



Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 U.S. Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Tel 225-381-4374

Kent Scott
Site Vice President

10 CFR 50.73

RBG-48103

June 24, 2021

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 2021-03-00, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to failure to perform Breaker Functional Test"

River Bend Station – Unit 1
NRC Docket No. 50-458
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report. This document contains no commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Tim Schenk at 225-381-4177.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "KCS", written over a light blue horizontal line.

KCS/dmw

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 2021-03-00, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to failure to perform Breaker Functional Test"

cc: NRC Regional Administrator - Region IV
NRC Project Manager - River Bend Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - River Bend Station
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Public Utility Commission of Texas

Enclosure

RBG-48103

Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 2021-03-00, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to failure to perform Breaker Functional Test"



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collection Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oir_submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. Facility Name River Bend Station – Unit 1	2. Docket Number 05000 458	3. Page 1 OF 2
--	---	---------------------------------

4. Title
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Failure to Perform Breaker Functional Test

5. Event Date			6. LER Number			7. Report Date			8. Other Facilities Involved		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Rev No.	Month	Day	Year	Facility Name	Docket Number	
04	08	2021	2021	-003-	00	06	24	2021	NA	05000	NA
									NA	05000	NA

9. Operating Mode <p style="text-align: center;">1</p>	10. Power Level <p style="text-align: center;">65</p>
--	---

11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

10 CFR Part 20	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	10 CFR Part 73
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.69(g)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	10 CFR Part 21	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)(i)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 21.2(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(i)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	10 CFR Part 50	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	

Other (Specify here, in Abstract, or in NRC 366A).

12. Licensee Contact for this LER

Licensee Contact Tim Schenk, Manager – Regulatory Assurance	Phone Number (Include Area Code) 225-381-4177
--	--

13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable To IRIS	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable To IRIS
NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

14. Supplemental Report Expected			15. Expected Submission Date		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)		Month	Day	Year
			NA	NA	NA

16. Abstract (Limit to 1560 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On April 08, 2021 at 09:26 CDT, River Bend Station was operating at 65% reactor power. At that time, while alternating divisions of Control Building Chilled Water from Division 1 to Division 2, Control Building Chiller D (HVK-CHL1D) failed to start. Control Building Chilled Water was restored to service in accordance with station procedures at 09:38 CDT.

HVK-CHL1D did not start because the supply breaker position switch contacts did not connect. A required breaker functional test had not been performed to verify proper operation after HVK-CHL1D supply breaker was racked to the connect position following tagout restoration on March 30, 2021. This caused HVK-CHL1D to be aligned as the standby chiller while it was not operable.

The cause of the event was a gap in human performance. Corrective Actions include procedure revisions and departmental briefings to ensure awareness and to avoid recurrence.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collection Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
River Bend Station – Unit 1	05000-458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
		2021	- 003	- 00

NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 08, 2021 at 09:26 CDT, River Bend Station was operating at 65% reactor power. At that time, Control Building Chiller D (HVK-CHL1D) failed to start while alternating divisions of Control Building Chilled Water (KM). Control Building Chilled Water was restored to service in accordance with station procedures at 09:38 CDT.

A required breaker functional test, which would have verified HVK-CHL1D (CHU) operability, had not been performed when HVK-CHL1D supply breaker was racked to the connect position following tagout restoration. This oversight resulted in equipment required by Technical Specifications to be placed in standby without being verified Operable. This condition existed from March 30,2021 at 15:32 CDT until this event occurred on April 08,2021. Technical Specification 3.7.7 Control Building Air Conditioning (CBAC) System 72-hour allowed outage time was exceeded and the required Action to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours was not met.

Timeline of events:
03/12/2021 07:39 - HVK-CHL1D supply breaker tag removed and racked to the connect position.
03/30/2021 15:32 - HVK-CHL1D was placed in standby
04/08/2021 09:26 - HVK-CHL1D failed to start during Divisional Swap
04/28/2021 21:23 - Discovery date - Past Operability Evaluation Complete.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT
There were no actual nuclear or radiological safety consequences due to this event. This event was of minimal significance to the health and safety of the public. The Control Building Chilled Water System was procedurally restored, and control building temperature margins were not challenged.

EVENT CAUSE
This event was caused by a gap in human performance. Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) failed to ensure completion of the required functional test due to perceived time pressure. The SRO authorizing the tagout assumed the breaker functional would be added to the Limiting Condition of Operability (LCO) when the tagout was removed. The SRO authorizing the tagout for removal assumed the breaker functional was added to the LCO already. Neither SRO validated their assumptions.

All other equipment associated with the tagout was checked and no additional missed breaker functional tests were discovered. HVK-CHL1D was successfully tested following an adjustment to the supply breaker.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Operations procedure guidance will be revised to require adding the breaker functional test to the LCO separate from the tagout when the tag is hung. The intent is to standardize when every SRO adds required breaker functionals to LCOs. (Completion tracked by Corrective Action)

An Operations Departmental briefing on this event will be developed and distributed. The intent is to ensure department personnel are aware of what occurred so it can be avoided in the future. (Completion tracked by Corrective Action)

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None