UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

June 25, 2021

Ms. Cheryl A. Gayheart
Regulatory Affairs Director
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
3535 Colonnade Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2021011 AND 05000366/2021011

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

On May 14, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Johnny Weissinger – Plant Manager and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000321 and 05000366
License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 – DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2021011 AND 05000366/2021011 dated June 25, 2021

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML21176A042

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OFFICE	RII/DRS	RII/DRS	RII/DRS	RII/DRS	RII/DRS
NAME	P. Braxton	P. Carman	K. Mangan	M. Schwieg	R. Smith
DATE	06/25/2021	06/25/2021	06/25/2021	06/25/2021	06/25/2021
OFFICE	RII/DRS	RII/DRS			
NAME	T. Su	J. Baptist			
DATE	06/25/2021	06/25/2021			

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000321 and 05000366
License Numbers:	DPR-57 and NPF-5
Report Numbers:	05000321/2021011 and 05000366/2021011
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2021-011-0010
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:	Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2
Location:	Baxley, GA
Inspection Dates:	April 26, 2021 to May 14, 2021
Inspectors:	P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector P. Carman, Senior Reactor Inspector K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector T. Su, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:	James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)

(1) Time Critical Operator Actions to Reduce Containment Pressure During a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Drywell Pressure is 35 PSIG, within 10 Minutes via one of following methods; Time Critical Operator Action to Start Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) after a LOCA to Buffer Suppression Pool, within Two Hours by one of the following methods:

- Reduce Reactor Pressure Using Main Condenser Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser
- Reduce Reactor Pressure Using Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to the Torus
- Reduce Drywell Pressure Using Drywell Sprays via the Residual Heat Removal System
- Initiating SBLC Using the Control Switch from the Main Control Room (MCR)
- Initiating SBLC Using Links and Jumpers from the MCR
- Initiating SBLC Using Links and Jumpers and Switch Manipulation Locally

(2) Main Steam Isolation Valve, 1B21-FO22A

- Component Degradation
- Component Inputs/Outputs

- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- System health report, maintenance effectiveness and records, and corrective action history
- Modifications
- Equipment/Environmental Qualification
- Design calculations
- Instrumentation (range, accuracy, and setpoint)
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- Energy Source (air)
- Time Critical Operator Action to establish MSIV Alternate Path to main condenser within 90 Minutes

(3) U1 LPCI MCC 1R24-S018B

- Compliance with UFSAR, Technical Specifications (TS), and TS Bases
- Conformance with manufacturer instructions for installation, maintenance, and operation
- Material condition and configuration (i.e. photos provided by licensee)
- System health reports
- Design requirements

(4) Diesel Generating Building ventilation system

- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
- Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
- Maintenance effectiveness and records, and corrective action history
- Design calculations
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- Electrical and logic diagrams

(5) Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1C

- Design bases documents, system descriptions, and training documents
- Primary design calculations
- System/component health report
- Condition reports associated with component
- Completed surveillance and test procedures

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers, 1T48-F328A/B

- UFSAR and other applicable design and licensing basis documents
- Design calculations
- Surveillance and in-service testing results
- Consistency between station documentation and vendor specifications

- Corrective maintenance records and corrective action history
- Maintenance effectiveness
- System/component health report

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)

(1) EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Line Missile Protection, SNC799744
(2) Degraded Grid – U2 Degraded Voltage Replacement, SNC489866
(3) SNC338333,
Dissolved Gas Monitors - U1 & U2 Kelman Gas Analyzers for Large Power Transformers
(4) SNC950252, Masterpact Part 21

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) NRC Information Notice 2019-03: Inadequate Implementation of Clearance Processes Resulting in Configuration Control Issues.
(2) IER L3 18-3 - Inadequate Use of Operating Experience and Declining Personnel Experience Lead to Damage to Rod Control Cluster Assembly Extension Shaft While Setting the Reactor Vessel Head.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: Capability of Diesel Building Ventilation System to Withstand the Effects of a Tornado	71111.21 M
This issue is a current licensing basis question and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.	
Description: The DBAI inspectors identified an issue of concern in that the diesel building ventilation system was not specifically shown to be designed to withstand the effects of a tornado re-pressurization. It is postulated that the differential pressure developed by a specific magnitude tornado could potentially damage the diesel building room ventilation system and challenge the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to maintain their safety functions due to rapidly increasing room temperatures. Each EDG and Switchgear room ventilation system consists of two large 100 percent capacity exhaust ventilation fans, associated automatic dampers, and motorized room louver that are arranged to maintain minimum ventilation requirements during diesel operation. The maximum temperature is not expected to exceed 122°F. When the room ventilation fans are not running, the room louver and auto dampers would be closed. During a tornado re-pressurization event, there would be no venting path to equalize the pressure differential which could damage the room louver and auto dampers As a result of inspector concerns, the licensee hired a contractor (MPR) to conduct a computer analysis of the louvers and dampers during a tornado event. The evaluation results indicate that the differential pressure caused by the room re-pressurization after the design basis tornado passing will cause the LV-6 louver blades to fail. The LV-6 blades are expected	

to survive the less severe tornado recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.76. Additionally, the fan dampers are expected to survive the design basis tornado.

Licensing Basis: The NRC staff reviewed the licensing basis documents, regulatory requirements, and regulatory correspondence related to the diesel building tornado protection criterion. The main documents reviewed are detailed below.

- FSAR 3.3.2 TORNADO LOADINGS
  - All above-ground Seismic Category 1 structures are designed to withstand tornado loadings and horizontal tornado-generated missiles. Components which directly affect the ultimate safe shutdown of the plant are located either under the protection of reinforced concrete or underground. These components include the following
  - Standby diesel generator system
- FSAR 3.3.2.1 Applicable Design Parameters
  - For Seismic Category 1 structures designed to withstand tornadoes and horizontal tornado-generated missiles, the following parameters are applied in combinations producing the most critical conditions
  - Pressure Differential
    - The structure interior bursting pressure is taken as rising 1 psi/s for 3 s, followed by a 3-s calm, then decreasing at 1 psi/s for 3 s. This cycle accounts for reduced pressure in the eye of a passing tornado. All fully enclosed Category 1 structures are designed to withstand the full 3-psi pressure differential.
- 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, I. Overall Requirements, Criterion 2—*Design bases for protection against natural phenomena*: "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these structures, systems, and components shall reflect: (1) Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed."
- 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control: "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions."
- Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-23: Notifies licensees of its regulatory position regarding loading effects caused by natural phenomena to safety related systems and components housed inside a structure partially exposed to the outside environment, specifically ventilating and air-conditioning (VAC) systems housed in the EDG room.
- Regulatory Guide 1.76 (issued in March 2007): Provides licensees and applicants with new guidance that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in selecting the design-basis tornado and design-basis tornado-generated missiles that a nuclear power plant should be designed to withstand to prevent undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

The licensee provided information on why they believed the issue of concern is not in their licensing basis. The licensee's review concluded that tornado depressurization structural design criteria applies to the design of Category 1 structures only. There is no commitment or requirement in the UFSAR extending this structural design criteria to individual systems or components, or in this case to the DG building fans or related components.

The inspectors did not agree with the licensee's design basis determination. The Diesel Generating room louvers and auto dampers are exposed to the outside pressure and will experience high differential pressure during a tornado. These components should be considered as part of the EDG building structural design and be designed to withstand the differential pressure caused by a design basis tornado.

Following the inspector's issue of concern, the licensee revised the site procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0 "Naturally Occurring Phenomena" to add an operator action during a tornado warning to start one Diesel and Switchgear room fan and to ensure room has its louver open. The licensee provided a hand calculation, with the room louver open, to show the maximum room pressure differential will be below the damper and louver design rating (0.28 psid). In other words, with the room fan running, the dampers and louvers would be protected by the design basis tornado.

Based on the low probability of an event of this magnitude and the licensee's actions taken, the inspectors concluded that the issue could be closed without immediate enforcement action and treated under the very low safety significance issue resolution process.

Significance: A risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst using SAPHIRE Version 8.2.3 and NRC Hatch SPAR model Version 8.58. The conditional analysis assumed failure of the EDG ventilation louvers for tornado initiating events with wind speeds greater than 200 miles per hour with a one-year exposure time. The dominant sequences were a tornado initiator accompanied by a loss of offsite power with failures of the emergency diesel generators, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump, and operator actions to recover offsite power. The analysis determined that if a performance deficiency was assumed to have existed, it would have resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of <1E-06/year and an estimated increase in large early release frequency of <1E-07/year, representing very low safety significance (Green).

Technical Assistance Request: A technical assistance request (TAR) was not initiated.

Corrective Action Reference: CR 10753014

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On May 14, 2021, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Johnny Weissinger – Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 23, 2021, the inspectors presented the Phone Re-Exit for the Hatch DBAI Meeting inspection results to Brian Waltman and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21M	Calculations	NEDE 10144	Vacuum Breaker Sizing for ’67 Product Line, Torus/Lightbulb Containments	02/1970
		S18643	Discontinuity Calculations F/20X20 Vacuum Breaker	11/19/1971
		S18646	Seismic Calculation for 20” X 20” Vacuum Breaker Vlv	Rev. A
		SCNH-13-021	Evaluation Of Plant Hatch Local Intense Precipitation Severe Accident Management (Sam) For Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1 Flooding Re-Evaluation	Rev. 1.0
		SENH-89-009	Steady State Loading Emergency Buses 1E, 1F & 1G During a LOCA/LOSP/SBO Event	Rev. 17
		SENH-94-013	Coordination Study for Non- Appendix R Breakers and Fuses in Response to REA HT-93753	Rev.7
		SMNH-15-006	EDG Bay and Battery Rooms Exhaust Area Required to Prevent Pressure Differential During Design Basis Tornado	Rev. 1
	Corrective Action Documents	10116247		
		10209664, 10212821, 10213119, 10232344, 10464440, 10527495		
		10467098		02/28/2018
		10467100		02/28/2018
		CAR265435		12/01/2016
		CR10753014		11/11/2020
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	10793548		04/27/2021
		10793550		04/27/2021
		10793879		04/28/2021
		10794181		04/29/2021
		10794215		04/29/2021
		10795264	U1 FSAR Code of Record	5/4/2021
		10797616	2021 Hatch DBAI – Vacuum Breaker Sizing Design	05/13/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Calculation	
	Drawings	B-44875	Diesel Generator Building North Access Door Modifications	Rev. 0
		H-12615	Diesel Generating Building Roof and Floor Plan	Rev. 7
		H-13395	Diesel Generator Heating and Ventilation	Rev. 20
		H-16024	Primary Containment Purge & Inerting System P.&I.D.	Ver. 54.0
		H-16062, SHT 1	Nuclear Boiler System P&ID	Rev. 57
		H-17012	Reactor Building 600V MCC "1E-A" & " 1E-B' MPL R24-S018A & R24-S018B	Rev. 30
		S18136	B/M 20” X 20” VAC. BKR.	Rev. E
		S71062	Bill of Material 20” Pallet Assembly	03/02/1990
		SX-17731	Assembly Drawing 20” Vacuum Breakers 20” ST/20” Flange	Rev. J
	Engineering Changes	SNC338333	Kelman Gas Analyzers for Transformers	Rev. 3
	Engineering Evaluations	LR-REG-003-0404	Response to OE 14370 (Testing Methodology For MSIVs May Not Support USAR and Licensing Commitments)	04/13/2004
		NMP-ES-050-F01	RER Response Form for SNC 510820 - Sequence 1	08/02/2013
		NMP-ES-050-F01	RER Response Form for SNC510820 - Sequence 2	08/26/2014
		NMP-GM-003-F19	Focused Area Self-Assessment (FASA) Plan and Report	Rev. 3
		SNC950252	Masterpack Part 21	Rev. 1
		TE1047898		09/08/2019
		TE1055365		09/18/2020
	Miscellaneous		EDG Room Main Louvers and associated thermostat	Rev. 0
			Hatch Position on Effects of Tornado Induced depressurization on Emergency Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System Components	05/13/2021
			Ltr From Bechtel Power Corporation to E.I Hatch, IEN 85-48	June 30, 1986
			Volumetric Leak Rate Monitor Local Leak Rate Test Data Sheet, MPL Number: 1T48-F310 & F328A	02/22/2018
			Volumetric Leak Rate Monitor Local Leak Rate Test Data Sheet, MPL Number: 1T48-F310 & F328A Retest	03/01/2020
			Volumetric Leak Rate Monitor Local Leak Rate Test Data	02/11/2018

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Sheet, MPL Number: 1T48-F311 & F328B	
			Volumetric Leak Rate Monitor Local Leak Rate Test Data Sheet, MPL Number: 1T48-F311 & F328B	02/03/2020
			Surveillance Frequency Control Program, Surveillance Test Interval List	Rev. 22
			Georgia Power Interoffice Correspondence from G.A. Goode to S.B Tipps, Plant E I Hatch IEN 85-84, MSIV Testing	January 13, 1987
		1R24 System Health Report	June 2019, June 2020, June 2021	
		H-LT-PP-X86-FLEX-LOCT-20303	Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (X86)	Rev. 2.0
		Information Notice No. 85-84	Inadequate Inservice Testing of Main Steam Isolation Valves	
		LDCR 2021-005	Vacuum Breaker Inspection	Ver. 1.0
		NMP-OS-014-002, Attachment 1, 2 and 3	HNP Time Critical Operator Action Program - Training for TCOA	05/12/2021
		S70572	Vendor Manual- Instruction Valueline Mark 1 MCC's Installation, Operations, and Maintenance	
		SIL 482	MSIV Closure Testing Requirement	2/22/89
		SNC338333	Design Input Record	Rev. 1
		SS6914-19	Specification for Louvers for Diesel Generating Building U1 and U2	09/18/1972
		SX-17731	Assembly Drawing 20” Vacuum Breakers 20” ST/20” Flange	Rev. J
	Procedures	31-GO-OPS-006-0	Condition, Required Actions, and Completion Times	Rev. 8.7
		31EO-EOP-010-1/2	RC RPV Control (Non-ATWS)	Rev. 12.0/12.0
		31EO-EOP-012-1/2	PC Primary Containment Control	Rev. 7.1/7.1
		31EO-EOP-015-1/2	CP-1 ALTERNATE LEVEL CONTROL, STEAM COOLING, & EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION	Rev. 10.1/11.1
		31EO-EOP-100-	Miscellaneous Emergency Overrides	Rev. 5.2/8.4

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		1/2		
		31EO-EOP-107-1/2	ALTERNATE RPV PRESSURE CONTROL	Rev. 5.6/5.5
		31EO-SAG-002-1/2	SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDELINE 2	Rev. 7.0/7.0
		34AB-B21-001-1/2	MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH RADIATION OR SUSPECTED FUEL ELEMENT FAILURE	Rev. 5.1/4.15
		34AB-Y22-002-0	Naturally Occurring Phenomena	Rev. 20
		34GO-OPS-056-0	Receipt of Diesel Generator, Security Diesel, Dry Storage (ISFSI) Diesel, Diesel Fire Pumps, and Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil	Rev. 12
		34GO-SUV-001-0	Control And Surveillance Of Locked Valves, Lock Wired Valves, And Locked Breakers	Rev. 28.6
		34SO-C41-003-1/2	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM	Rev. 12.7/12.6
		34SO-E11-010-1/2	Residual Heat Removal System	Rev. 45.3/44.5
		34SV-SUV-01901	Surveillance Procedure	Ver. 37.38
		34SV-T48-001-1	Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Relief System Operability	Ver. 8.1
		42EN-INS-002-0	Containment Leakage Rate Testing Plan	Ver. 9.0
		52GM-MME-004-1/2	Reactor Vessel Reassembly	Rev. 26.7/21
		52GM-MME-015-1/2	Reactor Vessel Disassembly	Rev. 22.9/18.9
		52PM-T48-002-0	Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Major Inspection/Overhaul	Rev. 5.3
		52SV-T48-003-0	Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Inspection	Rev. 2.0
		HNP-AP-001-F08	Site Procedure Approval Form	09/28/2016
		HNP-OS-014-002	HNP Time Critical Operator Action Program	Rev. 2.0
		NMP-AD-003	Equipment Clearance and Tagging	Rev. 26.0
		NMP-GM-005-002	Human Performance Tools Instruction	Rev. 9.1
		NMP-GM-005-	Communication Plan for Crew Learning - From NRC Design	04/29/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		005-F02	Basis Assessment Inspection	
		NMP-GM-008-F02	Typical Operating Experience Evaluation Format	Rev. 6.2
		NMP-OS-007	Conduct of Operations	Rev. 17.0
		NMP-OS-007-001	Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations	Rev. 17.1
		NMP-OS-007-005	Site Specific Operations Expectations and Fleet Operations Policies	Rev. 2.0
		NMP-OS-014	Time Critical Operator Action Program	Rev. 3.0
		NMP-OS-014-002	HNP Time Critical Operator Action Program	Rev. 4.0
		NMP-OS-014-002-F01	Exclusion of Actions from MCTCA/MLTSA	06/24/2014
		NMP-OS-014-002-F02	Operator Response Time Validation - for Placing MSIV ALT Path in Service Within 90 Minutes	08/19/2021
		NMP-OS-014-002-F02	Operator Response Time Validation - Take Action Within 10 Minutes of Drywell Pressure Reaching 35 PSIG	08/19/2020
		NMP-OS-014-002-F02	Operator Response Time Validation - Start SBLC Within 2 Hours	08/17/2020
		NMP-OS-017	Severe Weather	Rev. 3
	Self-Assessments	SNC 950252	10 CFR 50.59 Screening	Rev. 1
	Work Orders	SNC 553933, SNC 553942, SNC 925687, SNC 92856, SNC 925857, SNC 825858, SNC 1071304, SNC 359906, SNC 400164, SNC 400165, SNC 585222		
		SNC571213, SNC571613, SNC785958, SNC786383,		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		SNC964804, SNC965758, SNC966852		
		SNC587388	Replace Fan Motor	
		SNC785593		
		SNC786889		
		SNC799744		