



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION IV
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

August 2, 2021

Mr. Grover Hettel, Interim Chief Executive Officer
Energy Northwest
MD 1023
P.O. Box 968
Richland, WA 99352

SUBJECT: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000397/2021002

Dear Mr. Hettel:

On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On July 14, 2021, NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000397
License No. NPF-21

Enclosure:
As stated

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COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000397/2021002 – DATED August 2, 2021

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000397

License Number: NPF-21

Report Number: 05000397/2021002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-002-0104

Licensee: Energy Northwest

Facility: Columbia Generating Station

Location: Richland, Washington

Inspection Dates: April 01, 2021, to June 30, 2021

Inspectors: N. Hernandez, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
L. Merker, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Donley, Resident Inspector
D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist
B. Baca, Health Physicist
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
E. Simpson, Health Physicist

Approved By: Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified NCV is documented in the Inspection Results Section under IP 71111.13.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Install an Adequate Pressure Hose in Support of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Test			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000397/2021002-01 Open/Closed	[H.12] - Avoid Complacency	71111.20
<p>A Green, self-revealed violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified on June 11, 2021, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure OSP-RPV-R801, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Leakage Test,” Revision 33 and Work Order (WO) 02144095 task 18. Specifically, a mechanical jumper (hose) used to support the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) leak test was installed, but it was not the correct pressure rating listed in the WO instructions. As a result, the hose ruptured at approximately 760 psi, RPV pressure, which led to an uncontrolled drop in RPV pressure until the ruptured hose was isolated.</p>			
Inadequate Scaffold Procedure Results in Scaffold Installed Without Adequate Engineering Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000397/2021002-02 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71152
<p>The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” because Energy Northwest did not ensure procedures were in place to adequately direct the conduct of evaluations of temporary scaffolding constructed in the vicinity of safety-related components. Specifically, NRC inspectors identified that scaffolds erected with clearances of less than two inches to safety-related equipment were not consistently receiving engineering evaluations, engineering evaluations that were conducted were inadequate in scope, and records were not maintained to demonstrate the engineering basis of those evaluations. As a result, the site had an inconsistent process that either failed to perform engineering evaluations or performed inadequate engineering evaluations that were not documented.</p>			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Columbia Generating Station began the report period at 96 percent rated thermal power (RTP), coasting down for a planned refueling outage (RFO). Columbia reached 84 percent RTP before shutting down on May 8, 2021, for the RFO. Columbia started up the reactor on June 16, 2021, synchronized and tied the main generator to the electrical grid on June 20, 2021, ending the outage. The station achieved 100 percent RTP on June 20, 2021, and remained at that power level through the end of the report period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance, and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework, and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status"; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely, and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following systems on June 2, 2021:
 - standby service water system A
 - standby service water system B
 - emergency diesel generator 1
 - emergency diesel generator 2
 - transformer yard

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) high pressure core spray system on May 3, 2021
- (2) residual heat removal system B while aligned for shutdown cooling on May 26, 2021
- (3) standby service water system A following maintenance on May 26, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) fire area R-5, division 2 motor control center room, on April 8, 2021
- (2) fire area R-5/1, residual heat removal system A pump room, on May 10, 2021
- (3) fire area R-2/U, containment (drywell), on May 10, 2021
- (4) fire area R-2, reactor building, on May 20, 2021
- (5) fire area R-7/1, residual heat removal pump room C, on June 23, 2021

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation, and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from May 18–21, 2021:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

The inspectors evaluated nondestructive examination activities by observing the following activities:

- a) Ultrasonic Examinations
 - i) reactor recirculation control, nozzle 1B, nozzle to vessel and inner radius welds, (Report R-R25-034)
 - ii) reactor recirculation control nozzle 2A, AAFE end to nozzle, (Report APR-R23-01)
 - iii) reactor recirculation control nozzle 2A, nozzle to vessel, (Report AVR-R24-02)
 - iv) reactor coolant isolation cooling, 10-RCIC (12)-2 pipe to elbow, (Report R-R25-029)

- v) reactor coolant isolation cooling, 10-RCIC (12)-3 elbow to pipe, (Report R-R25-028)
- vi) reactor coolant isolation cooling, 10-RCIC (12)-10A pipe to pipe, (Report R-R25-031)
- vii) reactor coolant isolation cooling, 10-RCIC (12)-13 pipe to elbow, (Report R-R25-030)

b) Radiographic Examinations

- i) reactor water cleanup spool piece welds for MD valve 71/72

c) Visual Examinations

- i) main steam head vent piping bolting, MS-RPV-3 (Report 5-21-8-1)
- ii) reactor in-vessel visual examination of jet pump 17/18 riser
- iii) reactor core isolation cooling strut RCIC-1C-13, (Report 4HV-197)
- iv) reactor core isolation cooling strut RCIC-1C-2, (Report 4HV-198)
- v) reactor core isolation cooling spring can RCIC-61, (Report 4HV-199)
- vi) reactor core isolation cooling spring can RCIC-66, (Report 4HV-200)

The inspector reviewed and evaluated the following welding activities:

a) Gas Tungsten Arc Welding

- i) main steam lines startup drain isolation motor operated valve MD-V-71 and MD-V-72 replacement, weld records 2-14279 and 2-14264

b) Shielded Metal Arc Welding

- i) pipe to RWCU-HX-1C weld per EC 16475, weld record 2-14158

Problem Identification and Resolution review of Inservice items

The inspector evaluated a sample of 25 condition reports associated with inservice inspection activities. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the refueling outage for reactor cavity drain down, reactor pressure vessel leak test, the associated pre-job briefs, and performance of control rod drive scram testing June 8 - 12, 2021.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensed operator regualification program evaluated simulator scenario (Crew F) on April 13, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Division 1 4kV bus (SM-7) outage maintenance to ensure the structures, systems, and components remained capable of performing their intended function on June 3, 2021.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) residual heat removal system A out-of-service, on April 26, 2021
- (2) planned switchyard maintenance with standby diesel generator 3 out-of-service on April 28, 2021
- (3) yellow risk for planned switchyard maintenance on April 30, 2021
- (4) yellow risk for loss of reactor building ventilation on May 16, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) residual heat removal system A following inservice inspection identification of four indications in one-of-four seismic restraints on April 12, 2021
- (2) residual heat removal system A gas intrusion on April 12, 2021
- (3) damage to reactor core isolation cooling system pipe support RCIC-976S on May 18, 2021
- (4) standby service water pumps A and B following temporary scaffolding placement error on June 2, 2021
- (5) evaluation of reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity following a heatup transient on June 16, 2021

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) reactor protection systems trip system B following logic board replacement on May 7, 2021
- (2) 18.1.7, SW-P-1A baseline test, following replacement of the 1A standby service water pump motor on May 24, 2021

- (3) TSP-RCS-R802, Division 2 high-low pressure interface valve leak test, following corrective maintenance for residual heat removal valve RHR-V-8 on June 10, 2021
- (4) TSP-CEP/X67-R802; LLRT of CEP-V-3A, CEP-V-3B, CEP-V-4A, CEP-V-4B; following maintenance of containment exhaust purge valves CEP-V-3A and CEP-V-4A on June 22, 2021

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage R25 activities from May 8, 2021, to June 19, 2021.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

- (1) ISP-MS-X309, turbine trip valve closure and turbine governor valve fast closure trip bypass testing, on April 7, 2021
- (2) SOP-RWM-START, rod worth minimizer testing, on May 7, 2021
- (3) TSP-DG1/LOCA-B501, standby diesel generator 1 loss-of-coolant accident test, on May 10, 2021
- (4) OSP-RPV-R801, reactor pressure vessel leakage test, on June 12, 2021
- (5) TSP-CRD-C101, control rod drive scram timing with auto scram timer system, on June 21, 2021

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) ESP-SW/IST-Q701, standby service water system temperature control valve 11A operability, on April 20, 2021

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) TSP-RHR/X-11B-C801, local leak rate test of residual heat removal valves 16B and 17B, on June 7, 2021

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the emergency planning drill (Emergency Response Organization Team B) on April 6, 2021.

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee-identified the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits (RWPs) used to access high radiation areas.

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiation Work Packages

- RWP 30004739, "Dryer Separator Pit Entry **Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA)**," Revision 0
- RWP 30004661, "Dry Well/Steam Tunnel In-service Inspection/Non-destructive Examination/Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program and Support **LHRA**," Revision 1
- RWP 30004704, "Dry Well Reactor Recirculation System Motor Replacement/Work **LHRA**," Revision 2

Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms

- Accumulated dose alarm - a worker received an alarm while working in the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and not properly monitoring exposure. (AR-00415351)
- Dose rate alarm – a carpenter received an unanticipated dose rate alarm of 52 mrem per hour on a RWP set-point of 50 mrem per hour while climbing a scaffold during an RCA entry. (AR-00418294)
- Accumulated dose alarm - a worker received an unexpected and unverified dose alarm. Dosimeter recorded dose rates were significantly higher than the area survey results and the dosimeters of two coworkers in the area. The dosimeter was taken out-of-service for calibration/repair. (AR-00417622)

Labeling of Containers

- two low specific activity individually tagged yellow bags of dry active Waste (DAW) on the rad waste building 437-foot elevation
- one 55-gallon drum of contaminated hoses on the reactor building 548-foot elevation
- one contaminated turbine bypass tool storage box on the reactor building dry well 501-foot elevation
- one low specific activity individually tagged yellow bag of DAW on the reactor building spent fuel pool area 606-foot elevation

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material. The inspectors performed the following:

- (1) observed licensee conduct surveys of potentially contaminated equipment leaving the RCA and exiting high contamination areas in the dry well during the current refueling outage
- (2) evaluated the licensee's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and contaminated materials stored within the spent fuel pool
- (3) walked down the storage locations for selected non-exempt radioactive sources listed in the licensee's Technical Specification Source Inventory:
 - J.L. Shepherd Model 78-2M Calibrator (Cs-137)
 - J.L. Shepherd Model 89 Mini Calibrator (Cs-137)
 - J.L. Shepherd Portable Unit (Cs-137)

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observations of radiological work activities, to include areas with airborne or the potential for airborne radioactivity. The following activities and work packages were reviewed:

- (1) decontamination of valve body and valve seat replacement of reactor feedwater-V-32B under RWP 30004706, "Refueling Outage 25 (R25) Steam Tunnel Replace Seats on Reactor Feedwater Valve 32B **High Radiation Area**," Revision 0
- (2) reactor recirculation pump maintenance activities under RWP 30004704, "R25 drywell reactor recirculation motor replacement work **LHRA**," Revision 1
- (3) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) heat removal heat exchanger maintenance activities under RWP-30004619, "R25 Reactor Water Cleanup Pump Rooms and Mezzanine **LHRA**," Revision 0

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

- (1) rad waste building, 437-foot elevation, room C-111 shield wall door
- (2) rad waste building, 437-foot elevation, room C-113 shield wall door
- (3) rad waste building, 437-foot elevation, room C-115 shield wall door
- (4) rad waste building, 437-foot elevation, resin processing cage

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (4 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work controls.

- (1) RWP 30004639, "R25 Dry Well/Valve Room/Steam Tunnel Health Physics Support, **LHRA**," Revision 0

- (2) RWP 30004676, "Wet Well/ Reactor Dive Inspection (Divers), **LHRA**," Revision 0
- (3) RWP 30004732, "RWCU Heat Exchanger Room-Install New Heat Exchanger and Piping **LHRA**," Revision 0
- (4) RWP 30004706, "R25 Steam Tunnel Replace Seals on RFW-V-32A & 32B **High Radiation Area**," Revision 0

Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during multiple activities.

- (1) These activities included:
 - general worker activity within the dry well/wet well/steam tunnel on multiple tasks in lock high radiation areas
 - pipe and hose removal for the RWCU heat exchanger replacement activity
 - radiation protection coverage during multiple tasks within locked high radiation areas and when diving was occurring
 - radiation worker practices within the dry well during the reactor recirculation system motor replacement activity

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:

- (1) control room emergency filtration system
- (2) technical support center filtration system

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

- (1) high efficiency particulate air ventilation for RFW-V-32A and RFW-V-32B valve seat replacement under RWP 30004706, "R25 Steam Tunnel Replace Seals on RFW-V-32A & 32B **High Radiation Area**," Revision 0
- (2) high efficiency particulate air ventilation for RWCU heat exchanger replacement piping removal under RWP 30004732, "RWCU Heat Exchanger Room-Install New Heat Exchanger and Piping **LHRA**," Revision 0

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use of respiratory protection devices.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

- (1) June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 03.15) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 03.16) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's ability to identify issues regarding site scaffolding, evaluate each occurrence, and implement corrective actions; and documented one observation on May 19, 2021.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related evaluation of the standby liquid control level tank instrumentation design and corrective actions on June 10, 2021.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	71111.13
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
Violation: 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), states in part, that before performing maintenance activities (including, but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, on March 30, 2021, before performing maintenance activities, operations and work control personnel failed to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk that resulted from the proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, during maintenance that transferred the power source of the backup transformer, E-TR-B, from the normal power source to a non-credited source	

(White Bluffs 115 kV line) the risk was classified as Paragon Green when it should have been Paragon Yellow. On March 30, 2021, at 0700 PST, operations declared the backup transformer inoperable but available and risk was Paragon Green.

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors evaluated the licensee-identified violation using IMC 0609, Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," dated October 16, 2020, Flowchart 1, "Assessment of Risk Deficit," and determined the need to calculate the risk deficit to determine the significance of this issue. Upon request, the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment group estimated the incremental core damage probability deficit to be approximately 8.5E-10. In accordance with Flowchart 1 in Appendix K, because the core damage probability deficit was less than 1E-6 and the incremental large early release probability deficit was less than 1E-7, the violation screened as having very low safety significance (Green).

Corrective Action References: 417786, 417799

Observation: Increase in Scaffolding Issues Identified	71111.15
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The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions related to a potential trend increase of scaffolding issues. From January 1, 2021, to May 14, 2021, the licensee initiated 58 ARs related to scaffolding. The inspectors noted that 14 of the ARs documented clearance issues where scaffolding was built within two inches of site components, contrary to Plant Procedure Manual (PPM) 10.2.53, "Scaffolding," Revision 49. The inspectors evaluated each clearance performance deficiency and determined the following:

- one AR documented a licensee-identified performance deficiency of minor safety significance
- two ARs documented NRC-identified performance deficiencies of minor safety significance
- one AR documented a licensee-identified finding of low safety significance (Green) that did not result in a violation any NRC requirements
- ten ARs documented NRC-identified performance deficiencies of low safety significance (Green) with four examples detailed in NCV 05000397/2021002-02

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, evaluations, and corrective actions related to these ARs. In each instance, the licensee adequately followed site procedures to identify, evaluate, and correct the issue. The inspectors identified that the licensee was aware of the increasing trend of scaffolding issues and performed a site walkdown to identify any additional scaffolding issues but did not initiate an AR to document the results of the walkdown by the end of shift, contrary to PPM SWP-CAP-01, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 44. The licensee initiated AR 416868 to document this issue. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency and determined it was of minor safety significance.

Failure to Install an Adequate Pressure Hose in Support of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Test			
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Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000397/2021002-01	[H.12] - Avoid Complacency	71111.20

	Open/Closed		
<p>A Green, self-revealed violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified on June 11, 2021, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure OSP-RPV-R801, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Leakage Test," Revision 33 and WO 02144095 task 18. Specifically, a mechanical jumper (hose) used to support the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) leak test was installed, but it was not the correct pressure rating as listed in the WO instructions. As a result, the hose ruptured at approximately 760 psi RPV pressure, which led to an uncontrolled drop in RPV pressure until the ruptured hose was isolated.</p>			
<p><u>Description:</u> On June 11, 2021, while the plant was in Mode 4, the licensee conducted the RPV leakage test in accordance with licensee procedure OSP-RPV-R801, Revision 33. At approximately 760 psi RPV pressure, the test was aborted when the control room received indications of lowering RPV pressure. The licensee determined that a mechanical jumper used to pressurize portions of the main feed system had ruptured in the main steam tunnel. The mechanical jumper was required to be installed per step 9.1.12 of licensee procedure OSP-PV-R801 and WO 02144095 task 18. According to the WO instructions, the licensee should have installed a 3000-psi rated hose between RFW-V-30A/31A and MS-V-25B/26B. The licensee determined the installed hose was rated for 300 psi. Before repeating the RPV leak test on June 12, 2021, the licensee updated the procedure to remove the need to install a mechanical jumper if the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) was in service and returning to the reactor feed water piping. This method also exposes the feedwater piping to the RPV test pressure as the mechanical jumper was intended to do.</p> <p>Corrective Actions: The licensee aborted the RPV leak test, then isolated and removed the ruptured pressure hose from the main steam tunnel. The licensee also revised licensee procedure OSP-RPV-R801 which removed the need to install a mechanical jumper if RWCU is in service and connected to the reactor feed water piping.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: 421766</p>			
<p><u>Performance Assessment:</u></p> <p>Performance Deficiency: The failure to install an adequate hose per licensee procedure OSP-RPV-801 and WO 02144095 task 18 in support of the RPV leak test was a performance deficiency. As a result, on June 11, 2021, at approximately 760 psi RPV pressure, the hose ruptured (in the main steam tunnel) and the RPV leak test was aborted.</p> <p>Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the ruptured hose resulted in an uncontrolled drop in RPV pressure (plant transient) during the RPV leak test and challenged the inventory control shutdown safety function.</p> <p>Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix G, "Shutdown Safety SDP." The inspectors assessed this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated March 1, 2020. The finding screened to Green, very low safety significance, when considering the "Loss of Inventory (LOI) Initiator" screening questions in Exhibit 2, "Initiating Events Screening Questions." Specifically, this</p>			

event would not result in a loss of the decay heat removal method in 24 hours or less and was considered self-limiting leakage.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. The individual(s) involved with installing the hose failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools by not verifying the required pressure rating of the hose before it was installed.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, requires, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. Licensee procedure OSP-RPV-R801, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Leakage Test", Revision 33 and WO 02144095 task 18 prescribed the procedures for the RPV leak test performed on June 10, 2021. Section 9.1.12.a of the procedure required the installation of a mechanical jumper (hose) between RFW-V-30A/31A and MS-V025B/26B and WO 02144095 task 18 required installation of a 3000-psi rated hose between these valves.

Contrary to the above, from June 10, 2021 until June 11, 2021, the licensee did not accomplish the RPV pressure vessel leakage test, an activity affecting quality, in accordance with documented instructions and procedures. Specifically, the licensee installed a hose rated for 300-psi between RFW-V-30A/31A and MS-V-025B/26B in performance of the RPV pressure vessel leakage test. As a result, the hose ruptured at approximately 760 psi in the RPV and led to an uncontrolled drop in RPV pressure until the ruptured hose was isolated. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as AR 421766 and conducted the RPV leak test satisfactorily on June 12, 2021.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Inadequate Scaffold Procedure Results in Scaffold Installed Without Adequate Engineering Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000397/2021002-02 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71152
The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Energy Northwest did not ensure procedures were in place to adequately direct the conduct of evaluations of temporary scaffolding constructed in the vicinity of safety-related components. Specifically, NRC inspectors identified that scaffolds erected with clearances of less than two inches to safety-related equipment were not consistently receiving engineering evaluations, engineering evaluations that were conducted were inadequate in scope, and records were not maintained to demonstrate the engineering basis of those evaluations. As a result, the site had an inconsistent process that either failed to perform engineering evaluations or performed inadequate engineering evaluations that were not documented.			

Description: Temporary scaffolding installed in the plant must be controlled to ensure it is not installed too closely to safety-related equipment without an appropriate evaluation. During a seismic event, scaffolding installed too closely to safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) can come into contact with that equipment, cause damage to it, and affect its safety function. Energy Northwest procedures control the installation and evaluation of temporary scaffolds at Columbia Generating Station. Licensee procedure SWP-DES-01, "Plant Modification and Configuration Control," Revision 19, Section 3.5.8, states, in part, "changes (e.g., setpoints, scaffolding, temporary shielding) should be procedurally controlled. Such procedures should have Engineering review/verification, approval, and oversight to ensure design basis is maintained." Plant Program Manual (PPM) 10.2.53, "Scaffolds," Revision 48, is the procedure used by site personnel to construct scaffolds in the plant. PPM 10.2.53, Section 4.3.4, states, in part, "On identification of scaffold configurations outside of the generic configuration (Section 7.4.3), an engineering assessment is to be performed." PPM 10.2.53 does not place requirements on the scope, conduct, or record-keeping of the engineering evaluation, and does not ensure that scaffolding constructed in the vicinity of SSCs is appropriately evaluated in accordance with the site wide procedure requirements to provide reasonable assurance that temporary scaffolding will not impact safety-related equipment during a seismic event. The procedure allows for engineering evaluations to be performed over the telephone, which has led to incomplete and inconsistent engineering evaluations. The procedure includes a clearance requirement of 2 inches or greater that is intended to ensure the as-built scaffold configuration remains bounded by the site design basis seismic event in accordance with calculation CE-02-87-29, "Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding," Revision 1. In the following examples, NRC inspectors determined that craft personnel did not understand when to contact engineering for evaluations, however, the engineering department also did not understand engineering evaluation standards or record-keeping requirements.

Example 1. On February 22, 2021, during a routine walkdown of the standby service water pump houses, the NRC resident inspectors noted that temporary scaffolds were erected around both standby service water pumps and that both scaffolds had horizontal support poles within 2 inches of the pumps. The NRC inspectors located the associated scaffold tags and noted that the engineering evaluation signatures were blank. PPM 10.2.53, Section 7.4.4.q, states, in part, "If the two-inch minimum clearance cannot be maintained to safety-related equipment, contact engineering for an evaluation." When asked, the engineering department was unable to provide an evaluation for the as found condition as the craft did not recognize the need for the evaluation due to vague guidance in PPM 10.2.53, and never contacted the engineering department. The engineering department was unable to provide reasonable assurance that the service water pumps would remain operable during a seismic event and performed a calculation to demonstrate operability during the design basis seismic event. Engineering personnel drafted engineering change (EC) 18684 that provided reasonable assurance that the service water pumps would remain operable during the design basis seismic event.

Example 2. On March 2, 2021, during a routine walkdown of the residual heat removal (RHR) C pump room, the NRC resident inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding was in contact with a tie rod/support on the pump suction line. The engineering evaluation signature on the scaffold tag was blank. When asked, the engineering department was unable to provide an evaluation for the as found condition as the craft did not recognize the need for the evaluation due to vague guidance in PPM 10.2.53, and never contacted the engineering department. Engineering personnel walked down the scaffolding, performed a qualitative review, and determined that a design basis seismic event would not impact the operation of

the pump. Engineering department personnel signed the scaffold tag that the engineering evaluation had been completed but did not generate a record of the evaluation as PPM 10.2.53 does not require a record of the engineering evaluation outside of the initials on the tag. When asked to show the engineering basis for why the as-built scaffolding was bounded by the existing site scaffolding calculation, CE-02-87-29, "Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding," Revision 1, the licensee was unable to provide any documentation that an adequate evaluation as required by SWP-DES-01 and PPM 10.2.53 was performed since engineering judgment was used to approve the as-built scaffold configuration.

Example 3. On March 16, 2021, during a routine walkdown of the RHR A pump room, the NRC resident inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding was in contact in two places with RHR pump A. The inspectors noted that the scaffold tag indicated that the engineering evaluation was completed and signed for "via Telecom." When asked to provide the engineering evaluation for review, the engineering department informed the resident office that the initials on the tag constitute that an engineering evaluation was performed, but there was not a record to review as PPM 10.2.53 does not require a record of the engineering evaluation to be generated outside of the initials on the tag. The engineering department also indicated that it is common practice to have a scaffold builder describe the as-built scaffold over the phone and have that scaffold builder sign the tag as having a completed engineering evaluation. When asked how many points of contact were evaluated, what the aspect ratio of the as-built scaffold was, the size of the bays, and the number of joints on the scaffold, the engineering department was unable to answer those questions. When asked to review the personal notes for engineering evaluation approval, the licensee informed the residents that no notes existed. Engineering performed a walkdown of the pump and identified a third scaffold clearance less than 2 inches, and also identified a loose buckle. Engineering performed a qualitative review and determined the temporary scaffold would not impact operation of the pump during a design basis seismic event, but again did not generate a record to demonstrate the engineering basis for how the as-built scaffold is bounded by calculation CE-02-87-29 since engineering judgment was used to approve the as-built scaffold configuration.

Example 4. On May 17, 2021, during a routine walkdown of the high pressure core spray pump room, the NRC resident inspectors noted that a temporary scaffold was in contact with the pump motor grounding wire and within 2 inches of the pump's discharge piping. The inspectors noted that the scaffold tag was annotated that the engineering evaluation was "approved, signed via Telecom." When asked to provide the engineering evaluation for review, the engineering department informed the resident office that the initials on the tag constitute that an engineering evaluation was performed, but there was not a record to review as PPM 10.2.53 does not require a record of the engineering evaluation to be generated outside of the initials on the tag. The engineering department also indicated that it is common practice to have a scaffold builder describe the as-built scaffold over the phone and have that scaffold builder sign the tag as having a completed engineering evaluation. The engineering department performed a walkdown of the HPCS pump room, found several loose planks that were not in accordance with PPM 10.2.53, performed a calculation for the loose planks, concluded that the clearance issues and loose planks would not impact the operation of the pump during a design basis event, and documented the results of the evaluation on a draft new form that was part of the PPM 10.2.53 procedure revision.

The licensee stated on March 23, 2021, in AR 417526, that there were deficiencies with procedure PPM 10.2.53, which make understanding procedure requirements difficult and that the procedure uses outdated seismic calculations that hamper the installation of Excell brand

scaffold configurations in Seismic Category 1 areas of the plant. The licensee is in the process of revising PPM 10.2.53 to address these deficiencies.

Corrective Actions: The licensee reconfigured the temporary scaffolding around the standby service water pumps, corrected the loose buckle, performed an investigation template, and had engineers walk down and evaluate all of the clearances that were less than 2 inches.

The licensee has placed more stringent requirements on engineers performing evaluations and generated condition reports to track these items.

Corrective Action References: 416419, 416420, 417361, 412522, 413873, 414095, 416883, 416770, 416821, 416868, 416887, 417386, 417567, 417535, 417575, 417526, 417554, 417570

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide an adequate scaffold procedure that provided clear guidance for engineering evaluations when temporary scaffold is erected in close proximity to safety-related SSCs was a performance deficiency. The inspectors identified four examples of scaffolding within 2 inches of safety-related equipment that did not have an adequate engineering evaluation.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The performance deficiency was sufficiently similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 3.g. Absent NRC intervention, the licensee did not have the procedural controls in place to prevent scaffolding from interfering with safety-related seismic targets. Specifically, the licensee's practices of not informing the engineering department of clearances less than 2 inches to safety-related equipment, not performing adequate engineering evaluations (e.g., the use of engineering judgment and/or approving temporary scaffolds by telephonic communication and review), and failing to document the engineering basis for why the as-built configuration was bounded by the existing calculation may eventually result in scaffolds interfering with the operation of safety-related equipment during a seismic event.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, when faced with scaffold construction that may not have met PPM 10.2.53 requirements, craft personnel assumed the scaffolds were adequate and did not contact the engineering department for an evaluation. When contacted by craft personnel, engineering department personnel assumed a walkdown of the as-built scaffolds was not required, assumed engineering judgment was an adequate engineering evaluation, and assumed a signature on the scaffold tag was justification for continued reasonable assurance of operability during a design basis seismic event.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with those procedures.

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not ensure that procedures prescribing the construction and evaluation of temporary scaffolding in the vicinity of safety-related SSCs, activities affecting quality, were appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in accordance with those procedures. Specifically, NRC inspectors identified four examples of temporary scaffolding that were erected within 2 inches of safety-related equipment without an adequate engineering evaluation directed by the applicable procedure, PPM 10.2.53, "Scaffolds," Revision 48.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On May 20, 2021, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. R. Schuetz, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 20, 2021, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection debrief inspection results to Mr. R. Schuetz, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 14, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. G. Hettel, Interim Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Procedures	ABN-SW	Service Water Trouble	015
71111.01	Procedures	ABN-TRANSFORMER	Transformer Abnormal Operation	028
71111.01	Procedures	SOP-HOTWEATHER-OPS	Hot Weather Operations	007
71111.01	Procedures	SOP-WARMWEATHER-OPS	Warm Weather Operations	017
71111.01	Work Orders		02141151	
71111.04	Drawings	M-521-2	System Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal Loop "B"	117
71111.04	Drawings	M520	HPCS and LPCS Systems Flow Diagram	105
71111.04	Procedures	1.3.29	Locked Valve Checklist	088
71111.04	Procedures	SOP-HPCS-LU	HPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup	004
71111.04	Procedures	SOP-HPCS-STBY	Placing HPCS in Standby Status	004
71111.04	Procedures	SOP-RHR-LU	RHR System Valve and Breaker Lineup	009
71111.04	Procedures	SOP-RHR-SDC	RHR Shutdown Cooling	034
71111.05	Calculations	FP-02-85-03	Combustible Loading Calculation	011
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	419293	
71111.05	Fire Plans	PFP-RB-422	Reactor 422	006
71111.05	Fire Plans	PFP-RB-501	Reactor 501	003
71111.05	Fire Plans	PFP-RB-572	Reactor 572	004
71111.05	Procedures	1.3.10	Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation	036
71111.05	Procedures	1.3.10A	Control of Ignition Sources	017
71111.05	Procedures	1.3.10C	Control of Combustibles	022
71111.05	Procedures	SOP-ENTRY-DW	Personnel Entry into Drywell	027
71111.05	Procedures	SWP-FPP-01	Nuclear Fire Protection Program	008
71111.08G	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	392872, 393624, 403227, 403454, 405654, 405968, 408368, 408850, 409044, 409642, 409808, 409824, 409930, 410217, 410242, 410929, 411795, 411809, 412412, 413063, 413900, 414023, 414044, 414216,	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			415536, 416085, 416689	
71111.08G	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	Action Requests (ARs)	419968, 419969	
71111.08G	Drawings	4HV-200, Visual Examination Data Sheet - Component Supports	RCIC - 66	05/23/2021
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	ADAMS document	Columbia Generating Station - Approval for Relief Request 4ISI-09, Regarding Alternate Examination of Feedwater Nozzles (EPID L-2020-LLR-0068) Accession No. ML21096A048	04/14/2021
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	ADAMS Document	RFI Request for Columbia Generating Station ISI Inspection (May 2021) Accession No. ML21068A284	03/04/2021
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	ADAMS Document	Columbia Generating Station - Request to use a Provision of a later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (EPID L-2021-LLR-0015) Accession No. ML21061A211	03/25/2021
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	ADAMS Document	Columbia Generating Station – Request to use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (EPID L-2021-LLR-0015) Accession No. ML21081A150	03/25/2021
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	Certificates of Qualification	Qualification Certificates for Level II and III personnel	Various
71111.08G	Miscellaneous	Licensee letter to NRC	Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program 4ISI-10, Request to use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI	03/01/2021
71111.08G	Procedures	ISI-4	Inservice Inspection Program Plan - Interval 4	004
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Control Instructions SPS-7-3	Visual Inspection - Component Supports	002

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Control Instructions, SPS-3-3	Liquid Penetrant Examination - Columbia Generating Station - ISI	002
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Control Instructions, SPS-7-1	Visual Examination	004
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Control Instructions, SPS-7-4	Visual Examination of Containment	002
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Control Instructions, SPS-7-5	In-vessel Visual Inspection of the RPV Internals (IVVI)	009
71111.08G	Procedures	NDE Special Process Instructions, SPS-4-3	Magnetic Particle Examination Columbia Generating Station IS	002
71111.08G	Procedures	Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) 10.2.18	Maintenance Welding Program	019
71111.08G	Work Orders		02116563, 02116563-01, 02116563-02, 02145058-01, 02145058-02, 02145907-01, 02145907-02, 02145907-03, 02145907-04, 02145907-05, 02149774-01, 02152608, 02152608-01, 02154006, 02154006-01, 02110811-01	
71111.11Q	Miscellaneous		Crew F Cycle 21-2 Critique Summary	04/12/2021
71111.11Q	Miscellaneous	LR002518	Cycle 21-2 Evaluated Scenario	000
71111.11Q	Procedures	13.1.1	Classifying the Emergency	049
71111.11Q	Procedures	13.1.1A	Classifying the Emergency – Technical Bases	034
71111.11Q	Procedures	OI-09	Operations Standards and Expectation	079
71111.11Q	Procedures	OI-15	EOP and EAL Clarifications	033
71111.11Q	Procedures	OI-35	Conduct of Event Critiques and Operator Fundamentals	010

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.11Q	Procedures	TDI-08	Licensed Operator Requalification Program	018
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	419753, 419808, 419758	
71111.12	Procedures	ABN-ELEC-INV	120 VAC Critical Distribution System Failures	017
71111.12	Procedures	SOP-ELEC-IN1-OPS	IN-1 and E-US-PP Operations	005
71111.12	Procedures	SOP-ELEC-IN1-START	IN-1 Start	005
71111.12	Procedures	SOP-ELEC-SM7-MAINT	Removing/Restoring E-SM-7, E-SL-71, E-SL-73, and E-SM-75 From/To Service	020
71111.12	Work Orders		02146020	
71111.13	Calculations	ME-02-08-15	Determination of Allowable Volumes of Air/Gas in the RCIC and ECCS Discharge Piping	003
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	417799, 417786, 400346, 418184, 418190, 420012, 419750, 419729	
71111.13	Miscellaneous		Paragon Risk Assessment	04/28/2021
71111.13	Miscellaneous		Control Room Logs, May 15-17, 2021	
71111.13	Procedures	1.3.68	Work Management Process	036
71111.13	Procedures	1.3.76	Integrated Risk Management	060
71111.13	Procedures	1.5.14	Risk Assessment and Management for Maintenance/Surveillance Activities	043
71111.13	Procedures	OI-53	Offsite Power	015
71111.13	Procedures	OSP-RHR-M101	RHR A Fill Verification	022
71111.13	Procedures	SOP-ELEC-DIV1-TEMPPOWER	Div. 1 Outage Temporary Power Installation/Removal	021
71111.13	Procedures	SOP-ELEC-PP7AA-MAINT	Removing/Restoring E-PP-7AA From/To Service	001
71111.13	Work Orders		02137154, 29159087	
71111.15	Calculations	CE-02-87-29	Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding	001
71111.15	Calculations	EC 018684	Scaffolding Closer than 2 Inches to SW-M-P1/A and SW-M-P1/B	000
71111.15	Calculations	ME-02-08-15	Determination of Allowable Volumes of Air/Gas in the RCIC and ECCS Discharge Piping	003
71111.15	Calculations	ME-02-92-43	Room Temperature Calculation for DG Building, Reactor	013

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Building, Radwaste Building and Service Water	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	419968, 418105, 418184, 418190, 417140, 416419, 416420, 417361, 412522, 413873, 414095, 416883, 416887, 419968, 421579	
71111.15	Drawings	AED MID DM135	Containment Composite Plan at EL 545'-6"	G
71111.15	Drawings	AED STL S777	Structural Reactor Building Radial Plans, Sheet 1	042
71111.15	Drawings	AED STL S797	Structural Reactor Building Containment Vessel, Sheet 4	018
71111.15	Drawings	AED STL S801	Structural Containment Vessel, Sheet 8	025
71111.15	Drawings	RCIC-668-1-2	RHR Condensing Mode Steam Supply RHR-HX-1A & RHR-HX-1B	014
71111.15	Engineering Changes	18679	ME-02-92-43, EC 16619 Chiller Analysis Revision	000
71111.15	Engineering Changes	18733	Engineering Evaluation for RHR-HX-1A Upper Restraint Indication	000
71111.15	Engineering Changes	18736	Engineering Evaluation for Voids in RHR System A	000
71111.15	Engineering Evaluations	EC 18804	Evaluation of RCIC-976S Pipe Support and RCIC(12)-4 CL-1 Piping	000
71111.15	Engineering Evaluations	EC 18835	Evaluate RCPB Integrity per ASME Code Requirements Following a Heatup Transient in Mode 2, Cycle 26 Startup from R25	000
71111.15	Miscellaneous		Technical Issue Resolution – Excessive Voids in RHR-SYS-A	04/11/2021
71111.15	Miscellaneous	4-21-21-1	Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement Data Sheet	04/11/2021
71111.15	Miscellaneous	CNF-ISI-001	Customer Notification Form – 4RHR-006	04/07/2021
71111.15	Procedures	1.3.66	Operability Determination	037
71111.15	Procedures	10.2.53	Scaffolding	049
71111.15	Procedures	OSP-RCS-C101	RPV Heatup Surveillance	013
71111.15	Procedures	OSP-RHR-M101	RHR A Fill Verification	022
71111.15	Procedures	TSP-CR/HVAC-B101	Control Room AC Heat Load Capacity Test - Div 1	009
71111.15	Work Orders		02149770, 29159159, 29159087, 02147565, 02169565	
71111.19	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	254077, 420412, 419581, 419773, 421649, 419710, 421804, 421875	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.19	Drawings	EWD-15E-047	Electrical Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System RPS-PP-C72/P001 Circuit Breaker & Control Panel	011
71111.19	Procedures	1.3.74	Repair Process	008
71111.19	Procedures	10.2.235	Overhaul Procedure for Bettis NT520-SR2 and NT820-SR3 Spring Return Air Actuators	001
71111.19	Procedures	10.24.241	Flow Makeup and Pressure Decay Leak Rate Testing	003
71111.19	Procedures	10.24.242	High/Low Pressure Hydraulic Leak Rate Testing Water Cart Operations	004
71111.19	Procedures	ESP-EPA3B3D-S901	Electrical Protection Assemblies RPS-EPA-3B and RPS-EPA-3D-CFT/CC	014
71111.19	Procedures	IST-4	Inservice Testing Program Plan, Fourth Ten-year Inspection Interval	005
71111.19	Procedures	TSP-CEP/X67-R802	LLRT of CEP-V-3A, CEP-V-3B, CEP-V-4A, CEP-V-4B	002
71111.19	Procedures	TSP-RCS-R802	Division 2 High-Low Pressure Interface Valve Leak Test	017, 018, 019
71111.19	Work Orders		02136595, 02153579, 0215809844, 02107556, 02142984, 02081706, 02144009, 02180846	
71111.20	Calculations	NE-02-94-14	Calculation for Determination of Containment Integrated Leak Rate from %day to SCCM	002
71111.20	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	419458, 419749, 419866, 420214, 420599, 420725, 420992, 420982, 420988, 421180, 421835, 422408, 395368, 398329	
71111.20	Drawings		Cycle 26 Core Map	
71111.20	Miscellaneous		R25 Outage Shutdown Safety Plan	000
71111.20	Miscellaneous		Reactivity Control Plan May 2021 Cycle 25 EOC Shutdown	04/29/2021
71111.20	Miscellaneous	0-RCIC-SYS/R25-001	R25 RCIC Clearance	05/28/2021
71111.20	Miscellaneous	POC 21-08	Plant Operations Committee (POC) Meeting Package 21-08	06/12/2021
71111.20	Procedures	1.20.3	Outage Risk Management	013
71111.20	Procedures	1.3.40	Outage Mode Change, Refueling Activity Readiness, and ISFSI Activity Readiness Evaluation	028
71111.20	Procedures	1.3.5	Reactor Trip Report	027
71111.20	Procedures	1.3.64	Plant Clearance Order	042

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71111.20	Procedures	1.3.76	Integrated Risk Management	060
71111.20	Procedures	1.3.84	Reactivity Management Control	006, 007
71111.20	Procedures	3.1.11	Final Feedwater Temperature Reduction	012
71111.20	Procedures	3.1.2	Reactor Plant Startup	089
71111.20	Procedures	3.2.1	Normal Plant Shutdown	096
71111.20	Procedures	3.3.1	Reactor Scram	066
71111.20	Procedures	6.3.2	Fuel Movement with the Refueling Bridge	027
71111.20	Procedures	6.3.5	Full Core Verification	013
71111.20	Procedures	9.3.12	Plant Power Maneuvering	037
71111.20	Procedures	LLRT-01	Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program	008
71111.20	Procedures	OI-12	Clearance Order Instruction	057
71111.20	Procedures	OMI-3.2	Shutdown Safety Plan Development and Approval Process	012
71111.20	Procedures	OSP-RPS-B401	Mode Switch Shutdown Position CFT	005
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-CAVITY-DRAIN	Reactor Cavity and Dryer Separator Pit Draining	011
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-CR-MOVEMENT	Control Rod Movement	005
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-FPC-ASSIST-ALT	Alternate Fuel Pool Cooling Assist	013
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-MT-SHUTDOWN	Main Turbine Shutdown	015
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-MT-START	Main Turbine Start	030
71111.20	Procedures	SOP-REFUEL-OPS	Refueling Bridge Operations	012
71111.20	Procedures	SWP-FFD-04	Work Hour Controls	009
71111.20	Procedures	SWP-RXE-01	Reactivity Management Program	006
71111.20	Procedures	TSP-CONT-R801	Containment Isolation Valve and Penetration Leak Test Program	016
71111.20	Work Orders		02143651, 02111609	
71111.22	Calculations	E/I-02-92-1070	Calculation for Setting Range Determination	001
71111.22	Calculations	ME-02-17-02	Control Room Habitability During a LOCA with LOOP and Emergency A/C Coils Aligned to Emergency Chillers (CCH)	000
71111.22	Corrective Action	Action Requests	217444, 204656, 350866, 376348, 415425, 418083,	

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	Documents	(ARs)	395207, 326587, 328726	
71111.22	Drawings	EWD-15E-006	Reactor Protection System, Trip System A Sensor Relays	002
71111.22	Drawings	M775	Emergency Chilled Water Piping System Control Room Flow Diagram	030
71111.22	Engineering Changes	16840	ME-02-17-02 Rev. 0 Credit CCH for MCR Equipment Operability (EC 16619)	000
71111.22	Miscellaneous		Operator Logs: April 7 – 8, 2021	04/12/2021
71111.22	Miscellaneous		Operator Logs: May 10, 2021	
71111.22	Miscellaneous	IST-4	Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-year Inspection Interval	005
71111.22	Procedures	1.3.76	Integrated Risk Management	060
71111.22	Procedures	10.24.241	Flow Makeup and Pressure Decay Leak Rate Testing	003
71111.22	Procedures	ESP-SW/IST-Q701	SW-TCV-11A Operability	011
71111.22	Procedures	ISP-MS-X309	RPS and EOC Pump Trip – TTV Closure and TGV Fast Closure Trip Bypass MS-PS-3C – CFT/CC	011
71111.22	Procedures	OSP-RWM-C402	Rod Worth Minimizer CFT Prior to Shutdown	007
71111.22	Procedures	SOP-RWM-START	Rod Worth Minimizer Start	007
71111.22	Procedures	TSP-CRD-C101	CRD SCRAM Timing with Auto SCRAM Timer System	029
71111.22	Procedures	TSP-DG1/LOCA-B501	Standby Diesel Generator DG 1 LOCA Test	034
71111.22	Work Orders		02159227, 02155656, 02155988, 02155989, 02148025, 02153566, 02144095, 02141951	
71114.06	Miscellaneous		Columbia Generating Station ERO Team “B” Drill Report April 6, 2021 After Action Report / Improvement Plan	04/29/2021
71114.06	Miscellaneous	24075	Columbia Generating Station Classification Notification Form (CNF)	024
71114.06	Miscellaneous	25665	Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet	004
71114.06	Miscellaneous	25810	Energy Northwest Emergency Director Turnover Sheet	009
71114.06	Miscellaneous	26045	Energy Northwest Emergency Classification or Other Emergency Messages Form	036
71114.06	Miscellaneous	26050	Energy Northwest Public Address Emergency Message for Protected Area Evacuation Form	014

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71114.06	Miscellaneous	26051	Energy Northwest Public Address Emergency Message for Site Evacuation Form	013
71114.06	Miscellaneous	26501	Energy Northwest Shift Manager Checklist	007
71114.06	Procedures	13.1.1	Classifying the Emergency	049
71114.06	Procedures	13.1.1A	Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases	034
71114.06	Procedures	13.10.1	Control Room Operation and Shift Manager Duties	035
71114.06	Procedures	5.1.1	RPV Control	022
71114.06	Procedures	5.1.2	RPV Control - ATWS	026
71124.01	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	00393990, 00393998, 00394064, 00394156, 00394272, 00394339, 00394432, 00394579, 00395067, 00395167, 00395232, 00395272, 00396413, 00396632, 00398991, 00400349, 00401039, 00401200, 00401615, 00403346, 00404722, 00406957, 00409248, 00409249, 00412778, 00414240, 00415055, 00415317, 00415351, 00415546, 00415859, 00416044, 00416339, 00416544, 00416546, 00417622, 00418272, 00418294, 00418921, 00418922	
71124.01	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	Action Requests (ARs)	00419864, 00419865, 00419871, 00420075	
71124.01	Procedures	HPI-0.19	Radiation Protection Standards and Expectations	019
71124.01	Procedures	HPI-4.30	Processing, Evaluation, and Reporting of Dosimetry of Legal Record Exposure Data	017
71124.01	Procedures	HPI-4.8A	Routine Exchange of Personnel Dosimetry of Legal Record	025
71124.01	Procedures	HPI-6.4	Administering and Occupational Radiation Exposure History File	026
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.13.1	Radiation and Contamination Surveys	044
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.13.8	Airborne Radioactivity Surveys	021
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.6.1	Issuance and Retrieval of Personnel Dosimetry	028
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.6.7	Special Dosimetry	020
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.7.1	Area Posting	045
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 11.2.7.3	High Radiation Area, Locked High Radiation Area, and Very High Radiation Area Controls	044
71124.01	Procedures	PPM 6.1.1	Spent Fuel Pool Inventory	010

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71124.01	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-04	Entry Into, Conduct In, and Exit from Radiologically Controlled Areas	035
71124.01	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-06	Dosimetry Program Description	015
71124.01	Procedures	SWP-RPP-01	Radiation Protection Program	016
71124.01	Radiation Surveys	M-20210518-26	Reactor Building 548' Elevation Reactor Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger Room	05/18/2021
71124.01	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004650	Refueling Outage Number 25 Dry Well Minor Maintenance/Setup/Surveillances **LHRA**	001
71124.01	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004661	Refueling Outage Number 25 In-service Inspection Locked High Radiation Work - Nondestructive Examination/In-service Inspection/Weld Cleaning Dry Well & Steam Tunnel	001
71124.01	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004704	Refueling Outage Number 25 Dry Well Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Replacement/Work **LHRA**	002
71124.01	Self-Assessments	AR-SA 413680-01	Energy Northwest Snapshot Self-Assessment Report	03/20/2021
71124.01	Self-Assessments	AR-SA 414739	Energy Northwest Snapshot Self-Assessment Report	04/04/2021
71124.01	Self-Assessments	AU-RP/RW-20	Quality Services Audit Report Radiation Protection and Process Control Programs	12/16/2020
71124.02	ALARA Plans	RWP 30004649	R25 Drywell Steam Tunnel Shielding ALARA Plan	001
71124.02	ALARA Plans	RWP 30004661	R25 Drywell & Steam Tunnel ISI/Flow Accelerated Corrosion and Support ALARA Plan	000
71124.02	ALARA Plans	RWP 30004704	R25 Drywell Reactor Recirculating Motor Replacement/Work **LHRA** ALARA Plan	000
71124.02	ALARA Plans	RWP 30004706	R25 Steam Tunnel Replace Hard Seats on RFW-V-32A & 32B **High Radiation Area** ALARA Plan	000
71124.02	ALARA Plans	RWP 30004732	R25 RWCU Heat Exchanger Replacement Project ALARA Plan	000
71124.02	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	00402861, 00416924, 00413985, 00416972, 00405197, 00408948, 00405192, 00410826, 00405193, 00411143, 00405201, 00411316, 00405207, 00416546, 00405207, 00412778, 00404667, 00419954	
71124.02	Miscellaneous	Energy Northwest ALARA In-Progress Review	Job Description: R25 Steam Tunnel Replace Seals RFW-V-32A/B **High Radiation Area**	05/24/2021
71124.02	Miscellaneous	Energy Northwest	Job Description: Cut existing pipe. Install/Remove plugs &	05/15/2021

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		ALARA In-Progress Review	hoses - Reactor Building 548' elevation - RWCU Heat Exchanger	
71124.02	Miscellaneous	Energy Northwest ALARA In-Progress Review	Job Description: R25 Wet Work In-vessel, Spent Fuel Pool, and Dryer Separator Pit **HRA**	05/27/2021
71124.02	Miscellaneous	TEDE ALARA Evaluation	RWP 30004739- PAPR Use TEDE ALARA Evaluation	04/27/2021
71124.02	Miscellaneous	TEDE ALARA Evaluation	RWP 30004690- PAPR Use TEDE ALARA Evaluation	05/05/2020
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.11	Exposure Evaluations for Maintaining TEDE ALARA	009
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.12	Radiological Risk Assessment and Management	008
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.13	Flushing and Shielding Evaluations	002
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.14	Radiological Planning and Reviews	007
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.7	ALARA Procedure Analysis	012
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.2.8	ALARA Engineering Analysis	007
71124.02	Procedures	PPM 11.2.8.2	Radiation Worker Permit Preparation and Use	003
71124.02	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-01	ALARA Program Description	009
71124.02	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-02	Radiological Planning and Control Process	034
71124.02	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-13	Senior Site ALARA Committee	014
71124.02	Procedures	PPM GEN-RPP-14	Control of Temporary Shielding	016
71124.02	Radiation Surveys	M-20210518-26	Reactor Building 548' Elevation Reactor Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger Room	05/18/2021
71124.02	Radiation Surveys	M-20210520-18	Reactor Building 548' Elevation High Radiation Area Boundary Expansion	05/20/2021
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004639	R25 Drywell/Valve Room/Steam Tunnel Health Physics Support **LHRA**	000
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004676	R25 Wetwell/Reactor Dive Inspection (Divers) **LHRA/High Risk Activity**	000
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004690	2020 Reactor Building 548'/572' Elevation Pipe Cutout and Flush of DSP Drain Line	001

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71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004704	R25 Drywell Reactor Recirculation Motor Replacement/Work **LHRA**	002
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004706	RF 25 Steam Tunnel Replace Hard Seats on RFW-V-32A & 32B	000
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004732	RWCU Heat Exchanger Room-Install New Heat Exchanger and Piping (LHRA)	000
71124.02	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	30004739	2021 Reactor Building 606' Elevation Dryer Separator Pit Entry **LHRA**	000
71124.02	Self-Assessments	Energy Northwest Snapshot Self-Assessment Report	Pre-inspection (71124.02) ALARA Snapshot Self-assessment	02/28/2020
71124.02	Self-Assessments	Energy Northwest Snapshot Self-Assessment Report	Annual Review of Columbia Generating Station Radiation Protection Program to meet 10 CFR 20.1101(c) requirements.	04/04/2021
71124.03	Calibration Records	300300444	CL-8030 Clean and Calibrate Model 8030 PortaCount Pro Respirator Fit Tester: Serial Number 8030123705	10/20/2020
71124.03	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	00400325, 00400333, 00400691, 00403946, 00404472, 00412409, 00404716, 00416544, 00416546, 00417403	
71124.03	Miscellaneous		Breathing Air Sample Analysis: SCBA Air Compressor	03/18/2020
71124.03	Miscellaneous		Breathing Air Sample Analysis: Oxarc Specialty Gas Division	02/05/2020
71124.03	Procedures	GEN-RPP-05	Respiratory Protection Program Description	015
71124.03	Procedures	GEN-RPP-10	Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment	012
71124.03	Procedures	HPI-15.1	Inspection and Storage of Respirators and Attachments	012
71124.03	Procedures	HPI-8.2	Quantitative Respirator Fit Testing Using PortaCount System	029
71124.03	Procedures	HPI-8.4	Respirator Facepiece Cleaning and Disinfection	004
71124.03	Procedures	MSP-WMA-B101	Control Room DIV A Emergency Filtration System HEPA Filter Test	010
71124.03	Procedures	PPM 10.2.62	Breathing Air Compressor Operation	011
71124.03	Procedures	PPM 10.2.82	HEPA Filter In-Place Testing	008
71124.03	Procedures	PPM 10.2.83	Carbon Filter In-Place Testing	009

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71124.03	Procedures	PPM 11.2.11.3	Issuance of Respiratory Protection Equipment	017
71124.03	Procedures	PPM 12.5.36	Service Air Sampling	005
71124.03	Procedures	SWP-RPP-01	Radiation Protection Program	016
71124.03	Self-Assessments	AR-SA 00402740	Snapshot Self-Assessment: Control of in-plant airborne concentrations	02/06/2020
71124.03	Self-Assessments	AR-SA 00415897	Snapshot Self-Assessment: Control of in-plant airborne concentrations	02/26/2021
71124.03	Self-Assessments	AR-SA 378162	Focused Self-Assessment Report: Respiratory Protection Program	03/12/2020
71124.03	Self-Assessments	AU-RP/RW-19	Quality Services Audit Report: Radiation Protection and Process Control Programs	12/12/2019
71124.03	Self-Assessments	AU-RP/RW-20	Quality Services Audit Report: Radiation Protection and Process Control Programs	12/16/2020
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02074192-01	MSP-WMA-B104-WMA-FU-54B ("B" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-Carbon Adsorber Test	09/22/2016
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02074207-01	MSP-WMA-B102-WMA-FU-54B ("B" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-HEPA Filter Test	09/22/2016
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02083554-01	AMA-CF-52 (Technical Support Center Filtered Ventilation): Replace the Carbon Filter. Replace Pre-Filter and HEPA Filter as required. Perform filter In-Place Testing.	03/08/2018
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02098416-01	MSP-WMA-B103-WMA-FU-54A ("A" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-Carbon Adsorber Test	09/06/2018
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02098417-01	MSP-WMA-B101-WMA-FU-54A ("A" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-HEPA Filter Test	08/09/2018
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02101850-01	MSP-WMA-B102-WMA-FU-54B ("B" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-HEPA Filter Test	03/21/2019
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02105820-01	MSP-WMA-B104-WMA-FU-54B ("B" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-Carbon Adsorber Test	03/12/2019
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02131678-01	MSP-WMA-B101-WMA-FU-54A ("A" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-HEPA Filter Test	10/21/2020
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02131679-01	MSP-WMA-B103-WMA-FU-54A ("A" Control Room Emergency Filter Unit)-Carbon Adsorber Test	10/21/2020
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02146280-01	Breathing Air Sample Analysis: SA-V-99/35	03/23/2020
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02154409-01	AMA-CF-52 (Technical Support Center Filtered Ventilation):	06/29/2020

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			Replace the Carbon Filter. Replace Pre-Filter and HEPA Filter as required. Perform filter In-Place Testing.	
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02164388-01	Breathing Air Sample Analysis: SA-V-100/58	10/26/2020
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02164389-01	Breathing Air Sample Analysis: SA-V-99/35	01/25/2021
71124.03	Work Orders	WO 02171276-01	SA-C-1 1000 Hour Maintenance (CDR-1-1-12)	05/03/2021
71124.03	Work Orders	Work Order (WO)	Monthly Fire Brigade Station Inventories: 02168171-05, 02168171-06, 02169517-05, 02169517-06, 02169519-05, 02169519-06, 02169521-05, 02169521-06	
71151	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	00404722, 00416805	
71151	Miscellaneous		2020 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report	04/15/2021
71151	Miscellaneous		Limiting Conditions for Operations Logs June 1, 2020 – May 31, 2021	
71151	Procedures	PPM 16.12.1	Liquid Release Dose Assessments	007
71151	Procedures	PPM 16.12.2	Monthly Gaseous Release Dose Assessment	016
71151	Work Orders	WO 02165060-01	Monthly Gaseous Release Dose Assessment: January 2021	03/01/2021
71151	Work Orders	WO 02165076-01	Liquid Release Dose Assessment: January 2021	03/01/2021
71151	Work Orders	WO 02167631-01	Liquid Release Dose Assessment: February 2021	03/17/2021
71151	Work Orders	WO 02167632-01	Monthly Gaseous Release Dose Assessment: February 2021	03/17/2021
71151	Work Orders	WO 02169186-01	Liquid Release Dose Assessment: March 2021	04/20/2021
71151	Work Orders	WO 02169196-01	Monthly Gaseous Release Dose Assessment: March 2021	04/20/2021
71152	Corrective Action Documents	Action Requests (ARs)	415576, 416145, 416419, 416420, 417361, 056200, 412522, 413873, 414095, 416883, 416887, 417361, 416523, 416770, 416821, 416868, 416887, 417386, 417526, 417554, 417570, 417567, 417535, 417575, 403227, 405968, 409930, 410242, 414216, 416689	
71152	Miscellaneous	02-02C41-05	Standby Liquid Control System	012
71152	Miscellaneous	02-431-00	Reissue of O/M Manual for ST3000 Smart Transmitter & SFC Smart Field Communicator	002
71152	Miscellaneous	93-01	Customer Service Bulletin	06/07/1993
71152	Miscellaneous	999-00, 199	SLC Tank Flow Indicating Controller Replacement	000
71152	Miscellaneous	CVI 02-01, 1, 2	Part Equivalency Evaluation Sheet	002
71152	Miscellaneous	SLC-FIC-4	Inst. Air Supply for SLC-TK-1 Level	006

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71152	Miscellaneous	SLC-LI-1	SLC-TK-1 Level Local Indication	008
71152	Miscellaneous	SLC-LI-601	SLC-TK-1 Level Control Room Indication	009
71152	Miscellaneous	SLC-LT-1	Storage Tank (SLC-TK-1) Level SLC	012
71152	Procedures	10.2.53	Scaffolding	049
71152	Procedures	OSP-INST-H101	Shift and Daily Instrument Checks	094