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Sent: Monday, May 24, 2021 5:06 PM
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Subject: [External_Sender] Consolidated responses to NRC observations on TICAP tabletop exercises
Attachments: Consolidated responses to NRC TICAP tabletop exercises.docx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
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Hi Joe,

Attached, please find the consolidated responses to the NRC observations of the TICAP tabletop exercises. The only set of responses that you have not received to date are the responses to the observations on the MCRE tabletop exercise conducted with TerraPower.

All tabletop leads (copied on this email) have confirmed that neither the responses nor the observations contain confidential or proprietary information.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

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NRC Observations Associated with March 31, Terrapower Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) TICAP Tabletop Exercise

General Observations

I. The tabletop exercise included a comparison between the principal design criteria (PDCs), developed using the risk-informed and performance-based approach, and the General Design Criteria (GDCs)/Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDCs) in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.232. The observation team finds the comparison to be very informative. The comparison highlights perspectives on the role of GDCs/ARDCs as part of the PDC development under the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) process. The observation team plans to discuss this topic internally and may interact with the industry TICAP team for any follow-up interactions.

We are glad that the comparison exercise was found to be of benefit to the observation team, and we think that the process of developing PDC using an RIPB approach is a good candidate to be discussed during the upcoming TICAP workshops.

II. The NRC staff notes that this comparison may be outside of the TICAP guidance and not expected to be submitted as part of the safety analysis report (SAR). Nevertheless, the NRC staff believes that if such a comparison is made by an applicant having access to the comparison by the staff through an audit process would be helpful. In addition, the NRC staff would be interested in insights that industry may have on how the above comparison approach can work with the TICAP guidance document.

Although it was mentioned during the tabletop meeting and will be stated in the MCRE tabletop report, it is worth clarifying that the comparison of RIPB-derived PDC to the list of GDC/ARDC was an "academic exercise." NEI 18-04 does not require performing a comparison of final PDC to the GDC/ARDC, and the TICAP guidance does not call for including information on such a comparison in the SAR. TICAP does not believe that generating the comparison should be a de facto requirement on an applicant that follows NEI 18-04, but this could be candidate topic for an upcoming TICAP workshop.

III. The NRC staff notes that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 describes how you can use the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) at the beginning or at the end of the LMP process. If not used at the beginning of the LMP process, other tools such as a process hazards analysis (PHA) or a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) are used and then confirmed at the end of the LMP process via the PRA. However, the LMP did not appear to be used to develop frequency-consequence (F-C) curves (used for licensing basis event (LBE) identification and structure, system, and component (SSC) classification). How the PRA will be used to adjust the LBEs or SSC classification would be of interest to the NRC staff.

It is correct to say that a full iteration of the LMP process (as documented in NEI 18-04) has not yet been completed for MCRE; however, given the current maturity of the MCRE design and safety case, it was necessary to make assumptions to "simulate" a more complete safety case for MCRE in order to explore the TICAP guidance by exercising it. The adjusting of the LBEs and/or SSC classification as a MCRE PRA model is developed and matured would be the topic of an LMP-focused discussion; thus, a conversation on this topic would not be well-suited to discuss at the upcoming TICAP workshops.

Areas of Requested Feedback

I. What inconsistencies, if any, were noted between the sample SAR content discussed during the MCRE tabletop and NRC expectations.

   a. It is not clear how Section 3.1 of the TICAP guidance document was used to develop Appendix A of the MCRE report. Section 3.3 of the MCRE report did not analyze LBEs in a formalized manner, identify the required safety functions, present the radionuclide sources for the LBEs, define the success criteria for the reactor safe states, or evaluate the LBEs on the F-C curve. Characterization of the LBE needs to be defined with the required safety functions (RSFs) and the required end-states, otherwise the event success criteria remains undefined and incongruous.

Section 3.1 of the TICAP guidance was not explored as part of the MCRE TICAP tabletop, since this section of a TICAP SAR would indicate deviations taken from the LMP approach as documented in NEI 18-04, and this tabletop exercise assumed that the preliminary results had been developed using the LMP approach as documented in NEI 18-04. As stated above (and discussed during the tabletop meeting), the MCRE design and safety case are not currently mature enough to support the development of a SAR in full accordance with the TICAP guidance document. For example, a quantitative PRA model is still under development. For this reason, the current list of LBEs that has been identified for MCRE using qualitative risk assessment was assumed (for the purposes of development of example SAR content) to have been the results of a rigorous application of the LMP approach.

   b. Section A.3 of the MCRE report detailed that additional guidance from the TICAP document was needed for the plotting of anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) key parameters.

      Appendix A of the report details a good discussion of the AOOs, but this seems excessive compared to what would result from the large number of likely LBEs for advanced reactor designs.

The two examples of AOO descriptions presented in Appendix A helped develop the conclusion that the LBEs that are presented earlier in the SAR may have longer narrative descriptions than those presented later in the SAR. For example, in the MCRE examples, the first AOO allocated narrative space to describing the phenomenon of delayed neutron advection; however, the second AOO simply referred to the previous discussion. For this reason, the examples of AOO descriptions in the MCRE tabletop report may be longer and/or more detailed than the average discussion in a full SAR, but the TICAP guidance does not place minimum or maximum lengths for these types of discussions.

   c. No discussion of design basis events (DBEs) and beyond design basis events (BDBEs) was provided in Appendix A of the MCRE report, and thus there was little information to support the distinction of SSCs as Safety-Related (SR), Non-Safety-Related with Special Treatment (NSRST), Non-Safety-Related with No Special Treatment (NSR) in Appendix B of the report.

Unfortunately, given the current maturity of the MCRE design and safety case information, the development of a description for an event other than an AOO was outside of the scope of the MCRE tabletop exercise. DBEs and BDBEs have been analyzed for the MCRE design and were used to support development of the RSFs, PDC, and CDC; however, these

analyses were not at the appropriate level of detail to support development of example SAR LBE narratives.

Appendix B of the report does not detail the PDCs and their relationship to the RSFs and Required Function Design Criteria (RFDCs), or the Complimentary Design Criteria (CDCs).

Unfortunately, in order to share a draft of the tabletop report with the observation team, the version made available to the staff for the tabletop report was an incomplete draft. However, there were tables in Appendix B of the draft MCRE tabletop report that listed the RFDC/PDC and the CDC, as well as tables with examples that linked specific SR SSCs to specific LBEs based on the RSF that they were performing. Although the TICAP guidance indicates that "each RFDC constitutes a PDC," some clarifying text was added to the MCRE tabletop report to make it easier for a reader to navigate.

II. Does the NRC/INL have any suggestions for additional contexts that may be helpful to see in the tabletop report

a. There was an observation that it may be helpful to have additional discussions about the specific information expected to be available for staff audit and documented outside of the SAR versus the information expected to be included in the SAR (e.g., results of the LMP process included in the SAR vs. discussions of the LMP process except where there may have been deviations taken in implementing the process).

As stated in TICAP responses to previous tabletop exercise observations, the information available for staff audit vs. the information to be included in the SAR is a good candidate to be discussed at the upcoming TICAP workshops.

III. What other clarifying questions, if any, does the NRC have based on NRC/INL team observations.

a. The TICAP guidance document uses footnotes. A full bibliography at the end of the document would be more useful to applicants and reviewers.

Thank you for the feedback; this concern is one for the formatting of the guidance document that is not specific to this particular tabletop exercise. NRC may wish to include this comment as a formal written comment on the draft TICAP guidance document.

NRC Observations Associated with March 24, Westinghouse eVinci™ Micro-Reactor TICAP Tabletop Exercise

General Observations

These observations are based on insights developed during the conduct of the tabletop exercise since the observation team did not have the benefit to review the eVinci Micro-Reactor information prior to or following the tabletop exercise.

I. The tabletop exercise did not fully accomplish its goal of exercising the TICAP application content guidance. No SAR content was presented or discussed. Instead, the tabletop exercise was a "mini" version of the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) tabletop exercise that was performed in 2020, using some revised design features (TRISO fuel) and only evaluating for principal design criteria (PDCs). (Note that the 2020 LMP tabletop exercise did not evaluate for PDCs.) The tabletop exercise also did not perform some of the analysis that would be expected for development of licensing basis events, required safety functions, and PDCs, such as not evaluating the failure of all important structures, systems, and components (SSCs) (heat pipes and fuel), not calculating parametric uncertainties and not performing external hazards assessment.

Although the eVinci Micro-Reactor tabletop exercise did not explicitly develop example SAR content (like the other tabletop exercises), the primary focus was on the identification of PDC using the TICAP guidance. Also, while the above observation is correct in its identification that the LMP-based safety case for the eVinci Micro-Reactor design that was used for the TICAP tabletop exercise is not entirely complete, the exercise did accomplish its goal to exercise the TICAP guidance document and explore how to maximize the usefulness of the guidance in explaining how PDC are identified using the TICAP approach. PDC are required by regulation and were not addressed in detail by LMP; thus, this exercise was necessary to help ensure the gap between the guidance in NEI 18-04 (and endorsed in RG 1.233) was sufficiently bridged by the TICAP guidance document.

II. This TICAP tabletop exercise was further challenged by the limited state of completion of the LMP process for the specific safety analysis report (SAR) sections (Chapter 5) that were the subject of the tabletop exercise and therefore it was difficult to assess what information and level of detail should be included in the SAR and the adequacy of the content of application guidance. The state of completion of the LMP process for this TICAP tabletop exercise appeared to be less than what was performed for the prior LMP tabletop exercise.

As noted above, it is correct to state that the LMP-based safety case for the eVinci Micro-Reactor design is not mature enough for the preparation of an FSAR using the TICAP guidance; however, it was noted during the TICAP tabletop meeting (and will be reflected in the eVinci Micro-Reactor TICAP tabletop exercise report) that assumptions were made in order to explore the TICAP guidance. These assumptions do not necessarily reflect actual eVinci Micro-Reactor design, safety case, and/or licensing decisions. The eVinci Micro-Reactor tabletop exercise did not fully demonstrate the appropriate level of detail for information that is included in the SAR, but it did contribute to the comprehensive set of lessons learned captured by the TICAP team through the performance of the 4 different tabletop exercises. The concept of the appropriate level of detail in the SAR (especially with respect to the PDC) is an important item to be discussed during the upcoming TICAP workshops between the TICAP team and the NRC staff.

III. The observation team observed that there were cases where the LMP team provided clarification on the LMP process as applied to the eVinci microreactor which resulted in questions about what information and level of detail should be included in the SAR versus documentation available for the NRC staff audit.

As noted above, a more detailed discussion about the information and level of detail included in the SAR compared to what is available for the NRC staff audit will be a topic of conversation in the upcoming workshops between the NRC staff and the TICAP team.

IV. It was insightful for the NRC staff to see how the LMP process is applied as well as the level of detail/complexity for developing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for a simple microreactor design.

Thank you for the observation. The eVinci Micro-Reactor tabletop report will document the lessons learned from completing the tabletop exercise.

V. The tabletop exercise involved an approach used by Westinghouse to develop PDCs. Westinghouse went directly from development of the required safety functions (RSFs) to defining the PDCs. NEI 18-04 states (under Task 7) that for SSCs classified as Safety-Related (SR), the Safety-Related Design Criteria (SRDCs) are derived from the Required Functional Design Criteria (RFDCs) that are in turn developed from the RSFs determined in the LBE selection process. RFDCs are taken down from the RSFs to a lower level and form a transition to SSC-level criteria. RFDCs are defined to capture design-specific criteria that may be used to supplement or modify the applicable General Design Criteria (GDCs) or Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDCs) in the formulation of PDCs. This approach appeared to the observation team to result in gaps in information that would be incorporated into the SAR content.

According to the TICAP guidance, the PDC are the RFDC, which (as noted in the observation) are derived directly from the RSFs. Therefore, in Chapter 5 of a SAR developed using the TICAP guidance, the RSFs and the RFDC/PDC would be presented. Chapter 6 would present the SR-SSCs and the SRDC. The presentation of the PDC in Chapter 5, including the associated additional information, is a topic that would be a good candidate to discuss during the upcoming workshops between the NRC staff and the TICAP team.

VI. Principal design criteria are not limited to functional safety performance; instead, per the regulations, PDCs establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety. The three proposed PDCs appear to cover much of the design and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety, but do not explicitly capture other aspects required of PDCs. The mapping exercise that was outlined during the presentation provided useful context on how various PDCs could be addressed through other efforts. However, that would not obviate the need to provide PDCs to address these concepts if the application were proposed using 10 CFR Part 50 or 52. In particular, it was not clear to the observation team how the proposed PDC would address concepts like those in GDC/ARDC 1-4, inspection and testing, and fabrication and construction requirements not directly related to functional safety performance without including specific PDCs that address those areas for reasonable assurance. The observation team noted that the guidance document could provide clarification on how special treatments determined using the LMP process could address the scope of PDCs that address performance and quality requirements.

The perspective of the TICAP team is not fully aligned with that of this comment; as such, the approach to addressing special treatment, including inspection, testing and fabrication/construction requirements (and how this is discussed in the TICAP guidance) is a candidate to be discussed at the upcoming TICAP workshops. The TICAP team's preliminary thinking on the concept of PDC within an LMP-based affirmative safety case were discussed during the August 27, 2020 public meeting (Accession Number: ML20239A957).

VII. Westinghouse stated that they did not believe the TICAP/LMP guidance for developing a PRA was overly burdensome, even for their simple microreactor design.

Areas of Requested Feedback

I. What inconsistencies, if any, were noted between the sample SAR content discussed during the 3/5 tabletop and NRC expectations.

The TICAP tabletop exercise for eVinci was challenging in that there was no example SAR content developed. This made it difficult for the observation team to assess the adequacy of the COA guidance document for section of the SAR that was the focus of the tabletop exercise.

We understand the difficulty but hope that the interaction between the TICAP team and the Westinghouse team observed during the tabletop meeting and the ability to interact with the TICAP team during the upcoming workshops will enable the staff to gain a better understanding of the TICAP guidance and associated expectations for SAR content.

II. Does the NRC/INL have any suggestions for additional contexts that may be helpful to see in the tabletop report

The observation team noted that it could be helpful to provide additional clarification or examples about what information and level of detail should be included in the SAR versus documentation available for NRC staff audit (e.g., what details associated with the iterative LMP process implementation vs. results of the LMP process would be available for NRC staff audit). In addition, the observation team noted that it could be helpful to include some discussion or clarification in the content of application guidance document about how the special treatments for non-safety related SSCs determined using the LMP process could address the scope of PDCs for inspection and testing, quality and fabrication and construction requirements not directly related to functional safety performance that would otherwise be addressed by those such as GDC/ARDCs 1-4.

As noted above, both of these topics are good candidates to be discussed at the upcoming TICAP workshops. In addition, effort will be made to include sufficient context on these topics in the tabletop report to benefit a reader.

III. What other clarifying questions, if any, does the NRC have based on NRC/INL team observations.

How would the TICAP guidance address documentation of those elements of the LMP process where it was unclear how the development of SRDCs and RFDCs were derived, particularly for a microreactor design.

The TICAP guidance is predicated on the applicant exercising the LMP process in accordance with NEI 18-04. There should be an orderly flow from RSFs to RFDC to SRDC, and that should preclude the “lack of clarity” issue from arising.

NRC Observations Associated with March 5, Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP) Tabletop Exercise

General Observations

I. Overall, the VTR tabletop exercise provided useful feedback to the developers of the TICAP guidance document and provided the VTR design team the opportunity to interpret and apply the TICAP guidance. The tabletop exercise focused on TICAP Section 4.2 (DID) and TICAP Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (SSC categorization, safety functions and criteria). The feedback provided by the VTR team consisted of identification of those areas in TICAP where the guidance was unclear or incomplete and suggested additions to the guidance for clarification or to fill in gaps. In addition, the exercise provided the opportunity for the VTR design team to prepare example input to a safety analysis report (SAR) based on their interpretation of the TICAP guidance and to receive feedback from the TICAP team regarding whether or not the interpretation was correct. There was constructive interaction between the VTR and TICAP teams regarding the TICAP guidance and its implementation.

Thank you. We are glad that the meeting achieved its objectives.

II. The TICAP guidance document has been expanded substantially from what was provided in Southern Company's October 20, 2020 TICAP report. In many cases, the expanded guidance refers to NEI 18-04, which is appropriate. However, there are still areas where the TICAP guidance does not capture some key direction contained in NEI 18-04. Some of these areas are discussed below.

The TICAP guidance document has been undergoing development throughout the conduct of the tabletop exercises. We appreciate the specific comments below and will continue to consider them while developing the guidance.

III. This general observation relates to the X-energy General Observation item II, and Areas of Requested Feedback item III.d. The NRC/INL staff notes the robust discussion that was held regarding the level of detail in the SAR, supporting information placed on the docket, and information that is available for audit. The NRC staff understands that industry intends to revise the TICAP guidance to provide more guidance in this area. This area has been the topic of much discussion during public meetings and it is expected that NRC staff and stakeholder engagement (including with non-industry stakeholders) will continue in this area.

We agree that discussion on this topic is valuable and is a good candidate to be discussed during the TICAP workshops with the NRC/INL staff.

IV. During the discussion of non-safety related with special treatment (NSRST) structures, systems, and components (SSC) SAR content the NRC staff raised a question regarding where the reliability information for these SSCs would be located (e.g., PRA or SAR) and what this information might entail. The NRC staff believes further discussion on this topic would be beneficial.

This is an important point. We intend to clarify it in the draft guidance and discuss it further as part of the TICAP workshops with the NRC/INL staff.

V. Although it is important to understand the design to ascertain the necessary content for the SAR, the industry should be aware that the NRC staff has been reminded that the purpose of the tabletop exercise is to focus on the appropriateness of the content of the SAR and

level of detail. Any observations by the NRC team regarding the design itself should not be interpreted by industry as NRC review.

Thank you for recognizing the purpose of the exercise and explicitly making this statement.

VI. The SAR content should focus on presenting the results of implementing the LMP process. For discussion purposes, it may be beneficial to discuss what type of documentation may exist from implementing the LMP process by the applicant, including narrative on the iterations in the process, and the deliberations and decisions of the integrated decision-making process (IDP) and whether this documentation may be something that is audited by the NRC staff.

This topic is a good candidate to be discussed during the TICAP workshops with the NRC/INL staff.

<u>Areas of Requested Feedback</u>

IV. What inconsistencies, if any, were noted between the sample SAR content discussed during the 3/5 tabletop and NRC expectations.

a. NEI 18-04 (Section 3.2.2 – Task 6) states that, where possible, external events are to be analyzed in the PRA but, in some cases, may be selected and treated deterministically. There is no discussion in the TICAP guidance document about how to select and treat external events selected using a deterministic approach. Accordingly, the VTR report did not address this topic. For deterministically selected external events, it is not clear how they can be plotted on the frequency-consequence (F-C) curve since there is no frequency associated with the events. The discussion around this topic did not lead to a clear understanding of which external events are selected and treated deterministically and how they are compared to the F-C curve.

We think that this question is an interesting one and requires further clarification and discussion. We suggest that this topic be discussed at the upcoming TICAP workshops between the TICAP team and NRC/INL staff.

There are several levels in which external hazards are selected and treated deterministically in NEI 18-04. The selection of DBEHLs may be performed deterministically or based on a probabilistic hazard evaluation and leads to specific Safety-Related Design Criteria (SRDC) to ensure that each SR SSC is capable of performing its RSF in the case of occurrence of an event at the DBEHL.

External events are also identified in definition of LBEs derived from the PRA when those events are incorporated into the PRA. The development of a PRA in the LMP methodology including the selection of the initiating events benefits from the deterministic analyses that are needed to support the design as illustrated in Figure 3-3 of NEI 18-04. For the PRA evaluation of external events, whether selected deterministically or via probabilistic hazard analysis, all are dispositioned probabilistically via PRA modeling or application of the PRA standard screening criteria.

b. The largest inconsistency was in the area of defense-in-depth (DID). NEI 18-04 (Chapter 5) contains an extensive description on how to determine the adequacy of DID. DID attributes and evaluation criteria are described in Chapter 5 of NEI 18-04. The final determination of DID adequacy is to be made using an IDP and evaluation criteria as described in Section 5.9.3 of NEI 18-04. The TICAP guidance document does not mention the IDP, but does call for the SAR to include an “Integrated DID Summary.”

However, the TICAP guidance document does not explain what the "Integrated DID Summary" is to contain nor does it refer to NEI 18-04, Section 5.9.3. The VTR report (Appendix A, Section 4.2) does mention the IDP in various places, but does not include a summary of the IDP review and conclusions. In fact, the VTR design team, in Appendix A, Section A.4.2.4, of their report, questioned the need for the "Integrated DID Summary," since DID information can be found elsewhere in their report. The lack of a summary section in the VTR report is a concern because it puts the burden on the reviewer to piece together the DID information in the report and confirm that the evaluation criteria contained in NEI 18-04 (Section 5.9.3) for deciding on the adequacy of DID were used and met. It would seem reasonable to make the "Integrated DID Summary" the focus of the TICAP guidance in order to tie all of the DID pieces together and serve as a roadmap to the other SAR sections for details, thus making the reviewer's job easier.

The discussion of DID in Section 4.2 of a SAR developed using the TICAP guidance is a good candidate for discussion as part of the upcoming workshops with the NRC/INL staff. We would like to note that the guidance for Section 4.2.3 of the SAR (i.e., "Integrated DID Summary") was expanded to include explicit reference to NEI 18-04 Sections 5.9.2 and 5.9.4 as a result of the VTR tabletop exercise.

V. Does the NRC/INL have any suggestions for additional contexts that may be helpful to see in the tabletop report

a. It was helpful to review the pages of the document prior to page 55 to be able to put the VTR design information into context with the LMP/TICAP process and to note the differences into approaches used for developing the CSDR for DOE and the SAR content for the NRC.
We are glad that the context was useful and plan to include this background information in the final VTR tabletop report.

b. The format following page 55 of the document showing by color code the guidance, the SAR content developed using the guidance, and comments from the vendor on the guidance and SAR content was very helpful from a user-friendly standpoint.
We appreciate the feedback and intend to include similar formatting in future tabletop exercise content, to the maximum extent possible.

c. It seems that there may be have some duplication in the tables of information presented and some effort to streamline the information presented in the tables and the number of tables would likely be beneficial.
Thank you for the observation. The draft used for the tabletop meeting was not the final draft, and the tables will be reviewed prior to final publication.

d. It would be useful to have the tabletop report provide a comprehensive summary discussion on DID adequacy using the IDP review and the evaluation criteria in Section 5.9.3 of NEI 18-04, since these criteria seem to represent the bottom line on DID adequacy, as described in NEI 18-04.
We will consider this feedback with the understanding that the limited scope of the tabletop exercises and design maturity of the associated plants limit the extent that a comprehensive DID evaluation may be performed . We would like to mention, as noted in response to item I.b. above, additional changes to the guidance are under development on the integrated DID Summary. In general, we think that topic is an important one for the upcoming workshops; however, it may be possible to use the body

of the tabletop report to communicate further context and details about the IDP review beyond that which the TICAP guidance indicates should be included in the SAR.

e. It would be useful to describe how external events are selected and, for those selected deterministically, how they are incorporated into the risk-informed and performance-based LMP process.
We will consider this feedback. Similar to the response to II.d. above, we would like to mention that the question of how to select external events is covered in NEI 18-04 and was not intended to be in the scope of TICAP. The Design Basis External Hazard Levels (DBEHLs) may be selected deterministically or probabilistically, but the process is intended to cover events at the limiting hazard levels down to 10^{-4}/plant year with the requirement that the SR SSCs can support their RSFs with a high degree of confidence. If there are external events selected deterministically, they will at some point be included in the PRA. At that time, they will be subject to the PRA Standard screening criteria and, if not screened out, reflected in the AOOs, DBEs, and BDBEs. Only those events that survive the screening criteria and produce LBEs above $5x10^{-7}$/plant-year will appear on the F-C chart.

With respect to the design of safety related SSCs, external events are addressed in Chapter 6 of the TICAP guidance through the DBEHLs and Safety Related Design Criteria. However, it may be possible to use the body of the tabletop report to communicate further context and details about the selection of external events beyond that which the TICAP guidance indicates should be included in the SAR.

f. The VTR report states that a PRA self-assessment identified some gaps in Capability Category II requirements of the non-LWR PRA standard. It may be useful to specifically discuss the gaps and their resolutions in the PRA summary of the SAR or a peer review report for audit.
The NLWR PRA Standard requirements for peer review and configuration control and the NEI PRA Peer Review Guidance specify that peer review findings and dispositions be documented in the plant records and associated corrective actions programs. The dispositions of these findings is a rather dynamic process and is subject to frequent changes and this creates a major problem for inclusion in the SAR. Hence this matter is best handled via the on-site audit process.

VI. What other clarifying questions, if any, does the NRC have based on NRC/INL team observations.

a. Page 27 of NEI 18-04 states that in comparing LBE frequencies and consequences to the F-C curve, 95th percentile values of both frequency and consequence are to be used. In addition, Section 3.2.1 of the TICAP guidance document states that in plotting LBEs on the F-C curve, the 5% and 95% uncertainty bands should be shown. In Appendix B, Section B.5.4.1 of the VTR report, mean values were used in plotting the LBEs on the F-C curve. The use of mean values was questioned during the tabletop exercise and the TICAP team stated that mean values should be used. Emails between Brandon Chisholm (Southern Co.) and Tom King (INL/NRC) were exchanged on 3/6/21 on this topic, but the issue remains open. It is not clear why the TICAP team endorsed the use of mean values when their own guidance states otherwise. Therefore, since NEI 18-04 and the TICAP guidance call for the use of 95th percentile values of frequency and consequence or showing the uncertainty bands, these are what should be used when comparing LBEs to the F-C curve. This will then be consistent with the direction in NEI

18-04 and the guidance in TICAP and will help support the consideration of uncertainty in DID evaluations. In addition, Appendix A, Section A.4.2 (DID), of the VTR report does provide 95th percentile values of LBE frequency and consequence in tabular form, including a comparison to corresponding F-C curve consequence targets. Therefore, for consistency and to avoid confusion, it would seem reasonable to use 95th percentile values or show uncertainty bands in all cases when plotting LBEs on the F-C curve.

This may have been a miscommunication. At the time of the VTR tabletop exercise, only mean values were provided since the VTR team had not yet addressed uncertainties. As such, the information in the tabletop report is a process maturity snapshot of the VTR SAR content and is only as complete as the current design maturity allows.

The LMP does provide examples of tables and other possible activities to capture the final results in the SAR including where uncertainties play an important role in the final determination of DID adequacy; however, it was a high priority to developers that the LMP did not dictate format or other changes that would impact their internal design processes or documentation systems. As a result, how the tables look in the end is flexible, although the required results documentation needs to meet the expectations of LMP. In doing so, some of the information is included in the SAR and some in design records.

NRC Observations Associated with February 3, 2021, X-Energy TICAP Tabletop Exercise

Joe, thanks very much for the observations and input. The TICAP team has added some informal feedback, indicated by red font. Although our responses are initial reactions from the tabletop and guidance leads and not a fully vetted response, we thought it would be useful for you to see this information now, rather than after the completion of all of the tabletop exercises.

Please understand that all of the NRC/INL team's input will be considered as we proceed to refine our draft guidance.

General Observations

I. The staff notes that the first TICAP tabletop exercise was run differently than the LMP tabletop exercises. Namely the LMP tabletops were done after the NEI LMP guidance document was already written and therefore provided more insights on implementation of the LMP guidance. For TICAP, it appears that the vendors are implementing the tabletops earlier in the process and using the tabletops to help develop the TICAP guidance. The staff would just like to confirm this understanding is correct going forward. The staff understands that the focus of future tabletops will be to test-run TICAP against selected portions of the application. This is particularly relevant for Chapters 5, 6, and 7 which would help the staff see the difference between the information provided in the SAR for a safety-related SSC and a non-safety-related with special treatment SSC.
   Your understanding is correct. All of the TICAP tabletop exercises were conducted alongside the development of the draft guidance.

II. The staff would like to confirm industry's understanding of the TICAP guidance related to incorporating by reference technical report/topical reports into the safety analysis report. The staff considers such documents that are incorporated by reference (IBR) into the SAR to be part of the SAR (i.e., part of the licensing basis) and therefore subject to the SAR change process. That is also our understanding. We have a distinction between IBR and other reference material (REF) for that reason. Although the TICAP guidance on content of application includes reference to NEI 98-03 for distinctions between IBR and documents referenced in the SAR, the discussions of the Chapter 2 content seemed to convey an inconsistently applied approach regarding whether IBR documents are considered part of the SAR. Additional discussions in this area may be needed, and clarifications to the TICAP guidance document may be appropriate.

III. It may be beneficial for the NRC staff to have a content of application version continuously accessible throughout the entire period of the tabletop exercises such that more meaningful questions/feedback could be developed for the focus area for the tabletop exercise.
   Access was given to the core TICAP/ARCAP team via SharePoint site on 3/3/2021.

Areas of Requested Feedback

I. What inconsistencies, if any, were noted between the sample SAR content discussed during the 2/3 tabletop and NRC expectations

   a. The TICAP guidance document that was provided to support the tabletop has more content in it than the staff has previously seen. It provided the staff with a better

understanding of how Southern is developing the document. The staff thought this was a step in the right direction.
Thank you for the feedback.

b. The staff was expecting the tabletop to cover more topics. Only two chapters were discussed (chapter 2, Generic Analyses (20-page document – provided) and chapter 8 (plant programs – only 2 pages provided). Chapters 5, 6, and 7 were referenced during discussions but the staff did not have any proposed input to "observe"
SAR Chapters 5, 6, and 7 were initially considered within the scope of the Xe-100 tabletop exercise but the focus was shifted to Chapters 2 and 8 after work began on the exercise. This shift was at the request of the developer in response to resource prioritization during the tabletop performance period.

   i. Having information on chapters 5, "SSC Categorization," Chapter 6, "Safety-related SSC capabilities,", and Chapter 7, "Non-safety related with special treatment capabilities," would have been helpful to assess level of detail provided for these chapters. Other tabletop exercises have included portions of Chapters 5, 6, and/or 7 within their scope.
   ii. In areas where another document is referenced or referred to, some sample content (e.g. a table of contents) would be useful in confirming that the total level of detail available for review is adequate for the staff to make findings on the proposed information. Treatment of references is a work in progress.

c. It was not clear to the staff the extent to which the TICAP guidance document was used to support the tabletop. Most of the exercise discussion was on Chapter 2 and it was not clear to the staff how the TICAP guidance document was used to develop the content for this chapter.
It is our intention for the X-energy TICAP Tabletop Report to provide additional context regarding how the guidance document was used to support the exercise.

II. Does the NRC/INL have any suggestions for additional contexts that may be helpful to see in the tabletop report

a. Tech specs and other plant programs were referenced in the discussions on Chapter 8. It is unclear what guidance is going to be provided in TICAP regarding these topics. Southern has previously indicated that Tech Specs are outside the scope of the guidance it is developing. Having a clear understanding of what is and is not within the scope of TICAP is needed. Having information in the SAR (perhaps in chapters 5, 6, and 7) regarding associated technical specifications could obviate the need for a technical specification basis document. This has been the subject of ARCAP/TICAP scope discussions and is a good candidate for a topic to be discussed during the TICAP workshops with the NRC/INL team.

b. For those guidance documents and plant programs that are not part of TICAP, and for which no development plans are scheduled, it would be beneficial to gather insights on what the industry plans to reference/rely upon for completion of that portion of the SAR (i.e., How to meet 10CFR 50.36(a)) It would probably be inappropriate for TICAP to respond on that point, given that it is beyond the TICAP scope.

III. What other clarifying questions, if any, does the NRC have based on NRC/INL team observations

a. It would be helpful to provide a definition of what an “Affirmative Safety Case” is and the extent to which it will be described in the guidance document.
The TICAP slides presented at the June 11, 2020 Stakeholder Meeting address the definition. The wording was refined somewhat in the slides presented at the December 10, 2021 Stakeholder Meeting. The definition will be covered in the guidance document.

b. If we agree that Chapter 1 does not contain any licensing basis info that needs to be maintained or is part of change control process scope, no information that would be utilized by the staff in developing its findings should be included in Chapter 1 that is not provided elsewhere in the SAR (e.g., deviations/exceptions to the NEI 18-04 methodology were mentioned in Chapter 1 and those would likely be part of the licensing basis).
We understand the point and are addressing it in the guidance.

c. References to Southern Co. documents and DOE documents for additional guidance make the document less user friendly – relevant portions from these documents and/or examples from the LMP tabletops should be included in the TICAP guidance document. See related comment above (i.e., I.b.ii)
We agree.

d. The NRC staff notes that it is important to reach a common understanding about where PRA-related information will be located in the application. To this end, it would helpful to map each of the SRP Section 19.0 acceptance criteria to the various TICAP chapters. The NRC staff recognizes that some of these acceptance criteria do not apply to non-light water reactors, and that additional information will be provided that is specific to the use of PRA-related information in supporting implementation of the LMP process. The following table provides, as an example, an initial attempt at how this mapping could be performed using the existing guidance from the SRP. The table is provided for illustrative purposes to assist in further refining the TICAP guidance document.
The intent of our guidance is to meet the requirements stated in 10 CFR 52.47(a)(27) related to the PRA. Our approach places substantial reliance on conformance with the non-LWR PRA Standard as opposed to providing extensive PRA documentation in the SAR. Consistent with application of the LMP-based Affirmative Safety Case, we want to focus on what is necessary and sufficient today for an advanced reactor application, not on past SRP guidance for large light water reactor applications.

TICAP Chapter	PRA-Related Information
2 – Generic Analysis	SRP 19.0 Acceptance Criteria: 9 – PRA quality control 10- PRA technical adequacy 11 – Meet Capability Category I 12 – Prior NRC staff reviews, etc. 13 – Use of assumptions 18 – PRA maintenance process 19 – PRA maintenance and upgrade

	20 – PRA maintenance and upgrade program 21 – Treatment of tornados 22 – Treatment of hurricane missiles
3 – Licensing Basis Events	Use of PRA-related information for LBE selection (specific to LMP)
4 – Integrated Evaluations	SRP 19.0 Acceptance Criteria: 1 – Use of PRA to identify vulnerabilities 2 – Demonstrate that the QHOs are met 3 – Demonstrate the the CPG is met 4 – Identify risk-informed safety insights 5 – TMI requirement to perform PRA (n/a) 6 – Use PRA results in an integrated fashion 7 – Importance analysis 8 – Uncertainty analysis 14 – PRA quantitative and qualitative results 15 – PRA includes internal floods and fires 16 – Reporting of significant risk contributors 17 – Definition of “significant” 23 – Containment structure integrity 24 - Containment structural integrity
5 – Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and SSC Classification	Use of PRA-related information for SSC classification (specific to LMP)