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The purpose of this email is to transmit to you the draft white paper associated with the Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP) titled “Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Advanced Reactors.”

The staff is re-baselining its Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP) and TICAP draft guidance documents in July of 2021. The draft guidance associated with the attached TICAP regulatory guide (RG) was previously made publicly available on May 14, 2021 (see: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2113/ML21134A164.pdf). The draft TICAP RG has been reissued to update references in the document.

This email (including the attachment) will be made publicly available in ADAMS such that the documents can be referenced in Table 2 of the ARCAP/TICAP public webpage (see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/details.html#advRxContentAppProj).

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

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Senior Project Manager
Advanced Reactor Policy Branch
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
301-415-1132
Draft White Paper Associated with Advanced Reactor Content of Application
Project titled, "Guidance for Performing the Review of a Technology-Inclusive Advanced Reactor Application Review Roadmap"

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GUIDANCE FOR A TECHNOLOGY-INCLUSIVE CONTENT OF APPLICATION METHODOLOGY TO INFORM THE LICENSING BASIS AND CONTENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR ADVANCED REACTORS 
Draft July 2021 Version

A. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

This regulatory guide (RG) provides the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s guidance on using a technology-inclusive content of application methodology to inform specific portions of the safety analysis report (SAR) included as part of an advanced reactor license application. Specifically, this RG endorses the methodology described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 21-xx, “XYZ” (Ref. x), as one acceptable process for use when developing portions of an application for an
advanced reactor construction permit, operating license, combined license, manufacturing license, standard design approval (SDA), or design certification under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities” (Ref. x), and 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants” (Ref. x). It is anticipated that this guidance will be updated to use for reviews of advanced nuclear reactor license and permit applications submitted under 10 CFR Part 53, “Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors,” once that regulation is final.

NEI 21-xx describes an approach to develop the scope and content of an application by implementing the licensing modernization project (LMP) methodology described in NEI 18-04, Revision 1, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development” (Ref. x) as endorsed by the NRC in RG 1.233, “Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications For Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors” (Ref. x). The methodology in NEI 18-04 provides a systematic, risk-informed and technology neutral process for developing key inputs into the content of applications, to improve understanding of the safety and risk significance of system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations for a variety of non-light water reactor (LWR) designs. Even though the guidance described in NEI 18-04 is intended for non-LWRs, the NRC staff believes that the content and methodology described is also an acceptable approach to develop an application for the other categories of advanced reactors.

In this RG, the term “advanced reactor” is used in the context of the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). NEIMA included a definition for “advanced nuclear reactor” that was further refined by the Energy Act of 2020. The definition of advanced nuclear reactor found in the Energy Act of 2020 includes:

(1) ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR. —The term ‘advanced nuclear reactor’ means—
(A) a nuclear fission reactor, including a prototype plant (as defined in sections 50.2 and 52.1 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations)), with significant improvements compared to reactors operating on the date of enactment of the Energy Act of 2020, including improvements such as—
(i) additional inherent safety features;
(ii) lower waste yields;
(iii) improved fuel and material performance;
(iv) increased tolerance to loss of fuel cooling;
(v) enhanced reliability or improved resilience;
(vi) increased proliferation resistance;
(vii) increased thermal efficiency;
(viii) reduced consumption of cooling water and other environmental impacts;
(ix) the ability to integrate into electric applications and nonelectric applications;
(x) modular sizes to allow for deployment that corresponds with the demand for electricity or process heat; and
(xi) operational flexibility to respond to changes in demand for electricity or process heat and to complement integration with intermittent renewable energy or energy storage; and
(B) a fusion reactor.

In SECY 20-0032, “Rulemaking Plan On “Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors (Rin-3150-Ak31; Nrc-2019-0062)” (Ref. x), the staff further clarified its
interpretation of the advanced reactors described in NEIMA to include LWR small modular reactors (SMRs), non-LWRs, and fusion reactor designs. Although the technology-inclusive methodology described in NEI 21-xx provides a common approach to identifying and describing the scope and level of detail for the fundamental safety functions of a design, the applicant or the licensee is still responsible for demonstrating compliance with all applicable regulations and may request exemptions as appropriate. The staff issued a white paper to provide guidance on which regulations are applicable to non-LWRs in September of 2020, titled “Analysis of Applicability of NRC Regulations for Non-Light Water Reactors.” (Ref. ML20241A017). The staff supplemented this white paper in a document dated February 2021 (Ref. ML21049A098). The September 2020, white paper as supplemented by the February 2021 document describe which regulations are generally applicable to non-LWR applications for construction permits and operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 50 and standard design certifications, combined licenses, and standard design approvals under 10 CFR Part 52. The staff is in the process of revising the applicability of regulations white paper. The staff intends to include the content of this white paper as Appendix D the ARCAP roadmap ISG. In addition, the staff notes that the applicability of specific technical requirements in NRC regulations or the need to define additional technical requirements for a particular design arising from the safety assessments will be made on a case-by-case basis for advanced reactors.

**Applicability**

This RG applies to nuclear power reactor designers, applicants, and licensees of advanced reactors\(^1\) (non-LWR and SMR designs) applying for permits, licenses, certifications, and approvals under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities” (Ref. x), and 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants” (Ref. x). It is envisioned that the review approach described in this RG will also support the technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance-based application content and level of detail expected in a future application submitted under the proposed Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 53, “Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors,” which is currently being developed.

**Applicable Regulations**

- 10 CFR Part 50 provides regulations for licensing production and utilization facilities.
  - 10 CFR 50.34, “Contents of applications; technical information,” describes the minimum information required for (a) preliminary safety analysis reports supporting applications for a construction permit and (b) final safety analysis reports supporting applications for operating licenses.

- 10 CFR Part 52 governs the issuance of early site permits, standard design certifications (DCs), combined licenses (COLs), standard design approvals (SDAs), and manufacturing licenses (MLs) for nuclear power facilities.
  - 10 CFR 52.47, “Contents of applications; technical information,” describes the information to be included in final safety analysis reports supporting applications for standard DCs.

\(^1\) Certain elements of this RG may also be applicable to Fusion reactors, as appropriate. However, the staff notes that options for the regulatory treatment of fusion reactors are currently being considered by the NRC staff which may result in the development of fusion-specific guidance.
10 CFR 52.79, “Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report,” describes the information to be included in final safety analysis reports supporting COLs.

10 CFR 52.137, “Contents of applications; technical information,” describes the information to be included in final safety analysis reports supporting SDAs.

10 CFR 52.157, “Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report,” describes the information to be included in final safety analysis reports supporting MLs.

**Related Guidance, Communications, and Policy Statements**

- “Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors” (Volume 73 of the Federal Register, page 60612, October 14, 2008) (Ref. x), establishes the Commission’s expectations related to advanced reactor designs to protect the environment and public health and safety and promote the common defense and security with respect to advanced reactors.

- RG 1.70, “Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)” (Ref. x), provides detailed guidance to the writers of safety analysis reports to allow for the standardization of information the NRC requires for granting construction permits and operating licenses.

- RG 1.232, “Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light Water Reactors” (Ref. x), describes the NRC’s guidance on how the general design criteria in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.” This guidance may be used by non-LWR reactor designers, applicants, and licensees to develop principal design criteria for any non-LWR designs, as required by the applicable NRC regulations for nuclear power plants. The RG also describes the NRC’s guidance for modifying and supplementing the general design criteria to develop principal design criteria that address two types of non-LWR technologies: sodium cooled fast reactors and modular high temperature gas-cooled reactors (MHTGRs).

**Purpose of Regulatory Guides**

The NRC issues RGs to describe to the public methods that the staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agency’s regulations, to explain techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated events, and to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in RGs will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

**Paperwork Reduction Act**

This RG provides voluntary guidance for implementing the mandatory information collections in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq.). These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0011 and 3150-0151. Send comments regarding this information collection to the Information Services Branch (T-6A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011 and 3150-0151), Attn: Desk Officer for the
Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.
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B. DISCUSSION

Reason for Issuance

This RG provides the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s guidance on using a technology-inclusive content of application methodology to inform specific portions of the safety analysis report (SAR) included as part of an advanced reactor license application. Specifically, this RG endorses the methodology described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 21-xx, “XYZ” (Ref. x), as one acceptable process for use when developing portions of an application for an advanced reactor construction permit, operating license, combined license, manufacturing license, standard design approval (SDA), or design certification under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities” (Ref. x), and 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants” (Ref. x).

Background

As the NRC prepares to review and regulate a new generation of advanced reactors, the staff has previously recognized the need to establish, and the benefits of having, a flexible regulatory framework. The NRC described efforts to prepare for possible licensing of non-LWR technologies in “NRC Vision and Strategy: Safely Achieving Effective and Efficient Non-Light Water Reactor Mission Readiness,” (Ref. x). The staff then developed “NRC Non-Light Water Reactor Near Term Implementation Action Plans” (Ref. x), and “NRC Non-Light Water Reactor Mid-Term and Long-Term Implementation Action Plans” (Ref. x), to identify specific activities that the NRC will conduct in the near-term, mid-term, and long term timeframes. Similarly, the Commission encouraged the use of a performance based technology inclusive licensing framework for SMRs in SRM - COMGBJ-10-0004/COMGEA-10-0001, “Use of Risk Insights to Enhance Safety Focus of Small Modular Reactor Reviews,” and SRM – SECY -11-0024, “Use of Risk Insights to Enhance the Safety Focus of Small Modular Reactor Reviews”.

To ensure review readiness, a key element of this new and flexible regulatory framework is to standardize the development of content within an advanced reactor application to promote uniformity among applicants. A standardized content of application for advanced reactors also ensures review consistency and predictability from NRC staff, and presents a well-defined base from which to evaluate proposed changes in the scope and requirements of reviews. The development of applications for NRC licenses, permits, certifications, and approvals is a major undertaking, in that an applicant must provide sufficient information to support the agency’s safety findings. The needed information and level of detail will vary according to whether an application is for a construction permit, design approval, design certification, operating license, combined license, or other action.

The NRC staff has had success with a standard content of application methodology for large-LWRs. The NRC’s efforts to standardize the format and content of applications for LWRs are reflected in RG 1.70, issued in the 1970s, and RG 1.206, issued in 2007 and revised in 2018. Guidance documents, such as NUREG 0800 and numerous other documents on specific technical areas, address the suggested scope and level of detail for applications.

To standardize the development of content within an advanced reactor application, the staff has focused on two activities:

- The Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP), and
- The Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP).
The ARCAP is an NRC-led activity, and is intended to provide guidance for a complete advanced reactor application that supports 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR Part 52, and the ongoing 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking effort. As a result, ARCAP is broad and encompasses several industry-led, and NRC-led guidance documents aimed at ensuring a consistent approach to the development of each application document. A complete advanced reactor application is expected to include, among other things, a SAR, a Quality Assurance plan, a Fire Protection program, Emergency and Physical Security plans, etc.

The TICAP is an industry-led activity, and is focused on providing guidance on the appropriate scope and depth of information related to the specific portions of the SAR that describe the fundamental safety functions of the design, and details the affirmative safety case for each applicant consistent with the LMP approach. TICAP’s focus on those measures needed to address risks posed by non-LWR and SMR technologies will help an applicant provide sufficient information on the design and programmatic controls, while avoiding an excessive level of detail on less important parts of a plant. The specific portions of the SAR applicable to the scope of NEI 21-xx are described below in more detail. Based on the limited scope of the TICAP guidance, TICAP’s scope is encompassed by and supplemented by the ARCAP guidance. The ARCAP will describe the guidance for the specific areas of the SAR that are outside the scope of the LMP process (i.e., not covered by TICAP) such as site information, and information consistent with use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III, Division 5 construction codes.

As a result of extensive TICAP/ARCAP public interactions with industry and external stakeholders, the proposed development of the SAR for an advanced reactor application is based on a 12-chapter approach. In contrast, the SAR approach for large-LWRs described in NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” (Ref. x) is based on a 19-chapter approach. For an advanced reactor application consistent with ARCAP/TICAP and the methodology described in this RG, the 12 chapters are as follows:

- Chapter 1 - General Plant Information, Site Description, and Overview of the Safety Case
- Chapter 2 – Methodologies and Analyses
- Chapter 3 - Licensing Basis Events
- Chapter 4 - Integrated Evaluations
- Chapter 5 - Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and SSC Categorization
- Chapter 6 - Safety Related SSC Criteria and Capabilities
- Chapter 7 - NSRST SSC Criteria and Capabilities
- Chapter 8 - Plant Programs
- Chapter 9 - Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents, Plant Contamination, and Solid Waste
- Chapter 10 - Control of Occupational Dose
- Chapter 11 - Organization
- Chapter 12 - Initial Startup Programs.

Based on the SAR structure described above, the staff notes that TICAP’s scope as described in NEI 21-xx is only applicable to the LMP-related portions contained in the first 8 chapters2. Figure 1 below illustrates the nexus between ARCAP, TICAP, and other guidance in relation to an advanced reactor application.

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2 Pre-application engagement is highly encouraged for applicants that plan to use the methodology described in NEI-21 xx but rely on a different SAR structure than the 12-chapter approach described in this RG. Similarly, applicants not using the LMP approach described in NEI 21-xx but leveraging the 12-chapter SAR approach should engage the NRC staff early to optimize application reviews. On October 2020, the staff issued a white paper related to the importance of pre-application activities consistent with the Commission’s advanced reactor policy statement (ref. x).
Documents Endorsed in this Guide

Upon completion of the industry-led TICAP efforts, the results of the project were documented as guidance in NEI 21-xx, and submitted to NRC for review and endorsement. As a result, the purpose of this RG is twofold:

1. To endorse certain sections of NEI 21-xx which describe one acceptable approach for determining the scope and level of detail for the development of structured application content associated with the first 8 chapters of the SAR. The methodology in NEI 21-xx follows the LMP guidance, and systematically describes the selection of licensing-basis events (LBEs); classification and special treatments of structures, systems, and components (SSCs); the assessment of defense in depth (DID) features and supporting information. When applicable, this RG will also describe any additional clarifications, exceptions, points of emphasis, and/or further details relevant to the specific sections discussed in NEI 21-xx and endorsed by this RG.

2. To describe additional information outside the scope of LMP and NEI 21-xx that NRC staff has determined is also relevant and would expect to be included as part of the application content related to the first 8 chapters.

Based on the above, this RG endorses Sections {x,y, and z} of NEI 21-xx as one acceptable process for use when developing content for portions of the NRC license application SAR for non-LWR and SMR designs in a manner consistent with RG 1.233, “Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications For
Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors.” Additional details for each chapter will be described in their corresponding section.

The NRC endorsement of the aforementioned sections does not imply the NRC’s endorsement of the references cited in the endorsed sections of NEI 21-xx or to references in the endorsed sections of NEI 21-xx to other (unendorsed) sections of NEI 21-xx. The NRC has not necessarily reviewed and approved the guidance provided in these references, except where specifically noted in this regulatory guide.

In summary, the guidance in NEI 21-XX is focused on developing the portions of the SAR containing material addressed in NEI 18-04, and it will help ensure completeness of information submitted to NRC while avoiding unnecessary burden on the applicant and rightsizing the content of application commensurate with the complexity of the design being reviewed. This guidance provides a standardized content development process designed to facilitate efficient preparation by the applicant, review by the regulator, and maintenance by the licensee. The content formulation should optimize the type and level of detail of information provided, based on the complexity of the design’s safety case and the nexus between elements of the design and public health and safety.

Harmonization with International Standards

As described in the 2010 IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission report, the NRC has agreed to review international standards and, when practical, harmonize NRC regulations and guides with the appropriate international standards. During the development of this RG, the NRC staff did not identify any international standards related to this guide.

C. STAFF REGULATORY GUIDANCE

The guidance on the SAR content scope and level of detail described in this RG is based on the appropriate level of design-specific information that should be provided in an application to the NRC to demonstrate that the design’s safety case meets the regulatory standards for adequate protection of public health and safety. To accommodate an effective and efficient technology inclusive content guidance while ensuring the underlying intent of the current content requirements is met, this guidance is formulated to describe an LMP-based affirmative safety case. Pre-application engagement between applicants and the NRC is highly encouraged to optimize resources and review schedule, especially for non-LMP based applications.

The following sections describe the NRC’s endorsement (with clarifications or exceptions, when applicable) of the corresponding sections described in guidance document NEI-21 xx. In general, NEI 21-xx is structured to present the overall safety case first and then provide the specific supporting design and operating details in subsequent chapters. The staff notes that the methods, approaches, or data described in the regulatory position(s) discussed below are not requirements.

1. General Plant and Site Description, And Overview of The Safety Case

The information in this chapter should allow the reviewer to obtain a basic understanding of the overall facility, such as the type of permit, license, certification or approval requested, the number of plant units, a brief description of the proposed plant location, and the type of advanced reactor being proposed. The site description should provide an overview of the actual physical, environmental and demographic features of a site, and how they relate to the affirmative safety case. Examples of information related to site description include geological and demographic, seismological, hydrological, and meteorological characteristics of the site and the surrounding vicinity.
Chapter 1 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 1.1 to 1.4) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the plant description, site description, the affirmative safety case based on the LMP methodology, and a summary of reference of source materials, respectively.

For reference, the affirmative safety case is defined as a collection of scientific, technical, administrative and managerial evidence which documents the basis that the performance objectives of the technology-inclusive fundamental safety functions (FSFs) are met by a design during design specific Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs), Design Basis Events (DBEs), Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBEs), and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) by:

- Identifying design specific safety functions that are adequately performed by design specific SSCs and
- Establishing design specific features (programmatic (e.g., inspections) or physical (e.g., redundancy)) to provide reasonable assurance that credited SSC functions are reliably performed.

1st Regulatory Position
NEI 21-xx, Chapter 1 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the plant description, site description, the affirmative safety case based on the LMP methodology, and a summary of reference of source materials. However, the applicant or the licensee is still responsible for demonstrating compliance with all applicable regulations and may request exemptions as appropriate. The staff issued a white paper to provide guidance on which regulations are applicable to non-LWRs in September of 2020, titled “Analysis of Applicability of NRC Regulations for Non-Light Water Reactors,” (Ref. ML20241A017). The staff supplemented this white paper in a document dated February 2021 (Ref. ML21049A098). The September 2020, white paper as supplemented by the February 2021 document describe which regulations are generally applicable to non-LWR applications for construction permits and operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 50 and standard design certifications, combined licenses, and standard design approvals under 10 CFR Part 52. The staff is in the process of revising the applicability of regulations white paper. The staff intends to include the content of this white paper as Appendix D the ARCAP roadmap ISG.

2nd Regulatory Position – Construction Permit Information
NEI 21-xx, Section xxx provides an acceptable method for developing portions of a construction permit application in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 requirements. However, for advanced reactor applicants pursuing a construction permit (CP) application under 10 CFR Part 50 and using an alternative risk-informed performance-based approach (such as LMP), additional information not related to the LMP-based affirmative safety case should be provided. Specifically, the additional information is related to the minimum information necessary in a CP application for the staff to issue a CP under 10 CFR 50.35(a) when the applicant has not supplied all of the technical information required to complete the application (i.e., 50.34(a)) and support the issuance of a CP which approves all proposed design features (i.e., obtains finality for the design). The staff notes that the additional CP information described in this RG is consistent with the first 8 Chapters of the SAR. The guidance described in Appendix A of this RG contains guidance on one acceptable approach in scope and level of detail for applicants to provide the additional relevant CP information for advanced reactor applications related to the first 8 chapters of the SAR.
In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 1 of the SAR should also address the following issues:

a. Identify the applicability of Generic Safety Issues, Unresolved Safety Issues and Three Mile Island action items to the design and their proposed resolution.

b. Identify the RGs applicable to the design and any proposed exceptions.

c. Identify the consensus design codes and standards (ASME, ANSI, IEEE, etc.) used in the design along with what SSCs to which they apply. This includes, as appropriate, reference to ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 5, "High Temperature Reactors." The staff notes that ASME Section III, Division 5 guidance can be found in the following documents: NUREG-2245, “Technical Review of the 2017 Edition of ASME Code, Section III, Division 5, “High Temperature Reactors” – Draft Report for Comment (ADAMS Accession No. to be provided at a later date), and DG-1380, “Acceptability of ASME Code Section III, Division 5, High Temperature Reactors” (ADAMS Accession No. to be provided at a later date).

2. Methodologies and Analyses

An important part of the design process for reactor designs is the identification of events that could challenge key safety functions and layers of defense against the release of radioactive materials. Therefore, a key part of the review of an advanced reactor application is the selection of licensing basis events (LBEs). The LBEs are described as event sequences such as anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design-basis events (DBEs), or beyond-design-basis events (BDBEs). The primary determinate for categorizing events in each of these categories is the estimated frequency of the event sequence. Figure 3-2 of NEI 18-04 provides additional information on the selection and evaluation of LBE’s.

Chapter 2 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 2.1 to 2.3) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the probabilistic risk assessment (overview of the PRA), source-term analysis, and design-basis accidents (DBAs) analytical methods.

4th Regulatory Position

NEI 21-xx, Chapter 2 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the probabilistic risk assessment (overview of the PRA), source-term analysis, and design-basis accidents analytical methods.

5th Regulatory Position – Site Information

In addition to the site information described in Chapter 2 of NEI 21-xx, additional information not developed using the LMP process should be provided. The purpose of this information is to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 100, Subpart B, and the relevant parts of 10 CFR 50 and 52 that discuss site related issues, and to describe the site characteristics used in the design and safety analysis where (i) a design basis external hazard level must be specified for each system, structure, or component (SSCs) designed to withstand this hazard with no adverse impact on their capability to perform their required safety function (RSF) or (ii) an SSC is relied upon to establish the adequacy of defense-in-depth and must be designed with special treatment to withstand a given hazard. The guidance described in draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) “Site Information” (ADAMS Accession No. ML21189A031) contains guidance on one acceptable approach in scope and level of detail for applicants to provide relevant site information.
6th Regulatory Position – Methodologies and Analyses

Certain analyses are common to a number of LBE analyses. This chapter of the guidance provides information regarding how to document those analyses in an application. The scope of content, the level of detail, and the structure of the application guidance regarding this topic are acceptable, with the following exceptions and clarifications:

a. Other methodologies and analyses that should be provided include baseline operating parameters; a description of systems, components, and materials performance under normal operating, anticipated transient, and accident conditions.

3. Licensing Basis Events

After the identification of LBEs, the information in this chapter should describe the systematic and reproducible process and methodology used to select the LBEs, and the specific analysis and evaluation of the selected LBEs against the proposed design. The analysis in this section is primarily described in terms of event sequences comprised of an initiating event, the plant response to the initiating event (which includes a sequence of successes and failures of mitigating systems) and a well-defined end state. This chapter should also include information on the process used to group and condense the substantial number of event sequences considered in the PRA into sequence families that are used to define the AOOs, DBEs, and BDBEs. It is important to note that the term “event sequence” is used in lieu of the term “accident sequence” used in LWR PRA standards because the scope of the LBEs includes AOOs and initiating events with no adverse impacts on public safety.

Chapter 3 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 3.1 to 3.6) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the LBE selection methodology, and summary of LBEs (AOOs, DBEs, BDBEs and DBAs).

7th Regulatory Position

NEI 21-xx, Chapter 3 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the LBE selection methodology, and summary of LBEs (AOOs, DBEs, BDBEs and DBAs).

8th Regulatory Position – Supplemental Information

In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 3, the SAR should also include a discussion of the following:

1. Aircraft Impact Assessment (10 CFR 50.150) – The objective of the aircraft impact rule is to require nuclear power plant designers to rigorously assess their designs to identify design features and functional capabilities that could provide additional inherent protection to withstand the effects of an aircraft impact. The NRC expects this rule to result in new nuclear power reactor facilities that are inherently more robust with regard to an aircraft impact than if they were designed in the absence of the aircraft impact rule. The rule provides an enhanced level of protection beyond that which is provided by the existing adequate protection requirements applicable to currently operating power reactors. The following Regulatory Guide (RG) provides guidance regarding implementation this regulation:

   • RG 1.217, “Guidance for The Assessment of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impacts,” describes a method that the staff of the NRC considers acceptable for use in satisfying the regulations at 10 CFR 50.150, regarding the consideration of aircraft impacts for new nuclear power reactors. In particular, this RG endorses the methodologies described in the industry guidance document, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-13, “Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs,” Revision 8, dated April 2011.
2. Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events from Natural Phenomena (circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire) (10 CFR 50.155) – One of the primary lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant was the significance of the challenge presented by a loss of multiple safety-related systems following the occurrence of a beyond-design-basis external event (BDBEE). In the case of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the loss of all alternating current power led to loss of core cooling, and ultimately to core damage and a loss of containment integrity. The design basis for U.S. nuclear plants includes bounding analyses with margin for external events expected at each site. Extreme external events (e.g., seismic events, external flooding, etc.) beyond those accounted for in the design basis, while unlikely, could present challenges to nuclear power plants. The following RGs provide guidance regarding implementation this regulation:

- **RG 1.226, “Flexible Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis Events,”** identifies methods and procedures the staff of the NRC considers acceptable for nuclear power reactor applicants and licensees to demonstrate compliance with NRC regulations covering planning and preparedness for beyond-design basis events as required by 10 CFR 50.155, “Mitigation of beyond design-basis events.” This RG endorses, with clarifications, the methods and procedures promulgated by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in technical document NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,” Revision 4 (NEI 12-06, Revision 4) dated December 2016 as a process the NRC considers acceptable for meeting, in part, the regulations in 10 CFR 50.155. Additionally, this RG provides guidance for meeting the regulations in 10 CFR 50.155 that are in areas that are not covered in NEI 12-06.

- **RG 1.227, “Wide-Range Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation,”** identifies methods and procedures the staff of the NRC considers acceptable for demonstrating compliance with NRC regulations to provide a reliable means to remotely monitor wide-range spent fuel pool levels to support implementation of event mitigation and recovery actions as required by 10 CFR 50.155, “Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events” (10 CFR 50.155). This RG endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, the methods and procedures promulgated by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in document NEI 12-02, “Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, ‘To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation’,” Revision 1 (NEI 12-02) dated August 2012 as a process the NRC staff considers acceptable for meeting certain regulations in 10 CFR 50.155.

- **Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1319 (Proposed New Regulatory Guide 1.228), “Integrated Response Capabilities for Beyond-Design-Basis Events,”** identifies methods and procedures the staff of the NRC considers acceptable for nuclear power reactor applicants and licensees to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.155, and Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” Section VII, “Communications and Staffing Requirements for the Mitigation of Beyond Design Basis Events.” This RG endorses, with clarifications, the methods and procedures promulgated by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in the following documents as methods the NRC staff considers acceptable for meeting portions of the regulations in 10 CFR 50.155 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VII:

  - NEI 13-06, “Enhancements to Emergency Response Capabilities for Beyond-Design-Basis Events and Severe Accidents,” Revision 0, dated September 2014, and NEI 14-
4. **Integrated Evaluations**

The information in this chapter should describe the integrated risk of all LBEs against the plant, and evaluated against three cumulative risk targets:

1. The total mean frequency of exceeding a site boundary dose of 100 millirem (mrem) from all LBEs should not exceed 1/plant-year. The value of 100 mrem is selected from the annual cumulative exposure limits in 10 CFR 20.

2. The average individual risk of early fatality within 1 mile of the exclusion area boundary (EAB) from all LBEs based on mean estimates of frequencies and consequences shall not exceed $5 \times 10^{-7}$/plant-year to ensure that the NRC safety goal quantitative health objective (QHO) for early fatality risk is met.

3. The average individual risk of latent cancer fatalities within 10 miles of the EAB from all LBEs based on mean estimates of frequencies and consequences shall not exceed $2 \times 10^{-6}$/plant-year to ensure that the NRC safety goal QHO for latent cancer fatality risk is met.

Key information in this chapter should be to identify design features that are responsible for preventing and mitigating radiological releases and for meeting the integrated risk criteria, including defense-in-depth (DID). This evaluation leads to performance requirements and design criteria that are developed within the process of the SSC classification. This chapter should also describe information that conveys the evaluated SSC margins against the total mean frequency of exceeding a site boundary dose of 100 mrem in order to establish baseline margins between the frequencies and consequences of individual LBEs against the frequency-consequence curve described in Figure 3-1 of NEI 18-04, Rev. 1.

Chapter 4 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 4.1 and 4.2) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the Integrated Evaluations, which include the overall plant risk performance summary, and identify design features that are responsible for preventing and mitigating radiological releases and for meeting the integrated risk criteria, including defense-in-depth.

9th Regulatory Position

NEI 21-xx, Chapter 4 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the Integrated Evaluations, which include the overall plant risk performance summary, and identify design features that are responsible for preventing and mitigating radiological releases and for meeting the integrated risk criteria, including defense-in-depth.

5. **Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and Systems, Structures, and Components Classification**

As part of the LMP process, LBEs are generally defined in terms of successes and failures of SSCs that perform safety functions and are modeled in the probabilistic risk-assessment (PRA). Therefore, the PRA safety functions (PSFs) are those functions responsible for the prevention and mitigation of an unplanned radiological release from any source within the plant.

The information in this chapter should describe the approach for designating SSC safety functions and classifications in accordance with the PSFs. For SSCs, information should include a description of the required safety function(s) (RSFs), required functional design criteria (RFDC), principal design criteria...
(PDC), safety classification of safety-related, and non-safety related with special treatment (NSRST) SSCs, and the complementary design criteria. Definitions for these terms are described in Section 6 of NEI 18-04, Rev. 1 “Glossary of Terms.” The information in this chapter should also identify potential technical concerns related to SSC safety classification, and the derivation of requirements necessary to support PSFs in the prevention and mitigation of LBEs that are modeled in the PRA.

Chapter 5 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 5.1 to 5.4) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the safety classification of SSCs, which includes information about RSFs, RFDC, PDCs, and NSRST.

10th Regulatory Position
NEI 21-xx, Chapter 5 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the safety classification of SSCs, which includes information about RSFs, RFDC, PDCs, and NSRST.

11th Regulatory Position – Supplemental Information – Fuel Qualification
(Note this is preliminary language and will be updated as appropriate based on staff guidance that is under development. Two NRC documents provide additional guidance in the area of non-LWR fuel qualification: 1) NUREG-2246, Fuel Qualification for Advanced Reactors, Draft Report for Comment (ML21168A063), and 2) NRC staff report “Assessment of White Paper Submittals on Fuel Qualification and Mechanistic Source Terms: Next Generation Nuclear Plant”, Revision 1, July 2014 (ML14174A845)).

In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 5 of the SAR should also address fuel qualification. The reactor core and its fuel are generally identified as safety-related due to the direct involvement in performing fundamental safety functions. The information requirements associated with safety-related SSCs are discussed in Section 6, “Safety-Related SSC Criteria and Capabilities.” However, there are regulatory requirements, such as fuel design limits, that are attributed-to or identified with fuel performance and its qualification. One of the characteristics of fuel qualification is the need for irradiation data with associated long-time frames to collect that irradiation data. Accordingly, it is anticipated that advanced reactor designs will use existing data (e.g., Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) program data, legacy metal fuel data) to support regulatory licensing to some degree. The fuel qualification discussion should focus on (1) understanding the role of the fuel in the safety case, and (2) determining the adequacy of the plan to provide the evidentiary basis for fuel performance as assumed in the safety case. Sufficient information should be available to support reasonable assurance findings that:

1) The role of the fuel in the safety case is adequately described. This can be addressed by providing fuel performance requirements during (1) normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) accident conditions. In support of these findings, sufficient information should be provided such that the safety limits of the fuel and the fuel contribution in the accident source term are clearly identified. Understanding of the safety limits and source term should address uncertainty associated with any limitations on data available and reflected in the analyses discussed in Section 2 “Safety and Accident Analysis Methodologies and Associated Validation” and Section 3 “Discussion of accident source terms” of NEI 21-xx.

2) The fuel qualification plan is adequate. The fuel qualification plan should consider the proposed analysis methodologies (e.g., fuel performance codes), the use of existing data, and any ongoing testing or plans to utilize lead test specimens. Where legacy data is used, a justification for the applicability of the data to the current application should be provided (e.g., data was collected for a fuel fabricated consistent with the proposed fuel design and irradiated in an applicable environment).
6. **Safety-Related Systems, Structures, and Components Criteria and Capabilities**

The information in this chapter should leverage the analysis performed for the safety related SSCs in Chapter 5 of NEI 21-xx and describe further detail into the criteria and capabilities of all safety related SSCs that are part of the affirmative safety case.

For SSCs classified as SR, the information in this chapter should address the design criteria referred to as Safety-Related Design Criteria (SRDC). The SRDC are derived from the RFDC, which in turn are developed from the RSFs determined in the LBE selection process described in Chapters 2 and 3 of NEI 21-xx.

Chapter 6 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 6.1 to 6.3) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the design requirements for SSCs, special treatment requirements for SSCs, and system descriptions for safety-related SSCs.

12th Regulatory Position

NEI 21-xx, Chapter 6 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the design requirements for SSCs, special treatment requirements for SSCs, and system descriptions for safety-related SSCs.

13th Regulatory Position – Supplemental Information

In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 6 of the SAR should also address the following:

1. If there are instrumentation and control systems that are identified as safety related then Design Review Guide (DRG), “Instrumentation and Controls for Non-Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) Reviews,” (ADAMS under Accession No. ML21011A140) provides additional guidance for content and review of this material.

7. **Non Safety-Related Special Treatment (NSRST) Systems, Structures, and Components Criteria and Capabilities**

The information in this chapter should describe the regulatory design and special treatment requirements for those SSCs classified as NSRST in chapter 5 of the SAR. NSRST SSCs are not directly associated with RFDC (i.e.: not SR SCCs), but are relied upon to perform risk-significant functions. Risk-significant SSCs are those that perform functions that prevent or mitigate any LBE from exceeding the frequency-consequence target or make significant contributions to the cumulative risk metrics selected for evaluating the total risk from all analyzed LBEs.

For clarity the term “special treatment” is derived from NRC regulations and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidelines in the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69. In Regulatory Guide 1.201, the following definition of special treatment is provided:

“…special treatment refers to those requirements that provide increased assurance beyond normal industrial practices that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) perform their design-basis functions.”

Chapter 7 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections 7.1 and 7.2) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to the special treatment requirements for NSRST SSCs at the site, and NSRST SSCs descriptions and capabilities. Additional information can be found in Table 4-1 of NEI 18-04.
14th Regulatory Position
NEI 21-xx, Chapter 7 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to the special treatment requirements for NSRST SSCs at the site, and NSRST SSCs descriptions and capabilities.

15th Regulatory Position – Supplemental Information
In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 6 of the SAR should also address the following:

a. If there are instrumentation and control systems that are identified as safety related then Design Review Guide (DRG), “Instrumentation and Controls for Non-Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) Reviews,” (ADAMS under Accession No. ML21011A140) provides additional guidance for content and review of this material.

8. Plant Programs

The information in this chapter should provide information on those plant programs relied upon to provide special treatment to SR and NSRST SSCs that are part of the affirmative safety case. The information should provide an overview of the special treatment programs, addressing the purpose, scope, and performance objectives as well as applicability to SSCs. The information for the programs should provide reasonable assurance that 1) reliability and performance targets are met, and 2) safety-significant uncertainties are addressed. Program areas could include human factors, quality assurance, startup testing, and equipment qualification, among others.

Chapter 8 of NEI 21-xx, Rev. x (specifically, Sections X and Y) provides an acceptable method for licensees to follow and develop baseline information related to those plant programs relied upon to provide special treatment to SR and NSRST SSCs that are part of the affirmative safety case.

16th Regulatory Position
NEI 21-xx, Chapter 8 provides an acceptable method for developing information related to those plant programs relied upon to provide special treatment to SR and NSRST SSCs that are part of the affirmative safety case.

17th Regulatory Position – Supplemental Information
In addition to the material identified in NEI 21-xx, Chapter 8 of the SAR should also address the following:

a. A discussion of SR SSCs and their treatment should be provided in Chapter 8 of the SAR. The term “special treatment” is used in a manner consistent with NRC regulations and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidelines in the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69. In Regulatory Guide 1.201, the following definition of special treatment is provided:

“…special treatment refers to those requirements that provide increased assurance beyond normal industrial practices that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) perform their design-basis functions.”

All safety-significant SSCs are subject to special treatment requirements. Chapter 8 of the SAR should describe special treatment requirements applicable to each SR SSC. These requirements should include specific performance requirements to provide adequate assurance that the SSCs will be capable of performing their RSFs with significant margins and with appropriate degrees of reliability. These include numerical targets for SSC reliability and availability, design margins for performance
of the RSFs, and monitoring of performance against these targets with appropriate corrective actions when targets are not fully realized. Another consideration in the setting of SSC performance requirements is the need to assure that the results of the plant capability DID evaluation described in Chapter 4 and 5 of the application (in accordance with NEI 21-xx) are achieved not just in the design, but in the as-built and as-operated and maintained plant throughout the life of the plant.

b. Associated testing/validation for SR SSCs
Special treatment requirements for SR SSCs may include the performance of routine testing and validation of SSC performance capability. Describe, as applicable, the special treatment requirements from NEI 18-04, Table 4-1, on a case-by-case basis and in the context of the SSC functions in the prevention and mitigation of applicable LBEs. These special treatment items for SR SSC may include the following:

- Equipment qualification - Essentially the same as for existing reactors for SR SSCs, 10 CFR 50.49
- Materials qualification
- Pre-service and risk-informed in-service inspections - See Regulatory Guide 1.178
- Pre-service and in-service testing - In-service testing needs to be integrated with Reliability Assurance Program
- Surveillance testing - Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met (i.e., demonstrate the ability to perform the safety function).

c. All NSRST SSCs are subject to special treatment requirements. This Chapter should describe special treatment requirements applicable to each NSRST SSC. These requirements should include specific performance requirements to provide adequate assurance that the SSCs will be capable of performing their RSFs with significant margins and with appropriate degrees of reliability. These include numerical targets for SSC reliability and availability, design margins for performance of the RSFs, and monitoring of performance against these targets with appropriate corrective actions when targets are not fully realized. Another consideration in the setting of SSC performance requirements is the need to assure that the results of the plant capability DID evaluation described in Chapter 4 and 5 of the application (in accordance with NEI 21-xx) are achieved not just in the design, but in the as-built and as-operated and maintained plant throughout the life of the plant.

d. Associated testing/validation for NSRST SSCs
Special treatment requirements for NSRST SSCs may include the performance of routine testing and validation of SSC performance capability. Describe, as applicable, the special treatment requirements from NEI 18-04, Table 4-1, on a case-by-case basis and in the context of the SSC functions in the prevention and mitigation of applicable LBEs. These special treatment items for NSRST SSCs may include the following:

- Reliability assurance targets
- Seismic qualification
- Pre-service and risk-informed in-service inspections - See Regulatory Guide 1.178
- Pre-service and in-service testing - In-service testing needs to be integrated with Reliability Assurance Program
- Surveillance testing - Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained,
that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met (i.e., demonstrate the ability to perform the safety function).

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide information on how advanced reactor applicants and licensees \(^3\) may use this guide and information regarding the NRC’s plans for using this RG. In addition, it describes how the NRC staff complies with 10 CFR 50.109, “Backfitting,” and any applicable finality provisions in 10 CFR Part 52.

Use by Applicants and Licensees

Advanced reactor applicants and licensees may voluntarily \(^4\) use the guidance in this document to demonstrate compliance with the underlying NRC regulations. Methods or solutions that differ from those described in this RG may be deemed acceptable if they provide sufficient basis and information for the NRC staff to verify that the proposed alternative demonstrates compliance with the appropriate NRC regulations.

Advanced reactor licensees may use the information in this RG for actions that do not require NRC review and approval such as changes to a facility design under 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments.” Non-LWR licensees may also use the information in this RG or applicable parts to resolve regulatory or inspection issues.

Use by NRC Staff

The NRC staff does not intend or approve any imposition or backfitting of the guidance in this RG. Because this guidance applies only to advanced reactors, and not to power reactors that are large LWRs, the NRC staff does not expect any existing licensee to use or commit to using the guidance in this RG. The NRC staff does not expect or plan to request licensees to voluntarily adopt this RG to resolve a generic regulatory issue. The NRC staff does not expect or plan to request licensees to use or commit to using the guidance in this RG without further backfit consideration.

During regulatory discussions on plant specific operational issues, the staff may discuss with licensees various actions consistent with staff positions in this RG, as one acceptable means of meeting the underlying NRC regulatory requirement. Such discussions would not ordinarily be considered backfitting even if prior versions of this RG are part of the licensing basis of the facility. However, unless this RG is

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\(^3\) In this section, “licensees” refers to licensees of nuclear power plants under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52; and the term “applicants,” refers to applicants for licenses and permits for (or relating to) nuclear power plants under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, and applicants for standard design approvals and standard design certifications under 10 CFR Part 52.

\(^4\) In this section, “voluntary” and “voluntarily” means that the licensee is seeking the action of its own accord, without the force of a legally binding requirement or an NRC representation of further licensing or enforcement action.
part of the facility license, the staff may not represent to the licensee that the licensee’s failure to comply with the positions in this RG constitutes a violation.

If a licensee voluntarily seeks a license amendment or change and (1) the NRC staff’s consideration of the request involves a regulatory issue directly relevant to this new or revised RG and (2) the specific subject matter of this RG is an essential consideration in the staff’s determination of the acceptability of the licensee’s request, then the staff may request that the licensee either follow the guidance in this RG or provide an equivalent alternative process that demonstrates compliance with the underlying NRC regulatory requirements. This is not considered backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) or a violation of any of the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR Part 52. Additionally, an existing applicant may be required to comply with new rules, orders, or guidance if 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) applies.

If a licensee believes that the NRC is either using this RG or requesting or requiring the licensee to implement the methods or processes in this RG in a manner inconsistent with the discussion in this Implementation section, then the licensee may file a backfit appeal with the NRC in accordance with the guidance in NRC Management Directive 8.4, “Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information Collection” (Ref. 32), and in NUREG-1409, “Backfitting Guidelines,” (Ref. 34).
ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS – To Be Updated

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>anticipated operational occurrence</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDBE</td>
<td>beyond-design-basis event</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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REFERENCES – To Be Developed

Publicly available NRC published documents are available electronically through the NRC Library on the NRC's public Web site at [http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/](http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/) and through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at [http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html](http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html). The documents can also be viewed online or printed for a fee in the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. For problems with ADAMS, contact the PDR staff at 301-415-4737 or (800) 397-4209; fax (301) 415-3548; or e-mail pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Copies of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents may be obtained through their Web site: [WWW.IAEA.Org](http://www.IAEA.Org/) or by writing the International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box 100 Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria.

Appendix A
Construction Permit Application Guidance

Detailed Advanced Reactor Construction Permit Guidance

This guidance is intended for CP applications involving advanced reactors following the licensing modernization project process. The guidance is based on an application using a risk-informed performance-based approach, such as the advanced reactor content of application project (ARCAP) whose purpose is to develop technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance-based application guidance. The ARCAP, documented in ISG-XXX, “Advanced Reactor Content of Application Interim Staff Guidance,” is broad and encompasses the industry-led technology-inclusive content of application project (TICAP). This CP guidance references applicable guidance developed through the ARCAP/TICAP activities as well as guidance derived from separate ongoing regulatory activities (e.g., security and emergency planning rulemaking), as necessary.

The TICAP guidance that is being developed in parallel with the guidance found in this document is based on the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) described in NEI 18-04, Revision 1, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development,” as endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.233, “Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors.” Several vendors have indicated that they plan to implement the LMP to develop the licensing basis for their applications. As such, processes from the LMP and initial guidance referencing TICAP and ARCAP draft documents are referenced throughout this document.

The ARCAP guidance is currently under development and is intended to be used in conjunction with the guidance in this document for the review of a non-LWR CP application. Because ARCAP/TICAP is in its early stages this document italicizes NRC guidance and industry standards that are under development that are not yet formally endorsed. These italics will be removed in future revisions to the document as the ARCAP/TICAP guidance and other NRC guidance and Industry standards to reflect the appropriate endorsed guidance.

However, applicants are not required to utilize the TICAP/LMP approach and may instead use another methodology (e.g., traditional deterministic approach, maximum hypothetical accident\(^6\)) to analyze non-LWR performance and develop a licensing basis. The TICAP/LMP process forms the basis for this guidance although in some areas the guidance provides additional considerations for acceptably addressing a specific topic when a TICAP/LMP approach is not used. As noted above applicants are encouraged to use the preapplication process to optimize reviews, which is especially important if an applicant intends to use a process other than the LMP to develop their licensing basis. Regardless, the review guidance in this document is limited in scope. The NRC staff should continue to consult other established guidance documents, as applicable, to complete reviews of non-LWR applications.

This guidance addresses the minimum information necessary in a CP application for the NRC staff to issue a CP under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.35(a) when the applicant has not supplied all of the technical information required to complete the application (i.e., 10 CFR 50.34(a)) and support the issuance of a CP which approves all proposed design features (i.e., obtains finality for the

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\(^6\) In this context, “maximum hypothetical accident” refers to a conservatively assessed, deterministic accident with consequences that bound the full spectrum of accident conditions for the plant and is not necessarily a credible event.
When making its safety finding regarding the issuance of a CP under 10 CFR 50.35(a), the NRC staff should make the determination that the application:

1. **Describes the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to,**
   a. the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and
   b. the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
2. **Describes safety features or components, if any, which require research and development program necessary to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components.**
3. **Provides commitments that such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility, and**
4. **Describes the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100 and based on that criteria concludes that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.**

Where an applicant desires design finality regarding a specific topic, the NRC staff should review that the application has provided sufficient information about the topic at a level of detail that is expected at the operating license (OL) stage. The guidance that follows is limited to the first 8 chapters of the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) consistent with the scope and methodology described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 21-xx, “XYZ.” For CP guidance outside the first 8 chapters of the PSAR, refer to draft ARCAP ISG.

### Specific Topic Guidance

1. **General Plant and Site Description**
   
   The NRC staff should review application content to ensure that the following information is included:
   
   a. **Overview of technology** (size of the reactor and planned commercial application of the design—power production, industrial application, etc.), including references to previous experience with similar designs and technology.

   b. **General plant and site characteristics including:**
      
      i. The specific number, type, lifetime, and thermal power level of the facilities, or range of possible facilities, for which the site may be used.
      
      ii. General description of the important plant design and operational features in sufficient detail to allow the reviewer to understand how the plant operates in normal and off-normal conditions, including refueling. The description should include the major plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and relied upon to meet the regulations. The important characteristics (coolant, moderator, fuel design, neutron spectra, materials, etc.) of the design. Drawings and other material as necessary to understand the design.
      
      iii. A description of how the design accomplishes the fundamental safety functions of controlling reactivity, heat removal, and radionuclide retention, including spent fuel storage and cooling, should be provided.
      
      iv. The **Principal Design Criteria (PDCs)** applicable to the design (for additional guidance on selecting PDCs, refer to RG 1.232 “Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light Water Reactors.”
v. A summary of the approach used in conducting the safety analysis, including Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) including Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), safety classification of SSCs and their performance requirements and special treatments, adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) and the overall acceptance criteria used.

vi. Overview of the analytical codes and analysis methods used.

vii. The location and boundaries of the site.

viii. The proposed general location of each major structure on the site.

c. Novel design features – provide a description of novel design features (such as passive systems, inherent safety features, or simplified control features) that may be used in safety-related or safety-significant SSCs. Topics to be considered beyond the reactor system include unique features such as seismic isolators, novel digital instrumentation and control systems, security features, or novel approaches to programs.

d. Identify the applicability of Generic Safety Issues, Unresolved Safety Issues and Three Mile Island action items to the design and their proposed resolution.

e. Identify the RGs applicable to the design and any proposed exceptions.

f. Identify the consensus design codes and standards (ASME, ANSI, IEEE, etc.) used in the design along with what SSCs they apply to.

2. Methodologies and Analyses
   a. Source Terms
      The NRC staff should review the source term methodology used by the applicant to include the validation and verification of the associated engineering computer programs. The source term development needs to include radiological source terms for accident analysis, routine effluents, radwaste system design, shielding design and equipment qualification. The NRC staff should consider the guidance and references found in SECY-16-0072, “Accident Source terms and Siting for Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light Water Reactors” (ML15309A319) for additional information regarding expected CP application content in this area.

   b. PRA
      The NRC staff should review the description and results of the applicant’s PRA described in a CP application. The plant design and the associated PRA at the CP application stage are less mature relative to the Operating License and, accordingly, are considered to be preliminary. Therefore, the description of the PRA is a high-level overview or summary that covers topics such as the methodology, scope, and acceptability of the PRA. When assessing the acceptability of the PRA, the NRC staff should consider any self-assessment, use of the non-LWR PRA standard (ASME/ANS RA-S-1.4-2021) including any exceptions, and/or peer review performed by the applicant commensurate with the plant design and PRA development stage. The description of PRA should also discuss how insights gained from the PRA have been, and will be, used during the design and construction of the plant. The NRC staff should examine the methods used or to be used to conduct a thorough and systematic search for initiating events (such as the use of master logic diagrams, heat balance fault trees, process hazards analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, operating experience reviews, etc.). The results of PRA should summarize the key outputs of the PRA including risk-significant LBEs, SSCs and human actions as well as other risk insights such as those on
defense-in-depth. The results should also discuss the uncertainty analysis and sensitivity analysis performed. The NRC staff reviews the planned further development of the PRA and the use of its results to help resolve any safety questions associated with the major features or components identified in a CP application.

In order for the NRC staff to conclude that the PRA is of sufficient scope and technical adequacy to support a CP application, the staff needs to be assured that:

- The PRA description addresses the methodology used, includes a discussion regarding initiating events, includes key outputs and risk insights, and describes further plans for PRA development and use.
- The methodology is generally consistent with either consensus industry standards or good industry practices.
- The search for initiating events was complete given the level of design completeness.
- The PRA results were properly derived.
- Insights identified were incorporated into preliminary designs.

The reviewer should first understand the context in which the PRA is being used, which includes the description and results of the PRA. The description of PRA should include the key PRA assumptions. To assess the quality of the PRA for the decision-making in support of the application, it is expected that the applicants conform with the guidance provided in Section 2.1, “Probabilistic Risk Assessment,” of NEI 21-xxx regarding the content of a SAR related to PRA.

In addition, the frequencies and probabilities should be appropriately estimated; and the engineering analyses, assumptions, and approximations used in developing the PRA model be appropriate and should demonstrate the robustness with respect to the uncertainties in the assessment.

The NRC staff should make evaluation findings that the PRA has been performed in such a way that the PRA results are reasonable based on the level of maturity of the design, and information provided in the SAR is reasonable and sufficient to support the findings.

c. Safety and Accident Analysis

The staff should review the safety and accident analysis used by the applicant to support findings associated with 10 CFR 50.34(a)(4). This review should consider that the requirement under 10 CFR 50.43(e)(1)(iii), that sufficient data exist on the safety-features of the design to assess the analytical tools used for safety analysis, is not applicable to a CP. Accordingly, evaluation of the safety margins using approved evaluation models is not required to support a CP. However, preliminary analyses should be available to support reasonable assurance findings that:

1. The design will be able to provide sufficient margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions.
2. The applicant has identified the structures, systems, and components necessary for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents.
3. The applicant has demonstrated an understanding of the uncertainty associated with the performance of structures, systems, and components necessary for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents.
It is noted that items above are closely related (e.g., an understanding of the uncertainties under item 3 is essential to an understanding of the margin under item 1). Additionally, items 2 and 3 support staff findings associated with 10 CFR 50.35(a)(3) that safety features or components which require research and development have been described and that there will be conducted a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components (see Section 17 on Research & Development). Additionally, the review of the safety analysis should consider the identification of licensing basis events (see Section 3 on licensing basis events).

d. Site Information
The NRC staff should review the site information in the application. Guidance regarding specific information content for this section can be found in draft ARCAP ISG, “Site Information,” (for applications using the LMP approach) and [forthcoming] Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-20-0045, “Population-Related Siting Considerations for Advanced Reactors,” for guidance regarding population distribution. The relevant topics areas are:

i. Site Characteristics and Site Parameters (Overview)

ii. Geography and Demography
   (1) Site Location and Description
   (2) Exclusion Area Authority and Control
   (3) Population Distribution

iii. Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities

iv. Regional Climatology, Local Meteorology, and Atmospheric Dispersion

v. Hydrological Description
   (1) Floods
   (2) Flooding Protection
   (3) Groundwater

vi. Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering
   (1) Geologic Hazards
   (2) Vibratory Ground Motion
   (3) Surface Deformation
   (4) Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations
   (5) Stability of Slopes

vii. Summary of Design Basis External Hazards

3. Licensing Basis Events
The NRC staff should review the process described in the application for selection of LBEs and classification and treatment of SSCs. One acceptable approach is described in RG 1.233, which classifies LBEs as either Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs), Design Basis Events (DBEs), Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBEs), or DBAs. DBAs are selected from the set of DBEs. Other risk-informed approaches will need to be reviewed, evaluated, and determined acceptable by the staff. Regardless of the approach described for addressing LBEs and classification and treatment of SSCs, the staff review should ensure that the application adequately describes the analysis of the radiological consequences of accidents to show compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), to include the following:

a. Discussion of selected DBAs. The NRC staff should ensure that the spectrum of DBAs includes those DBAs that present the greatest challenge with respect to calculated fission product releases.
b. Discussion of accident source terms. The NRC staff should consider the following:
   i. The identification of radionuclide release mechanisms from fuel, the associated limits, and the contribution to source term are or will be supported by experimental data that cover the needed range of applicability.
   ii. The performance of fission product barriers credited to prevent and/or inhibit the release of radionuclides are or will be supported by existing or planned experimental data that cover the needed range of applicability.

The NRC staff should evaluate the applicant’s use of bounding assumptions and conservative modeling to account for the uncertainty in final design details. For review of mechanistic source terms (if provided), additional information on development of accident source terms can be found in [INL paper] “Technology-Inclusive Determination of Mechanistic Source Terms for Offsite Dose-Related Assessments for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Facilities,” (ML20192A250). The staff should consider SECY-16-0012, “Accident Source Terms and Siting for Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light Water Reactors,” for guidance on mechanistic source terms.

c. Discussion of the major SSCs of the facility that are intended to mitigate the radiological consequences of a DBA with a description of how the three fundamental safety functions are accomplished for each DBA. Major SSCs of the facility include those that may affect the performance of barriers that restrict or limit the transport of radioactive materials from the fuel to the public (i.e., that bear significantly on the acceptability of the site under the radiological consequence evaluation factors identified in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)). The staff’s review should include identification of the design basis for the SSCs (e.g., codes and standards to be followed, seismic categories, etc.) as well as the SSC fission product removal mechanisms. This includes natural fission product removal processes or for unique features of the design that may require additional information from the applicant to fully explain the process being credited, the amount of removal being credited (specifically decontamination factors or coefficients and timing), basis for the proposed values and inputs to the dose analysis calculation, and the justification for assuming the removal process is applicable to the design of the plant for the duration of the event.

d. Discussion of the characteristics of fission product releases from the proposed site to the environment including the rates of fission product release, the isotopic quantities and the chemical forms of fission products released to the environment.

e. Discussion of the meteorological characteristics of the proposed site used in the accident analysis including the site-specific short-term atmospheric dispersion (χ/Q) values determined by the applicant.

f. Discussion of the analysis methods, assumptions and results for the total calculated radiological consequence dose at the exclusion area boundary (EAB), the outer boundary of the low population zone (LPZ) and control room (if required, e.g., operator actions are relied upon for safety-significant functions) from the DBAs. The uncertainty analyses in the mechanistic source terms and radiological doses should be reviewed as part of the evaluation of conservative assumptions used in this analysis. The plant design features intended to
mitigate the radiological consequences of accidents, site atmospheric dispersion characteristics and the distances to the EAB and to the LPZ outer boundary are acceptable if the total calculated radiological consequences for the postulated fission product release (calculated at the upper 95th percentile of consequences) fall within the following exposure acceptance criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D):

i. An individual located at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2-hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), and

ii. An individual located at any point on the outer boundary of the LPZ, who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage), would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem TEDE.

The NRC staff should consider performing an independent confirmatory radiological consequence analysis using pertinent information in the application to assess whether the proposed site meets the radiological consequence evaluation factors identified in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1).

4. Integrated Evaluations
   a. Evaluation of Integrated Plant Risk
      Integrated individual risks of site boundary dose and early and latent health effects should be reviewed over the range of LBEs analyzed. The analysis method and assumptions should be reviewed for consistency with NRC practice. Considerations could include:

      • was off-site evacuation in accordance with the facility's EP plan assumed?
      • was medical treatment for those members of the public exposed assumed?
      • what latent fatality risk coefficient was used
      • what segment of the population [average healthy individual or something else] does the risk coefficient represent, etc.?

      The integrated risk evaluation should be reviewed against three cumulative risk targets:

      i. The total mean value frequency of exceeding a site boundary dose of 100 mrem from all LBEs should not exceed 1/plant-year. The value of 100 mrem is selected from the annual exposure limits in 10 CFR Part 20.

      ii. The average individual risk of early fatality within 1 mile of the EAB shall not exceed a mean value of $5 \times 10^{-7}$/plant-year to ensure that the NRC safety goal Quantitative Health Objective (QHO) for early fatality risk is met.

      iii. The average individual risk of latent cancer fatalities within 10 miles of the EAB shall not exceed a mean value of $2 \times 10^{-6}$/plant-year to ensure that the NRC safety goal QHO for latent cancer fatality risk is met.

   b. Defense-in-Depth
      DID is a design approach to account for uncertainties in equipment and human performance. It can result in redundant, diverse and independent measures to accomplish safety functions and ensure that safety is not dependent upon a single SSC or human action. For applications that use a risk-informed performance-based approach, the staff should expect the DID information to address the systematic assessment methodology endorsed by RG 1.233 and
document preliminary integrated decision-making process panel (IDPP) decisions according to NEI 18-04, Revision 1.

The staff should ensure that the applicant has provided necessary commitments to establish DID adequacy. Commitments to implement the DID evaluation processes in RG 1.233 should be adequate. Alternately, the staff should ensure that the applicant’s DID process involves incorporating DID into design features, operating and emergency procedures, and other programmatic elements to ensure performance requirements are maintained throughout the life of the plant. For applicants that choose not to use the RG 1.233 endorsed approach, the applicant will need to explain its approach to DID and include in the application a description regarding how DID is addressed.

5. Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and SSC Categorization
   a. Principal Design Criteria
      The NRC staff should review the PDCs proposed in the application. The NRC staff expects prospective non-LWR applicants will review the general design criteria (GDCs) pertaining to LWRs provided in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the guidance in RG 1.232 to develop their PDCs and ensure that necessary safety functions and SSCs are covered under the selected PDCs. The staff should determine that the PDCs were appropriately developed. As part of this process, the staff should evaluate the acceptability the safety functions (referred to as the required safety functions (RSFs) in the LMP process) that must be fulfilled to keep the DBEs within the dose and integrated risk targets. Required Functional Design Criteria (RFDC) are then derived from the RSFs. The staff should ensure that the RFDCs are defined to capture design-specific criteria that may be used to supplement or modify the applicable GDCs or Advanced Reactor Design Criteria in the formulation of PDCs.

   b. Safety-Related (SR) SSCs
      The NRC staff should review the list of the SR SSCs identified through the LBE analysis. The staff should ensure that for each SR SSC, the basis for such classification is indicated in a traceable manner.

   c. Complementary Design Criteria
      The NRC staff should review the complementary design criteria (CDCs) proposed in the application. The staff should determine that the CDCs were appropriately developed. As part of this process, the staff should evaluate the acceptability the risk significant functions that must be fulfilled to address DID adequacy. The NRC staff should ensure that necessary risk significant safety functions and other safety functions for adequate DID are covered under the selected CDC.

   d. Non-Safety-Related with Special Treatment (NSRST) SSCs
      The NRC staff should review the list of the NSRST SSCs identified through the LBE analysis. The staff should ensure that for each NSRST SSC, the basis for such classification is indicated in a traceable manner.

   e. SSC Categorization Process
      The NRC staff should review the SSC categorization process described in the application. NRC accepted guidance for SSC categorization includes RG 1.233 which endorses the
6. Safety-Related SSC Criteria and Capabilities
Refer to NEI 18-04 for a definition of SR SSCs. The NRC staff should review the SR design criteria and special treatment requirements for each SR SSC described in the application. Information should be provided for each SR SSC to support a determination that the SSC will meet its reliability and performance targets as credited in the PRA. Specifically, the staff should review information for each SR SSC including:
- Design requirements and applicable codes and standards used in the design of the SSC.
- The RSF of the SSC, its RFDCs and its relationship to the PDCs.

The NRC staff should ensure that the application describes how the SR SSCs that are credited in the fulfillment of RSFs are capable to perform their RSFs with a high degree of confidence in response to any Design Basis External Hazard Levels (DBEHLs).

The NRC staff should ensure that commitments are provided to describe SR SSC reliability and capability performance requirements, performance of testing and validation of SSC performance capability, operability/availability requirements, special treatment requirements, and any required support functions at the operating license stage.

7. Non-Safety Related with Special Treatment (NSRST) SSC Criteria and Capabilities
Refer to NEI 18-04 for a definition of NSRST SSCs. The NRC staff should review the design criteria and special treatment requirements for each NSTST SSC described in the application. Information should be provided for each NSRST SSC to support a determination that the SSC will meet its reliability and performance targets as credited in the PRA. Specifically, the staff should review information for each NSRST SSC including:
- Design requirements and applicable codes and standards used in the design.
- The risk significant functions and functions required for defense-in-depth of the SSC, and its relation to the PDCs (In TICAP these PDCs are called CDCs).

The staff should ensure that the application describes how the NSRST SSCs are capable of performing their risk-significant functions or functions that are necessary for defense-in-depth adequacy with a high degree of confidence in response to any internal hazard (e.g., internal floods, internal fires, pipe whip, spatial placement, etc.) or DBEHLs.

The staff should ensure that commitments are provided to describe NSRST SSC reliability and capability performance requirements, performance of testing and validation of SSC performance capability, availability requirements, special treatment requirements, and any required support functions at the OL stage.

8. Plant Programs
The NRC staff should review the application for commitments to develop programs needed to implement the special treatments and meet reliability and performance targets for SR SSCs and NSRST SSCs. Such program areas may include in-service testing, maintenance, human factors, training, and reliability assurance.