



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
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February 12, 2021

Mr. Terry Brown
Site Vice President
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Rte. 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

**SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000346/2020004**

Dear Mr. Brown:

On December 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On January 28, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to Terry Brown from Billy C. Dickson Jr., dated February 12, 2021.

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2020004

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000346

License Number: NPF-3

Report Number: 05000346/2020004

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-004-0028

Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Dates: October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020

Inspectors: S. Bell, Health Physicist
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Harvey, Resident Inspector
D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Emergency Preparedness	Green NCV 05000346/2020004-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71114.04
<p>The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for the licensee’s failure to follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Specifically, on August 11, 2020, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station experienced a phone outage that affected the licensee’s ability to receive calls from offsite. Since they could not receive calls and an alternate notification method was not available, they could not receive notifications per Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA 1.2. During the communications outage, the licensee did not maintain the emergency plan due to EAL HA 1.2 being rendered ineffective. The licensee did not establish compensatory actions until after inquiry from the Senior Resident Inspector. The licensee’s corrective actions included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishing compensatory measures • updating their procedures to incorporate these actions • entering this issue into their CAP as CR 2020-06343 			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The plant operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status"; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of winter for the following systems:
 - Borated water storage tank
 - Emergency feedwater system

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensee's design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding during the week ending December 5, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Core spray train 2 during the week ending December 19, 2020
- (2) High pressure injection train 2 after planned testing during the week ending December 26, 2020

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the emergency feedwater system during the week ending January 2, 2021.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the emergency diesel generator system during the week ending December 19, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Mechanical penetration room 1 (room 208), fire area AB, during the week ending November 7, 2020
- (2) Control room and control room support rooms (rooms 502-513), fire area FF, during the week ending December 12, 2020
- (3) Service water pump room (room 52), fire area BF, during the week ending December 19, 2020
- (4) Emergency core cooling system pump room 2 (room 115), fire area A-04, during the week ending December 19, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

- (1) Emergency core cooling system pump room 2 (room 115)

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification program biennial written examination and annual operating test administered between October 19 and December 11, 2020.

71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Partial)

(1) (Partial)
Biennial Requalification Written Examinations

The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on 12/4/2020.

Annual Requalification Operating Tests

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensee's annual requalification operating test.

Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test

Due to the COVID-19 PHE, the inspectors could not by direct observation, evaluate the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives. Specifically, the inspectors did not observe the administration of simulator scenarios and JPMs during the conduct of an annual requalification operating test required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2).

Requalification Examination Security

The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.

Remedial Training and Re-examinations

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.

Operator License Conditions

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.

Control Room Simulator

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensee's control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power changes, turbine valve testing, and control rod drive exercise during the week ending December 12, 2020.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator license regualification simulator scenarios on December 9, 2020 and December 10, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Repeat failure of containment air cooler 2 service water outlet, SW1357 during the week ending September 5, 2020
- (2) Borated water storage tank level transmitter replacement due to water intrusion during the week ending June 27, 2020
- (3) Programmatic review of the periodic maintenance effectiveness assessment report for May 9, 2018, to March 3, 2020
- (4) Emergency diesel generator 1 scheduled 2-year preventive maintenance during the week ending November 14, 2020
- (5) Low pressure injection/decay heat pump 2 bearing replacement and constant level oiler installation during the week ending October 31, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) CR 2020-05932: Incorrect comparison of borated water storage tank concentration to upper technical specification limit
- (2) CR 2020-04688: Reactor coolant pump 2-2 seal return flow high
- (3) CR 2020-09055: Storm damage to shield building scaffold
- (4) CR 2020-05473: AF6451 close mVdc does not meet the minimum value specified in test procedure during minimal time period of power being applied

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) Emergency feedwater testing following installation of automatic start function during the week ending November 21, 2020
- (2) Component cooling water pump 1 following overhaul during the week ending October 31, 2020
- (3) Emergency diesel generator 1 following planned maintenance during the week ending November 14, 2020
- (4) Low pressure injection/decay heat pump 1 following planned maintenance during the week ending December 12, 2020
- (5) Emergency core cooling system room cooler 4 following planned maintenance during the week ending December 12, 2020
- (6) Auxiliary feedwater pump 1 following planned maintenance during the week ending September 12, 2020
- (7) Low pressure injection/decay heat pump 2 following bearing replacement and constant level oiler installation during the week ending October 31, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Emergency diesel generator 1 184-day run during the week ending November 28, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

- (1) Emergency core cooling system train 1 quarterly valve testing during the week ending December 5, 2020
- (2) Turbine valve testing during the week ending December 12, 2020
- (3) Control rod drive exercise during the week ending December 12, 2020

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) Emergency feedwater pump quarterly testing during the week ending November 28, 2020

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors completed an evaluation of submitted emergency action level and emergency plan changes on December 31, 2020. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) Integrated emergency preparedness/emergency response drill held on October 6, 2020

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

- (1) Shepherd Model 89 calibrator repair under RWP 120-1048. This work involved high activity sources and significant dose gradients.

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (11 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:

- (1) MG Telepole, SN 2.7.338, calibrated on March 22, 2020
- (2) Fluke 451B, SN 2.7.526, calibrated on April 3, 2020
- (3) Canberra Cronos-4, SN 2.12.99, calibrated on November 4, 2019
- (4) Tenelec S5XLB, SN 2.12.56, calibrated on November 17, 2019
- (5) MG AMP 100, SN 2.7.501, calibrated September 9, 2020
- (6) Eberline AMS-4, SN 2.8.183, calibrated on August 3, 2020
- (7) Apex High Purity Germanium Gamma Spectroscopy Detector, SN 3, calibrated on September 11, 2019
- (8) Ludlum Model 12, SN 2.7.667, calibrated on August 19, 2020
- (9) Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counter, calibrated on August 8, 2019
- (10) Ludlum Model L177, SN 2.7.541, calibrated on April 23, 2020
- (11) Hi Range Containment Radiation Monitor, RE4596B, calibrated on March 24, 2020

Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:

- (1) Radioactive Liquid Discharge Monitor, RE1770A
- (2) Radioactive Gaseous Vent Stack Discharge Monitor, RE4598BA

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)

- (1) October 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

- (1) October 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

- (1) January 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

- (1) July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends in communications systems that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) 2020 Inspection campaign as part of long-term monitoring for the shield building laminar cracking condition, EN-DP-01511
- (2) Licensee effectiveness in maintaining minimum staffing levels
- (3) Unintended power change during feedwater flow transmitter calibration

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Emergency Preparedness	Green NCV 05000346/2020004-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71114.04
<p>The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for the licensee's failure to follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Specifically, on August 11, 2020, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station experienced a phone outage that affected the licensee's ability to receive calls from offsite. Since they could not receive calls and an alternate notification method was not available, they could not receive notifications per Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA 1.2. During the communications outage, the licensee did not maintain the emergency plan due to EAL HA 1.2 being rendered ineffective. The licensee did not establish compensatory actions until after inquiry from the Senior Resident Inspector. The licensee's corrective actions included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishing compensatory measures • updating their procedures to incorporate these actions • entering this issue into their CAP as CR 2020-06343 			
<p><u>Description:</u></p> <p>On August 11, 2020, security staff at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station discovered that offsite phone calls were not being received to onsite phone lines, including the NRC and Emergency Notification System phone lines. The unexpected outage began at approximately 1315 EDT and affected the inbound calling capability of all hardwired phones onsite. The outbound calling ability was not affected. The shift manager contacted the senior resident inspector (SRI) as a courtesy notification regarding the outage and provided a personal cell phone number. Upon receipt of the call, the SRI inquired about compensatory actions to allow the station to receive notifications from offsite entities, including the NRC Operations Center. The SRI noted that cell phone reception is deficient in the control room, making it an unreliable communication method for receiving notifications. Following this discussion, the licensee established compensatory measures to allow offsite communications with control room operators. The licensee informed the NRC Operations Center of the compensatory measures.</p> <p>Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. The corrective actions included a revision to plant procedures governing equipment important to EP, and include appropriate compensatory actions in the event of a loss of phone lines.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: CR-2020-06343; Site Phones Experiencing Issues Receiving Outside Calls</p>			
<p><u>Performance Assessment:</u></p> <p>Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to maintain the effectiveness of the Davis-Besse emergency plan due to an ineffective EAL because plant operators were unable to receive timely notifications from offsite entities including the NRC</p>			

Operations Center. The inspectors also determined that this was a performance deficiency within the licensee’s ability to foresee and correct.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. In this case the licensee may not have received a notification of a hostile threat with enough time to implement the required procedures and declare an Alert prior to the event. Inspection manual chapter 0612 Appendix E example 4.i is similar to this issue.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Manual chapter 0609 Appendix B, “Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process.” Appendix B table 5.4-1 and figure 5.4-1 provide significance determination examples for an ineffective EAL. Since the licensee would not have received notifications and thus, would not have been able to be declare an Alert under HA1.2 during the time that the phone lines were out, this finding screens as GREEN.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown, because the licensee did not stop and assess all vulnerabilities when presented with the unexpected loss of inbound communications capabilities. Specifically, the licensee failed to fully evaluate and manage the risk presented by the inability to declare an emergency under HA1.2 and enter the proper response procedures due to the loss of inbound communications capability.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.54(q)(2) requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in Appendix E to this part and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain the effectiveness of the emergency plan. Specifically, on August 11, 2020, the licensee failed to maintain a standard emergency classification and action level scheme as the site could not receive incoming phone calls and there were no compensatory actions in place to receive notifications that would meet the initiating condition of the site’s emergency action level, HA 1.2.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: 2020 Inspection Campaign as Part of Long-Term Monitoring for the Shield Building Laminar Cracking Condition	71152
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As part of the continued long-term monitoring of the shield building laminar cracking condition, the licensee subjected a sample of existing shield building core bores to visual	
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examination as prescribed by licensee procedure EN-DP-01511, "Structures Monitoring." One purpose of the core bore visual examinations conducted under this procedure was to determine if any growth or change in the nature of the cracks had occurred by measurement of crack width and comparison to historical values. In areas of identified laminar crack planar propagation, the licensee performed additional impulse response mapping to provide a relative indication of the extent of propagation.

During this in-depth review, the inspectors verified the status of the licensee's core bore visual examinations and their evaluations and corrective actions resulting from shield building laminar cracking not identified by previous visual examinations. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for follow-on examinations and corrective actions that they had established to verify that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of these actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

During the 2020 periodic examination, the licensee identified additional growth in laminar crack width. In some instances, the measured laminar crack width exceeded the crack widths induced during testing previously performed at selected universities referenced in IR 05000346/2014008 to credit full reinforcement capacity in those areas. The licensee documented measured laminar crack widths that exceeded the testing limit in the corrective action program. The licensee observed laminar crack propagation at some locations based on visual examination. The inspectors verified that the licensee determined the extent of laminar crack growth by a combination of additional impulse response mapping and confirmatory concrete cores. As a result of the increased crack widths, the licensee performed operability evaluations of the shield building and determined that the shield building remained operable because the increased crack widths were localized in nature. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability determinations, engineering analyses, and assessment that the shield building remained capable of performing its intended safety functions and identified no concerns. The inspectors identified no findings.

Observation: Trend of Communication System Issues

71152

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends involving communication systems that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. During the review period for this inspection sample, the inspectors noted several phone system problems challenged the licensee. The inspectors determined that though these issues were identified and corrected by the licensee, several could have negatively impacted plant safety. Specific examples associated with this trend included but were not limited to:

- During the third quarter of 2020, the licensee was notified by an offsite employee that he could not reach anyone onsite by landline. The licensee identified that incoming calls could not reach any onsite phones even though they maintained the ability to call out and to call numbers onsite. Operators notified the NRC Resident Inspectors of the condition and provided personal cell phone number of an operator. The inspectors requested an alternate method of communication. The licensee provided an acceptable alternate communication method for the NRC emergency operations center to reach the unit control room in response to inspector requests. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 71114.04 of this report (ineffective EAL HA1.2). (CR 2020-06343 - August 11, 2020)

- While performing a monthly walkdown of the Joint Information Center, the licensee discovered three phone lines and two fax lines were nonfunctional. (CR 2020-06399 – August 13, 2020)
- The licensee discovered that five plant cell phones were not able to receive incoming phone calls. (CR 2020-08623 – November 3, 2020)
- The licensee discovered that hardwired phone lines were once again not able to receive incoming phone calls. (CR 2020-08623 – November 7, 2020)
- The licensee discovered that several security cell phones were not working. (CR 2020-09147 - November 30, 2020)

Individually, none of these examples may suggest an ongoing problem, but the inspectors determined that they may indicate a potential weakness when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, for these and other issues, the station may be missing the opportunity to identify and resolve deficiencies before the failure manifests, potentially resulting in an adverse impact on the plant. The inspectors provided these observations to the licensee. The inspectors will continue monitoring the licensee's actions to identify and correct similar issues.

Observation: Inspector verification of licensee minimum staffing levels	71152
<p>The inspectors reviewed the licensee's pandemic response plan, condition reports, staffing plans, and licensee use of NRC exemption from certain portions of part 26 and part 73.</p> <p>The inspectors verified that the licensee maintained sufficient staffing levels in key positions (e.g., operations, emergency response organization, security). Additionally, the inspectors evaluated for deferred maintenance and other activities, use of overtime, and the use of NRC enforcement discretion.</p> <p>The inspectors also assessed licensee preparations and planning for potential staffing challenges at the facility or in the conduct of activities related to operations, emergency response organization, and security.</p> <p>No issues were identified.</p>	

Observation: Unintended Power Change during Feedwater Flow Transmitter Calibration	71152
<p>On March 29, 2020, as operators were starting up the reactor following the refueling outage, the control room received feedwater flow deviation alarms, and the operators halted the power ascension. The licensee determined that the issue was caused by the loop 1 feedwater flow instrument channel being out of calibration. The licensee commenced a calibration of the instrument channel using the approved calibration procedure. While performing the calibration, a plant transient resulted, during which the control rods automatically inserted and resulted in a 2.5 percent power reduction. The operators halted the transient by placing rod control and reactor demand hand/auto stations in hand (manual operation), and the calibration was completed. The licensee conducted an apparent cause evaluation that identified the apparent cause: the procedure failed to include steps to direct the operators to place the rod control and reactor demand hand/auto stations in hand before conducting the calibration. The licensee also identified that contributing causes included</p>	

failures to identify the procedural deficiency. The licensee previously performed the procedure during plant conditions when control rod movement was not possible.

Inspectors reviewed procedures, logs, and the apparent cause evaluation. The inspectors identified no findings, but the licensee's failure to identify this issue before the performance of this work activity may indicate a weakness related to work planning and job preparation. The licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the issue during work planning, pre-job brief, and other work preparation activities. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's focus on addressing work planning and work management issues.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On January 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 4, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Mr. M. Sidoti, Radiation Protection Support Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the Davis-Besse Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection Results inspection results to Mr. D. Huey, Operations Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Procedures	DB-OP-06913	Seasonal Plant Preparation Checklist	39
		RA-EP-02870	Station Isolation	07
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents	2020-07572	Relay Failed as Found Testing for BF1141TD	10/29/2020
	Drawings	M-017A	Diesel Generators	22
		M-017B	Diesel Generators Air Start	47
		M-017C	Fuel Oil	32
		OS-003	High Pressure Injection System	25
	Procedures	DB-OP-06011	High Pressure Injection Operating Procedure	34
		DB-OP-06013	Containment Spray System	27
		DB-OP-06234	Emergency Feedwater System	07
		DB-OP-06316	Diesel Generator Operating Procedure	63
	71111.05	Fire Plans	PFP-AB-115	ECCS Pump Room 1-2 Room 115
PFP-AB-208			No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room and Pipe Way Area Rooms 202, 208, and 208DC	08
PFP-AB-505			Control Room and Adjacent Support Rooms	09
PFP-IS-52			Service Water Pump Room	04
71111.06	Drawings	A-2111	Barrier Penetration Drawing Intake Structure	0
	Procedures	NORM-ER-3208	Penetrations and Barriers	1
	Work Orders	200720548	ECCS Sump 1-2 Pump B	08/25/2020
71111.11A	Miscellaneous		Davis-Besse Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Program Results Information	12/14/2020
71111.11B	Corrective Action Documents	2018-10895	Ops Training- Potential Exam Security Event, Cell Phone	12/12/2018
		2019-03972	Negative Performance Trend with Respect to EAL Classification	04/30/2019
		2020-02741	Unexpected Rod Insertion During FW Flow Calibration	03/29/2020
		2020-08032	Senior Reactor Operator May Have Not Have Met the Minimum Watch Standing Requirements	10/16/2020
		2020-08446	ILT Exam Security - SCANNER	10/26/2020
		ATL-2019-0015-ATA-1 I	Effectiveness Evaluation for EAL Performance Gap	10/19/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date	
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	2020-09464	2020 NRC IP 71111.11 Issue of Concern; the Amount of Overlap Between the 2018 and 2020 Written Exams.	12/15/2020	
	Miscellaneous	2020 CT List	Davis-Besse Licensed Operator Critical Task List	12/03/2020	
		2020 DB Biennial Written Exam 1	2020 Davis-Besse Biennial Written Exam 1	09/29/2020	
		2020 DB Sample Plan	2020 Davis-Besse Examination Sample Plan and Outlines	Various	
		2020 JPM Crew 1	2020 Davis-Besse Annual Operating Test Job Performance Measures Crew1 (001, 045, 227, 285, 308)	11/30/2020	
		2020 JPM Crew 2	2020 Davis-Besse Annual Operating Test Job Performance Measures Crew 2 (027, 166, 120, 283, 193)	10/19/2020	
		2020 Scn Crew 1	2020 Davis-Besse Annual Operating Test Crew 1 Scenarios (S109R14, S132R8, S137R5)	11/30/2020	
		2020 Scn Crew 5	2020 Davis-Besse Annual Operating Test Crew 5 Scenario (S134R12)	11/09/2020	
		CREW EVALUATION ANNUAL EXAM FORM (from NOBP-TR-1112)	Scenarios #1 - #3: for Crew 1	12/02/2020	
		CYCLE 22 TAB 01 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP	Simulator Transient Test	11/23/2020	
		DB 2020 Biennial Exam 2	LORT Biennial Written Exam Failed by an Applicant	08/27/2020	
		DB 2020 Biennial Exam 3	LORT Remedial Biennial Written Exam Passed by an Applicant	11/18/2020	
		DBBP-TRAN-0021 for Scenario ORQ EPE S101	Simulator Scenario Based Testing Documentation	07/13/2020	
		Procedures	DBBP-OPS-1013	Control of Time Critical Actions	2
			DBBP-TRAN-	Conduct and Development of Job Performance Measures	10

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		0501		
		NOP-TR-1010	Requal Exam Development and Administration	4
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	2017-10018	SW1357 Failed to Close During Air Drop Test due to SV1357B Continuously Venting	10/01/2017
		2018-02603	SW1357, CAC 2 Service Water Outlet, Would Not Stroke Closed during Test	03/18/2018
		2020-01255	Difficulty Installing Split Ring on New Cartridge Style Seals for the Decay Heat Pump	02/17/2020
		2020-01305	P42-2, Decay Heat Pump 2, Seal Leakage	02/19/2020
		2020-01363	BACC: Decay Heat Pump 2 Inboard Seal Package Leakage 2 DPM	02/21/2020
		2020-01382	Oil Sample on Decay Heat Pump 2 O.B. Pump Bearing Grayish in Color	02/21/2020
		2020-01458	Decay Heat Pump 2 Mechanical Seal Replacement Post Job Comments	02/25/2020
		2020-01909	1R21 BACC Boric Acid Build Up on 2 Decay Heat Pump Inboard Pump Seal	03/07/2020
		2020-02616	Minor Oil Leakage from Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection Pump 2 Outboard Bearing Inside Cover	03/25/2020
		2020-02856	Vibration Point on Decay Heat Pump 1 is in the Alert Range	04/01/2020
		2020-03031	Required Actions Not Completed for HPI Pump 2 D-H Vibrations in Alert Range from 1R21 Comprehensive Test	04/09/2020
		2020-05230	SFAS Channel 4 BWST Level Erratic	06/24/2020
		2020-06179	Suction Pressure Spike Following LPI Pump 2 Jog	08/05/2020
		2020-06619	SW1357 Would Not Stroke Closed	08/23/2020
		2020-07101	Alpha Level 3 Contamination Found Inside RCS Piping	09/11/2020
		2020-07724	EDG FOST 1 Internal Oxidation at Top of Tank	10/06/2020
		2020-07821	EDG Week Tank 1 Refill Delayed Retest and Operability Determination	10/08/2020
	2020-07826	EDG 1 FOST Fuel Found with Water/Sediment Post Maintenance	10/08/2020	
	2020-07844	High Pressure at P12987 (1 Emergency Diesel Generator South Air Start)	10/09/2020	
	2020-08296	As Found Thrust on P42-2 Found Outside the Procedural	10/26/2020	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Specifications in DB-MM-09174	
		2020-08671	Pitting Noted n EDG 1-1 HX E10-1 Tubing	11/09/2020
		2020-08678	As-Found Visual Inspection for Piston Oil Piping was Discovered Out Alignment	11/10/2020
		2020-08705	EDG 1 Jacket Water Hose Replacement Parts Not Correct Size	11/11/2020
		2020-08740	EDG 1 Exhaust Temp Thermocouples Read Outside of Required Value	11/11/2020
		2020-08742	EDG 1 Outage Critical Path Delay	11/11/2020
		2020-08743	EDG 1 Failed the Overspeed Trip Test	11/11/2020
		2020-08826	Control Room Annunciator 1-1-K EDG 2 Trouble Failed to Alarm	11/15/2020
		2020-09073	Old Removed EDG 1 Speed Switch Signs of Overheating	11/25/2020
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	2020-09755	Maintenance Rule Program Missed Condition Monitoring Failure CR in Periodic Assessment Cycle 21	12/30/2020
	Miscellaneous	MRPM	Maintenance Rule Program Manual	38
	Procedures	NOBP-LP-2001	Self-Assessment and Benchmarking	31
		NOP-ER-3004	Maintenance Rule Program	6
	Self-Assessments	ATA-2020-9407	Cycle 21 Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness Assessment Report (PMEAR)	Cycle 21
		SA-BN-2018-1138	Cycle 20 Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness Assessment Report (PMEAR)	Cycle 20
	Work Orders	200700254	PM 8878 GK5-1 Check Slip Ring Runout	11/09/2020
		200709265	Decay Heat Pump Outboard Bearing Housing Interior Coating	10/26/2020
		200755711	Replace Decay Heat Pump Seals with Cartridge Type Seals	02/16/2020
		200759589	PM 10851 Engine Analysis on EDG 1	11/09/2020
		200766360	PM 0723 K5-1 24-Month Check EDG 1	11/08/2020
		200767926	Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Static Exercise	11/09/2020
		200771879	Diesel Generator and Auxiliary	11/08/2020
		200772284	EDG 1 Overspeed Trip Test	11/08/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date	
		200772284	Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Overspeed Trip Test	11/08/2002	
		200784743	Recommendations from EDG 1 Engine Analysis	11/09/2020	
		200784759	Borated Water Storage Tank Level SFAS Channel 4 Level TA	06/24/2020	
		200826241	Borated Water Storage Tank Level SFAS Channel 4 Level TA	06/24/2020	
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	2012-18810	DB-SP-03161 AF6451 Closed Voltage Out of Spec	12/02/2012	
		2020-04688	RCP 2-2 Seal Return Flow High	05/31/2020	
		2020-05473	AF6451 Close mVdc Does Not Meet the Minimum Value Specified in Test Procedure During Minimal Time Period of Power Being Applied	07/05/2020	
		2020-05932	Incorrect Comparison of BWST Concentration to Upper Tech Spec Limit	07/24/2020	
		2020-09055	Storm Damage to Shield Building Scaffold	11/24/2020	
		G201-2008-36648	Boron Concentrations Do Not Include Sample Accuracy	03/11/2008	
	Procedures	DBBP-OPS-0011	Protected Equipment Posting	14	
	Work Orders	200683357	Auxiliary Feedpumps and Piping	09/09/2020	
		200684824	Auxiliary Feedpump 1 to Steam Generator	09/09/2020	
		200714135	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbines	09/09/2020	
		200765006	AFW Train 1 Valve Testing	09/09/2020	
	71111.19	Procedures	DB-MM-09180	Component Cooling Water Pump Maintenance	06
			DB-PF-03572	Component Cooling Water Pump 1 Baseline Test	06
			DB-PF-03572	Component Cooling Water Pump 1 Baseline Test	07
Work Orders		200683357	Motor for AFP 1 Discharge to SG 1	09/09/2020	
		200684824	Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-1 to SG 1-2 Stop Valve	09/09/2020	
		200714135	Main Steam Line 1 to AFPT 1 Isolation Valve Motor	09/09/2020	
		200765030	AFP 1 Quarterly Test	09/08/2020	
		200770852	Decay Heat Train 2 Pump and Valve Test	12/26/2020	
		200770857	Emergency Feedwater Pump Monthly Test	10/29/2020	
		200772760	Monthly PMT Order	11/18/2020	
		200775489	Emergency CR RM CLR FAN 4	12/03/2020	
		200776052	ECCS Room 105 Cooler Fan 4 Motor Refurbish	12/04/2020	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		200837784	CCW Pump 1 Quarterly Test	11/23/2020
71111.22	Procedures	DB-SS-04201	Emergency Feedwater Pump Quarterly Test	05
	Work Orders	200764576	MTSV Main Turbine Stop Valves Test	12/05/2020
		200764577	Main Turbine Control Valve	12/05/2020
		200764578	Main Turbine CIV Test	12/05/2020
		200772722	EDG 2 184 Day Test	11/25/2020
		200773169	CRD Exercise Test	12/05/2020
		200774425	DH14B Mech Stop POS Test	11/30/2020
200840154	Quarterly PMT Test	11/18/2020		
71114.04	Corrective Action Documents	2019-08756	Need to Perform 50.54(q) Reviews on Three Procedures That Were Revised and Made Effective Without These Reviews	10/22/2019
		2020-06343	Site Phones Experiencing Issues Receiving Outside Calls	08/11/2020
	Miscellaneous	DB-2019-022-01	10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) Analysis	11/15/2019
		DB-2019-026-00	10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screen/Evaluation	10/22/2019
		DBRM-EMER-5003	Equipment Important to Emergency Response	19
		DBRM-EMER-5003	Equipment Important to Emergency Response	20
NOBP-OP-1015	Event Notifications	17		
71124.01	ALARA Plans	120-1048	Repair of Gamma Irradiator Shepherd Model 89	1
	Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)	120-1048	Repair and Maintenance of the Shepherd Model 89	1
	Work Orders	200833345	Source Rod of JL Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has Become Detached	11/17/2020
71124.05	Calibration Records		Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counter Calibration	08/08/2019
		DB-MI3401-001	Radioactive Liquid Discharge Monitor, RE1770A, Calibration	06/17/2019
		DB-MI3408-001	Hi Range Containment Radiation Monitor, RE4596B, Calibration	03/14/2020
		DB-MI3413-001	Radioactive Gaseous Vent Stack Discharge Monitor, RE4598BA, Calibration	05/14/2019
		RE4596B	Hi Range Containment Radiation Monitor Calibration	03/24/2020
SN 2.12.56	Tennelec S5XLB Calibration	11/17/2019		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		SN 2.12.99	Canberra Cronos-4 Calibration	11/04/2019
		SN 2.7.338	MG Telepole Calibration	03/22/2020
		SN 2.7.501	MG AMP 100 Calibration	09/09/2020
		SN 2.7.526	Fluke 451B Calibration	04/03/2020
		SN 2.7.541	Ludlum Model 177 Calibration	04/23/2020
		SN 2.7.667	Ludlum Model 12 Calibration	08/19/2020
		SN 2.8.183	Eberline AMS-4 Calibration	08/03/2020
	SN Number 3	Apex High Purity Germanium Gamma Spectroscopy Detector Calibration	09/11/2019	
	Corrective Action Documents	2018-08094	JL Shepherd Model 89 Requires Repair	10/12/2020
		2019-09708	Shepherd Model 89 Gamma Irradiator Failure	11/16/2019
		2019-09708	Shepherd Model 89 Gamma Irradiator Failure	11/16/2019
		2020-00942	Incorrect Alarm Setpoints in RE8406, Miscellaneous Waste Evaporator Room Area Monitor	02/07/2020
		2020-01010	Initial Part 21 Notification from Fluke Regarding to Compliance Gap on Nickel Seal Rings for Victoreen CTMT High Range (Model 977) Ion Chamber Area Radiation Monitors	02/10/2020
		2020-01025	Telepole 2.7.343 Taken Out of Service	02/20/2020
		2020-04503	JL Shepherd 89 Gamma Irradiator Failure	05/24/2020
		2020-05419	10 CFR 21 Notice of Deviation for Victoreen Model 876A-1, P/N 3649559, Radiation Monitor	07/01/2020
		2020-06066	Stop Work Criteria for Shepherd was Met	07/30/2020
	2020-06730	Telepole 2.7.339 Failed Daily Check	08/26/2020	
	71151	Corrective Action Documents	2019-10166	Elevated Dose Rates Identified in Dry Shielded Container Drain Port
Miscellaneous			Cycle 21 Chemistry Dose Equivalent Iodine Data	Undated
			Cycle 22 Chemistry Dose Equivalent Iodine Data	Undated
		Radiological Effluent Dose Summary Information from 07/01/2019 through 06/30/2020.	Various	
71152	Corrective Action Documents	2016-07491	Unit Load Demand Transferred to Manual Due to Feedwater Flow Divergence	06/07/2016
		2018-09568	Integrated Control System Unit Load Demand in Alarm Due	10/30/2018

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			to Loop 2 Feedwater Flow Deviation	
		2020-02414	Re-Evaluate Medical Screening of Ill Personnel for Departments and Health Services	03/19/2020
		2020-02733	Unit Load Demand Transferred to Manual Due to Feedwater Flow Divergence	03/29/2020
		2020-02741	Unexpected Rod Insertion During FW Flow Calibration	03/29/2020
		2020-02818	Hospital Inventories not Completed for 1st Quarter 2020 per RA-EP-00600 due to Covid-19	03/31/2020
		2020-02854	Monthly JIC Walkdown/RA-EP-04010 Quarterly Communication Test	04/01/2020
		2020-03386	Concern with How Range Masks are Cleaned/Disinfected	04/18/2020
		2020-03473	Recommendation for Hand Search PPE Requirements	04/21/2020
		2020-05090	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulders 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11	06/16/2020
		2020-05091	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 16	06/16/2020
		2020-05388	Telephone Lines Out of Service at Lindsey Emergency Response Facility	06/30/2020
		2020-05400	New Alternate Davis-Besse 4-Way Phone Number Did Not Work	07/01/2020
		2020-05524	Telephone Lines Out of Service at Lindsey Emergency Response Facility	07/07/2020
		2020-05546	Unsafe Mandatory Wearing of Face Masks	07/08/2020
		2020-05926	Knowledge and Ownership of Equipment Previously Supported by FirstEnergy IT	07/24/2020
		2020-06004	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 1	07/28/2020
		2020-06019	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 2	07/29/2020
		2020-06055	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 15	07/30/2020
		2020-06224	First Half 2020 IPA Site Gap Identified for Equipment Reliability	08/06/2020
		2020-06280	Evaluate the Effectiveness of Curtain on PSF Rooftop	08/09/2020
		2020-06343	Site Phones Experiencing Issues Receiving Outside Calls	08/11/2020
		2020-06399	Phones/Fax Lines Not Working at Joint Information Center During Monthly Walkdown	08/13/2020
		2020-06481	Safety Condition Report Social Distancing Separation Not	08/17/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			being Maintained	
		2020-06552	Covid-19 PHE Related Violation of 10 CFR 73 Appendix B, VI.C.3.(I)(1) Subject to NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 20-002	08/20/2020
		2020-07727	Failure Analysis Report - 4 Control Valve Intermittently Changes Position During Transfers of ICS SG/RX Demand Station from Manual to Auto	10/06/2020
		2020-07764	EP Drill: Network and Miscellaneous Technical Issues During 10/06/2020 ERO Drill	10/07/2020
		2020-07776	Post 1R21 Code Safety Valve RC13A As-Found Setpoint Tested High	10/07/2020
		2020-07779	EP Drill: EOF Fax Did Not Receive Messages During 10/06/2020 Drill	10/07/2020
		2020-07834	Sprinkler Guard Hanging Improperly	10/08/2020
		2020-07840	Revised Reactor Vessel P-T Curves Limited to 43 EPY	10/09/2020
		2020-07851	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 13	10/09/2020
		2020-07929	Shield Building Inspection Results - Shoulder 14	10/13/2020
		2020-08032	Potential Licensed Operator Watch Standing Requirements Not Met	10/16/2020
		2020-08039	Foreign Material/Obstruction Identified at the Bottom of the West-Most Drainpipe of EDG 1 FOST (FME Unrecovered)	10/17/2020
		2020-08070	Post 4 Floor Degradation	10/19/2020
		2020-08076	Contraband Identified at Entrance	10/19/2020
		2020-08088	Hydrogen Orbisphere Will Not Communicate with Computer Preventing Instrument Calibration	10/19/2020
		2020-08096	Received Unexpected Annunciator Alarm 5-1A CRD System Fault	10/19/2020
		2020-08135	MS107A Static Test Not Performed	10/20/2020
		2020-08152	Security Radio Degradation	10/21/2020
		2020-08169	RPS Channel 2 Scaled Difference Amplifier Found Out of Tolerance	10/21/2020
		2020-08211	Conduit to MS100-1 is Separated	10/23/2020
		2020-08215	Electrical Manhole Inspection Sump Pump Failures	10/23/2020
		2020-08222	Startup Transformer 01 Trouble	10/23/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date	
		2020-08300	DB-FP-04035 Fire Suppression System 5-Year Test Not Completed as Required	10/26/2020	
		2020-08443	Emergency Plan Drills Not Conducted Due to Pandemic	10/30/2020	
		2020-08519	Security B5b Phones Not Working as Designed	11/03/2020	
		2020-08623	Site Phones Experiencing Issues Receiving Outside Calls	11/07/2020	
		2020-09012	Inadequate Covid-19 prevention and Planning	11/21/2020	
		2020-09036	Non-CDC Approved Disinfectant	11/23/2020	
		2020-09147	CAS/SAS/SSS Cell Phone Failure Noted During Computerized Automated Notification System Weekly Test (CANS)	11/30/2020	
	Miscellaneous			Energy Harbor Pandemic Health Emergency Response Plan	2
				Nuclear Generation Pandemic Health Emergency Response Plan	2
		DBRM-EMER-1500A		Davis-Besse Emergency Action Level Basis Document	09
	NDE Reports	Construction Technology Laboratories (CTLGroup) Project 263453	2020 Shield Building Inspections	05/26/2020 - 10/09/2020	
	Procedures	EN-DP-01511	Structures Monitoring	11	
	Work Orders	200743529	200743529	Steam Room Work Online	05/26/2020
		200743529		Shield Building Long Term Monitoring for the Laminar Cracking Condition Under EN-DP-01511, Structures Monitoring - 2020 Inspection Campaign	10/27/2020