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS

Event # 1	Raise Reactor Power to POAH
ACTION	Booth: None
STUDENT RESPONSE	 CO3/C01 Perform OP 1B actions as directed. OS1 Implements OP 1B, reactor Startup to raise power to POAH starting from Step 5.16.49. Crew 5.16.49 Allow flux level to rise further to confirm onset of nuclear heating reactivity effect and remain below 2% power.
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM communications: Brief the crew on current plant conditions and planned reactor startup tasks. Provide direction to the crew to raise power to POAH (approximately 4.0 E-6 amps).
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After power has been raised to POAH, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.



SEG Page 12 of 33

Event # 2	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator
STUDENT RESPONSE	 CO3/C01 Diagnoses loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06. Recognizes the loss of letdown and reduces charging flow to minimum.
	 OS1 Implements AOP-18A, Train 'A' Equipment Operation and AOP-19B, Train 'B' Safeguards Bus Restoration.
	Crew AOP-18A, Train 'A' Equipment Operation 1. Check bus 1A-05 – ENERGIZED 2. Monitor diesel voltage and frequency within limits 3. Check bus 1B-03 – ENERGIZED 4. Check MCC 1B-32 – ENERGIZED 5. Check blender operation on both units. 6. Check RHR – REQUIRED; RNO; Go to Step 8 8. Check Component Cooling Water pumps – AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 9. Check Component Cooling Water plumps – RUNNING 10. Check only one Component Cooling Water pump – RUNNING 11. Check Service Water header pressure – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 PSIG 12. Check one Instrument Air compressor – RUNNING 13. Verify Charging flow a. Charging pumps – AT LEAST ONE RUNNING b. Start additional charging pumps and adjust speed on running charging pumps to establish desired charging flow. c. Adjust charging line flow controller to maintain labyrinth seal AP greater than 20 inches. 14. Check if letdown should be established. a. Normal letdown isolated b. Establish letdown 1) Open letdown containment isolation valves 2) Open RCS Loop B cold leg letdown isolation valve heat exchanger – ESTABLISHED 4) Ensure charging flow – AT LEAST 21 GPM 5) Adjust backpressure and open letdown orifice outlet valves to establish desired letdown flow. 15. Check control room ventilation – IN MODE 1 16. Check rod control system – IN AUTO 17. SM make notifications and enter applicable TS action conditions. 18. Restart Containment Accident fans as necessary. 19. Restore Battery Chargers
	20. Reenergize MCC 1B-31 a. Close 1B-03 feed to 1B-31: 1B52-14C



SEG Page 13 of 33

Event # 2	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06
Event # 2	b. Start one cavity cooling fan 21. Restore PAB ventilation 22. Restore fire pumps to normal 23. Restore loads as time permits 24. Ensure adequate spent fuel pool cooling 25. Check bus 1A-06 – ENERGIZED; RNO: Go to AOP-19B, Train 'B' Safeguards Bus Restoration. AOP-19B, Train 'B' Safeguards Bus Restoration 1. Check plant stable per AOP-18A, train 'A' Equipment Operation 2. Energize bus 1A-06 from diesel G-03 3. Check bus 1A-06 – ENERGIZED a. Check annunciator UNIT 1 4.16Kv BUS LOCKOUT – CLEAR: C02 D 3-4 b. Check G-03 to bus 1A-06 breaker – IN AUTO: 1A52-80 c. Check G-03 - RUNNING; RNO: Start G-03 1) Ensure G-03 diesel mode selector switch – IN AUTO 2) Turn G-03 diesel generator control switch to – START 3) IF G-03 will NOT start, THEN go to step 6. d. Ensure 1A-4 to 1A-6 bus tie breaker – OPEN: 1A52-77 e. Check G-03 to 1A-06 breaker – CLOSED; RNO: Perform the following: 1) Try to auto close breaker by placing control switch to trip position and then release. 2) IF breaker will NOT auto-close, THEN: a) Place G-03 Mode selector switch to – EXERCISE b) Turn sync switch for G-03 to bus 1A-06 breaker – ON
	 a) Place G-03 Mode selector switch to – EXERCISE b) Turn sync switch for G-03 to bus 1A-06 breaker –



SEG Page 14 of 33

Event # 2	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06		
	Assess Technical Specifications:		
	CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME		
TS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating			
	C. Associated unit's required off site power source(s) to OPERABLE status. C. 1 Restore required offsite power source(s) to OPERABLE status.		
	D. One or more required offsite power source(s) to one or more required Class 1E 4.16kV bus(es) inoperable. D.1 Declare required features supported by the inoperable required offsite power source inoperable when its required redundant feature. 12 hours from discovery of Condition D concurrent with inoperability of required redundant feature.		
	D.2 Restore required offsite power source to OPERABLE status. 7 days AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO		
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: TH AO: If directed to investigate G-03 failure to auto start, wait 3 minutes and report that G-03 is not running and all condition appear normal. TH AO: If directed to restore fire pumps to normal, acknowledge the report – take no action. PAB AO: If directed to close the supply breaker for MOV 1CV-285 (1B52-3210C), wait 2 minutes and report that the breaker cannot be closed, it immediately opens to trip-free when attempting to close. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required. If asked for direction regarding reactor power, direct the crew to stabilize power at 10E-6 amps. 		



SEGPage 15 of 33

Event # 2	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06
NOTES	Note: Once the crew completes actions in AOP-19B, they will proceed with implementing AOP-18B, Train 'B' Equipment Operation. AOP-18B actions are not necessary to meet the objectives of this scenario.
	Continuation Criteria: After power has been restored to Safeguards Bus 1A-06, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.
	Note : RCP high vibration alarm occurs approximately 8 minutes after the trigger 3 is entered.



SEG Page 16 of 33

Event # 3	High Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration – 1P-1B	
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator	
	Note : RCP high vibration alarm occurs approximately 8 minutes after the trigger is entered.	
	Trigger 7 deletes malfunctions when the RCP is tripped.	
STUDENT RESPONSE	CO3/C01 Acknowledges alarms and references ARBs	
	 OS1 Implements AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction 	
	Crew 1. Check annunciator P-1A&B RCP Vibration Alarm – CLEAR; RNO: check if RCP shutdown is required a. Vibration readings on PPCS page RCPS or locally at 1C-76	



SEGPage 17 of 33

Event # 3	High Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration – 1P-1B
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: TH AO: If directed to check RCP vibration reading on 1C-76 in rod drive room, wait 2 minutes and report vibration readings as read from RCPs PPCS page. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: Once AOP-1B Step 19 actions have been completed, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.



SEG Page 18 of 33

Event # 4	Reactor Trip – Trip Pushbuttons Fail
ACTION	Booth: None
STUDENT RESPONSE	Attempts to manually trip the reactor, when first set of pushbuttons fail, uses alternate pushbuttons to trip the reactor. Performs EOP-0 Immediate Actions.
	 OS1 Implements EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
	 Verify Reactor Trip; RNO: manually trip reactor Verify turbine trip Verify power to AC Safeguards buses Check if SI Actuated. RNO: IF Si is not required, THEN perform the following: Notify STA to monitor and implement CSP Status per CSP-ST.0, CSF Status Trees. Go to EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.
	 SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	Note : Once EOP-0 immediate actions have been completed, the crew will complete the actions of AOP-1B, Step 19.



SEGPage 19 of 33

Event # 5	LOCA - RHR Pump Failures
ACTION	Booth: Insert Trigger 5 per Lead Evaluator.
STUDENT RESPONSE	 CO3/C01 Recognizes RHR Pump failures (1P-10 fails to start, 1P-10B trips), and manually actuates SI and CI per EOP-0 Step 4 RNO. Manually starts 1P-10A, RHR Pump
	 OS1 Directs 1P-10A manually started, continues implementing EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
	Crew
	 EOP-0 continued: (returns to EOP-0 Step 4 from EOP-0.1 when SI actuates) 4. Check if SI actuated a. Any SI annunciators – LIT b. Both trains of SI – ACTUATED; RNO: Manually actuate both trains
	of SI and Containment Isolation
	FO1 RCP Trip Criteria: If both conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs
	 RCS subcooling – LESS THAN [40°F] 31°F SI Pumps – AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW
	 Perform Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, while continuing with this procedure. Verify AFW Pumps – RUNNING Check RCP Seal Cooling Check RCS Temperatures
	 9. Check PZR PORVs and spray valves 10. Check if RCPs Should be stopped RNO: Go to Step 11 11. Check if S/G are NOT faulted 12. Check if S/G tubes are NOT ruptured
	13. Check if RCS is intact; RNO: a. Notify STA to MONITOR CSP Status per CSP-ST.0, CSF Status Trees
	b. Go to EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
	EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant FO6 Containment Sump Recirculation Switchover Criteria
	IF either condition below is satisfied, THEN go to EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection:
	 RWST Level – LESS THAN 60% RCS Pressure less than [450 psig] 325 psig AND RHR flow greater than 550 gpm



SEG Page 20 of 33

Event # 5	LOCA - RHR Pump Failures
	CO3 performs EOP-0, Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification
	A1 – Verify feedwater isolation
	A2 – Verify containment isolation
	A3 – Verify ECCS Pumps RUNNING
	a. SI pumps – BOTH RUNNING
	b. RHR Pumps – BOTH RUNNING; RNO: WHEN SI sequence is complete
	THEN manually start RHR Pumps.
	A4 – Verify service water pumps running
	A5 – Verify containment accident cooling units RUNNING
	A6 – Verify component cooling water pumps – ONLY ONE RUNNING
	A7 – Check if main steam lines can remain open
	A8 – Verify containment spray not required:
	A9 – Verify ECCS Flow
	A10 – verify AFW valve alignment – PROPPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT A11 – Verify proper ECCS valve alignment
	A11 – Verily proper ECCS valve alignment A12 – Check containment spray NOT ACTUATED; RNO: Check containment spray
	alignment
	Ensure all containment spry pump discharge MOVs are open.
	 Ensure at least one containment spray pump is running.
	3. IF two containment spray pumps are running, THEN place one
	containment spray pump in pull-out.
	4. WHEN containment spray has been actuated for greater than two minutes,
	THEN ensure spray additive eductor suction valve is open on the running
	train.
	A13 – Stop any boration via the blender in progress
	A14 – Ensure the Auxiliary building filter/exhaust fans – OPERATING
	A15 - Notify the STA to IMPLEMENT Status trees, Notify the SM of any equipment
	malfunctions previously noted.
	A16 – Verify Service Water system alignment
	A17 – Check miscellaneous valves – SHUT
	A18 – Check Control Room ventilation
	A19 – Check cable spreading room ventilation system – OPERATING
	A20 – Check Computer Room ventilation system – OPERATING
	A21 – Check AFW recirc fans – ONE RUNNING
	A22 – Check Circ Water Pump House temperature less than 105°F
	A23 – Check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature less than 95°F
	A24 – Periodically check status of spent fuel cooling.



SEG Page 21 of 33

Event # 5	LOCA - RHR Pump Failures
ROLE PLAY	 PAB AO: If directed to investigate 1P-10B trip, wait 2 minutes and report the motor is stopped and hot to the touch. TH AO: If directed to check the breaker for 1P-10B at 1B04, wait 2 minutes and report the breaker has tripped on overcurrent. EOP-0, Att A communications: PAB AO: When directed to check rad waste service water valves SHUT at C-180, report the TV-LW61 and TV-LW62 are both SHUT TH AO: When directed to check Circ Water Pump House temperature, wait 1 minute and report 76°F and stable. TH AO: When directed to check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature, wait 1 minute and report 80°F and stable. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.
NOTES	



SEG Page 22 of 33

Event # 6	LB LOCA – Containment Sump Recirculation
ACTION	Booth:
	Insert TRIGGER 9 when directed by crew for EOP-1.3, Att A alignment.
	Insert TRIGGER 11 when directed by crew to isolate SI test lines.
STUDENT RESPONSE	CO3/C01 • Performs actions as directed.
	 OS1 Implements EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection
	Crew 1. Reset SI 2. Check RCS break size. 3. Align CCW per Attachment A, local Alignment of Component Colling Water, while continuing with this procedure. 4. Direct unnecessary personnel to evacuate the PAB 5. Check if containment sump pH must be adjusted 6. Check if Train 'A' SI Flow should be stopped; RNO: Go to Step 7 7. Check if Train 'B' SI flow should be stopped a. Check train 'A' RHR injection flow - GREATER THAN 550 gpm b. Stop train 'B' RHR pump and place in pull-out c. Stop Train 'B' RHR pump and place in pull-out 8. Monitor core cooling 9. Evaluate Control Room conditions 10. Isolate component cooling flow to containment a. Check RCPs - BOTH STOPPED b. Shut containment equipment CC supply header isolation valve: 1CC-719 11. Isolate component cooling flow to non-regenerative heat exchanger a. Check normal letdown - ISOLATED b. Place non-regen heat exchanger outlet temperature controller in manual and shut valve: 1HC-130 12. Check Service Water pumps - SIX RUNNING 13. Check service water supply ring header - CONTINOUS FLOWPATH ESTABLISHED 14. Establish component cooling flow to RHR heat exchangers: a. Ensure component cooling pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING b. Open only one RHR heat exchanger shell side inlet valve • 1CC-738B c. Start second component cooling pump • 1P-11A • 1P-11B d. Open second RHR heat exchanger shell side inlet valve



SEGPage 23 of 33

Event # 6	LB LOCA – Containment Sump Recirculation
	1CC-738B 15. Ensure RV Injection MOV's – BOTH OPEN 16. Align SI test lines for recirculation Check containment approviding barge valves. AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
	a. Check containment spray discharge valves – AT LEAST ONE OPEN IN EACH TRAIN
	b. Locally shut both SI test line return isolation valves: • 1SI-897A
	• 1SI-897B 17. Align RHR Suction Valves
	a. Open train 'A' RHR pump suction from containment sump 'B' isolation valve: 1SI-850A
	b. Open train 'B' RHR pump suction from containment sump 'B'
	isolation valve: 1SI-850B
	18. Check Train 'A' Ready for Recirculation
	19. Check Train 'B' Ready for Recirculation; RNO: Try to prepare train 'B' for recirculation while continuing with this procedure.
	 20. Check battery chargers supplying DC buses – ENERGIZED 21. Check RHR trains – AT LEAST ONE READY FOR RECIRCULATION 22. Check RWST level – LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 34%; RNO: Perform the following:
	 a. WHEN RWST level is less than or equal to 34%, THEN immediately return to this procedure and continue with Step 23. b. Implement Critical Safety Procedures and continue with procedure
	and step in effect.
	Note: The crew should address CSP-P.1, Response to Immanent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, and implement EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant until RWST level reaches 34%.
	23. Check containment sump 'B' level – GREATER THAN 38 inches. 24. Prepare for high radiation levels in PAB
	25. Align Train 'B' of RHR for containment sump recirculation. a. Check RHR train 'B' – READY FOR RECIRCULATION; RNO:
	OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO STEP 27 and go to Step 27. 27. Align train 'A' of RHR for containment sump recirculation
	 a. Check RHR train 'A' – READY FOR RECIRCULATION b. Check SI test line return isolation AOVs – AT LEAST ONE SHUT
	c. Open train 'A' RHR pump suction from containment sump 'B' MOV: 1SI-851A
	d. Shut train 'A' RHR pump suction from RWST MOV: 1SI-856A
	e. Check train 'B' RHR – ON RECIRCULATION; RNO: Ensure train 'A' RHR pump is running.
	28. Check CCW HX Outlet Temperature – LESS THAN 150°F 29. Check RHR trains – AT LEAST ONE ON SUMP RECIRCULATION
	30. Monitor containment sump performance:
	Containment sump level
	RHR pump operation – NORMAL Low head injection flow STARLE
	Low head injection flow - STABLE



SEG Page 24 of 33

Event # 6	LB LOCA – Containment Sump Recirculation
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: PAB AO: When directed to perform EOP-1.3, Attachment A alignment, insert trigger 9, and report when all actions are complete. PAB AO: When directed to shut 1SI-897A and 1SI-897B, insert trigger 11 and report when complete. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. STA Communication: When CSF Status Trees are in effect and plant conditions are met, report to the OS1 that CSF INTEGRITY RED path conditions exist. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	

	Scenario Termination
	Terminate the scenario when the crew has established one train of sump recirculation, or per Lead Evaluator.
NOTES	 Freeze the simulator Determine if the NRC has any follow up questions Save SBT Data (see sim setup instructions)



SEG

Page 25 of 33

QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

Malfunctions:

Before EOP Entry:

- Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06
- RCP 1P-1B high vibration

After EOP Entry:

- One set of reactor trip pushbuttons fail
- 1P-10B RHR Pump trip
- 1P-10A RHR Pump fails to auto start

Abnormal Events:

- Loss of Safeguards Bus
- RCP Malfunction

Major Transients:

LB LOCA

Critical Tasks:

1.	CT-5	Manually start at least one low head ECCS pump
2.	CT-36	Establish at least one train of sump recirculation

Major Procedures:

 $AOP-18A \Rightarrow AOP-19B \Rightarrow AOP-1B \Rightarrow EOP-0 \Rightarrow EOP-1 \Rightarrow EOP-1.3 \Rightarrow CSP-P.1 \Rightarrow EOP-1 \Rightarrow EOP-1.3$



SEG

Page 26 of 33

CT-5

Manually start at least one low head ECCS pump

Critical Task:

Manually start [at least one low-head ECCS pump]1 [before transition out of E-0]2

Plant Conditions:

- Large-break LOCA
- Reactor trip
- S
- RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the low-head ECCS pumps
- Both low-head ECCS pumps fail to automatically start upon SI
- At least one low-head ECCS pump can be started, provided that manual action is taken as necessary

Cues:

Indication and/or annunciation that low-head ECCS pumped injection is required

- SI actuation
- RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the low-head ECCS pumps

AND

Indication and/or annunciation that no low-head ECCS pump is injecting into the core

- Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for both low-head ECCS pumps are open
- All low-head ECCS pump discharge pressure indicators read zero
- All flow rate indicators for low-head pumped injection read zero

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required to start at least one low-head ECCS pump

 Control switch indication that the circuit breaker or contactor for at least one low-head ECCS pump is closed

Feedback:

Indication and/or annunciation that at least one low-head ECCS pump is injecting

Flow rate indication of injection from at least one low-head ECCS pump

Basis:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start at least one low-head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ...capacity." In this case, at least one low-head ECCS pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a low-head ECCS pump also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the following abilities:

- Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin (beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario)
- Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component"

Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a low-head ECCS pump (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a large-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the



SEG

Page 27 of 33

following ECCS pumps: high-head pump, intermediate-head pump, and low-head pump. Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. For both the minimum and maximum cases specified in Comment 1 of this critical task worksheet and for all cases in between, failure to perform the critical task means that the plant is needlessly left in an unanalyzed condition. Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results.



SEG

Page 28 of 33

CT-36

Transfer to cold leg recirculation

Critical Task:

Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow from at least one train of RHR.

Plant Conditions:

- LOCA inside containment
- RWST level decreases to 34%
- Containment recirculation sump level is at or above 38 inches
- Transfer to cold leg recirculation can be performed manually from switches in the control room

Cues:

Indication and/or annunciation that safety injection is actuated

AND

Indication and/or annunciation that RWST level is at or below 34%

AND

Indication that containment sump level is at or above 38 inches

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required to transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow that at least meets the assumptions of the plant-specific LOCA analyses:

- Valve position indication that the cold leg recirculation flow path is established
- Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for the low-head injection pumps are closed

Feedback:

Flow indication of the recirculation of containment sump water through the RHR heat exchangers and into the RCS

Basis:

The justification for selecting this task as critical can be thoroughly argued only on the basis of plant-specific requirements. A detailed justification cannot be presented on a generic basis because of the following plant-specific variables:

- ECCS recirculation-mode alignments
- Methods for transfer to cold leg recirculation
- RWST inventory criteria for initiating switchover
- RWST inventory transfer allowances for completing transfer of injection pumps and spray pumps

The plant-specific justification for selecting this task as critical should be argued along one or more of the following lines:

- Improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequence(s) or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant
- Operation or correct performance prevents a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
- Operation or correct performance prevents unnecessary challenges to the following CSFs:
 - Core cooling
 - Containment
- The crew demonstrates the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety



SEG

Page 29 of 33

Booth Summary

Event #1	Raise Reactor Power to POAH
Action	Booth: None
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.

Event #2	Loss of Safeguards Bus 1A-06
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator
Role Play	 TH AO: If directed to investigate G-03 failure to auto start, wait 3 minutes and report that G-03 is not running and all condition appear normal. TH AO: If directed to restore fire pumps to normal, acknowledge the report – take no action. PAB AO: If directed to close the supply breaker for MOV 1CV-285 (1B52-3210C), wait 2 minutes and report that the breaker cannot be closed, it immediately opens to trip-free when attempting to close. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.

Event #3	1P-1B RCP High Vibration
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator
	Note: RCP high vibration alarm occurs approximately 8 minutes after the trigger is entered.
	Trigger 7 deletes malfunctions when the RCP is tripped.
Role Play	 TH AO: If directed to check RCP vibration reading on 1C-76 in rod drive room, wait 2 minutes and report vibration readings as read from RCPs PPCS page. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.

Event #4	Reactor Trip – Pushbuttons Fail
Action	Booth: None Trigger 15 opens reactor trip breakers once the second set of pushbuttons is depressed.
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.

Event #5	RHR Pump Failures		
Action	Booth: None		
	Trigger 5 inserts motor winding ground when the reactor is tripped.		
Role Play	 PAB AO: If directed to investigate 1P-10B trip, wait 2 minutes and report the motor is stopped and hot to the touch. TH AO: If directed to check the breaker for 1P-10B at 1B04, wait 2 minutes and report the breaker has tripped on overcurrent. EOP-0, Att A communications: PAB AO: When directed to check rad waste service water valves SHUT at C-180, report the TV-LW61 and TV-LW62 are both SHUT TH AO: When directed to check Circ Water Pump House temperature, wait 1 minute and report 76°F and stable. TH AO: When directed to check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature, wait 1 minute and report 80°F and stable. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 		



SEG Page 30 of 33

Event #6	LB LOCA – Containment Sump Recirculation	
Action	Booth:	
	Trigger 5 inserts when the reactor is tripped.	
	Insert TRIGGER 9 when directed by crew for EOP-1.3, Att A alignment.	
	Insert TRIGGER 11 when directed by crew to isolate SI test lines.	
Role Play	PAB AO: When directed to perform EOP-1.3, Attachment A alignment, insert trigger 9 , and report when all actions are complete. PAR AO: When directed to shut 1SI 807A and 1SI 807B, insert trigger 14 and report when	
	 PAB AO: When directed to shut 1SI-897A and 1SI-897B, insert trigger 11 and report when complete. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 	



SEG

Page 31 of 33

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

PLANT CONDITIONS:

UNIT 1

Time in core life (MWD/MTU): BOL

Reactor power (%): 0% (1.3x10E-6 amps in IR)

Boron concentration (ppm): 2250 ppm

Rod height, CBD @: 196

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION CONDITIONS IN EFFECT:

TSAC Description Required Action & Completion Time

U1 3.3.1.A/K RPS one channel inoperable Place channel in trip – 1 hour

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE:

- G02 Emergency Diesel Generator for maintenance.
- 1PT-949, Containment Pressure instrument.
- 1W-3A, Control Rod Drive Shroud Fan.

PLANNED EVOLUTIONS:

Raise reactor power to POAH.

TURNOVER INFORMATION:

- G01 Emergency Diesel Generator is aligned to both 1A05 and 2A05 4160 Safeguards Busses.
- On line risk is GREEN.
- Today is Tuesday, day shift.



SEG Page 32 of 33

Pre-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	OS1	
	1 st Check	2 nd Check
AOP-1B		
AOP-18A		
AOP-18B		
AOP-19B		
AOP-19A		
EOP 0		
EOP 1		
EOP 1.3		
CSP-P.1		
OP 5E		
Specific ARP/ARBs to checked	be second checked	- All Others first
	1 st Check	2 nd Check
CO2 D 1-4		
CO2 D 2-1		
1CO4 1C 1-5		
1CO4 1C 3-10		



SEG Page 33 of 33

Post-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	OS1	
	1 st Check	2 nd Check
AOP-1B		
AOP-18A		
AOP-18B		
AOP-19B		
AOP-19A		
EOP 0		
EOP 1		
EOP 1.3		
CSP-P.1		
OP 5E		
	1 st Check	2 nd Check
CO2 D 1-4		
CO2 D 2-1		
1CO4 1C 1-5		
1CO4 1C 3-10		
RESET IC		N/A
Booth Cleared Exam Material		
Magnets Replaced		



SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

SEG

SITE:	PBNP	Revision #: 0
LMS ID:	PBN LOI NRC 25E	LMS Rev. Date:
SEG TITLE:	2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4	
SEG TYPE:	□Training	⊠ Evaluation
PROGRAM:	□ LOCT ⊠ LOIT □ Other:	
DURATION:	90 minutes	
Developed by:	John Rogers Instructor/Developer	
Reviewed by:	Jeff Hinze Instructor (Instructional Review)	
Validated by:	John Rogers SME (Technical Review)	 Date
Approved by:	Adam Moore	
Approved by:	Training Supervision Joe Krear	Date
.,	Training Program Owner (Line)	Date



SEG Page 2 of 32

Facility: Point Beach Sc	enario No.:4	Op-Test No.: <u>2021</u>				
Examiners:	Operators:					
						
Initial Conditions: _Reactor power is 47%. G03, EDG is out of service due to maintenance with						
_G04, EDG aligned. 1LT-426, PZR Level transmitter (Red) removed from service						
Turnover: Conduct an up power to 100% power at 15% per hour per OP 1C, Startup to Power						
<u>Operations</u>						
Critical Tasks: CT-3, Manually Actuate Containment Cooling						
CT-17, Isolate Faulted SG						

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1		C-RO C-SRO	Letdown inadvertently isolates, needs to be re-established NEW	
2		R-RO C-BOP R-SRO	Inadvertent Turbine trip with no reactor trip NEW	
3		C-RO C-SRO TS-SRO	Seismic event 1P-11A, CCW pumps failure due to a mechanical failure requiring pump shift 2019 Repeat	
4		M-ALL	Seismic event causes multiple dropped rods, without an automatic RX Trip	
5		C-BOP C-SRO	Steam Generator fault in containment upstream of the orifice NEW	
6		C-BOP C-SRO	Containment Spray fails to actuate 2017 Repeat	
* (1	N)ormal, (I	R)eactivity,	(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor	



SEG

Page 3 of 32

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS

Terminal Objective:

Given the site simulator and specific plant conditions, the students will be able to respond to various plant abnormal and emergency events, in accordance with site procedures and technical Specifications.

Enabling Objectives:

1. None

Prerequisites:

1. Simulator available

2. Students enrolled in Initial License Program

Training
Resources:

1. Floor Instructor as Shift Manager / Shift Technical Advisor

2. Simulator Booth Operator

Communicator
 NRC Evaluators

References: 1. AOP-1D, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction

2. AOP-6A, Dropped Rod

3. AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction

4. AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip

5. AOP-28, Seismic Event

6. EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

7. EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant

8. EOP-1.1, SI Termination

9. EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

10. OM 3.7, AOP and EOP Procedure Usage For Response To Plant

Transients

11. Technical Specifications Manual12. Technical Requirements Manual

Protected Content:

None

Evaluation Method:

Simulator performance will be evaluated in accordance with

NUREG 1021.

Operating Experience:

None

Risk Significant Operator Actions:

Initiating Event with Core Damage Frequency:

Steam Break Inside Containment (4.12E-09 CDF) (2.00E-11 LERF)

Failure to isolate AFW to the Faulted Steam Generator from T

(1.41E-03)



SEG Page 4 of 32

UPDATE LOG: Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions made to the material after initial approval.

#	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	REASON FOR CHANGE	AR/TWR#	PREPARER REVIEWER	DATE DATE
0	Developed for the 2021 ILT NRC				
	Exam				



SEG Page 5 of 32

OVERVIEW / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

OVERVIEW

Initial conditions for the scenario are: Unit 1 reactor power is stable at approximately 47% during a plant startup following a short forced outage. Power ascension to 100% is planned for this shift.

Examinees will respond to an inadvertent CVCS letdown isolation. A seismic event causes the running CCW pump to degrade. A second seismic event causes two dropped rods, requiring a reactor trip. Coincident with the reactor trip, a S/G faults inside containment; containment spray will fail to automatically actuate.

The scenario will be terminated when the crew has completed actions through Step 7 of EOP-1.1, SI Termination.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Letc letd The rest 2. Inadve The 47% The 3. Seismi A seismi The The Scool SRO	down Orifice Isolation valve, 1CV-200A inadvertently closes causing a loss of lown flow. e crew will respond per AOP-1D, CVCS Malfunction, to minimize charging flow and tore letdown to service. The trubine Trip Without Reactor Trip e Unit 1 Main Turbine will inadvertently trip with reactor power at approximately 7. The reactor will not trip. e crew will stabilize the plant per AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip ic Event / 1P-11A, CCW Pump Failure	
2. Inadve • The rest 2. Inadve • The 47% • The 3. Seismi • A se • The • The Coo • SRO	lown flow. e crew will respond per AOP-1D, CVCS Malfunction, to minimize charging flow and tore letdown to service. Intert Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip e Unit 1 Main Turbine will inadvertently trip with reactor power at approximately 6. The reactor will not trip. e crew will stabilize the plant per AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip	
2. Inadve	rtent Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip e Unit 1 Main Turbine will inadvertently trip with reactor power at approximately 6. The reactor will not trip. e crew will stabilize the plant per AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip	
The 47% The 3. Seismi A seismi The Cool SR0	Unit 1 Main Turbine will inadvertently trip with reactor power at approximately 6. The reactor will not trip. c crew will stabilize the plant per AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip	
3. Seismi • A se • The • The Coc • SRO	%. The reactor will not trip. e crew will stabilize the plant per AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip	
3. Seismi A se The The Coo		
A see The The Coc SR0	c Event / 1P-11A, CCW Pump Failure	
• The • The Coc • SR0		
4. Multipl	eismic event occurs that results in the mechanical failure of 1P-11A, CCW Pump. e crew will implement AOP-28, Seismic Event, in response to the Seismic Event. e crew will respond to the loss of 1P-11A, CCW Pump, per AOP-9B, Component oling System Malfunction, to restore CCW system flow. O will address Technical Specifications	
	e Dropped Rods	
	econd seismic event causes two rods to drop, requiring a reactor trip. e crew will respond to AOP-6A, Dropped Rod, to trip the reactor.	
5. Faulted	Faulted Steam Generator	
	ncident with the reactor trip, the 'A' S/G will fault inside containment. e crew will isolate the faulted S/G per EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.	



SEG Page 6 of 32

6.	Containment Spray Fails to Actuate		
	 The faulted S/G will cause containment pressure to rise above the containment spray actuation setpoint, but CS will fail to auto actuate. The crew will respond to manually initiate containment spray per EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 		
	Terminate the scenario when crew has completed through Step7 of EOP-1.1, SI Termination, or per Lead Evaluator.		



SEG Page 7 of 32

SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS

Perform simulator set up per the site specific Simulator Setup Checklist.

Check	Action
1.	Reset to IC-32
2.	Perform Simulator Setup Checklist
3.	Open schedule file. Z:/2021 ILT NRC Simulator Files/NRC Scenario 4.sch
4.	To record SBT data:
	Launch "SBT Report" from Thunderbar
	2. Open "Scenario Validation Checklist.sbt" (TRex_PB\Lightning)
5.	Take schedule(s) to run
6.	Verify required event file(s) open if required
7.	Take sim to run
8.	Place turnover sheets on RO desk
9.	Place reactivity sheets on RO desk
10.	Guard the following:
	• G01, G02, G04 EDG's
	Place the following OOS:
	• G03 EDG
	1LT-426 Pressurizer Level
	Place red dots on the G03 alarm and PZR Level:
	• C02 E 2-1
	• C02 E 2-2
	• 1C04 1C 3-3
4.4	
11.	Conduct simulator crew pre-scenario brief using TR-AA-230-1007-F06,
	Simulator Instructor Pre-Exercise Checklist.
	Brief the scenario evaluators Brief the scenario evaluators
	Brief surrogates using TR-AA-230-1007-F11, Surrogate Brief Checklist, if
40	necessary
12.	Run Scenario
13.	To save SBT Data:
	In the SBT Report program click the Generate Report icon (green arrow)
	2. In Test Title enter a unique test title, to be same as file name
	3. In report name enter the location the test files are to be saved, use same file name
	as Test Title
	4. Click "Generate" (generates and saves two files in the selected folder)5. Verify files saved in the selected folder
	6. The generated report and SBT Report program may now be closed
	7. Collect procedure markups for SBT
	8. Save any InSight, Alarm, Event, Schedule Files to the secure drive that were in
	use
14.	Reset simulator to appropriate IC.
	1

SEG Page 8 of 32

BOOTH OPERATOR BRIEFING:

Review the scenario sequence, event triggers and expected field communications.

Z:/2021 ILT NRC Simulator Files/NRC Scenario 4.sch

At Time	On Event	Action	Description
		Preloads / Initial Conditions	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction MAL1DSG001B	DIESEL G03 FAILURE TO START
00:00:00		Insert malfunction XMT1RCS007C to -15	1-LT426 PRZR NARROW RANGE LEVEL FIXED BIAS
		Event Z:/2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files/NRC 4.evt	
		Event 1: Inadvertent Loss of Letdown	
	1	Insert malfunction VLV1CVRO5 to Close on event 1 delete in 30	1-CV-200A LTDN ORIFICE STOP VLV NO 1-200A
		Event 2: Inadvertent Turbine Trip	
	3	Insert malfunction MAL1EHC008 on event 3	INADVERTANT TURBINE TRIP
		Event 3: Seismic Event / 'A' CCW Pump Failing	
	5	Schedule Z:\2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files\NRC 4 Seismic 1.sch	
	5	Insert malfunction PMP1CCW001C to 50.00000 in 15 on event 5	1-P11A COMPONENT COOLING PUMP NO 1-P11A HEAD CAPACITY
		Event 4: Dropped Rods / 2nd Seismic Event	
	7	Insert malfunction MAL1CRF002-J4 after 5 on event 7	ROD DROP J4
	7	Insert malfunction MAL1CRF002-I3 after 10 on event 7	ROD DROP 13
	7	Schedule Z:\2021 ILT NRC Exam Simulator Files\NRC 4 Seismic 2.sch after 5	
	7	Insert remote LOA1ANN008 to ON on event 7 delete in 5	SEI-RESET Seismic detector reset C-206
		Event 5: Faulted Steam Generator	
	9	Insert malfunction MAL1SGN002A to 10000000.00000 in 10 on event 9	SG A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK UPSTREAM OF FT
	11	Insert remote LOA1SGN023 to 0 in 10 on event 11	1MS-235 P-29 AFP & RADWASTE STM ISOL
		Event 6: Containment Spray Fails to Actuate	
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BST1PPL057 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC945B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BST1PPL061 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC947B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)
00:00:00		Insert malfunction BST1PPL065 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC949B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)



SEG Page 9 of 32

00:00:00	Insert malfunction BST1PPL059 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC946B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)
00:00:00	Insert malfunction BST1PPL063 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC948B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)
00:00:00	Insert malfunction BST1PPL067 to Fail_As_Is	1-PC950B CONT PRESS HI-HI B/S (SPRAY)

Seismic Event Schedule Files

At Time	On Event	Action	Description
00:00:00		Insert remote LOA1ANN004 to SEIS_EVT	SEI-6210 Switchgear Seismic Detector
00:00:00		Insert remote LOA1ANN005 to SEIS_EVT	SEI-6211 Facade Seismic Detector
00:00:00		Insert remote LOA1ANN006 to SEIS_EVT	SEI-6212 Drum Area Seismic Detector
00:00:00		Insert remote LOA1ANN007 to SEIS_EVT	SEI-6213 Aux FW Tunnel Seismic Detector
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-ROA-B06 to On	SEISMIC DETECTOR ACTIVATION
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-1BOPF-A01 after 5 to On delete in 15	LO PRESS FEEDWATER HEATER 1A,2A OR 3A LEVE
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-1BOPF-B01 after 5 to On delete in 15	LO PRESS FEEDWATER HEATER 1B,2B OR 3B LEVE
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-1BOPF-D02 after 10 to On delete in 20	STILLING MANIFOLD LEVEL HI
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-1BOPF-B02 after 20 to On delete in 30	HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL HI-LO
00:00:00		Insert malfunction ANN-ROD-A01 after 10 to On delete in 20	SERVICE AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW

Event file: Trigger 9 Unit 1 Reactor Trip (JCRFTR)



SEG

Page 10 of 32

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS

Bolded steps are Verifiable Actions taken by the Operators.

(IA) actions are those allowed to be taken from memory, before referencing the procedure, as allowed by OM 3.7, Attachment F, AOP Actions Allowed From Memory.

Inadvertent Letdown Isolation	
Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator	
 Symptoms and Indications: PPCS Alarms: PRIORITY 1 & 2 COMPOSITE ALARM F-134 LETDOWN LINE FLOW P-135 LOW PRESS LETDOWN PRESS 1C04 Indications: 1PI-135, Letdown Pressure lowers to < 50 psig 1FI-134, Letdown Line Flow lowers to approximately 0 gpm Pressurizer level rising Auto Charging Pump speed lowering VCT Level lowering Annunciators PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT (1C04 1C 3-3) PPCS PRIORITY ALARM (1C20D 2-1) 	
 BOP/RO Diagnoses the loss of letdown and reduces charging flow to minimum. SRO Implements AOP-1D, CVCS Malfunction Crew Check RCS leak – NOT IN PROGRESS (RO) Determine CVCS Malfunction: (RO) IF inadvertent letdown isolation occurred, THEN go to Step 48 48. Check letdown – INADVERTENTLY ISOLATED (RO) (IA) Reduce charging to – MINIMUM (RO) Go to manual on both charging pumps, secure one, and reduce the other charging pump to minimum speed 50. Check that letdown restoration can be performed (RO) Ensure letdown orifice outlet valves –SHUT (RO) Ensure normal charging – IN SERVICE (RO) Check PZR Level – GREATER THAN 20% (RO) Establish letdown (RO) a. Open letdown line containment isolation valves b. Open RC loop B cold leg letdown isolation valve 	



SEG Page 11 of 32

Event # 1	Inadvertent Letdown Isolation	
Takes 1HC-130 controller to manual, and establishes and Ensure charging flow – AT LEAST 20 GPM Adjusts changing pump controller until min of 20 gpm of the end of the		
	IF PZR level rises >52%, THEN LCO 3.4.9 is NOT MET CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. PZR water level not within limit in Water level to MODE 1 REQUIRED ACTION I hour Water level to Within limit.	
ROLE PLAY	Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: If asked, direct the crew to restore letdown using 1CV-200B orifice Isolation valve. Respond to reports from crew members as required.	
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After the crew has restored letdown flow and is controlling charging flow, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.	



SEGPage 12 of 32

Event # 2	Inadvertent Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip	
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator	
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications:	
	 BOP/RO Diagnoses the turbine trip without reactor trip, places rod control in manual. SRO 	
	 Implements AOP-25, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip Crew 1. Verify turbine trip (BOP) 2. (IA) Ensure rod control in MANUAL (RO) 3. Check reactor power – BETWEEN 5% and 50% (RO) 4. Stabilize reactor power and temperature. a. Set condenser steam dumps to stabilize reactor power referencing ATTACHMENT A, Reactor Power, Tavg and CSD Controller Settings, as needed: (BOP)	



SEGPage 13 of 32

Event # 2	Inadvertent Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip
	reactor temperature at approximate reactor power per Attachment A, Reactor Power, Tavg and CSD Controller Settings c. Control reactor power between 5% and 40% as directed by shift management. (RO/BOP) 1HFC-484 and rods will be adjusted as necessary to maintain reactor power 5. Verify generator trip (BOP) 6. Check steam generator levels – STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO NORMAL (BOP) 7. Check pressurizer pressure – STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG (RO) 8. Check pressurizer level – STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL (RO)
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: TH AO: If AOs are dispatched to investigate the cause of the turbine trip, wait 3 minutes and report that that there is no apparent cause. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After the crew has stabilized reactor power and temperature, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.



SEG Page 14 of 32

Event # 3	Seismic Event / 1P11A, CCW Pump Failure	
ACTION	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 5 per Lead Evaluator	
	Trigger 5 will open and run schedule file "NRC Seismic 1.sch." After all events have run, CLOSE schedule file "NRC 4 Seismic 1.sch ." (This is necessary for the next seismic event to run properly)	



SEGPage 15 of 32

Event # 3	Seismic Event / 1P	11A, CCW Pum	p Failure
STUDENT RESPONSE	 1C03 1D 1-4 and 1C03 1F 1-1, 2-1, PPCS Alarms: SEI-6210 through 1C03 Indications: 	ompanied by various r TOR ACTIVATION (C 1-5 1P-1A(B) RCP CO	CO1A 2-6) COLING WATER FLOW LOW ER Heater High and Low Level alarms ECTOR alarms
	BOP/RO • Diagnoses reduced C	CW system flow.	
	SROImplements AOP-28, Malfunction.	Seismic Event and A	OP-9B, Component Cooling System
		t cooling pumps – AT ent cooling surge tank cooling pump.	tion LEAST ONE RUNNING (BOP) level greater than 20%, THEN start
	field walkdowns) 2. Check seismic ins 3. Notify DSM and ir notifications)	itions – NORMAL (RC struments – NOT TRIC nplement Emergency wn inspection per Atta	D/BOP and crew will contact AOs for
	Assess Technical Specific CCW LCO 3.7.7 is No.	OT MET	
	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	A. One CC pump inoperable	A.1 Restore CC pump to OPERABLE status.	72 hours AND 144 hours from discovery of failure to meet the LCO



SEG Page 16 of 32

Event # 3	Seismic Event / 1P11A, CCW Pump Failure
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: PAB AO: One minute after the seismic event, report that 1P-11A, CCW Pump is making an excessive noise and you recommend securing the pump. PAB AO: If asked, report pre-start check on 1P-11B, CCW pump, SAT PAB AO: After 1P-11B is started, report a SAT start on 1P-11B. Lead AO: If directed to perform plant walkdowns per AOP-28, Att A, wait 10 minutes and report that the only damage was the CCW Pump. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: If asked, plant management has approved continued operation while walkdowns are being performed. Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	Continuation Criteria: After the crew has switched operating CCW pumps, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, continue with the next event.



SEGPage 17 of 32

Event # 4	Multiple Dropped Rods (J4 and I3)
ACTION	Booth: Check that schedule file "NRC 4 Seismic 1.sch" is CLOSED, Then Insert TRIGGER 7 per Lead Evaluator
STUDENT RESPONSE	Symptoms and Indications: Rumbling sound accompanied by various alarms Annunciators: SEISMIC DETECTOR ACTIVATION (C01A 2-6) ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP (1C04 1A 1-5) POWER RANGE ROD DROP (1C04 1A 4-5) PPCS Alarms: SEI-6210 through 6213 SEISMIC DETECTOR alarms 1C04 Indications: Control Rod I3 (CBA) and J4 (CBC) rod bottom lights lit Control Rod I3 and J4 IRPI indications at 0 steps
	 BOP/RO Diagnoses multiple dropped rods and trips the reactor. (RO) Performs EOP-0 Immediate Actions. (RO)
	 SRO Directs a reactor trip per AOP-6A, Dropped Rod Implements EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
	Crew AOP-6A, Dropped Rod Check only one rod dropped RNO: Perform the following: Trip the reactor (RO) Go to EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (SRO)
	 EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Verify Reactor Trip (RO) Verify Turbine Trip (RO) Verify Power to AC Safeguards Busses (RO) Check if SI actuated (RO)
Conditions for CT-3 and CT-17 start here CT-17 action	 Foldout Page #3: Faulted S/G Isolation Criteria (BOP) IF any S/G pressure trending lower in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G completely depressurized, THEN the following may be performed: (CT-17) Isolate feed flow to faulted S/G. Ensure 1FIC-4074A, 1P-53 AFP to 1HX-1A FCV in manual and shut AND 1AF-4001 AFP Disch SG A Inlet MOV shut Maintain total feed flow greater than or equal to 275 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S/G is greater than [52%] 33%. Control feed flow to B S/G using 1FIC-4074B, 1P-53 AFP to 1HX-1B FCV and 1AF-4000, 1P29 AFP Disch SG B Inlet MOV



SEGPage 18 of 32

Event # 4	Multiple Dropped Rods (J4 and I3)
	 Perform Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, while continuing with this procedure. (BOP) Verify AFW Pumps – RUNNING (RO) Check RCP Seal Cooling (RO) Check RCS Temperatures (RO) Condenser steam dumps - AVAILABLE RNO: Adjust S/G(s) atmospheric steam dump controllers to 1005 psig RCS Temperature With and RCP running: RCS average temperature – STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RNO: Perform the following: IF temperature is less than 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following: Stop dumping steam IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow.
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	



SEGPage 19 of 32

Event # 5	Faulted 'A' Steam Generator	
ACTION	Booth: TRIGGER 9 will auto insert on reactor trip.	
	Insert Trigger 11 per crew direction for local S/G isolations	
STUDENT RESPONSE	 Symptoms and indications: Steam Flow indicated on A S/G Containment Pressure rising rapidly to >25 psig (Containment Spray setpoint) S/G A level and pressure lowering rapidly, inconsistent with plant trip BOP/RO Performs actions as directed. 	
	SROImplements EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation	
CT-17 action	Crew EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 1. Check main steam isolation (RO) 2. Check if any S/G is not faulted (RO) 3. Identify faulted S/G (RO) 4. (CT-17)Isolate faulted S/G (RO) a. Ensure feedwater isolation valve is – SHUT, 1CS-3124 b. Ensure MDAFW valve – SHUT, 1AF-4074A c. Ensure TDAFW valve – SHUT, 1AF-4001 d. Ensure SSG supply valve – SHUT, AF-4023 e. Isolate flow from faulted S/G: 1) Ensure atmospheric steam dump – SHUT, 1MS-2016 2) Shut steam supply to turbine-driven AFW pump: 1MS-2020 3) Ensure S/G blowdown isolation valves – SHUT: 1MS-5958, 1MS-2042 4) Locally shut 1P-29 AFP/Radwaste steam isolation: 1MS-235 5) Locally shut main steam trap isolation: 1MS-228 5. Check CST level – GREATER THAN 4 ft (RO) 6. Check secondary radiation (RO) 7. Go to EOP-1, Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant (SRO)	



SEG Page 20 of 32

Event # 5	Faulted 'A' Steam Generator
ROLE PLAY	 Booth Communications: PAB AO: When directed to locally shut 1MS-235, AFP/Radwaste steam isolation, and 1MS-228, main steam trap isolation, then insert Trigger 11, wait two minutes and report the valves are shut. Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required.
NOTES	



SEG Page 21 of 32

Event # 6	Containment Spray Fails to Actuate
ACTION	Booth: None
STUDENT RESPONSE	 Symptoms and indications: Containment Pressure rising rapidly to >25 psig (Containment Spray setpoint) SI and Containment Isolation actuation NO Unit 1 Containment Spray actuation alarm C01B 2-6 NO response by Unit Containment Spray System
	BOP performs EOP-0, Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification (BOP)
CT-3 action	A1 – Verify feedwater isolation A2 – Verify containment isolation A3 – Verify ECCS Pumps RUNNING a. SI pumps – BOTH RUNNING b. RHR Pumps – BOTH RUNNING A4 – Verify service water pumps running A5 – Verify containment accident cooling units RUNNING A6 – Verify component cooling water pumps – ONLY ONE RUNNING A7 – Check if main steam lines can remain open A8 – (CT-3) Verify containment spray not required a. Containment pressure recorder – HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 25 psig RNO: Perform the following: 1) Check containment spray actuated: annunciator C01 B 2-6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY, lit IF containment spray has not actuated, THEN manually actuate containment spray. A9 – Verify ECCS Flow A10 – Verify AFW valve alignment – PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT A11 – Verify proper ECCS valve alignment A12 – Check containment spray NOT ACTUATED RNO: Check containment spray alignment: 1. Ensure all containment spray pump discharge valves are open 2. Ensure all containment spray pump bis running 3. IF two containment spray pumps are running, THEN place one containment spray pump in pull-out Takes one of 1P-14A/B, Containment Spray pump to pullout 4. WHEN containment spray has been actuated for GREATER THAN two minutes, THEN ensure spray additive eductor suction valve is open on the running train A13 – Stop any boration via the blender in progress A14 – Ensure the Auxiliary building filter/exhaust fans – OPERATING A15 – Notify the STA to IMPLEMENT Status trees, Notify the SM of any equipment malfunctions previously noted. A16 – Verify Service Water system alignment A17 – Check miscellaneous valves – SHUT A18 – Check Control Room ventilation



SEGPage 22 of 32

F	Containment Conser Falls to Astronto			
Event # 6	Containment Spray Fails to Actuate			
	A19 – Check cable spreading room ventilation system – OPERATING			
	A20 – Check Computer Room ventilation system – OPERATING			
	A21 – Check AFW recirc fans – ONE RUNNING			
	A22 – Check Circ Water Pump House temperature less than 105°F A23 – Check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature less than 95°F			
	A24 – Periodically check status of spent fuel cooling.			
	724 - I Gliodically clieck status of spelit fuel coolling.			
CTUDENT	EOP-1, Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant:			
1. Check if RCPs should be stopped (RO)				
RESPONSE	a. RCPs – ANY RUNNING; RNO: Go to Step 2 (SRO)			
	2. Check if S/Gs are NOT faulted (BOP)			
	3. Check intact S/G level (BOP)			
	a. S/G Level – Greater than [52%] 33%: RNO: Maintain total feed flow			
	greater than 275 gpm until level is greater than [52%] 33% in at least one S/G.			
	Control feed to B S/G based on level using 1FIC-4074B, 1P-53			
	AFP to 1HX-1B FCV and 1AF-4000, 1P29 AFP Disch SG B Inlet			
	MOV			
	4. Check secondary radiation (BOP)			
	5. Check PORVs and Block valves (RO)			
	6. Reset SI (BOP)			
	7. Reset isolation and lockout signals (BOP)			
	Containment isolation			
	 1B03 and 1B04 non-safeguards equipment lockouts 			
	8. Establish Instrument Air to containment (BOP)			
	a. Check instrument air header pressure – GREATER THAN 80 PSIG			
	b. Open instrument air containment isolation valves one at a time:			
	• IA 3047 • IA-3048			
	9. Check power supply to charging pumps (BOP)			
	10. Check if charging flow has been established (RO)			
	11. Check if ECCS flow should be terminated			
	Evaluator Note: Step 11 is the same as Foldout Page #2			
	a. RCS subcooling based on core exit thermocouples – GREATER			
	THAN [62°F] 37°F (RO)			
	b. Secondary heat sink: (BOP)			
	o Level in at least one S/G – GREATER THAN [52%] 33%			
	OR			
	o Total feed flow to intact S/G – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL			
	TO 275 GPM			
	c. RCS Pressure (RO) • Pressure – GREATER THAN [1850 psig] 1725 psig			
	AND			
	Pressure – STABLE OR RISING			
	d. PZR Level – GREATER THAN [26%] 11% (RO)			
	e. Go to EOP-1.1, SI Termination (SRO)			



SEGPage 23 of 32

Event # 6	Containment Spray Fails to Actuate		
	EOP-1.1, SI Termination		
	Evaluator Note: Foldout Page #5 may apply upon entry to EOP-1.1.		
	Foldout Page #5: IF RCS hot leg temperatures are not stable, THEN control steam dump and total feed flow as necessary to stabilize RCS hot leg temperatures. (BOP)		
	RCS temperature stabilized using B S/G feed flow and 1HC-478, SG B Atmos Steam Dump Controller		
	 Reset SI (BOP) Reset isolation and lockout signals (BOP) Containment isolation 		
	 1B03 and 1B04 non-safeguards equipment lockouts 3. Establish Instrument Air to containment (BOP) c. Check instrument air header pressure – GREATER THAN 80 PSIG d. Open instrument air containment isolation valves one at a time: IA 3047 IA-3048 		
	 4. Check if charging flow has been established (RO) 5. Stop ECCS pumps and place in standby: (BOP) a. Stop both SI pumps and place in auto b. RHR pumps – ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST 		
	 c. Stop both RHR pumps and place in auto 6. Verify SI flow not required (RO) 7. Check if containment spray should be stopped (BOP) a. Containment spray pumps – ANY RUNNING b. Containment pressure – LESS THAN 20 psig c. Reset containment spray signal d. Ensure containment spray pump RWST suction MOVs - OPEN e. Stop both containment spray pumps and place in auto f. Shut containment spray pump discharge valve and place in auto-after-shut position Shuts 1SI-860A/B/C/D, Containment Spray Pump flow MOVs, and places control switch in Auto g. Ensure both spray additive eductor suction valves – SHUT Places 1YIC-926A/B, Spray Add Eductor Suct Flow controller in 		



SEGPage 24 of 32

Event # 6	Containment Spray Fails to Actuate		
ROLE PLAY	 EOP-0, Att A communications: PAB AO: When directed to check rad waste service water valves SHUT at C-180, report the TV-LW61 and TV-LW62 are both SHUT TH AO: When directed to check Circ Water Pump House temperature, wait 1 minute and report 76°F and stable. TH AO: When directed to check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature, wait 1 minute and report 80°F and stable. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. SM Communications: Respond to reports from crew members as required. 		
NOTES			

	Scenario Termination		
	Terminate the scenario when crew has completed through Step 7 of EOP-1.1, SI Termination, or per Lead Evaluator.		
NOTES	 Freeze the simulator Determine if the NRC has any follow up questions Save SBT Data (see sim setup instructions) 		



SEG

Page 25 of 32

QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

Malfunctions:

Before EOP Entry:

- 1CV-200A inadvertently shuts
- Inadvertent turbine trip
- 1P-11A CCW Pump failure
- Two dropped rods

After EOP Entry:

• Containment spray fails to auto actuate

Abnormal Events:

- CVCS Malfunction
- Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip
- Dropped Rod
- Seismic Event

Major Transients:

• Faulted Steam Generator

Critical Tasks:

1.	CT-3	Manually actuate containment cooling	
2.	CT-17	Isolate faulted S/G	

Major Procedures:

 $AOP-1D \Rightarrow AOP-25 \Rightarrow AOP-9B \Rightarrow AOP-28 \Rightarrow AOP-6A \Rightarrow EOP-0 \Rightarrow EOP-2 \Rightarrow EOP-1 \Rightarrow EOP-1.1$



SEG

Page 26 of 32

CT-3

Manually actuate containment cooling

Critical Task:

Manually actuate at least one train of containment cooling before an extreme (RED path) challenge develops to the containment CSF.

Plant Conditions:

Containment cooling is required but the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment is not automatically actuated

 The minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room

Cues:

- Indication and/or annunciation that containment cooling is required
- Indication and/or annunciation that the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment is not actuated

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required to actuate containment cooling equipment

Feedback:

Indication and/or annunciation that at least one train of containment cooling equipment is actuated

Basis:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component." that can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to "effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity)." Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate containment cooling equipment when it is possible to do so results in a failure to prevent "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."



SEG

Page 27 of 32

CT-17

Isolate faulted steam generator

Plant Conditions:

Faulted Steam Generator

Cues:

Indication and/or annunciation that both the following are occurring:

- Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify a single SG as faulted AND
- Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG

Performance Indicator:

Manipulation of controls as required isolating the faulted SG

- MSIVs indicate closed
- Indication of feedline isolation
 - Feedwater control valves indicate closed
 - Feedline isolation valves indicate closed
 - Main feed pumps indicate tripped
- Indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped
 - AFW flow control valves for faulted SG indicate closed

Feedback:

- Any depressurization of intact SGs stops
- Steam flow indication from faulted SG decreases to zero
- RCS cooldown stops
- Main feedwater flow rate indication of zero
- · AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero

Basis:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE - Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component."

Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

- Integrity
- Subcriticality



SEG

Page 28 of 32

Booth Summary

Event #1	Inadvertent Letdown Isolation	
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 1 per Lead Evaluator	
Role Play	Respond to reports or direction to field operators as necessary.	

Event #2	Inadvertent Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip		
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 3 per Lead Evaluator		
Role Play	Booth Communications:		
	 TH AO: If AOs are dispatched to investigate the cause of the turbine trip, wait 3 minutes and report that that there is no apparent cause. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 		

Event #3	Seismic Event / 1P11A, CCW Pump Failure	
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 5 per Lead Evaluator	
	Trigger 5 will open and run schedule file "NRC Seismic 1.sch." After all events have run, CLOSE schedule file "NRC 4 Seismic 1.sch." (This is necessary for the next seismic event to run properly)	
Role Play	 Booth Communications: PAB AO: One minute after the seismic event, report that 1P-11A, CCW Pump is making an excessive noise and you recommend securing the pump. PAB AO: If asked, report pre-start check on 1P-11B, CCW pump, SAT PAB AO: After 1P-11B is started, report a SAT start on 1P-11B. Lead AO: If directed to perform plant walkdowns per AOP-28, Att A, wait 10 minutes and report that the only damage was the CCW Pump. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary. 	

Event #4	Multiple Dropped Rods (J4 and I3)	
Action	Booth: Check that schedule file "NRC 4 Seismic 1.sch" is CLOSED, Then Insert TRIGGER 7 per Lead Evaluator	
Role Play	Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary.	



SEGPage 29 of 32

Event #5	Faulted 'A' Steam Generator		
Action	Booth: Insert TRIGGER 9 per Lead Evaluator		
	Insert Trigger 11 per crew direction for local S/G isolations		
Role Play	Booth Communications:		
	 PAB AO: When directed to locally shut 1MS-235, AFP/Radwaste steam isolation, and 1MS-228, main steam trap isolation, then insert Trigger 11, wait two minutes and report the valves are shut. 		
	Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary.		

Booth: None	
Booth Communications: EOP-0, Att A communications: PAB AO: When directed to check rad waste service water valves SHUT at C-180, report the TV-LW61 and TV-LW62 are both SHUT TH AO: When directed to check Circ Water Pump House temperature, wait 1 minute and report 76°F and stable. TH AO: When directed to check G03/G04 switchgear room temperature, wait 1 minute and report 80°F and stable. Respond to other reports or direction to field operators as necessary.	
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SEG

Page 30 of 32

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

PLANT CONDITIONS:

UNIT 1

Time in core life (MWD/MTU): 9500

Reactor power (%): 47%

Boron concentration (ppm): 1111 ppm

Rod height, CBD @: 220

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION CONDITIONS IN EFFECT:

TSAC Description Required Action & Completion Time

U1 3.3.1.A/K RPS one channel inoperable Place channel in trip – 1 hour

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE:

• G03 Emergency Diesel Generator for maintenance.

• 1LT-426 Pressurizer Level Transmitter.

PLANNED EVOLUTIONS:

Power ascension to 100%.

TURNOVER INFORMATION:

- G04 Emergency Diesel Generator is aligned to both 1A06 and 2A06 4160 Safeguards Busses.
- On line risk is GREEN.
- Today is Tuesday, day shift.



SEG Page 31 of 32

Pre-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	SRO		
	1 st Check	2 nd Check	
AOP-1D			
AOP-6A			
AOP-9B			
AOP-25			
AOP-28			
EOP-0			
EOP-1			
EOP-1.1			
EOP-2			
Specific ARP/ARBs to be second checked – All Others first checked			
	1 st Check	2 nd Check	
1C20D 2-1			
1C03 1E1 4-2			
1C03 E1 4-3			
1C03 D 1-4			
1C03 D 1-5			



SEG Page 32 of 32

Post-Scenario Procedure Checks

Procedure	SRO	
	1 st Check	2 nd Check
AOP-1D		
AOP-6A		
AOP-9B		
AOP-25		
AOP-28		
EOP-0		
EOP-1		
EOP-1.1		
EOP-2		
ARB's	1 st Check	2 nd Check
1C20D 2-1		
1C03 1E1 4-2		
1C03 1E1 4-3		
1C03 D 1-4		
1C03 D 1-5		
RESET IC		N/A
Booth Cleared Exam Material		
Magnets Replaced		