



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

April 29, 2021

Ms. Kim Maza
Site Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
5413 Shearon Harris Rd.
Mail Code HNP01
New Hill, NC 27562-9300

**SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000400/2021001**

Dear Ms. Maza:

On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. On April 21, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stewart N. Bailey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000400
License No. NPF-63

Enclosure:
As stated

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SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000400/2021001 Dated April 29, 2021

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000400

License Number: NPF-63

Report Number: 05000400/2021001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0074

Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, LLC

Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Location: New Hill, NC 27562

Inspection Dates: January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021

Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Stewart N. Bailey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Adequately Resolve Fire Safety Hazards Involving Recalled Surge Protectors			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000400/2021001-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.05
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of the Shearon Harris Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.F, "Fire Protection Program," for the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions to address fire safety hazards involving the use of defective surge protectors that were recalled by the United States (U.S.) Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2013 resulting in many surge protectors affected by the recall remaining in operation throughout the plant.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status"; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather for severe thunderstorms with high winds and chance of hail and tornadoes on March 18, 2021.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) 'A' essential services chilled water (ESCW) system while 'B' ESCW system was out of service for emergent repairs on January 11, 2021
- (2) 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) while 'A' EDG was out of service for scheduled maintenance on January 13-14, 2021

- (3) 'A' emergency safeguards sequencer while 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer was out of service for scheduled maintenance on February 2, 2021
- (4) 'A' emergency service water (ESW) pump while 'B' ESW pump was out of service for scheduled maintenance on March 2, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) 'A' EDG room and support equipment areas (fire zones 1-D-1-DGA-RM, 1-D-3-DGA-ES, 1-D-DTA, 1-D-1-DGA-ASU, 1-D-1-DGA-ER, and 1-D-2-DGA-HVD) on January 13, 2021
- (2) Reactor auxiliary building (RAB) 286' elevation 'A' train essential switchgear room, ventilation room, and battery rooms (fire zones 1-A-SWGRA, 1-A-5-HVA, 1-A-BATA, and 1-A-5-BATN) on January 21, 2021
- (3) RAB 305' elevation main control room, termination cabinet room, rod control cabinet room, auxiliary relay panel room, and process instrument cabinet room (fire zones 12-A-6-CR1, 12-A-6-RT1, 12-A-6-RCC1, 12-A-6-ARP1, and 12-A-6-PICR1) on February 3, 2021
- (4) RAB 236' elevation component cooling water (CCW), auxiliary feedwater (AFW), charging and safety injection pump (CSIP), and residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger areas (fire zones 1-A-3-PB, 1-A-3-TA, 1-A-BAL-H, 1-A-34-RHXA, and 1-A-34-RHXB) on February 15, 2021
- (5) Fuel handling building (FHB) 261' elevation areas (fire zones 5-F-CHF, 5-F-3-CHFB, 5-F-3-CHF-BAL, and 5-F-3-DMNZ1) on March 1, 2021

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during end of life (EOL) moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) surveillance testing on February 8, 2021

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario for operator training involving a steam generator tube leak followed by a steam generator tube rupture on March 4, 2021

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Failure of 6900 volt unit auxiliary transformer 1B x-winding due to electrical fault in non-segregated bus duct on December 16, 2020
- (2) Failed Agastat relay in 'B' train emergency safeguards sequencer on February 2, 2021

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Elevated (Green) risk during emergent repair of 'B' ESCW chiller service water condenser pump discharge check valve on January 11-12, 2021
- (2) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' train emergency safeguards sequencer outage to calibrate relays on February 2, 2021
- (3) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'A' EDG and 'A' ESW maintenance outage on January 13-14, 2021
- (4) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' ESW screen wash pump maintenance activities on March 2, 2021
- (5) Elevated (Green) risk during scheduled 'B' RHR valve maintenance activities on March 9, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) 'A' ESW pump room exhaust fan did not secure automatically on low temperature following shutdown of the 'A' ESW pump (NCR 02363802) on January 6, 2021
- (2) 'B' ESCW chiller service water condenser recirculation pump discharge check valve failed to stroke closed during ESCW chiller surveillance testing (NCR 02364510) on January 11, 2021
- (3) Valve 1SW-124 failed to stroke shut following successfully opening during surveillance testing (NCR 02365709) on January 16, 2021
- (4) Failed contact identified in Agastat time relay for 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer (NCR 02368286) on February 2, 2021

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) Permanent modification engineering change (EC) 418926, Seal seismic gap between turbine building and RAB at 286' elevation
- (2) Permanent modification EC 418427, ESW screen wash pump oiler reconfiguration

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST)-M0076, Check Valve Non-Intrusive Testing, and Operation Surveillance Test (OST)-1040, Essential Services Chilled Water System Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6, on 'B' ESCW chiller following emergent repairs on January 12, 2021
- (2) OST-1013, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-6, on the 'A' EDG following maintenance outage on January 14, 2021
- (3) Operations Periodic Test (OPT)-1538, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test - Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6, on 'B' emergency safeguards sequencer following replacement of drifting relays on February 2, 2021
- (4) Operating Procedure (OP)-139, Service Water System, on 'B' ESW screen wash pump following maintenance on March 2, 2021
- (5) OST-1092, 1B-SB RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3, on 'B' RHR valves 1SI-301, 1SI-323, and 1RH-63, following scheduled maintenance on March 9, 2021
- (6) OST-1316, Component Cooling Water System Operability (Pump 1C0SAB In Service) Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, Section 7.6, for stroke testing of motor operated valve (MOV) 1CC-147, CCW from RHR Heat Exchanger A-SB, following scheduled MOV Diagnostic Testing on March 24, 2021

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) Technical Procedure (Maintenance) TE-NF-PWR-0810, Moderator Temperature Coefficient - End of Life (EOL), on February 8, 2021
- (2) OST-1823, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 18 Month Interval Modes 1 Through 6 and Defueled, on March 16-17, 2021

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) OST-1211, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, on February 15, 2021

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Computer Calculation, Daily Interval, Modes 1-4, on January 10, 2021

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) A licensee quarterly emergency preparedness drill involving fuel failure, a loss-of-coolant accident, and subsequent loss of containment integrity on February 11, 2021

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) 'A' ESCW chiller declared inoperable due to hot gas bypass valve not functioning properly on November 3, 2020 (NCR 02356217)

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Adequately Resolve Fire Safety Hazards Involving Recalled Surge Protectors			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000400/2021001-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.05
<p>The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of the Shearon Harris Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.F, "Fire Protection Program," for the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions to address fire safety hazards involving the use of defective surge protectors that were recalled by the United States (U.S.) Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2013 resulting in numerous surge protectors affected by the recall, remaining in operation throughout the plant.</p>			
<p><u>Description:</u> On February 26, 2021, during investigation into the licensee's practice of using surge protectors to protect electronic equipment in the plant, the inspectors noted that most of the devices currently in operation included Schneider Electric IT Corporation APC 7 Series SurgeArrest models. The inspectors discovered that these protectors, as well as APC 8 Series SurgeArrest model surge protectors, were the subject of an October 3, 2013, recall notice issued by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission due to a fire hazard concern. This APC recall notice (No. 14-001) described numerous model APC 7 and 8 Series SurgeArrest surge protectors manufactured between 1993 through 2002 that were being recalled as a result of overheating, melting, and smoking, posing a fire hazard that had already resulted in 700 incident reports, 55 claims of property damage from smoke and fire, as well as multiple reports of personnel injuries. The recall notice directed consumers to immediately unplug and stop using the affected surge protectors due to the fire hazard concerns.</p> <p>During a subsequent check of several surge protectors in operation in the plant, the inspectors identified that many were included in the 2013 APC recall notice. The majority of these were found in the licensee's Administration building and were being used to protect personnel computer equipment. However, several recalled surge protectors were found inside the power block where important plant safety equipment is located. This included one that was near the 'A' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump located in the RAB, that was powering radiological survey equipment. Subsequently, the licensee conducted a complete plant inspection and identified over 100 surge protectors that were part of the recall notice and were still in operation. While the majority of these were found outside the power block areas, nine more in addition to those identified by the inspectors were found in operation inside the power block, including one in the RAB, six in the waste processing building, and two in the turbine building.</p> <p>The inspectors reviewed fire protection program procedure FPP-001, "Fire Protection Program Manual," which requires conditions adverse to quality associated with fire protection to be addressed via the licensee's corrective action program implemented under administrative procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, "Corrective Action Program." Procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100 required issues that are identified as conditions adverse to quality to be corrected. The inspectors noted that on October 8, 2013, in accordance with AD-PI-ALL-</p>			

0100, nuclear condition report (NCR) 00633715 was initiated to address the fire safety hazard associated with APC Recall Notice 14-001. The purpose of this NCR was to identify all APC surge protectors in the plant affected by the recall and to remove them from operation.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and conducted site-wide inspections of all areas of the plant to identify and remove any remaining surge protectors that were affected by the 2013 APC recall notice.

Corrective Action References: NCRs 02371670, 02371966, and 02374856

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to implement adequate corrective actions to address the fire safety hazard posed by the degraded recalled APC surge protectors under NCR 00633715 was a performance deficiency (PD).

Screening: The inspectors determined the PD was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to remove degraded surge protectors would allow unnecessary fire hazards to exist increasing the likelihood of a fire, which could cause a plant transient or adversely affect important plant equipment.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," because the finding involved a failure to adequately implement fire prevention and administrative controls for transient ignition sources. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection SDP Worksheet," the issue screened as Green in Step 1.4.7 for post-fire safe shutdown because it did not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown, hot standby, or safe and stable conditions using the credited safe shutdown success path. Specifically, none of the recalled surge protectors were found in areas of the power block where if a fire had occurred, it would have resulted in adversely affecting important safe shutdown equipment.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. The failure to implement adequate corrective actions to address the fire safety hazard associated with the recalled surge protectors occurred in 2013.

Enforcement:

Violation: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-63, Condition 2.F, "Fire Protection Program," states, in part, that Duke Energy Progress, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), "National Fire Protection Associated Standard NFPA 805," as specified in the revised license amendment request dated October 9, 2009. Attachment A of the licensee's NFPA 805 Transition Report, which is enclosed with the revised license amendment request, states, in part, that procedure FPP-001, "Fire Protection Program Manual," provides the site-wide fire protection plan and establishes the criteria for implementing all fire protection activities. The licensee's fire protection quality assurance program is described in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of procedure FPP-001, and states, in part, that (fire protection) conditions adverse to quality are documented in accordance with procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, "Corrective Action Program," to provide an effective process for identifying, evaluating, and correcting adverse conditions. In

accordance with procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, on October 8, 2013, the licensee initiated nuclear condition report 00633715 to address the fire protection condition adverse to quality involving the fire safety hazard associated with recalled APC surge protectors. Contrary to the above, since October 2013, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program because it failed to adequately correct the fire safety hazards associated with the recalled APC surge protectors by identifying and removing from operation all the affected devices from the power block.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 21, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Kim Maza and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Procedures	AP-300	Severe Weather Response	Rev. 35
71111.04	Procedures	OP-139	Service Water System	Rev. 138
		OP-148	Essential Services Chilled Water System	Rev. 80
		OP-155	Diesel Generator Emergency Power System	Rev. 91
71111.05	Fire Plans	CSD-HNP-PFP-DGB	Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 1
		CSD-HNP-PFP-FHB	Fuel Handling Building Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 1
		CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-236	Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 236 Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 2
		CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-286	Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 1
		CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-305-324	Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevations 305 and 324 Pre-Fire Plan	Rev. 4
	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1520	Transient Combustible Control	Rev. 13
		FPP-001	Fire Protection Program Manual	Rev. 44
		FPP-013	Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions and Surveillance Requirements	Revs. 106 and 107
	71111.11Q	Engineering Evaluations		Reactor Engineering Reactivity Management Plan for H1C23 EOL MTC Testing
Procedures		AD-OP-ALL-0106	Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions	Rev. 4
		AD-OP-ALL-0203	Reactivity Management	Rev. 13
		AD-OP-ALL-1000	Conduct of Operations	Rev. 17
		AD-OP-ALL-1001	Conduct of Abnormal Operations	Rev. 3
		OMM-001	Operations Administrative Requirements	Rev. 121
		TE-NF-PWR-0810	Moderator Temperature Coefficient - End of Life (EOL)	Rev. 0
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	NCR 02362309	Reactor trip due to ground fault on 1B Unit Auxiliary Transformer	12/16/2020
		NCR 02368286	Replace bad Agastat relay PIA3/1183 in B emergency safeguards sequencer	2/02/2021
	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1210	Maintenance Rule Program	Rev. 2

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.13	Procedures	AD-NF-ALL-0501	Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT)	Rev. 5
		AD-OP-ALL-0201	Protected Equipment	Rev. 7
		AD-OP-ALL-0210	Operational Risk Management	Rev. 1
		AD-WC-ALL-0200	On-Line Work Management	Rev. 18
		AD-WC-ALL-0240	On-Line Risk Management Process	Rev. 2
		AD-WC-ALL-0410	Work Activity Integrated Risk Management	Rev. 10
71111.15	Miscellaneous	Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-03	Operability Determinations	Rev. 0
	Procedures	AD-OP-ALL-0105	Operability Determinations	Rev. 6
71111.18	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1110	Design Review Requirements	Rev. 9
		AD-EG-ALL-1132	Preparation and Control of Design Change Engineering Changes	Rev. 18
		AD-EG-ALL-1155	Post Modification Testing	Rev. 4
	Work Orders	WO 20419169	Reposition oiler on 'B' ESW screen wash pump bearing housing	3/2/2021
		WO 20448191	Install sealant for seismic gap at turbine building to reactor auxiliary building 286 elevation per EC 418926	3/1/2021
71111.19	Procedures	AD-EG-ALL-1155	Post Modification Testing	Rev. 4
	Work Orders	WO 20379573	MOV Diagnostic Testing of Valve 1CC-147	3/24/2021
		WO 20445789	Troubleshoot/repair seat leakage identified past 'B' ESCW chiller condenser pump service water discharge check valve 1SW-1232	1/12/2021
		WOs 12018383, 20290676, 20350745, and 20394609	'A' EDG maintenance to replace relays, overspeed trip pressure regulator, fuel oil strainer cleaning, and jacket water heat exchanger cleaning	1/12-13/2021
		WOs 20333404, 20345510, and 20352737	Valve 1SI-323, 1RH-63, and SI-301 maintenance activities	3/09/2021
		WOs 20416860,	Calibration of four relays in 'B' train emergency safeguards	2/02/2021

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		20416861, 20416862, and 20416866	sequencer	
71111.22	Miscellaneous	HNEI-0400-0016	Harris Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)	Rev. 2
	Procedures	OP-155	Diesel Generator Emergency Power System	Rev. 92
71114.06	Procedures	AD-EP-ALL-0105	Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center	Rev. 5
		AD-EP-ALL-0109	Offsite Protective Action Recommendations	Rev. 5
		AD-EP-ALL-0202	Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment	Rev. 8
		AD-EP-ALL-0304	State and County Notifications	Rev. 3
		AD-EP-ALL-0802	Conducting Drills and Exercises	Rev. 6
		AD-EP-HNP-0105	HNP Site Specific TSC Support	Rev. 0
		CSD-EP-ALL-0800-01	Drill and Exercise Templates	Rev. 0
		CSD-EP-HNP-0101-01	EAL Technical Basis Document	Rev. 2
		CSD-EP-HNP-0101-02	EAL Wallchart	Rev. 1
		EOP-E-1	Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant	Rev. 5
		PLP-201	Emergency Plan	Rev. 73
71151	Procedures	AD-PI-ALL-0700	Performance Indicators	Rev. 4
71152	Procedures	AD-PI-ALL-0100	Corrective Action Program	Rev. 23
		AD-PI-ALL-0101	Root Cause Evaluation	Rev. 7
		AD-PI-ALL-0106	Cause Investigation Checklists	Rev. 4