Facility: Palo Ver	de								Date	e of E	Exam	n: May	6, 2021					
						RO I	K/A (	Cate	gory	Poin	ıts				SRC	)-Onl	y Point	s
Tier	Group	K1	K2	К3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	АЗ	A4	G*	Total		A2	(	G*	Total
1.	1	3	3	3				3	3			3	18					6
Emergency and Abnormal Plant	2	2	1	1		N/A		1	2	N,	/A	2	9					4
Evolutions	Tier Totals	5	4	4				4	5			5	27					10
	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	28					5
2. Plant	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	10					3
Systems	Tier Totals	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	38					8
3. Generic K	(nowledge and	l Abi	lities		,	1	2	2	(	3		4	10	1	2	3	4	7
	Categories				2	2		3	(	3		2						

Note:

- 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ±1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G\* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

#### G\* Generic K/As

- \* These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
- \*\* These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 Emergence	y an	d Ab					n Outline Form ons—Tier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)	ES-4	01-2
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10 CE E02) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1									
000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3					х		AA2.23 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Criteria for throttling high-pressure injection after a small LOCA	3.6	1
000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3	Х						EK1.02Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA: Use of steam tables	3.5	2
000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3				Х			EA1.09Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Core flood tank initiation	4.3	3
000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4					X		AA2.10 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection	3.7	4
000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2			Х				AK3.05 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup and the following: Need to avoid plant transients	3.2	5
000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4		х					AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: Service water or closed cooling water pumps	2.7	6
000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8			Х				AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Effect on the CCW flow header of a loss of CCW	3.5	7
000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3		Х					AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners	2.6	8
000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1					х		EA2.05 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a ATWS: System component valve position indications	3.4	9
000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3				Х			EA1.17 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: S/G sample isolation valve indicators	3.2	10
000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) Steam Line Rupture—Excessive Heat Transfer / 4				х			EA1.3 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations	3.4	11
000054 (APE 54; <del>CE E06</del> ) Loss of Main Feedwater /4						Х	2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.	3.8	12
000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6									
000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6	Х						AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Principle of cooling by natural convection	3.7	13
000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6						Х	2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures	4.2	14
000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6	Х						AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Battery charger equipment and instrumentation	2.8	15
000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4			Х				AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS	3.6	16

000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8						Х	2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation 4.4	17
000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6		Х					AK2.07 Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: Turbine / generator control	18
(W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3								
(W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4								
(BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat Transfer—Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4								
K/A Category Totals:	3	3	3	3	3	3	Group Point Total:	18

ES-401 PWR Emergency and Abnormal	R Exar Plant		-			Grou		n ES-4	101-2
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1									
000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1					х		AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Rod position indication to actual rod position	3.7	19
000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1									
000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1					х		AA2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between Emergency Boration and the following: When use of manual boration valve is needed	3.9	20
000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2									
000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7									
000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7						Х	2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls	4.4	21
000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8		Х					AK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Fuel Handling Incidents and the following: Radiation monitoring equipment (portable and installed)	3.4	22
000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3	х						AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: Leak rate vs. pressure drop	3.9	26
000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4									
000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9			x				AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Actions contained in EOP for accidental liquid radioactivewaste release	3.8	23
000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9									
000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms / 7									
000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8									
000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8									
000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5									
000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /									
000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9				Х			AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Failed fuel-monitoring equipment	3.2	24
000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3									
(W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3									
(W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4									
(W E15) Containment Flooding / 5									
(W E16) High Containment Radiation /9									
(BW A01) Plant Runback / 1									
(BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7									
(BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4									

σ-									
(BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6									
(BW A07) Flooding / 8									
(BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4									
(BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown—Depressurization / 4									
(BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4	X						AK1.2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations)	3.2	25
(BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures									
(CE A11**; W E08) RCS Overcooling—Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4									
(CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2									
(CE E09) Functional Recovery						X	2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)	3.7	27
(CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4									
K/A Category Point Totals:	2	1	1	1	2	2	Group Point Total:		9

ES-401				Pla							Outli	ine Form 1 (RO/SRO)	ES-40	01-2
System # / Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	А3	A4	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump									Х			A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including: Seal injection flow	3.3	28
004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control									Х			A3.14 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CVCS, including: Letdown and charging flows	3.4	29
005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal						Х						K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RHRS: RHR heat exchanger	2.5	30
006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling				х								K4.06 Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Recirculation of minimum flow through pumps	2.7	31
007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank										Х		A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Recognition of leaking PORV/code safety	3.6	32
008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water			х									K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following: Loads cooled by CCWS	3.4	33
010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control		Х										K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Controller for PZR spray valve	2.5	34
012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection					Х							K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the RPS: Power Density	3.1	35
013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation								Х				A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; LOCA	4.6	36
022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling											х	2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.	4.6	37
025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser														
026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray		Х										K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: MOVs	3.4	38
039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam				х								K4.05 Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic isolation of steam line	3.7	39
059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater									Х			A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Programmed levels of the S/G	2.9	40
061 (SF4S AFW) Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater		Х										K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: AFW system MOVs	4.0	41
062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution	х											K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems: DC distribution	3.5	42
063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution								X				A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Grounds	2.5	43
064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator						Х						K6.08 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Fuel oil storage tanks	3.2	44
073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring											х	2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.	4.1	45

076 (SF4S SW) Service Water			Х									K3.07 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following: ESF loads	3.7	46
078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air	х											K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: MSIV air	3.4	47
103 (SF5 CNT) Containment							Х					A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity	3.7	48
053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control														
003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump					х							K5.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply tot eh RCPs: Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow and feed flow	3.2	49
005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal							X					A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: Closed cooling water flow rate and temperature	2.5	50
010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control							х					A1.07 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR PCS controls including: RCS pressure	3.7	51
012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection								х				A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of dc control power	3.2	52
026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray										Х		A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Containment spray reset switches	3.5	53
039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam										X		A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam supply. valves	2.9	54
076 (SF4S SW) Service Water											Х	2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.	3.6	55
K/A Category Point Totals:	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	Group Point Total:		28

ES-401				Pla						ion (		line Fori 2 (RO/SRO)	n ES-4	01-2
System # / Name	K1	Кa	K3	K4									IR	#
001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive	Х	ΝZ	KS	N4	No	NO	AI	AZ	AS	A4	G	K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems: NIS and RPS	4.5	56
002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant							Х					A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls including: Temperature	3.7	57
011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control														
014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication														
015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation										Х		A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip Bypasses	3.5	65
016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation														
017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor														
027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal														
028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control					Х							K5.03 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Sources of hydrogen within containment	2.9	58
029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge														
033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling			х									K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: Area and ventilation radiation monitoring systems	2.8	59
034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment														
035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator								Х				A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SG; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Small break LOCA	4.5	60
041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control						х						K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SDS: Controller and positioners, including ICS S/G, CRDS	2.7	61
045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator				х								K4.01 Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power leve	2.7	62
055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal											х	2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes or plant operation.	f 4.3	63
056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate														
068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste														
071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal														
072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring														
075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water		Х										K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Emergency/essential SWS pumps	2.6	64
079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air														
086 Fire Protection														

ES-401 9 Form ES-401-2

050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation													
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	Group Point Total:	10

Facility: Palo Verde		Date of Exam: May 6, 2021			<u> </u>	
Category	K/A #	Topic	R	0	SRC	-only
			IR	#	IR	#
	2.1.28	Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.	4.1	66		
<ol> <li>Conduct of Operations</li> </ol>	2.1.38	Knowledge of the station's requirements for verbal communications when implementing procedures.	3.7	67		
	Subtotal		2			
	2.2.2	Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels	4.6	68		
2. Equipment	2.2.13	Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures	4.1	69		
Control	2.2.36	Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.	3.1	70		
	Subtotal		3			
	2.3.4	Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.	3.2	71		
0. D. I'. I'.	2.3.11	Ability to control radiation releases.	3.8	72		
3. Radiation Control	2.3.15	Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.	2.9	73		
	Subtotal		3			
4. Emergency	2.4.4	Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.	4.5	74		
Procedures/Plan	2.4.29	Knowledge of the emergency plan.	3.1	75		
	Subtotal		2			
Tier 3 Point Total	•			10		7

Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
1 / 2 (Q20)	024 AA2.06	There are no alarms or indications which conclusively indicate a boron dilution event is in progress, and even when there is, there is procedural discretion for the CRS/SM to enter the Emergency Boration AOP and take action or to just perform a normal boration per the OP. As such, we could not construct a question that has one conclusively correct answer and 3 corresponding plausible but incorrect answers. Reselected 024 AA2.02.
2 / 1 (Q32)	007 K5.02	The procedural guidance for drawing a pressurizer bubble at PVNGS does not allow for a written question which one and only one correct answer and plausible but clearly incorrect answers. Because this was the only K5 in 007 which was 2.5 or higher, and since Q49 also needed to have a KA change, reselected 007 A4.10 and chose a K5 for Q49 (replacing an A4).
2 / 1 (Q39)	039 K4.08	There are no physical interlocks between the MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves at PVNGS. Reselected 039 K4.05.
2 / 1 (Q49)	003 A4.02	The original question was virtually the same topic as a question on the 2020 exam, which put us over the maximum of 4 questions on the RO exam from the previous two exams. Since Q32 needed to be replaced as well and there were no other K5 KAs for Q32 which were 2.5 or higher, replaced this KA with a K5 and replaced Q32 with an A4 for outline balancing. Reselected 003 K5.04.
2 / 1 (Q51)	010 A1.06	Could not create plausible distractors for the effect of a heat up and cool down on pressure (not plausible that it would be anything other than pressure following temperature), therefore reselected 010 A1.07.
2 / 2 (Q57)	002 A1.04	Questions we wrote for this KA were overlapping with Question 2 (use of Steam Tables) since the only operationally relevant questions using steam tables during a small break LOCA would be used to determine subcooling and the operational restrictions. As a result, reselected 002 A1.03.
2 / 2 (Q59)	033 K3.03	There is no malfunction in the SFP Cooling System which would make temperature do anything other than rise, which negates the plausibility of any distractors. Reselected 033 K3.02.

ES-401		Form ES-401-4	
3 (Q68)	G 2.2.21	Knowledge of operability requirements is function at PVNGS. Re-selected G 2.2.2	
3 (Q69)	G 2.2.23	Tracking of Tech Spec LCOs is a job fun SRO job function at PVNGS. Reselected	•

Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: May 6, 2021																		
			RO K/A Category Points											SRO-Only Points				
Tier	Group	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	А3	A4	G*	Total		A2	(	G*	Total
1.	1												18		3		3	6
Emergency and Abnormal Plant	2					N/A				N,	/A		9		2		2	4
Evolutions	Tier Totals									_			27	5		5		10
	1												28		3		2	5
2. Plant	2												10		1		2	3
Systems	Tier Totals												38		4		4	8
Generic Knowledge and Abilities					,	1	2	2		3		4	10	1	2	3	4	7
Categories														1	2	2	2	

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- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G\* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

#### G\* Generic K/As

- \* These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
- \*\* These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 Emergence	y an	d Ab					Outline Formons—Tier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)	ES-4	01-2
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10 CE E02) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1									
000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3									
000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3						Х	2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.	4.1	76
000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3					Х		EA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications	3.7	77
000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4						Х	2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.	4.7	78
000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2						X	2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.	4.4	79
000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4									
000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8									
000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3									
000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1									
000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3					X		EA2.14 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: Magnitude of atmospheric radioactive release if cooldown must be completed using steam dumps or if atmospheric reliefs lift	4.6	80
000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) Steam Line Rupture—Excessive Heat Transfer / 4									
000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4									
000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6									
000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6									
000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6									
000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6					Х		AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: 125V dc bus voltage, low/critical low, alarm	3.6	81
000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4									
000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8									
000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6									
(W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3									
(W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4									
(BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat Transfer—Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4									
K/A Category Totals:					3	3	Group Point Total:		6

ES-401 PWR Emergency and Abnormal	Exar Plant				-	Grou		n ES-4	101-2
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K1	K2	КЗ	A1	A2	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1					х		AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place	4.8	82
000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1									
000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1									
000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1									
000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2									
000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7									
000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7									
000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8									
000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3									
000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4									
000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9									
000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9									
000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms / 7									
000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8									
000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8									
000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5									
000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling / 4						х	2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.	4.6	83
000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9									
000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3									
(W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3									
(W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4									
(W E15) Containment Flooding / 5									
(W E16) High Containment Radiation /9									
(BW A01) Plant Runback / 1									
(BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7									
(BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4									
(BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6									
(BW A07) Flooding / 8									
(BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4									
(BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown—Depressurization / 4									
(BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4									
(BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures									
(CE A11**; W E08) RCS Overcooling—Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4					х		AA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling): Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.	3.4	84

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(CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2				Х	2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.	.2	85
(CE E09) Functional Recovery							
(CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4							
K/A Category Point Totals:			2	2	Group Point Total:		4

ES-401				Plai							Outli	ne Form 1 (RO/SRO)	ES-40	)1-2
System # / Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	А3	A4	G*	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump														
004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control														
005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal														
006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling														
007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank														
008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water								Х				A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low CCW temperature	3.2	86
010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control														
012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection														
013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation														
022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling											х	2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures	4.7	87
025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser														
026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray														
039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam														
059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater														
061 (SF4S AFW) Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater														
062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution														
063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution														
064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator								X				A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Load, VARS, pressure on air compressor, speed droop, frequency, voltage, fuel oil level, temperatures.	2.9	88
073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring								X				A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Erratic or failed power supply	2.9	89

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076 (SF4S SW) Service Water						Χ	2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.	2	90
078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air									
103 (SF5 CNT) Containment									
053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control									
K/A Category Point Totals:				3		2	Group Point Total:		5

ES-401				Plan				Outli	ine Form E 2 (RO/SRO)	ES-40	)1-2
System # / Name	K1	K2	К3	K4					,	IR	#
001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive									121115 [13(0)		
002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant											
011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control								X	2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.	4.2	91
014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication											
015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation											
016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation											
017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor								Х	2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and or function	4.0	92
027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal											
028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control											
029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge											
033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling											
034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment											
035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator											
041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control											
045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator											
055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal											
056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate											
068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste											
071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal											
072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring											
075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water											
079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air											
086 Fire Protection						X			A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage	3.9	93
050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation											
K/A Category Point Totals:	<u> </u>					1		2	Group Point Total:		3

Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: May 6, 2021											
Category	K/A #	Topic	R	.0	SRO	-only					
			IR	#	IR	#					
1. Conduct of	2.1.4				3.8	94					
Operations	Subtotal										
2. Equipment	2.2.2	Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.			4.6	95					
Control	2.2.25	Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.			4.2	96					
	Subtotal										
	2.3.15	Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.			3.1	97					
3. Radiation Control	2.3.13	Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.			3.8	98					
	Subtotal										
	2.4.18	Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.			4.0	99					
4. Emergency Procedures/Plan	2.4.23	Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.			4.4	100					
	Subtotal										
Tier 3 Point Total				10		7					

Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
1 / 1 (Q80)	038 EA2.09	Multiple attempts to write a question to this KA either ended up with multiple correct answers or overlap with other natural circulation questions on the exam (Q13 and Q25). Reselected 038 EA2.14.
2 / 1 (Q87)	022 G 2.4.9	The power level (or shutdown condition) of the unit has no impact on the operation of containment cooling in any of the EOPs at PVNGS. Reselected 022 G 2.4.4.
2 / 2 (Q92)	017 G 2.1.20	Since Incore Temperature Monitors are a passive system, could not write a question about executing procedure steps for this system. Reselected 017 G 2.1.27
2 / 2 (Q93)	086 A2.01	The fire protection system is not operated by Operations personnel at PVNGS as this is done by the site fire department. Reselected 086 A2.04.
3 (Q94)	G 2.1.28	Could not generate an SRO level Tier 3 question based on the purpose of major system components and controls without delving into the Tier 1 or 2 categories. Reselected G 2.1.4.

## Administrative Topics Outline

Facility: PVNGS			Date of Examination:	4/26/2021							
Examination Level	RO		Operating Test Number:	2021 NRC							
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*		Describe Activity to be Perfo	rmed							
		JPM:	l: Determine the correct replacement bulbs to use for 3 control room handswitches								
(A1)	M, R	KA:	KA: 2.1.1								
		IR:	3.8								
(A2)	D, R	JPM:	Calculate required boron concentrations ascension from 40-60% power per 40 Operations								
(712)	2,10	KA:	2.1.37								
		IR:	4.3								
(4.2)	5	JPM:	JPM: Perform IV of 73ST-9XI52, Safety Injection Train Throttle Valves – In Service Test								
(A3)	M, R	KA:	2.2.12								
		IR:	3.7								
(4.4)	5	JPM:	Determine the system clearance while lowest dose to the workers	ch will result in the							
(A4)	M, R	KA:	2.3.14								
		IR:	IR: 3.4								
	NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.										
*Type Codes & Criteri	a: (C)ont	rol room	, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom								
	(D)ired	t from b	ank ( $\leq$ 3 for ROs; $\leq$ 4 for SROs & RO r	etakes) (1)							
	(N)ew	or (M)oc	dified from bank (≥ 1) (3)								
	(P)revi	ous 2 ex	cams (≤ 1; randomly selected) (0)								

# Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary

- A1 The applicant will be directed to determine the correct light bulb sizes/models to replace burned out bulbs on 3 Control Room handswitches using the Unit 1 Indicating Lamp Reference Index. This JPM was created (for the 2020 Annual Exam) based on multiple instances of incorrect bulbs being used in the Control Room. This is a modified JPM covering the Conduct of Operations section of the KA catalog.
- A2 The applicant will be directed to determine the required change in boron concentration to perform a power ascension from 40% power to 60% power per 40OP-9ZZ05, Power Operations, and the Boron OAP (Operator Aid Program). This is a bank JPM covering the Conduct of Operations section of the KA catalog.
- A3 The applicant will be directed to perform and independent verification of the acceptance criteria calculations of 73ST-9XI52, Safety Injection Train B ECCS Throttle Valves In Service Test. The applicant will calculate the valve stem travel for 3 valves, apply that value to a stem travel vs flow chart to determine flow through the valve, and determine flow differentials between the valves. This is a modified JPM covering the Equipment Control section of the KA catalog.
- A4 The applicant will be directed to determine the clearance which result in the lowest dose received by the operators hanging the clearance to remove a valve with a hot spot. The applicant will be provided a diagram of the valves in the system and based on the number of valves and the distance of the valves (both upstream and downstream) from the valve to be removed, and perform dose rate calculations to determine the valves to be used for the clearance. This is a modified JPM covering the Radiation Control section of the KA catalog.

## Administrative Topics Outline

Facility: PVNGS			Date of Examination:	4/26/2021	
Examination Level	SRO		Operating Test Number:	2021 NRC	
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*	Describe Activity to be Performed			
(1.5)		JPM:	Determine maximum stay time base evaluation	ed on heat stress	
(A5)	M, R	KA:	2.1.26		
		IR:	3.6		
		JPM:	Determine Time to SDC with TS Eva	aluation	
(A6)	D, R	KA:	2.1.25		
		IR:	4.2		
	D, R	JPM:	Determine the impacts of a failed St refueling activities and Technical Sp		
(A7)		KA:	2.2.40		
		IR:	4.7		
	M, R	JPM:	Determine the maximum dose for a reporting requirements	pregnant AO and the	
(A8)		KA:	2.3.4		
		IR:	3.7		
		JPM:	Classify an event in MODE 6		
(A9)	M, R	KA:	2.4.41		
		IR:	4.6		
	NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.				
*Type Codes & Criteria	a: (C)ont	rol room	, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom		
	(D)ired	t from b	ank ( $\leq$ 3 for ROs; $\leq$ 4 for SROs & RO	retakes) (2)	
	(N)ew	or (M)oc	lified from bank (≥ 1) (3)		
	(P)revious 2 exams (≤ 1; randomly selected) (0)				

# Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary

- A5 The applicant will be directed to determine the maximum required stay time in a high heat work area and determine the minimum required recovery time following the work per 1DP-0IS17, Heat Stress Prevention Program. This is a modified JPM covering the Conduct of Operations section of the KA catalog.
- A6 The applicant will be directed to determine the time by which SDC must be placed in service per Appendix 4, Time to SDC. The applicant will be provided conditions post-trip (feed rates, CST level, time since trip) and they will have to use the provide chart to determine how much time until the unit is required to be on SDC. The applicant will also be required to determine the time at which the CST will go inoperable during the cooldown. This is a bank JPM covered by the Conduct of Operations section of the KA catalog.
- A7 The applicant will be directed to determine the Technical Specification impact of a failed Startup Channel NI and the subsequent impact on an upcoming refueling evolution. Following the Technical Specification evaluation, the applicant will refer to an outage evolution table and determine whether or not the evolution may proceed with one failed Startup Channel NI. This is a bank JPM covering the Equipment Operations section of the KA catalog.
- A8 The applicant will be directed to determine the remaining allowable dose for an AO who has declared a pregnancy. The applicant will be provided with a timeline of events and dose history for the AO. The applicant will also have to determine any applicable required reporting requirements as a result the received dose. This is a modified JPM covering the Radiation Control section of the KA catalog.
- A9 The applicant will be directed to evaluate plant conditions in MODE 6 and determine if the conditions warrant an EAL call (and to determine the EAL call if applicable). The event is a loss of SDC in MODE 6 that will result in a slow heatup. The cue indicates that SDC will not be restored for 30 minutes which will raise RCS temp above the threshold for an EAL call and will be of a duration to require an alert declaration. This is a modified JPM covering the Emergency Procedures / Plan section of the KA catalog.

Facility:		PVNGS	Date of Examin	ation:	4/26/2021
Exam Le	ram Level: SRO(U) / SRO(I) / RO Operating Tes		Operating Test	No.:	2021 NRC
	•				
Control R	Room Sy	stems (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SR	O-U, including 1	ESF)	
		System / JPM Title		Type Code*	Safety Function
S1		m an Emergency Boration using HPSI Injec AO-9ZZ01, Emergency Boration	tion in MODE 4	A, D, L, S	1
S2 (RO ONLY)	Align a Containment Spray Pump for SI Injection during a LOCA per Appendix 107, Aligning a Containment Spray Pump for Injection			EN, L, N, S	2
<b>S</b> 3	Respond to a PPCS Malfunction and mitigate the malfunction per 40AL-9RK4A, B04 Alarm Response Procedure			A, D, S	3
S4	Perform SDC Flowrate Surveillance per 40ST-9SI12, SDC Flow Verification		L, N, S	4P	
<b>S</b> 5		and to a Complete Loss of Turbine Coolir 9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water	ng Water per	A, M, S	48
S6	Restore Normal Containment Cooling during a SGTR per Appendix 17, Restoration of Containment Cooling		D, EN, L, S	5	
S7		m Vital Auxiliaries Verification per 40EP-9E0	O01, Standard	A, N, S	6
S8	Immediate actions of 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside Control Room			D, S	8
In-Plant Systems (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)					
P1	Align Room	a Charging Pump suction to the RWT du Fire	ring a Control	A, D, E, R	1
P2	Local	Operation of AFA-P01 – Appendix 40		A, D, E	4S
Р3	Reset	EDG following Low Lube Oil Trip – Appe	ndix 55	E, N	6

SRO-U will perform S-3. S-5. S-6, P-1, and P-3

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.				
* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U				
(A)Iternate path	4-6 <b>(6)</b> / 4-6 <b>(6)</b> / 2-3 <b>(3)</b>			
(C)ontrol room				
(D)irect from bank	≤ 9 <b>(6)</b> / ≤ 8 <b>(6)</b> / ≤ 4 <b>(3)</b>			
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant	≥ 1 <b>(3)</b> / ≥ 1 <b>(3)</b> / ≥ 1 <b>(2)</b>			
(EN)gineered safety feature	≥ 1 (2) / ≥ 1 (1) / ≥ 1 (1) (control room system)			
(L)ow Power / Shutdown	≥ 1 <b>(4)</b> / ≥ 1 <b>(3)</b> / ≥ 1 <b>(1)</b>			
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)	≥ 2 (5 – 2A) / ≥ 2 (4 – 2A) / ≥ 1 (2 – 1A)			
(P)revious 2 exams	≤ 3 (0) / ≤ 3 (0) / ≤ 2 (0) (randomly selected)			
(R)CA	≥ 1 (1) / ≥ 1 (1) / ≥ 1 (1)			
(S)imulator				

### NRC JPM Examination Summary Description

- The applicant will be directed to perform an emergency boration (in MODE 4) per 40AO-9ZZ01, Emergency Boration. The normal boration path will fail and the applicant will have to use HPSI injection to borate via alternate means. This is a bank alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 1.
- S2 The applicant will be directed to align a Containment Spray Pump for low pressure injection during a large break LOCA with no LPSI Pumps per Appendix 107, Aligning a Containment Spray Pump for Injection. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 2.
- The applicant will be directed to respond to a failed instrument in the PPCS system which results in rising RCS pressure. The failure will be mitigating by using the associated ARP and the pressure rise must be corrected prior to a manual or automatic reactor trip. This is an alternate path bank JPM covering Safety Function 3.
- The applicant will be directed to perform a SDC flow verification surveillance test per 40ST-9SI12, SDC Flow Verification. The applicant will throttle various SDC flow control valves open and closed to test the minimum flow through each valve when used alone while maintaining SDC flowrates within allowable flow bands. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 4P.
- The applicant will be directed to take mitigating action for a complete loss of Turbine Cooling Water per 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water. The applicant will be directed to use AFN-P01 to transition from MFW to AFW, however when the MFPs are stopped, an inadvertent Train 'A' SIAS half leg trip will occur, which will trip AFN-P01. The applicant

may attempt to transition to AFB-P01, however that pump will have a sheared shaft and will not feed. The applicant will have to recognize this and take action to override and restart AFN-P01 in order to restore feedwater to at least one SG. This is a modified bank JPM covering Safety Function 4S..

- S6 The applicant will be directed to restore normal containment cooling following a SIAS resulting from a SGTR per Appendix 17, Restoration of Containment Cooling. This is a bank JPM covering Safety Function 5.
- S7 The applicant will be directed to perform a verification of Vital Auxiliaries during 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions. The setup of the JPM has a loss of offsite power as well as non-class instrument bus NNN-D12. The 'B' EDG will not have loaded onto the Train 'B' 4kV Bus and due to the loss of NNN-D12, the 'B' EDG frequency meter is deenergized, requiring the applicant to energize and use the synchroscope in order to determine EDG frequency and determine if they can place it on the bus or have to emergency stop the EDG. The EDG also will only have come up to 58 Hz requiring the applicant to override the EDG and raise speed to 60 Hz prior to closing the EDG output breaker and loading onto the bus. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 6.
- S8 The applicant will be directed to perform the immediate actions of 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside Control Room. These actions include tripping the reactor, stopping one RCP in each loop, taking local auto control of the PLCS master controller, and establishing a setpoint of 50%. This is a bank JPM covering Safety Function 8.
- P1 The applicant will be directed to align a Charging Pump suction to a borated water source per 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire. The applicant will be unable to realign a valve in the RCA from the electrical control panel and will have to locally manually open the valve to establish the lineup. This is an alternate path bank JPM covering Safety Function 1.
- P2 The applicant will be directed to reset the overspeed trip on Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFA-P01 per Appendix 40, Local Operation of AFA-P01 Using Main Steam. This is an alternate path bank JPM covering Safety Function 4S. This JPM is a plant JPM but will be performed on a functioning mockup of AFA-P01 in a training lab.
- P3 The applicant will be directed to locally reset the EDG Low Lube Oil trip in order to start and load the EDG. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 6.

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1

Facility:	Palo Verd	Scenario: 1	Test:	2021 NRC Exam
Examine	rs:	Operators	s: 	
Initial Conditi	ons: 2% Re	ctor Power, BOC		
Turnover: Ma	aintain powe	stable, raise RCP 2A Bearing Oil Reserv	voir level	

Event Number	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	N (OATC)	Raise RCP 2A Bearing Oil Reservoir Level	
2	I (ALL)	RCS Loop 1 Thot Instrument, TT-111X, Fails High	
3	I (BOP), TS (CRS)	RCS Pressure Transmitter, RCB-PI-101B, Fails Low	
4	C (ALL), TS (CRS)	Inadvertent Train 'B' SIAS Leg 2-4 / 'A' CEDM Fans Fail to Auto Start	
5	M (ALL)	Loss of Offsite Power / 'A' EDG Trip / 'B' Spray Pond Pump Trip / 2 CEAs Fail to Insert	
*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification			

Actual	Target Quantitative Attributes
8	Total malfunctions (5-8)
3	Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
3	Abnormal events (2-4)
1	Major transients (1-2)
1	EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)
1	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
2	Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1
Appendix D	Scenario Outilite	1 01111 [3-0-1

Facility:	Palo Verde	Scenario: 2	Test:	2021 NRC Exam	
Examine	ers:	Operators:			
Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC					
Turnover: M	laintain 1 <mark>00% po</mark> v	ver, 'B' NC Pump OOS, 'E' Charging Pur	np OOS		

Event Number	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	N (OATC)	Raise Pressure on SIT 2A	
2	R (OATC)	Exercise CEA 5 following ACTM card replacement	
3	I (CRS, BOP)	SG #1 Steam Flow Transmitter FT-1011 Fails Low	
4	I (BOP), TS (CRS)	UV Relays 727-1 and 727-5 Fail	
5	C (ALL), TS (CRS)	'A' NC Pump Trip / X-Tie NC and EW	
6	M (ALL)	1A RCP High Pressure Seal Cooler Leak	
7	С	PBB-S04 Bus Fault on Rx Trip	
8	C (CRS, OATC)	CIVs Fail to Auto Close (K-Relay Failures)	
9	I (CRS, BOP)	RRS Tavg Fails High	
*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification			

Actual	Target Quantitative Attributes
7	Total malfunctions (5-8)
3	Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
3	Abnormal events (2-4)
1	Major transients (1-2)
1	EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)
0	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
3	Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1

Facility:	Palo Verde	Scenario: 3	Test:	2021 NRC Exam		
Examiners:		Operators:				
		<del></del>				
Initial Condit	ions: 100%	ower, MOC				
Turnover: Maintain 100% power, 'B' NC Pump OOS, 'E' Charging Pump OOS						

Event Number	Event Type*	Event Description		
1	TS (CRS)	'B' CS Header Isolation Valve, SIB-UV-671, Control Power Fuses Blow		
2	I (ALL)	Turbine Load Input to RRS, TLI #2, Fails Low		
3	I (OATC), TS (CRS)	Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-110X, Fails Low		
4	C (CRS, BOP)	Stator Cooling Water Pump Trip, Standby Pump Fails to Auto Start		
5	C (ALL)	Main Turbine Trip		
6	M (ALL)	Loss of Coolant Accident		
7	C (CRS, OATC)	'A' CS Pump Trip / 'B' CS Header Isolation Seized (cannot be opened locally)		
*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification				

Actual	Target Quantitative Attributes	
7	Total malfunctions (5-8)	
2	Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)	
4	Abnormal events (2-4)	
1	Major transients (1-2)	
1	EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)	
1	EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)	
2	Critical tasks (2-3)	