LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

1

ID: 2164596

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 70% Reactor Power.

- Both Reactor Recirc Pumps are running at 1250 RPM
- "2B" Reactor Recirc Pump (RRP) trips
- OT-112, "Unexpected/Unexplained Change in Core Flow" is entered

What action is required and the reason for that action?

- A. Insert 8 control rods to prevent Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities (THI)
- B. Close the RRP discharge valve and reopen 5 minutes later to allow the impeller to settle
- C. Lower speed of the "2A" RRP to <1000 RPM to prevent reverse flow in the B Jet Pumps
- D. Scram the reactor as single loop operation at Low power places the reactor in the restricted region of the Power/Flow map
- Answer: B

Answer Explanation	

positio 1.2 Unexpe	Pump trip(s) while Reactor Mode Switch is in	
	ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 2 Trip of a Recirc Pump	Find Unexpecte
	NOTES	
	rmal binding/pressure locking, Recirc Pump isolation <u>10t</u> be closed for more than approximately 5 minutes.	
rated core flow	circ loop isolation valves open with total core flow >40% of will cause reverse flow through idle loop idle loop warm. At lower flows, idle loop reverse flow will	
AND cool down	n will occur.	[]
1. ENSURE OPE	N **-BUS-03, "START A(B)" for the tripped Recirc Pump.	[]
 (DISCHARGE A) OR HV-043-*F02 for tripped Recirc IF Recirc Pump i AND approximat THEN OPEN H 	23Â(B), "*A(B) Recirc Pump Suction VIv" (SUCTION A(B)), c Pump. solation valve is <u>not</u> required to be closed ely 5 minutes has elapsed, V-043-*F031A(B), "*A(B) Recirc Pump Disch VIv"	[] ⊕
(DISCHARGE A OR HV-043-*F02 for tripped Recirc	23A(B), "*A(B) Recirc Pump Suction VIv" (SUCTION A(B)),	[]
ANSWER (B)	Close the RRP discharge valve and reoperallow the impeller to settle; Correct: As really trip, the discharge valve should be close the impeller to settle and then re-opened to perform the impeller to settle and the settle and th	noted above, following a ed for 5 minutes to allow
DISTRACTOR (A)	Insert 8 control rods to prevent Thermal H (THI); Wrong: Plausible to the candidate the power is >80%, 8 control rods should be inser Initial power in this condition was 70%.	nat recalls that if initial
DISTRACTOR (C)	Lower speed of the "2A" RRP to <1000 RF flow in the B Jet Pumps; Wrong: Plausible recalls that with recirc speed <1000 rpm, flow all forward flow. Not directed by the proce	le to the candidate who w through the jet pumps is
DISTRACTOR (D)	Scram the reactor as single loop operation the reactor in the restricted region of the Plausible to the candidate who recalls that si	Power/Flow map; Wrong:

Question 1 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164596
User-Defined ID:	Q #01 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Reduced Loop Operating Requirements Basis
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification	tests the op plant respo	perators know	of an ASD whic
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional Information	N/A		
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		1	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating	ng 295001 AK3.05 3		
	KA Statement		for the follo as they app OR COMPI FORCED C CIRCULAT loop operat requiremen Plant-Spec	ts:
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Function		1 - Reactivi	ty Ctrl
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.6	
	Technical Referen Revision No:		OT-112	Rev 62
	Question History: NRC-05)		NEW	
	Question Type: (M Modified)		NEW	
	Revision History:			
	Training Objectiv	e	LGSOPS00 LGSOPS00	043A.LO13,

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2

ID: 2163839

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is in a Station Blackout, with the following:

- HPCI and RCIC initiated on RPV low level.
- RPV level is recovering.
- E-1, "Loss of All AC Power (Station Blackout)" and T-101, "RPV Control" are being executed concurrently.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the required operator action per E-1?

Α.	Shutdown HPCI within 10 minutes of Station Blackout;
	Transfer and maintain RCIC Pump suction to the Suppression Pool

- B. Shutdown RCIC within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Transfer and maintain HPCI Pump suction to the Suppression Pool
- C. Shutdown HPCI within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Maintain RCIC Pump suction aligned to the CST
- D. Shutdown RCIC within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Maintain HPCI Pump suction aligned to the CST

Answer:

Answer Explanation

А

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E-1, step 2.1 directs operators to enter T-100/T-101 (RPV Control), as applicable, and execute it concurrently. Per step 3.1, if HPCI is automatically initiated, then HPCI shutdown per S55.2.A is to be completed within 10 minutes of the Station Blackout. The Limerick design basis for RPV water level control following a Station Blackout credits only the RCIC system for RPV level control since RCIC has sufficient capacity to maintain RPV inventory and HPCI capacity would result in exceeding the High RPV water level trip of +54 inches. Performance of S55.2.A returns the HPCI system to the auto/standby condition if the system has automatically initiated. Step 3.2 of E-1 provides direction to transfer and maintain RCIC suction to the Suppression Pool. The Limerick design basis for RPV level control for the four hour coping period following a Station Blackout credits the RCIC system in operation with suction from the Suppression Pool only. No credit is taken for the CST as a suction source for RCIC.

ANSWER (A)	Shutdown HPCI within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Transfer and maintain RCIC Pump suction to the Suppression Pool. Correct. As reasons described above.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Shutdown RCIC within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Transfer and maintain HPCI Pump suction to the Suppression Pool. Wrong. Plausible to the examinee who incorrectly recalls E-1 requirements to secure HPCI and substitutes RCIC instead. Also plausible in that HPCI and RCIC share the same suction sources.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Shutdown HPCI within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Maintain RCIC Pump suction aligned to the CST. Wrong. Plausible to the examinee who recalls that HPCI must be shut down following a station blackout but who assumes that the CST is the preferred source for suction since that is true for power operation. Per the bases, this is not correct.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Shutdown RCIC within 10 minutes of Station Blackout; Maintain HPCI Pump suction aligned to the CST. Wrong. Plausible to the examinee who incorrectly recalls E-1 requirements to secure HPCI and substitutes RCIC instead. Also plausible to the candidate who, assuming HPCI is running, wants to ensure that the cleanest water is used. Bases does not credit the CST for a station blackout.

Question 2 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2163839		
User-Defined ID:	Q #02 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	E-1 Station Blacko	ut - Recall ope	erator actions
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating	I	295003 AK1/06 3.8/4.0
	KA Statement		Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OF COMPLETE LOSS OF A.0 POWER: Station blackout: Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level		LOW
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55		(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10)
	Technical Reference with		E-1, Rev.51; E-1 Bases,
	Revision No:		Rev.15
	Question Histor NRC-05)	y: (i.e. LGS	LGS 2012 NRC Exam Question #73, LGS ILT 15-1 COMP 2
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		BANK 1149992
	Revision History		
	Training Objecti	VA	LGSOPS

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3

ID: 2163841

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions:

- 100% power
- '1A' CRD Pump is in service.

The following alarms are received:

- 121 G-1 1 UNIT DIV 3 SFGD BATTERY CHARGER TROUBLE
- 121 G-2 1PPC1/1PPC3 125V DC DIST PANELS UNDERVOLTAGE
- 121 G-3 1PPC2 125V DC DIST PANEL UNDERVOLTAGE

A LOCA occurs which results in reactor level lowering to -150".

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) The procedure(s) to be entered?

(2) The pump(s) that will be running following the LOCA signal?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
A.	E-1FC Only	'1A' CRD
В.	E-1FC Only	'1C' Core Spray
C.	E-1FA, E-1FC	'1A' CRD
D.	E-1FA, E-1FC	'1C' Core Spray

Answer:

Answer Explanation	n
ANSWER (A)	E-1FC, 1A CRD; Correct. The annunciators provided in the stem are an indication of a loss of Division 3 DC. With Division 3 DC de-energized, 4KV breakers on the D13 Bus will lose control power. This will prevent the breakers from being operated remotely or automatically. Since the "1A" CRD Pump breaker was already closed, it will remain closed after the LOCA since it will be unable to automatically trip.
DISTRACTOR (B)	E-1FC, 1C Core Spray; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that knows the '1A' CRD pump will normally trip on a LOCA signal and must be manually restarted, and that the '1C' Core Spray pump will normally start on a LOCA signal but has no control power in this instance
DISTRACTOR (C)	E-1FA, E-1FC, 1A CRD; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that see the 1PPC1, 1PPC2 and 1PPC3 annunciators and associate them with Division 1 and 3 DC distribution panels.
DISTRACTOR (D)	E-1FA, E-1FC, 1C Core Spray; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that see the 1PPC1, 1PPC2 and 1PPC3 annunciators and associate them with Division 1 and 3 DC distribution panels and who recalls that 1C C.S. pump would start on a LOCA signal but forgets that there is no control power.

Question 3 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2163841
User-Defined ID:	Q #03 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Predict Impact of Div 3 4 KV loss on Pumps following LOCA
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	requires th Off Norma Divisional	ion meets the KA because it he candidate to recognize the I procedure for loss of DC and recognize the loads navailable for use.
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295004 AK2.03 3.3
	KA Statement		Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER and the following: D.C. bus loads.
	Cognitive level	Cognitive level	
	Safety Function	Safety Function	
	10 CFR 55		(CFR: 41.7 / 45.8)
	Technical Referen Revision No:	ce with	E-1FC Rev 16 SE-10 Rev 61 S12.1.A App 2 Rev 1
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	NEW
	Question Type: (N Modified)	ew, Bank,	NEW
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective)	LGSOPS0092A.8

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ID: 2163876

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 Plant Conditions are as follows:

- Reactor Startup is in progress.
- 1A RRP Speed is 466 RPM
- 1B RRP Speed is 466 RPM •
- Main Generator is synchronized to the grid.
- Reactor power is 24%
- Reactor vessel pressure is 980 psig steady •

Rising vibration on the Main Turbine requires operators to trip the turbine.

Six (6) Main Turbine Bypass valves are open.

Two (2) minutes later:

- Annunciator 106 Main Steam F5, "MINOR TROUBLE PRESS CONTROL" alarms.
- Annunciator 105 Main Turbine B3, "MINOR TROUBLE TURBINE CONTROL" alarms. •
- Four (4) Main Turbine Bypass valves are open and not moving. •
- RPV pressure is 1030 psig and rising slowly.

What action is required to mitigate the event?

- Reduce reactor power by incrementally lowering RRP speed Α.
- Β. Take manual control of pressure with the Bypass valve jack
- C. Scram the reactor since it should have scrammed on turbine trip
- Lower the Max Combined Flow Limit (MCFL) setpoint until it is in control of pressure D.

Answer:

Answer Explanation

В

ANSWER (B)	Take manual control of pressure with the Bypass valve jack; Correct: OT-102, "Rx High Pressure", has immediate operator actions to control pressure below 1053 psig using the bypass jack due to an unexpected/unexplained rise in Rx pressure. A failure of the DEHC to control pressure is the most likely cause of this event.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Reduce reactor power by incrementally lowering RRP speed; Wrong. Lowering reactor power is an immediate operator action in OT-102, however in this case lowering RRP speed is not an option since the RRPs are already operating at minimum speed (466 RPM).
DISTRACTOR (C)	Scram the reactor since it should have scrammed on turbine trip; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes that on a turbine trip, the Reactor should have scrammed based on 1st stage pressure. In this instance, power at 24% is below the power at which first stage pressure should cause that trip.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Lower the Max Combined Flow Limit (MCFL) setpoint until it is in control of pressure; Wrong:. Plausible to the candidate that infers that a DEHC regulator malfunction is the cause of this event and concludes that lowering MCFL would force DEHC to control. However, the MCFL is not user ajustable Also there is no procedural direction for this action.

Question 4 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2163876
User-Defined ID:	Q #04 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Recognize Turbine Status from Annunciators
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

omments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification	question po which resul answer the	osits a Main ⁻ ts in rising R question, the	x pressure. To e candidate mus
	N/A Justification	main turbin contained in procedure a action.	e system. 1 n an Operatio	and DEHC and The answer is onal Transient ate operator
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A		
	Additional Information	N/A		
	mormation			×
		General	Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		1	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		295005 4.2	G2.4.31
	KA Statement		Trip; Know annunciato	r alarms, , or response
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Function		3 - Reactor Control	Pressure
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 45.	3
	Technical Refere Revision No:		OT-102	Rev.030
	Question History NRC-05)		NEW	
		Now Bank	NEW	
	Question Type: (I Modified)	· ·	NEW	
		:		01A.3A, 5A, 5B

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ID: 2163899

Points: 1.00

Following a reactor scram ONE rod is at position "24" and all other rods are at position "00".

WHICH ONE of the following describes whether the reactor will remain shutdown?

- A. Design basis shutdown margin is NOT met; therefore it CANNOT be assured that the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions.
- B. Design basis shutdown margin is met; therefore the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions.
- C. Control rods are inserted to or beyond the Maximum Sub-critical Banked Withdrawal limit; therefore the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions.
- D. Control rods are NOT inserted to or beyond the Maximum Sub-critical Banked Withdrawal limit; therefore it CANNOT be assured the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions.

Answer: B

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Answer Explanation

ANSWER (B)	Design basis shutdown margin is met; therefore the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions; Correct. Design basis shutdown margin is met, therefore the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions. IAW Tech Specs definition, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical assuming all control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth is assumed to be fully withdrawn and the reactor is in the shutdown condition; cold, i.e. 68°F and xenon free"
DISTRACTOR (A)	Design basis shutdown margin is NOT met; therefore it CANNOT be assured that the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who does not believe that with a rod at position 24, shutdown margin is met. They would consequently not expect that the Rx would remain shut down under all conditions
DISTRACTOR (C)	Control rods are inserted to or beyond the Maximum Sub-critical Banked Withdrawal limit; therefore the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the definition of Maximum Subcritical Banked Withdrawal Position and incorrectly applies it to this condition. With one rod withdrawn to position 24 MSBWP is not met.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Control rods are NOT inserted to or beyond the Maximum Sub-critical Banked Withdrawal limit; therefore it CANNOT be assured the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who correctly recalls the definition of Maximum Sub-critical Banked Withdrawal Position and determines that it is not met in this case. That is true but the TS criteria for shutdown is the correct answer and in this instance, the Rx will remain shut down as TS assures.

Question 5 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?		No		
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2163899			
User-Defined ID:	Q #05 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	Knowledge of shutd	own margin a	applied to scram	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References	None		
	Provided			
	K/A Justification	This question meets the KA because it requires the candidate have knowledge of the definition of shutdown margin as applies to SCRAM conditions.		
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A		
	Additional Information	N/A		
		Genera	I Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		1	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		295006 AK1.02 3.4	
	KA Statement		Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to SCRAM: Shutdown margin.	
	Cognitive level		LOW	
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55			
	Technical Refere Revision No:	Technical Reference with Revision No:		
	Question History NRC-05)	•		
	Question Type: (I Modified)		BANK (Hope Creek 2012 ILT Q40)	
	Revision History:	•		
	Training Objectiv		LGSOPS1560.5 (T-101)	

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6

ID: 2164035

Points: 1.00

There is a fire in the Main Control Room.

SE-1, "Remote Shutdown" has been entered and the Main Control Room has been evacuated.

The CRS has directed performance of the following SE-1 step on unit 1:

CLOSE 51-*018A, "RHR Pump Disch Hdr Cond Transfer Fill Inlet" (510-11-283/589-17-283) **AND** 51-*031A, "Cond Transfer Fill to A Loop S/D Clg Return Hdr" (309-15-217/376-17-238).

Where is the valve 51-1031A physically located?

- A. Control Enclosure
- B. Radwaste Enclosure
- C. Unit 1 Turbine Enclosure
- D. Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure

D


Answer:

Answer Explanation

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The key to answering the question in in understanding the location code give in the procedure step; (309-15-217/376-17-238).

The first 3 numbers contain the location for 51-1031A, and the second set of 3 numbers contains the location for 51-2031A. Since the question is about 51-1031A, the first set of numbers contains the location. The location given by the number set is in the Room Number - Plant Area - Plant Elevation format. So the valve is located in Room 309, Area 15, Elevation 217. By recalling the plant area map below the candidate can determine that plant area 15 in in the Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure. Since plant elevation 217' (ground floor) is common to all plant areas, the final number (217) in the set is of no use in determining the answer.



Question 6 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164035		
User-Defined ID:	Q #06 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	MCR Abandonment	: - Locate and	Operate Local Controls
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	I Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295016 G2.1.30
	KA Statement		Ability to locate and operat components, including loca controls.
	Cognitive level		LOW
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.7
	Technical Reference with Revision No:		SE-1 Rev 76, A-307 Sh 1 Rev 32
	Question History NRC-05)	: (i.e. LGS	NEW
	Question Type: (Modified)	New, Bank,	NEW
	Revision History	:	

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ID: 2164096

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with degraded RECW heat exchanger performance.

Unit 2 Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger outlet temperatures were recorded as:

<u>Time</u>	Temperature (TI-44-2R607) Channel 3
T = 0 min	120°F
T = 1 min	122°F
T = 2 min	124°F

7

WHICH ONE of the following identifies (1) The automatic action that happens next; and

(2) At what time (from T=0) the automatic action will occur, assuming the current temperature trend continues?

	1	2
Α.	HV-044-2F004 Isolates	T = 10 min
В.	HV-044-2F004 Isolates	T = 5 min
C.	HV-044-2F001 Isolates	T = 10 min
D.	HV-044-2F001 Isolates	T = 5 min
Answer:	Α	

Answer Explanation

From ON-113, "Loss of RECW"_		
Exch	eactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Non-Regenerative Heat anger outlet temperature reaches 140 °F, <u>N</u> VERIFY the following:	
2.9.1	HV-044-*F004, "Rx Wtr Cleanup Outboard PCIV" (OUTBOARD), is closed	
2.9.2	RWCU Pumps tripped	
2.9.3	RWCU Demineralizer Hold Pumps start	
ANSWER (A)	HV-044-2F004 Isolates, T = 10 min; Correct. The next automatic action to occur from the conditions in the question is a Group 3 NSSSS Isolation at 140°F at the outlet of the NRHX. This isolation signal will close the HV-44-2F004 PCIV. From the table a 2°F/min heatup of the outlet temperature exists. Since there is a 20°F difference from 120°F to 140 at that heatup rate the isolation signal will occur at T= 10.0 minutes. So it will have happened by T=10	
DISTRACTOR (B)	HV-044-2F004 Isolates, T = 5 min; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that mistakenly calculates the isolation based on high temp alarm at 130° F rather than the actual 140° F. There is no isolation on the high temp alarm condition.	
DISTRACTOR (C)	HV-044-2F001 Isolates, T = 10 min; Wrong. Plausible misconception that the high outlet temperature causes an inboard PCIV isolation (HV-44-2F001). As noted above, 2F004 outlet valve actually closes, not 2F001.	
DISTRACTOR (D)	HV-044-2F001 Isolates, T = 5 min; Wrong. Plausible misconception that the high outlet temperature causes an inboard PCIV isolation (HV-44-2F001) valve rather than the outlet (HV-44-2F004) valve and mistakenly calculates the isolation based on high temp alarm at 130°F rather than the actual 140°F isolation	

Question 7 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164096
User-Defined ID:	Q #07 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Interpret Component Temps due to loss of CCW
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

nments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	RECW coo of RWCU s of the integ information	er 1 KA because the loss of ling initiates the ultimate loss system requiring assessment rated plant response, and the required to answer this procedure based.ON-113
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295018 AA2.01
	KA Statement		Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER: Component temperatures.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		8 Plant Service Systems
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13
	Technical Referen Revision No:		ARC-MCR-112 H-1 Rev 0 ON-113 Rev.028
	Question History: NRC-05)		NEW
	Question Type: (Modified)	New, Bank,	NEW
	Revision History:		
	Training Objectiv		LGSOPS044.10a

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8


ID: 2164995

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

A Loss of TECW has led to a trip of all Air Compressors

'1A' and '1B' Instrument Air header pressures drop and are as indicated below:



Alarm 108-D5, "Scram Valve Pilot Air Header LO Pressure" is received

Then, several minutes later, the following alarms are received:

- 108-F4, "Rod Drift"
- Rod 42-19 is drifting into the core

Which of the following actions is required?

- A. Enter OT-104 and ON-104
- B. Insert a full scram per ON-119
- C. Cross Tie Unit 2 Instrument Air Header to Unit 1 per ON-119
- D. Lineup the Backup Service Air Compressor to Unit 1 Instrument Air Header per ARC 118-A2,"Service Air Low Press"

Answer: B

Answer Explanati	Answer Explanation		
ANSWER (B)	Insert a full scram per ON-119; Correct. ON-119 entry is required when the 108-D5 Scram air header low pressure is received. A requirement of the procedure is to scram if rods drift into the core to prevent uneven flux distribution as described in the ON Bases. ROs are required to know procedure bases.		
DISTRACTOR (A)	Enter OT-104 and ON-104, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who recalls the entry conditions for these two procedure are rod drift alarms. Those procedures would be correct for a single rod drift for an unspecified condition. However, a common mode failure such as loss of air pressure is likely to result in multiple rod drifts and as such, there is no reason to wait for additional rod drifts. The action for immediate scram is from ON-119 and ON-107 attachment 4 and bases.		
DISTRACTOR (C)	Cross Tie Unit 2 Instrument Air Header to Unit 1 per ON-119, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who concludes that cross tying headers would correct the air pressure issues and incorrectly believes that ON-119 allows the cross tying of the headers. A caution in the procedure however, informs the operator that this should not be performed if the unaffected unit will not be adversely impacted.		
DISTRACTOR (D)	Lineup the Backup Service Air Compressor to Unit 1 Instrument Air Header, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who recalls that the Backup service air compressor can supply the Service air Header and the Service air header backs up the Instrument air header. The Backup air compressor cannot supply the Instrument Air Header. It can only be aligned to the service air header as the name implies and that is downstream of the cross tie to Instrument air.		

Question 8 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164995
User-Defined ID:	Q #08 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Plant Air System interpret MCR indications and operator action impact
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

ments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	interpret M pressure a those pres alarms, ac	tion requires the operator to ICR meters for Instrument ai and determine that based on soures and subsequent tions must be taken per the I procedures to scram the
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295019 G2.2.444.2
	KA Statement		Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		8 - Plant Service Systems
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.6
	Technical Referen Revision No:	nce with	ON-119 Rev.033 ON-119 Bases Rev.033 ON-107 Rev.021
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: (N Modified)	lew, Bank,	New
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective	9	LGSOPS1550.02

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

9

ID: 2164178

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 has just entered OPCON 4 in preparation for a refueling outage.

An inadvertent isolation and subsequent mechanical failure closed of HV-051-2F008, "RHR Shutdown Clg Suction Outboard PCIV", results in a loss of Shutdown Cooling with 2B RHR and necessitates establishing Alternate Shutdown Cooling using SRV's and Suppression Pool Cooling, per:

- ON-121 Attachment 6, "Alternate Shutdown Cooling", and
- S41.7.B, Use of SRV's and Suppression Pool Cooling as an Alternate Shutdown Cooling Method".

Conditions have been established as follows:

- Suppression Pool Cooling is in service using the '2A' RHR pump
- The '2E' and '2H' SRV control switches are in the OPEN position
- LPCI injection to the RPV has been established with the '2D' RHR pump
- RPV level is 118 inches and steady on Shutdown Range (LI-042-2R605) RPV pressure is 30 psig and steady
- Suppression Pool pressure is 0 psig and steady
- Condensate transfer has been isolated to 2A, 2B, and 2D RHR.

Given:

- HV-051-2F017D 2D LPCI Injection Valve
- HV-051-2F015B 2B RHR Shutdown Clg Injection PCIV

Which one of the following describes the action required to establish alternate shutdown cooling through an open SRV?

Open (1) and raise RPV injection until RPV (2).

Answer Exp	planation	
Answer:	С	
D.	HV-051-2F017D	level is 150 inches
C.	HV-051-2F017D	pressure is 55 psig
В.	HV-051-2F015B	level is 150 inches
Α.	HV-051-2F015B	pressure is 55 psig
	1	<u>2</u>

ANSWER (C)	(1) HV-051-2F017D (2) pressure is 55 psig, Correct.	
	A 50 psig D/P is required across the SRV's in order for them to open a	
	establish alternate heat removal. 2D LPCI is the injection source. 17D	
	is the flow path for LPCI.	
DISTRACTOR	(1) HV-051-2F015B	
(A)	(2) pressure is 55 psig, Wrong.	
	Plausible to the candidate that misinterprets the available flow path and assumes injection is raised through the 15B which is the normal shutdown cooling injection pathway.	
DISTRACTOR	(1) HV-051-2F017D	
(B)	(2) level is 118 inches, Wrong:	
	Plausible misconception that 150" RPV level will provide sufficient head to open the SRVs without flooding the Main Steam lines and provide a flow path to the S.P.	
DISTRACTOR	(1) HV-051-2F015B	
(D)	(2) level is 118 inches, Wrong	
	Plausible to the candidate that misinterprets the available flow path and assumes injection is raised through the 15B which is the normal shutdown cooling injection pathway and 150" RPV level will provide sufficient head to open the SRVs without flooding the Main Steam lines and provide a flow path to the S.P.	

Question 9 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164178		
User-Defined ID:	Q #09 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Operate/Monitor AD	OHR due to los	ss of SDC
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295021 AA1.04 3.7/3.7
	KA Statement		Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING: Alternate heat removal methods.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		4 - Heat Removal From R
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.6
	Technical Refere	nce with	ON-121 Attachment 6 Rev
	Revision No:		33
	Question History NRC-05)	/: (i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: (Modified)	New, Bank,	New
	Revision History	:	
	Training Objectiv		LGSOPS0051.5

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

10

ID: 2164211

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is shutdown with fuel shuffle 2 in progress on the Refuel Floor.

The Unit 2 Refuel Bridge main hoist is loaded with a new fuel bundle in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.

- The bundle is to be inserted into Core Quadrant B.
- '2B' SRM reads 10 CPS
- ST-6-107-632-2, "One Rod Out Interlock Verification Testing" was just completed SAT.

The following MCR annunciator alarms with the bridge maneuvering in the Spent Fuel Pool:

• 208 REACTOR F4, ROD DRIFT

The '2B' SRM now reads 30 CPS.

WHICH ONE of the following states the effect on the refuel bridge and the required procedure to enter?

	Refuel Bridge Effect	Procedure
A.	The refuel bridge will be prevented from being moved anywhere over the core.	ON-104, "Control Rod Problems"
В.	The refuel bridge will be prevented from being moved anywhere over the core.	ON-120, "Fuel Handing Problems"
C.	The refuel bridge will experience a bridge fault and ALL refuel bridge motion will be halted.	ON-104, "Control Rod Problems"
D.	The refuel bridge will experience a bridge fault and ALL refuel bridge motion will be halted.	ON-120, "Fuel Handing Problems"
Answer:	А	
Answer	Explanation	

ANSWER (A)	The refuel bridge will be prevented from being moved anywhere
	over the core.
	ON-104, "Control Rod Problems". Correct.
	The question describes a fuel-loaded refuel platform, currently in the
	fuel pool, to be moved to the second core quadrant, while a Rod Drift
	alarm annunciates. The annunciator shows that a control rod is no
	longer at position 00 and moving without a command signal. When the
	bridge is moved toward the core area, the refuel interlock will auto stop
	the bridge before the core area is reached. This is to prevent a large
	reactivity addition to the core (largest reactivity addition would be in the
	cell with the control rod is drifting). The undemanded movement of
	the control rod is an entry condition to the ON-104.
DISTRACTOR (B)	The refuel bridge will be prevented from being moved anywhere
	over the core.
	ON-120, "Fuel Handing Problems". Wrong.
	ON-120 is plausible as it requires that count rates incur two doublings
	The stem of the question only provides an increase in SRM count rates
	from 10 to 30 CPM, rather than the required 10 to 40 CPM to achieve
	two doublings. This is attractive to the candidate that sees a doubling
	from 10 to 20 CPM and then another 10 CPM increase as meeting the 2 doubling entry condition.
DISTRACTOR (C)	The refuel bridge will NOT be prevented from being moved over
DISTRACTOR (C)	the core .
	ON-104, "Control Rod Problems". Wrong.
	Plausible to the candidate who believes that the SAT performance
	ST-6-107-632-2 test verifies the ability of the refuel bridge to move
	over the core with a control rod withdrawn. This test tests the ability to
	withdraw only one control rod with the Reactor Mode Switch in the
	SHUTDOWN position.
DISTRACTOR (D)	The refuel bridge will NOT be prevented from being moved over
	the core, ON-120, "Fuel Handing Problems"; Wrong:
	Plausible to the candidate who believes that the SAT performance
	ST-6-107-632-2 test verifies the ability of the refuel bridge to move
	over the core with a control rod withdrawn. This test tests the ability to
	withdraw only one control rod with the Reactor Mode Switch in the
	SHUTDOWN position. ON-120 is plausible as it requires that count
	rates incur two doublings. The stem of the question only provides an
	increase in SRM count rates from 10 to 30 CPM, rather than the
	required 10 to 40 CPM to achieve two doublings. This is attractive to
	the candidate the sees a doubling from 10 to 20 CPM and then anothe
	10 CPM increase as meeting the 2 doubling entry condition.

Question 10 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	2164211	
User-Defined ID:	Q #10 NEW	
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	
Topic:	Reasons for fuel handling interlo Accidents	cks as applied to Refuel
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	
Comments:	References None	
	Provided	
	K/A Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
	Genera	
	Level	RO
	Tier	1
	Group	1
	KA # and Rating	295023 AK3.02 3.
	KA Statement	Refueling Accidents Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS Interlocks associated with fuel handling equipment.
	Cognitive level	HIGH
	Safety Function	8
	10 CFR 55	41.5 / 45.6
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	S97.0.M Rev 43 ON-104 Rev 59 ON-120 Rev 30 ST-6-107-632-2 Rev 23
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	New
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)	New
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0097.3, 5, 11

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Points: 1.00 11 ID: 2164996 A seismic event has resulted in the following Unit 2 plant conditions: T-102 entered • RCIC is maintaining level • Suppression pool temperature is 155°F up slow • LOCA with drywell pressure greater than Primary Suppression Pressure (PSP) Drywell sprays have been initiated and Drywell pressure is rapidly dropping • Drywell sprays must be secured before _____(1) ____ and the basis for that action _____ (1) (2) -0.5 PSIG Prevent exceeding the negative pressure Α. rating of the drywell Prevent cavitation of RCIC due to operation Β. -0.5 PSIG below the NPSH limit C. 0 PSIG Prevent exceeding the negative pressure rating of the drywell 0 PSIG D. Prevent cavitation of RCIC due to operation below the NPSH limit С Answer: **Answer Explanation**

ANSWER (C)	0 PSIG, Prevent exceeding the negative pressure rating of the drywell; Correct: From T-102, step PCC-8 directs terminating DW spray before pressure drops below 0 psig. From the basis for T-102, terminating spray by 0 psig will prevent exceeding the negative pressure rating of the drywell.
DISTRACTOR (A)	-0.5 PSIG, Prevent exceeding the negative pressure rating of the drywell; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that recalls the actual design negative pressure value of -0.5 psig but fails to account for the T-102 direction to secure at 0.0 psig to avoid exceeding the limit.
DISTRACTOR (B)	-0.5 PSIG, Prevent cavitation of RCIC due to operation below the NPSH limit Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that recalls the actual design negative pressure value of -0.5 psig but fails to account for the T-102 direction to secure at 0.0 psig to avoid exceeding the limit and who recalls the NPSH limits of RCIC and the effect that lowering containment pressure would have on RCIC. In this case, there is still significant margin for NPSH even at 0 psig
DISTRACTOR (D)	0 PSIG, Prevent cavitation of RCIC due to operation below the NPSH limit Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the NPSH limits of RCIC and the effect that lowering containment pressure would have on RCIC. In this case, there is still significant margin for NPSH even at 0 psig.

Question 11 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164996
User-Defined ID:	Q #11 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Implications on DW integrity due to High DW Press
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-High
Text Field:	LO-ILT

nments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	the impact of integrity as th question is a LOCA. Dryw based on the drywell. If sp pressure bec	meets the KA to determine High Drywell pressure on DW ie initiating condition of this high drywell pressure from a vell integrity is challenged EOP actions to spray the prays are not secured prior to oming negative, the negative ure limit will be exceeded.
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratin	ng	295024 EK1.01 4.1
	KA Statement	<u> </u>	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: Drywell integrity:
			Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level	l	Plant-Specific. High
	Cognitive level Safety Functio		
			High
	Safety Functio	n	High 5 - Containment Integrity
	Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo	n erence with	High 5 - Containment Integrity 41.8 to 41.10 T-102 Rev. 028
	Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No:	n erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	High 5 - Containment Integrity 41.8 to 41.10 T-102 Rev. 028 T-102 Bases Rev 028
	Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05) Question Type	n erence with ory: (i.e. LGS :: (New, Bank,	High 5 - Containment Integrity 41.8 to 41.10 T-102 Rev. 028 T-102 Bases Rev 028 New

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12

ID: 2164278

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 was operating at full power when a transient resulted in a reactor scram following a Group 1 NSSSS Isolation.

- HPCI automatically started and injected.
- The HPCI flow controller thumbwheel was adjusted to 3000 GPM to maintain RPV level steady.
- Fifteen (15) minutes later RPV pressure rose from 900 psig to 1100 psig.

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) HPCI speed over the course of the RPV pressure increase?

(2) The lowest RPV pressure requiring entry into T-101, "RPV Control"?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
Α.	Remained STABLE	Greater than 1053 psig
В.	Remained STABLE	Greater than 1096 psig
C.	Rising	Greater than 1053 psig
D.	Rising	Greater than 1096 psig
Answer:	D	
Answer Exp	planation	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

HPCI discharge pressure is higher than reactor pressure to provide a large enough differential pressure to provide flow into the RPV. As the differential pressure between the pump discharge and the RPV lowers, flow rate will lower. The flow controller will sense the lowering flow and change the signal sent to the governor control valve raising turbine speed until the flow rises to match the flow controller setting.

T-101, "RPV Control", has an entry condition of RPV pressure "greater than 1096 psig". This is the scram setpoint as well. The RPV high pressure alarm is generated at 1053 psig and is only an entry into OT-102, "RPV High Pressure" AOP.

ANSWER (D)	Rising, Greater than 1096 psig. Correct.
	As described above.
DISTRACTOR	Remained stable, Greater than 1053 psig. Wrong.
(A)	The stem indicates that flow was reduced using the controller to 3000 gpm using the controller thumbwheel. This will change only the controller flow setpoint. The candidate could take this manipulation of the controller as placing it "manual". With the controller in "manual", the speed of the of the HPCI turbine is maintained and not flow. Therefore over the course of the pressure rise, HPCI turbine speed would remain constant. The 1053 psig is plausible as it is the RPV High Pressure Alarm setpoint as well as the pressure to which the operators lower pressure below as an immediate operator action in OT-102, "RPV High Pressure" AOP
DISTRACTOR (B)	Remained Stable, Greater than 1096 psig. Wrong. The stem indicates that flow was reduced using the controller to 3000 gpm using the controller thumbwheel. This will change only the controller flow setpoint. The candidate could take this manipulation of the controller as placing it "manual". With the controller in "manual", the speed of the of the HPCI turbine is maintained and not flow. Therefore over the course of the pressure rise, HPCI turbine speed would remain constant.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Rising, Greater than 1053 psig. Wrong. The 1053 psig is plausible as it is the RPV High Pressure Alarm setpoint as well as the pressure to which the operators lower pressure below as an immediate operator action in OT-102, "RPV High Pressure" AOP

Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Question Type: Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2164278			
User-Defined ID: Cross Reference Number:	Q #12 NEW			
	CLOSED			
Topic:	<u> </u>	HPCI Ops due to Hi RPV Pressure		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	ReferencesNoneProvided			
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only N/A			
	Justification			
		Additional N/A		
	Information			
	General Data			
		General Data		
	Level	General Data RO		
	Level Tier			
	Tier	RO		
		RO 1 1		
	Tier Group	RO 1 1 295025 EK3.03 3.4 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation:		
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement	RO 1 1 295025 EK3.03 3.4 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE:		
	Tier Group KA # and Rating	RO 1 295025 EK3.03 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation: Plant-Specific. HIGH 3 - Reactor Pressure		
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function	RO 1 295025 EK3.03 3.4 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation: Plant-Specific. HIGH 3 - Reactor Pressure Control		
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Reference w	RO 1 295025 EK3.03 3.4 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation: Plant-Specific. HIGH 3 - Reactor Pressure Control 41.5 / 45.6		
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Reference wRevision No:Question History: (i.e.	RO11295025 EK3.034 High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation: Plant-Specific.HIGH 3 - Reactor Pressure Control 41.5 / 45.6withLGSOPS0055 Rev 2		
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Reference wRevision No:	RO1295025 EK3.03High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH 		
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Reference wRevision No:Question History: (i.e.NRC-05)Question Type: (New,	RO 1 295025 EK3.03 3. High Reactor Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: HPCI operation: Plant-Specific. HIGH 3 - Reactor Pressure Control 41.5 / 45.6 with LGSOPS0055 Rev 2 NEW		

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13

ID: 2164369

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions:

- 98% power
- Suppression Pool level is 22.5'
- Suppression Pool temperature (SPOTMOS) is 87°F.
- HPCI is operating in Full Flow test mode for a quarterly surveillance
- HPCI pump suction temperature is 92°F, rising at .5°F/ min
- 1A RHR pump is operating in Suppression pool cooling with a pump suction temperature of 87°F
- Pool Temperature is rising at 2°F / min

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the **preferred** Suppression Pool temperature indication per T-102, and the time (in minutes) until the HPCI test must be secured due to the limits of T.S.3.6.2.1 (assume constant heat up rate)?

	Preferred Temperature	<u>Minutes</u>
A.	SPOTMOS	4 min.
В.	SPOTMOS	9 min.
C.	1A RHR Pump Suction Temperature	4 min.
D.	1A RHR Pump Suction Temperature	9 min
Answer:	В	

Answer Explanation

Refer to T-102, SP/T-1, which reminds operators that the SPOTMOS probes are located in the suppression pool at an elevation which corresponds to an indicated suppression pool level of 17.8 ft. If indicated suppression pool level drops below 17.8 ft., Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump suction temperature can be used as a valid alternate method for determining suppression pool temperature provided an RHR pump is running.		
ANSWER (B)	SPOTMOS, 9 min; Correct : Correct for the reasons described above, with level above 17.8', SPTMOS should be used for temperature indication. Per tech spec 3.6.2.1.a.2.a, Max temperature in the Suppression pool is 105°F during testing which adds heat to the chamber.	
DISTRACTOR (A)	SPOTMOS, 4 min; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who recognizes that the supp pool level is high enough to use SPOTMOS, but who mistakenly believes that 95°F is the limit per T.S. 3.6.2.1.a.2. but fails to recall the exception for testing contained in part a. of the spec.	
DISTRACTOR (C)	1A RHR Pump Suction Temperature,4 min; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who does not recognizes that the supp pool level is above the low level where SPOTMOS is invalid and therefore believes that running RHR pump suction temperature should be used and who mistakenly believes that 95°F is the limit per T.S. 3.6.2.1.a.2. but fails to recall the exception for testing contained in part a. of the spec	
DISTRACTOR (D)	1A RHR Pump Suction Temperature, 9 min; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who does not recognizes that the supp pool level is above the low level where SPOTMOS is invalid and therefore believes that running RHR pump suction temperature should be used	

Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?		No	
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID: User-Defined ID:	2164369		
Cross Reference Number:	Q #13 NEW CLOSED		
Closs Reference Number.			
Торіс:	SP Hi Water Ter	Ability to operate/monitor Temperature Monitoring as applied SP Hi Water Temp.	
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	
	Level	Genera	RO
	Tier	Genera	
		Genera	RO
	Tier		RO 1 295026 EA1.03 3.9 Ability to operate and/or
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement	ng	RO 1 1 295026 EA1.03 3.9
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve	ng	RO1295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE:
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	ng	RO1295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring.
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve	ng	RO 1 295026 EA1.03 3.9 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring. High
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	ng el el on	RO1295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring.High5
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref	ng el on erence with	RO1295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring.High541.7 / 45.6
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05)	ng el on erence with	RO11295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring.HiGH541.7 / 45.6T-102 Rev 28
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Type	ng el on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	RO11295026 EA1.03 3.9Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring.High541.7 / 45.6T-102 Rev 28New

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14

ID: 2164375


Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power when it experiences a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

Drywell temperature is 360°F Reactor Pressure is 100 psig Wide range level indication on PAMS is -50 inches steady

In accordance with T-102, "Primary Containment Control", complete the following statement below:

Level Instrument XR-42-1R623B ______ and all level instrument indications should be verified using _____.



Which of the level indications above are valid?

Α.	May be unreliable	T-291, Temp Effects on Rx Level Inst.
В.	May be unreliable	OP-AID 00-009 Temperature Compensation Graph
C.	Safe to use	T-291, Temp Effects on Rx Level Inst.
D.	Safe to use	OP-AID 00-009 Temperature Compensation Graph
Answer:	A	


Answer Explanation

Following a Loss of Coolant Accident in primary containment a DW pressure and temperature will be elevated and RPV Pressure and Temperature will drop. These two effects will allow

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conditions for RPV level instrument reference leg flashing to occur. When reference leg flashing occurs indicated RPV level will rise on the affected level instruments due to a reduction of the static column of water to the level transmitter.

The CRD system is normally aligned to provide constant backfill to the RPV level instrument reference legs to prevent flashing. During a LOCA the CRD pumps are load shed and must be manually restarted.



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ANSWER (A)	May be unreliable, T-291, Temp effects on Rx Level Inst.; Correct: With the conditions provided, Plotted point is on the unsafe side of the curve. and per the bases for T-102, when in this region, operators must be aware of possible effects on level instruments. The caution in T-102 also directs the operator to T-291 to verify the RPV level and or trend can be relied upon
DISTRACTOR (B)	May be unreliable, OP-AID 00-009 Temperature Compensation Graph; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that plots the point on the curve and recognizes it is on the unsafe side and recalls that the OP-Aid provides temperature correction for indicated vs. actual level. This is valid during normal operation primarily startup and shutdown but not during accident conditions.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Safe to use,T-291, Temp effects on Rx Level Inst.; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that does not correctly plot the point but recalling the note in T-102, correctly determines that T-291 should be consulted to validate the reading.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Safe to use, OP-AID 00-009 Temperature Compensation Graph; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not correctly plot the point on the curve and determines that T-291 is not required but that Temperature Compensation would be a good idea.

Γ

Outpation Turner	Multiple Choice		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice Active		
Status:			
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No 1.00		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164375		
User-Defined ID:	Q #14 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN EMBED		
Торіс:	Interrelation betv	veen Hi DWT an	d Rx Water Level Indication
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	Embbedded	graph of DW Temp vs. Press
	K/A Justification	None	
	SRO-Only		
	Justification	N/A	
	Additional	None	
	Information	None	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		RO 1
			RO 1 1
	Tier	ng	RO 1 1 295028 EK2.03 3.6
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement	-	RO1295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.
	Tier Group KA # and Ration KA Statement Cognitive level	- 	RO 1 295028 EK2.03 3.6 Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication. HIGH
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	- 	RO1295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity
	Tier Group KA # and Ration KA Statement Cognitive level	- 	RO1295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity41.7 / 45.8
	TierGroupKA # and RationKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferenceRevision No:	erence with	RO1295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refo Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05)	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	RO11295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity41.7 / 45.8T-102 Bases Rev. 028 T-102T-102Rev.
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05) Question Type Modified)	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	RO11295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity41.7 / 45.8T-102 Bases Rev. 028 T-102 Rev. 028
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05) Question Type	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	RO11295028 EK2.03 3.6Knowledge of the interrelations betweenHIGH DRYWELLTEMPERATURE and the following: Reactor water level indication.HIGH5 - Containment Integrity41.7 / 45.8T-102 BasesT-102 BasesRev.028NEW

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15


ID: 2164437

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 Suppression Pool Level is 12.5 feet on LI-52-140A & B

The '1C' RHR pump is operating in LPCI mode maintaining level.

The reactor is depressurized to 20 psig.



RHR VORTEX LIMIT

WHICH ONE describes the MAXIMUM FLOW that is recommended through the pump and the BASIS for that limit?

	Maximum Flow	Basis
А.	9000 gpm	Pump Runout
В.	9000 gpm	Pump Air Entrainment
C.	11000 gpm	Pump Runout
D.	11000 gpm	Pump Air Entrainment
Answer:	В	
Answer Exp	blanation	

The graph is a recreation of a graph found on T-102 Sheet 2. The only difference is the removal of the coloring to indicates the side of the bolded line unsafe for operation. The SAFE side of the line is above it.		
ANSWER (B)	9000 gpm, Pump Air Entrainment, Correct. Give a Suppression Pool level of 12.5 feet a value of 9000 gpm can be determined to be on the safe side of the graph. If on the safe side of the graph then the pump is running within its vortex limits.	
DISTRACTOR (A)	9000 gpm, RHR Pump Runout, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the correct basis for the graph but recalls that high flow with low discharge pressure is a condition of runout	
DISTRACTOR (C)	11000 gpm, Pump Air Entrainment, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not understand which side of the line on the graph is the safe side for pump operation or how to use the graph .	
DISTRACTOR (D)	11000 gpm, RHR Pump Runout, Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not understand which side of the line on the graph is the safe side for pump operation and recalls that high flow with low discharge pressure is a condition of runout	

Question 15 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164437		
User-Defined ID:	Q #15 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN - EMBED	DED	
Торіс:	Ability to operate SPL	e/monitor ECCS	Systems as applied to Low
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	OPEN - EBEDD	ED
	Provided		
	K/A	None	
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	None	
	Information		
	Laurel	Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rati	ng	295030 EA1.01 3.6
			Ability to operate and/or
	KA Statement		monitor the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific.
	KA Statement		they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations):
		91	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive leve	91	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH
	Cognitive leve Safety Function	el on	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH 5 - Containment Integrity
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55	el on	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH 5 - Containment Integrity 41.7 / 45.6
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	erence with	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH 5 - Containment Integrity 41.7 / 45.6 T-102 Sh 2, T-102 Bases
	Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer Revision No: Question Histon NRC-05)	erence with	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH 5 - Containment Integrity 41.7 / 45.6 T-102 Sh 2, T-102 Bases Rev 28
	Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer Revision No: Question Histon NRC-05) Question Type	el on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: ECCS systems (NPSH considerations): Plant-Specific. HIGH 5 - Containment Integrity 41.7 / 45.6 T-102 Sh 2, T-102 Bases Rev 28 NEW

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16

ID: 2168375

Points: 1.00

T-111, "Alternate Level/Pressure Control" is in progress with the following:

- Reactor water level is -207"
- RPV pressure is 300 psig and steady.
- No injection systems are available to the RPV

WHICH ONE of the following correctly completes the following two statements:

For the above conditions Adequate Core Cooling ____(1)____ present.

(2) With no injection into the RPV, what is the highest peak clad temperature that ensures adequate core cooling?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
A.	is	1800°F
В.	is	2200°F
C.	is NOT	1800°F
D.	is NOT	2200°F
Answer: A		

Answer Explanation

will generate suffi	86") is the lowest RPV level at which the covered portion of the reactor core cient steam to prevent any clad temperature in the uncovered part of the co 500°F assuming the most limiting top-peaked power shape prior to reactor
 one of two conditi RPV level can RPV Water Leand steam co Design core same loop, and steam loop, and steam loop. 	oling is ensured following emergency RPV depressurization as long as ons exists: an be restored and maintained above -186", the Minimum Steam Cooling evel (MSCRWL). The core is then cooled by a combination of submergence oling even with no core spray flow, or spray loop flow requirements, produced by two Core Spray pumps in the re satisfied (6,250 gpm) and, RPV level can be restored and maintained at o evation of the jet pump suctions (-211").
Minimum Zero-In	evel/Pressure Control ijection RPV Water Level (MZIRWL, -236'') ated by the covered portion of the core is exactly sufficient to remove the he
generated in the u	Incovered region with PCT at 1800□F. criteria of peak cladding temperature below 2200 degrees F
generated in the u	ncovered region with PCT at 1800□F. criteria of peak cladding temperature below 2200 degrees F
generated in the u	Incovered region with PCT at 1800□F. criteria of peak cladding temperature below 2200 degrees F is, 1800°F. Correct: As described above, with no injection and greater than -236 inches of RPV water level, adequate core cooling exists with a peak cladding
generated in the u The ECCS design ANSWER (A) DISTRACTOR	Incovered region with PCT at 1800□F. criteria of peak cladding temperature below 2200 degrees F is, 1800°F. Correct: As described above, with no injection and greater than -236 inches of RPV water level, adequate core cooling exists with a peak cladding temperature of 1800°F is NOT, 1800°F. Wrong:
generated in the u	Incovered region with PCT at 1800□F. criteria of peak cladding temperature below 2200 degrees F is, 1800°F. Correct: As described above, with no injection and greater than -236 inches of RPV water level, adequate core cooling exists with a peak cladding temperature of 1800°F

Question 16 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2168375
User-Defined ID:	Q #16 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Ability to determine/interpret adequate core cooling as it applies to Rx Low Level
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

omments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	differences be	s requires knowing etween when adequate core I is not assured.
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	The answer conditions are derived from the bases of EOPs from which the mitigation strategy for providing ACC to reactor are defined. This make the question RO level	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratin	g	295031 EA2.04 4.6
	KA Statement		Reactor Low Water Level Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL: Adequate core cooling.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function	n	2 - Reactor Water Inventory Control
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13
	Technical Refe Revision No:		T-101 Rev 28, T-101 Bases Rev 28, T-111 Rev 18, T-111 Bases Rev 18.
	Question Histo NRC-05)		NEW
	Question Type: Modified)		NEW
	Revision Histor		
	Training Object	tive	LGSOPS1560.5

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17

ID: 2164703

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100%

A Main Turbine trip occurs with a failure to scram of 150 control rods.

- All Full Core Display blue lights are lit
- Pressure peaked at 1145 psig
- The RO did not initiate RRCS
- 10 minutes later, level is being controlled with feedwater between -60 inches and -100 inches
- Rx power is 12%
- (1) What automatic RRCS functions should have activated at this time and
- (2) What procedure must be performed to manually insert the remaining control rods?

Given:	T-210 - Inserting Control rods with the RWM Bypassed
	T-213 - Individual Rod Scrams

	<u>1.</u>	<u>2.</u>
Α.	RPT and SLC ONLY	T-213
В.	RPT and SLC ONLY	T-210
C.	ARI, RPT, SLC	T-213
D.	ARI, RPT, SLC	T-210
Answer:	D	

Answer Explanation

conditions:	ation of Alternate Rod Insertion system will occur under the following evel OR 1149 psig RPV Pressure OR Manual RRCS Pushbuttons
ANSWER (D)	ARI, RPT, SLC, T-210; Correct. See initiation logic above for ARI initiation. RPT and SLC will occur on -38" Rx level with a 9 second delay for RPT and 118 sec delay for SLC without operator action. ARI will initiate immediately on -38". Per T-117, LQ/Q-9, Insert rods manually with the RWM bypassed. This is required because power is <13.9% and the RWM is enforcing rod blocks.
DISTRACTOR (A)	RPT, SLC, T-213; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that knows that SLC and RPT initiate on -38" Rx level but assumes that ARI must be initiated by the RO. ARI will automatically initiate on low low level(-38") immediately (no time delay) T-213 is plausible to the candidate who recalls that this procedure is used to scram individual control rods during an ATWS and is directed from T-117. However, since RPS ed-energized, T-213 would have no effect.
DISTRACTOR (B)	SLC, RPT, T-210; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that knows that SLC and RPT initiate on -38" Rx level but assumes that ARI must be initiated by the RO. ARI will automatically initiate on low low level(-38") immediately (no time delay)
DISTRACTOR (C)	ARI, RPT, SLC, T-213; Wrong: T-213 is plausible to the candidate who recalls that this procedure is used to scram individual control rods during an ATWS and is directed from T-117. However, since RPS ed-energized, T-213 would have no effect.

Question 17 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164703
User-Defined ID:	Q #17 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of the interrelations b/n Scram Condition Present > APRM dnscl and RRCS
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-High
Text Field:	LO-ILT

ts:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification		
		N/A	
	SRO-Only N/A Justification		
	Additional N/A		
	Information	,, .	
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295037 EK2.02 4.0
			SCRAM Condition Present
			and Reactor Power Above
			APRM Downscale
	KA Statement		or Unknown: Knowledge of
			the interrelations between
			SCRAM CONDITION
			PRESENT AND REACTOR
			DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN and the
			following: RRCS:
			Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		1 - Reactivity Control
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.6
			L-S-55 Redundant
	Technical Reference with		Reactivity Control System.
	Revision No:		T-117 Rev.023
	Question History: (i NRC-05)	i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: (Ne Modified)	w, Bank,	New
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0036A.LO3

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18

ID: 2164755

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 Plant Conditions:

- Reactor Power 100%
- HVAC Zones 1 and 3 are tied together and operating normally.

A fuel failure occurs:

- The Shift Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event due to Offsite Release Rates
- Reactor Enclosure HVAC Exhaust Radiation Reading
 - RRSH-26-1R605 Ch A = 1.33 mr/hr
 - RRSH-26-1R614 Ch B = 1.34 mr/hr
 - o RRSH-26-1R605 Ch C = 1.35 mr/hr
 - RRSH-26-1R614 Ch D = 1.36 mr/hr

(1) What TRIP procedure(s) should be entered?

(2) What is the current Unit 1 release point?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
A.	T-103 and T-104	Unit 1 South Stack
В.	T-103 and T-104	North Stack
С.	T-103 Only	Unit 1 South Stack
D.	T-103 Only	North Stack
Answer:	D	
Answer Explan	ation	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

T-103 Entry conditions of concern:

• Reactor Enclosure HVAC Exhaust isolation signal 1.35 mr/hr

T-104 Entry Condition

• Offsite release above ALERT level per EP-AA-1008, Addendum 3

The logic for the RE Isolation is Channels A & B <u>OR</u> Channels C & D. Since Channels C & D are above the 1.35mr/hr isolation setpoint a valid Isolation of the Unit 1 RE and RF will occur.

Normal alignment of RE and RF HVAC exhaust is through the Unit South Stack. When the RE and RF HVAC systems are tied together an isolation signal on either system will cause an isolation on both systems. Once an RE or RF HVAC Isolation occurs the exhaust point is re-aligned through the Common North Stack via the Standby Gas Treatment System.

ANSWER (D)	T-103 Only, North Stack. Correct. As described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	T-103 and T-104, South Stack. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that recalls the entry condition to T-104 as an Unusual Event based on offsite release rates. This is plausible to the candidate who does not recall the radiation setpoint or logic combination required to initiate a RE HVAC isolation and thus RE HVAC continues to exhaust through the Unit 1 South Stack.
DISTRACTOR (B)	T-103 and T-104, North Stack. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that recalls the entry condition to T-104 as an Unusual Event based on offsite release rates.
DISTRACTOR (C)	T-103 Only, South Stack. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who recognizes the entry value of 1.35mr/hr for T-103 but does not believe the system logic is sufficient to cause an isolation.

Question 18 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164755
User-Defined ID:	Q #18 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Ability to operate/monitor Plant Ventilation as apply to Hi Offsite Release Rate
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References N Provided	lone	
	K/A		
	Justification		
		1/A	
	Justification	N/A	
		I/A	
	Information		
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		295038 EA1.06 3.5
	KA Statement		High Off-Site Release Rate: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to HIGH OFFSITE RELEASE RATE: Plant ventilation.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		9 - Radioactivity Release
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.6
	Technical Reference Revision No:	ce with	T-103 Rev 25, T-104 Rev 13, EP-AA-1008 Addendum 3 Rev 5, GP-8.1 Rev 17
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	NEW
	Question Type: (No Modified)	ew, Bank,	NEW
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective	•	LGSOPS0076.LO3, LGSOPS1560.2

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19

ID: 2164805

Points: 1.00

WHICH ONE of the following REQUIRES an Emergency Plant Shutdown as an IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION?

- A. Fire in the Cable Spreading Room and heavy smoke in the MCR
- B. Toxic Gas in the MCR
- C. Notification of Air Based Threat within 25 minutes of plant
- D. Fire in the Remote Shutdown Panel Room

Answer: A

Answer Explanati	on
ANSWER (A)	Fire in the Cable Spreading Room and heavy smoke in the MCR. Correct. SE-1 directs scramming both reactors as an immediate operator action.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Toxic Gas in the MCR. Wrong. SE-2 directs donning SCBAs within 2 minutes for toxic gas or chlorine events in the MCR as immediate operator actions. Only later in the procedure, as part of the follow up actions does it state that if the MCR becomes uninhabitable enter SE-1.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Notification of Air Based Threat with 25 minutes of plant. Wrong. There is no immediate operator action to shut down the reactor in SE-23. There are follow up actions to scram the reactor for a validated airborne threat less than 5 minutes of the plant.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Fire in the Remote Shutdown Panel Room. Wrong. Neither SE-8 or ARC-MCR-006 J3L have any direction to scram the reactor as an immediate operator action. SE-8 only discusses plant shutdown as a follow up action based on location of the fire.

Question Turner	Multiple Chairs		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164805		
User-Defined ID:	Q #19 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	Ability to determi	ne need for plar	nt S/D due to fire on Site
Num Field 1:	LM	no noou ioi piui	
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	ıl Data
	Level	Genera	I Data RO
		Genera	
	Tier	Genera	RO
	Tier Group		RO 1 1
	Tier		RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2
	Tier Group		RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin		RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or
	Tier Group		RO 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin		RO 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin		RO 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Need for
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin	ng	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need for
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement	ng	RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Need for emergency plant shutdowr LOW
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve	ng	RO 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Need for emergency plant shutdowr
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55	ng I	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	ng I	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55	ng I	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No:	ng	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29SE-8 Rev 60, SE-23 Rev28
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	ng	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29SE-8 Rev 60, SE-23 Rev
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo	ng I on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Need for emergency plant shutdowr LOW 8 - Plant Systems 41.10 SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29 SE-8 Rev 60, SE-23 Rev 28 NEW
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05)	ng I on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	RO11600000 AA2.13 3.2Plant Fire On SiteAbility to determine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to PLANT FIREON SITE: Need foremergency plant shutdowrLOW8 - Plant Systems41.10SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29SE-8 Rev 60, SE-23 Rev28
	Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histor NRC-05) Question Type	ng I on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	RO 1 1 600000 AA2.13 3.2 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: Need for emergency plant shutdowr LOW 8 - Plant Systems 41.10 SE-1 Rev 76, SE-2 Rev 29 SE-8 Rev 60, SE-23 Rev 28 NEW

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

20

ID: 2168381

Points: 1.00

Plant conditions are as follows:

- PJM has declared a Grid Emergency due to a Hurricane Warning and an anticipated loss of Grid Load.
- E-5, "Grid Emergency" has been entered

Current conditions on Unit 2 Main Generator:

- Unit 2 AVR is in Automatic
- Generator MW load is 1100 MW
- Generator MVAR load is 200 MVAR lagging
- Grid voltage is rising

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) What will happen to Main Generator reactive load as grid voltage rises?

(2) What operator action is required to restore Main Generator reactive load to 200 MVAR lagging?

	(1)	(2)
Α.	Increases	Raise generator field excitation.
В.	Increases	Lower generator field excitation.
C.	Decreases	Raise generator field excitation.
D.	Decreases	Lower generator field excitation.
Answer:	С	

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

As real load is shed on the grid, Grid Voltage will rise. The Main Generator AVR (Automatic Voltage Regulator) will attempt to maintain terminal voltage on the generator at a constant value by lowering generator field excitation, resulting in a lowering Main Generator field current value. This has the effect of underexciting the Main Generator field in relation to what it was at the start of the transient. This underexcitation trend will continue until Grid Voltage stabilizes, the AVR adjustment limiter is reached, or operator action is taken.

To reverse the lowering lagging reactive load trend by manual action, an operator raises the Main Generator terminal voltage setpoint on the AVR. This will cause the Main Generator field excitation to increase, and Main Generator terminal voltage to rise.

ANSWER (C)	Decreases, Raise generator field excitation. Correct. As described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Increases, Raise generator field excitation. Wrong. Plausible misconception that assumes a rising grid voltage acts in a similar way to manually raising the AVR terminal voltage setpoint and understands to raise reactive load in the lagging direction, generator field excitation must be increased.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Increases, Lower generator field excitation. Wrong. Plausible misconception that rising grid voltage acts in a similar way to manually raising the AVR terminal voltage setpoint. With this same thought process, lowering the generator field should also cause an increase in reactive load in the lagging direction.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Decreases, Lower generator field excitation. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that confuses lagging and leading reactive load behavior with a change in generator field excitation.

Question 20 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2168381
User-Defined ID:	Q #20 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Determine Actions based on Main Gen Parameters During Grid Emergency
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References	NONE	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification	N1/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
	mormation		
		General	
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		700000 AK1.03 3.3
	KA Statement		Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES: Under-excitation.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55		41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8
	Technical Reference Revision No:		E-5, S32.3.A
	Question Histor NRC-05)	•	NEW
	Question Type: Modified)	• • •	NEW
	Revision History		
	Training Objecti	ve	LGSOPS0032.LO4

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21

ID: 2164876

Points: 1.00

A reactor startup is in progress with the following conditions:

- Reactor power is 24% and stable
- Main Generator is synched to the Grid

A loss of sealing steam causes vacuum to decay

- Annunciator 104-COND-E5, 1A CONDENSER LO VACUUM 104-E5, is in ALARM
- Off Gas system flow has risen to 175 scfm and steady
- Condenser vacuum (PR-05-101) is 23.5 inches Hg vacuum and degrading at a rate of 1/2 inch Hg per minute
- RPV pressure is 955 psig and stable

If the current rate of vacuum degradation continues, per OT-116, "Loss of Condenser Vacuum", what is the required action?

- A. Start the Mechanical Vacuum Pump
- B. Scram the reactor in 3 minutes

С

- C. Trip the main turbine <u>only</u> in 3 minutes
- D. Perform a GP-4, Rapid Plant Shutdown, immediately

Answer:

Answer Explanation

 *A(B,C) Main T *A(B,C) *A(B,C) *A(B,C) MSIV Is 	tions occur as a result of lowering Main Condenser Vacuum:) CONDENSER LO VACUUM (*04-E(F,G)-5) alarm 23.5" Hg Vac urbine Trip 21.5" Hg Vac) RFPT LOW VACUUM (*02-A(B,C)-4) alarm 18.5" Hg Vac) RFPT LOW VACUUM TRIP (*02-A(B,C)-3) alarm 15" Hg Vac solation 8.54" Hg Vac 4 Valve Closure 7" Hg Vac
ANSWER (C)	Trip the main turbine only in 3 minutes; Correct: Based on the conditions in the stem of the question (23.5 in/Hg -21.5 in/Hg) X 2 min/inch = 4 minutes to reach the Turbine Trip setpoint. Step 3.2 in OT-116 is to trip the turbine at 22". Since power is 24%, it is within the limit of the BPV and 1st stage pressure so no scram will occur.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Start the Mechanical Vacuum Pump; Wrong. This is plausible to the candidate that recalls that OT-116 recommends using the MVP to assist in maintaining vacuum if the Air Ejectors/Offgas are unable to do so. However, there is a caution in the procedure that the MVP cannot be used above 5% signal as there is potential for explosion due to the presence of H2 and O2 in the condenser.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Scram the reactor in 3 minutes; Wrong: This is plausible to the candidate that calculates time to 21.5" as above. (23.5 in/Hg -21.5 in/Hg) X 2 min/inch = 4 minutes to reach the turbine trip setpoint. And IOA step 2.1 states that "IF main turbine trip will cause reactor scram, AND turbine trip is imminent (condenser vacuum 22" Hg Vac and lowering) THEN manually SCRAM the reactor. However, because power is 24%, a turbine trip will not cause a scram and therefore a scram is not required at this time.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Perform a GP-4, Rapid Plant Shutdown, immediately; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the procedure step to perform a GP-4 shutdown if offgas flow is too high. However, in this scenario, off gas flow is stated at 175 scfm but the procedure direction is for GP-4 if 200 scfm is exceeded.

Question 21 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	2164876	
User-Defined ID:	Q #21 NEW	
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	
Topic:	Ability to determine/interpret Rx Power as applied to Loss of Condenser Vacuum	
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	

omments:	References None Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only N/A		
	Justification		
		N/A	
	Information		
		General Data	
	Level	RO	
	Tier	1	
	Group	2	
	KA # and Rating	295002 AA2.02 3.2	
		Loss of Main Condenser	
		Vacuum: Ability to	
		determine and/or interpret	
	KA Statement	the following as they apply	
		to LOSS OF MAIN	
		CONDENSER VACUUM:	
		Reactor power:	
	Cognitive level	Plant-Specific. HIGH	
	Cognitive level		
	Safety Function	3 - Reactor Pressure	
	-		
	10 CFR 55	41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13	
	Technical Reference w Revision No:	OT-116 Rev 46	
	Question History: (i.e.	LGS	
	NRC-05)	New	
	Question Type: (New, Modified)	Bank, New	
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective	LGSOPS3000	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

22

ID: 2167522

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor power 100%
- Reactor level 35"
- The 1A FWLC narrow range level transmitter has failed upscale

10 minutes later, an electrical transient causes the B and D channel FWLC narrow range level transmitters to fail downscale

Annunciator 107 D-4 "FWLCS FAILURE" is received with the following DFWLCS workstation alarm:

- "1XXX-FW300.ILE" Reactor Level Error
- Given: OT-100 Reactor Low Level OT-110 - Reactor High Level

WHICH ONE of the following describes the Control Mode of all three Reactor Feed Pumps and the applicable procedure that should be entered?

	<u>Co</u>	ntrol Status	Procedure to Enter
A.		Auto	OT-100
В.		Auto	OT-110
C.		Manual	OT-100
D.		Manual	OT-110
Answer:	D		
Answer Exp	anation		

ANSWER (D)	Manual, OT-110; Correct: S06.1.H Alarm List describes the results of 2 simultaneous level transmitter failures as: FWLCS Failure which causes Recirc pumps to run back to Low speed - 28%. Also, the RFP flow controllers will swap to manual (M/A) since the system has no level input. Based on that, Feed pumps are in manual at the 100% speed and RRP runback to 28% will cause a feed flow/steam flow mismatch and a rise in reactor level. This is the entry condition for OT-110. The immediate operator action for FWLCS Failure is to manually control RFPs if a RFP controller malfunction exists.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Auto, OT-100; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that 2 level transmitters can fail without losing the ability to automatically control level. However, a simultaneous failure will cause a Feedwater failure, a swap to Manual of the controllers and RRP runback. Also plausible to the candidate who interprets the failure of the level inputs to cause a reduction in feed flow to restore level to the normal band. This associated level reduction would be an entry into OT-100. A trip of the feed pumps on high level would also occasion a low level. A and B would not cause a trip.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Auto, OT-110; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that 2 level transmitters can fail without losing the ability to automatically control level. However, a simultaneous failure will cause a Feedwater failure, a swap to Manual of the controllers and RRP runback.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Manual, OT-100; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who interprets the failure of the level inputs to cause a reduction in feed flow to restore level to the normal band. This associated level reduction would be an entry into OT-100. A trip of the feed pumps on high level would also occasion a low level. A and B would not cause a trip.

Question 22 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167522
User-Defined ID:	Q #22 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Operational Implications of Stm Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch on Hi RPV Level
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

omments:	References None Provided	
	K/A	
	Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
	G	eneral Data
	Level	RO
	Tier	1
	Group	2
	KA # and Rating	295008 AK1.03 3.2
		High Reactor Water Level
		Knowledge of the
		operational implications of
	KA Statement	the following concepts as
	KA Statement	they apply to HIGH
		REACTOR WATER
		LEVEL: Feed flow/steam
		flow mismatch.
	Cognitive level	HIGH
	Safety Function	2 - Reactor Water Inventor Control
	10 CFR 55	41.8 to 41.10
	10 01 12 35	OT-110
	Technical Reference wit	
	Revision No:	ARC-MCR-107, D4
		Rev.003
	Question History: (i.e. Lo NRC-05)	
	Question Type: (New, Ba Modified)	ank, NEW
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0006.13

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

23

ID: 2165095

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions:

- RPV Level is -70".
- Reactor Power is 30%.
- Full Core Display blue lights are **LIT** for all 185 control rods.
- Scram Discharge Vent and Drain valves indicate closed.
- 1A and 1B CRD pumps are <u>tripped</u> and cannot be restarted.

WHICH ONE of the following procedures would be effective for the given conditions?

- A. T-213 Individual Control Rod Scram/Solenoid De-energization
- B. T-214 Manual Initiation of ARI
- C. T-218 Control Rod Insertion By Withdraw Line Venting
- D. T-219 Maximizing CRD Cooling Water Header Flow During ATWS Conditions

Answer: C

Answer Explanation

air header has depr exists which is not p being the case, son and/or removing wa	ditions (ATWS, all scram valves opened), it can be surmised that the scram ressurized and that some type of hydraulic lock/mechanical interference bermitting the CRD Hydraulic system to properly control rods to insert. This ne method of raising the differential pressure across the CRDM drive piston ater from the Scram Discharge Volume would be most effective in inditions necessary to insert the control rods.
ANSWER (C)	T-218. Correct: T-218, Control Rod Insertion By Withdraw Line Venting, directs actions to vent the individual CRD withdrawal header to a floor drain to develop d/p across the CRD piston and cause rod insertion.
DISTRACTOR (A)	T-213. Wrong: Plausible misconception that blue lights on the full core display mean that the scram solenoids are energized. T-213, Individual Control Rod Scram/Solenoid De-energization, directs actions to individually scram control rods at the HCUs by using the test switches to de-energize its scram air pilot valves.
DISTRACTOR (B)	T-214. Wrong: Plausible misconception that ARI initiation would be effective inserting control rods. T-214, Manual Initiation Of ARI, directs actions to initiate ARI from the Auxiliary Equipment Room to vent the scram air header. Because plant conditions indicate that the scram air header is already depressurized, this method is not likely to be successful.
DISTRACTOR (D)	T-219. Wrong: Plausible misconception that T-219, Maximizing CRD Cooling Water Header Flow During ATWS Conditions, would be effective to cause rod insertion. T-219 directs actions to maximize CRD cooling water header flow during ATWS conditions to cause control rods to drift in, however as noted in the stem, CRD pumps are tripped and cannot be restarted.

Question Type:	Multiple Choice	Multiple Choice		
Status:		Active		
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2165095			
User-Defined ID:		Q #23 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	_		
Торіс:	Ability to operate/mo Incomplete Scram	Ability to operate/monitor CRD Hydraulics as applied to Incomplete Scram		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A		
	Additional	N/A		
	Information			
		Genera	l Data	
			RO	
	Information		RO 1	
	Information Level		RO	
	Information Level Tier		RO 1 2 295015 AA1.01 3.8	
	Information Level Tier Group		RO 1 2 295015 AA1.01 3.8 Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating		RO 1 2 295015 AA1.01 3.8 Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM:	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement		RO 1 2 295015 AA1.01 3.8 Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics.	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level		RO 1 2 295015 AA1.01 3.8 Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics. CRD hydraulics. LOW	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function	Genera	RO12295015 AA1.01 3.8Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics.LOW1 - Reactivity Control41.7 / 45.6T-101 Rev 23, T-213 Rev 13, T-214 Rev 15,	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen Revision No: Question History: NRC-05)	Genera Genera	RO12295015 AA1.01 3.8Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics.LOW1 - Reactivity Control41.7 / 45.6T-101 Rev 23, T-213 Rev 13, T-214 Rev 15,	
	InformationLevelTierGroupKA # and RatingKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Referent Revision No:Question History: NRC-05) Question Type: (N Modified)	Genera Genera	RO12295015 AA1.01 3.8Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics.LOW1 - Reactivity Control41.7 / 45.6T-101 Rev 23, T-213 Rev 13, T-214 Rev 15, T-218 Rev 9, T-219 Rev 4	
	InformationLevelTierGroupKA # and RatingKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferentRevision No:Question History:NRC-05)Question Type: (N	Genera Genera	RO12295015 AA1.01 3.8Incomplete SCRAM: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: CRD hydraulics.LOW1 - Reactivity Control41.7 / 45.6T-101 Rev 23, T-213 Rev 13, T-214 Rev 15, T-218 Rev 9, T-219 Rev 4NEW	

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24

ID: 2165127

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor Power is 100%
- Outside air temperature is 95° F
- "1B" Drywell Chiller is in service
- "1A" and "1B" Drywell Chilled Water Pumps are in service

A Dead Bus Transfer of the D12 Bus results in a loss of Drywell Chilled Water with the following indications:

- Drywell temperature is 143 ° F and up slow
- Drywell pressure rises to 0.7 psig

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the required action(s) to restore a DWCW flow path to the containment, if any?

- A. No action required, flow path is maintained
- B. Reopen the DWCW Containment isolation valves
- C. Reset isolation R2 with Blue/Green reset per GP 8.3 and reopen the DWCW Containment isolation valves
- D. Bypass the isolation per GP 8.5 and reopen the DWCW Containment isolation valves

Answer: B

Answer Explanation

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From E-D12 NOTE Loss of 10-Y102 (D124-R-G-23) will de-energize interposing relays AND isolate Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW) Loop A AND B isolation valves. The valves are powered from D124-R-C and will not isolate until power is restored to MCC. ANSWER (B) Reopen the DWCW Containment isolation valves. Correct. The Dead Bus transfer of D12 will de-energize the interposing relays, resulting in isolation/closure of the DWCW Containment Isolation Valves upon re-energization of the bus. The valves can be re-opened when D12 power is restored because no isolation signal is present. DISTRACTOR No action required, flow path is maintained. Wrong, Plausible if the applicant fails to recognize that DW cooling isolation valves will (A) close upon restoration of power to the MOVs due to the effects of the interposing relays. DISTRACTOR Reset isolation R2 with Blue/Green reset per GP 8.3 and reopen (C) the DWCW Containment isolation valves. Wrong. Plausible if the applicant believes an isolation signal exists. Performing an R2 with Blue/Green reset would clear an existing isolation signal when the monitored parameter (i.e., High DW Pressure for DWCW Containment Isolation Valves) has returned to a normal value. With no isolation signal present, the DWCW Containment Isolation Valves can be re-opened once power is restored to the D12 bus. DISTRACTOR Bypass the isolation per GP 8.5 and reopen the DWCW Containment isolation valves. Wrong. Bypassing the isolation per (D) GP-8.5 is plausible if the applicant believes that an isolation signal exists. With no isolation signal present, the DWCW Containment Isolation Valves can be re-opened once power is restored to the D12 bus. In addition, GP-8.5 is not directed until DW temperature rises above 145°F in accordance with T-102, Step DW/T-5.

Question 24 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2165127
User-Defined ID:	Q #24 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Operate/monitor DW cooling as applied to Inadvertent Containment Isolation
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References None		
	Provided		
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only N/A		
	Justification		
	Additional N/A		
	Information		
	Gen	General Data	
	Level	RO	
	Tier	1	
	Group	2	
	KA # and Rating	295020 AA1.02 3.2	
		Inadvertent Containment	
		Isolation: Inadvertent	
		Containment Isolation:	
		Ability to operate and/or	
	KA Statement	monitor the following as	
	NA Otatement	they apply to	
		INADVERTENT	
		CONTAINMENT	
		ISOLATION: Drywell	
		ventilation/cooling system	
	Cognitive level	High	
	Safety Function	5 - Containment Integrity	
	-	7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with	41.7 / 45.6	
	Revision No:	E-D12 Rev 15	
	Question History: (i.e. LGS	NRC LGS2012, NRC	
	NRC-05)	LGS2017	
	Question Type: (New, Bank Modified)	General BANK (1097448,1799276)	
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0072.O5m	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

25

ID: 2165132

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 Reactor pressure is 920 psig.

A sustained loss of control rod charging water header pressure (0 psig) has occurred.

Which of the following describes the MAXIMUM time and the MINIMUM conditions requiring the Mode Switch to be placed in SHUTDOWN per ON-107, "Control Rod Drive System Problems"?

- A. Immediately if ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with a fully withdrawn control rod.
- B. Immediately if More than ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with fully withdrawn control rods
- C. Within 20 minutes if ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with a fully withdrawn control rod
- D. Within 20 minutes if More than ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with fully withdrawn control rods

Answer: D

Answer Explanation	n
ANSWER (D)	Within 20 minutes if More than ONE Inoperable accumulators are associated with fully withdrawn control rods; Correct. With more than one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, the rod is required to be declared inoperable. Additionally, charging header pressure must be verified ≥1400 psig, and restart one control drive pump (not possible due to sustained loss described in stem) and If reactor pressure is >= 900 psig, then restart at least one control drive pump within 20 minutes or place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, or 2) If reactor pressure is <900 psig, then place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Immediately if ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with a fully withdrawn control rod; Wrong. Plausible to the candidate who recalls the action required for multiple INOP accumulators but not for an individual accumulator.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Immediately if More than ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with fully withdrawn control rods; Wrong. This would be correct if RPV pressure were less than 900 psig. Given that reactor pressure is >900 psig, no Scram is required for 20 minutes
DISTRACTOR (C)	Within 20 minutes if ONE Inoperable accumulator is associated with a fully withdrawn control rod; Wrong. Plausible for the candidate who recalls the action for multiple INOP accumulators but not for an individual accumulator. The 20 minute time frame is correct.

Question 25 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2165132
User-Defined ID:	Q #25 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of interrelations b/n Loss of CRD Pumps and Rx Pressure (Scram Assist).
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

omments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	Knowledge of when to scram is considered part of RO license level a LGS. The required action is a <1hr action.	
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional	N/A	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		295022 AK2.07 3.4
	KA Statement		Loss of Control Rod Drive Pumps: Knowledge of the interrelations between LOSS OF CRD PUMPS and the following: Reactor Pressure (SCRAM assist): Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level		LOW
	Safety Function		1 - Reactivity Control
	10 CFR 55 Technical Reference Revision No:		41.7 / 45.8 TS 3.1.3.5 Amend. 143 ON-107 Rev.02
	Question History: (NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	LGS NRC 2012
	Question Type: (No Modified)	ew, Bank,	BANK (1098622)
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS1550.03

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

26

ID: 2165297

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100%:

- At 0300 the following Annunciator is received: 004 VENT A2, A REAC ENCL HVAC PNL 1AC208 TROUBLE
- At 0305 the following Annunciator is received: 107 REACTOR F5, DIV 1 STEAM LEAK DET SYS HI TEMP/TROUBLE

No other information is currently available.

At what time should T-103, Secondary Containment Control be entered, and when T-103 is entered, what RPV Level instrument is available?

	Time T-103 Entered	Level Instrument Available
Α.	0300	Wide Range Level (Lv(WR) LI-042-1R604)
В.	0300	1B PAMS (Lv/Px XR-042-1R623B)
C.	0305	Wide Range Level (Lv(WR) LI-042-1R604)
D.	0305	1B PAMS (Lv/Px XR-042-1R623B)
Answer:	D	
Answer Expl	anation	

ANSWER (D)	 0305, 1B PAMS (Lv/Px XR-042-1R623B). Correct. A Reactor Enclosure area temperature above its MNO value will result in the receipt of a Division I, II, III, or IV steam leak detection annunciator. Anytime a steam leak detection annunciator is received, T-103 should be entered. The steam leak detection alarm is received at 0305. T-103 immediately directs the use of Post Accident Monitor (PAMS), Fuel Zone and EQ PPC parameters only when Steam Leak Detection Annunciators are in alarm. The PAMs Recorders are XR-042-1R623A and XR-042-1R623B.
DISTRACTOR (A)	0300, Wide Range Level (Lv(WR) LI-042-1R604). Wrong. Receipt of a REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE annunciator is an entry condition to T-103 only if it has been determined that the alarm is due to a high unit cooler inlet temperature (which corresponds to the MNO value in TABLE SCC-1), the respective ARC will direct entry into T-103. The REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE is received at 0300. Plausible to the candidate that does not recall that the REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE entry condition must be verified before entry.
DISTRACTOR (B)	0300, 1B PAMS (Lv/Px XR-042-1R623B). Wrong. Receipt of a REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE annunciator is an entry condition to T-103 only if it has been determined that the alarm is due to a high unit cooler inlet temperature (which corresponds to the MNO value in TABLE SCC-1), the respective ARC will direct entry into T-103. The REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE is received at 0300. Plausible to the candidate that does not recall that the REACTOR ENCLOSURE HVAC PANEL TROUBLE entry condition must be verified before entry.
DISTRACTOR (C)	0305, Wide Range Level (Lv(WR) LI-042-1R604). Wrong. The steam leak detection alarm is received at 0305. T-103 immediately directs the use of Post Accident Monitor (PAMS), Fuel Zone and EQ PPC parameters only when Steam Leak Detection Annunciators are in alarm.

Question 26 Info	Multiple Choice		
Question Type: Status:	Multiple Choice		
Always select on test? Authorized for practice?	No No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2165297		
User-Defined ID:	Q #26 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Knowledge of EOP e steps.	ntry conditio	ons and immediate action
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:		lone	
Commenta.	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
		I/A	
	Justification	// (
		N/A	
	Information	,,,,,	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		1
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		295032 Generic 2.4.1 4.0
	KA Statement		High Secondary Containment Area Temperature Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.
	Cognitive level		LOW
	Safety Function		5 - Containment Integrity
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13
	Technical Referen Revision No:		T-103 Rev 25
	Question History: NRC-05)		NEW
	Question Type: (N Modified)	ew, Bank,	NEW
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective)	LGSOPS1560.2D

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27

ID: 2168415

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 conditions:

- 004 VENT B3 REAC ENCL LOW DELTA P/LOSS OF POWER/INOP is in alarm.
- Reactor Enclosure differential pressure indications (PDI-76-198A, PDI-76-198B) both indicated hard positive pressure.
- Steam is reported exiting the Reactor Enclosure above the Diesel Generator Enclosures.

Given: ON-111, "Loss of Secondary Containment" T-103, "Secondary Containment Control"

WHICH ONE of the following identifies:

(1) the correct abnormal/emergency procedure(s) to enter?

(2) the component which has actuated to prevent Rx Enclosure overpressure?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
A.	ON-111 ONLY	Steam Flooding Damper
В.	ON-111 ONLY	Blowout Panel
C.	ON-111 and T-103	Steam Flooding Damper
D.	ON-111 and T-103	Blowout Panel
Answer:	В	
Answer Fxr	anation	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Blowout panels are mounted in the following rooms: Outboard MSIV Room, RWCU Pump Room, and HPCI and RCIC Pump Rooms, all of which are in Secondary Containment.

Blowout panels "relieve" pressure from within the room/area; i.e., the panels are installed as part of the room/area walls using differential-pressure sensitive explosive washers that act to disengage the panel from the wall upon sensing a fairly small d/p within that room/area. For example: the Unit 1 RWCU Pump Room has one blowout, mounted on the West wall of the Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure, which actuates at 0.5 psid to rapidly relieve pressure from within the RWCU Pump Room (due to a high-energy pipe break in the room) directly to the outside atmosphere.

Steam flooding dampers are normally-open and will automatically close when pressure inside the duct is 5" W.C. higher than pressure outside the duct (i.e., pressure within that room).

ON-111, Loss of Secondary Containment, symptoms:

- 1. Visual observation of damage to secondary containment.
- 2. Observation of unauthorized opening of secondary containment boundary.
- 3. SGTS is unable to maintain secondary containment at -0.25 inches of water pressure with flow rate less than 2,500 CFM for Reactor Enclosure OR 764 CFM for refueling area.

ANSWER (B)	ON-111 Only, Blowout Panel; Correct: Correct for the reasons described above damage to the containment is observed, and the blowout panel is in the location described and relieves pressure at 0.5 psid.
DISTRACTOR	ON-111, Steam Flooding Damper; Wrong: Plausible to the
(A)	candidate who assumes that Steam Flooding dampers have actuated
	since they have an actuation setpoint of only 5" H2O, less than the
	blowout panel. However, they don't act to prevent overpressurization,
	they are to prevent the spread of steam in the building.
DISTRACTOR (C)	ON-111 and T-103, Steam Flooding Damper; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that T-103 is generally entered when a steam leak occurs in the Rx Enclosure. In the stem conditions, no T-103 entry conditions are given. Also, plausible to the candidate who assumes that Steam Flooding dampers have actuated since they have an actuation setpoint of only 5" H2O, less than the blowout panel.
DISTRACTOR (D)	ON-111 and T-103, Blowout Panel; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that T-103 is generally entered when a steam leak occurs in the Rx Enclosure.

Question 27 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2168415
User-Defined ID:	Q #27 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Reasons for Blow out Panel Operation for Secondary Cont. Hi D/P
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

iments:	References Provided	None				
	K/A Justification					
	SRO-Only	N/A				
	Justification					
	Additional	N/A				
	Information					
		Genera	I Data			
	Level		RO			
	Tier		1			
	Group	Group				
	KA # and Rating		295035 EK3.01 2.8			
	KA Statement		Secondary Containment High Differential Pressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE: Blow-out panel operation: Plant-Specific.			
	Cognitive level		LOW			
	Safety Function		5 - Containment Integrity			
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.6			
	Technical Reference Revision No:		P&ID M-0076, Sheet 5, Rev.41 LGSOPS0076A, R.E. HVAC lesson plan LGSOPS0076B, Secondary Containment lesson plan			
	Question History: (NRC-05)		NEW			
	Question Type: (Ne Modified)	ew, Bank,	NEW			
	Revision History:					
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0076B.06F			

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28

ID: 2166041

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is in a startup with the following conditions:

- Reactor Pressure is 150 psig
- Reactor Power is 5%
- 1B RHR is blocked out of service with a Tag Out

Consider the following sequence of events:

• The 10 Bus experiences a loss of power

One minute later - the following two events occur simultaneously:

- Drywell Pressure rapidly rises to 2 psig
- The 20 Bus experiences a loss of power

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the order in which the LPCI Loops will begin injecting into the RPV?

- A. 1A and 1C simultaneously followed by 1D
- B. 1A and 1C and 1D simultaneously
- C. 1C followed by 1A followed by 1D

А

D. 1C and 1D simultaneously followed by 1A

Answer:

Answer Explanation LOCA LOAD Sequence LOCA signal - Diesel starts t = 0 t = 0 Load shed C & D RHR pumps start t = 0 L.C. Transformer Breaker closes t = 3 A & B RHR pumps start t = 5 t = 10 A & C Core Spray pumps start t = 15 B & D Core Spray pumps start

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LOCA w/LOOP

- t = 0 D/G Breaker closes
- t = 0 All RHR pumps start
- t = 3 Load Center Breakers close
- t = 7 All Core Spray pumps start

From the stem, reactor pressure is below 455 psig (1/2 of the LOCA signal).

A loss of the 10 Bus will result in a loss of the 101 Bus. D11 and D13 Buses are aligned to the 101 Bus. Upon a loss of the 101 Bus, after 0.5 seconds the associated EDG will receive a start signal and the 201 breaker will close re-powering the D11 and D13 Buses after 1 second.

At this point all four divisional safeguard buses are aligned to the 201 Bus with D11 EDG and D13 EDG running.

The next simultaneous event is a loss of the 20 bus which will result in a loss of the 201 Bus. As a result the D11 and D13 Buses will re-power from their associated EDG following a 0.5 second time delay. At the same time as the 20 Bus loss, drywell pressure rapidly rises to 2 psig (above the 2nd half of the required LOCA signal of 1.68 psig). With this situation all LPCI pumps will start and inject as soon as power to the bus is available. For the D14 Bus, the associated EDG was not previously running resulting in a 10 second delay (the required time for the EDG to start and reach rated voltage and frequency) to power the D14 Bus.

The expected sequence of event is: The 1A LPCI Loop starts at T=0.5 second The 1C LPCI Loop starts at T=0.5 second and the 1D LPCI Loop starting at T= \sim 10 seconds.

ANSWER (A)	1A and 1C simultaneously followed by 1D; Correct: Correct for the above reasons. 1A and 1C RHR are powered from their EDGs and can immediately inject as described. 1D will not start until D14 starts and loads in approx. 10 seconds.
DISTRACTOR (B)	1A and 1C and 1D simultaneously; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate the believes that all the requirements for a LOCA/LOOP signal are met and that all three RHR pumps will start at time 0.5 seconds. This would require the D14 EDG to already be running
DISTRACTOR (C)	1C followed by 1A followed by 1D; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that recognizes that the 1A and 1C RHR Pumps will have power sooner than the 1D pump but erroneously applies the LOCA loading sequence where the 1C pump starts before the 1A RHR Pump. 1C at T=0 and 1A at T=5 sec.
DISTRACTOR (D)	1C and 1D simultaneously followed by 1A. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that fails take into consideration the loss of the offsite power sources and just applies the LOCA loading sequence where RHR 1C and 1D start at T=0 sec and 1A start at T=5 sec.

Question 28 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2166041
User-Defined ID:	Q #28 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Monitor automatic operations of the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE including: EDG load sequencing.
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

		NONE			
	Provided				
	K/A Justification				
	SRO-Only N/A				
	Justification				
		N/A			
	Information				
		General	Data		
	Level		RO		
	Tier		2		
	Group		1		
	KA # and Rating		203000 A3.09 3.6		
			RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode		
			Ability to monitor automatic		
			operations of the		
	KA Statement		RHR/LPCI: INJECTION		
			MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC)		
			including: Emergency		
		generator load sequencing.			
	Cognitive level		HIGH		
	v		2 - Reactor Water Inventory		
	Osfata Eurotian		Control		
	Safety Function		4 - Heat Removal Form Rx		
			Core		
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.7		
	Technical Reference	with			
	Revision No:		LGSOPS0092A		
	Question History: (i. NRC-05)	e. LGS	ILT NRC 2017		
	Question Type: (New, Bank,		BANK (2029824)		
	Question Type: (New	v, Bank,	BANK (2029824)		
		v, Bank,	BANK (2029824)		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

29

ID: 2166095

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is in OPCON 4 following shut down for refueling outage with the following conditions at 0430:

- 2B RHR Loop in SDC •
- RPV Coolant Temperature = 175°F •
- RPV Level = 80" (Shutdown Level Indication) •

At 0430 an inadvertent Group IIA isolation occurs on channels A & B only.

Conditions at 0435:

- RPV Coolant Temperature = 185°F •
- RPV Level = 82" (Shutdown Level Indication) •

Assume no operator action.

- (1) When the isolation completes, what is the status of the HV-51-2F008, "RHR S/D Cooling Suction Outbd Isol"?
- (2) At what time will an OPCON change take place?

	HV-51-2F008 Status	Time of OPCON change
Α.	CLOSED	0443
В.	CLOSED	0449
C.	OPEN	0443
D.	OPEN	0449

nswer Explanat	ion			
GP-8.1 Rev 17, A roup IIA - <u>RHR S/D (</u>	utomatic Actuations by Iso Cooling	lation Signa		er Signal: V)
EQUIPMENT	NAME	POSITION	CHANNEL	BYPASS
HV-51-1F009	"RHR S/D Clg Suct" (INBD)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-1F008	"RHR S/D Clg Suct" (OUTBD)	Close	C & D	None
HV-51-1F050A(B)	"RHR S/D Clg Rtn Ck" (INBD)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-151A(B)	RHR S/D Clg Rtn Ck Equal" (TEST)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-1F015A(B)	RHR S/D Clg Rtn" (OUTBD)	Close	C & D	None

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		NOTE		
1	. Loss of any of the	e following power sources:		
	 *A-Y160 *B-Y160 *A-Y160-1 *B-Y160-1 			
	will isolate *F008 <u>AND</u> *F015A/B	, *F009,	[1
2	Loss of either of	the following Inboard NSSSS logic power sources:		
	 *A-Y160-0 *0C-622/B 			
	will isolate *F009	only.	[1
3	. Loss of either of	the following Outboard NSSSS logic power sources:		
	 *B-Y160-0 *0C-623/B 			
	will isolate *F008 <u>AND</u> *F015A/B.		[]
4.	cooling due to a f	is being performed as a result of a loss of shutdown ire, umpers required per the Attachments shall be obtained fe Shutdown Equipment Locker.	[]
5.		y be used to perform a rapid start of RHR in Shutdown		
	Cooling mode.		l	
HV-5 Char his o HV-5 The t chan 2009	Group IIA isolati 1-2F009 only. Inels C&D will of uestion, since f 1-2F008 will no temperature riso ge occurs once PF - 185°F) / 2°F	ons an actuation of channels A&B only will ca cause an isolation of the HV-51-2F008, and H the inadvertent isolation was caused by a trip it be affected and will remain open. e from the stem is (185°F-175°F/(0435 - 0430 average coolant temperature reaches 200°F F/minute + 0435 = 0442:30, rounds to 0443.	V-51-2F0 of the A &)) 2ºF/mir	115A/B valves. For & B channels, the nute. The OPCON
IV-5 Char his o IV-5 The t chan 200 ^o	Group IIA isolati 1-2F009 only. Inels C&D will of uestion, since f 1-2F008 will no temperature riso ge occurs once PF - 185°F) / 2°F	ause an isolation of the HV-51-2F008, and H the inadvertent isolation was caused by a trip t be affected and will remain open. e from the stem is (185°F-175°F/(0435 - 0430 average coolant temperature reaches 200°F F/minute + 0435 = 0442:30, rounds to 0443.	V-51-2F0 of the A a)) 2ºF/mir , rounds t	115A/B valves. For & B channels, the nute. The OPCON
IV-5 Char Nis c IV-5 The t han 2000	Group IIA isolati i1-2F009 only. inels C&D will of question, since i i1-2F008 will no temperature riso ge occurs once PF - 185°F) / 2°F time to boil is (2	ause an isolation of the HV-51-2F008, and H the inadvertent isolation was caused by a trip t be affected and will remain open. e from the stem is (185°F-175°F/(0435 - 0430 average coolant temperature reaches 200°F F/minute + 0435 = 0442:30, rounds to 0443.	V-51-2F0 of the A a)) 2°F/mir , rounds t re.	115A/B valves. Fo & B channels, the nute. The OPCON o 0449.
IV-5 Char his c IV-5 The t han 200 ⁰ The t AN DIS (A)	Group IIA isolati i1-2F009 only. inels C&D will of question, since f i1-2F008 will no temperature rise ge occurs once PF - 185°F) / 2°F time to boil is (2 SWER (C)	ause an isolation of the HV-51-2F008, and H the inadvertent isolation was caused by a trip t be affected and will remain open. e from the stem is (185°F-175°F/(0435 - 0430 average coolant temperature reaches 200°F F/minute + 0435 = 0442:30, rounds to 0443. 12°F - 185°F) / 2°F/minute + 0435 = 0448:30 OPEN, 0443. Correct: As explained abov CLOSED, 0443. Wrong: Plausible misper	V-51-2F0 of the A &)) 2°F/mir , rounds t re. rception c	115A/B valves. For & B channels, the nute. The OPCON o 0449.

Question 29 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2166095		
User-Defined ID:	Q #29 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	Effect a loss/ malfunction of the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM will have on Rx temps		
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		

mments:	References None Provided	
	K/A	
	Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
		eral Data
	Level	RO
	Tier	2
	Group	1
	KA # and Rating	205000 K3.03 3.8
		Shutdown Cooling Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of
	KA Statement	the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) will have on following: Reactor temperatures (moderator, vessel, flange).
	Cognitive level	HIGH
	Safety Function	4 - Heat Removal From R Core
	10 CFR 55	41.7 / 45.4
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	GP8.1 Rev 17, ON-121 Rev 33 U2 Tech Specs Table 1.2 Amend't 112
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	
	Question Type: (New, Ban Modified)	k, NEW
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0072.LO2A, C

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30

ID: 2166210

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 plant conditions:

- Group 1 NSSSS Isolation occurred
- HPCI is running in full flow test (CST to CST) at 5000 gpm in automatic maintaining Reactor pressure
- RCIC is running at 400 GPM in automatic maintaining Reactor water level

A loss of Division 2 DC power occurs.

Which of the following identifies the plant impact, if any?

- A. Reactor pressure remains constant
- B. Reactor pressure rises
- C. RCIC trips on overspeed

В

D. HPCI outboard steam isolation valve closes

Answer:

Answer Explanation

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A loss of DIV 2 power to HPCI will cause HPCI speed to run back to the low setting (600 RPM) due to loss of control power to the speed controller which feeds the Turbine Governor. DIV 2 provides power for control power, isolation circuits, all DIV 2 valves, initiation logic, aux oil pump control and turbine trip logic. HPCI is out of service and not available on loss of DIV 2 DC ANSWER (B) Reactor pressure rises; Correct: A loss of DIV 2 power to HPCI will cause HPCI speed to run back to the low setting due to loss of control power to the flow controller which feeds the Turbine Governor. When turbine speed drops below approximately 1000 RPM the shaft driven oil pump will not have sufficient pressure to maintain the governor valve open. a loss of div II dc will cause the aux. oil pump to lose power, so it will not be available to start on low pressure. without the aux oil pump the governor will continue to close to the full closed position. HPCI will no longer control pressure and pressure will rise. DISTRACTOR Reactor pressure remains constant; Wrong: Plausible to candidate who does not remember loss of div 2 will close governor but recalls (A) that the isolation is energized to operate and therefore believes that nothing happens to HPCI. With the loss as described above, HPCI shuts down. DISTRACTOR RCIC trips on overspeed; Wrong: Plausible to candidate who believes that RCIC operates using Division 2 DC power and recalls (C) that on a loss of DC power, RCIC will overspeed as its governor moves to max position. RCIC uses Div 1 DC. No impact. DISTRACTOR HPCI outboard steam isolation valve closes; Wrong: Plausible to (D) candidate who recalls that the HPCI steam admission valve closes on a loss of Div 2 DC and conflates that with a steam isolation valve closing. In actuality, the AC powered steam isolation valves will not close.

Question 30 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2166210		
User-Defined ID:	Q #30 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	HPCI and Loss of DC Power		
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO- High		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		

Comments:	References Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification	,, .	
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		206000 K1.07 3.7
			High-Pressure Coolant Injection Knowledge of the physical connections and/or
	KA Statement		cause-effect relationships between HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM and the following D.C. power: BWR-2,3,4.
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		2 - Reactor Water Inventory 4 - Heat Removal From Reactor Core
	10 CFR 55		41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8
	Technical Referen Revision No:		E41-1040-E-004, sht. 001 Rev 26 E41-1040-E-005, sht. 001 Rev 30 E41-1040-E-006, sht. 001 Rev 36 ARC-MCR-117, A1 Rev 2
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: (N Modified)	ew, Bank,	New
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective)	LGSOPS.14a

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31

ID: 2166215

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor SCRAMMED on a loss of feed
- HPCI initiated on Low RPV Level and Tripped on High RPV Level.
- HPCI HIGH LEVEL Trip white light is lit
- HPCI Initiation White Light is Lit
- RPV level is now -5" and slowly lowering

Drywell pressure rises to 2.0 psig

WHICH ONE of the following describes the expected HPCI response?

The HPCI trip solenoid will

- A. Energize and allow control oil to flow to the governor valve, and HPCI will start.
- B. De-energize and allow control oil to flow to the governor valve, and HPCI will start.
- C. REMAIN energized, and HPCI will remain tripped.
- D. REMAIN de-energized, and HPCI will remain tripped.

Answer:

Answer Explanation

С

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ANSWER (C)	REMAIN energized, and HPCI will remain tripped. Correct: When HPCI trips on high level, Trip solenoid SV1 energizes and dumps control oil from the Steam admission valve and speed governor. This causes the valve to close and HPCI stops rotating. This solenoid will remain energized until level drops below +54" and either the high level reset button is pushed or level drops below -38".
DISTRACTOR (A)	energize and allow control oil to flow to the governor valve, and HPCI will start. Wrong: Plausible misconception that HPCI will default to the most conservative condition and inject on a high drywell pressure and who does not recall that the trip solenoid is energized to operate.
DISTRACTOR (B)	de-energize and allow control oil to flow to the governor valve, and HPCI will start. Wrong: Plausible misconception that HPCI will default to the most conservative condition and inject on a high drywell pressure and does not recall that only resetting the high level trip or level below -38" will de-energize the solenoid.
DISTRACTOR (D)	REMAIN de-energized, and HPCI will remain tripped. Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the HPCI will remain tripped until the high level trip is reset but who doesn't understand the operation of the solenoid SV1.

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Question 31 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2166215
User-Defined ID:	Q #31 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	HPCI design features and or interlocks which provide for control oil to turbine speed controls
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	l Data
	Level	Ochicita	RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratin	20	206000 K4.14 3.4
		ig	
			High-Pressure Coolant Injection;
			K4.14 - Knowledge of HIG
			PRESSURE COOLANT
			INJECTION SYSTEM
	KA Statement		design feature(s) and or
			interlocks which provide fo
			the following: Control oil to
			turbine speed controls:
			BWR-2,3,4.
		-	
	Cognitive leve		High
			2 - Reactor Water Inventor
	Safety Function	n	Control
			4 - Heat Removal From
			Reactor Core
	10 CFR 55		41.7
			E41-1040-E-003, sht. 001
			Rev 38
	Technical Def	ronoo with	E41-1040-E-005, sht. 001
	Technical Refe Revision No:	erence with	Rev 30
	Revision NO:		E41-1040-E-006, sht. 001 Rev 36
			E41-1040-E-008, sht. 001
			Rev 20
	Question Histo	orv: (i.e. I GS	
	NRC-05)		NEW
	Question Type	: (New, Bank,	NEW
	Modified)		
	Revision Histo		
	Training Object	tive	LGSOPS0055.6, 8

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32

ID: 2166255

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor is shutdown following an ATWS.
- All Control Rods are fully inserted.
- T-270, Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV, has been completed in the Main Control Room and Aux. Equipment Room
- Reactor pressure is 400 psig
- Core Spray (CS) injection to the Reactor has been directed from T-101

Given following Core Spray system component names:

HV-52-1F004A, Core Spray Loop "A" Injection Valve (outboard) HV-52-1F005, Core Spray Loop "A" Injection Valve (inboard) E21A-S22A(C), Core Spray DIV 1 (3) Manual Initiation PB

WHICH ONE of the following describes the steps necessary to align "1A" Core Spray Loop for injection?

- A. Arm and depress E21A-S22A and C, open HV-52-1F004A and then open HV-52-1F005
- B. Arm and depress E21A-S22A and C, close HV52-1F004A, open HV-52-1F005, re-open HV-52-1F004A
- C. Manually start "1A" and "1C"Core Spray Pumps, open HV-52-1F004A and then open HV-52-1F005
- D. Manually start "1A" and "1C" Core Spray Pumps, close HV-52-1F004A, open HV-52-1F005, re-open HV-52-1F004A

Answer:

Answer Explanation

D

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T-270 will disable the power monitor function of the CS pumps and associated logic. Moreover, the CS pumps will not start, nor will the valve logic recognize a LOCA signal, either real or manual.

As a result, if Core Spray is required the pumps must be manually started and all valve interlocks must be manually overridden. To override the injection valve logic the normally open HV-52-1F004A must be closed to enable the valve interlock permissive to open HV-52-1F005. Once the HV-52-1F005 is open, than the HV-52-1F004 Core Spray discharge valve can be reopened to align the CS loop for injection.

ANSWER (D)	Manually start "1A" and "1C" Core Spray Pumps, close
	HV-52-1F004A, open HV-52-1F005, re-open HV-52-1F004A.
	Correct.
	As described above.
DISTRACTOR	Arm and depress E21A-S22A and C, open HV-52-1F004A and then
(A)	open HV-52-1F005. Wrong.
	This would be correct if T-270 did not prevent CS pump starts via
	manual or automatic LOCA signals and there was no valve interlocks
	to open HV-52-1F005
DISTRACTOR	Arm and depress E21A-S22A and C, close HV52-1F004A, open
(B)	HV-52-1F005, re-open HV-52-1F004A. Wrong.
	This would be correct if the candidate that does not recall that T-270
	prevents CS pump starts via manual or automatic LOCA signals.
DISTRACTOR	Manually start "1A" and "1C"Core Spray Pumps, open
(C)	HV-52-1F004A and then open HV-52-1F005. Wrong.
	Plausible to the candidate that does not recognize that HV-52-1F004A
	is a normally open valve and that with this valve open and no LOCA
	signal present, valve interlocks prevent the HV-52-1F005 from opening.

Question 32 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2166255
User-Defined ID:	Q #32 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor CS Injection valves in the control room
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-High
Text Field:	LO-ILT

omments:	References NONE	
	Provided	
	K/A Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
	Gene	ral Data
	Level	RO
	Tier	2
	Group	1
	KA # and Rating	209001 A4.03 3.7
	KA Statement	Low-Pressure Core Spray Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Injection valves.
	Cognitive level	High
	Safety Function	2 - Reactor Water Inventor Control 4 - Heat Removal From Reactor Core
	10 CFR 55	41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	T-270 Rev 16 E21-1040-E-5 Rev 18 E21-1040-E-6 Rev 19 E21-1040-E-9 Rev 26 E21-1040-E-11 Rev 20 E21-1040-E-12 Rev 20
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)	BANK (561180, 977784)
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0052.10B

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33

ID: 2166297

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 Plant conditions:

- Reactor Mode Switch was placed in SHUTDOWN 10 minutes ago
- Reactor power is 30% lowering
- RPV Level (LI-42-1R604) stabilized at -75 inches two minutes ago
- SLC Tank level (LI-48-2R601) is 3500 gpm lowering

What best describes the expected SLC MCR indications?

	XV-48-2F004A(B), SQUIB READY Status	PI-48-2R600A(B) Pump A(B) Discharge Pressure
A.	OFF	1100 psig
В.	OFF	1400 psig;
C.	ON	1100 psig;
D.	ON	1400 psig
Answer	: A	

Answer Explanation	n
ANSWER (A)	OFF, 1100 psig. Correct. The conditions in the stem provide indications that an ATWS is in progress. With Rx power >3.2% and Rx Level < -38" for greater than 118 seconds SLC would have started 2 SLC pumps, fired the 2 associated explosive squib valves and begun injecting into the RPV. The indication of the SQUIB READY Status light OFF indicates that its associated Explosive Squib Valve has fired. The normal discharge pressure for the SLC pumps is 1100 psig.
DISTRACTOR (B)	ON, 1400 psig. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that mistakes the SQUIB READY status light being ON as energized to operate as the squib valves must be energized to fire. 1400 psig is plausible if the candidate mistakes the SLC discharge relief valve setpoint with the value for the SLC pump normal operation
DISTRACTOR (C)	ON, 1100 psig. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that mistakes the SQUIB READY status light being ON as energized to operate as the squib valves must be energized to fire.
DISTRACTOR (D)	OFF, 1400 psig. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that mistakes the SLC discharge relief valve setpoint with the value for the SLC pump discharge pressure at rated RPV pressure during normal operation

Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2166297		
User-Defined ID:	Q #33 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Knowledge of the op Ops as they apply to		blications of Explosive Valve
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional Information	N/A	
	Internation		
		Comoria	
	Level	Genera	RO
	Tier		I KU
			2
			2
	Group		1
	Group KA # and Rating		1 211000 K5.04 3.1 Standby Liquid Control Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM: Explosive valve
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement		1 211000 K5.04 3.1 Standby Liquid Control Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM: Explosive valve operation.
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55		1 211000 K5.04 3.1 Standby Liquid Control Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM: Explosive valve operation. LOW
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen Revision No:		1211000 K5.043.1Standby Liquid ControlKnowledge of theoperational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply to STANDBYLIQUID CONTROLSYSTEM: Explosive valveoperation.LOW1 - Reactivity Control
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen		1211000 K5.043.1Standby Liquid ControlKnowledge of theoperational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply to STANDBYLIQUID CONTROLSYSTEM: Explosive valveoperation.LOW1 - Reactivity Control
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen Revision No: Question History NRC-05) Question Type: (I Modified)	: (i.e. LGS New, Bank,	1211000 K5.043.1Standby Liquid ControlKnowledge of theoperational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply to STANDBYLIQUID CONTROLSYSTEM: Explosive valveoperation.LOW1 - Reactivity Control
	Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen Revision No: Question History NRC-05) Question Type: (I	: (i.e. LGS New, Bank,	1 211000 K5.04 3.1 Standby Liquid Control Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM: Explosive valve operation. LOW 1 - Reactivity Control 41.5 / 45.3

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34

ID: 2167095

Points: 1.00

RPS Power Supply is in its normal alignment

At 0320 the following annunciators alarm


- 122 D12 G-2, 1DB-1 250 DC MCC Undervoltage
- 122 D12 G-3, 1DB-2 250 DC MCC Undervoltage

What is the status of Unit 1 "B' RPS Logic and where is 'B' RPS power supplied from?

Answer Exp	lanation			
Answer:	А		\mathcal{N}	
D.		Half Scram		124A-G-F
C.		Half Scram		144D-C-F
В.		No Scram		124A-G-F
Α.		No Scram		144D-C-F
		Logic Status		Power Supply

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Each RPS subsystem (A/B) is powered via an UPS inverter. Each inverter can supply power from either its inverted DC which is supplied from Division 1 or Division 2 250V DC for A and B Subsystems respectively, or through an internal static switch from either the TSC inverter through 144D-C-F (normal) or from the 124A-G-F (backup) for B RPS.



On a loss of DC supply to an inverter, the internal static switch will power the inverter loads from the alternate source aligned.

The TSC power supply from 144D-C-F is preferred as it comes from an inverter in the TSC supplied by the TSC Battery System. This is the normal backup.

ANSWER	No Scram,144D-C-F; Correct: Since the static switch in the UPS will automatically power RPS from its alternate feed, there is no loss of power to RPS and no half scram. As noted above, 144D-C-F is correct alternate supply
DISTRACTOR	Half Scram,124A-G-F; Wrong: The candidate may pick this because of the misconception that the static switch (automatic) and the UPS backup source transfer switch (manual, break before make) are the same component and they do not know that 144D-C-F is the normal backup power supply to the UPS RPS.
DISTRACTOR	Half Scram, 144D-C-F; Wrong: The candidate may pick this because of the misconception that the static switch (automatic) and the UPS backup source transfer switch (manual, break before make) are the same component
DISTRACTOR	No Scram,124A-G-F, Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the normal backup supply and selects the alternate which is only manually aligned for maintenance of the TSC inverter.

Question 34 Info	Multimer Office in		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167095		
User-Defined ID:	Q #34 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Knowledge of the	e effect that a los	s of DC will have on RPS
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional		
	Auultional	IN/A	
	Information		
	Information	Genera	
	Information Level		RO
	Information Level Tier		RO 2
	Information Level Tier Group	Genera	RO
	Information Level Tier	Genera	RO 2 1 212000 K6.04 2.8
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement	Genera	RO21212000K6.04 2.8Reactor ProtectionKnowledge of the effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have onthe REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM:D.C. electrical distribution.
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve	Genera	RO 2 1 212000 K6.04 2.8 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM: D.C. electrical distribution. LOW
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	Genera	RO21212000K6.04 2.8Reactor ProtectionKnowledge of the effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have onthe following will have onthe REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM:D.C. electrical distribution.LOW7 - Instrumentation
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55	Genera ng	RO 2 1 212000 K6.04 2.8 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM: D.C. electrical distribution. LOW
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No:	Genera ng l on erence with	RO21212000K6.04 2.8Reactor ProtectionKnowledge of the effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have onthe following will have onthe REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM:D.C. electrical distribution.LOW7 - Instrumentation
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05)	Genera ng l on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	RO21212000K6.04 2.8Reactor ProtectionKnowledge of the effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have onthe following will have onthe REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM:D.C. electrical distribution.LOW7 - Instrumentation41.7 / 45.7
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo	Genera ng l on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	RO21212000K6.04 2.8Reactor ProtectionKnowledge of the effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have onthe following will have onthe REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM:D.C. electrical distribution.LOW7 - Instrumentation41.7 / 45.7E-32 sheet 1, E-33 sheet 1
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05) Question Type	Genera ng il on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	RO 2 1 212000 K6.04 2.8 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM: D.C. electrical distribution. LOW 7 - Instrumentation 41.7 / 45.7 E-32 sheet 1, E-33 sheet 1 NEW

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
ID: 2168416

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power when the following occurs:

35

• 'SCRAM SYSTEM LOGIC' white light 'B3' on panel 20C603 extinguishes



- The EO investigating this failure reports that the fuse to the RPS B group 3 Scram solenoid valves has blown
- Prior to fuse replacement, a loss of power to 2A-Y160 A RPS/UPS panel occurs

WHICH ONE of the following correctly identifies the status of the control rods IMMEDIATELY after the loss of 2A-Y160?

- A. Two solenoids have deenergized for one-quarter (1/4) of the control rods, one-quarter (1/4) of the control rods have scrammed into the core.
- B. Only two of the 'SCRAM SYSTEM LOGIC' white lights have extinguished. No rods have scrammed
- C. Two solenoids have deenergized for one half (1/2) of the control rods, one half (1/2) of the control rods have scrammed into the core.
- D. Only four of the 'SCRAM SYSTEM LOGIC' white lights have extinguished. No rods have scrammed

Answer: A

Answer Explanation

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There are 8 'Scram System Logic' white lights on panel 20C603, 4 across the top row and 4 across the bottom row. The top row lights are labeled 'A1', 'A2', 'A3', 'A4';(DS9A,C,E, &G) similarly, the bottom row lights are labeled 'B1', 'B2', 'B3', 'B4' (DS(B,D,F,&H). Each light monitors the availability of 120 VAC RPS power to the 'scram pilot valve solenoids' for a Group of control rods. For example: an illuminated 'B3' light means that RPS power is being supplied to the 'B' solenoids for the Group 3 rods (where 'Group 3' has approximately one-quarter of the 185 total control rods). Suppose that we consider (for this question) that the 'B3' light is extinguished...that means that 'B' solenoids (normally energized by RPS Trip System 'B' power) are de-energized for approximately one-quarter of the 185 control rods. Since the 'A' solenoids for those rods are still energized, the associated scram pilot valves have not re-positioned; therefor, the Scram Inlet and Scram Outlet Valves for each HCU remain closed (i.e., no scram occurs) however when a loss of 2A-Y160 occurs all 'A' side solenoids deenergize (A 1/2 scram). Since 'A'3 solenoids are deenergized along with 'B'3 solenoid 1/4 of the rods will initially scram into the core.

ANSWER	Two solenoids have deenergized for one-quarter (1/4) of the control rods, one-quarter (1/4) of the control rods have scrammed into the core; Correct: For the above reasons
DISTRACTOR	Only two of the 'SCRAM SYSTEM LOGIC' white lights have extinguished. No rods have scrammed; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that normally all solenoids must de-energize to cause rod motion. However, as described above, when both solenoids in a group de-energize, the associated rods scram.
DISTRACTOR	Two solenoids have deenergized for one half (1/2) of the control rods, one-half (1/2) of the control rods have scrammed into the core; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who concludes that since one of the white lights have de-energized prior to the loss of *AY160, only half of rods will scram since there is no A RPS and a loss of B3.
DISTRACTOR	Only four of the 'SCRAM SYSTEM LOGIC' white lights have extinguished. No rods have scrammed; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that on a loss of *AY160, one half of the white lights will de-energize but fails to consider the impact of the blown fuse on group 3 rods.

Question 35 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2168416			
User-Defined ID:	Q #35 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	Scram Solenoid	Logic Power loss	3	
Num Field 1:	LM	Logio i onoriorio		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References	Embedded nict	ture of RPS channel logic power	
	Provided			
	K/A	None		
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	None		
	Information			
		Genera	I Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rati	ng	212000 K5.02 3.3	
	KA Statement		Reactor Protection System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to REACTOR	
			PROTECTION SYSTEM: Specific logic arrangements.	
	Cognitive level		High	
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.3	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No:	erence with	41.5 / 45.3	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05)	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	41.5 / 45.3	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05)	erence with	41.5 / 45.3 C71-1020-E-010 Rev. 02	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Type	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	41.5 / 45.3 C71-1020-E-010 Rev. 02 1151844	

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36

ID: 2167110

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant startup is in progress.

• The mode switch is in Startup

The IRMs have the following indications:

A - 80/125 B - 72/125 C - 78/125 D - 124/125 E - 75/125 F - 83/125 G - 122/125 H - 74/125

• A Rod withdraw block is received

WHAT is the Reactor Protection System (RPS) response, if any?

- A. No RPS response
- B. RPS 'A' half-scram, only
- C. RPS 'B' half-scram, only

D

D. Full scram

Answer:

Answor Explanation	2	
Answer Explanation		
Use alarm response card ARC-MCR-107, F3 to validate the following: IRM Upscale rod block setpoint is 85/125 of scale on any one of the 8 IRM channels. Use ARC-MCR-107, H3 to validate the following: IRM Upscale trip (RPS actuation) setpoint is 120/125 of scale. IRMs A, C, E, and G input to RPS Trip System 'A'; IRMs B, D, F, and H input to RPS Trip System 'B'. IRM trips are enabled so long as the Reactor Mode Switch is NOT in RUN.		
ANSWER (D)	Full scram; Correct: Channel 'D' is above 120/125; therefore RPS 'B' actuates. Channel 'G' is above 120/125; therefore RPS 'A' actuates. A full scram results.	
DISTRACTOR (A)	No RPS response; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee incorrectly recalls the IRM Upscale Trip (RPS) setpoint of 120/125 scale believing it to be higher.	
DISTRACTOR (B)	RPS 'A' half-scram, only; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who fails to recognize that the two IRMs that are above 120/125 scale ('D' and 'G') are associated with opposite sides of RPS.	
DISTRACTOR (C)	RPS 'B' half-scram, only; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who fails to recognize that the two IRMs that are above 120/125 scale ('D' and 'G') are associated with opposite sides of RPS.	

Question 36 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167110			
User-Defined ID:	Q #36 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	Ability to predict/moni		in parameters associated	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	NONE		
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	N/A		
	Information			
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		215003 A1.05 3.9	
	KA Statement		Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated wit operating the INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM controls including: SCRAM and rod block trip setpoints	
	Cognitive level		LOW	
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.5	
	Technical Referen	co with	ARC-MCR-107, F3 Rev 1	
	Revision No:		ARC-MCR-107, H3	
			Rev 0	
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	1741662	
	Question Type: (No Modified)	ew, Bank,	BANK	
	Revision History:			
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0074.19	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

37

ID: 2167112

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor startup in progress
- ST-6-107-884-2, Neutron Monitoring System Overlap Verification on Startup, has been completed
- Source Range Monitor (SRM) detectors are being withdrawn from the core with the following Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) System conditions:

IRM	<u>Range</u>	
A	3	
В	3	
С	Channel is bypassed	
D	2	
E	3	
F	4	
G	3	
Н	5	

While being withdrawn, the indication for the "2A" SRM Channel drops to 30 CPS.

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the status of the "SRM Retracted When Not Permitted" Annunciator and the Control Rod Withdrawal Block?

Answer Ex	colanation	
Answer:	D	
D.	Not Lit	Not Active
C.	Not Lit	Active
В.	Lit	Not Active
Α.	Lit	Active
	SRM Retracted When Not Permitted	Control Rod Withdrawal Block

Per ARC-MCR-207, REACTOR, I4, "SRM RETRACTED WHEN NOT PERMITTED," this alarm will be received and a control rod withdrawal block signal will be generated if an attempt is made to retract any SRM detector while it is indicating less than 100 CPS <u>AND</u> any associated IRM Channel Range Switches are below Range 3.				
ANSWER	Not Lit, Not active; Correct, With all associated IRMs above range			
	2, the alarm is not lit and no rod block is active as described above			
DISTRACTOR	Lit, Active; Wrong, Plausible to the candidate who remembers that			
	SRM Retract Permit becomes active when SRM level is <100 CPS			
	but forgets that the IRM must be associated with the SRM			
DISTRACTOR	R Lit, Not Active; Wrong, Plausible to the candidate who remembers			
	that SRM Retract Permit becomes active when SRM level is <100 CPS			
	but forgets that the IRM must be associated with the SRM and who			
	does not recall the threshold for the Rod Block			
DISTRACTOR	Not Lit, Active; Wrong, Plausible to the candidate who correctly			
	recalls that the SRM retract when not permit circuit is not active but			
	who incorrectly assumes that the rod block is active due to the low			
	count rate.			

Question 37 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No	No		
Authorized for practice?	No	No		
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167112			
User-Defined ID:	Q #37 PREVIOUS			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	Ability to monitor aut Annunciator and alar		tions of the SRMs including:	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	NONE		
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	N/A		
	Information	Information		
		General		
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		215004 A3.02 3.4	
	KA Statement	SYSTEM including: Annunciator and alarm signals.		
	Cognitive level		High	
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.7 GEK-73626A, Source	
	Technical Referen Revision No:	Technical Reference with Revision No:		
	Question History: NRC-05)		Mechanism Operation LGS NRC17-1	
	Question Type: (N Modified)	lew, Bank,	BANK (2078352)	
	Question Type: (N		BANK (2078352) LGSOPS0074.06	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

38

ID: 2167158

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions:

• Core axial flux is peaked at notch 24

Ten seconds after selection of an adjacent control rod, a central LPRM detector at the 'C' elevation fails from a reading of 70% to a reading of 6%.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the impact on the APRM ODA Display and on the RBM ODA Channel Output Value?

	APRM ODA Display	RBM ODA Output Value
Α.	Flux indicates Lower than Actual	Lower Than Actual
В.	Flux indicates Lower than Actual	Unchanged
C.	Flux indication is unchanged	Lower Than Actual
D.	Flux indication is unchanged	Unchanged
Answer:	Α	
Answer Ex	planation	

ANSWER (A)	Flux indicates Lower than Actual; Lower Than Actual:	
	If an LPRM detector fails downscale , the affected APRM	
	channel indication is lowered by an amount depending upon	
	the initial LPRM detector reading. The RBM channels will	
	automatically remove any LPRM detector input signal from	
	its local average neutron flux calculation when the input	
	signal from that LPRM detector drops below 3%. This does	
	not affect the LPRM input to the APRMs only the RBM local	
	power calculation. In this case, the output fell to 6% and	
	would be averaged, lowering the RBM output and APRM	
	values.	
DISTRACTOR	Flux indication is unchanged; Unchanged:	
(D)	The candidate may confuse the entry condition to T-101,	
()	"RPV Control", "Scram with power above 4%", with the	
	LPRM downscale setpoint of 3%, as the level at which the	
	LPRM is removed from the RBM local power average.	
	Additionally, the candidate may not recall that only RBMs	
	remove LPRMs from their average and assume that both	
	the APRM and RBM both remove downscale LPRM from	
	their averages.	
DISTRACTOR	Flux indicates Lower than Actual; Unchanged:	
(B)	The candidate may confuse the entry condition to T-101,	
(D)	"RPV Control", "Scram with power above 4%", with the	
	LPRM downscale setpoint of 3%, as the level at which the	
	LPRM is removed from the RBM local power average.	
	Flux indication is unchanged; Lower than actual:	
(C)	The candidate may confuse the entry condition to T-101,	
	"RPV Control", "Scram with power above 4%", with the	
	LPRM downscale setpoint of 3%, as the level at which the	
	LPRM is removed from the RBM local power average.	
	Additionally, the candidate may not recall that it is only	
	RBMs that remove LPRMs from their averages and believe	
	that it is the APRMs that remove downscale LPRMs from	
	their averages.	

Question 38 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167158
User-Defined ID:	Q #38 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of the physical connections/cause-effect relationships between APRMs and LPRMs
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

ments:		
References	None	
K/A Justification		
SRO-Only	N/A	
Justification		
Additional Information	N/A	
	Genera	Data
Level		RO
Tier		2
Group		1
KA # and Rating		215005 K1.04 3.6
KA Statement Cognitive level		Average Power Range Monitor/Local Power Range Monitor Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM and the following: LPRM channels.
Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation
10 CFR 55		41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8
Technical Referer Revision No:		LPRM - UFSAR 7.6.1.4.4.1.1.b APRM - UFSAR 7.6.1.4.5.1.1 RBM - UFSAR 7.7.1.6.2.1.1
Question History: NRC-05)		
Question Type: (N Modified)	lew, Bank,	BANK (995178)
Revision History:		
Training Objective	•	LGSOPS0074A.7

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

39

ID: 2167116

Points: 1.00

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the <u>minimum</u> operating speed limit for the RCIC turbine and the basis for the limit?

	Minimum Speed	Basis
Α.	2200 RPM	Prevent exhaust line oscillations
В.	2200 RPM	Provide adequate lube & control oil pressure
C.	2500 RPM	Prevent exhaust line oscillations
D.	2500 RPM	Provide adequate lube & control oil pressure
Answer:	В	

Answer Explanation

RCIC Min speed is 2200 rpm to ensure proper lube to bearings via shaft attached lube oil pump. Operation of HPCI turbine at speeds less than 2,200 rpm for prolonged periods may cause severe exhaust line oscillations.

ANSWER	2200 RPM, Provide adequate lube & control oil pressure.		
	Correct.		
	As described above.		
DISTRACTOR	2200 RPM, Prevent exhaust line oscillations. Wrong.		
	Plausible to the candidate that confuses RCIC min speed basis with		
	that for HPCI.		
DISTRACTOR	2500 RPM, Provide adequate lube & control oil pressure. Wrong.		
	Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the RCIC Min Speed.		
	and recalls the procedurally directed value for min speed from RCIC		
	test procedures.		
DISTRACTOR 2500 RPM, Prevent exhaust line oscillations. Wrong.			
	Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the RCIC Min Speed and		
	recalls the procedurally directed value for min speed from RCIC test		
	procedures and who confuses RCIC min speed basis with HPCI		

Question 39 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167116			
User-Defined ID:	Q #39 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	RCIC-Ability to expla	in and apply	system limits and precautior	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References	NONE		
	Provided			
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	N/A	N/A	
	Information			
	Level	Genera	RO	
			2	
	Tier			
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		217000 G2.1.323.8	
	KA Statement		Reactor Core Isolation	
			Ability to explain and apply	
			system limits and	
			precautions.	
	Cognitive level		LOW	
			2 - Reactor Water Inventor	
			Control	
	Safety Function		4 - Heat Removal From	
			Reactor Core	
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12	
	Technical Reference with		S49.1.D Rev44	
	Revision No:		349.1.D Rev44	
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS		
	Question Type: (N Modified)	lew, Bank,	BANK (555099)	
	Revision History:			
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0049.13	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

40

ID: 2167155

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 conditions:

- RPV Level: -135" down slow
- RPV Pressure: 600 psig steady
- LOCA signal occurred 15 minutes ago
- HPCI, RCIC and RHR Pumps are not available.
- Core Spray pump discharge pressures
 - o 2A CS pump: 145 psig
 - o 2B CS pump: 127 psig
 - o 2C CS pump: 0 psig
 - o 2D CS pump: 127 psig

Assume no operator action.

Which ADS Division logic, if any, has initiated ADS.

- A. Div 1 only
- B. Div 3 only
- C. Both Div 1 and Div 3
- D. Neither Div 1 nor Div 3

D

Answer:

Answer Explanation

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ADS will automatically initiate upon receiving an initiation signal from either Division 1 or Division 3 logic system.

Division 1 and Division 3 logic systems are divided into logic channels. "A" and "E" for Division 1, and "C" and "G" for Division 3.

Channel "A", Division 1, inputs for automatic initiation:

- High drywell pressure (1.68 psig) or 420 second high drywell pressure bypass timer timed out, and
- Low reactor water level (-129"), and
- Low confirmatory water level (+12.5"), and
- Time delay of 105 seconds, and
- RHR Pump "A" or "C" running (125 psig discharge pressure) or Core Spray Pump "A" running (145 psig discharge pressure)

Channel "E", Division 1, inputs for automatic initiation:

- High drywell pressure (1.68 psig) or 420 second high drywell pressure bypass timer timed out, and
- Low reactor water level (-129"), and
- RHR Pump "A" or "C" running (125 psig discharge pressure) or Core Spray Pump "C" running (145 psig discharge pressure)

When both Division 1 channels "A" and "E" initiation relays are energized, the "A" solenoid for each ADS valve is energized

Channels "C" and "G" of division 3 are similar to Channels "A" and "E" of division 1, with the following exceptions:

- Channel "C" pump running inputs are from RHR pump "B" or "D" or Core Spray Pump "B"
- Channel "G" pump running inputs are from RHR pump "B" or "D" or Core Spray pump "D"

Once both Division 3 channels "C" and "G" initiation relays are energized, the "B" solenoid for each ADS valve is energized.

The conditions given meet all of the condition for both Divisions to initiate with the exception of the required pumps. RHR is not available and there neither the A and C or B and D pump have sufficient discharge pressure (145 psig).

ANSWER	Neither Div 1 or Div 3, Correct As described above. Without proper discharge pressure from either a RHR pump or a Core Spray Loop (both pumps) ADS will not initiate to preserve any HP injection which may be available.
DISTRACTOR	Div 1 only, Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that recognizes the correct pump discharge pressure for the 2A CS pump but doesn't recall that both pump channels in the division must be satisfied to actuate the ADS logic
DISTRACTOR	Div 3 only, Wrong: Plausible to the candidate the misremembers the actuation pressure for CS pumps as 125 psig vs 145 psig. 125 psig is for the RHR Pumps
DISTRACTOR	Both Div 1 and Div 3, Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that misremembers the actuation pressure for Core Spray and that both pumps in a division must actuate for the ADS to initiate

Question 40 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	2167155	
User-Defined ID:	Q #40 NEW	
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	
Topic:	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of CS Pressure has on ADS	
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	

omments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	knowledge of	meets the intent of the KA for a malfunction in the LPCS impacts the ability of ADS to
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratin	ng	218000 K6.02 4.1
	KA Statement		Automatic Depressurization Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction o the following will have on the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM: Low pressure core spray system pressure: Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Functio	n	3 - Reactor Pressure
	10 CFR 55		Control 41.7 / 45.7
	Technical Refe Revision No:	erence with	B21-1060-E
	Question Histo NRC-05)	ory: (i.e. LGS	NEW
	Question Type Modified)		NEW
	Revision Histo		
	Training Object	tive	LGSOPS0050.LO5

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

41

ID: 2167160

Points: 1.00

Consider the following Unit 2 isolation valves:

- HV-49-2F007 RCIC Steam Line Inboard Isolation
- HV-55-2F002 HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation
- HV-41-2F028A 2A Main Steam Line Outboard Isolation

Unit 2 is at 20% power

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the correct sequence for the automatic isolation of these systems due to a lowering RPV/Steam Line pressure?

(Assume no Mode Switch manipulation.)

- A. HV-41-2F028A, HV-49-2F007, HV-55-2F002
- B. HV-55-2F002, HV-49-2F007, HV-41-2F028A
- C. HV-41-2F028A, HV-55-2F002, HV-49-2F007
- D. HV-49-2F007, HV-55-2F002, HV-41-2F028A

Answer:

Answer Explanation

С

 HV-49-2F007 – Unit 2 RCIC Inboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve – Automatically closes when RPV pressure is 64.5 psig. HV-55-2F002 – Unit 2 HPCI Inboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve – Automatically closes when RPV pressure is 100 psig. HV-41-2F028A – Unit 2 A Main Steam Line Outboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve – Automatically closes when RPV pressure is 840 psig with Reactor Mode Switch in RUN. 			
ANSWER	HV-41-2F028A, HV-55-2F002, HV-49-2F007, Correct. As described above MSIV will close first as long as the M/S is in run. Then HPCI and then RCIC		
DISTRACTOR	HV-41-2F028A, HV-49-2F007, HV-55-2F002, Wrong: Plausible to any candidate with a misperception that assumes that RCIC may isolate prior to HPCI because of its relatively small size and therefore relative lack of importance. HPCI plausibly isolates last due to its importance as an ECCS system.		
DISTRACTOR	HV-55-2F002, HV-49-2F007, HV-41-2F028A, Wrong: Plausible misperception that HPCI will isolate first at 100 psig followed by RCIC and MSL would not isolate if the candidate conflated Turbine 1st stage pressure scram with MSL closure isolation as power was less than 29%		
DISTRACTOR	HV-49-2F007, HV-55-2F002, HV-41-2F028A, Wrong: Plausible to any candidate that does not recall the listed system isolation setpoints and assumes that RCIC may isolate first because of its relatively small size and therefore relative lack of importance. MSL plausibly would not isolate if the candidate conflated Turbine 1st stage pressure scram with MSL closure isolation as power was less than 29%		

Question 41 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167160
User-Defined ID:	Q #41 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic: Ability to predict/monitor changes in parameters asso with operating the PCIS: Valve Closures	
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional	N/A	
	Information	11/23	
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		223002 A1.02 3.7
	KA Statement		Primary Containment Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
			SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF SYSTEM controls including: Valve closures.
	Cognitive level		Low
	Safety Function		5 - Containment Integrity
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.5
	Technical Reference Revision No:	ence with	B21-1090E GE Elementary Drawing GP-8.1, Automatic Actuations by Isolation Signals
	Question Histor NRC-05)		
	Question Type: Modified)		BANK (555615)
	Revision History	/:	
	Training Objecti	ve	LGSOPS0072.LO1, LO2, LO4

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

42

ID: 2168419

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 has scrammed from 75% power due to an inadvertent Group I Isolation

- RO is manually controlling RPV pressure with ADS SRVs in the pressure band 900 to 1000 psig
- Drywell pressure is 0.60 psig
- Suppression Pool pressure is 0.30 psig

A 1K SRV Tailpipe Vacuum Breaker fails open

One minute later, the RO cycles the 1K SRV to control pressure.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the expected conditions and corrective action?

	Expected Conditions	Corrective Action	
A.	1.20 psig in Drywell, 1.72 psig in the Suppression Pool	Vent the Drywell per OT-101, Hi Drywell Pressure	
В.	1.20 psig in Drywell, 1.72 psig in the Suppression Pool	Maximize Drywell Cooling per T-102, Pri. Cont. Control when Drywell temp exceeds 145°F	
C.	1.72 psig in Drywell, 0.30 psig in the Suppression Pool	Vent the Drywell per OT-101, Hi Drywell Pressure	
D.	1.72 psig in Drywell, 0.30 psig in the Suppression Pool	Maximize Drywell Cooling per T-102, Pri. Cont. Control when Drywell temp exceeds 145°F	
Answer:	D		
Answer Explanation			

ANSWER (D)	1.72 psig in Drywell, 0.30 psig in the Suppression Pool, Maximize Drywell Cooling when Drywell temp exceeds 145°F. Correct: The SRV Vacuum Breaker is located in the DW just above the DW Floor. Should the vacuum breaker fail to close following its associated SRV actuation, any subsequent reopening of that same SRV will result in steam entering the DW with a subsequent rise in DW pressure. SP pressure will not begin to rise until a 5 psig differential exits between the DW and SP. T-102 is entered at 1.68 psig and 145°F in the DW and directs bypassing and maximizing DW cooling (DW/T-5) and spraying the SP (PC/P-5).
DISTRACTOR (A)	1.20 psig in Drywell, 1.72 psig in the Suppression Pool; Vent the Drywell per OT-101: Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes the Vacuum breaker is in the SP. It is not. Vent the Drywell is plausible to the candidate that recalls that venting is permitted to lower DW pressure per OT-101 if no primary leak is present. With drywell pressure >1.68 psig, this vent path would be isolated.
DISTRACTOR (B)	1.20 psig in Drywell, 1.72 psig in the Supression Pool, Maximize Drywell Cooling when Drywell temp exceeds 145°F. Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes the Vacuum breaker is in the SP. It is not
DISTRACTOR (C)	1.72 psig in Drywell, 0.30 psig in the Supression Pool, Vent the Drywell. Wrong: Vent the Drywell is plausible to the candidate that recalls that venting is permitted to lower DW pressure per OT-101 if no primary leak is present. With drywell pressure >1.68 psig, this vent path would be isolated

Question 42 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2168419
User-Defined ID:	Q #42 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Predict the impacts of stuck open vacuum beakers on SRVs.
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

	ferences ovided	NONE		
	A Justification			
	RO-Only	N/A		
	stification	11/71		
Ad	Iditional	N/A		
Inf	ormation			
		General	Data	
Le	evel		RO	
Ті	ier		2	
G	roup		1	
ĸ	A # and Rating			2.01 3.0
ĸ	A Statement		Safety Re Ability to impacts of the RELI VALVES those pre procedur control, c conseque abnorma	elief Valves (a) predict the of the following on EF/SAFETY and (b) based on edictions, use es to correct, r mitigate the ences of those conditions or s: Stuck open
				or Pressure
Sa	afety Function		Control	
10) CFR 55		41.5 / 45	6
Те	echnical Referenc	e with	OT-101 T-102	REV.039
Q	evision No: uestion History: (i RC-05)		NEW	REV.028
М	uestion Type: (Ne odified)	w, Bank,	NEW	
	evision History:			
Т	raining Objective			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

ID: 2167499

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 4% Reactor power during a startup.

- 2A Rx Feed Pump is operating in Startup Level Control on the LV-C-238A
- The reactor pressure transmitter inputting to Feedwater Level Control fails upscale

What is the response of the 2A RFP speed and reactor level?

	RFP Speed	Rx Level
A.	Rises	Rises
В.	Rises	No Change
C.	No Change	Rises
D.	No Change	No Change
Answer:	В	

Answer Explanatio	n
ANSWER (B)	Rises, No Change; Correct : FWLC operates in either level control mode or D/P mode. When operating in Level mode, the RFPs will respond to level changes by changing speed. More speed= more flow. In D/P mode, the RFP will maintain discharge pressure a constant D/P of approx. 330 psig > reactor pressure. In this question, the Rx pressure input fails high. This would cause the RFP to accelerate to raise discharge pressure. RFP speed is limited by the High speed stop (HSS) but its output pressure would rise dramatically. Level control in this mode is achieved by modulating the LV-C-006-238A level control valve. Changes in discharge pressure from the pump would not cause any change in Rx level.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Rises, Rises; Wrong: Plausible misconception that a rise in RFP speed would lead to a rise in Reactor level due to additional flow. As noted above, the *38A valve would limit flow to the vessel and prevent level change
DISTRACTOR (C)	No Change, Rises; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines that since actual pressure didn't change, the pump speed would not change due to a soft Majority select function similar to level, but believes that the *38A is would open on a rising pressure signal similar to 3 element control to try to limit level dropping
DISTRACTOR (D)	No Change, No Change; Wrong: Plausible misconception that since actual pressure didn't change, the pump speed would not change and therefore the level would not change.

43

Question 43 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167499		
User-Defined ID:	Q #43 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	DFWLCS D/P Mo	ode	
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	l Data
	Level	Genera	RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratir	ıg	259002 K4.11 3.3
	KA Statement		Reactor Water Level Control; Knowledge of REACTOR WATER LEVE CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide fo the following: DP control: Plant-Specific
	Cognitive leve	l	High
	Safety Functio		2 - Rx Water Inventory
	10 CFR 55		41.7
	Technical Refe	erence with	S06.1.D U/2
	Revision No:		Rev. 009
	Question Histo NRC-05)	ory: (i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New
	Revision Histo		
	Training Object	tive	LLOT0550.11A

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

44

ID: 2167757

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 was scrammed 10 minutes ago due to turbine vibration

- Feedwater is controlling level at 32 inches up slow in post scram level control
- T-100, "Scram/Scram Recovery" is being executed

The output of the LIC-006-138, "Startup Level Controller", fails to zero

The following alarm is received:

• 107-D5, FWLCS Trouble

Which of the following is the result of the failure and what procedure actions should be performed?

- A. Reactor level remains as is, respond per S06.1.H, Responding to Alarms and Events at the FWLCS Operator Station", throttle flow with the HV-006-138 block valve
- B. Reactor level lowers, inject to the vessel through the HV-006-120, "RFP Bypass Control Valve" per GP-3, "Plant Shutdown"
- C. Reactor level continues to rise, emergency stop the 1A RFP per S06.1.D, "Post Scram Level Control"
- D. Reactor level lowers, feed through the HV-006-108A, RFP A Discharge valve per S06.1.D, "Post Scram Level Control"
- Answer: D

Answer Explanation

ANSWER (D)	Reactor level lowers, feed through the HV-006-108A, RFP A Discharge valve per S06.1.D, "Post Scram Level Control"; Correct: Given a controller output failure to zero, the Level control valve will close completely and no feedwater will inject. Manual operation of the controller will not work so the only method of putting water into the reactor is through the A RFP Discharge Valve 108A. S06.1.D has direction to place the RFP in service through the associated 108(*) valve.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Reactor level remains as is, respond per S06.1.H, Responding to Alarms and Events at the FWLCS Operator Station", throttle flow with the HV-006-138 block valve; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that on a loss of air, the 138A valve will fail as is for some period of time and assumes that this is the case for a loss of controller signal as well. In this instance, the valve fails closed.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Reactor level lowers, inject to the vessel through the HV-006-120, "RFP Bypass Control Valve" per GP-3, "Plant Shutdown"; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recognizes the valve is closed and believes that using the LVC-120 valve and controller to automatically control level would be appropriate. However, Rx pressure is too high for the LIC-120 controller which only has a rated pressure of 450 psig
DISTRACTOR (C)	Reactor level continues to rise, emergency stop the 1A RFP per S06.1.D, "Post Scram Level Control"; Wrong: Plausible misperception if a candidate associated the action of the LVC-006-138A on a loss of air to FW heater dump valves which fail open. Then, the level rise caused by this transient would require the operator to emergency stop the RFP per S06.1.D. In this case, the valve will fail closed.

Question 44 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167757
User-Defined ID:	Q #44 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	DFWLCS Loss of Control Signal
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	ROHIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating	I	259002 A2.06 3.3
	KA Statement		Reactor Water Level Control; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Loss of controller output signal.
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		2 - Rx Water Inventory
	10 CFR 55		41.5
	Technical Refer Revision No:		S06.1.H Rev. 015 0T-100 Rev. 038 038
	Question Histor NRC-05)	y: (i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: Modified)	• • •	New
	Revision Histor		
	Training Object	ve	LLOT550.06

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

45

ID: 2167235

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, with the following:

- Reactor Enclosure HVAC is aligned normally
- 'A' SGTS Fan is INOP

Unit 1 RE HVAC isolates on High Rad, with the following:

- 'B' SGTS Fan starts
- 'B' SGTS Fan Bypass Damper is stuck closed

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the steady-state Reactor Enclosure d/p, 20 minutes later?

- A. <0.00" to -0.15" H₂O
- B. 0.00" to +0.15" H₂O
- C. -0.25" H₂O, or more <u>negative</u>
- D. +0.25" H₂O, or more <u>positive</u>
- Answer: C

Answer Explana	ation
ANSWER (C)	-0.25" H2O, or more <u>negative</u>: Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) draws suction on RERS downstream of the RERS filters, or directly on the refuel floor, and maintains the zone(s) pressure -0.25" w.c. The SGTS fan flowrate is controlled by the combined modulation of the fan inlet, outlet and bypass dampers. When running, a SGTS fan will be regulated by the bypass damper (PD-C-339A,B) to maintain the zone with the highest static pressure (least negative) at -0.25" w.c. The failed closed bypass damper, 339B, will reduce the amount of air bypassing the SBGT fan, however the inlet and outlet damper will continue to regulate to maintain -0.25" w.c. or better (i.e., more negative).
DISTRACTOR (A)	<0.00" to -0.15" H2O: Plausible misconception that with a bypass damper broken, Standby Gas fans would be unable to maintain D/P at the proper setpoint value of <25: H2O.
DISTRACTOR (B)	0.00" to +0.15" H2O: Plausible misconception that with the failed damper, SGTS would not be able to adequately draw down the Rx Enclosure and D/P would become positive as the air in the RE heated up.
DISTRACTOR (D)	+0.25" H2O, or more <u>positive</u>: Plausible misconception that with a failed damper, pressure in the secondary containment will rise to the point that a blowout panel will actuate and therefore cause a loss of secondary containment as this is what would happen if RE exhaust fans stopped operating while the supply fans continued to add outside air.

Question 45 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167235
User-Defined ID:	Q #45 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	Knowledge of the effect that a loss/ malfunction of SGTS has on Sec Cont D/P
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

ts:		
References Provided	NONE	
K/A Justification		
SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
Additional	N/A	
	Genera	Data
Level		RO
Tier		2
Group		1
KA # and Rating		261000 K3.01 3.3
KA Statement		Standby Gas Treatment Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM will have on the following: Secondary containment and environment differential pressure.
Cognitive level		HIGH
Safety Function		9 - Radioactivity Release
10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.6
Technical Referen Revision No:		M-0076
Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	ILT 17-1 CERT
Question Type: (N Modified)	ew, Bank,	BANK (995075, 2057801)
Revision History:		
Training Objective		LGSOPS0076.4E

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

46

ID: 2167237

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 20% power a during power ascension with the main generator synchronized to the grid.

House Loads have been transferred to the Aux Busses per S91.6.A, TRANSFERRING HOUSE LOADS TO UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER

A Main Turbine trip and Generator lockout occurs.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the status of the Startup Source and the 13.2 KV ASD Supply Breakers following the Generator Lockout?

Answer Exp	lanation	
Answer:	В	
D.	Open	Open
C.	Open	Closed
В.	Closed	Open
A.	Closed	Closed
	10-22 and 20-21 Breakers	13.2 KV ASD Breakers

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Actuating any one of the unit protection lockout relays will initiate the following actions: (1) Trip of the Main Generator output breakers - Isolates fault to or from the main generator (2) Trip of the Alterrex exciter field breaker - Limits internal damage to the Alterrex exciter (3) Trip of the Main Turbine - Prevents main turbine overspeed due to loss of load (4) Trip of the Stator Water Cooling pumps - Limits water input to the main generator stator if a stator bar has ruptured (5) Auxiliary Bus fast transfer – 11, 12 or 21, 22 Busses transfer from the Main Generator to the Start-Up busses - Maintains power to selected vital loads (6) Transfer of the main generator voltage regulator to MANUAL - Prevents voltage regulator damage (7) Trip of the Reactor Recirculation pumps, if powered from the main generator - Minimizes reactor power during the transient (8) Energization of the main generator output breaker failure circuit - To ensure main generator has been isolated from the 220 KV switchyard (9) Trip of the main unit transformer cooling units - No need for cooling of main unit transformer, and/or to protect against a fault in the main unit transformer (10)Trip of the unit auxiliary transformer cooling unit - No need for cooling of unit auxiliary transformer, and/or to protect against a fault in the unit auxiliary transformer ANSWER (B) Closed, Open. Correct. As described above. DISTRACTOR Closed, Closed. Wrong. Is incorrect as the 13.2 KV ASD Breakers trip on a Aux Bus Fast (A) transfer. Plausible to the candidate who confuses the Fast Transfer trip with the RPT EOC trip which would not actuate at 20% power. DISTRACTOR Open, Closed. Wrong. Plausible misconception if a candidate recalls the operation of Unit 1 (C) fast transfer breakers which are reversed on unit 2. On unit 1 the 10-11 would close but the 10-21 would not on U2, Likewise, on U1 the 20-12 will close but not the 20-22. On a turbine trip, the candidate may recall that the EOC function of the RPT breaker is triggered above 29% power and conflate that with the ASD 13.2KV breakers. The 13.2KV ASD breaker will trip on the MG output breaker trip as noted above. DISTRACTOR Open, Open. Wrong Is incorrect since the startup breakers would be closed. Plausible to (D) the candidate who does not recall the fast transfer action on a Generator Trip on Unit 2

Outpation Turn -:				
Question Type:		Multiple Choice		
Status:		Active		
Always select on test?		No		
Authorized for practice?	1.00	No		
Points:	3			
Time to Complete:	0.00			
Difficulty:				
System ID:	2167237			
User-Defined ID:	Q #46 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	Ability to predict and/ AC DIST.	or monitor c	hanges in Breaker lineups in	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:				
	References	NONE		
	Provided			
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	N/A		
	Information			
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		262001 A1.05 3.2	
	KA Statement		AC Electrical Distribution Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups.	
			Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function		Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH 6 - Electrical	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55		Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referent Revision No:		Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH 6 - Electrical	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Reference		Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.5 / 45.5 S91.6.A	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Reference Revision No: Question History:	(i.e. LGS	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.5 / 45.5 S91.6.A	
	KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referent Revision No: Question History: NRC-05) Question Type: (Net State	(i.e. LGS ew, Bank,	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including: Breaker lineups. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.5 / 45.5 S91.6.A E-0001	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

47

ID: 2167240

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- 100% power
- Normal electrical lineup

A 201 Safeguard Bus bus lockout occurs.

Thirty (30) seconds later, WHICH ONE of the following identifies the breaker supplying power to D12 BUS and the breaker supplying power to D22 BUS?

	D12 Bus Supply Breaker	D22 Bus Supply Breaker			
A.	101-D12	D22 DG Output			
В.	101-D12	101-D22			
C.	D12 DG Output	D22 DG Output			
D.	D12 DG Output	101-D22			
Answer:	В				
Answer Exp	Answer Explanation				

ANSWER (B)	101-D12, 101-D22. Correct. The 101 Safeguard Bus normally supplies D11, D13, D22, and D24 Buses The 201 Safeguard Bus normally supplies D12, D14, D21, and D23 Buses
	 During a 201 Safeguard Bus Lockout, the feed breaker (201 Transformer breaker) to the 201 Transformer opens and transformer's voltage drops to <70%. At this point the 201 feed breakers to their respective buses (D12 BUS for the question) trip open. Upon tripping of the 201-D12 feed breaker the 101-D12 feed breaker will close if the following conditions are met: 101-D11 breaker is connected, 201-D11 breaker control switch is RED flagged, D12 BUS voltage<40%, 1 sec T/D, 101 transformer feed voltage >70%, All lockout relays reset, Along with the feeder breaker swap (1 sec) (D12-201 → D12-101) the D12 EDG will start after 0.5 seconds and remain running with its output breaker open in isochronous mode.
	The D22 BUS is originally fed by the 101 Safeguard Bus through the 101-D22 breaker and is therefore not affected by the 201 bus lockout.
DISTRACTOR	101-D12 , D22 DG Output. Wrong:
(A)	Plausible to the candidate who recalls that the D12 BUS is normally fed from the 201 bus and therefore assumes that D22 is as well, and that the 201 bus lockout effects the feed to the D22 BUS, thus allowing for a dead bus start an loading of the D22 DG.
DISTRACTOR	D12 DG Output, D22 DG Output. Wrong.
(C)	Plausible to the candidate who recalls that the D12 BUS is normally fed from the 201 bus and therefore assumes that D22 is as well when it is actually fed from 101, and that EDGs will preferentially load on a dead bus. However, the diesels take 10 seconds to come up to speed and voltage
DISTRACTOR	D12 DG Output, 101-D22, Wrong.
(D)	The candidate who wrongly recalls that the D12 BUS is normally fed from the 101 bus, (as its complement on Unit 2 is) and the 201 bus lockout effects the 101 bus feed to D12 BUS, thus allowing for a dead bus start and loading of the D12 DG.

Question 47 Info Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167240			
User-Defined ID:	Q #47 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	Knowledge of AC Electrical Dist for Bus Lockouts	t design/interlocks which provi		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References None Provided			
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only N/A Justification			
	Additional N/A			
	Information			
	Information	ral Data		
	Information	ral Data RO		
	Information			
	Information Gener Level Tier Group	RO		
	Information Gener Level Tier	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0		
	Information Gener Level Tier Group	RO 2 1		
	Information Gener Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the		
	Information Cener Level Tier Group KA # and Rating	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts.		
	Information Cener Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts. HIGH		
	Generation Generation Level Common Colspan="2">Group KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts. HIGH 6 - Electrical		
	Cener Cener Level Common Component KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.7		
	Generation Generation Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with Revision No: Question History: (i.e. LGS	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.7 E-0001, E-0160 NEW		
	Cener Cener Level Tier Tier Group KA # and Rating KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with Revision No: Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05) Question Type: (New, Bank, Reference, New, Bank,	RO 2 1 262001 K4.01 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following: Bus lockouts. HIGH 6 - Electrical 41.7 E-0001, E-0160 NEW		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

48

ID: 2167275

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 conditions:

- 100% power
- '1A' Reactor Recirc Pump Speed 1354 RPM
- '1B' Reactor Recirc Pump Speed 1355 RPM

The following event then occurred:

- 10Y109 CKT 1, "'1A' ASD Runback Control & Indication", Tripped open.
- The ASD Runback Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) failed such that there is no output power.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the status of the '1A' Reactor Recirc Pump?

- A. Tripped
- B. Running at 28% Speed
- C. Running at 42% Speed
- D. Running at 1354 RPM

В

Answer:

Answer Explanation

From ARC-BOP-100	C160 A1:
AUTOMAT	C ACTIONS:
	ess of AC feed (10Y109 CKT.1), 1A ASD Runback UPS at power will be supplied by the UPS battery.
outp	e battery exhausts (minimum 4 hours) or IF there is a UPS fault that cause ut power to shut down: <u>I</u> the 1A ASD will be supplied by the alternate AC feed (10Y110 CKT. 1).
	e ASD Runback ATS fails such that there is no output power, <u>I</u> the 1A ASD will runback to minimum speed immediately.
ANSWER (B)	Running at 28% speed. Correct: Loss of power to the ASD runback circuitry will result in a 28% speed runback. The ASD UPS provides power to the ASD controller for normal operation. ASD Runback UPS provides power to just the runback circuit, the loss of which would cause a low speed runback.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Tripped. Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that confuses the ASD Runback UPS with the ASD control power ASD. Loss of the ASD UPS would cause a ASD trip.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Running at 42% speed. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that knows that a runback should occur but does not recall which runback occurs.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Running at 1354 RPM. Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that believes that a loss of power to the ASD runback circuitry prevents an automatic runback from occurring since the circuitry has no power or that if this power to the controller, the backup controller will take over.

Question 48 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167275
User-Defined ID:	Q #48 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of the effect that a loss/malfunction of the UPS will have on RRP Speed
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

mments:	References None Provided	
	K/A	
	Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
	Genera	
	Level	RO
	Tier	2
	Group	1
	KA # and Rating	262002 K3.02 2.9
	KA Statement	Uninterruptable Power Supply (AC/DC) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) will have on the following: Recirculation pump speed: Plant-Specific.
	Cognitive level	LOW
	Safety Function	6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with Revision No:	41.7 / 45.4 S43.8.F U/1 Rev 1 ARC-BOP-10C160 A-1 Rev 5 EC 628416 (IR04168043)
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	NEW
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)	NEW
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS043.LO2g

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

49

ID: 2167296

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, with the following alarms:

- 1PPA1/1PPA3 125VDC DIST PANELS UNDERVOLTAGE (ARC-MCR-120, G3)
- REAC. ENCL. STEAM FLOODING DAMPERS PNL 10C245 TROUBLE (ARC-MCR-002, F4)
- REAC. ENCL. STEAM FLOODING DAMPERS PNL 10C234 TROUBLE (ARC-MCR-002, F5)

An EO reports that half of the lights on 10C234 and 10C245 are extinguished.

A steam leak in the RCIC room causes room pressure to rise to 10 inches w.c. above HVAC duct pressure.

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the status of the RCIC room exhaust duct 'A' and 'B' Steam Flooding Dampers (SFD) following the steam leak?

		<u>'A' SFD</u>	'B' SFD
A.		Closed	Closed
В.		Closed	Open
C.		Open	Open
D.		Open	Closed
Answer:	D		

Answer Explana	tion
ANSWER (D)	Open, Closed; Correct: 1PPA1 supplies power to panels 10C234 and 10C245 which in turn power the DC solenoids for the 'A' SFDs. Absence of 1PPA1 power results in the 'A' SFD position indication lights at these panels being extinguished and the inability to trip the 'A' SFDs closed (energize-to-actuate closed) in response to a room pressurization by a steam leak. Div II DC powers the solenoids for the 'B' SFDs; therefore, the 'B' SFDs will trip closed per design.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Closed, Closed; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who either fails to recognize that the 'A' SFDs are Div I DC powered, and/or that the SFDs are energize-to-actuate devices.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Closed, Open; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who incorrectly associates the 'A' SFDs with being Div II DC powered and the 'B' SFDs being Div I DC powered.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Open, Open; Wrong: Plausible for reasons already described.

Question 49 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167296				
User-Defined ID:	Q #49 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Торіс:	annunciator or a		e significance of ea	ich	
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A Justification	None			
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A			
	Additional Information	None			
	Level	General	Data RO		
	Tier		2		
	Group		1		
	KA # and Rati	na	263000 G2.4.45		
	KA Statement		DC Electrical Distribution Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.		
	Cognitive level		High		
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical		
	10 CFR 55		41.7		
	Technical Ref Revision No:		S76.0.A ARC-MCR-122, G4 ARC-MCR-002, F4 ARC-MCR-002, F5	Rev #:	
	Question Hist NRC-05)		2115215		
	Modified)	e: (New, Bank,	BANK		
	Revision Histo			<u></u>	
	Training Obje	cuve	LGSOPS0076A.0	∠∟	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

50

ID: 2167320

Points: 1.00

WHICH ONE of the following describes when starting air is secured to an Emergency Diesel Generator after its starting relay is energized on a successful start?

- A. Starting air pressure drops to 200 psig
- B. Diesel Ready-to-Load (95%) relay energizes
- C. Low Speed Relay energizes at 200 RPM
- D. Ten (10) seconds after start sequence begins

Answer:

Answer Explanation

С

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam

Test ID: 346747

	ng Sequence		
		energizes start relay and cranking time control relay	
		nergizes the air vent and air start solenoids	
c)	Air start valves admit air to air distributors and booster servo motor forcing governor to		
	full fuel position		
d)	Air vent solenoids close		
e)	e) Engine fires and speed increases to greater than 200 rpm when the Low Speed Rela		
	energizes to:		
	 Disarm start and cranking time control relays 		
	2) De-energ	gizes the standby lube oil and jacket water keep warm systems, pre-lube	
	pump, ar	nd D/G space heater	
	3) Initiates	generator field flash	
	4) Enables	voltage regulator and governor remote control circuits unless diesel	
	generato	or automatically started	
		e combustion air temperature control valve	
		auto start of D/G enclosure vent exhaust fan	
		auto start of ESW pump (after time delay)	
f)	At 800 rpm th	he high speed relay energizes performing the following functions:	
		elay relay is energized	
		elay relay is TDC (10 seconds) to enable protective trips and de-energizes	
		iary fuel oil pump	
g)	Unsuccessfu	Il start causes start attempt to be aborted if 200 rpm is not reached within 7	
	seconds		
ANSV	NER (C)	Low Speed Relay energizes at 200 RPM; Correct.	
		At 200 RPM the LSR energizes and disarms the starting logic, securing	
		starting air to the air start system.	
DICT	RACTOR	Starting air processes drang, to 200 pairs Wrangs	
_	RACIOR	Starting air pressure drops to 200 psig; Wrong:	
(A)		Plausible to the candidate that recalls that starting air low pressure	
		LOW alarm occurs at 200 psig and the candidate may assume that air	
		is secured.	
DIST	RACTOR	Diesel Read-to-Load (95%) relay energizes; Wrong: Plausible to the	
	RACIOR		
(B)		candidate that recalls that the "Ready to Load" relay determines that the EDG is up to speed (95%) and therefore is used to secure air from	
		the starting system. In actuality, this relay is used to signal the output	
		breaker that voltage and speed are adequate for breaker closure.	
	RACTOR	Ten (10) seconds after start sequence begins; Wrong: Plausible	
	RACIUR	to the candidate that recalls the 10 second Tech Spec initiation time for	
(D)		the EDG following a LOCA or LOOP. Or who recalls the Start failure	
		alarm contact which will stop the cranking process after 7 seconds if	
		the Low Speed Relay doesn't energize and the Start failure relay is set.	
		The Low Speed Relay doesn't energize and the Start failule feldy is set.	
11			

Question 50 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167320
User-Defined ID:	Q #50 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of physical connections/cause-effect relationships between EDGs and the Starting Sys
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional Information	N/A	
		General	
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		264000 K1.06 3.2
	KA Statement		Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet) EDG Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) and the following: Starting system.
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55 Technical Refere Revision No:	ence with	41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8 ARC-MCR-121 C2 Rev.000 ST-6-092-313-1 Rev.109
	Question History NRC-05)		NEW
	Question Type: Modified)	•	NEW
	Revision History	/:	
	Training Objecti	ve	LGSOPS0092B.LO3, LO4, LO7, LO10

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ID: 2167375

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 Conditions

- ST-6-092-312-2, "D22 Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test Run", is in progress,
- D22 DG Load is 2750 KW
- '0B' RHRSW Pump is tagged out for maintenance

At 0134 a complete LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER occurs.

• D22 DG Load is 950 KW.

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) What is the D22 EDG Frequency Control Mode after the LOOP.

(2) What is the order for starting the '2B' RHR and '0D' RHRSW pumps for suppression pool cooling.

Answer Exp	planation	
Answer:	Α	
D.	Isochronous	Start the '0D' RHRSW pump first then the '2B' RHR pump.
C.	Isochronous	Start the '2B' RHR pump first then the '0D' RHRSW pump
В.	Droop	Start the '0D' RHRSW pump first then the '2B' RHR pump.
Α.	Droop	Start the '2B' RHR pump first then the '0D' RHRSW pump
	<u>(1)</u>	(2)

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The DG was paralleled to the D22 Bus in droop mode to allow frequency control. When the LOOP occurs, the connection to offsite through the normally close 101-D22 breaker will be lost when the 101-D22 Breaker opens on 101 Bus transformer undervoltage. The D22 Bus remains powered from the DG. Since there is no LOCA or Dead Bus Start condition for the DG, it will remain in droop mode supplying D22 Bus.

The RHR pump is the largest load on each of the 4KV safeguard busses. S51.8.A and SE-10 both have procedural guidance to ensure a RHR pump is started with less than 1000 KW being carried by its respective DG to prevent DG overloading. In this case with the DG carrying 950 KW, starting an RHRSW pump first will raise DG over its 1000 KW limit. Thus, the RHR pump must be started first.

S51.8.A/SE-10 Caution:

IF the EDG is carrying the respective Bus,

THEN the EDG load must be below 1000 kW prior to starting an RHR Pump, to prevent loss of the other EDG loads.

Consider removing the following loads as required to obtain less than 1000 kW on the respective Bus:

- Core Spray 480 kW
- RHRSW Pump 557 kW
- ESW Pump 405 kW
- MCR Chiller 329 kW

ANSWER (A)	Droop, Start the '2B' RHR pump first then the '0D' RHRSW pump.
	Correct.
	As described above.
DISTRACTOR	Droop, Start the '0D' RHRSW pump first then the '2B' RHR pump.
(B)	Wrong.
	Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the procedural guidance
	in SE-10 for limiting safeguard bus load to less than 1000KW for
	starting and RHR Pump when supplied by its EDG, but instead only
	considers its max continuous load rating of 2850KW.
DISTRACTOR	Isochronous, Start the '2B' RHR pump first then the '0D' RHRSW
(C)	pump. Wrong.
	Plausible to the candidate that believes that once the LOOP occurs,
	and the DG is carrying the safeguard bus by itself, the DG will switch
	from droop to isochronous to maintain a constant bus frequency as it
	does during a LOCA/Dead Bus Start condition.
DISTRACTOR	Isochronous, Start the '0D' RHRSW pump first then the '2B' RHR
(D)	pump. Wrong.
	Plausible to the candidate that believes that once the LOOP occurs,
	and the DG is carrying the safeguard bus by itself, the DG will switch
	from droop to isochronous to maintain a constant bus frequency as it
	does during a LOCA/Dead Bus Start condition. Plausible to the
	candidate that does not recall the procedural guidance in SE-10 for
	limiting safeguard bus load to less than 1000KW for starting and RHR
	Pump when supplied by its EDG, but instead only considers its max
	continuous load rating of 2850KW.
<u></u>	

Question 51 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167375
User-Defined ID:	Q #51 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Predict impact of Loss of Off Site power with DG full load testing
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:		None	
	Provided		
	K/A		
	Justification	N/A	
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
		N/A	
	Information	N/A	
	mormation		
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating		264000 A2.07 3.5
	KA Statement		Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet) EDG Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET); and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Loss of off-site power during full-load testing.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.6
	Technical Refere Revision No:		E10/20, S51.8.A
	Question History NRC-05)	: (i.e. LGS	NEW
	Question Type: (I Modified)		NEW
	Revision History:		
	Training Objectiv	'e	LGSOPS0092A.LO5A, LGSOPS0092B.LO2, LGSOPS1103.3

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52

ID: 2167321

Points: 1.00

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the location of the breaker that supplies electrical power directly to 2BK101, 2B Instrument Air Compressor?

- A. 224A
- B. 224A-G-F
- C. D244
- D. D244-R-H

Answer: D

Answer Explanation

Refer to 2S15.1.A (COL-2), 2B Instrument Air Compressor Normal Operating Lineup. Page 7 of 7, Step 62 shows <u>Div 4, 480 volt MCC</u> D244-R-H supplying the 2BK101 compressor. Note - Although powered from a Divisional MCC, the compressor is shunt-tripped on a LOCA condition, meaning that the compressor will be load-shed and will not be available until operators "reset" the shunt trip device, then allowing a restart of the compressor (refer to SE-10-1, Breaker Reset Following a LOCA for more detail).

ANSWER (D)	D244-R-H. Correct
	Correct for the reason described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	224A. Wrong. 224A is a non-safeguard 480 volt Load Center (LCC). This choice is plausible to the Examinee who concludes that the 2BK101 air compressor has a motor large enough as to be powered from an LCC and recalls that the Examinee has believed that, he/she then recalls that the Instrument Air Compressors are, themselves, non-safeguard qualified components (a true fact); Incorrect because the compressors are Divisionally powered, as described above.
DISTRACTOR (B)	224A-G-F. Wrong. This is an MCC that is fed from the 224A LCC already described in choice 'A'. Plausible to the Examinee who does recognize that the air compressor motor is small enough to be powered from an MCC, but who nonetheless believes that the MCC is a non-safeguard one for the same reason as already described for choice 'A'.
DISTRACTOR (C)	D244. Wrong. As already described, this is the LCC that powers MCC D244-R-H, but it is not the "location" of the circuit breaker. Plausible to the examinee who correctly recalls that the 2BK101 compressor is a Div 4 load, but who incorrectly recalls the size of its motor (i.e., believing it to be large enough so as to be powered directly from the LCC).

Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167321		
User-Defined ID:	Q #52 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	5	cal power su	pplies to the Instrument air
•	compressors.		
Num Field 1:			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW LO-ILT		
Text Field:			
Comments:	References Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	I Data
	Level	Genera	RO
	Level Tier	Genera	
		Genera	RO 2 1
	Tier	Genera	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement	Genera	RO 2 1
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level	Genera	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor.
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function	Genera	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor. 8 - Plant Service System
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55		RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor.
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical Referent		RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor. 8 - Plant Service System
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55	nce with	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor. 8 - Plant Service System 41.7
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferentRevision No:Question History:NRC-05)Question Type: (NModified)	nce with	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor. 8 - Plant Service System 41.7
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferenceRevision No:Question History:NRC-05)Question Type: (N	nce with a (i.e. LGS New, Bank,	RO 2 1 300000 K2.01 2.8/2.8 Instrument Air Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor. 8 - Plant Service System 41.7 2S15.1.A (COL-4), Rev.6

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53

ID: 2167515

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 conditions as follows


- Reactor Power is 100%
- TECW and RECW pump configuration is depicted below



• RPV level drops to -150"

WHICH ONE of the following shows the status of the TECW and RECW pumps one minute after the level drop? (Assume NO Operator Action)

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- A. A
- B. B
- C. C
- D. D

Answer: B

Answer Explanation

Unit 1 will get a LOCA signal at -129" RPV Level. This will cause the D114, D124, D134, and D144 Load centers to load shed and then reclose after 3 seconds.

The D114-G-D MCC and D124-G-D MCC feeder breakers have an undervoltage trip which will drop out when their respective Load Centers are load shed.

The feeds for D114-G-D MCC and D124-G-D MCC are in the MCR and are reset following a LOCA signal by MCR operators as an immediate operator action. The stem of the question states assume no operator action, and with no operator actions the TECW pumps will remain de-energized with no indicating lights on due to the de-energized MCCs.

The RECW pumps will be de-energized for 3 second as their load centers load shed and then re-energize automatically. The associated pump MCCs do not have undervoltage relays on their feed breakers so they stay closed in. There is an interposing relay on the RECW pump logic that prevents it from restarting automatically when it trips on a LOCA signal. As a result, neither pump will restart.

	P. Correct
ANSWER (B)	B. Correct
	As described above.
DISTRACTOR	A. Wrong
(A)	Plausible to the candidate that does not recognize that the TECW pumps are fed from the D114-G-D and D124-G-D MCCs. Plausible to the candidate that has the misconception that RECW pumps can restart automatically following a LOCA signal.
DISTRACTOR	C. Wrong
(C)	Plausible to the candidate that does not recognize that the TECW pumps are feed from the D114-G-D and D124-G-D MCCs, or that the RECW pumps will not restart on a LOCA, but that the running pumps will start on low pressure.
DISTRACTOR	D. Wrong
(D)	Plausible to the candidate that confuses the logic between the TECW and RECW pumps.

Question 53 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:		Active		
Always select on test?		No		
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167515			
User-Defined ID:	Q #53 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN - EMBEDDED PICTURE			
Topic:	Ability to manual CCW indications		monitor in the control room	
Num Field 1:	LM	und control.		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	Embedded Pi	cture.	
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional Information	N/A		
	mormation			
		General	Data	
	Level	Contra	RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		1	
	KA # and Rating		400000 A4.01 3.1	
	KA Statement		Component Cooling Water Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCW indications and control.	
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Function		8 - Plant Service Systems	
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8	
	Technical Ref	erence with	E-565 Rev 10	
	Revision No:			
	Question Hist NRC-05)		NEW	
	Question Type Modified)	• • •	NEW	
	Revision Histo			
	Training Obje	ctive	LGSOPS0013.LO7A	

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ID: 2168460

Points: 1.00

Performance of surveillance test ST-6-107-760-2, "Control Rod Exercise", is in progress:

- Control rod 18-19 showed the following indication on the 4-Rod Display following a single notch insert : 48, BLANK, - -, BLANK, 46, BLANK, - -, BLANK, 46
- Later during the test MCR Annunciator 108 REACTOR E-4, "RDCS Inoperative", alarmed and RDCS cannot be reset.
- The last performance of ST-6-107-760-2, "Control Rod Exercise", was completed at 1300 on 4/30/21.

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

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- (1) the stroke speed indication on the 4-Rod Display for control rod 18-19?
- (2) the latest this surveillance test can be completed and remain in surveillance?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
Α.	Fast Speed	1300 7/30/21
В.	Fast Speed	1300 8/23/21
C.	Normal Speed	1300 7/30/21
D.	Normal Speed	1300 8/23/21
Answer: B		

Answer Explanation

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Per ST-6-107-760-2

Fast control rod stroke speed is indicated by any of the following:

- The rod appears to be traveling faster than 3 inches per second (Normal is from notch 48 to 46 in about 2 seconds, or from position 46 to 48 in about 1.5 seconds).
- A rod inserts beyond the next odd position on a single notch insert. Normal insert on 4-Rod Display is position "48", a blank " ", then the odd reed switch "- -", then " ", then "46" and " " (as the rod moves up past 46 so it can settle back down to 46) and then back to "46". A fast rod would indicate as follows: "48", " ", "- -", " ", "46", " ", "- -", " ", "46".
- A rod that withdraws to the next position before the settle function begins. A rod should settle, not drive, into the next notch.

From the cover page of ST-6-107-760-2

The test frequency is 92 days. 92 days from the last completion date of 1300 4/30/21 is 1300 7/31/21. However a grace period of 25% of the test frequency is allowed (TS 4.0.2, WC-AA-111) to prevent the test from going out of surveillance. Therefore: 92 days X 1.25 = 115 Days --> 1300 8/23/21

ANSWER (B)	Fast Speed, 1300 8/23/21. Correct. As described above
DISTRACTOR (A)	Fast Speed, 1300 7/31/21. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that believes 92 day frequency on the ST cover page must be met to remain in surveillance.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Normal Speed, 1300 7/31/21. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not recognized an incorrect behavior for a control rod for a single notch insert signal and who believes 92 day frequency on the ST cover page must be met to remain in surveillance.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Normal Speed, 1300 8/23/21. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not recognized an incorrect behavior for a control rod for a single notch insert signal

Question 54 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2168460			
User-Defined ID:	Q #54 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN			
Topic:	Knowledge of sur	veillance proce	dures.	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	ST-6-107-76	0-2 Pages 1-6	
	K/A			
	Justification	N1/A		
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification	N1/A		
	Additional Information	N/A		
		Genera		
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		2	
	KA # and Ratin	Ig	201002 G2.2.12	
	KA Statement		Reactor Manual Control Knowledge of surveillance procedures.	
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Functio		1 - Reactivity Control	
	10 CFR 55		41.10 / 45.13	
	Technical Refe	rence with	WC-AA-111,	
	Revision No:		ST-6-107-760-2	
	Question Histo NRC-05)	ory: (i.e. LGS	NEW	
	Question Type Modified)	: (New, Bank,	NEW	
	Revision Histo	ry:		
	Training Objec		LGSOPS0046	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

55

ID: 2167597

Points: 1.00

LGS Unit 1 is at 100% CTP when a reactor scram occurs.

WHICH ONE of the following is correct when the control rods scram?

Scram water/pressure is provided _____.

- A. by reactor pressure <u>ONLY</u>
- B. by accumulator pressure ONLY
- C. by reactor pressure first and then by accumulator pressure
- D. by accumulator pressure first and then by reactor pressure.

Answer: D

Answer: D	
Answer Explanat	ion
reactor pressure a	is with reactor at pressure, accumulator pressure is initially GT nd initially inserts the rod. Eventually accumulator pressure reactor pressure and then reactor pressure inserts the rod.
ANSWER (D)	by accumulator pressure first and then by reactor pressure. Correct. As described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	by reactor pressure ONLY. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate with a misperception of the function of the ball check valve to check when Rx pressure is greater than accumulator pressure. The check valve operates to check when acc. press. is greater.
DISTRACTOR (B)	by accumulator pressure ONLY. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that recognizes reactor pressure at 100% CTP (1043 psig) to be less than that of accumulator pressure, which is maintained 1050-1150 psig and who does not recall that an internal ball check valve in the CRDM will reposition to port reactor pressure to the underside of the drive piston as Accumulator pressure lowers below Reactor pressure.
DISTRACTOR (C)	by reactor pressure first and then by accumulator pressure. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that considers reactor pressure at 100% CTP (1042 psig) to be greater than that of accumulator pressure, which is maintained 1050-1150 psig. And then expects the internal ball check valve in the CRDM will reposition to port Accumulator pressure to the underside of the drive piston as reactor pressure lowers due to CR insertion.

Question 55 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167597
User-Defined ID:	Q #55 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of CRDM design feature(s) which provide for the use of either accumulator/Reactor Pressure
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

A General Data RO 2 2 2 2 201003 K4.04 3.6 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
General Data RO 2
General Data RO 2
General Data RO 2
General Data RO 2 2 2 2 201003 K4.04 3.6 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
General Data RO 2 2 2 2 201003 K4.04 3.6 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
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201003 K4.04 3.6 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
Control Rod and Drive Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
Mechanism Knowledge of CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM design
feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following: The use of either accumulator or reactor water to SCRAM the control rod.
LOW
1 - Reactivity Control
41.7
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i.e. LGS Columbia 4/2011 #58
w, Bank, BANK(Columbia 4/2011 #58)
LGSOPS0046A.8D
i

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

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ID: 2167603

Points: 1.00

Unit One is operating at 31% power when the Steam Flow input from the DFWLCS to the Rod Worth Minimizer has failed to 16%

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the effect this will have, if any, on the RWM?

The RWM will be operating _____

- A. below the Low Power Set Point, alarms and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are enforced
- B. above the Low Power Alarm Point, alarms and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced
- C. between the Low Power Set Point and Low Power Alarm Point, alarms are active but rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced
- D. between the Low Power Set Point and Low Power Alarm Point, alarms are not active and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced

Answer: C

Answer Explanation		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Below Low Power Setpoint (LPSP) : <15.9% Reactor Power, as sensed by the Total Steam Flow signal from the Digital Feedwater Level Control System (DFWLCS)

- 1. The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) monitors each control rod selection and requested movement.
- 2. It compares the selection and movement called for to a prescribed sequence of control rod movements.
- 3. If the request is not in accordance with the prescribed sequence, control rod blocks will be applied.

a. The control rod block is initiated when the RWM removes the rod motion permissive signal from the Rod Drive Control System (RDCS)

Between LPSP and Low Power Alarm Point (LPAP): (15.9 to 30%)

- 1. The RWM still functions to provide indications (errors) for out of sequence control rods, but will not impose rod sequence control rod blocks. (RWM failures can cause rod blocks)
- 2. This area is known as the transition zone

Above LPAP: >30% Reactor Power, as sensed by the Total Steam Flow signal from the DFWLCS

1. Will no longer display out of sequence control rods (errors) unless the Operator recalls it.

A single steam flow indicator failing will result in a total steam flow signal remaining at 21%. The DFWLCS will remove the faulty indication from the total steam flow calculation and recalculate it as :

%Total Steam Flow = $\frac{\dot{m}_{stm1}\% + \dot{m}_{stm2}\% + \dot{m}_{stm3}\%}{X}$ X 4

ANSWER (C)	between the Low Power Set Point and Low Power Alarm Point, alarms are active but rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced; Correct: As described above with steam flow at 16%, the RWM senses power in the transition region and as described above will provide alarms for mispositioning but not rod blocks.
DISTRACTOR (A)	below the Low Power Set Point, alarms and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are enforced; Wrong: Misconception that 16% steam flow is below the LPSP. The LPSP deactivates at 15.9% rising.
DISTRACTOR (B)	above the Low Power Alarm Point, alarms and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced; Wrong: Plausible since the Unit 1 is operating at 31% power which is above the LPAP.
DISTRACTOR (D)	between the Low Power Set Point and Low Power Alarm Point, alarms are not active and rod blocks due to control rod mispositionings are not enforced; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that recognizes that the LPAP is active but does not recall the function of the LPAP to prepare for LPSP active on a shutdown.

Question 56 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167603
User-Defined ID:	Q #56 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Knowledge of the effect that a loss/ malfunction of steam flow input will have on the RWM
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References	None		
	Provided			
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional Information	N/A		
		General	Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		2	
	KA # and Rating	1	201006 K6.05 2.7	
	KA Statement	Rod Worth Minimizer Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM (RWM) (PLANT		
			SPECIFIC): Steam flow input: P-Spec (Not-BWR6).	
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.7	
	Technical Reference with		GEK-94966C - RWM	
	Revision No:		Operating Manual	
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)		New	
	Question Type: Modified)	(New, Bank,	New	
	Revision History:			
	Training Object		LGSOPS0073B.LO4	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

57

ID: 2167676

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 conditions:

- Reactor Power = 70%
- OPRMs are Operable

1A Reactor Recirc Pump Trips

- Rx Power drops to 50%
- 1B RRP Speed = 990 RPM
- Total Core Flow (FR-043-1R613) indication is 47 mlbm/hr
- Core plate D/P (FR-043-1R613) = 2.25 psid
- P-1 results indicate MFLCPR = 1.001
 - (1) What is actual core flow?
 - (2) What actions are REQUIRED, if any?

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
A.	47 mlbm/hr	No action required
В.	47 mlbm/hr	Insert control rods
C.	50 mlbm/hr	No action required
D.	50 mlbm/hr	Insert control rods
Answer:	D	

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

With the 1A RRP tripped, the core flow subtraction is in effect. Therefore, the indicated total core flow is the operating loop jet pump flow minus the non-operating jet pump flow. The bases of OT-112 states that with RRP speed less than 1000 RPM, core plate D/P be used for determining N/F Map position rather than indicated total core flow. Using core plate D/P and Reactor Power information to plot on the provided N/F Map, it is determined that the P/F point is outside of the restricted region at 50 mlbm and 50% power.

However, MFLCPR at 1.001 is an entry into GP-14 for a thermal limit violation which requires inserting control rods to exit.

ANSWER (D)	50 mlbm/hr, Insert control rods; Correct:
	As described above
DISTRACTOR	47 mlbm/hr, No action required; Wrong:
(A)	Plausible to the candidate that uses the Core Flow Indication for flow rather
	than core plate D/P. Also No action is plausible if the candidate evaluates
	the P/F map and determines that operating point is in the safe zone.
	However, MFLCPR >1.0 requires rod insertion
DISTRACTOR	47 mlbm/hr, Insert control rods; Wrong:
(B)	Plausible to the candidate that uses the Core Flow Indication for flow rather
	than core plate D/P.
DISTRACTOR	50 mlbm/hr, No action required; Wrong:
(C)	Plausible if the candidate evaluates the P/F map and determines that
	operating point is in the safe zone.

Question 57 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167676
User-Defined ID:	Q #57 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN
Торіс:	Ability to predict impacts of a RRP Trip on Recirc Flow Control System, and take action
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

nments:	References OT-112 Atta	chment 4
	K/A	
	Justification	
	SRO-Only N/A	
	Justification	
	Additional N/A	
	Information	
		al Data
	Level	RO
	Tier	2
	Group	2
	KA # and Rating	202002 A2.01 3.4
	KA Statement	Recirculation Flow Control Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based of those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Recirculation pump trip.
	Cognitive level	HIGH
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55	1 - Reactivity Control
	Technical Reference with	41.5 / 45.6 OT-112 Rev. 062
	Revision No:	GP-14 Rev. 002
	Question History: (i.e. LGS	
	NRC-05)	NEW
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)	NEW
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS-043A.LO13

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

58

ID: 2167683

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor power is 95%
- Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) scans are in progress using only '1A' TIP machine.

A Main Turbine trip occurs, resulting in the following:

• RCIC and HPCI automatically start on a valid low RPV level signal.

WHICH ONE of the following describes the expected position of the TIP Shear and Ball Valves for the '1A' TIP Drive two (2) minutes later? (Assume NO operator action)

		<u>Shear Valve</u>	Ball Valve
A.		Open	Open
В.		Open	Closed
C.		Closed	Open
D.		Closed	Closed
Answer:	В		

Answer Explanation

HPCI and RCIC auto start on a -38 inch RPV level signal, which is also an isolation signal for the TIPs. When a containment isolation signal is received and the TIP system is in use, the TIP drive automatically shifts to manual reverse and withdraws the detector to the shield, and the ball valve closes. Only if the drive malfunctions, and the detector cannot be withdrawn, is the shear valve closure manually initiated. The shear valve will cut the TIP cable and seal the penetration.

ANSWER (B)	Open, Close. Correct. As described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Open, Open. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the RCIC and HPCI low RPV level start at -38" is the same RPV level that actuates a TIP isolation.
DISTRACTOR	Closed, Closed. Wrong.
(D)	Plausible misconception that the shear valve is an automatically actuated isolation valve. The shear valve is completely manual and has no automatic action.
DISTRACTOR	Closed, Open. Wrong.
(C)	Plausible to the candidate that does not recall the that the operation of the shear valve is completely manual and has no automatic action and concludes the shear valve and not the ball valve is the normal means of penetration closure in the event of an isolation initiation.

Question 58 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167683
User-Defined ID:	Q #58 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Predict/monitor changes in params associated with operating the TIP controls incl valve status
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:			
	References Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		215001 A1.03 2.6
	KA Statement		Traversing In-Core Probe Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE controls including: Valve status: Mark-I&II (Not-BWR1)
	Cognitive level		LOW
	Safety Function		7 - Instrumentation
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.4
	Technical Reference Revision No:	ce with	S74.0.B GP 8.1 U/1
	Question History: NRC-05)		
	Question Type: (No Modified)	ew, Bank,	BANK(561310)
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0074C.LO6

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

59

ID: 2167697

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 plant cooldown is in progress, with the following:

- Shutdown Cooling (SDC) is in service.
- RPV level is 95 inches
- Trip unit LIS-42-2N680B has been taken to 'TEST' and is reading 35 inches

Then:

• Actual RPV level drops to zero (0) inches.

Five minutes later, WHICH ONE of the following identifies the status of the SDC Suction Inboard Isolation (HV-51-2F009) and Outboard Isolation (HV-51-2F008)?

Answer Ex	Answer Explanation					
Answer:	С					
D.		Open	Open			
C.		Open	Closed			
В.		Closed	Open			
Α.		Closed	Closed			
	<u>HV-</u>	51-2F009 INBOARD	HV-51-2F008 OUTBOARD			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Per GP-8.1, the low reactor level isolation signal A (+12.5 inches RPV level) requires both channels to actuate for the SDC valves to close. A and B (inbd) or C and D (outbd).

GP-8.1, Rev. 14 Page 3 of 61

* * UNIT 2 ONLY * *

A: REACTOR LEVEL 3 - LOW

RESET - R1

(Other Signal: V)

Α

Group IIA - RHR S/D Cooling

EQUIPMENT	NAME	POSITION	CHANNEL	BYPASS
HV-51-2F009	"RHR S/D Clg Suction" (INBD)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-2F008	"RHR S/D Clg Suction" (OUTBD)	Close	C&D	None
HV-51-2F050A(B)	"RHR S/D Clg Rtn Ck" (INBD)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-251A(B)	RHR S/D Clg Rtn Ck Equal" (TEST)	Close	A & B	None
HV-51-2F015A(B)	RHR S/D Clg Rtn" (OUTBD)	Close	C&D	None
. RHR SYSTEM SHU	TDOWN COOLING MODE ISOLATION			
a. Reactor V Low - Lev	essel Water Level el 3	≥ 12.5 i	nches*	
	essel (RHR Cut-in e) Pressure - High	<u>≤</u> 75 psi	g	
ANSWER (C)	Open, Closed. Correct. The candidate determines the lsolation signal setpoint (+12) with "B" Channel instrument trip value, the isolation will or isolation valve.	2.5 inches) a being ventee	nd correctly d and its trip	determines unit set to
DISTRACTOR A)	Closed, Closed. Wrong Plausible to the candidate th valve associations (gets ther the SDC isolation based on I system) with the SDC isolation channel per isolation system	n backwards RPV level (n on based on	s) and confus eed 2 chann	ses the logi els per isol
DISTRACTOR (B)	Closed, Open. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that confuses the inboard and outboard valve associations (gets them backwards).			
DISTRACTOR D)				

Question 59 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:		Active			
Always select on test?		No			
Authorized for practice?		No			
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167697				
User-Defined ID:	Q #59 NEW				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Торіс:	Knowledge of the eff NUCLEAR BOILER				
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:					
	References	NONE			
	Provided				
	K/A Justification				
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification				
	Additional	N/A			
	Information				
		Genera			
	Level		RO		
	Tier		2		
	Group		2		
	KA # and Rating		216000 K3.02 4.		
			Nuclear Boiler		
			Instrumentation		
	KA Statement		Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION will have on following: PCIS/NSSSS.		
	Cognitive level		LOW		
	Safety Function		7 – Instrumentation		
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.4		
		•.•	GP-8.1 U/2		
	Technical Referen	ice with	M-0042 sh 4		
	Revision No:		U2 Tech Spec 3.3.2		
	Question History: NRC-05)		NEW		
	Question Type: (N Modified)		NEW		
	Revision History:				
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0072.7D		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

60

ID: 2168696

Points: 1.00

The following drywell unit cooler fans are in "RUN" and operating on Unit 2:

- 2A1V212
- 2B1V212
- 2C1V212
- 2D1V212
- 2E1V212
- 2F1V212
- 2G1V212
- 2H1V212

All other drywell unit cooler fan switches are in "AUTO".

The D214-R-G MCC feeder breaker trips OPEN.

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the number of running Unit 2 Drywell Unit Cooler fans two (2) minutes later?

- Α. Four (4)
- Β. Six (6)
- C. Eight (8)
- D. Twelve (12)
- Answer:

Answer Explanation

С

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

There are 8 Unit Coolers each having 2 Fans (for a total of 16 fans). Each of the 4 safeguard divisions of electrical power supplies 4 unit cooler fans. The D21 bus (via D214-R-G) powers <u>one</u> fan for each of the following coolers: A, C, E, and G (for a total of 4 fans). There are normally 8 fans running, one for each of the 8 unit coolers, with their switches in RUN. The other 8 fans are aligned with their switches in AUTO

On Unit 2, a low flow condition on a unit cooler, results in the second unit cooler fan starting after a 55 second time delay if that second fan is in AUTO.

A 2 minute delay is given in the stem of the question. This is sufficient time for the 4 fans in AUTO associated with the 4 fans that lost power to start on the low flow condition. Therefore, a total of 8 fans will be running. Four of the running fans will be in RUN and four will be in AUTO.

Power supplies:							
D21 BUS	D22 BUS	D23 BUS		D24 BUS			
Division 1	Division 2	Division 3		Division 3 Division 4		ion 4	
D214-R-G	D224-R-G	D234-R-E	D234-R-H	D244-R-H	D244-R-E		
2A1V212	2B1V212	2A2V212	2C2V212	2D2V212	2B2V212		
2C1V212	2D1V212	2E2V212	2G2V212	2F2V212	2H2V212		
2E1V212	2F1V212						
2G1V212	2H1V212						

ANSWER (C)	8. Correct.		
	As described above.		
DISTRACTOR	4. Wrong		
(A)	A candidate may pick this answer assume that the low flow time delay		
	has not yet been met. Thus only 4 fans will be running.		
DISTRACTOR	6. Wrong.		
(B)	A candidate may pick this answer if they believe that there were		
	originally 2 fans running on each of the 4 divisions, and that the low		
	flow time delay has not yet been met.		
DISTRACTOR	12. Wrong.		
(D)	A candidate may choose this if they know the divisional power supplies		
	for the running fans (Divisions 1 and 2) but they think that on the low		
	flow condition all the fans in AUTO will start automatically.		

Question 60 Info Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2168696			
User-Defined ID:		Q #60 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	_		
Торіс:	cooling fans	cal power su	pplies to the following: Drywe	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	NONE		
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A		
			A	
	Additional Information	N/A		
		N/A Genera	ıl Data	
			RO	
	Information			
	Information Level		RO	
	Information Level Tier		RO 2 2 223001 K2.09 2.7	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement		RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-Specific	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level		RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function		RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW5 - Containment Integrity	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55	Genera	RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen Revision No:	Genera	RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW5 - Containment Integrity	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referen	Genera	RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW5 - Containment Integrity41.7	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referer Revision No: Question History:	Genera Genera	RO2223001 K2.092.7Primary ContainmentSystem and AuxiliariesKnowledge of electricalpower supplies to thefollowing: Drywell coolingfans:Plant-SpecificLOW5 - Containment Integrity41.7	
	Information Level Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Referer Revision No: Question History: NRC-05) Question Type: (N	Genera Genera	RO 2 23001 K2.09 2.7 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Drywell cooling fans: Plant-Specific LOW 5 - Containment Integrity 41.7 E-0476 sheet 1	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

61

ID: 2167756

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 95% power when the following occurs:

- The '1B' throttle pressure transmitter for DEHC fails to an output signal of 1000 psig and remains there
- The Reactor Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN

Reactor pressure is 850 psig and lowering.

WHICH ONE of the following operator actions will terminate this plant transient?

- A. Lower the PRESSURE SET
- B. Press the FULL CLOSE button for the BPV JACK
- C. Raise the LOAD LIMIT setting

D

D. Place the standby and running EHC pump hand switches in Pull To Lock

Answer:

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

A failed-high (to 1000 psig signal) condition for either steam pressure transmitter (selected, or not) causes the pressure regulator to believe that a high pressure exists. The TCVs and the BPVs will open, limited only by the Max Combined Flow Limit. The reactor will rapidly depressurize until a MSIV Group I isolation occurs (840 psig in RUN) and, with it, an automatic scram (on MSIV closure).

The stem conditions indicate that operators have already taken the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN (i.e., have taken the Mode Switch out of RUN, thereby preventing the automatic closure of the MSIVs).

Nonetheless, as also indicated in the stem, reactor pressure will continue to lower until some additional action is taken (short of manually closing the MSIVs to stop all steam flow). Because the turbine trip caused the TCVs to close, they are no longer contributing to the lowering pressure. It's the still-open BPVs that are depressurizing.

ANSWER (D)	Place the standby and running EHC pump hand switches in Pull To Lock. Correct Because the transmitter is failed at a pressure greater than pressure set, the system will continually call for Bypass Valves Open. The only method to close the valves from the provided answers is to trip the pumps. After the BPV accumulator pressure is exhausted (~1 min), the BPVs will close and the transient will end.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Lower PRESSURE SET. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that believes does not recall the function of PRESSURE SET. Lowering the Pressure Setpoint just makes the delta between the failed-high '1B' steam pressure transmitter signal (1000 psig) and the pressure regulator LARGER. Thus, it is still the much SMALLER signal (the delta between the MCFL and the Speed Control Unit signals) that gets through the Bypass Control Unit LVG (<), keeping the BPVs fully open.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Press the FULL CLOSE button for the BPV JACK. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that determines the BPVs are open due to the BPV JACK operation. The normal "Bypass Jack" signal to the Bypass Control Unit HVG (>) is 0%; therefore, pressing the FULL CLOSE button won't change anything.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Raise the LOAD LIMIT setting. Wrong. Plausible to the candidate that believes the LOAD LIMIT is set too low and is thus causing BPVs to remain open. Since the LOAD LIMIT signal only inputs to the Bypass Control Unit LVG (<), raising its setpoint won't accomplish anything.

Question 61 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167756
User-Defined ID:	Q #61 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	Unit 1 DEHC - Operator action to mitigate transient resulting from failed HIGH steam press xmtr
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References N Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
		I/A	
	Justification		
		N/A	
	Information		
	<u> </u>		
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		241000 K5.04 3.3
			Reactor/Turbine Pressure Regulating Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as
	KA Statement		they apply to REACTOR/TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM: Turbine inlet pressure vs. reactor pressure.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		3 - Reactor Pressure Control
	10 CFR 55		41.5 / 45.3
	Technical Reference Revision No:		LGSOPS0031B
	Question History: (i.e NRC-05)		16-1 Q#33
	Question Type: (New Modified)	, Bank,	BANK(1121029, 1151870)
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0031.1A, 1B

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

62

ID: 2167759

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 conditions:

- Reactor power = 38%
- A 2A and 2B RRP are running at 60% speed
- GENERATOR LOAD (amps) = 11,000 amps (35%)
- Load Set is at 105%.

The following occurs:

- '2A' Stator Cooling Water Pump trips (breaker fault).
- '2B' Stator Cooling Water Pump will not start.

12 seconds after the '2A' Stator Cooling Water pump trips, WHAT is the expected plant response (if any)?

- A. 2A RRP running at 60% speed, Load Set is 105%
- B. 2A RRP running at 60% speed, Load Set is running back
- C. 2A RRP running at 42% speed, Load set is 105%
- D. 2A RRP running at 42% speed, Load set is running back

Answer:

Answer Explanation

В

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

The SCW runback is designed to reduce generator load to the "no cooling setpoint" of 21.4% or 7469 amps in 3 minutes. In order to ensure the runback is working properly the circuitry has two checkpoints. One checkpoint at 75% load (26,173 amps) and 2 minutes and another at 21.4% load (7469 amps) in 3 1/2 minutes. If generator load is not reduced below the checkpoint values at the given time then the turbine will be tripped to unload the generator. RRP runbacks only occur is FW flow is >6.7 mlbm/hr after a 9 sec (A) and 18 sec.(B) time delay. ANSWER (B) 2A RRP running at 60% speed. Load Set is running back: Correct: With power below 6.7 mlbm/hr feedwater flow, the RRPs will not runback and will remain at 60%. At 100% Rx power Feed flow is 15.3mlbm/hr. 6.7/15.3 = 43.7% power so Rx power of 38% means a feed flow of ~5.8 mlbm/hr. Therefore RRPs will not runback. Load set will runback as long as Generator Amps are >7469 A. DISTRACTOR 2A RRP running at 60% speed, Load Set is 105%; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that FW flow must be >6.7 (A) mlbm/hr for a runback to occur and who concludes that load set will not runback if FW flow is less than 6.7 mlbm/hr. DISTRACTOR 2A RRP running at 42% speed, Load set is 105%; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that, 9 seconds after a Loss of (C) stator cooling, the A RRP will runback but only if FW flow >6.7 mlbm/hr and who believes that load set will not runback until both RRPs runback which would occur at 18 seconds if power were higher. DISTRACTOR 2A RRP running at 42% speed, Load set is running back; Wrong: (D) Plausible to the candidate who recalls that, 9 seconds after a Loss of stator cooling, the A RRP will runback but only if FW flow >6.7 mlbm/hr

Question 62 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167759		
User-Defined ID:	Q #62 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Effect a loss/malfur	nction of SWC	has on Main Generator
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	NONE	
	K/A Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
	General Data		
	Level		RO
	Tier		2
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		245000 K6.05 3.9
	KA Statement		Main Turbine Generator/Auxiliary Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS: Stator water cooling.
	Cognitive level		HIGH
	Safety Function		4 - Heat Removal From Reactor Core
	10 CFR 55		41.7 / 45.7
	Technical Reference with Revision No:		ON-114
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)		New
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New
	Revision History	/ :	
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0033.3A

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

63

ID: 2167856

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 Conditions:

- Reactor Power = 100% steady state operations
- Unit 1 Hotwell level is 46 inches and steady.



WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) The reason for the CURRENT Condensate Fine Makeup and Reject Valve positions?

(2) how the controller signal demand would change on a trip of the "1A" Condensate Pump?

	(1)	<u>(2)</u>
Α.	Fine Reject valve is gagged open.	Full Reject
В.	Fine Reject valve is gagged open.	Full Makeup
C.	Fine Makeup valve is gagged open.	Full Reject
D.	Fine Makeup valve is gagged open.	Full Makeup
Answer:	А	

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Answer Explanation

The fine control valve is electronically gagged to maintain a constant reject flow rate of 200 gpm.

Both reject valves will close completely:

- Loss of *0-Y106 (loss of valve control power.)
- Loss of instrument air to the valve actuator
- High CST Level
- Low Condensate header pressure.

This constant reject is designed to provide the following loads with the cleanest, lowest oxygen content condensate available.

1) CRD pump suction

2) Condensate pump seal water

3) SJAE and SPE loop seals

4) Mechanical vacuum pump seal water

5) Condenser vacuum breaker seal water

The picture shows the fine reject valve partially open via the top set of dual red/green lights. This show indication of the electronic gagging of the fine reject valve. The bottom set of indicating light show the fine make-up valve also in the mid-position. The Fine controller output signal is sending an open signal to the fine make up valve to restore the 200 gpm lost through the reject line.

When the Condensate pump trips a 42% ASD runback will occur. This will cause an immediate reduction in reactor power due to core voiding. The reactor feed system will react faster than the EHC system due to the rise in RPV level as a result of the core voiding. Feed flow will be reduced. A steam flow feed flow mismatch occurs with steam flow being larger. Hotwell level will rise as more steam is condensed than the feed system needs to maintain RPV level. In response to the rising hotwell level, the condensate fine reject valve will controller signal will go to the full reject open and the fine reject will open fully to maintain hotwell level at its 46 inch setpoint.

ANSWER (A)	Fine Reject valve is gagged open, Full Reject. Correct. As described above.		
DISTRACTOR (B)	Fine Reject valve is gagged open, Full Makeup. Wrong. The candidate does not recognize the impact that the transient will have on the condensate system, and uses the current condition of the controller output to derive an answer.		
DISTRACTOR (C)	Fine Makeup valve is gagged open, Full Reject. Wrong. Plausible to that does not recall which valve is gagged open and looks at the current controller signal position., but recognizes what happen to the condensate system in response to the transient.		
DISTRACTOR (D)	Fine Makeup valve is gagged open, Full Makeup. Wrong. Plausible to that does not recall which valve is gagged open and looks at the current controller signal position and uses the current condition of the controller output to derive an answer for the transient response		

Question 63 Info	Multiple Chains	Multiple Chaine		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?		No		
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167856			
User-Defined ID:	Q #63 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	Ability to manua Hotwell level co		r monitor in the control room:	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References	Embedded p	icture	
	Provided			
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional			
	Information			
		Genera		
	Level		RO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		2	
	KA # and Rating		256000 A4.03 3.2	
	KA Statement		Condensate Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Hotwell level controls.	
	Cognitive level		HIGH	
	Safety Function		2 - Reactor Water Inventor Control	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Reference with Revision No:		41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8	
			ARC-MCR-104 D-2	
	NRC-05)	tory: (i.e. LGS	NEW	
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		NEW	
	Revision Hist	ory:		
	Training Obje		LGSOPS0005.3B	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

64

ID: 2167857

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

A small single pin fuel failure occurs causing a doubling of release rates.

WHICH ONE of the following describes:

(1) The radiation monitoring system response?

(2) Procedure which must be implemented?

- A. (1) A rise in Drywell Post LOCA radiation <u>and</u> Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm
 (2) T-103 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL
- B. (1) A rise in Drywell Post LOCA radiation <u>and</u> Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm
 (2) ON-102 AIR EJECTOR DISCHARGE OR MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH RADIATION
- C. (1) Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm ONLY (2) T-103 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL
- D. (1) Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm ONLY
 (2) ON-102 AIR EJECTOR DISCHARGE OR MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH RADIATION

Answer:

Answer Explanation

D

ANSWER (D)	(1) Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm Only, (2) ON-102 AIR EJECTOR DISCHARGE OR MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH RADIATION; CORRECT: A small fuel failure that causes release rates to rise will cause Air Ejector Offgas Discharge radiation to rise. With a doubling of air ejector rad, the Air Ejector Offgas monitor will alarm. The normal setpoint is 1.5X the background rad levels. A.E. Alarm 109-G2 is an entry into ON-102
DISTRACTOR (A)	(1) A rise in Drywell Post LOCA radiation and Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm, (2) T-103 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL; Wrong: Plausible misconception that a minor fuel failure would cause a rise in DW rad and plausible because MSL high rad is a T-103 entry. Drywell post LOCA radiation will not significantly rise due to small fuel failure. The small amount of gas released in the fuel would rapidly exit through the steam and be measured in the steam lines or offgas system. Post LOCA rad monitors are not sensitive to small gas releases at power. T-103 would not be entered unless Rad levels exceeded the MNO values for the MSLs of 1.5X NFPB.
DISTRACTOR (B)	((1) A rise in Drywell Post LOCA radiation and Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm, (2) ON-102 AIR EJECTOR DISCHARGE OR MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH RADIATION; Wrong: Plausible misconception that a fuel failure would cause a rise in DW rad. Drywell post LOCA radiation will not significantly rise due to small fuel failure. The small amount of gas released in the fuel would rapidly exit through the steam and be measured in the steam lines or offgas system. Post LOCA rad monitors are not sensitive to small gas releases at power.
DISTRACTOR (C)	(1) Air Ejector Offgas Discharge Hi Radiation Alarm Only, (2) T-103 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL; Wrong: Plausible because MSL High Rad is a T-103 entry but not Air Ejector Rad.

Question 64 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167857				
User-Defined ID:		Q #64 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Торіс:	Predict plant res	ponse to Off Gas	Rad Monitor Ala	rm	
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A Justification	None			
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification				
	Additional	None	 ne		
	Information				
		Genera	L Doto		
	Level	Genera	RO		
	Tier		2		
	Group		2		
	KA # and Rati	ng	271000 K1.02 3.1		
	KA Statement		Offgas; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between OFFGAS SYSTEM and the following: Process radiation monitoring system		
	Cognitive leve		High	5111	
	Safety Function		9 - Radioactivity Release		
	10 CFR 55		41.2		
	Technical Ref	erence with	ON-102	Rev 3	
	Question Hist NRC-05)	ory: (i.e. LGS	2057821	<i>n</i> .	
		e: (New, Bank,	Bank		
	Revision Histo	orv:			
	Training Obje				

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

65

ID: 2167855

Points: 1.00

Plant conditions are as follows:

- '0A' Control Enclosure Chiller is running
- '0B' Control Enclosure Chiller is in AUTO, and not running

Unit 1 RPV level drops to -150 inches

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the response of the Control Enclosure Chillers?

	'0A' CHILLER	' <u>0B' CHILLER</u>
A.	Trips and restarts in 51 seconds	Remains off
В.	Trips and restarts in 51 seconds	Starts in 167 seconds
C.	Trips and restarts in 167 seconds	Remains off
D.	Trips and restarts in 167 seconds	Starts in 167 seconds
Answer:	D	
Answer Ex	xplanation	

	ATTACHMENT 2 LOCA LOAD SEQUENCING
Response of 4K	V system to a LOCA (All times in seconds)
$\begin{array}{cccc} t = 0 & & Lo \\ t = 0 & & C \\ t = 3 & & L.0 \\ t = 5 & & A \\ t = 10 & & A \\ t = 15 & & B \\ t = 53 & & ES \\ t = 167 & & Bo \end{array}$	OCA signal - Diesel starts ad shed (Running RHR Pumps will not trip) & D RHR pumps start C. Transformer Breaker closes & B RHR pumps start & C Core Spray pumps start & D Core Spray pumps start & D Core Spray pumps start W pumps start th Control Room chillers start (Unit 1LOCA signal Only) ERS fan that is in AUTO starts
	and Interlocks Chillers Operated from MCR panel 0C681 using handswitch HS90-026A(B) litions, one chiller is running, and the other is in standby
 immediately, and t If an asso Taking the chiller I Lockout amber light After a LOCA sign before the LOCA s the D13/D14 buses 	rol Room Supply fan 0BV116 is started, then the 'B' Chilled water pump starts he 'B' CE Chiller starts after 51 seconds (when the program timer times out). ciated Control Enclosure HVAC fan starts nandswitch on 00C681 to stop will prevent the chiller from AUTO starting (Auto ht illuminates on chiller indicator on 00C681) Total time delay is about 167 second al, both chillers will receive a start signal, regardless of whether they were running signal. The LOCA start signal will be generated immediately after re-energization s. The LOCA start signal energizes another relay with a 116 second time delay. and time delay expires, the chiller program timer starts, and 51 seconds later, the cl
ANSWER (D)	Trips and restarts in 167 seconds, Trips and restarts in 167 seconds Correct: As discussed above, on a LOCA, both chillers start automatical 167 seconds following the LOCA signal unless prevented from starting.
ANSWER (D) DISTRACTOR (A)	Correct: As discussed above, on a LOCA, both chillers start automatical 167 seconds following the LOCA signal unless prevented from starting.
DISTRACTOR	 Correct: As discussed above, on a LOCA, both chillers start automatical 167 seconds following the LOCA signal unless prevented from starting. Trips and restarts in 51 seconds, Remains off; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the normal chiller sequence of starting 51 seconds following a pump start and assumes that the standby chiller will remain off. However, as noted above, the LOCA sequencing starts both chillers in 167 seconds

Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167855		
User-Defined ID:	Q #65 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Describe the res	ponse of the MC	R Chiller on a LOCA signal
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A	None	
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional Information	None	
		General	l Data
	Level	General	Data RO
	Level Tier	General	RO 2
		Genera	RO 2 2
	Tier		RO 2
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement	ng	RO 2 290003 A3.01 3.3 Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve	ng	RO 2 290003 A3.01 3.3 Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	ng	RO222900033.3Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High 9 - Radioactivity Release
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55	ng	RO222900033.3Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High9 - Radioactivity Release 41.7
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio	ng	RO22290003 A3.013.3Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High 9 - Radioactivity Release
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	ng el on erence with	RO222900033.3Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High 9 - Radioactivity Release 41.7 SE-10
	TierGroupKA # and RatiKA # and RatiKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferenceRevision No:Question HistonNRC-05)Question TypeModified)	ng sl on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank,	RO22290003A3.013.3Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High 9 - Radioactivity Release 41.79 - Radioactivity Release 41.7SE-10Rev.065
	Tier Group KA # and Rati KA Statement Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Type	ng el on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	RO 2 290003 A3.01 3.3 Control Room Ventilation: Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration High 9 - Radioactivity Release 41.7 SE-10 Rev.065 E-463, E-164

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

66

ID: 2167821

Points: 1.00

What is the frequency of panel walk downs in accordance with OP-AA-103-102, "Watch-Standing Practices"?

The Unit Operator (RO) is to perform a panel walk down of rad monitors and PPC alarms and indications a minimum of once 1 and a paired walkdown with the Unit Supervisor (CRS) a minimum of once 2.

Answer Exp	planation	
Answer:	В	
D.	per two hours	once per shift
C.	per two hours	every 4 hours
В.	per hour	once per shift
Α.	per hour	every 4 hours
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>

 4.4. <u>MCR Panel and PPC Monitoring</u> 4.4.1. The Unit Reactor Operator shall: PERFORM an hourly walk-down of the unit (including front and back par nuclear instrumentation drawers, radiation monitoring, computer displays PPC alarms, PPC indications, etc.). The Assist Reactor Operator is expite to assist and share this responsibility. A. The hourly control room panel walk downs shall be DOCUMENTE such a manner that evidence exists that it occurred. 	S,
 PERFORM an hourly walk-down of the unit (including front and back par nuclear instrumentation drawers, radiation monitoring, computer displays PPC alarms, PPC indications, etc.). The Assist Reactor Operator is exp to assist and share this responsibility. A. The hourly control room panel walk downs shall be DOCUMENTE 	S,
nuclear instrumentation drawers, radiation monitoring, computer displays PPC alarms, PPC indications, etc.). The Assist Reactor Operator is exp to assist and share this responsibility. A. The hourly control room panel walk downs shall be DOCUMENTE	S,
	ED in
B. Critical parameters shall also be RECORDED .	
4.4.2. The Unit Supervisor shall;	
 PERFORM a MCR panel / PPC walk-down as described above at least of four hours. 	every
 At least once per shift, the Unit Supervisor shall PERFORM a panel walk down of the control panels / PPC with the Unit or Assist Reactor Operator 	k- or.
ANSWER (B) per hour, once per shift; Correct: As noted in the to RO must walkdown the entirety of the MCR including t every hour and perform a paired walkdown with the CF per shift.	the back panels
DISTRACTOR (A)per hour, every 4 hours; Wrong: Plausible to the carecalls the hourly requirement for the RO but confuses for the CRS to perform a walkdown every 4 hours by the the requirement to perform the paired walkdown once	the requirement hemselves with
DISTRACTOR (C)per two hours, every 4 hours; Wrong: Plausible to who fails to recall the requirement for hourly walkdown	
DISTRACTOR (D) per two hours, once per shift; Wrong: Plausible to who fails to recall the requirement for hourly walkdown confuses the requirement for the CRS to perform a wa hours by themselves with the requirement to perform the walkdown once per shift.	ns and who Ikdown every 4

Question 66 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167821			
User-Defined ID:	Q #66 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	Conduct of OPS Panel	Walkdowns		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Non Provided	e		
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only N/A Justification			
	Information			
	mornation			
		General Data		
	Level	RO		
	Tier	3		
	Group			
	KA # and Rating	G 2.1.1 3.8		
	KA Statement	Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements		
	Cognitive level	Low		
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55	41.10		
	Technical Reference			
Revision No:		020		
	Question History: (i.e NRC-05)	e. LGS New		
	Question Type: (New Modified)	, Bank , New		
	Revision History:			
	Training Objective			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

67

ID: 2167818

Points: 1.00

The Unit Supervisor has directed you to perform S44.1.B, "UNISOLATE/STARTUP IDLE RWCU RECIRCULATION PUMP"

WHICH ONE of the following describes the MINIMUM electrical safety precautions required to install jumpers for the low flow trip bypass per step 4.4 in 10-C602 panel (125VDC)?

(Assume no PPE exemptions)

All metal removed, safety glasses worn and what additional PPE, if any, is required?

- A. No additional PPE required
- B. Electrical safety coat and rubber gloves
- C. Long sleeve cotton shirt and rubber gloves
- D. Electrical safety coat, face shield and insulating blanket

Answer: C

Answer Explanation

		ATTACHMENT 1	n Oh a als Duata ati an	
	Electri	cal Safety PPE General Guidelines fo Page 1 of 1	r Shock Protection	
Electrical Protective Clothing Required Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Source: NFPA 70E				
Electrical Work Activity Performed	r To Be	Voltage Rated Gloves (See Note 1 for insulating sleeves)	Required Eye, Face & Head Prote	
Bench Work 50 – 240 Vo AC/DC Less than or = 20) amps	Class 00 for <u>all</u> work on exposed energized equipment.	Safety glasses or goggles. Hard hat and hearing protection, as re Safety and/or leather shoes, as requir	
Normal Work 50 – 240 V 20 amps	olts over	Class 00 for <u>all</u> work on exposed energized equipment.	Safety glasses or goggles. Hard hat and hearing protection, as re Safety and/or leather shoes, as requir	
acet B. W	ate unl IEAR c tachme Long is froi quest	vear any clothing made solely or in combir ess the clothing is labeled Flame Resistan inly clothing materials meeting or exceedir ent 1 and Attachment 4, as applicable. Sleeve cotton shirt and rubber gloves; in SA-AA-129 Attachment 1 PPE guideline ion is to jumper 125VDC contacts, the tab es, hard had as required (N/A in the MCR ge.	t. In the requirements specified Correct: The table above tes. Since the job in all directs the use of safety	
DISTRACTO R (A)		dditional PPE required; Wrong: Plausil not recall the requirements for long sleeve		
DISTRACTO R (B)Electrical safety coat and rubber gloves ; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who mistakenly believes that an electrical safety coat is required for this job. It is only required for higher voltage work with the potential for an ARC flash.				
DISTRACTO R (D)	Plaus insula	rical safety coat, face shield and insula ible to the candidate who mistakenly belie ating blanket are required for this job. Fac red on higher voltage work	eves that a face shield and	

Question 67 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:		0			
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167818				
User-Defined ID:	Q #67 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	CLOSED			
Topic:	Electrical Safety re	equirements			
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A Justification	None			
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification	N/A			
	Additional	None			
	Information				
		Genera			
	Level	Genera	RO		
	Tier	Genera			
		Genera	RO		
	Tier		RO 3 G 2.1.26		
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement	g	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen).	res (such as nent, temperature caustic,	
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level	g	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic,	
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function	g	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic,	
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55	g	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low 41.10	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic,	
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferRevision No:	g n rence with	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic,	
	Tier Group KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer	g n rence with	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low 41.10 SA-AA-129	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic, en and	
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferRevision No:Question Histor	g n rence with ry: (i.e. LGS	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low 41.10 SA-AA-129 Rev.010	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic, en and	
	TierGroupKA # and RatingKA StatementCognitive levelSafety Function10 CFR 55Technical ReferRevision No:Question HistorNRC-05)Question Type:	g rence with ry: (i.e. LGS (New, Bank,	RO 3 G 2.1.26 Knowledge of i safety procedu rotating equipn electrical, high high pressure, chlorine, oxyge hydrogen). Low 41.10 SA-AA-129 Rev.010 LGS 2016 #67	ndustrial res (such as nent, temperature caustic, en and	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

68

ID: 2167817

Points: 1.00

Which ONE of the following types of procedure revisions is a non-permanent procedure change that does not contain a change of intent?

- A. Interim
- B. Temporary
- C. Editorial
- D. Minor

Answer: B

Answer Explanati	on
ANSWER (B)	Temporary; Correct: Per AD-AA-101, rev. 29 The definition of Temporary change. This type of change is a non-permanent procedure change that does not contain a change of intent
DISTRACTOR (A)	Interim; Wrong: Plausible misperception as "Interim Change" is also a non-permanent change: Interim change does contain change of intent
DISTRACTOR (C)	Editorial; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls making or reading editorial changes. This is not actually a type of published "change" per the AD procedure but a classification of the changes to determine the level of review required prior to approval.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Minor; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who doesn't recall the definition of Temporary change and assumes that minor is synonymous with not changing intent. A minor change is just a descriptor of the amount of the change as it appears in the AD-AA-101 procedure. Not an actual category of change.

Question 68 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:					
	0.00				
System ID:	2167817				
User-Defined ID:	Q #68 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Topic:	Procedure Change	Temporary			
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A				
	Justification				
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification				
	Additional N/A		N/A		
		Genera	l Data		
	Level		RO		
	Tier		3		
	Group				
	KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55		G 2.2.06 3.0		
			Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures		
			Low		
			41.10		
	Technical Reference with Revision No:		AD-AA-101 Rev.029		
·	Question Histor NRC-05)	y: (i.e. LGS	QDC 2016 NRC #68		
	Question Type: Modified)	(New, Bank,	Bank		
	Revision History	/:			
	Training Objecti				

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

69

ID: 2167823

Points: 1.00

In accordance with OP-AA-109-101, "Personnel and Equipment Tagout Process"

A Tagout is prepared to perform emergent online maintenance of the 1A Condensate filter/demineralizer system. Only one valve protection is possible to the Condensate system.

How must the Tagout be designated?

- A. Exceptional
- B. Worker Safety
- C. Special Condition
- D. Condition Dependent

А

Answer:

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam

Test ID: 346747

3.17.	accept the risk	agout: A clearance that requires workers to understand, mitigate and s (compliant to 29 CFR 1910.269(d)(6)(v) through 29 CFR)(vii)) associated with:		
		t that does <u>not</u> provide complete conventional isolation and removal rdous energy for the work to be performed		
		ATTACHMENT 2		
		Examples of Exceptional Tagouts		
		Page 1 of 1		
		all-inclusive list. It is incumbent upon the tagout preparer and approver out is exceptional.		
1.	All required isol	lation points <u>cannot</u> be isolated.		
2.	Use of an MOV hang a Tag.	as a boundary isolation point when the hand wheel is inaccessible to		
3.	Use of a contro protection.	I switch as the sole electrical isolation point for personnel or equipment		
4.	Use of inaccess <u>cannot</u> be atta	sible valve hand wheels that <u>cannot</u> be physically verified closed or Tag ched.		
5.		lve isolation WITH a vent or drain path when isolating >500 psig or lving noxious chemicals		
	2001,01110			
	WER (A)	Exceptional; Correct: From OP-AA-109-101 above, an exceptional		
ANS	WER (A)	tagout does not offer complete conventional zone of protection. The example number 5 above is for lack of dual valve isolation with >500 psig system. Condensate, downstream of the Cond. pumps has a pressure of >500 psig at 100% power and higher at low power.		
DISTRACTOR (B)		Worker Safety; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who is less familiar with the process and recalls that Worker Safety Tagging allows workers to apply Tags and Locks close to their work location and therefore monitor it closer. Not appropriate in this case as single valve protection makes this more urgently important for control.		
DIST (C)	RACTOR	Special Condition; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that SCT allows the worker to manipulate components essential to their work. Not appropriate in this case.		
DIST (D)	RACTOR	Condition Dependent; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes that this tagging would provide some protection for their work. It would not in this case as conditions are hazardous to the unprotected worker.		

Question 69 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167823			
User-Defined ID:	Q #69 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	Tagging Procedure	s Exceptional	Clearance	
Num Field 1:	LM	e Exceptional		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References	None		
	Provided			
	K/A			
	Justification			
	SRO-Only N/A			
	Justification			
	Additional N/A			
	Information			
		Genera	Data	
	Level	Genera	RO	
	Tier		3	
			3	
	Group KA # and Rating		G 2.2.13	
			4.1	
	KA Statement Cognitive level		Knowledge of tagging and	
			clearance procedures	
			Low	
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55		41.10	
	Technical Reference with		OP-AA-109-101	
	Revision No:		Rev.016	
	Question History NRC-05)	/: (i.e. LGS	New	
	Question Type: (Modified)	New, Bank,	New	
	Revision History:			
	Training Objectiv			
	Training Objectiv			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

70

ID: 2170263

Points: 1.00

LGS Unit 2 is shutdown for refueling with RPV cooldown in progress.

WHICH ONE of the following events describes the <u>earliest</u> point when Technical Specification OPCON 5 is entered?

- A. Mode Switch in Shutdown <u>AND</u> RPV vessel head removed
- B. Mode Switch in Shutdown AND one RPV vessel head bolt is less than fully tensioned
- C. Mode Switch in Refuel <u>AND</u> RPV coolant temperature ≤200 degrees
- D. Mode Switch in Refuel <u>AND</u> all RPV vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned

Answer: B

Answer Explana	tion
_	
ANSWER (B)	Mode Switch in Shutdown <u>AND</u> one RPV vessel head bolt is less than fully tensioned; Correct: Technical Specifications definitions Table 1.2 defines OPCON 5 as Mode switch position in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL with vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Mode Switch in Shutdown AND RPV vessel head removed; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that this condition would be Mode 5 however it is not the earliest point when that condition is met.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Mode Switch in Refuel <u>AND</u> RPV coolant temperature ≤200 degrees; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that temperature must be cooled down to less than 200°F to refuel the vessel and preferable much less. OPCON 5 is dependent on at least one head bolt being less than fully tensioned.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Mode Switch in Refuel AND all RPV vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that this condition would be Mode 5 however it is not the earliest point when that condition is met.

Question 70 Info	Multiple Chairs				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?		No			
Points:	<u>1.00</u> 6				
Time to Complete:	4.00				
Difficulty:					
System ID:	2170263				
User-Defined ID:	Q #70 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Торіс:	Mode of Operati	on			
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	RO - Low				
Text Field:	ILT				
Comments:	References	None			
	Provided				
	K/A				
	Justification				
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification				
	Additional	N/A			
	Information	Information			
		Genera	l Data		
	Level		RO		
	Tier		3		
	Group				
	KA # and Rating		2.2.35 3.6		
	KA Statement Cognitive level		Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation		
	Cognitive leve	əl	Low		
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55				
	Safety Function	on	Low		
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref	on erence with	Low 41.10 LGS Tech Specs Def. 1.0		
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05)	on erence with	Low 41.10 LGS Tech Specs Def. 1.0 Rev. 149		
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Type Modified) Revision Histe	on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	Low 41.10 LGS Tech Specs Def. 1.0 Rev. 149 980302		
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Type Modified)	on erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	Low 41.10 LGS Tech Specs Def. 1.0 Rev. 149 980302		
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Histon NRC-05) Question Type Modified) Revision Histon Training Object	on Ference with Fory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory: ctive t Control / G2.2.3 o determine Tech	Low 41.10 LGS Tech Specs Def. 1.0 Rev. 149 980302 Bank		

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71

ID: 2167815

Points: 1.00

During a declared emergency, an Equipment Operator (EO) must enter an area of the Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure to locate and isolate a leak.

• The general area radiation level is 3 Rem/hour.

The EO, age 38, has the following radiation history:

- 1760 mRem cumulative exposure for the current year (TEDE)
- 19 Rem lifetime exposure to this date (TEDE)
- No dose extensions have been obtained
- NRC Form 4 completed and on file

The EO has been given 30 minutes to complete the task.

WHICH ONE of the following radiation exposure limits, if any, would be exceeded if the EO performs this task?

- A. No exposure limits would be exceeded
- B. Administrative Dose Control Level
- C. Administrative Dose Control Level <u>AND</u> NRC Exposure Limit
- D. Administrative Dose Control Level, <u>AND</u> NRC Exposure Limit, <u>AND</u> Emergency Exposure Limit
- Answer:

Answer Explanation

В

3 Rem = 3000 ml		
3000 mRem X .5 = 1500 mRem 1500 mRem + 1760 mRem = 3260 mRem		
3260 mRem exce	eeds 2000 mRem TEDE Admin Dose Control Level.	
ANSWER (B)	Administrative Dose Control Level; Correct: As noted in the calculation, the total dose to the individual for the year would be 3260 mrem. This is in excess of the Admin limit of 2000 mrem but less than the NRC limit.	
DISTRACTOR (A)	No exposure limits would be exceeded; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who calculates the dose received on this particular job as 1500 mrem but did not include the workers previous annual exposure to determine the workers total exposure for the year.	
DISTRACTOR (C)	Administrative Dose Control Level <u>AND</u> NRC Exposure Limit; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who miscalculated the total dose or added the workers lifetime exposure into the calculation.	
DISTRACTOR (D)	Administrative Dose Control Level, <u>AND</u> NRC Exposure Limit, <u>AND</u> Emergency Exposure Limit; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who miscalculated the total dose and included the workers lifetime exposure while assuming that a dose in excess of 10 Rem was an emergency exposure.	

Question 71 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	5		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167815		
User-Defined ID:	Q #71 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	Dose Admin Limit		
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A	None	
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional None		
	Information		
		General	
	Level		RO
	Tier		3
	Group		
	KA # and Dating		G 2.3.4
	KA # and Rating		3.2
			Knowledge of radiation
	KA Statement		exposure limits under
	RA Statement		normal or emergency
			conditions
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		-
	10 CFR 55		41.12
	Technical Refer	ence with	RP-AA-203
	Revision No:		Rev.006
	Question Histor	v: (i.e. LGS	
	NRC-05)		738395
	Question Type:	(New, Bank	
	Modified)	(, Danity	Bank
	Revision History	/:	
		-	
	Training Objecti	VA	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

72

ID: 2167795

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 plant conditions are as follows:

- Reactor power is 100%
- TIPS are in operation per S74.0.A, "Operation of Traversing In-Core Probe System," to support APRM calibrations
- The Reactor Enclosure Equipment Operator reports that workers are on the TIP Room roof.

WHICH ONE of the following shall be immediately performed?

- A. Direct Security to enter area and evacuate workers
- B. Immediately withdraw TIPS into shields, Inform Shift Supervision
- C. Direct Equipment Operator to enter posted area and evacuate workers
- D. Stop operation of TIP mechanisms, Inform Shift Supervision

Answer:

Answer Explanation

D

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

With the conditions stated, either the required postings and Announcements per S74.0.A, Steps 4.2 and 4.3, have not been completed, or personnel have violated a posted radiation boundary. S74.0.A, Step 4.3 PA announcement, is as follows:

• "Unit 1(2) TIPS will be (are) in operation. Please stay clear of the TIP room, the TIP room roof, and affected areas."

Action to stop operation of the TIP mechanisms prevents moving the irradiated TIP detectors from their shields and from In-Core through the area that would result in a higher dose to the workers on the TIP Room roof. Area postings and periodic PA announcements are consistent with RP-LG-301-2001, Attachment 9, "TIP Run Coverage and Posting," and RP-AB-460, "TIP Area Access Radiological Controls

ANSWER (D)	Stop operation of TIP mechanisms, Inform Shift Supervision; Correct: As noted above, when personnel are discovered in a compromised location, Stopping TIP movements is the best action to prevent exposing them to the TIP probe radiation as it exits the core prior to reaching the shield.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Direct Security to enter area and evacuate workers; Wrong: Plausible if the candidate who does not recognize that this action would violate a posted Radiation Boundary and lead to potential uncontrolled dose of the Security personnel
DISTRACTOR (B)	Immediately withdraw TIPS into shields, Inform Shift Supervision; Wrong: Plausible if the applicant believes that moving the irradiated TIP detector from In-Core through the TIP Room to the chamber shields would not raise dose rate in the vicinity of the workers on the TIP Room roof. This is incorrect.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Direct Equipment Operator to enter posted area and evacuate workers; Wrong: Plausible if the applicant does not recognize that this action would violate a posted Radiation Boundary and lead to potential uncontrolled dose to additional operators

Question 72 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167795
User-Defined ID:	Q #72 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	TIPS Rad Issues
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification K/A		er 3 question as described in While the situation used for the ribes work near the TIP room, n tests generic plant nts for Radiation hazards.	
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	Â	
	Additional Information	N/A		
		Genera	I Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		3	
	Group			
	KA # and Ratir	ng	G 2.3.14 3.4	
	KA Statement Cognitive level		Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities	
			Low	
	Safety Functio			
	10 CFR 55		41.12	
	Technical Refe Revision No:	erence with	S74.0.A Rev. 061 RP-AA-460 Rev. 038 RP-LG-301-2001 Rev.028	
	Question Histo NRC-05)	ory: (i.e. LGS	LGS NRC 2012 #72	
	Question Type Modified)	: (New, Bank,	Bank	
	Revision Histo	ory:		
	Training Object			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

73

ID: 2167714

Points: 1.00

Which one of the following conditions describes when the Reactor is in a DEPRESSURIZED state per T-112 requirements?

	RPV Pressure	Suppression Pool Pressure
Α.	110 psig	15 psig
В.	95 psig	20 psig
C.	74 psig	32 psig
D.	65 psig	10 psig
Answer:	С	
Answer Exp	blanation	

	\wedge
	PPV press (YES)
	< 50 psig above Supp Pool
	press
	EB-8
DISCUSSION	
suppresision pool the use of alternat	cision diamond that has operators evaluate the current status of RPV-to- differential pressure. This information must be known to determine whether e RPV depressurization systems will be required to depressurize and in a "depressurized" state.
	s used in T-112 is an RPV to suppression chamber differential pressure less eat Removal Pressure (DHRP) (50 psig). The DHRP is used as the basis for state since:
	definition, is equal to or greater than the lowest pressure at which an SRV will and remain fully open when its control switch is placed in the "OPEN"
	AND
	differential, the rate of energy addition to the primary containment will be
within the	capacity of the primary containment vent path.
ANSWER (C)	74 psig, 32 psig; Correct: As noted above in the basis, Rx is depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid.
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls
	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig.
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor
DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to
DISTRACTOR (A)	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig.
DISTRACTOR (A) DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to
DISTRACTOR (A) DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to
DISTRACTOR (A) DISTRACTOR (B) DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to allow for continued injection as long as possible. 95 psig, 20 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who assumes that <100 psig in the vessel is depressurized based on simulator experience where pressure less than 100 psig is when operators are told to prepare for SRV closure and level perturbations. 65 psig, 10 psig Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the
DISTRACTOR (A) DISTRACTOR (B)	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to allow for continued injection as long as possible. 95 psig, 20 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who assumes that <100 psig in the vessel is depressurized based on simulator experience where pressure less than 100 psig is when operators are
DISTRACTOR (A) DISTRACTOR (B) DISTRACTOR	depressurized when PSID between the Reactor and the Suppression Pool is < 50 psid. 110 psig, 15 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that when using RCIC for injection in T-111, if Emergency depressurization is directed, pressure is lowered to 150-300 psig. Therefore, 110 psig could be assumed to be depressurized. This however does not meet the intent of the T-112 trip step to get reactor energy as low as possible. The direction in T-111 is an interim step to allow for continued injection as long as possible. 95 psig, 20 psig; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who assumes that <100 psig in the vessel is depressurized based on simulator experience where pressure less than 100 psig is when operators are told to prepare for SRV closure and level perturbations. 65 psig, 10 psig Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the

Question 73 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167714			
User-Defined ID:	Q #73 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Торіс:	EOP Depressurized	d		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification			
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A		
	Additional	Additional N/A		
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		RO	
	Tier		3	
	Group			
	KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level		G2.4.17 3.9	
			Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.	
			Low	
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55		41.10	
	Technical Reference with Revision No:			
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)		T-117 Rev 023 TSG 3.10 Boy 002	
	Rev.002 Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)			
	Revision History:		New	
	Training Objectiv			

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74

ID: 2167675

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is at 100% power Unit 2 is shut down for refueling in OPCON 5

Which ONE of the choices below completes the following statements concerning fire brigade staffing?

- 1. IAW, OP-LG-101-111, Shift Staffing Requirements, a MINIMUM of ______ Fire Brigade Members must be onsite to respond to this fire.
- 2. The outside operator, while performing normal duties, _____ be assigned as a member of the Fire Brigade
 - A. 1.5
 - 2. May
 - B. 1. 5 2. May Not
 - C. 1. 6 2. May
 - D. 1. 6 2. May Not

Answer: B

Answer Explanation	1
ANSWER (B)	1. 5, 2. May Not; Correct: The number of Fire Brigade members is 5 per TS. 6.2.2 and per OP-LG-101-111, Shift Staffing Requirements. Per the OP-LG-101-111 procedure Att. 4 step 1, Fire Brigade member Shall <u>not</u> be assigned to routine activities outside the site protected area boundary.
DISTRACTOR (A)	1.5, 2. May; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls 5 is the correct staffing number but assumes that the Outside operator may be on the fire brigade since they could be a fire safe shutdown operator.
DISTRACTOR (C)	1. 6, 2. May; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who confuses the FSSD number which is 6 with the FB number of 5 and who assumes that the Outside operator may be on the fire brigade since they could be a fire safe shutdown operator.
DISTRACTOR (D)	1. 6, 2. May Not; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who confuses the required number of FSSD members (6) with minimum fire Brigade staffing(5)

Question 74 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167675		
User-Defined ID:	Q #74 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	Fire Protection Rec	quirements	
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT	L.	
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	
	Level		RO
	Tier		3
	Group		
	KA # and Rating]	G2.4.26 3.1
			Knowledge of facility
	KA Statement		protection requirements,
	KA Statement		including fire brigade and
			portable fire fighting
	Cognitive level		equipment usage
	Safety Function		8 - Plant Services
	10 CFR 55		41.10
	Technical Refer	ence with	OP-LG-101-111
	Revision No:		Rev.008
	Question Histor	v: (i.e. I GS	
	NRC-05)	J. (10) 200	New
	Question Type:	(New, Bank.	
	Modified)		New
		v:	
			LGSOPS1574.04A
	Revision History Training Objecti		LGSOPS1574.04A

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75

ID: 2167602

Points: 1.00

An ALERT Emergency Action Level has been declared.

The Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility are NOT activated.

Per EP-MA-114-100, "Mid Atlantic State/Local Notifications", which one of the following communications methods is used to make State and Local Initial notifications if EONS system is NOT available?

- A. NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System
- B. ENS Emergency Notification System
- C. ERDS Emergency Response Data System
- D. EPDS Emergency Preparedness Data System

Answer:

Answer Explanation

А

ANSWER (A)	NARS - Nuclear Accident Reporting System; Correct: The normal system for making state and local notifications has recently been transferred to EONS which is a computerized system to directly transmit emergency declarations without a human interaction. The question stem states that EONS is not available. Therefore NARS is the backup method for state and local notifications. This is a manual system requiring the communicator to transmit the form and read it to the responding agencies.
DISTRACTOR (B)	ENS; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who fails to recall the definition of ENS. Emergency Notification System (ENS), is a telecommunications network and worksheet used to transmit information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
DISTRACTOR (C)	ERDS - Emergency Response Data System; Wrong : Plausible to the candidate who fails to recall the function of ERDS. This is a computer system to provide real time info to the NRC on plant status fed from LGS PPC. From EP-AA-110: <i>Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is a direct near real-time electronic data link between the onsite computer system and the NRC Headquarters Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters</i>
DISTRACTOR (D)	EPDS; Wrong; Plausible to the candidate who fails to recall the function of EPDS. This is a computer system to provide real time info to the TSC and EOF on plant status fed from LGS PPC. From EP-AA-110: Emergency Preparedness Data System (EPDS) is an Mid-Atlantic emergency facility data system used to aid in assessing plant response and status during emergencies. EPDS is a computer based real-time data acquisition and display system, which acquires, stores and re-packages data from the Plant Monitoring System (PMS) and Radiological Monitoring System (RMS) for display in the Technical Support Center (TSC) at Limerick and Peach Bottom Stations and the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at the Coatesville, Pennsylvania, Service Center

Question 75 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2167602		
User-Defined ID:	Q #75 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	EP Communication	ns Systems	
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	RO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		General	Data
	Level		RO
	Tier		3
	Group		
	KA # and Rating	l	G2.4.43 3.2
	KA Statement		Knowledge of emergency communication systems and techniques
	Cognitive level		Low
	Safety Function		
	10 CFR 55		41.10
	Technical Refer	ence with	EP-MA-114-100
	Revision No:		Rev.027
	Question Histor	y: (i.e. LGS	New
	NRC-05)		
	Question Type: Modified)	(New, Bank,	New
	Revision History	/:	
	Training Objecti		EP
		VC	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

76

ID: 2164016

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is operating at 90% power.

Multiple cell failures on the '2A' ASD results in the following Recirc indications:

- '2A' Recirc Loop Flow is 28 Mlbm/hr
- '2B' Recirc Loop Flow is 42 Mlbm/hr
- Core Flow is 70 Mlbm/hr

WHICH ONE of the following identifies (1) the <u>HIGHEST</u> '2B' Recirc flow value that will satisfy Tech Specs and (2) the Basis for the Tech Spec Recirc flow mismatch limitations? (Assume 'A' flows remain constant)

	HIGHEST '2B' Recirc flow value that will satisfy Tech Specs	Basis for Tech Spec Recirc flow mismatch limitations
A.	32.5 Mlbm/hr	Prevents undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region
В.	32.5 Mlbm/hr	Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirc loop following a LOCA
C.	37.5 Mlbm/hr	Prevents undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region
D.	37.5 Mlbm/hr	Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirc loop following a LOCA
Answer:	D	
Answer	Explanation	

ANSWER (D)	37.5 MIbm/hr, Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either <u>recirc loop following a LOCA</u> ; Correct: Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.1.3 action a, which states "Recirculation loop flow mismatch shall be maintained: a. Within 5% of each other with core flow greater than or equal to 70% of rated core flow, or b . within 10% of each other with core flow less than 70% of rated core flow. From the daily ST, ST-6-107-590-2, Note 1 on page 85, (Rev. 134) states "If core flow < 70%, THEN VERIFY DIFFERENCE ≤ 10 MIbm/hr OR IF ≥ 70%, THEN VERIFY DIFFERENCE ≤ 5MIbm/hr. Therefore, when 'B' Recirc flow is reduced to 37.5 MIbm/hr, total core flow will be less than 70% and the 10 MIbm/hr flow mismatch requirement will be met.
DISTRACTO R (A)	32.5 Mlbm/hr, Prevents undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom <u>head region;</u> Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines the requirement as 5% mismatch because they don't consider that when Loop B flow is reduced, the core flow will be less than 70% and therefore 10% mismatch applies and who recalls the basis for recirc loop temperature difference prior to a start of an idle recirc pump rather than flow mismatch
DISTRACTO R (B)	32.5 Mlbm/hr, Ensure an adequate core flow cooldown from either recirc loop following a LOCA; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines the requirement as 5% mismatch because they don't consider that when Loop B flow is reduced, the core flow will be less than 70% and therefore 10% mismatch applies
DISTRACTO R (C)	37.5 Mlbm/hr, Prevents undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the basis for recirc loop temperature difference prior to a start of an idle recirc pump rather than flow mismatch

Question 76 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164016		
User-Defined ID:	Q #76 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	(SRO) Recall Tech Spec 3.4.1.3 SR requirements for Recirc Flow mismatch		
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	SRO - HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	None	
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A	
	Additional Information		
		Genera	l Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		1
	Group		1
	KA # and Rating KA Statement		295001 G 2.2.25 4.2
	KA Statement		of Forced Core Flow Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting
	KA Statement Cognitive level		Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operation an
		1	of Forced Core Flow Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operation an safety limits (SRO Only)
	Cognitive level	1	of Forced Core Flow Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operation an safety limits (SRO Only) High
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer		of Forced Core FlowCirculation: Knowledge ofthe bases in technicalspecifications for limitingconditions for operation ansafety limits (SRO Only)High1 - Reactivity43.2OT-112Rev. 062
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer Revision No: Question Histor NRC-05)	rence with ry: (i.e. LGS	of Forced Core Flow Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operation an safety limits (SRO Only) High 1 - Reactivity 43.2
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer Revision No: Question Histor NRC-05) Question Type: Modified)	rence with ry: (i.e. LGS (New, Bank,	of Forced Core FlowCirculation: Knowledge ofthe bases in technicalspecifications for limitingconditions for operation ansafety limits (SRO Only)High1 - Reactivity43.2OT-112Rev. 062
	Cognitive level Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refer Revision No: Question Histor NRC-05) Question Type:	rence with ry: (i.e. LGS (New, Bank, 'y:	of Forced Core Flow Circulation: Knowledge of the bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operation an safety limits (SRO Only) High 1 - Reactivity 43.2 OT-112 Rev. 062 T.S. 3.4.1.3 Rev 186

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

77

ID: 2164203

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

An Instrument Air header in the Turbine Building ruptures, resulting in a complete loss of Instrument Air. A GP-4 Rapid Plant Shutdown has been performed and the following conditions now exist:

- All control rods are fully inserted
- MSIVs are closed
- RPV level is being maintained +12.5 inches to +54 inches with RCIC
- RPV pressure is being maintained 800-1000 psig with HPCI
- Drywell pressure is 0.58 psig and slowly rising
- Recirc pumps have been tripped

With the plant stabilized the CRS has transitioned to T-100, "Scram /Scram Recovery."

WHICH ONE of the following actions describes the appropriate Operator response based on the above conditions?

- A. Secure CRD flow to the RPV per S46.7.A, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Operation Following Reactor Scram"
- B. Vent the Drywell per OT-101, "High Drywell Pressure"
- C. Maximize RPV bottom head drain flow through the Filter Demins per S44.1.J, "RWCU Hot Shutdown Operation"
- D. Place RECW in service to cool the Drywell per S13.6.D, "RECW Operation With Loss Of Drywell Chilled Water"

Answer:

Answer Explanation

А

ANSWER (A)	Secure CRD flow to the RPV per S46.7.A, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Operation Following Reactor Scram"; Correct: Step RC/P-10 of T-100, directs alternative actions to prevent thermal stratification of coolant in the RPV on the basis of "NO" responses to RC/P-8 and RC/P-9 (no Recirc pumps running and the RWCU System not in service). On a Complete Loss of Instrument Air, RWCU will trip on low flow when the Filter Demin flow control valves fail closed. With both Recirc pumps tripped and RWCU unavailable, the required action, in accordance with Step RC/P-10, is to secure CRD pump flow to the RPV using S46.7.A. The CRD pumps are a source of cold water that could cause thermal stratification of coolant in the RPV. Since the CRD pumps are not needed for control rod insertion or RPV level control, CRD pump flow is secured. This action is also important from the standpoint that CRD charging water will continue to flow into the RPV through the "Inlet Scram Valves," even after the Scram is reset, because there is no air to close the valves.
DISTRACTOR	Vent the Drywell per OT-101, "High Drywell Pressure"; Wrong:
(B)	Plausible: Loss of Instrument Air results in a loss of the Drywell Chilled Water System (causes Drywell temperature and pressure to rise). Plausible if the applicant does not recall or is unfamiliar with the procedural guidance provided in the "ON-119 Attachment," which states that Containment cannot be vented with a Loss of Instrument Air. OT-101, "High Drywell Pressure," directs the use of HV-57-*17, "Drywell Purge To Equipment Compt Exh Outbd PCIV," to vent containment. This is an air-operated valve, the normal position of which is closed. On a Loss of Instrument Air, HV-57-*17 will remain in the closed "Fail Safe" position.
DISTRACTOR	Maximize RPV bottom head drain flow through the Filter Demins per
(C)	S44.1.J, "RWCU Hot Shutdown Operation"; Wrong: Plausible if the applicant does not recall that on a Complete Loss of Instrument Air, RWCU will trip on low flow when the Filter Demin flow control valves fail closed. Step RC/P-12 of T-100, directs maximization of RPV bottom head drain flow (per S44.1.J) assuming a "YES" response to RC/P-9 (RWCU System in service).
DISTRACTOR	Place RECW in service to cool the Drywell per S13.6.D, "RECW
(D)	Operation With Loss Of Drywell Chilled Water"; Wrong: Plausible, Loss of Instrument Air results in a loss of the Drywell Chilled Water System (causes Drywell temperature and pressure to rise). Plausible if the applicant does not understand that "RECW to Drywell Cooling Primary Containment Isolation Valves" HV87-*24a, *24B, *25A, and *25B are no longer automatic PCIVs that can be opened in OPCONs 1, 2, or 3 without violating primary containment integrity (TS 3.6.1.1). The RECW System provides backup cooling to the Drywell portion of the Drywell Chilled Water System (DCWS) during a LOOP or failure of the DCWS. Placing RECW in service to cool the Drywell per S13.6.D would be a viable option in OPCONs 4 and 5 only (stem conditions indicate that the Unit is in OPCON 3).

Question 77 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	0				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2164203				
User-Defined ID:	Q #77 BANK PF	REVIOUS 17-1			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Торіс:	SRO ONLY - ON-1	19 operation re	esponse to loss of IA		
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A Justification	None			
	SRO-Only Justification	N/A			
	Additional	None			
	Information				
		Genera			
	Level		SRO		
	Tier		1		
	Group		1 295019 AA2.02 (3.6/3.7		
	KA # and Rating	KA # and Rating			
	KA Statement		Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply t PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR: Status of safety-related instrument air system loads (see AK2.1 – AK2.19)		
	Cognitive level		High		
	Safety Function		8 Plant Service System		
	10 CFR 55		43(b)(5)		
	Technical Refere Revision No:		T-100 Rev. 019		
	Question History NRC-05)	y: (i.e. LGS	NRC 17-1		
	Question Type: Modified)	(New, Bank,	Bank 2061686		
	Revision History	/:			
	Training Objecti		LGSOPS0015.07		

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78

ID: 2163797

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

The plant is in day 8 of a refueling outage

- Reactor coolant temperature is 105°F and stable
- Cavity water level is 490"
- Secondary containment is cross tied with the SGD 76-206-3 open
- Core shuffle is in progress

A spent fuel assembly has been dropped in the Spent Fuel Pool

- A secondary containment isolation has occurred with a start of both standby gas fans
- ON-121 is entered

Refuel Floor rad monitors read as follows:

- RIS29-M1-1K600 183 mR/hr up slow
- RIS30-M1-1K600 241 mR/hr up slow
- RIS31-M1-1K600 1,053 mR/hr up slow
- RIS32-M1-1K600 527 mR/hr up slow
- RIS33-M1-1K600 334 mR/hr up slow

Given: T-122 - "Containment and Radioactivity Release Control – OPCON 4" T-132 - "Containment and Radioactivity Release Control – OPCON 5"

Which one of the following describes the EOP which should be entered and emergency plan action level threshold met?

Answer Explanati	on	
Answer: C		
D.	T-132	RU2
С.	T-132	RA2
В.	T-122	RU2
А.	T-122	RA2
	EOP	EAL


A	LERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
RA2 Significant lowering level above, or dam	of water 12345 D age to, irradiated fuel.	RU2 Unplanned loss of water level 12345 D above irradiated fuel.		
Emergency Action Level (Emergency Action Level (EAL):		
PATHWAY.	ed fuel in the REFUELING	1. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by:		
OR 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R2 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mR/hr.		Refueling Cavity water level < 484 inches. OR Spent Fuel Pool level < 22 ft. above seated irradiated fuel. OR		
OR 3. Lowering of spent f indicated on LI-053	uel pool level to 10.20 ft. as :200A(B).	Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. AND UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise		
		on ANY radiation monitor in Table R2.		
	able R2 Floor ARM's			
 RIS29-M1-1(2 Laydown)K600, Drywell Head			
RIS30-M1-1(2 Area)K600, Dryer / Separator			
• RIS31-M1-1(2	K600, Spent Fuel Pool			
 RIS32-M1-1(2 Vault)K600, New Fuel storage			
 RIS33-M1-1(2 	K600, Pool Plug Laydown			
ANSWER (C)	recognize that a dro ON-120 is an entry T-132 is the correct	ct: To answer the question, the candidate should opped fuel bundle is an entry into ON-120 and into T-132 and T-122. With the plant in OPCON s procedure. RA2 is correct EAL as noted above 00 Rad monitor is reading 1,053 mR/hr, the		
DISTRACTOR (A)		g: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly ing mode and believes that the unit is in OPCON 4		
DISTRACTOR (B)	identifies the operat	g: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly ing mode and believes that the unit is in Mode 4 es the EAL threshold by not recognizing that er than 1000 mr/hr.		
DISTRACTOR (D)		g: Plausible to the candidate who misidentifies the ot recognizing that channel 31 is greater than 1000		

Question 78 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2163797				
User-Defined ID:	Q #78 NEW				
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN				
Topic:	(SRO Only) Refueling	Accident E	OP entry		
Num Field 1:	LM	,			
Num Field 2:	SRO- HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References		page 2-15 with RG2 and RS2		
	Provided	blocked out	t or covered		
	K/A Justification				
	SRO-Only		e of Emergency Action Levels		
	Justification		ng the correct EAL for the		
		refueling emergency.			
	Additional				
	Information				
		Comorrol	Data		
	Level	General	SRO		
	Tier		1		
	Cloup				
	KA # and Rating		295023 AA2.05 4.6		
$\langle \rangle$	KA Statement		Refueling Accidents: Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as		
			they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS : Entry conditions of emergency plan		
	Cognitive level		High		
	Safety Function		8 - Fuel Handling		
	10 CFR 55		43.07		
	Technical Reference with Revision No:		ON-120 Rev 030 EP-AA-1008 Add. 3 Rev 005		
			T-131 Rev 000		
	Question History: NRC-05)	•	New		
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New		
1	Revision History:				
	Revision History:				

79

ID: 2164212

Points: 1.00



Plant conditions:

- An ATWS is in progress
- RPV level is being controlled with HPCI
- SLC injection line is broken
- Reactor power is 10%
- Reactor pressure is being controlled between 750 psig and 850 psig with SRVs
- Suppression Pool level is 23'
- Suppression Pool temperature is 176° rising slowly

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the required action?

- A. Lower Suppression Pool level to 21 ft. per T-102, Primary Containment Control
- B. Reduce and maintain reactor pressure between 501 and 700 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control
- C. Rapidly depressurize RPV until RPV press <50 psig above Suppression pool pressure per T-112, Emergency Blowdownl
- D. Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control
- Answer: B

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LQ/P-13	tion			
	\mathbf{k}			
	SLC tank			
les	s than CSBW level (YES) (Table LQ-1)			
	eactor shutdown with no			
LQ/P-14	boron injected			
Lun - 14	#16 ATW: CON			
L (*	ю) 🕌			
Control RPV press	by lowering to as low as possible above			
350 psig using:				
 main conden any Table LC 	ser (preferred): Turbine AND/OR BPVs			
Exceed 100 °F/ hr limits if necessary	cooldown rate AND offsite release rate			
1 0/P-15				
ANSWER (B)	Reduce and maintain reactor pressure between 501 and 700 psig			
	per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Correct:			
	While on the safe side of HCTL, RPV pressure must be lowered to			
	maintain the safe side of HCTL for the given SP Temperature and SP			
	Level conditions per T-117 LQ/P-5 and T-102 SP/T-6.			
DISTRACTOR	Lower Suppression Pool level to 21 ft. per T-102, Primary			
(A)	Containment Control; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who			
	interprets the graph to indicate that a change in water level would			
	restore the operating point to the safe side of the curve. However,			
	lowering level to 21 feet would be below the normal operating level of			
	22 feet and would be prohibited by T-102.			
	zz leet and would be promoted by 1-102.			
DISTRACTOR	Rapidly depressurize RPV until RPV press <50 psig above			
$\langle \mathbf{C} \rangle$	Suppression pool pressure per T-117, ATWS RPV Control;			
(6)				
(C)				
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be			
(C)	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step			
	Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 			
	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the 			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that believes that T-117 directs lowering pressure and 			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the 			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that believes that T-117 directs lowering pressure and believes that the minimum pressure in an ATWS (MARP) is 255# per 			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that believes that T-117 directs lowering pressure and believes that the minimum pressure in an ATWS (MARP) is 255# per table LQ-P-2. This table is only to be used when determining 			
DISTRACTOR	 Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who reads determines that since the operating point is above the lowest (highest pressure) curve, a blowdown is required per T-102 which directs the user to T-117. Since pressure was lowered, HCTL has not been violated yet and per step LQQ/P-14 above, without CSBW injected, pressure should not be lowered to below 350 psig Lower and control RPV pressure as low as possible but above 255 psig per T-117, ATWS RPV Control; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that believes that T-117 directs lowering pressure and believes that the minimum pressure in an ATWS (MARP) is 255# per 			

Question 79 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2164212				
User-Defined ID:	Q #79 NEW				
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN - EMBEDDE	D			
Торіс:	(SRO Only) Suppr	ession Pool H	High Temp		
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	SRO - HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	OPEN - EN	MBEDDED		
	K/A Justification	None			
	SRO-Only		of TRIP steps		
	Justification				
	Additional	None			
	Information				
	General Data				
	Level		SRO		
	Tier		1		
	Group		1		
	KA # and Rating		295026 EA2.03		
			4.0		
	KA Statement		Suppression Pool High Water Temperature: Abilit to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Reactor pressure		
	Cognitive level		High		
	Safety Function		5 - Primary Containment		
	10 CFR 55		43.5		
	Technical Refere Revision No:	nce with	T-117 Rev 023		
	Question History NRC-05)	/: (i.e. LGS	New		
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New		
	Revision History				
	Training Objectiv		LGSOPS1560.04		

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80

ID: 2164273

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 2 is operating at 15% power with an ATWS in progress

- RPV water level is currently -175 inches on Fuel Zone
- ADS SRVs are being cycled to maintain Rx pressure between 990 to 1096 psig
- Suppression Pool temperature is 121° F up slow
- Total MSL flow is 1.55 Mlbm/hr

What is the required action and the bases for that action?

Required Action ases Control injection as low as possible above Α. Lowest steam flow to maintain PCT less 1.2 Mlbm/hr and maintain MSL flow above than 1500°F MCSF Β. Control injection as low as possible above 1.2 Mlbm/hr and maintain MSL flow above Prevent core thermal hydraulic instabilities MCSF C. Maintain RPV level between -186 inches Lowest steam flow to maintain PCT less and the level to which it was lowered than 1500°F D. Maintain RPV level between -186 inches Prevent core thermal hydraulic instabilities and the level to which it was lowered Answer: А

Answer Explanation

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Test ID: 346747

ANSWER (A)	 Control injection as low as possible above 1.2 Mlbm/hr and maintain MSL flow above MCSF, Lowest steam flow to maintain PCT less than 1500°F; Correct: Based on T-117 step 8, when all conditions in table LQ/L-4 are met: Power >11.5% RPV level below -161" Any SRV open or DW press > 1.68# Then control RPV injection as low as possible above 1.2 Mlbm/hr and maintain injection above MCSF MCSF is defined in table LQ-P-2 as MSL flow >1.2 Mlbm/hr or Rx power >11.5% or BPV or SRV open based on pressure. The bases for T-117 list the definition for MCSF as the lowest steam flow which is sufficient to preclude any clad temp from exceeding
DISTRACTOR (B)	1500°F Control injection as low as possible above 1.2 Mlbm/hr and maintain MSL flow above MCSF, Prevent core thermal hydraulic instabilities; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly recalls the bases for the first lowering below -50" which is for THI prevention. this is not the bases for the lowering of injection to MCSF
DISTRACTOR (C)	Maintain RPV level between -186 inches and the level to which it was lowered, Lowest steam flow to maintain PCT less than 1500°F; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the action to level control when it is determined that MSL flow is below the MCSF value. At the current power level and open SRV condition, this level band would cause too much heat to be added to the Suppression Pool
DISTRACTOR (D)	Maintain RPV level between -186 inches and the level to which it was lowered, Prevent core thermal hydraulic instabilities; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the action to level control when i is determined that MSL flow is below the MCSF value. Also who incorrectly recalls the bases for the first lowering below -50" which is for THI prevention. this is not the bases for the lowering of injection to

Г

Question 80 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2164273				
User-Defined ID:	Q #80 NEW				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
Topic:	(SRO Only) ATW	S Bases			
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	None			
	K/A	None			
	Justification				
	SRO-Only	N/A			
	Justification				
	Additional Information	None			
	Information				
		Genera	l Data		
	Level	Conora	SRO		
	Tier		1		
	Group		1		
	KA # and Ratin	g	295037 2.4.18 3.3 / 4.0		
	KA Statement	A Statement A Statement A Statement A Statement A Statement A Statement A Statement Bownscale or Unknown: Knowledge of the bases for EOPs.			
	Cognitive level	ĺ	High		
	Safety Functio	n	1 - Reactivity control		
	10 CFR 55		43.5		
	Technical Refe Revision No:	erence with	T-117 Bases Rev 022 T-117 Rev 023		
	Question Histo NRC-05)		New		
	Question Type Modified)		New		
	Revision Histo		1.000000		
	Training Objec	tive	LGSOPS		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

81

ID: 2164459

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

LGS Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

The following alarms are received in rapid succession:

- RCIC pump room fire alarm
- A report of fire and heavy smoke in the RCIC room is called in to the MCR

SE-8, "FIRE" is entered and executed

Two minutes later Div 1 Steam leak detection alarm is received.

In addition to entering SE-8, FIRE, what actions are required for the above scenario?

Given : T-103 - "Secondary Containment Control"

D

- A. Exit SE-8 and enter T-103, SE-8 may be re-entered at the same step in-progress when T-103 is exited
- B. Exit SE-8 and enter T-103, SE-8 entry is re-evaluated when T-103 is exited
- C. Enter T-103 and continue performing SE-8 actions. SE-8 is the controlling procedure
- D. Enter T-103 and continue performing SE-8 actions. T-103 is the controlling procedure

Answer:

Answer Explanation

ANSWER (D)	 Enter T-103 and continue performing SE-8 actions. T-103 is the controlling procedure; Correct: Based upon the conditions given, Fire alarm and report of fire in RCIC, SE-8 is entered and the fire brigade be dispatched: When the Div 1 Steam Leak Detection alarm is received, T-103 is entered. EOPs are the top of the procedure Hierarchy and must be the governing procedure
DISTRACTOR (A)	Exit SE-8 and enter T-103, SE-8 may be re-entered at the same step in-progress when T-103 is exited; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who knows that EOPs are the governing procedure and assumes that similar to SAMPs, all other procedures must be exited when TRIPS are entered. This is incorrect as EOPs are the superior document but AOPs should be performed in parallel.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Exit SE-8 and enter T-103, SE-8 entry is re-evaluated when T-103 is exited; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who knows that EOPs are the governing procedure and assumes that similar to SAMPs, all other procedures must be exited when TRIPS are entered. This is incorrect as EOPs are the superior document but AOPs should be performed in parallel.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Enter T-103 and continue performing SE-8 actions, SE-8 is the controlling procedure Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who knows that EOPs and AOPs are performed in parallel but incorrectly assumes that since the AOPs are generally more detailed, their direction must be followed.

Question 81 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2164459
User-Defined ID:	Q #81 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	(SRO Only) Plant Fire AOP/EOP
Num Field 1:	ĹM
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

O a manual a materi						
Comments:	References Provided	None				
		None				
	Justification	Volle				
		N/A				
	Justification	,				
		None				
	Information					
		General	Data			
	Level		SRO			
	Tier		1			
	Group		1			
	KA # and Rating		600000 / G2.4.8			
			4.5 Plant Fire On Site:			
	KA Statement	KA Statement		Knowledge of how abnormal operating		
	RA Statement		procedures are used in			
				conjunction with EOPs.		
	Cognitive level	Cognitive level				
	Safety Function		8 -Plant Service Systems			
	10 CFR 55	43.5				
	Technical Referen	Technical Reference with		SE-8 Rev 060		
	Revision No:			T-103 Rev 025		
	Question History: NRC-05)	estion History: (i.e. LGS C-05)		New		
	Question Type: (N Modified)	lew, Bank,	New			
	Revision History:					
	Training Objective	9	LGSOPS2000.02			
	600000 (APE 24) PI	ant Fire On S	Site / 8			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

82

ID: 2164477

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are operating at 100% power.

All 4 KV buses are aligned normally.

• PJM has issued a Voltage Reduction Alert

TSO notifies LGS that:

- 230 KV Switchyard Voltage is 225 KV
- 500 KV Switchyard Voltage is 495 KV

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the status of the 10 Bus and 20 Bus Offsite Sources?

	10 BUS SOURCE	20 BUS SOURCE
Α.	OPERABLE	OPERABLE
В.	OPERABLE	INOPERABLE
C.	INOPERABLE	OPERABLE
D.	INOPERABLE	INOPERABLE
Answer:	В	

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Refer to E-5 Grid Emergency. There are three sections/steps in this procedure that need to be evaluated against the existing 230 KV and 500 KV system voltages given in the stem: Steps 3.14.1

Step 3.14.1 directs operators to declare as INOPERABLE the 10 Bus Source if it drops below 225 KV (given to be 225 KV in the stem; therefore, the 10 Bus Source is OPERABLE. Step 3.14.1 also directs operators to declare as INOPERABLE the 20 Bus source if the 500KV source drops below 498 KV (therefore, the 20 Bus Source is also INOPERABLE)

SOURCE	TRANSMISSION SYSTEM	MINIMUM VOLTAGE
10 Bus	230 kV System	225 kV
20 Bus	500 kV System	498 kV
	230 kV System	225 kV
6680 Line	69 kV System	67.5 kV (when connected
		as 3 rd offsite source)

ANSWER (B)	OPERABLE, INOPERABLE; Correct: For the reasons described above.
DISTRACTOR (A)	OPERABLE, OPERABLE; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who incorrectly recalls the limits of the tables in E-5 and determines that both sources are operable
DISTRACTOR (C)	INOPERABLE, OPERABLE; Wrong: Plausible misconception that 224 KV is unacceptably low if the candidate incorrectly recalls the minimum value in E-5
DISTRACTOR (D)	INOPERABLE, INOPERABLE; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who identifies that the voltage of the 230 KV yard is 5 kv low and so is the 500kv yard and assumes that both yards must be INOPERABLE.

Question 82 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	6		
Difficulty:	0.00	0.00	
System ID:	2164477		
User-Defined ID:	Q #82 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	(SRO ONLY) Grid		n Status
Num Field 1:			p Glatus
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A Justification	Grid operable question. To	nust know the reasons for the e status to answer this o determine operability, they w voltage on the 230 KV bus sources.
	SRO-Only Justification	This question is SRO level because it requires the candidate to assess facility/ grid conditions and determine that grid voltage is below the minimum required for operability.	
	Additional Information	None	
		Genera	al Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		1
	Group	1	
	KA # and Ratin	g	700000 AA2.05
	KA Statement		3.8 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to GENERATO VOLTAGE AND ELECTRI GRID DISTURBANCES: Operational status of offsit circuit.
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		6 - Electrical
	10 CFR 55		41.5 and 43.5 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8
	Technical Refe Revision No:	rence with	E-5 Rev. 028

Question History: NRC-05)
Question Type: (No Modified)
Revision History:
Training Objective
700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

83

ID: 2164476

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 was operating at rated thermal power when a loss of feedwater heating resulted in the following:

• At time 02:45, MFLPD is 1.01

Operators lower recirc flow with Recirc and a new P-1 was demanded

• At time 02:50, MCPR is 1.06

(1) At what time was the Reactor Core Safety Limit (SL) violated?(2) What are the TS notification requirements for this event?

Time of Sat	ety Limit Violation	Notification
Α.	02:45	8 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center
В.	02:45	1 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center
С.	02:50	8 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center
D.	02:50	1 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center
Answer: D		

Answer Explanation

ANSWER (D)	02:50, 1 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center; Correct: Based on T.S.2.1.2, "The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall not be less than 1.07 with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 700 psia and core flow greater than 10% of rated flow." With any SL violation, the NRC Operations Center shall be notified within 1 hour in accordance with T.S6.7.1.a, The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour."
DISTRACTOR (A)	02:45, 8 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the limit for MFLPD as 1.00 and as an entry into GP-14. This is a tech spec issue but not a safety limit violation. 8 hour notification for NRC is plausible to the candidate who recalls SAF 1.4 for Degraded or Unanalyzed condition. This requires an 8 hour notification for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The SAF then lists example conditions such as degraded Fuel cladding.
DISTRACTOR (B)	02:45, 1 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the limit for MFLPD as 1.00 and as an entry into GP-14. This is a tech spec issue but not a safety limit violation.
DISTRACTOR (C)	02:50, 8 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center; Wrong: 8 hour notification for NRC is plausible to the candidate who recalls SAF 1.4 for Degraded or Unanalyzed condition. This requires an 8 hour notification for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The SAF then lists example conditions such as degraded Fuel cladding.

Question 83 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2164476		
User-Defined ID:	Q #83 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:	(SRO ONLY) Re	porting Reg. SL	Violation
Num Field 1:	ĹM	. <u> </u>	
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References	None	
	Provided		
	K/A	None	
	Justification		
	SRO-Only		violation reporting
	Justification		are an SRO responsibility
	Additional	None	
	Information		
	Level	Genera	SRO
	Tier		1
			2
	Group		2 295014 / G2.4.30
	KA # and Ratin	ng	4.1
	KA Statement		Inadvertent Reactivity Addition: Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
	Cognitive leve		High
	Cognitive leve Safety Functio		High 1
	Cognitive leve Safety Functio 10 CFR 55		
	Safety Function	n	1
	Safety Function 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	erence with bry: (i.e. LGS	1 43.2 LGS Tech spec 2.1.2

	sion History: ing Objective	LGSOPS1800.06c
Inadve	vity Addition /	Generic 2.4.30 - Knowledge of events related to system operation/status 0 that must be 4 reported to internal organizations or 3 external agencies, 0 such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

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84


ID: 2166082

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 2 plant conditions:

- Reactor is Shutdown
- RPV level is +18"
- Suppression Pool temperature is 85°F
- Suppression Pool level is 30 feet and slowly rising
- RPV pressure 900 psig and rising
- Main Turbine Bypass Valves are available




Which of the following actions is required and what is the basis for that action?

	Action	Basis
Α.	Reduce RPV pressure	Prevent tailpipe failure
В.	Reduce RPV pressure	Ensure vacuum breakers function
C.	Emergency blowdown	Prevent tailpipe failure
D.	Emergency blowdown	Ensure vacuum breakers function
Answer:	Α	


Answer Explanation If suppression pool water level is approaching a limiting elevation (e.g., 32.75', the Maximum

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Pressure Suppression Primary Containment Water Level, it may be necessary to operate suppression pool pump down systems even if such action may increase area radiation levels, require personnel exposure, or result in radioactivity release outside the primary containment Step SP/L-10 of T-102 directs actions to maintain suppression pool level on the SAFE side of the SRV Tail Pipe Level Limit (STPLL) Curve.



The STPLL is a function of suppression pool level and RPV pressure. SRV operation with suppression pool level above the STPLL could damage the SRV discharge lines. This, in turn, could lead to primary containment failure from direct pressurization and damage to equipment inside the primary containment (Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping, RPV level instrument runs, suppression pool-to-drywell vacuum breakers, etc.) from pipe-whip and jet-impingement loads



ANSWER (A)	Reduce RPV pressure, Prevent tailpipe failure; Correct: T-102 step SP/L-10 as noted above directs actions to reduce level in the suppression pool as necessary to prevent exceeding curve STPLL. The obvious strategy is to lower level, but no less valid is a strategy of lowering Rx pressure to ensure that the curve is not exceeded. As noted in the stem, Bypass Valves are available and could be used to lower pressure by sending steam to the condenser rather than the pool with the SRVs which would potentially worsen the condition. Consistent with the definition of the term "restore", emergency RPV depressurization is not required until it has been determined that actions to restore suppression pool level and/or RPV pressure on the safe side of the STPLL will not be effective
DISTRACTOR (B)	Reduce RPV pressure, Ensure vacuum breakers function; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who confuses the SPTLL with the Maximum suppression pool level of 37.4' for the Downcomer Vacuum breakers. At a level below the STPLL, vacuum breakers are still uncovered.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Emergency blowdown, Prevent tailpipe failure; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who does not consider that pressure may be lowered to prevent exceeding the curve. T-102 does allow that even if the curve is violated, a blowdown is not required if conditions can be restored to the SAFE side of the curve. Also plausible to the candidate who confuses the SPTLL with the Maximum suppression pool level of 37.4' for the Downcomer Vacuum breakers. At a level below the STPLL, vacuum breakers are still uncovered.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Emergency blowdown, Ensure vacuum breakers function; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who does not consider that pressure may be lowered to prevent exceeding the curve. T-102 does allow that even if the curve is violated, a blowdown is not required if conditions can be restored to the SAFE side of the cure.

Question 84 Info Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2166082		
User-Defined ID:	Q #84 BANK		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Topic:		gh Suppression I	Pool Water Level
Num Field 1:		ĹM	
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:	References Provided	Embedded P	icture
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only	N/A	
	Justification		
	Additional	N/A	
	Information		
		Genera	
	Level		SRO
	Tier		1
	Group		2
	KA # and Rati	ng	295029 EA2.03
	KA Statement		High Suppression Pool Water Level: Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: Drywell/containment water level.
	Cognitive leve		High
	Safety Function		5 - Containment Integrity
		511	
	10 CFR 55		43.2/43.5
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref		T-102 rev. 028
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist	erence with	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05)	erence with	T-102 rev. 028
	10 CFR 55 Technical Ref Revision No: Question Hist NRC-05) Question Typ	erence with ory: (i.e. LGS e: (New, Bank, ory:	T-102 rev. 028 T-102 Bases rev. 028

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

85


ID: 2166216

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 2 plant conditions are as follows:

- A LOCA is in progress
- RPV level dropped to -285 inches but has recovered and level is now -159 inches up slow
- SAMPS were entered 1 hour ago
- Drywell Hydrogen is 5.5%
- Drywell Oxygen is 6.8%
- Suppression Pool Hydrogen is 1.2%
- Suppression Pool Oxygen is 4.5%




WHICH ONE of the following identifies the actions for Containment atmosphere control, (if any)?


- A. Vent the Suppression Pool up to the General Emergency limits
- B. Vent the Suppression Pool regardless of Offsite release limits
- C. Vent the Drywell up to the General Emergency limits
- D. Vent the Drywell regardless of Offsite release limits

Answer:

С



LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747



ANSWER (C)	Vent the Drywell up to the General Emergency limits; Correct: As noted above, evaluating the table would lead to DW/G-2 as the strategy venting within the General Emergency limits is the directed action for the DW. TSG-3.3 allows the candidate to translate DW/G-2 to the General Emergency Limits.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Vent the Suppression Pool up to the General Emergency limits; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who evaluates the SP table and determined that SP/G-1 is correct and mistakenly assumed that General Emergency Limits encompassed TS limits. GE limits are actually above
DISTRACTOR (B)	Vent the Suppression Pool regardless of Offsite release limits; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly evaluates the SP table and determines that SP/G-3 is the correct strategy by using DW H2 concentration instead of SP H2 concentration in the Left side SP H2 concentration and uses the DW O2 concentration instead of the SP O2
DISTRACTOR (D)	Vent the Drywell regardless of Offsite release limits; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly evaluates the table and determines that DW/G-3 is the correct strategy by using DW O2 concentration in the 4th line column of the DW table rather than the H2 concentration. However, a correct evaluation of the table would determine that DW/G-2 is correct

Question 85 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2166216		
User-Defined ID:	Q #85 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN		
Topic:	SRO Only - SAMP 2 H2 Combustion Limit		
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		

Comments:			1, SAMP 2, DW/G and SP/G
		oles	
	K/A		
	Justification SRO-Only N/A	1	
	Justification	4	
		N/A	
	Information	•	
		General	Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		1
	Group		2
	KA # and Rating		500000 EA2.03 3.8
	KA Statement		High Containment Hydrogen Concentration: Ability to determine and / or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS: Combustible limits for drywe
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function		5 - Containment Integrity
	10 CFR 55		
	Technical Reference Revision No:	e with	SAMP-2 Rev 14
	Question History: (i. NRC-05)		New
	Question Type: (New Modified)	w, Bank,	New
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS1562.04

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

86

ID: 2166256

Points: 1.00

Unit 2 plant conditions:

- OPCON 5
- Reactor level is 217"
- '2A' RHR is in Shutdown Cooling
- HV-51-2F008, SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION OUTBOARD, fails closed and cannot be reopened

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the:

- (1) Tech Spec required action, and
- (2) the basis for performing that action?
 - A. (1) Place ADHR in service
 - (2) To maintain and reduce reactor coolant temperature
 - B. (1) Place ADHR in service
 - (2) To assure accurate reactor coolant temperature indication
 - C. (1) Place 'A' Recirc pump in service
 - (2) To maintain and reduce reactor coolant temperature
 - D. (1) Place 'A' Recirc pump in service
 (2) To assure accurate reactor coolant temperature indication

Answer: D

Answer Explanation

From the stem, the candidate determines that SDC has no suction path (HV-51-2F008 closed). Tech Spec 3.9.11.2 action c.1 requires the verification of reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.

- c. With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation:
 - 1. Within one (1) hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation, and once per 12 hours thereafter, verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method; and
 - 2. Once per hour monitor reactor coolant temperature.

The current plant configuration does not support placing ADHR in service due to the need to have the Reactor cavity flooded up.

Placing a Recirc loop in service satisfies Tech Spec 3.9.11.2, ACTION c.1. This only provides for the coolant circulation need to ensure proper reactor coolant temperature monitoring; it does NOT constitute an "alternate Decay Heat Removal method."

Tech Spec 3.9.11 Bases:

one (1) heat exc having one (1) R cooling capacity reactor pressure available throug	E RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of one (1) OPERABLE RHR pump, hanger, and the associated piping and valves. The requirement for HR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE ensures that 1) sufficient is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the vessel below 140°F, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation would be h the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication. s voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling Subsystem OPERABILITY.
2.7 Reactor (rnate Decay Heat Removal, Prerequisite # 2.7: Cavity is flooded up with Skimmer Surge Tank (SST) level equal or Cavity level
<u>AND</u> the	associated Fuel Pool gates are removed per GP-6.1, Shutdown n - Refueling, Core Alteration and Core Off-Loading.
ANSWER (D)	(1) Place 'A' Recirc pump in service, (2) To assure accurate reactor coolant temperature indication; Correct: For the above reasons.
DISTRACTOR (A)	(1) Place ADHR in service, (2) To maintain and reduce reactor coolant temperature; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that fails to recall that ADHR cannot be placed in service without the Reactor cavity being flooded. Operation of ADHR would support maintaining and reducing reactor coolant temperature.
DISTRACTOR (B)	(1) Place ADHR in service,(2) To assure accurate reactor coolant temperature indication; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate that fails to recall that ADHR cannot be placed in service without the Reactor cavity being flooded. Operation of ADHR would support ensuring adequate monitoring of reactor coolant temperature.
DISTRACTOR (C)	(1) Place 'A' Recirc pump in service, (2) To maintain and reduce reactor coolant temperature; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes core circulation with recirc is credited as an alternate method of decay heat removal.

Question 86 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	2166256	
User-Defined ID:	Q #86 BANK	
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	
Topic:	SRO ONLY - OPCON 5 - Loss of SDC and Tech Spec bases	
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	

Comments:	References N Provided	one			
	K/A				
	Justification				
		/A			
	Justification				
		/A			
	mormation				
					_
		Genera			
	Level		SRO		
	Tier		2		
	Group		1	.7	
	KA # and Rating	KA # and Rating		205000 / G 2.2.37 4.6	
	KA Statement		Shutdown Cooling to determine oper and/or availability related equipmen	ability of safe	•
	Cognitive level		High		
	Safety Function		4 - Heat Removal		
	10 CFR 55		43(b)(2)		
	Technical Referen Revision No:	ce with	Tech Spec 3.9.11.2 T.S. Bases 3.9.11	Rev #:	
	Question History: NRC-05)	(i.e. LGS	LGS NRC 15-1		
	Question Type: (N Modified)	ew, Bank,	Bank		
	Revision History:				
	Training Objective		LGSOPS0051.24B		
	Lesson Plan: LGSOF	2S0051 Obi.	24		
		<u>3003 i Obj.</u>	<u> </u>		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

87

ID: 2166295

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 1 is operating at 100%

• 1C LPCI is tagged out for maintenance and will not be restored for 8 days

The following alarm is received:

- 113-B5, "Core Spray Line Internal Break"
- All pumps have been verified off

I&C investigates and reports that the valid D/P reading is -4.6 psid

What is the most limiting tech spec based on the above conditions? (Assume no RICT)

- A. Declare Core Spray Instrumentation INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 72 hours
- B. Declare the 'A' Core Spray loop INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 7 days
- C. Declare the 'B' Core Spray loop INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 7 days
- D. Declare Both Core Spray Loops INOPERABLE and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours

Answer: C

Answer Explanation

From the ARC 113-B5:			
3. IF signal is valid AND dP is less than -3.8 psid, THEN declare `B' Core Spray loop INOPERABLE due to a pipe break AND consider a normal plant shutdown per GP-3.			
From Tech specs:			
a. The core spra comprised of: 1. Two OPE 2. An OPER	y core cooling systems shall be OPERABLE with: by system (CSS) consisting of two subsystems with each subsystem RABLE CSS pumps, and CABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber ring the water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel.		
ANSWER (C)	Declare the 'B' Core Spray loop INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 7 days; Correct: The indications of D/P of -4.6 psid indicate a break in the "B" CS subsystem per the ARC above. Tech spec 3.5.1 action a.1. requires Restore the inoperable Core Spray subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days,		
DISTRACTOR (A)	Declare Core Spray Instrumentation INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes that the CS break detection instrument is faulty and applies the spec 3.5.1.e for 72 hour action. Reading is valid per the stem		
DISTRACTOR (B)	Declare the 'A' Core Spray loop INOPERABLE and restore to OPERABLE status within 7 days; Wrong: Plausible if the candidate determines that the A CS loop is INOP based on the mis-applying the ARC direction. This is incorrect,		
DISTRACTOR (D)	Declare Both Core Spray Loops INOPERABLE and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who applies action 3.5.1.a.2 for both Core Spray subsystems INOP rather than using the ARC direction which will identify the correct subsystem		

Question 87 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
System ID:	2166295	
User-Defined ID:	Q #87 NEW	
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN	
Topic:	SRO Only - Core Spray Line Break	
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	

comments:	References		13 B5: Core Spray Line
	Provided K/A	Internal Brea	k, TS 3.5.1 pg 3.5-1 to 3.5-3
	N/A Justification		
	SRO-Only Justification		requires the candidate to operability of the Core spray
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	
	Level		SRO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratin	g	209001 A2.05 3.6
	KA Statement		Low Pressure Core Spray: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Core spray line break
	Cognitive level		High
	Safety Function	ı	2 - Rx Water Inventory Control
	10 CFR 55		43.2
	Technical Refer Revision No:	rence with	Unit 1 Tech specs ARC-MCR-113 B5
	Question Histo NRC-05)	ry: (i.e. LGS	New
	Question Type: Modified)	(New, Bank,	New
	Revision Histor		
	Training Object	tive	LGSOPS0052.14B

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

88

ID: 2166695


Points: 1.00

Unit 2 is in OPCON 5 with Core Shuffle 2 in progress.

- The 2A SRM is bypassed due to spiking
- The 2D SRM is withdrawn partially for drive motor testing
- A new fuel bundle is being installed into core location 37-56
- Control Rod 10-15 is selected and is inserted to position 00

Alarm 107-H4, SRM Upscale/INOP is received The 2C SRM is declared INOP due to High Voltage failure

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the correct action under the given conditions?



- A. Suspend all Core Alterations and insert SRM "D" fully per GP-6.2
- B. Enter ON-122 and ensure that visual indication and audible alarm available in MCR
- C. Bypass SRM C per ARC 107-H4, Insert SRM "D" and continue with Core Alterations
- D. Ensure the shorting links are removed until shutdown margin is demonstrated per NF-AB-725
- Answer: A

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

Answer Explanation

From the stem the candidate determines that the 2A SRM is INOP and the 2D SRM is not inserted into the core which is a requirement to be available for Core ALTS. Upon the loss of the 2C SRM on HV INOP, only the 2B SRM is operable and usable for Core Alts. Based on T.S. 3.9.2, 2 inserted operable SRMs in the quadrant and adjacent quadrant are required for core alts.

3.9.2 At least two source range monitor (SRM) channels* shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:

- a. Continuous visual indication in the control room,
- b. At least one with audible alarm in the control room,
- c. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and
- d. Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated, the shorting links shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn.**

<u>APPLICABILITY:</u> OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and insert all insertable control rods.

ANSWER (A)	Suspend all Core Alterations and insert SRM "D" fully per GP-6.2; Correct: Based on the info above, with 2 SRMs, A & C INOP and a third (D) withdrawn, Core Alts must stop immediately. This information is found in Tech specs and GP-6.2
DISTRACTOR	Enter ON-122 and ensure that visual indication and audible alarm
(B)	available in MCR; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the step in ON-122 which directs suspending core Alts if visual and/or audible indication is lost. However, ON-122 is based on a loss of alarm functions, not an INOPERABILITY of the SRM system. SRM B is still functioning and providing visual and audible alarms
DISTRACTOR	Bypass SRM C per ARC 107-H4, Insert SRM "B", and continue with
(C)	Core Alterations; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that 2 SRMs are required for Core Alts but forgets that the SRMs must be in the affected quadrant and in the adjacent quadrant. In this case, the C SRM cannot be bypassed as the A SRM is already bypassed and there is only one common bypass switch
DISTRACTOR	Ensure the shorting links are removed until shutdown margin is
(D)	demonstrated per NF-AB-725; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the tech spec requirement to remove the shorting links if shutdown margin hasn't been determined (3.9.2.d) Shutdown margin determination occurs prior to the commencement of Core Alterations and shorting links are never removed.

Question 88 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2166695
User-Defined ID:	Q #88 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	SRO ONLY SRM INOP
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References Embedded Provided	picture	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only N/A		
	Justification		
		N/A	
	Information		
	Gene	ral Data	
	Level	RO	
	Tier	2	
	Group	1	
	KA # and Rating	215004 A2.02 3.7	
	KA Statement	Source-Range Monitor; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: SRM inop condition	
	Cognitive level	High	
	Safety Function	7 - Instrumentation	
	10 CFR 55	43.5	
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	Tech Specs Rev 1 LCO 3.9.2 Fee 6 GP-6.2 1	
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	New	
	Question Type: (New, Bank Modified)	New	
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

89

ID: 2166780

Points: 1.00

**********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 1 is in a station blackout following operation at 100% power 4 hours ago

Reactor Water Level was -56" down slow when the following annunciators were received:

- 120-D11 G2 1DA 250 VDC MCC UNDERVOLTAGE
- 120-D11 G3 1PPA1/1PPA3 125 VDC DIST PANELS UNDERVOLTAGE
- 122-D12 G2 1DB-1 250 VDC MCC UNDERVOLATAGE
- Rx Pressure is 225 psig and efforts to depressurize have been unsuccessful
- Current Suppression Pool temperature is 175°F up slow


Which of the following actions should be directed to restore level?

- A. Inject with Flex Pump per T-301, RPV Injection From Spray Pond
- B. Inject with RCIC using T-305, Local Operation of RCIC without DC Power
- C. Inject with HPCI thru T-251, Establish a HPCI Injection Flow Path Via Feedwater Only
- D. Inject with the Diesel Driven Fire Pump per T-244, Alternate Injection From The Fire System
- Answer:

Answer Explanation

В

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747



ANSWER (B)	Inject with RCIC using T-305, Local Operation of RCIC without DC Power; Correct: Because pressure is too high for Flex pump and fire pump options, local operation of RCIC should be directed. T-305 allows operation using local indications of speed and discharge pressure with I&C or others monitoring level at the transmitter.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Inject with Flex Pump per T-301, RPV Injection From Spray Pond; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the flex pump is the primary option for higher capacity when all Station power is lost. The Flex system is the primary alternate injection system directed from T-111 that does not use station power. However, pressure is too high for flex usage. (135 psig)
DISTRACTOR (C)	Inject with HPCI thru T-251, Establish a HPCI Injection Flow Path Via Feedwater Only; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that T-111 directs HPCI usage if available and only through T-251 flowpath. With the loss of DC power, no contingency procedure exists to use HPCI.
DISTRACTOR (D)	Inject with the Diesel Driven Fire Pump per T-244, Alternate Injection From The Fire System; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that the Fire system is also an alternate injection strategy per T-111. But it only has a max press of 70 psig.

Question 89 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2166780			
User-Defined ID:		Q #89 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	SRO Only - RCIC	CUse T-111		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A			
	Justification	N1/A		
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification	N1/A		
	Additional Information	N/A		
	mornation			
	Level	Genera	SRO	
	Tier			
			10	
			2	
	Group		1	
		ng	1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4	
	Group	ng	1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perforn specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant	
	Group KA # and Ratir		1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perforn specific system and integrated plant procedure	
	Group KA # and Ratir KA Statement		1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operation High 2 - Rx Water Inventory	
	Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Functio		1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operation High 2 - Rx Water Inventory Control	
	Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe	I n	1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perforn specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operation High 2 - Rx Water Inventory	
	Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo	n Prence with	1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perforn specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operation High 2 - Rx Water Inventory Control 43.5	
	Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No:	I n erence with ory: (i.e. LGS	1217000 / G 2.1.234.4Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operationHigh 2 - Rx Water Inventory Control43.5T-111Rev. 018	
	Group KA # and Ratin KA Statement Cognitive level Safety Functio 10 CFR 55 Technical Refe Revision No: Question Histo NRC-05) Question Type	n erence with ory: (i.e. LGS :: (New, Bank,	1 217000 / G 2.1.23 4.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling; Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedure during all modes of plant operation High 2 - Rx Water Inventory Control 43.5 T-111 New	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

90

ID: 2167139

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Unit 2 is in refueling day 10

Core Shuffle 2 is in progress

- Annunciator 002-G4, "A REAC ENCL SGTS CHARCOAL FLT HI-HI TEMP/TROUBLE" alarms
- EO reports a Fire in the 0A SGTS Filter Train
- On panel 00C681, TI-76-010A (Charcoal Filter Temp), indicates 588 deg. F

Which one of the following actions is required for (1) the conditions given and (2) what is the Technical specification action required?

- A. (1) Initiate the Deluge system manually per S76.7.B(2) Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately
- B. (1) Initiate the Deluge system manually per S76.7.B
 (2) Restore the INOPERABLE subsystem to operable status within 7 days, CORE ALTERATIONS may continue
- C. (1) Verify the Deluge system has automatically initiated per S76.7.B
 (2) Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately
- D. (1) Verify the Deluge system has automatically initiated per S76.7.B
 (2) Restore the INOPERABLE subsystem to operable status within 7 days, CORE ALTERATIONS may continue

Answer: B

Answer Explanation

3.6.5.3 Two i	ndependent standby gas treatment subsystems shall be OPERABLE.		
<u>APPLICABILITY</u> : is being handl ALTERATIONS.	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, and when (1) irradiated fuel ed in the refueling area secondary containment, or (2) during CORE		
ACTION:			
a. In (a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3:		
1.	With one standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.		
	n (1) irradiated fuel is being handled in the refueling area ondary containment, or (2) during CORE ALTERATIONS:		
1.	With one standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and CORE ALTERATIONS. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.		
	days, CORE ALTERATIONS may continue; Correct: With a fire in the filter train, S76.7.B directs the manual initiation of the deluge system for that train. There is no automatic initiation. Per TS 3.6.5.3.a, IN OPCON 1,2,3: With one SGTS inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 7 days. Per 3.6.5.3.b During Core alterations, With one SGTS inop, restore the INOP subsystem to Operable within 7 days or suspend Core Alterations.		
DISTRACTOR (A)	Initiate the Deluge system manually per S76.7.B Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that SGTS must be operable to begin core alts but does not recall that 7 days is allowed when core alts are in progress.		
DISTRACTOR (C)	Verify the Deluge system has automatically initiated per S76.7.B Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS immediately; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that a deluge system protects the filter train but does not recall that it is manually initiated and who recalls that SGTS must be operable to begin core alts but does not recall that 7 days is allowed when core alts are in progress		
DISTRACTOR (D)	Verify the Deluge system has automatically initiated per S76.7.B Restore the INOPERABLE subsystem to operable status within 7 days, CORE ALTERATIONS may continue; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that SGTS must be operable to begin core alts		

Question 90 Info		
Question Type:	Multiple Choice	
Status:	Active	
Always select on test?	No	
Authorized for practice?	No	
Points:	1.00	
Time to Complete:	3	
Difficulty:	0.00	
0 1 10	0107100	
System ID:	2167139	
User-Defined ID:	Q #90 NEW	
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	
Topic:	SRO Only - SGTS Hi Temp	
Num Field 1:	LM	
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH	
Text Field:	LO-ILT	

Comments:	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	requires the	n meets the KA because it candidate to recall actions for nperature which are directed
	SRO-Only Justification	requires know loss of SGTS	n is SRO only because it wledge of the TS actions for 5 trains during operation at uring refueling. (55.43.2 and
	Additional Information	N/A	
		Genera	al Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		2
	Group		1
	KA # and Ratio	ng	216000 A2.03 3.2
	KA Statement		Standby Gas Treatment; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High train temperature
	Cognitive leve) 	HIGH
	Safety Function	on	9
	10 CFR 55		43.2, 43.5
	Technical Refe	erence with	S76.7.B Rev. 013
	Revision No: Question Histo	ory: (i.e. LGS	TS 3.6.5.3 Amend 227 New
	NRC-05) Question Type		
	Modified)		New
	Revision Histo	ory:	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

91

ID: 2167164

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY*********

Unit 2 is at 100% power when the following indications occur:

- Rx Power has dropped to 98%
- Generator output has lowered by 25 MWe
- Indicated Total Core flow has increased
- Core plate D/P has dropped

The RO investigates further and reports:

- Recirc pump speeds have not changed.
- Recirc Loop "A" indicated flow is 38x10⁶ lbm/hr and stable.
- Recirc Loop "B" indicated flow is 42x10⁶ lbm/hr and stable.

What action is required and the bases for that action?

	Action	Bases
A.	Perform Jet Pump Operability ST	Maintain ability to flood reactor to 2/3 core height
В.	Perform Jet Pump Operability ST	Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA
C.	Raise the speed of the 2A RRP to increase A loop flow to within 5% of the B loop	Maintain ability to flood reactor to 2/3 core height
D.	Raise the speed of the 2A RRP to increase A loop flow to within 5% of the B loop	Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA
Answer	: А	
Answe	r Explanation	

ANSWER (A)	Perform Jet Pump Operability ST, Maintain ability to flood reactor to 2/3 core height; Correct: The indications provided are consistent with a failure of a Jet pump where core flow appears to increase due to bypass flow through the failed jet pump and subsequently, since actual core flow is less, power drops. Loop flow also changes as the amount of flow through the failed jet pump changes the loop flow indication. ON-100 step 2.2 directs the performance of the Jet pump operability ST, ST-6-043-320-1(2) based on the indications. Tech spec bases 3.4.1 states:
	An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does, in case of a design-basis-accident, increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Raise the speed of the 2A RRP to increase A loop flow to within 5% of the B loop, Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the requirement to maintain matched flow between Recirc loop to within 5% when power is >70%. While this is true, the loop flow mismatch is <5 also the flow coastdown is the bases for the flow mismatch spec, not the jet pump spec.
DISTRACTOR (C)	Raise the speed of the 2A RRP to increase A loop flow to within 5% of the B loop, Maintain ability to flood reactor to 2/3 core height; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls the requirement to maintain matched flow between Recirc loop to within 5% when power is >70%. While this is true, the loop flow mismatch is <5
DISTRACTOR (D)	Perform Jet Pump Operability ST, Ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who confuses the LOCA bases with the Jet Pump bases

Question 91 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167164
User-Defined ID:	Q #91 NEW
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Topic:	SRO Only Failed Jet Pump
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

Comments:	References No Provided	one	
	K/A		
	Justification		
	SRO-Only N/	A	
	Justification		
	Additional N/	A	
	Information		
	1	General Data	
	Level	SRO	
	Tier	2	
	Group	2	
	KA # and Rating	202001 A2.01 3.9	
	KA Statement	Recirculation; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RECIRCULATION SYSTEM; and (b) based of those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Jet pump failure: Plant-Specific	
	Cognitive level	High	
	Safety Function	1	
	10 CFR 55 Technical Reference Revision No:	e with 6 With 6 With 6 With 6 With 6 With 7 With 7 With 7 With 7 With 7 With 8 With 7 W	
	Question History: (NRC-05)		
	Question Type: (Ne Modified)	w, Bank, New	
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0043A.12	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

92

ID: 2167167

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power

- Annunciator 108-E5, "RPIS INOPERATIVE" is received
- The EO reports that 10Y201 circuit 15 is de-energized

Which one of the following describes the method to determine rod position AND what Tech Spec actions are required?

	Method to Determine Position	T.S. Action Required
Α.	Monitor Full Core Display and 4 rod display per ON-127	Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours
В.	Monitor Full Core Display and 4 rod display per ON-127	Verify position of control rods within 1 hour
C.	I&C Perform IC-11-00730	Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours
D.	I&C Perform IC-11-00730	Verify position of control rods within 1 hour
Answer	: D	
Answe	r Explanation	

ANSWER (D)	I&C Perform IC-11-00730, Verify position of control rods within 1 hour, Correct; A power failure to the RPIS will cause indications to be lost. No indications, such as Full Core Display, 4 rod display, PPC or OD-7 report will function. Therefore, only I&C using the Rod Position Analyzer can determine the positions. From ON-127, step 2.6, CONTACT I&C to perform IC-11-00730, "Determining Control Rod Position Using the Rod Position Analyzer". Tech spec. 3.1.3.7 action for an inoperable system requires the determination of rod position within 1 hour by an alternate method.
DISTRACTOR (A)	Full Core Display and 4 rod display, Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours, Wrong ; Plausible to the candidate who fails to recall that with a loss of RPIS power, the Full Core Display and 4 rod display are inoperable and reads the tech spec and believes that the drift alarm would indicate rod motion. The drift alarm is inoperable when RPIS is inoperable.
DISTRACTOR (B)	Full Core Display and 4 rod display, Verify position of control rods within 1 hour, Wrong ; Plausible to the candidate who does not correctly recall that with a loss of RPIC power, the Full Core Display and 4 rod display are inoperable. They show a historical position but do not update.
DISTRACTOR (C)	I&C Perform IC-11-00730, Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours, Wrong; Plausible to the candidate who reads the tech spec and believes that the drift alarm would indicate rod motion. The drift alarm is inoperable when RPIS is inoperable.

Question 92 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	6			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167167			
User-Defined ID:	Q #92 BANK			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	SRO Only - RPIS IN	IOP Power S	upply	
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A Justification	None		
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	None		
	Information			
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		SRO	
	Tier		2	
	Group		2	
	KA # and Rating		214000 G 2.1.7 4.7	
	KA Statement		Rod Position Information; Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation	
	Cognitive level		High	
	Safety Function		7	
	10 CFR 55		43.5	
	Technical Refere	nce with	ON-127 Rev 001	
	Revision No:		TS 3.1.3.7 Amend 169	
	Question History NRC-05)	: (i.e. LGS		
	Question Type: (I Modified)		Bank(2115253)	
	Revision History: History:	Revision		
	Training Objectiv	e	LGSOPS0073A.04B	

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

93

ID: 2167255

Points: 1.00

Unit 1 is in OPCON 1.

Technicians determine that the following heat detector is non-functional (does not work):

- Heat Detector HD-247-2
- Located in Unit 1 RCIC Pump Room, Rx Enclosure El. 177 ft.

WHICH ONE of the following:

- (1) identifies the TRM action required for the failed detector, and
- (2) identifies whether or not a TRM 3.7.6.2 entry is <u>potentially</u> required for an automatic sprinkler/spray system affected by the failed detector?
 - A. (1) Restore to Operable within 14 days
 - (2) Yes, a TRM entry is potentially required for an effected fire suppression system
 - B. (1) Restore to Operable within 14 days
 - (2) No, a TRM entry is not potentially required for an effected fire suppression system
 - C. (1) Establish an hourly fire watch within 1 hour of discovery
 - (2) Yes, a TRM entry is potentially required for an effected fire suppression system
 - D. (1) Establish an hourly fire watch within 1 hour of discovery
 (2) No, a TRM entry is not potentially required for an effected fire suppression system
 - Answer: C

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

ILT Provided reference(s):

- U/1 TRM 3.3.7.9
- U/1 TRM 3.7.6.2

Part (1) refers to TRM LCO 3.3.7.9 (Fire Detection Instrumentation). This LCO statement clearly states that all of the detectors in a given fire zone shown on Table 3.3.7.9-1 must be OPERABLE. The specific question, here, is whether or not <u>this</u> fire zone is one that answers to this LCO. A review of that Table shows that the RCIC Pump Room 108, Unit 1 Rx.177', does in fact appear on the Table and is identified as Fire Zone 33. Since there are 3 heat detectors in the room, action a.2. applies since the affected detectors are heat not smoke and are part of function B. Therefore Establish an hourly fire watch within 1 hour is the correct answer.

Part (2) refers to TRM LCO 3.7.6.2 (Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems). This LCO statement lists the Fire Zones for which the spray and sprinkler systems must be OPERABLE. Notice that Fire Zone 33 is one of the listed zones. There is a cause-effect relationship between the failed heat detector and the sprinkler system in this Fire Zone. Reason is: Table 3.3.7.9-1 accounts for this heat detector under the column labeled "Heat x/y", and shows there are a total of 3 of these heat detectors in that zone. Notice how they are listed: 0/3. The meaning of the x/y notation is defined on the last page of the Table. We find that the "x" refers to the total number of detectors that provide <u>only</u> "Early Warning Fire Detection and Notification". Similarly, the "y" refers to the number of detectors that also provide "Activation of Fire Suppression Systems". Therefore, from the 0/3 listed on Table 3.3.7.9-1, we can conclude that this failed heat detector is required for that Fire Zone's sprinkler system.

ANSWER (C)	(1) Establish an hourly fire watch within 1 hour of discovery
	(2) Yes, a TRM entry is potentially required for an effected fire
	suppression system: Correct, see explanation above
DISTRACTOR	(1) Restore to Operable within 14 days
(A)	(2) Yes, a TRM entry is potentially required for an effected fire suppression system: Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines action a.1 applies and that more than half of the required detectors are available. However, heat detectors are function B as noted in the note at the bottom of the table and are not subject to action a.1.
DISTRACTOR (B)	 (1) Restore to Operable within 14 days (2) No, a TRM entry is not potentially required for an effected fire suppression system: Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines action a.1 applies and that more than half of the required detectors are available and who does not identify that heat detectors are required to make the sprinkler system operable.
DISTRACTOR (D)	 (1) Establish an hourly fire watch within 1 hour of discovery (2) No, a TRM entry is not potentially required for an effected fire suppression system: Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who incorrectly determines that heat detectors are not a required input to the sprinkler system.

Question 93 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	0.00
System ID:	2167255
User-Defined ID:	Q #93 NEW REF
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN
Topic:	(SRO ONLY) - Recognize TRM Entry for Fire Detection/Suppression
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-ILT

mments:		3.3.7.9 pg 3-92 to 3-96 3.7.6.2 pg. 7-22 to 7-23
	K/A None	
	Justification SRO-Only	
	Justification Additional None	
	Information	
	Gen	eral Data
	Level	SRO
	Tier	2
	Group	2
	KA # and Rating	286000 G 2.2.38
	KA Statement	Fire Protection; Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.
	Cognitive level	High
	Safety Function	8 - Plant Services
	10 CFR 55	43.3
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	U/1 TRM 3.3.7.9 U/1 TRM 3.7.6.2 ARC-MCR-006, I3U Rev #: 0 0 7
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	New
	Question Type: (New, Ban Modified)	k, New
	Revision History:	
	Training Objective	LGSOPS0022.013A

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

94

ID: 2167260

Points: 1.00

************SRO ONLY*********

Which of the following refuel activities REQUIRES a Licensed SRO to DIRECTLY supervise per GP-6.1, "Shutdown Operations - Refueling, Core Alteration and Core Off- Loading?

- 1. Withdrawal of fuel from the vessel
- 2. Control rod removal from a defueled cell
- 3. Insertion of fuel into the vessel
 - A. 1 and 2 ONLY
 - B. 1 and 3 ONLY
 - C. 2 and 3 ONLY
 - D. 1, 2 and 3
 - Answer: B

Answer Explanation

T.S. Def. 1.7: CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a) Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special moveable detectors (including under vessel replacement); and

b) Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

T.S. 6.2.2.d states: "ALL CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation."

ANSWER (B)	1 and 3 ONLY; Correct: From the Tech specs referenced above, Senior Licensed operators must supervise Core Alts and core alts include the movement of fuel and rods in fueled cells. Only 1 and 3 above are fuel movements meeting the definition
DISTRACTOR (A)	1 and 2 ONLY; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that control rods movements are considered Core Alts and would normally be supervised by an SRO but who fails to remember that a defueled cell rod movement is not Core Alt.
DISTRACTOR (C)	2 and 3 ONLY; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that fuel and control rods movements (in a fueled cell) are considered Core Alts but does not recall that rod movement in a defueled cell is not a Core Alt or that removing fuel from the vessel is a core alt.
DISTRACTOR (D)	1, 2 and 3; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recalls that fuel and control rods movements (in a fueled cell) are considered Core Alts but doesn't recall movement in a defueled cell is not a Core Alt.

Question 94 Info						
Question Type:	Multiple Choice					
Status:	Active					
Always select on test?	No					
Authorized for practice?	No					
Points:	1.00					
Time to Complete:	3					
Difficulty:	0.00					
System ID:	2167260					
User-Defined ID:		Q #94 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED	CLOSED				
Topic:	SRO Only - Core Al	terations				
Num Field 1:	LM					
Num Field 2:	SRO-LOW					
Text Field:	LO-ILT					
Comments:	References Provided	None				
	K/A					
	Justification					
		N/A				
	Justification					
		N/A				
	Information	Information				
	General Data					
	Tier		3			
			3			
	Group	Group				
	KA # and Rating		G 2.1.37 4.6			
	KA Statement		Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management			
	Cognitive level		Low			
Safety Function			1 - Reactivity Control			
	10 CFR 55					
	Technical Reference with Revision No:		43.6 LGS Tech Spec 1.7 Rev. 227 LGS Tech Spec 6.2.2 Rev. 198 GP-6.1 Rev. 043			
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)		Oyster Creek 2010 ILT #98			
	Question Type: (I Modified)	· · ·	Bank			
	Question Type: (:	Bank LGSOPS			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

95

ID: 2167317

Points: 1.00

**********SRO ONLY*********

A Unit 1 refueling outage is in progress on day 2

- Secondary Containment Zones 1 and 3 are cross tied
- Rx level is +225 inches
- 1A RHR is in Shutdown cooling

The following activity is in progress:

- B RHR 50 valve (HV-051-050) D/P line flush is in progress, this is a Water Inventory Control (WIC) activity
- GP-17 and Tech spec 3.5.2 have been entered for the WIC activity
- Drain time has been determined to be 7.5 hours

Secondary Containment is declared INOPERABLE due to a seal failure allowing excess in-leakage

Which one of the following describes the actions required?

- A. Ensure that an RHR pump is available for LPCI injection
- B. Suspend WIC activity, immediately initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME to greater than or equal to 36 hours
- C. Within 4 hours, establish Secondary Containment Integrity within the drain time
- D. Place 1 train of standby gas in service per S76.8.A, "Startup and Shutdown of SGTS"

Answer:

Answer Explanation

В

d.	With DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours, immediately:					
	 Initiate action to establish an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level greater than TAF for greater than or equal to 36 hours,*** 					
		itiate action to establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT				
	penetr	. Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room, and				
	 Initiate action to verify one standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation. 					
e.	e. With required ACTION and associated allowed outage time for ACTIONs c. or d. not met, or DRAIN TIME less than 1 hour, immediately initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME to greater than or equal to 36 hours.					
ANSW	ER (B)	Immediately suspend Water Inventory Control activity; Correct: Based on TS 3.5.2.d, Secondary containment is required to be operable and in service. Without Sec Cont. available, the TS is not met and action e. is required which directs the operator to restore from the WIC activity				
(A) This is plausible to the candidate who recognizes that having		Ensure that an RHR pump is available for LPCI injection; Wrong: This is plausible to the candidate who recognizes that having an RHR/LPCI pump operable is a requirement to begin WIC activities per 3.5.2. It is not a LCO action for the loss of Sec. Cont.				
(C) Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who applies the actions of 3		Within 4 hours, establish Secondary Containment Integrity; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who applies the actions of 3.5.2.c. However, this is only true for actions when drain time is <32 hours and >8 hours. This identified work is 7.5 hour drain time.				
DISTRA (D)	ACTOR	Place 1 train of standby gas in service per S76.8.A, "Startup and Shutdown of SGTS" Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who applies the requirements of 3.5.2.d for drain time but does not recognize that this is necessary to begin the WIC evolution and now with the in-leakage, it is not effective. Without Sec. cont., the requirements of action d. are not met and action e. applies.				

Question 95 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167317				
User-Defined ID:	Q #95 NEW R	EF			
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN				
Торіс:	SRO Only - Refue	eling Admin Re	quirements		
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	SRO-LOW				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References Provided	Tech Spec 3	Tech Spec 3.5.2 pg 3. 5-6, 6a, 7		
	K/A Justification				
	SRO-Only	N/A	N/A		
	Justification				
	Additional	N/A			
	Information				
	General Data				
	Level		SRO		
	Tier		3		
	Group				
	KA # and Rating		G 2.1.40 3.9		
	KA Statement		Knowledge of refueling administrative requirement		
	Cognitive level		Low		
	Safety Function		Refueling		
	10 CFR 55		43.		
	Technical Reference with		T.S. 3.5.2 Rev 227		
	Revision No:		GP-17.2 Rev 000		
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)		New		
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New		
	Revision History:				
	Training Objective		LGSOPS		

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

96

ID: 2167356

Points: 1.00

***********SRO ONLY********

Consider the requirements of CC-AA-112, "Temporary Configuration Changes."

WHICH ONE of the following activities requires a Temporary Configuration Change Package per CC-AA-112?

- A. Fuses removed per a Routine Test procedure (RT)
- B. Scaffolding installed (<u>not</u> attached to any plant system/component) above an operating Reactor Feed Pump
- C. Non-safety related relief valve that is mechanically gagged to stop its leakage
- D. Temporary lead shielding installed around a main steam line drain valve to support nearby maintenance

Answer: C

Answer Explanation

Refer to CC-AA-112: section 2.3 defines "Controlled Exclusions" as temporary changes controlled in a manner OTHER THAN by using a TCCP; section 4.2.1 lists some "controlled exclusions", including...temporary lead shielding and scaffolding; section 4.2.12 lists activities that are NOT considered to be "controlled exclusions"...this includes installed scaffolding when it is attached to a plant system/component, and also includes a "gagged or disabled relief valve".

ANSWER: Non-safety related relief valve that is mechanically gagged to stop its leakage

ANSWER (C)	Non-safety related relief valve that is mechanically gagged to stop its leakage; Correct: As noted above, the list of controlled exclusions does not include gagging safety relief valves. All other choices are on the exclusion list.		
DISTRACTOR	Fuses removed per a Routine Test procedure (RT); Wrong: Plausible		
(A)	to the candidate who is not familiar with the exclusions in CC-AA-112.		
. ,	Removing fuses is an exclusion per step 4.2.5		
DISTRACTOR (B)	Scaffolding installed (<u>not</u> attached to any plant system/component) above an operating Reactor Feed Pump; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who is not familiar with the exclusions in CC-AA-112 but recalls that scaffold attached to plant systems does require an TCCP. Unconnected Scaffolding is an exclusion per step 4.2.1		
DISTRACTOR	Temporary lead shielding installed around a main steam line drain		
(D)	valve to support nearby maintenance; Wrong: Plausible to the		
	candidate who is not familiar with the exclusions in CC-AA-112.		
	Temporary Lead Shielding is an exclusion per step 4.2.1		

Question 96 Info					
Question Type:	Multiple Choice				
Status:	Active				
Always select on test?	No				
Authorized for practice?	No				
Points:	1.00				
Time to Complete:	3				
Difficulty:	0.00				
System ID:	2167356				
User-Defined ID:	Q #96 BANK				
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED				
	SRO ONLY - Recognize an a	Iteration that requires Temporary			
Topic:	Config Change controls				
Num Field 1:	LM				
Num Field 2:	SRO-LOW				
Text Field:	LO-ILT				
Comments:	References None Provided				
	K/A None Justification	K/A None			
	SRO-Only N/A Justification				
	Additional None Information Information				
	Level	eral Data SRO			
		3			
	Tier	3			
	Group KA # and Rating	G 2.2.11 3.3			
	KA Statement	Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes			
	Cognitive level	Lower			
	Safety Function				
	10 CFR 55	43.3			
	Technical Reference with Revision No:	CC-AA-112 Rev. 02			
	Question History: (i.e. LGS NRC-05)	6			
	Question Type: (New, Ban Modified)	k , Bank(985683)			
	Revision History:				
	Training Objective	LGSOPS2005.18A			

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

97

ID: 2168697

Points: 1.00

************SRO ONLY*********

Unit 2 is operating at 100% Reactor Power

The Toxic Gas Monitor A has been declared INOP due to a malfunction

I&C Technicians have completed work on the monitor and are ready to retest it.

Technicians must remove the trip condition to test the monitor.

WHICH ONE of the following actions is required to perform the PMT?

- A. Enter LCO 3.0.3, complete the PMT, then exit LCO 3.0.3
- B. Initiate a Control Room Chlorine Isolation until the testing is complete
- C. Administratively declare the equipment Operable to perform the PMT
- D. Enter LCO 3.0.5, complete the PMT, then exit LCO 3.0.5

Answer:

Answer Explanation

D

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

From Tech Spec 3.0.5 and Bases

3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONs may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to the second premise of Specification 3.0.1 and is an exception to Specification 3.0.2 (i.e., to not comply with the applicable ACTION(s)) for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

Bases

Specification 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONs. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to Specifications 3.0.1 and 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable ACTION(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service, or

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONs is limited to the time necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. LCO 3.0.5 should not be used in lieu of other practicable alternatives that comply

with Required Actions and that do not require changing the MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in order to demonstrate equipment is OPERABLE. LCO 3.0.5 is not intended to be used repeatedly.

ANSWER	Enter LCO 3.0.5, complete the PMT, then exit LCO 3.0.5; Correct: as described above
DISTRACTOR	Enter LCO 3.0.3, complete the PMT, then exit LCO 3.0.3; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who fails to recall that Tech Spec 3.0.5 addresses the events listed above, and selects 3.0.3 which are actions to be taken if no other Tech Spec section addresses the conditions
DISTRACTOR	Initiate a Control Room Chlorine Isolation until the testing is complete; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who applies the action b of the TRM as the more conservative action. While this would meet the requirements of the TRM, it is overly conservative and not the desired action as unnecessary use of CREFAS is discouraged.
DISTRACTOR	Administratively declare the equipment Operable to perform the PMT; Wrong: Plausible to the examinee who confuses the actions for a PCIV which are to open the valve under administrative control, not to declare the system OPERABLE under admin control.

Question 97 Info			
Question Type:	Multiple Choice		
Status:	Active		
Always select on test?	No		
Authorized for practice?	No		
Points:	1.00		
Time to Complete:	3		
Difficulty:	0.00		
System ID:	2168697		
User-Defined ID:	Q #97 NEW		
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED		
Торіс:	SRO - Knowledge o requirements	f pre and pos	t maintenance operability
Num Field 1:	LM		
Num Field 2:	SRO-LOW		
Text Field:	LO-ILT		
Comments:			
	References Provided	None	
	K/A Justification	None	
	SRO-Only Justification knowledge section (inc the requirer		nee is required to exercise of Tech Spec Applicability cluding 3.0.5) which contains ments for restoring equipme during PMTs.
	Additional Information	Additional None	
		Genera	l Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		3
	Group		N/A
	KA # and Rating		G2.2.21 SRO 4.1
	KA # and Kating KA Statement		Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements
	Cognitive level		Low
	Safety Function		N/A
	10 CFR 55		43(b)(2)
	Technical Refere	Technical Reference with	
	Revision No:		TS 3.0.5 Amend. 234
	Question History NRC-05)	·	New
	Question Type: (I Modified)	· · · · ·	New
	Revision History:		
	Training Objectiv	'e	LGSOPS1800 - 6

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

98

ID: 2168717

Points: 1.00

********** SRO ONLY **********

LGS has declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Command & Control has been transferred to the TSC.

Consider the following ERO personnel:

- 1. Shift Manager / Shift Emergency Director
- 2. Radiation Protection Manager
- 3. Station Emergency Director

WHICH ONE of the following identifies (from the above list) <u>ALL</u> of those who can **APPROVE** an "Authorization for Emergency Exposure" form for a worker to receive exposure greater than 25 Rem TEDE?

- A. 1 only
- B. 1 and 2 only
- C. 2 and 3 only
- D. 3 only

Answer:

Answer Explanation

D

Refer to EP-AA-113-F-02 (Authorization for Emergency Exposure). The Shift Manager / Shift Emergency Director may <u>approve prior</u> to transferring Command and Control to the Station Emergency Director. After the transfer of command and control, only the Station Emergency Director can approve the emergency exposure.

ANSWER (D)	3 Only; Correct: Correct for the reasons described above.			
DISTRACTOR (A)	1 Only; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recognizes that the Shift Manager is always the initial "Emergency Director" and so believes that he/she still approves the exposure even after transferring command and control			
DISTRACTOR (B)	1 and 2 Only; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who recognizes that the Shift Manager is always the initial "Emergency Director" and so believes that he/she still approves the exposure even after transferring command and control and plausible to the candidate who believes that since the RPM approves Admin limit extensions they also can approve emergency exposures.			
DISTRACTOR (C)	2 and 3 Only; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who believes that since the RPM approves Admin limit extensions they also can approve emergency exposures			

Question 98 Info	
Question Type:	Multiple Choice
Status:	Active
Always select on test?	No
Authorized for practice?	No
Points:	1.00
Time to Complete:	3
Difficulty:	2.00
System ID:	2168717
User-Defined ID:	Q #98 BANK
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED
Торіс:	(SRO) Recall who can Approve an Emergency Exposure request
Num Field 1:	LM
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH
Text Field:	LO-I

Comments:	References No Provided	one	
		22	
		one	
	Justification	•	
		N/A	
	Justification Additional No		
	Information	None	
		Genera	Data
	Level		SRO
	Tier		3
	Group		n/a
	KA # and Rating		2.3.13 3.8
	KA Statement		Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas aligning filters, etc
	Cognitive level		high
	Safety Function		n/a
	10 CFR 55		43.4
	Technical Reference	e with	EP-AA-113
	Revision No:		RP-AA
	Question History: (NRC-05)		1685033 2015 NRC
	Question Type: (Ne Modified)	w, Bank,	Bank
	Revision History:		
	Training Objective		LGSOPS

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

99

ID: 2167378

Points: 1.00

A Site Area Emergency is declared at LGS and the TSC cannot be staffed due to hazardous travel conditions.

The EOF is fully staffed and is ready to assume command and control function.

Per EP-AA-112-F-01, "Command and Control Turnover Briefing Form", which of the following responsibilities are retained by the shift emergency director and what is the time limit to inform the NRC of the <u>Emergency declaration</u>?

Answer Ex	planation	
Answer:	С	
D.	Event Classification	15 minutes
C.	Event Classification	60 minutes
В.	State and local notifications	15 minutes
Α.	State and local notifications	60 minutes
SED Responsibilities Time to		Time to Inform NRC

Per EP-AA-112-F				
	Control, of the following functions will be performed by:			
a. Event Classification				
	itions			
	Exposure Controls			
	n-Making			
e. State/Local I	Notifications	🗖 CR 📮 EOF		
	ATIONAL ACTIONS			
4.1. <u>Secu</u>	ity Related Events			
A. U	SE site-specific Operations/Security proced	lures for:		
1)	NRC Expedited Communications - NO within 15 minutes as required.	TIFY the NRC		
ANSWER (C)	Event Classification, 60 minutes; Correct: Based on given, an emergency with travel conditions preventing th TSC, therefore command and control will to be transferre EOF. However, the EOF does not perform Event classi Therefore per EP-AA-112-F-01, this task remains with the NRC is required to be notified within 60 minutes.	e staffing of the ed directly to the fication.		
DISTRACTOR (A)	State and local notifications, 60 minutes; Wrong: Pla candidate who recalls that Event classification normally g and assumes that this function travels to the EOF and will State and Local notifications are performed using EONs control room and assumes that would remain the case.	goes to the TSC ho recalls that the		
DISTRACTOR (B)	State and local notifications, 15 minutes; Wrong: F candidate who recalls that Event classification normally g and assumes that this function travels to the EOF and will State and Local notifications are performed using EONs control room and assumes that would remain the case. state and local notifications are required in 15 minutes ar same for the NRC.	ho recalls that the software from the Also recalls that		
DISTRACTOR (D)	Event Classification, 15 minutes; Wrong: Plausible t who recalls that state and local notifications are required assumes the same for the NRC			

Question 99 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
Time to Complete:	3			
Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167378			
User-Defined ID:	Q #99 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	CLOSED			
Topic:	SRO Only - EP in	nplementation		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	SRO-LOW			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	None		
	K/A	None		
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	None		
	Information			
		Genera	l Data	
	Level		SRO	
	Tier		3	
	Group		· ·	
		a	2.4.38 4.4	
	KA # and Rating KA Statement Cognitive level		Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.	
			Low	
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55		43.5	
	Technical Refe	rence with		
	Revision No:	Tence with	EP-AA-112-F-01 Rev. I	
	Question Histo	nv: (i o I GS		
	NRC-05)	iy. (i.e. 103		
	Question Type: Modified)	: (New, Bank,	New	
	Revision Histor	rv:	New	
Training Objective				

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

100

ID: 2167417

Points: 1.00

************SRO ONLY**********

Unit 1 LOCA is in progress following operation at 100%:

- A protest is in progress at the entrance to the access road
- A General Emergency has been declared per FG1
- No turnover of command and control has taken place
- No previous notifications have been made
- Post LOCA Rad Monitors are steady at 3345 R/Hr
- Wind direction is from 236°

WHICH ONE of the following identifies the required PAR (if any)?

- A. Shelter 5 mile radius
- B. Evacuate 2 mile Radius and Evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E
- C. Shelter 2 mile Radius and Shelter 2 5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E
- D. Evacuate 2 mile Radius and Evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E and Shelter 5-10 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E

Answer: B

Answer Explanation

LGS ILT 20-1 NRC SRO Exam Test ID: 346747

From the stem conditions, there is a protest which does not constitute a hostile action so NO Hostile Action Event in progress. There are NO impediments to evacuation and MCR has not been evacuated. The stem also indicates that this is an initial PAR (no previous notifications made) and that it is being made from the MCR (command and control has not been turned over). Refer to EP-AA-111-F-11 PAR Flowchart. A General Emergency has been declared out of Fission Product Barrier Matrix (FG1), therefore a PAR is required.

Per The Fission Product Barrier Matrix, Primary Containment is lost or potentially lost; however, the conditions for EAL RG1 have not been given to the candidate they should therefore not assume it is met Post LOCA Rad is 3345 R/Hr which is below the threshold for Rapid progression. Therefore the answer is **Evacuate 2 mile Radius and Evacuate 2-5 miles in** in sectors A / B / C / D / E.

ANSWER (B)	Evacuate 2 mile Radius and Evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E; Correct: As described above
DISTRACTOR (A)	Shelter 5 mile radius; Wrong: Plausible to the candidate who determines that a hostile action event is in progress
DISTRACTOR (C)	Shelter 2 mile Radius and Shelter 2 - 5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E; Wrong: Plausible to the student who determines that sheltering is required due to failed containment This is not correct. To get to that leg of the PAR flowchart, the PAR would have to come from the TSC. The option for sheltering is only for non-MCR PARS
DISTRACTOR (D)	Evacuate 2 mile Radius and Evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors A / B / C / D / E and Shelter 5-10 miles in sectors; Wrong: Plausible to the student who determines that this is a rapidly progressing severe accident based on containment rad reading. This would be due to a mis-interpretation of the value in the flow chart. The requirement is 2.36E+04 R/Hr which is actually 23600 R/Hr. therefore, the conditions for rapidly progressing severe accident not met

Question 100 Info				
Question Type:	Multiple Choice			
Status:	Active			
Always select on test?	No			
Authorized for practice?	No			
Points:	1.00			
	3			
Time to Complete: Difficulty:	0.00			
System ID:	2167417			
User-Defined ID:	Q #100 NEW			
Cross Reference Number:	OPEN			
Topic:	SRO ONLY - Det	ermine PAR		
Num Field 1:	LM			
Num Field 2:	SRO-HIGH			
Text Field:	LO-ILT			
Comments:	References Provided	EP-AA-111-F	-11	
	K/A	None		
	Justification			
	SRO-Only	N/A		
	Justification			
	Additional	None		
	Information			
		General	Data	
	Level		SRO	
	Tier		3	
	Group		N/A	
	KA # and Ratir	ng	2.4.44 4.4	
	KA Statement		Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations	
	Cognitive level	1	High	
	•		N/A	
	Safety Function			
	10 CFR 55	43.5		
Technical Reference with Revision No:		erence with	EP-AA-111-F-11 Rev. D EP-AA-1008 Add 3 Rev 5	
	Question Histo NRC-05)		New	
	Question Type: (New, Bank, Modified)		New	
Revision History: Training Objective				
		tive	LGSOPS0051.25	