UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

September 7, 2021

Mr. Joel P. Gebbie
Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2021010 AND 05000316/2021010

Dear Mr. Gebbie:

On August 5, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On August 5, 2021 the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Signed by Feliz-Adorno, Nestor
on 09/07/21

Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

Enclosure:
As stated

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Letter to Joel Gebbie from Néstor Féliz Adorno dated September 7, 2021.

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2021010 AND 05000316/2021010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:	DPR-58 and DPR-74
Report Numbers:	05000315/2021010 and 05000316/2021010
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2021-010-0045
Licensee:	Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:	Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Location:	Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:	July 19, 2021 to August 05, 2021
Inspectors:	E. Fernandez, Reactor Inspector J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector R. Ng, Project Engineer G. O'Dwyer, Reactor Engineer
Approved By:	Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensee's corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.

- Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action program's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the ice condenser glycol chiller system.

- Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.

- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment: Assessment of the Corrective Action Program	71152B

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the Corrective Action Program. The team determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the Corrective Action Program completely and accurately. The inspectors determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety.

The team also noted that some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, that had not been previously identified by licensee staff and were subsequently entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, the licensee also utilized Corrective Action Program support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit process and the Operating Experience Program. For example, the licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits to identify issues in station processes. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both NRC and industry operating experience and entered them into the Corrective Action Program when they were applicable to the station.

The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the Corrective Action Program to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

The team performed a 5-year review of the ice condenser glycol chiller issues. As part of this review, the team interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the plant health report, and reviewed selected corrective actions and condition evaluation documents. The team concluded that the ice condenser glycol chiller concerns were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program at a low threshold and were resolved in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. The team did not identify any additional issues.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Initial Screening Committee and the Management Screening Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. In addition, the team observed a healthy dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues.

In general, once a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified, the Corrective Action Program directed that an equipment operability or functionality review be performed. As a result, most of the samples reviewed were evaluated in a timely manner. However, the team

noted examples of condition reports that had less than adequate documentation of evaluation activities. The details of this issue are documented in the observation section below.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with Corrective Action Program requirements. The team determined that the licensee generally assigned corrective actions that were effective and timely for NRC identified issues and licensee event reports (LERs).

Assessment: Use of Operating Experience	71152B

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee's performance in the use of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. The team observed the Operating Experience Screening Committee meeting and determined that the licensee initiated actions in the Corrective Action Program to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed the information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as issue reviews and investigations. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.

Assessment: Self-Assessments and Audits	71152B

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and nuclear oversight audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the Corrective Action Program itself. The licensee's Nuclear Oversight (NOS) identified deficiencies with the licensee's processes and those issues were addressed by the station through the Corrective Action Program. The team did not identify any concern in this area.

Assessment: Safety Conscious Work Environment	71152B

The team reviewed the results from the 2019 Employee Concerns Annual Assessment, the 2019 and 2020 departmental safety culture surveys and the 2020 Gallup survey. The team also conducted one-on-one interviews with 23 licensee staff concerning the effectiveness of the Corrective Action Program, the ability to raise issues, and the freedom from potential retaliation for raising issues. The team did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment.

In general, the licensee's staff was aware of and familiar with the Corrective Action Program and other processes to raise nuclear safety concerns, such as the Employee Concerns Program. Licensee staff indicated they could raise nuclear safety concerns without a fear of retaliation. The team did not identify examples of retaliation for raising nuclear safety

concerns. The licensee staff interviewed believed that operational issues and issues with high safety significance were being appropriately addressed in a timely manner.

Minor Violation: Failure to Follow the Operability Evaluation Procedure	71152B

Minor Violation: In 2015, an NRC Component Design Bases Inspection identified a finding for the licensee's failure to appropriately establish the in-service inspection boundaries for the safety-related component cooling water system. As part of the corrective actions, the licensee performed Engineering Change (EC) 56391 to upgrade steam generator sample coolers 1-QC-501-6 and 2-QC-501-9 from Seismic Class III to Seismic Class I.

On March 4, 2019, during the walkdown being performed in support of this EC, the licensee noted that support for cooler 1-QC-501-6 was missing the bottom unistrut bolt and support for cooler 2-QC-501-9 was missing a top mounting bolt. The licensee initiated AR 2019-1940 to document the missing bolts. The shift manager stated in the operability review section of the AR that an operability justification was not required because the support was Seismic Class III (not safety related). The licensee also created Work Order Task 55529607-01 to replace the bolts.

In May 2019, the missing top mounting bolt on cooler 2-QC-501-9 was replaced. However, the missing bottom unistrut bolt on cooler 1-QC-501-6 was not accessible and therefore not replaced. The work order was subsequently closed in June 2019.

In January 2020, the licensee discovered that the work order was closed and wrote AR 2020-0255 to ask Engineering to accept the condition as-is. However, engineering stated in the AR that evaluating the acceptance of the missing bolt as-is required significant engineering resources. Therefore, work order 55561980 was initiated to replace the missing bolt, which was in planning status at the time of this inspection.

During this inspection, the team noted the licensee incorrectly treated the affected piping section as Seismic Category III when evaluating the need to perform an operability determination. Procedure PMP-7030-OPR-001, "Operability Determination," Revision 37, required an operability evaluation for Seismic Class I components such as this piping section. The team determined that the failure to follow this procedure was a performance deficiency and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency was minor because it did not adversely affect the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in reasonable doubt about the equipment's seismic qualifications as the licensee did not have to revise any calculation or evaluation to resolve the associated operability concerns.

Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Lack of Technical Rigor in Corrective Action Program Evaluation	71152B

The team noted examples of lack of technical rigor in corrective action program evaluations, including:

- The licensee's audit determined a vendor's quality assurance program was ineffective as documented in AR 2019-12088. The licensee removed the vendor from the Approved Suppliers' List / Quality Suppliers' List and concluded items received from that vendor after January 2017 required additional quality evaluation for acceptance or rejection. The licensee also determined that a sight glass provided by this vendor was installed on the oil reservoir for the Unit 1 east charging pump 1-PP-50E. The licensee performed discrepant condition evaluation (DCE) 2020-0390 to evaluate the impact of the non-qualified sight glass to the charging system and initiated work order 55542705 to replace the sight glass with a quality-related part. The DCE concluded that the sight glass had the same form, fit and function as a quality assurance (QA) qualified installation. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the part would maintain the required integrity with no additional justification. However, the team concluded the DCE did not provide sufficient technical justification because it did not consider relevant attributes such as seismic qualifications, material properties and equipment qualification (EQ) as the licensee would have to perform for the unqualified spare parts. The inspectors determined there was no significant safety impact since the sight glass was replaced within a reasonable amount of time.

- The licensee generated AR 2020-4967 for degraded essential service water piping due to flow accelerated corrosion. The licensee determined that the minimum allowable wall thickness criteria established in procedures for certain areas were non-conservative due to the presence of welded piping attachments. The licensee created assignments to correct the calculations, revise the affected inspection procedures, and review the extend of condition. However, the team noted the licensee did not establish an interim action until the procedures were revised. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as AR 2021-6742 and planned to revise the affected procedures to add interim guidance. The licensee did not identify examples of unacceptable wall thickness that were deemed acceptable due to the non-conservative acceptance criteria.

- The licensee failed to perform an operability evaluation because it incorrectly determined the affected component was Seismic Class III (not safety related). This issue was documented as a minor violation in this inspection report.

The inspectors concluded that the lack of technical rigor in corrective action program evaluation represented a weakness in addressing deficient conditions. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as AR 2021-7077.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On August 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to you and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents		Security Survey Results	07/2019
			Material Management Survey Results	08/2019
			Chemistry/Environmental Survey Results	11/2019
			Work Control and Schedule Survey Results	09/2020
		2010-11114	Exposed Insulation Found During U2C19 Recirc Sump Walkdown	10/19/2010
		2013-13536	NRC Comment on Methodology of Vortex Calculations	09/13/2013
		2013-16557	Cable Tray and Conduit Overfill Issues	10/28/2013
		2014-14190	Failure of 2D5 Synch Circuit	11/12/2014
		2014-15099	Identified a Pin Hole Leak in 2-HV-AFP-EAC ESW Piping	10/02/2014
		2015-4459	ISI-Scope Deferral for U2C22	03/31/2015
		2016-12216	U2C23 Baffle-Former Bolt UT Inspection Results	10/23/2016
		2016-1537	AR 2016-1537 Plant and Drawing Configuration Discrepancy for Condensate System	02/08/2016
		2016-7752	PRT Seismic Anchor Movement	06/30/2016
		2017-11986	1SI-158-L2/L3 Leakage Above Acceptance Criteria	11/22/2017
		2017-4740	Loss of CCS Charging Warrants an AOP	05/09/2017
		2017-7596	Floor Drain Credited in Fire Modeling Are Not Monitored	08/07/2017
		2017-9084	AR 2017-9084, 12-OME-129-9 Glycol Chiller #9 Trouble Alarm	09/16/2017
		20174-5989	N-Train Battery Charger Part Evaluation	06/15/2017
		2018-10025	AR 2018-10025 Update Drawing Desktop Guide	10/30/2018
		2018-1045	Missed Security Patrol	02/01/2018
		2018-10451	NRC Inspection QHSA-71124.05 Rad Monitoring Instrumentation	11/15/2018
		2018-11245	12-DR-GCS2 Missing Required Door Sweep	12/17/2018
		2018-6613	Inadequate Evaluation of LOCA Anchor Motions	06/26/2018
		2018-7204	Deficiency of Evaluation of Emergency Level Conditions	07/17/2018
		2018-9690	1-OME-150-AB Fuel Line Leak Near #6 Rear Fuel Injector	10/16/2018
		2019-10855-4	Review Installation of Sight Glass in 1-PP-50E	01/14/2020
		2019-11077	Drop in Frequency Noted During LOP/LOCA Testing	11/07/2019

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		2019-12088	Vendor Quality Program Ineffective	12/11/2019
		2019-12191	GT 2019-12191, Cook Review of NRC IN-2012-22, Rev 1: Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Item (CRSI) Training Offerings	11/20/2019
		2019-12255	Corrosion in Fire Protection Piping	12/17/2019
		2019-1349	Bent Hanger in U2-East RHR Pump Room 2-GRH-V819	02/11/2019
		2019-1398	Determine Impact (CDI) for Completion of SD-180820-001	02/12/2019
		2019-4190	Air Void Per UT is Unacceptable Location Prior to 1-IMO-261	04/21/2019
		2019-5275	Transcript Error of SRD Calibration	05/16/2019
		2019-6691	Negative Trend of INPO Radiation Protection Events Indicator	07/08/2019
		2019-6882	AR 2019-6882, Unit 2 Ice Bed Temps above ESOMS Notification Limits	07/15/2019
		2019-6998	AR 2019-6998 Unexpected Alarm in Unit 2 Control Room	07/18/2019
		2019-7047	Received a 204 Drop 13 South NESW PP Strainer DP High	07/21/2019
		2019-7276	AR 2019-7276 Intermittent Alarm 2-SG-7 PT 162	07/27/2019
		2019-8320	AR 2019-8320 Unit 2 ITS 5.5.12.d Specific Requirements May Not Being Met	08/29/2019
		2020-0255	WOT 55529607 Was Not Completed as Prescribed	01/09/2020
		2020-0390	1-PP-50E, Replace Sight Glass Installed Under WO 55455925	01/13/2020
		2020-0529	Update Specs to Support Section XI Requirements	01/16/2020
		2020-10105	MTS UPS Condition Identified During PM	12/10/2020
		2020-10439	GT 2020-10439 Cook Review of IN 2020-004 - Operating Experience Related to Failure of Buried Fire Protection Main Yard Piping	12/23/2020
		2020-10440	GT 2020-10440 Cook Review of IN 2018-11, SUPPLEMENT 1: QA Record Falsification at Kobe Steel and Other International Vendors 12/23/2020	12/23/2020
		2020-1047	ACE AR 2020-1047, Gland Seal Effluent RMS High Range Reading	12/16/2020
		2020-1877	CCE AR 2020-1877 ERO Qualification Process and Tracking in PQM	01/13/2021
		2020-2027	Failed Operations Surveillance	02/28/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		2020-2642	ACE AR 2020-2642 Radiation Monitor Communication to Control Room Lost	06/25/2020
		2020-3709	RCE CR 2020-3709 RCS Leak - Plug Unit 1 NRV-163/NRV-164 Bellows Tell-Tale at the Bonnet	08/04/2020
		2020-3739	ACE AR 2020-3739, 2-NRI-32 is Slowly Failing Low	09/19/2020
		2020-4285	Actions are Not Always Changing Workflow State as Required	05/20/2020
		2020-4891	AR 2020-4891, 1-VTR-185 High Temp Alarm	06/15/2020
		2020-4946	Wrong Radiation Work Permit used to Enter the U2 Vestibule	06/17/2020
		2020-4967	Degraded ESW Pipe Downstream of 1-WMO-715	06/17/2020
		2020-6117	NOS Identified Deficient Execution of Fire Door Surveillance	08/03/2020
		2020-7242	GT 2020-7242, Cook Review of IN 2020-02 – FLEX Diesel Generator Operational Challenges	11/23/2020
		2020-8177	Performance Issues/Common Cause	10/05/2020
		2021-0169	Cook Review of IN 2007-21, Supplement 1: Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibration and Reflective Metal Insulation	01/06/2021
		2021-2008	CCE AR 2021-2008, Glycol Chiller Failure Possible Trend	04/28/2021
		2021-2838	CCE AR 2021-2838 Vulnerabilities introduced During Design Modifications	04/05/2021
		2021-2858	AR 2021-2858 U2 Ice Condenser FME Walkdown	04/06/2021
		2021-3139	AR 2021-3139 Disparity in Unit 2 Source Range Readings	04/17/2021
		2021-4239	AR 2021-4239, 2-NRV-152 Failed as Found Stroke Time on Backup Air	05/11/2021
		2021-4250	GT 2021-4250 Cook Opex Review of NRC IN 21-01, Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants	05/11/2021
		2021-4721	Steam/Water Leak on 2FW-115-4	05/21/2021
		2021-4722	28 DPM Condensate Leak	05/22/2021
		2021-4743	2-SV-1A-4 Steam Leak	05/23/2021
		2021-4750	Leak by on 1-CW-344E	05/23/2021
		2021-4812	Minor RCS Back Leakage Suspected Through 1-SI-152S	05/25/2021
		2021-4817	WR Only to Install Missing Clips on CCW Cooling Coils	05/25/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		2021-4882	1-OME-34W Packing Leaks on Inlet and Outlet Valves	05/26/2021
		2021-5016	U2 CD EDG Coalescing Filter Air Leak	06/01/2021
		GT 2020-10549	White Finding for Check Valve Not Meeting IST Requirements	12/30/2020
		GT 2021-1076	Perform OE Evaluation for James A Fitzpatrick Finding	02/01/2021
		GT 2021-2166	Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-19-5 Rev. 1	03/09/2021
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	2021-6378	Drawing Updated Prematurely and EDB Impacts Missed	07/22/2021
		2021-6638	Operability Review of CR 2019-1940 & Seismic Class	07/29/2021
		2021-6742	Interim Guidance Not Developed for UT Exam	08/03/2021
		2021-6785	Attachments Not Attached to AR 2019-1349-2	08/04/2021
		2021-6809	DIT / Calc Guidance for FAC Tmins Do Not Include WPA Stresses	08/04/2021
		2021-7077	Observation of Technical Rigor in ENG Products	08/16/2021
		2021-7078	NRC Observation on CR Generation Rates	08/16/2021
	Engineering Evaluations	03554	DIT-B-03554-00-Provided Program Engineering with Minimum Allowable Pipe Wall Thicknesses	11/22/2013
	Miscellaneous		Operations Survey Results	06/2019
		5700-11	Interim Acceptance Criteria for Safety Related Piping System	2
	NDE Reports	1-OHP-4030-102-017	RCS Pressure Isolation Valves Leak Rate Surveillance Test	10/20/2020
	Procedures	12-EHP-5043-EDC-001	Evaluation of Degraded/Nonconforming Conditions	029
		12-MHP-5021-032-018	Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Injector Maintenance	15
		ECP-01	Employee Concerns Program Administration Manual	10
		PMI-7030	Corrective Action Program	46
		PMP-7030-CAP-001	Action Initiation	41
		PMP-7030-CAP-002	Condition Action and Closure	38
		PMP-7030-MOP-001	Corrective Action Program Management Oversight Process	32
		PMP-7030-OPR-	Operability Determination	037

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		001		
	Self-Assessments	2019-1575-1	GT 2019-1575-1; CRE Program Full SA; ESYN; System Engineering NSSS	09/25/2019
		2019-8560	AR 2019-8560 DIT Inappropriately Updated BOM for SI Pumps Caused Configuration Change	09/09/2019
		2019-8779	ARM-19-09-01 Mods Not Adequately Prepared with Excess Emergent Problems After Implementation	10/17/2019
		2021-6317	AR 2021-6317; 1-WRV-723: AB Emergency Diesel North Combustion Air Aftercooler HE-47-ABN ESW Inlet/Bypass Valve	07/20/2021
		GT 2019-11203	Improvement Actions	11/10/2019
		GT 2020-8602	Biennial PI&R Inspection	02/25/2021
		NOS 19-04	Material Control, and Measuring and Test Equipment	07/25/2019
		NOS-19-03	Maintenance, Work Control, and Special Processes	06/25/2019
		NOS-19-05	Nuclear Oversight Audit - Corrective Action Program	07/29/2019
		NOS-19-08	NOS Audit - Engineering, Design Control, & In-Service Inspection (ISI)/In-Service Testing (IST)	10/17/2019
		NOS-20-03	NOS Audit NOS-20-03, “Emergency Preparedness”	04/04/2020
		NOS-21-01	REMP/ODCM	04/08/2021
		SA-2019-ECP-001	2019 Employee Concerns Annual Assessment	01/17/2020
	Work Orders	55547169	Plug Unit 1 NRV-163 and NRV-164 Bellows Tell-Tale at the Bonnet	11/05/2020