

| Training Id: 2020 N | MP1 NRC RO-SRO Admin JPM COO | 1 Revision: | 0.0 |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Title: Control Roc | d Position Verification and De | etermine Reactivit | ty Severity |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/31/20 |
| Validated By | Dave masor | n, Jeremy Spring | 7/14/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | | |
| | Approximate Duration: | 15 minutes | |
| Documentation of | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | _ | |
| Evaluator: | | _ | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Comments: | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signat | ure: | Date: | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-42, Process Computer / SPDS
- 2. N1-OP-5, Control Rod Drive System
- 3. OP-AA-300, Reactivity Management
- 4. OP-AA-300-1540, Reactivity Management Administration
- 5. BWROG-TP-09-025, Monitoring of Reactivity Management Issues
- 6. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.37 (4.3/4.6)
- 7. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's knowledge of reactivity management processes, and tests the operator's ability to determine whether control rod patterns correctly reflect the desired plant lineup by performing a control rod position verification.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-SOP1.5-03001-07, Concurrent mitigation of control rod mispositiong
- b. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.37 (4.3/4.6), Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform | |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | No | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Classroom

5. JPM Setup

- a. Provide sufficient copies of OP-AA-300, Reactivity Management
- b. Provide sufficient copies of OP-AA-300-1540, Reactivity Management Administration
- c. Provide sufficient copies of BWROG-TP-09-025, Monitoring of Reactivity Management Issues
- d. Provide sufficient copies of N1-OP-5 for the SRO applicants
- e. Provide A2 startup sequence completed up to final rod position verification
- f. Provide printout of rod positions from the PPC



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- A plant startup is in progress.
- All RWM Group 10 Rods have been withdrawn.
- An independent verification of control rod positions for RWM group 10 must be performed prior to moving ahead with the start up.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), perform the Independent Verification of final control rod positions for RWM group 9 using the plant process computer rod position data.

START TIME

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|--|-------------|---|---|--|
| 1. | Provide rep | peat back of initiating cue | Р | SAT / UNSAT |
| | | owledge repeat back providing ction if necessary. | | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a co | opy of the reference handouts. | Р | SAT / UNSAT |
| | | | | STD: Obtains copy of A2 startup sequence and PPC rod position printout. |
| 3. Identify rod position discrepancy | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies rod 34-47 is fully inserted and should be at position 12. Rod 30-47 is at position 12 and should be fully inserted. | |
| Evaluator Cue: When the applicant identifies the control rod position discrepancy, position the RO/SRO worksheet and all applicable references. | | | | |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----------------|--|---|---------------------|---|
| 4 | determination accordance | RO Worksheet, makes on of mispositioned control rod in with OP-AA-300-1540, Reactivity at Administration. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines this DOES meet the definition of a mispositioned control rod. |
| | Reactivity C "Guidelines "Monitoring Issues", who | A-300-1540 references BWROG controls Review Committee for Excellence," Section 5.0 of Reactivity Management ere mispositioned control rod is ned in definition 'I'. | | |
| 5 | From RO/SRO Worksheet, determines the reactivity event severity level in accordance with OP-AA-300-1540, Reactivity Management Administration. Note: OP-AA-300-1540 directs the use of BWROG Reactivity Controls Review Committee "Guidelines for Excellence, "Section 5.0 "Monitoring of Reactivity Management Issues", where a mispositioned control rod due to personnel error is example 2-5. (significance level 2). | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines this is a significance level 2 reactivity event. |
| | | | | |
| Evaluator Cue: | | When the RO applicants have comtask is complete. | npleted the work | ksheet, inform them their |
| | | When the SRO applicants have completed the RO/SRO worksheet, provide them with the SRO Only worksheet and N1-OP-5. | | |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|--|---------------------|---|
| 6 | SRO Only: Makes determination of who is required to be notified in accordance with N1-OP-5. Note: N1-OP-5 step H.9.5.3 directs notifying the General Supervisor Operations. This title was changed to Shift Operations Superintendant (SOS). Either answer is acceptable. | P | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines Shift Manager (H.9.1), Reactor Engineering (H.9.3), and General Supervisor Operations (H.9.5.3) are required to be notified. Additionally, an IR would be generated. The applicant may include this in the required notifications, but it is not required to pass this step. |

| TASK STANDARD | Control rod position verification is complete. Mispositioned control rod identified and severity level classified. SRO has determined Shift Manager, Reactor Engineering and the SOS must be notified. |
|------------------|--|
|------------------|--|

| STOP TIME | |
|-----------|--|
|-----------|--|



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: A plant startup is in progress. All RWM Group 10 Rods have been withdrawn. An independent verification of control rod positions for RWM group 10 must be performed prior to moving ahead with the start up. |
|-----------------------|---|
| | Г |
| INITIATING CUE | (Operators Name), perform the Independent Verification of final control rod positions. |



RO/SRO Worksheet Handout

• Does this issue meet the definition of a "mispositioned control rod"?

• Investigation reveals that this issue was caused by human error, not an equipment malfunction. What is the associated significance level of this issue?



SRO Only Worksheet

| • | Determine the required notifications that must be made for this incident in accordance |
|---|--|
| | with N1-OP-5. |



| Training Id: 2020 NMP1 NRC SRO Admin JPM COO2 | | Revision: 0.0 | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|--|--|--|
| Title: Assess Re | eportability Requirements For Los | s of Offsite Power | | | | |
| Approvals: | Approvals: | | | | | |
| | <u>Signature / Printed</u> | <u>i Name</u> | <u>Date</u> | | | |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/31/20 | | | |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 | | | |
| Facility Reviewer | | | | | | |
| | Approximate Duration: 30 | minutes | | | | |
| Documentation | of Performance: | | | | | |
| Performer: | | _ | | | | |
| Evaluator: | | _ | | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | | | | |
| Grade: | Pass / Fail | | | | | |
| Comments: | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u> </u> | | | | | | |
| Evaluators Sigr | nature: | Date: | | | | |



References

- A. EP-AA-111, EP-AA-111, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations
- B. NMP Reportability Manual
- C. LS-AA-1400, LS-AA-1400, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73
- D. Unit 1 Technical Specifications
- E. NUREG 1123, 2.2.12 (4.1)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM is to evaluate the SRO's ability to classify an event and perform the Station specific Initial Notification Form in accordance with EP-CE-111, EP-AA-112-100-F-50, EP-CE-114-100-F-05, EP-AA-114.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. NIP-ECA01-00002 Perform a Supervisor Review and Operability/Reportability Review of a Condition Report
- b. K/A 2.4.30 (4.1), Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom/Simulator | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | No | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Training Classroom



5. JPM Setup (if required)

- a. Ensure adequate copies of the NMP Reportability Manual (Books 1 and 2) are available.
- b. Ensure adequate copies of the EAL matrices are available.
- c. Ensure Tech Specs are available
- d. Ensure calculators are available



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

- The plant was operating at 100% power with no equipment out of service.
- A loss of offsite power, Lines 1 and 4, has occurred.
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 failed to start and has been declared inoperable.
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 103 responded as designed.
- Maintenance reports that repairs to EDG 102 will take several days.
- Power Control reports Line 1 will be returned to service in approximately 12 hours, and Line 4 will be returned to service in approximately 24 hours.

Instructor / Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), list the applicable 10CFR50.72 reportability requirements, the reason that they apply, including Emergency Classification EAL (if applicable) and Tech Specs (if applicable) and the associated time limitations for reporting under that category. Record findings on the sheet provided.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used. |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Reportability manual Obtained. |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 3. | Locate and identify applicability of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1) Note: SRO must identify Emergency Classification Alert MA1, AC power capability to 4.16 kV emergency buses reduced to a single power source for ≥ 15 minutes AND any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all 4.16 kV emergency bus power bus power. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies plant condition requires Emergency Classification per Alert MA1 |
| 3a | Locate and identify applicability of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1) | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies reportability per 50.72(a)(1), for declaration of any of the Emergency Classes, within one hour. |
| 4 | Locate and identify applicability of 50.72(b)(2)(i). Non-emergency four hour report. Initiation of a plant shutdown required by Tech Specs. Note: Must determine that Tech Spec 3.6.3.e(1) applies to accurately determine that this 4 hour report applies. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.3.e(1) and determines that with specification not being met, the required action is to initiate a shutdown within one hour and be in cold shutdown within 10 hours. STD: Identifies reportability per 50.72(b)(2)(i), for initiation of a plant shutdown required by Tech Specs, within four hours. |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 5 | Locate and identify applicability of 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Non-emergency eight hour report. Event or condition results in valid actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies reportability per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) [or may alternately reference 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)], for valid actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator, within 8 hours. |
| 6. | Locate and identify applicability of 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Non-emergency eight hour report. Event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Note: This step is deemed not-critical because of the redundancy with other reports and the subjective nature of this call. | P | SAT / UNSAT STD: Identifies reportability per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (loss of both offsite power lines, failure of EDG 102), within 8 hours. |

| TASK Reportability requirements have been determined. STANDARD |
|---|
|---|

| STOP TIME | STOP | IME | | |
|-----------|------|-----|--|--|
|-----------|------|-----|--|--|



JPM Handout

INITIAL CONDITIONS

- The plant was operating at 100% power with no equipment out of service.
- A loss of offsite power, Lines 1 and 4, has occurred.
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 failed to start and has been declared inoperable.
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 103 responded as designed.
- Maintenance reports that repairs to EDG 102 will take several days.
- Power Control reports Line 1 will be returned to service in approximately 12 hours, and Line 4 will be returned to service in approximately 24 hours.

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), list the applicable 10CFR50.72 reportability requirements, the reason that they apply, including Emergency Classification EAL (if applicable) and Tech Specs (if applicable) and the associated time limitations for reporting under that category. Record findings on the sheet provided.



| Training Id: 2020 NM | P1 NRC RO Admin JPM COO2 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Title: Develop and | get Approval for an Operato | or Aid | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 5/22/19 |
| Validated By | | Jason Quick | 7/14/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | | |
| App Documentation of P | erformance: | minutes | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Evaluators Signature | e: | Date: | |



References

- A. OP-AA-115-101, Operator Aid Postings
- B. NUREG 1123, 2.1.15 (2.7)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to develop and get approval for an Operator Aid.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. NS-OM502-00004, Install and Use Authorized Labels
- b. K/A 2.1.15 (2.7) Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, operations memos, etc.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform | |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | No | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Training Classroom



| 5. | JPM | Setup | (if re | equired | |
|----|-----|-------|--------|---------|--|
|----|-----|-------|--------|---------|--|

a. Ensure adequate copies of OP-AA-115-101, Operator Aid Postings are available.



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Plant is operating at 100% power.
- The crew has recently discovered that RMC-29-158, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 VALVE CONTROL Yokogawa controller is difficult to place in MANUAL CONTROL.
- Specifically, when shifting the controller from AUTO to MANUAL, the operators have to hold the MAN pushbutton down for 2 to 3 seconds to get the controller to shift into MANUAL.
- IMD has been contacted and have setup a repair schedule. The controller is scheduled to be repaired in one week.
- While waiting for repairs, IMD has said that the controller will still function and if it is necessary for the operators to shift the controller from AUTO to MAN, the operators will need to hold down the MAN pushbutton for 2 to 3 seconds.
- The Unit Supervisor has determined an Operator Aid is to be developed explaining this condition, and a permanent label is NOT required.
- The controller is located on F Panel
- IR-04324087 is tracking the repair of the controller.
- You are the operator assigned to develop the Operator Aid and get signature approval of the Operator Aid through the Operations Director.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), develop and get Operations Department Head approval to post an Operator Aid for RMC-29-158 per OP-AA-115-101. Complete Attachment 1 and Attachment 2.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used. |

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure. Note: Evaluator is to provide OP-AA-115-101, Operator Aid Postings, to the candidate. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: OP-AA-115-101 Obtained and reviewed. |
| Evaluator Notes: | | The remaining steps may be performed in any order. The answer key attached to this JPM may be used to assist in the grading of the below steps. The operator may choose to use different words on Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 than what is listed on the answer key. This is acceptable as long as the intent of the Operator Aid documentation is consistent with the intent of the below steps. The Evaluator may use their judgment as to whether or not the intent of the below steps are met. The operator may choose to fill out all portions of Attachment 1 and 2 prior to presenting the attachments for approval. This is an acceptable action. | | |
| 3. | Using the provided blank Operator Aid Review and Approval form, Attachment 1, documents the following information: • A note stating that in order to place RMC- 29-158 in MANUAL, the M button must be depressed for 2 to 3 seconds. | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: On the provided Attachment 1, in the 'Reason for Posting' box, documents that in order to place RMC-29-158 in MANUAL, the M pushbutton must be depressed for 2 to 3 seconds. Or words to that effect. |
| one of two ways. The operator n Department Head Approval block evaluator or the operator may lead | | The Department Head authorization of one of two ways. The operator may be Department Head Approval block on the evaluator or the operator may leave the write it in. Either method is acceptable for approval. | write the Depart the operator aid the name blank | ment Head name in the and present it to the and allow the evaluator to |
| 4 | 4 Documents the following additional data on the Operator Aid attachments: | | | |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 4a | Operator Aid number on Attachment 2 | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: From the Operator Aid Log, Attachment 2, takes the next sequential number, OA-20-03 and documents on Attachment 2 |
| 4b | Operator Aid number on Attachment 1 | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Documents the next sequential number, obtained from Attachment 2, on attachment 1. OA-20-03 |
| 4c | Operator Aid Title | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Documents any appropriate title. |
| 4d | Permanent sign/label required | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Circles 'No' on attachment 1. |
| 4e | • Location | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Documents the location as 'F Panel' or 'RMC-29-158' on both attachments. |
| 4f | Reason for Posting / Description | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Documents RMC-29-158 is difficult to place in manual. The manual pushbutton must be held for 2-3 seconds. (or words to that effect) |
| 4g | Originator Name | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Operator documents their name and date on both attachments. |
| 5 | Obtains Department Head Approval Cue: As the Department Head, when presented with the Attachment 1, sign in the block labeled "Department Head Approval". | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Routes the completed Attachment 1 to the examiner for approval. |



| | PERFORMANCE | | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|------------------------|-------------|---|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Evaluator p Note: t | | Unless the operator would like to perform an additional review of all the paperwork, then when the operator requests approval, inform the operator that another operator will perform the action of Operations Approval and attaching the Operator Aid to the panel and their task is complete. | | |
| TASK STANDARD | | Attachment 1 and 2 of OP-AA-1 for approval. | 15-101 complete | ed per the key and routed |

| STOP TIME | | |
|-----------|--|--|
| 0.0 | | |



JPM Handout

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Plant is operating at 100% power.
- The crew has recently discovered that RMC-29-158, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 VALVE CONTROL Yokogawa controller is difficult to place in MANUAL CONTROL.
- Specifically, when shifting the controller from AUTO to MANUAL, the operators have to hold the MAN pushbutton down for 2 to 3 seconds to get the controller to shift into MANUAL.
- IMD has been contacted and have setup a repair schedule. The controller is scheduled to be repaired in one week.
- While waiting for repairs, IMD has said that the controller will still function and if it is necessary for the operators to shift the controller from AUTO to MAN, the operators will need to hold down the MAN pushbutton for 2 to 3 seconds.
- The Unit Supervisor has determined an Operator Aid is to be developed explaining this condition, and a permanent label is NOT required.
- The controller is located on F Panel
- IR-04324087 is tracking the repair of the controller.
- You are the operator assigned to develop the Operator Aid and get signature approval of the Operator Aid through the Operations Director.

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), develop and get Operations Department Head approval to post an Operator Aid for RMC-29-158 per OP-AA-115-101. Complete Attachment 1 and Attachment 2.



OP-AA-115-101 Revision 2 | Page 4 of 5

ATTACHMENT 1 Operator Aid Review and Approval Page 1 of 1

| | Op Aid # | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Operator Aid Title: | | | | |
| Permanent Sign/Label Required: Yes No | If Yes, Label Request Submittal Date: | | | |
| Location: | • | | | |
| Reason for Posting/Description: | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Originator Name: | (Print/ Signature/Date) | | | |
| | (Print/ Signature/Date) | | | |
| Department Head Approval: | | | | |
| Operations Approval: | (Printl Signature/Date) | | | |
| - Pro- | | | | |
| Review Items: | | | | |
| Poor this Operator Aid replicate infe | ormation from a procedure? | | | |
| Does this Operator Aid replicate information from a procedure? ☐ Yes ☐ No Should this be incorporated into a procedure? ☐ Yes ☐ No | | | | |
| Could it be eliminated with better labeling or a placard? □ Yes □ No | | | | |
| Attach this form to the original Operator Aid placed in the WEC Book. Copies shall be made and | | | | |

distributed as appropriate.



OP-AA-115-101 Revision 2 Page 5 of 5

ATTACHMENT 2 Operator Aid Log Page 1 of 1

| OPERATOR AID NUMBER (sequential) | TITLE/DESCRIPTION | REASON FOR POSTING | LOCATION | ORIGINATOR NAME/DATE | POSTED BY NAME/DATE | REMOVED BY NAME/DATE |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| OA-20-01 | MG-167 AC Generator AC Voltage Adjust Rheostat | Unexpected indication | MG-167 control cabinet | Balzer / 2/23/20 | Pryor / 2/23/20 | |
| OA-20-02 | 12 Cleanup Filter Control Panel Switch 35-99 | Switch does not operate properly | 12 Cleanup Filter control panel | Nichols / 7/15/20 | Skiff / 7/15/20 | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |



| Training Id: 2020 N | MP1 NRC SRO Admin JPM EC | Revision: | 0.0 | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|--|--|--|
| Review and Approval of Completed Surveillance Test, N1-ST-Q6A, Title: Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test | | | | | | |
| Approvals: | | | | | | |
| | <u>Signature / Printe</u> | ed Name | <u>Date</u> | | | |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 5/13/19 | | | |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 | | | |
| Facility Reviewer | | | | | | |
| Documentation of | pproximate Duration: 2 Performance: | 20 minutes | | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | _ Completion Time | | | | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | | | | |
| Evaluators Signatu | re: | Date: | | | | |



References

- A. N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test
- B. Unit 1 Technical Specifications
- C. NUREG 1123, 2.2.12 (4.1)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to use and comply with facility surveillance procedures. Given a partial copy of N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test, the candidate will review the results and identify any discrepancies.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-223002-01019, Perform N1-ST-Q5, Primary Containment Isolation Valves
 Operability Test
- b. K/A 2.2.12 (4.1) Knowledge of Surveillance Procedures

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Training Classroom

NMP1 NRC JPM SRO EC Page **3** of **8** December 2020



5. JPM Setup (if required)

- a. Ensure adequate marked up copies of N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test are available.
- b. Ensure Tech Specs are available
- c. Ensure calculators are available



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP1 NRC JPM SRO EC Page **5** of **8** December 2020



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Plant is operating at 100% power.
- N1-ST-Q6A has just been completed up to the Operations Review.
- You are the Shift Manager

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), using the completed surveillance provided, complete Section 10.2, SM Review. Record the results of your review and any required actions in the space below.

When completed, report findings to the Examiner.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used. |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure. Note: Evaluator is to provide the marked up copy of N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test, to the candidate. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: N1-ST-Q6A Obtained. General Test Methods, References / Commitments and the Precaution and Limitation reviewed. |
| 3. | Determines status of the completed surveillance. Reviews N1-ST-Q6A, Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability Test and identifies the following in the remarks section: | | |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 3a | Note: May inform examiner verbally of issues | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies At step 8.1.4.d, the opening stroke time is unsat. However, it is marked SAT in step 10.1.1.a. 10.1.1.a should be marked UNSAT for 80-16 C to O. |
| 3b | Note: May inform examiner verbally of issues | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies from the comments in section 10.2, 80-16 was stroked a second time which is not permitted per 4.8.1.b. The original opening time was outside the {IST value} which requires the valve immediately be declared inoperable and no retest be performed. |
| 3c | Note: Applicant may also identify the incorrect pressure listed from 8.2.39 was used in the calculation for 8.2.41. However, 8.2.41 remains SAT, regardless of the math error. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies math error in step 8.2.39. |
| 4. | Notify appropriate Plant Management. Cue: Acknowledge the information presented | | SAT / UNSAT STD: Notifies EXAMINER / Ops Director or designee of issues identified. |

| TASK | Determination of the status of this surveillance has been made with the | | |
|----------|---|--|--|
| STANDARD | following errors identified: | | |
| | Valve 80-16 UNSAT stroke time and non-permitted retest | | |
| | Math error in step 8.2.39 | | |

| STOP TIME |
|-----------|
|-----------|



JPM Handout

| CONDITIONS | Given: The Plant is operating at 100% power. N1-ST-Q6A has just been completed up to the Operations Review. You are the Shift Manager |
|------------|--|
| | N1-ST-Q6A has just been completed up to the Operations Review. You are the Shift Manager |

| INITIATING CUE | (Operators Name), using the completed surveillance provided, complete Section 10.2, SM Review. Record the results of your review and any required actions in the space below. |
|-------------------|---|
| | When completed, report findings to the Examiner. |



| Training Id: 20 | 20 NMF | P1 NRC RO Admin JPM EC | Revision: | 0.0 | | | |
|--|---------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|--|--|--|
| Title: RPS Manual Scram Electrical Print Reading | | | | | | | |
| Approvals: | | | | | | | |
| | | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> | | | |
| Developed By | | | Paul Isham | 1/31/20 | | | |
| Validated By | | | Jeremy Spring | 7/14/20 | | | |
| Facility Reviewe | r . | | | | | | |
| | Appro | ximate Duration: 15 | minutes | | | | |
| Documentation of Performance: | | | | | | | |
| Performer: | | | _ | | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | _ | | | | |
| Start Time: | | Stop Time: | Completion Time | | | | |
| | | Pass / Fail | | | | | |
| Comments: | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Evaluators Sig | gnature | : | Date: | | | | |



References

- 1. C-19859-C Sheet 7
- 2. NUREG 1123, 2.2.41 (3.5)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to use and interpret station electrical prints. Given an electrical print, the candidate must identify and explain the implications of depressing a manual scram pushbutton.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-212000-01016, Perform or Support Performance of N1-ST-W15, Manual and Automatic Scram Instrument Channel Test
- b. K/A 2.2.41 (3.5), Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Training Classroom



| JPM Setup (if required | 5. | JPM | Setup | (if | required |
|--|----|-----|-------|-----|----------|
|--|----|-----|-------|-----|----------|

a. Ensure adequate copies of C-19859-C Sheet 7 are available.



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

 This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP1 NRC JPM RO EC Page **5** of **9** November 2020



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

None

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), using station electrical prints, explain how depressing the RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton on E console results in an RPS channel 12 half scram. You may mark the provided prints and/or write the explanation on this sheet. Identify the electrical components that accomplish this action.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used. |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the necessary electrical print. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: C19859C Sheet 7 Obtained. |
| 3. | Using C-19859-C Sheet 7, locates RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton Note: This may be identified by either marking on the electrical print or writing the electrical print number and location on the response sheet. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Locates RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton (1S28) on C-19859-C Sheet 7 near drawing coordinate E-6 |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 4. | Using C-19859-C Sheet 7, identifies relay 12K55 Note: This may be identified by either marking on the electrical print or writing the electrical print number and location on the response sheet. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Locates relay 12K55 on C-19859-C Sheet 7 near drawing coordinate E-7 |
| 5. | Using C-19859-C Sheet 7, identifies contacts 12K55 Note: This may be identified by either marking on the electrical print or writing the electrical print number and location on the response sheet. Note: The candidate may also identify the contact near drawing coordinate N-2. This is satisfactory but not required, as the task did not require discussion of the backup scram. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Locates contact 12K55 on C-19859-C Sheet 7 near drawing coordinates F-2, H-2, J-2, and L-2 |
| 6. | Using C-19859-C Sheet 7, identifies relays/solenoids 305-139(B) Notes: This may be identified by either marking on the electrical print or writing the electrical print number and location on the response sheet. The candidate does not have to identify all eight solenoids/relays on this sheet, as long as a representative sample is identified and some indication is given that there are multiple solenoids/relays. | P | *PASS / FAIL STD: Locates relays/solenoids 305-139(B) on C-19859-C Sheet 7 near drawing coordinates F-5/6 through M-5/6 |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|---|
| 7. | Describes how depressing the RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton on E console results in an RPS half scram Note: The candidate does not have to match this description word-for-word, but must include all concepts in their description. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Describes the following: • Depressing RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton on E console causes relay 12K55 to de-energize. • Relay 12K55 de-energizing causes contacts 12K55 to open. • Contacts 12K55 opening causes solenoid/relay 305-139(B) to de-energize at each HCU. |

| TASK STANDARD | Relays and contacts affected by depressing RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton are identified on station electrical drawings and operation is explained. |
|------------------|---|
|------------------|---|

| STOP TIME | |
|-----------|--|
|-----------|--|



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: None | |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| | | |
| INITIATING | (Operators Name), using station electrical prints, explain how | |
| CUE | depressing the RPS 12 manual scram pushbutton on E console results in | |
| | an RPS channel 12 half scram. You may mark the provided prints and/or | |

that accomplish this action.

write the explanation on this sheet. Identify the electrical components

NMP1 NRC JPM RO EC Page **9** of **9** November 2020



| Training Id: 2020 NMP1 NRC RO-SRO Admin JPM RC | | <u>c</u> Revision: | 0.0 |
|--|--|--------------------------|-------------|
| | al Requirements and Heat S r Work in High Radiation A | | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | <u>Signature / Print</u> | ed Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/31/20 |
| Validated By | Dave N | Mason, Jason Quick | 7/14/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | | |
| A | 1! Approximate Duration: | 5/20 minutes (RO/SRO) | |
| Documentation of | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | · |
| Grade: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Comments: | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signat | ure: | Date: | |



References

- 1. RP-AA-10 RADIATION PROTECTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION
- 2. RP-AA-11- EXTERNAL DOSE CONTROL PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
- 3. RP-AA-12 INTERNAL DOSE CONTROL PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
- 4. RP-AA-203 EXPOSURE CONTROL AND AUTHORIZATION
- 5. RP-AA-403 ADMINISTRATION OF THE RADIATION WORK PERMIT PROGRAM
- 6. RP-AA-460 CONTROLS FOR HIGH AND LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREAS
- 7. RP-AA-460-001 CONTROLS FOR VERY HIGH RADIATION AREAS
- 8. SA-AA-111 HEAT STRESS CONTROL
- 9. NUREG 1123, 2.3.7 (3.5/3.6)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM is used to test knowledge in calculation of overall dose and control mechanisms to allow the operators to continue or perform work in high dose areas. This JPM tests basic mathematics and understanding of heat stress stay times and remaining dose limitations.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. GAP-RPP07-00002, Comply with administrative exposure limits
- b. K/A 2.3.7 (3.5/3.6), Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Training Classroom



- 5. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Ensure sufficient copies of the following procedures are available in the exam area:
 - RP-AA-10
 - RP-AA-11
 - RP-AA-12
 - RP-AA-203
 - RP-AA-403
 - RP-AA-460
 - RP-AA-460-001
 - SA-AA-111
 - b. Ensure calculators are available.
 - c. Provide survey map for EC Steam IV Rom



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

 This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The plant is at 100% power.
- A steam leak has developed in the Emergency Condenser Steam Isolation Valve Room.
- Entry into the room is required to assist Maintenance with repairing valve 39-15.
- An updated survey map is provided.
- RP will post the radiological boundary at the gate at the entrance to the ECIV room.
- Your current year-to-date exposure is 1800 mRem TEDE.
- You have not received any dose extension this year.
- Job conditions are as follows:
 - You will be performing Moderate Work for a total of 45 minutes at valve 39-15 (near circle 4 on the provided survey map).
 - The same workers will perform the whole job
 - You will be wearing a respirator.
 - You will be wearing work clothes plus vapor impermeable coveralls.
 - The wet bulb temperature in the room is 93°F.
 - The dry bulb temperature in the room is 95°F.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), address the radiological and heat stress aspects of performing this work, and record your findings on the provided scorecard.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used. |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedures and review / utilize the correct section of the procedures. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Associated procedures obtained |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 3. | Addresses radiological and heat stress aspects of working in EC Steam IV Room | | |
| 3a | Determines radiological classification of area. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines area is a Locked High Radiation Area (greater than OR equal to 1000 mrem/hr at 30 cm; < 500 Rad/hr at 1 meter) |
| 3b | Determines highest dose rate in the room and location. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: 2000 mrem/hr by smear 6 |
| 3c | Determines highest dose rate at the work location. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: 500 mrem/hr |
| 3d | Determines highest contamination level in the room and that location. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: 25000 dpm/100cm2 at location circle 5 |
| 3e | Determines contamination level at the work location. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: 5000 dpm/100cm2 |
| 3f | Determines expected dose for job. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: 375 mrem (500 mrem/hr x .75 hr) |
| 3g | Determines heat stress stay time. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: <15 minutes (SA-AA- 111, 4.2.1.3.C requires this be classified as High Work Rate) |

SRO Only: Provide SRO candidates with the SRO Only cue sheet. This completes the RO portion on the JPM.



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 4. | Determines dose extension required | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines annual exposure will exceed 2000 mRem dose control level. (1800 mRem + 375 mRem = 2175 mRem |
| 5. | Identifies proper form for dose extension | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: References RP-AA-203 and determines attachment 1 is the required form for dose extension |
| 6. | Determines required approvals for dose extension | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Identifies required approvals as the Work Group Supervisor and the RP Manager. |

| STOP TIME |
|-----------|
|-----------|



JPM Handout

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The plant is at 100% power.
- A steam leak has developed in the Emergency Condenser Steam Isolation Valve Room.
- Entry into the room is required to assist Maintenance with repairing valve 39-15.
- An updated survey map is provided.
- RP will post the radiological boundary at the gate at the entrance to the ECIV room.
- Your current year-to-date exposure is 1800 mRem TEDE.
- You have not received any dose extension this year.
- Job conditions are as follows:
 - You will be performing Moderate Work for a total of 45 minutes at valve 39-15 (near circle 4 on the provided survey map).
 - The same workers will perform the whole job
 - You will be wearing a respirator.
 - You will be wearing work clothes plus vapor impermeable coveralls.
 - The wet bulb temperature in the room is 93°F.
 - The dry bulb temperature in the room is 95°F.

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), address the radiological and heat stress aspects of performing this work, and record your findings on the provided scorecard.



Scorecard

| Answer the following when performing this task: |
|---|
| 1. |
| Classify the room based on radiation level (check one): |
| Radiation Area |
| ☐ High Radiation Area |
| ☐ Locked High Radiation Area |
| □ Very High Radiation Area |
| 2. |
| Designate the highest dose rate in the room and the location: |
| |
| |
| |
| 3. |
| Designate the dose rate at the work location: |
| |
| |
| 4. |
| Designate the highest contamination level in the area and the location: |
| Designate the highest contamination level in the area and the location. |
| |
| |
| 5. |
| Designate the contamination level at the work location: |
| |
| |
| |
| 6. |
| Designate the expected dose for the duration of the job: |
| |
| |
| |
| 7 |
| 7. |
| Designate the heat stress stay time: |
| |
| |
| |
| |



Examiner Scorecard. Do Not Provide to Applicant.

| Answer the following when performing this task: |
|---|
| 1. |
| Classify the room based on radiation level (check one): Radiation Area High Radiation Area Locked High Radiation Area Very High Radiation Area |
| 2. |
| Designate the highest dose rate in the room and the location: 2000 mrem/hr near the smear 6 |
| 3. |
| Designate the dose rate at the work location: 500 mRem/hr |
| 4. |
| Designate the highest contamination level in the area and the location: 25,000 dpm/100cm² at circle 5 |
| 5. |
| Designate the contamination level at the work location: 5,000 dpm/100cm ² |
| 6. |
| Designate the expected dose for the duration of the job: 375 mRem |
| 7. |
| Designate the heat stress stay time: <15 minutes |
| |



SRO Only Handout

Cue:

"(Operator's name), determine if a dose extension is required to perform this work. If no extension is required, identify the expected margin to the dose limit upon completion of the task. If an extension is required, identify the form required to be completed for the dose extension and the levels of approval needed for the dose extension. Record your findings on the scorecard below."

SRO Only Scorecard

| Answer the following when performing this task: |
|---|
| 1. |
| Is a dose extension required? |
| □ No (answer question 2 below only) |
| \square Yes (answer questions 3 and 4 below only) |
| 2. |
| Designate expected margin to dose limit upon completion of the job. |
| besignate expected margin to dose in the dost completion of the job! |
| |
| |
| |
| 3. |
| Identify the form required to be completed for the dose extension. |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| 4. |
| Check all appropriate boxes below for the approvals required for this dose extension. |
| |
| □ Work Group Supervisor |
| ☐ Radiation Protection Manager |
| ☐ Plant Manager |
| ☐ Site Vice President |
| |
| |



Examiner Scorecard. Do Not Provide to Applicant.

| 1, |
|---|
| Is a dose extension required? □ No (answer question 2 below only) ▼ Yes (answer questions 3 and 4 below only) |
| 2. |
| Designate expected margin to dose limit upon completion of the job. |
| N/A |
| 3. |
| Identify the form required to be completed for the dose extension. |
| RP-AA-203 Attachment 1 |
| 4. |
| Check all appropriate boxes below for the approvals required for this dose extension. |
| Work Group Supervisor Radiation Protection Manager □ Plant General Manager □ Site Vice President |



| Training Id: | 2020 NMI | P1 NRC SRO Admi | n JPM EP | Revision | : 0.0 |
|---------------------|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Title: Post- | Scenario | Emergency Eve | nt Classification | | |
| Approvals: | | | | | |
| | | <u>Signatur</u> | re / Printed Name | | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | , | | Pa | aul Isham | 01/31/2020 |
| Validated By | | | Da | ve Mason | 7/15/20 |
| Facility Review | wer | | | | |
| | Approx | ximate Duration: _ | 15 minutes | | |
| Documentat | ion of Pe | erformance: | | | |
| Performer: | | | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | | | |
| Start Time: | | Stop Time: | Completi Time | on | |
| Grade: | | Pass / Fail | | | |
| Comments: | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Evaluators : | Signature | e: | | Date: | |



References

- 1. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.4.29, (4.4)
- 2. EP-AA-1013
- 3. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 3
- 4. EP-AA-1013 Wallboard



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the SRO's knowledge of the emergency plan by having them determine any applicable EALs, post-scenario.
- b. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded *Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. NS-EP101-03005, Classify Emergency Events Requiring Emergency Plan Implementation
- b. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.4.29 (4.4), Knowledge of the Emergency Plan.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Classroom |
| Time Critical Task | Yes |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit 1 Simulator or Classroom

5. JPM Setup

- a. Provide a copy of EP-AA-1013 Addendum 3 Appendix 1, NMP1 Wallboard
- b. Provide a copy of the Shift Emergency Director book

NMP1 NRC JPM SRO EP Page **3** of **11** December 2020



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

 This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

None

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), based on the events that have just occurred, determine if the conditions warranted emergency classification. If so, determine the appropriate emergency classification. This is a time critical task. Your time starts now.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the Shift Manager ERO Guidebook and review/utilize the correct section | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Shift Emergency Director book is obtained |
| 3. | Reviews plant conditions and determines if emergency classification is warranted. Examiner Note: The listed EAL is the expected EAL based on scenario validation. If scenario deviates from the expected course, examiner discretion will be required to determine the actual classification. | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines an emergency classification is required. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|--|---------------------|--|
| 4 | Classifies the emergency for 2020 NRC Scenario #1. | Р | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Time difference below must be 15 minutes or less: | | STD: Determines the emergency classification level is General Emergency |
| | JPM start time: | | |
| | Time of Classification: | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | | | STD: Determines the Emergency Action Level (EAL) designator is RG1. |
| | | | (dose assessment indicates >1000 mRem TEDE at site boundary) |
| | | | |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|--|---------------------|---|
| 5 | Classifies the emergency for 2020 NRC Scenario #2. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines the |
| | Time difference below must be 15 minutes or less: | | emergency classification level is Alert |
| | JPM start time: | | |
| | Time of Classification: | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | | | STD: Determines the Emergency Action Level (EAL) designator is MA3. |
| | | | (An automatic Scram failed to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power >6% AND Manual/ARI actions taken at the reactor |
| | | | control console failed to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power >6%) |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|--|---------------------|--|
| | | | |
| 6 | Classifies the emergency for 2020 NRC Scenario #3. Time difference below must be 15 minutes or less: JPM start time: | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines the emergency classification level is Alert |
| | Time of Classification: | | *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines the Emergency Action Level (EAL) designator is FA1. (Any loss or any potential loss of either fuel clad barrier or RCS barrier) |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|---|---------------------|--|
| 7 | Classifies the emergency for 2020 NRC Scenario #4. | Р | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Time difference below must be 15 minutes or less: | | STD: Determines the emergency classification level is Alert. |
| | JPM start time: | | |
| | Time of Classification: | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Note: May also identify Unusual Event, HU4 due to the confirmed seismic event. | | STD: Determines the Emergency Action Level (EAL) designator is FA1. |
| | | | (Loss of RCS barrier) |
| | | | |
| 8 | Classifies the emergency for 2020 NRC Scenario #5. | Р | *PASS / FAIL |
| | | | STD: Determines the |
| | Time difference below must be 15 minutes or less: | | emergency classification level is Site Area Emergency |
| | JPM start time: | | |
| | Time of Classification: | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | | | STD: Determines the Emergency Action Level (EAL) designator is FS1. |
| | | | (Loss or potential loss of ANY two fission product barriers) |



| TERMINATING CUE | Emergency classification requirement is determined. |
|--------------------|---|
| STOP TIME | |



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: • None |
|-----------------------|---|
| INITIATING CUE | (Operators Name), based on the events that have just occurred, determine if the conditions warranted emergency classification. If so, determine the appropriate emergency classification. This is a time critical task. Your time starts now. |



| Training Id: 2020 NR | C NMP1 Simulator JPM S-1 | L Revision: | 0.0 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Shift Reactor E | Building Operating Exhaus | st and Supply Fans | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | | |
| Appr | roximate Duration:15 | minutes | |
| Documentation of Pe | erformance: | | |
| Performer: | | - | |
| Evaluator: | | - | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signature | : | Date: | |



- 1. N1-OP-10, Reactor Building Heating, Cooling, and Ventilating System
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 288000 A4.01, (3.1/2.9)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to operate the Reactor Building Ventilation System.
- b. This JPM is considered alternate path, because one of the newly started fans displays abnormal operating parameters which should prompt the operator to restore reactor building ventilation back to a functioning lineup.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*PASS/FAIL.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-288001-01002
- b. K/A 288000 A4.01, (3.1/2.9)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | Yes |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. Initialize simulator to IC-169
 - b. RX Building Supply and Exhaust Fans #11 in service.
 - c. RB VENT JPM SETUP
 - Event trigger set TRG 3 to ZDHVF02T==0
 - Overrides assigned to TRG 3 (Delete overrides when Supply Fan 12 switch is taken to STOP.)
 - DI-5485, RB Supply Fan 12 & Inlet Damper, ON
 - AO-1257, React Bldg supply Fan 12 AMP, Analog Value 1
 - DO-9525, Reactor Bldg Supply Fan 12 Green light OFF
 - DO-9526, Reactor Bldg Supply Fan 12 SLOW Red light ON
 - DO-9512, Reactor Bldg Supply Fan 12 Inlet Damper Green light OFF DT=10sec
 - DO-9513, Reactor Bldg Supply Fan 12 Inlet Damper Red light ON
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. No steps need to be marked up.

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM



Given:

 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan #11, and Reactor Building Supply Fan # 11 are in service.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), Place Reactor Building Exhaust and Supply Fans #12 in service IAW N1-OP-10 Section F.1.0 and F.2.0.

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | STD: N1-OP-10 obtained. Precautions & limitations reviewed & section F.1.0 and F.2.0 referenced. |
| 3. | Verify operating RX Building supply and | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | exhaust fans in SLOW. | P (Step 1.2.1) | STD: Visually observe REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 and REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 fans in SLOW red slow light illuminated. |
| 4. | Start REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 on | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | SLOW | P (Step 1.2.2) | STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 control switch CW to the slow position observe red slow light illuminated, green light off. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|--|---------------------|---|
| 5. | Confirm damper 202-07, REACTOR BLDG | Р | SAT / UNSAT |
| | EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET DAMPER open. | (Step 1.2.3) | STD: Observe 202-07 open red light on, green light off. |
| 6. | Stop REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11. | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | | P (Step 1.2.4) | STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 control switch CCW to the Off position. |
| 7. | Confirm damper 202-08, REACTOR BLDG | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER closed. P (Step 1.2.5) | | STD: Observe REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER closed green light on, red light off. |
| 8. | Confirm normal system flow. | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | | P (Step 1.3) | STD: Observe annunciator L1-2-5 RB VENT EXH FLOW LOW is clear. |
| 9. | Start REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 on | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | SLOW. | P (Step 2.2.2) | STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 control switch CW to the Slow position observe red slow light illuminated, green light off. |
| 10. | Confirm damper FCV 202-04, REACTOR | Р | SAT / UNSAT / NA |
| | BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 INLET DAMPER open. | (Step 2.2.3) | STD: Observe 202-04 open red light on, green light off |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|--|---|-------------|--|---|
| _ | Note: Candidate may not notice amps low and continue in procedure to secure Fan 11. There are 2 success paths. 1. Low amps identified after Supply Fan 12 start. Candidate performs steps 11,12,13 and 18, with step 13 a critical step. 2. Low amps not identified after Supply Fan 12 start. Candidate performs steps 14,15,16,17,18, with steps 16 and 17 as critical step. | | | |
| 11. Identify low amps on REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: Observe low amps on Fan 12 (5-10 amps) with Fan 11 amps remaining at normal (~30 amps). | |
| 12. | 12. Inform SM of low amps on REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12.Cue: As SM, concur and allow Fan 11 to remain in service. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: Recommend Fan 11 remains in service and Fan 12 be shutdown. |
| 13. | Secure REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12. Note: Booth operator, delete all overrides when Supply Fan 12 is secured. | | Р | *PASS / FAIL / NA STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 control switch CCW to the Off position. |
| 14. | Secure REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 Cue: If directed from L1-2-4 report the following: Heating Unit is tripped Inlet Filter differential pressure is normal | | P (Step 2.2.4) | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 control switch CCW to the Off position and observe red slow light off, green light illuminated. Observe annunciator L1-3-4 and L1-2-4 alarm Observe RB dp indication rises indicating high negative dp |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|---|---------------------|---|
| 15. | Report abnormal indication to SM Cue: As SM, concur and allow Fan 11 to be returned to service and Fan 12 to be shutdown. | | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: Recommend returning Fan 11 to service and securing Fan 12 |
| 16. | Start REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 on SLOW. Annunciators L1-3-4 and L1-2-4 clear RB dp indication returns to normal | | *PASS / FAIL / NA STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 control switch CW to the Slow position observe red slow light illuminated, green light off. |
| 17. | Secure REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 Note: Booth operator, delete all overrides when Supply Fan 12 is secured. Note: Applicant may reference the OP to secure fan 12 | | *PASS / FAIL / NA STD: Rotate REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 control switch CCW to the Off position and observe red slow light off, green light illuminated. |
| 18. Notify US/SM that REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 has been returned to service with normal dp and REACTOR BLDG supply FAN 12 is secured. Cue: Acknowledge report. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: Proper communications used. |
| Eval | Evaluator Note: Cue: Your task is complete. | | |

| TASK | Misoperation identified on Supply Fan 12. Supply Fan 11 is running with |
|----------|---|
| STANDARD | either Exhaust Fan 11 or 12 running. |

| STOP TIME |
|-----------|
|-----------|



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: • Reactor Building Exhaust Fan #11, and Reactor Building Supply Fan # 11 are in service. |
|-----------------------|--|
|-----------------------|--|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), Place Reactor Building Exhaust and Supply Fans #12 |
|------------|--|
| CUE | in service IAW N1-OP-10 Section F.1.0 and F.2.0. |



| Training Id: 2020 N | RC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-2 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Title: Shift Feedwa | ater Pressure and Level Cha | nnels | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/10/19 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Ар | proximate Duration: 20 | minutes | |
| Documentation of F | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signatu | re: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-OP-16, Feedwater System Booster Pump to Reactor
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 259002 A4.06, (3.1/3.2)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to locate and operate controls associated with Digital Feedwater Level Control. The operator will shift in-service pressure and level columns and shift to single element control.
- b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.
- Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-259002-01011, Shift Reactor Pressure / Level Columns and Feedwater Modes
- b. K/A 259002 A4.06, (3.1/3.2)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. A plant shutdown is in progress, <25% power.
 - b. Initialize simulator to IC 169
 - c. Channel 11 Pressure and Level columns are in service.
 - d. Feedwater is in automatic 3-element control
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. No steps need to be marked up.
 - b. Ensure adequate copies of N1-OP-16, F.10 and Precautions & Limitations are available.

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM



Given:

- A plant shutdown is in progress
- Reactor power is approximately 22%
- Per N1-OP-43C, Plant Shutdown, FWLC is required to be transferred to single element control.
- It is also desired to shift pressure and level columns

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), shift pressure and level columns to channel 12 and transfer feedwater to single element control per N1-OP-16 section F.10.

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and | Р | SAT / UNSAT |
| | review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | P | STD: N1-OP-16 obtained. |
| 3. | Place in service FCV Yokogawa in MANUAL if swapping level / pressure channels. | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | swapping level / pressure channels. | P (10.1) | STD: Depresses "M" on the in-service FCV, RMC-29-156, to place Feedwater in manual |
| 4. | Operate pressure keylock selector switch | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | TRS-36-101 as required to place desired channel in control AND verify corresponding light indication response. | P (10.2) | STD: At E Console, rotates TRS-36-101 clockwise to channel 12. Switch spring returns to normal. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 5. | Verify selected pressure channel ONLY light lit | | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes channel 12 |
| | Note: Both channel lights will be lit for a short period as the channel input is being transferred. Indicated level will also change slightly. | P (10.2.1) | light illuminate and channel 11 light extinguish |
| 6. | Operate level keylock selector switch TRS- 36-100 as required to place desired channel in control AND verify corresponding light indication response | P (10.3) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At E Console, rotates TRS-36-100 clockwise to channel 12. Switch spring returns to normal. |
| 7. | Verify selected level channel ONLY light lit | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Note: Both channel lights will be lit for a short period as the channel input is being transferred. | P (10.3.1) | STD: Observes channel 12 light illuminate and channel 11 light extinguish |
| 8. | Operate feedwater mode selector switch RMC-ID34 as required to place desired feedwater mode in control AND verify corresponding light indication response | P (10.4) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At E Console, rotates RMC-ID34, Single Element / Three Element Control Switch, CCW to "1". Switch spring returns to normal. |
| 9. | Verify selected feedwater mode ONLY light lit | P (10.4.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes single element light illuminate and three element light extinguish |
| 10. | IF FWLC was placed in MANUAL, adjust FW Master Yokogawa PV setpoint to match indicated level on selected level channel. | P (10.5) | SAT / UNSAT STD: If necessary, adjusts the in-service FCV setpoint to match indicated level. |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------------------|--|---|---------------------|--|
| 11. Place in serv | | vice FCV Yokogawa in AUTO | P (10.6) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Depresses "A" on the in-service FCV, RMC-29-156, to place Feedwater in automatic. |
| Evaluator Note: | | Cue: Your task is complete. | | |
| TASK STANDARD | | Reactor Pressure / Level Columns Feedwater Mode has been transfe | | |
| STOP TIME | | | | |



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS • A plant shutdown is in progress • Reactor power is approximately 22% • Per N1-OP-43C, Plant Shutdown, FWLC is required to be trans to single element control. • It is also desired to shift pressure and level columns | - erred |
|--|------------|
|--|------------|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), shift pressure and level columns to channel 12 and |
|------------|---|
| CUE | transfer feedwater to single element control per N1-OP-16 section F.10. |



| Training Id: 2020 | NRC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-3 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Title: Respond | to Recirculation Pump Seal Fail | lure (Alternate Pa | ath) |
| Approvals: | | - | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| | Approximate Duration: 20 r | minutes | |
| Documentation | of Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Evaluators Signa | ature: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-OP-1, NSSS
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 202001 A2.10, (3.5/3.9)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to respond to the catastrophic failure of a reactor recirculation pump's seals per N1-SOP-1.2, Recirc Pump Seal Failure.
- b. The JPM is considered alternate path because a spurious trip of the associated power board will occur while attempting to isolate the affected loop. The operator will be required to reenergize this bus to complete the task.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-202001-01011, Respond to a reactor recirculation pump seal failure
- b. K/A 202001 A2.10, (3.5/3.9)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform | |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | Yes | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. The reactor is in a power operating condition with 5 recirc loops in operation
 - b. Initialize simulator to IC 161
 - RR06D, RR Pump 14 Lower (Inner) Seal Failure, FV=50 Inserted
 - RR07D, RR Pump 14 Upper (Outer) Seal Failure, FV=10
 Inserted
 - ED12A, PB 16A Electrical Fault TRG 1
 - c. Verify the following event triggers:

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|---------|---|-----------|
| 1 | hzlrrv03c(4)==1 (True when 14 RRP Discharge MOV green light on) | blank |
| 2 | hzled601c==0 (True when R1041 red light off) | dmf ed12a |

- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. No steps need to be marked up.

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM



Given:

- 14 Reactor Recirculation Pump seal degradation is occurring
 - LP seal pressure < 425 psig OR > 625 psig at normal operating pressure.
- All five Recirculation Pumps are currently operating
- Drywell Floor Drain Leak rate has risen by 1.5 gpm

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), perform the actions for failure of both seals on 14 Reactor Recirculation Pump per N1-SOP-1.2, Recirc Pump Seal Failure.

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and | P | SAT / UNSAT |
| | review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | P | STD: N1-SOP-1.2 obtained. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 3. | Place the affected REACTOR RP MOTOR MG SET control switch to STOP Cue: Inform the operator that plant response (i.e. power, level, pressure, etc) will be monitored by other operators | P | *PASS / FAIL STD: Momentarily places REACTOR RP MOTOR 14 MG SET control switch CCW to the STOP position on F Panel. Verifies trip by observing associated red light off, green light on, as well as redundant instrumentation (flow, current, power, frequency, etc) |
| 4. | Give a close signal the associated REACTOR R PUMP BYPASS VALVE | P | *PASS / FAIL STD: Places REACTOR R PUMP 14 BYPASS VALVE control switch CCW to the CLOSE position and verifies valve closure by observing associated green light on, red light off on F Panel (may wait to perform the verification in step 15 or do it again per N1-SOP-1.2). |
| Alter Path | In the following step, both mot valves are NOT closed and alte | • | · |

NMP1 NRC JPM S-3 Page **6** of **11** December 2020



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 5. | Simultaneously close Suction AND Discharge Valves | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Simultaneously places and holds, REACTOR R PUMP 14 SUCTION VALVE and REACTOR R PUMP 14 DISCHARGE VALVE control switches CCW to the CLOSE position |
| 6. | Reports to Unit Supervisor that power is lost to REACTOR R PUMP 14 SUCTION VALVE and REACTOR R PUMP 14 DISCHARGE VALVE Cue: As SM/US, direct operator to carry out the ARP actions for annunciator A4-3-1, "POWER BD 16 R1041 TRIP" Role Play: Provides repeat back of direction | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices STD: Current version N1-ARP-A4-3-1 obtained and referenced per HU-AA-104-101, Procedure Use and Adherence |
| 7. | Confirm alarm on computer | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Consults alarm typer and observes E138, PB16A-SUP BK-R1041 TRIP displayed |
| 8. | Verify tripped R1041 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Verifies R1041 tripped by observing associated green light on, red light off on A Panel |



| | PERFORMANCE | | | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---------------|--|--------|---|---|---|
| 9. | | | loads on PB 17 as required JS, another operator will be | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | starting alternate loads on PB 17 | | Р | STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices | |
| Evalu Note | Evaluator Note | | Malfunction ED12A (PB 16A PB16A to be re-energized. | Electrical Fault) | auto deletes allowing |
| 10. | Verify | PB 16A | clear of faults | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: As SM/US, inform operator that the Electrical Maintenance supervisor, reported that PB 16A is clear of fath Maintenance accidently bumped in the powerboard with their tool can | | al Maintenance supervisor, has d that PB 16A is clear of faults. nance accidently bumped into | Р | STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices |
| 11. | Obtain SM perr | | mission to re-energize PB 16A | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: | - | grant permission to re- e PB 16A, using cross-tie · | Р | STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 12. | Note: After receiving the report that the powerboard is NOT faulted, the operator may opt to re-energize PB-16 using A4-4-2, and close breaker R1041 instead. This is an acceptable action to receive credit for this step. | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Closes A-B Tie Breaker 1042 (1041) by momentarily placing R 1042 (1041) control switch CW to the CLOSE position and verifies breaker closure by observing associated red light on, green light off, and PB 16A voltage indicated on A Panel |
| 13. | Cue: As SM/US, direct operator to complete the isolation of 14 reactor recirculation pump per SOP-1.2 Provide repeat back of direction | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices |
| 14. | Simultaneously close Suction AND Discharge Valves | P | *PASS / FAIL STD: Simultaneously places and holds REACTOR R PUMP 14 SUCTION VALVE and REACTOR R PUMP 14 DISCHARGE VALVE control switches CCW to the CLOSE position. Verifies both valves have closed by observing associated green lights illuminated and red lights extinguished on F Panel. |

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|---|--|---------------------|--|
| 15. | Verify 14 Rea valve is shut. | ctor Recirculation Pump Bypass | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Verifies valve closure by observing associated green light on, red light off on F Panel |
| Evalu Note | iator | Another Control Room Operato Zone. | r will verify prox | ximity to the Restricted |
| 16. | verify Zone | er Control Room Operator will proximity to the Restricted rovide repeat back | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices |
| 17. | 17. Reports 14 reactor recirculation pump has been shutdown and isolated per SOP-1.2 Role Play: Acknowledge report | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used IAW HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices |
| Evaluator Note: Cue: Your task is complete. | | | | |
| | | Reactor Recirculation Pump 14 ha SOP-1.2, Recirc Pump Seal Failure | | n and isolated per N1- |
| STOP TIME | | | | |



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: • 14 Reactor Recirculation Pump seal degradation is occurring • LP seal pressure < 425 psig OR > 625 psig at normal operating pressure. |
|-----------------------|--|
| | All five Recirculation Pumps are currently operating Drywell Floor Drain Leak rate has risen by 1.5 gpm |

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), perform the actions for failure of both seals on 14 Reactor Recirculation Pump per N1-SOP-1.2, Recirc Pump Seal Failure.



| Training Id: 2020 NF | RC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-4 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Title: Place Contair | nment Spray in Torus Coolin | g (Alternate Pat | h) |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | | Jason Quick | 7/15/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Арј | proximate Duration: 15 i | minutes | |
| Documentation of P | erformance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signatur | e: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-EOP-1, Attachment 16
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 219000, A4.02, (3.7/3.5)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to manipulate the containment spray system into Torus Cooling mode in an emergency.
- b. This JPM is considered alternate path because 80-118, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV will fail to open. N1-EOP-1, Attachment 16 provides direction to the operator in the event this happens.
- Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-226001-01016, Perform cooling of Torus water temperature using Containment Spray
- b. K/A 219000, A4.02, (3.7/3.5)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform | |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | Yes | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. Initialize Simulator to IC 162
 - b. Verify failure to scram conditions result in Torus water temperature high (~160°F).
 - c. Ensure all Recirc pump are tripped.
 - d. Verify the following overrides are preset:
 - DI-4724 on (Indication 80-118 fails to open)
 - DI-4725 off (Indication 80-118 fails to open)
 - e. Verify DW cooling fans are tripped.
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. No steps need to be marked up.

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM



Given:

- A high power ATWS has occurred.
- An RPV Blowdown has been performed due to exceeding HCTL.
- Torus water temperature is approximately 150°F and rising.
- All DW cooling fans are tripped.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), place Containment Spray loop 111 in Torus Cooling per N1-EOP-1 attachment 16.

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review/utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: N1-EOP-1 attachment 16 obtained |
| 3. | Close 80-45 CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV 122 | P (Step 3.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Closes 80-45 by rotating control switch CCW to CLOSE |
| 4. | Verify closed 80-115, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 | P (Step 3.3) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 80-115 green light on, red light off |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| 5. | Verify closed 80-114, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 | | P (Step 3.4) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 80-114 green light on, red light off |
| 6. | Verify closed 80-16, CONT SPRAY DISCHARGE IV 111 | | P (Step 3.5) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Closes 80-16 by rotating control switch CCW to CLOSE |
| 7. | Verify open 80-40, CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV 111 | | P (Step 3.6) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 80-40 green light off, red light on |
| Alter | nate Path | The following step reveals the alter | rnate path. Valv | ve 80-118 will fail to open |
| 8. | Note: 80- alternate p | 118 will fail to open, creating the | P (Step 3.7) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Attempts to open 80-118 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|---|
| 9. | IF 80-118 fails closed OR can NOT be opened AND the following conditions exist: • Torus cooling is required to establish adequate NPSH for Containment/Core Spray AND • Inside the Containment Spray Initiation Limit (Fig K) THEN perform the following: Cue: Once Candidate recognizes that 80-118 cannot be opened, inform them that Torus cooling is required to preserve | P | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines from cue that Torus cooling is required SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines conditions are inside the Containment Spray Initiation Limit |
| 10. | Containment Spray and Core Spray NPSH. Close the following IF opened in Step 3.6: • 80-44 • 80-41 | P (Step 3.8.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines 80-44 and 80-41 were not |
| 11. | Reopen the Cont Spray Discharge IV that was closed in Step 3.5 | P (Step 3.8.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 80-16 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 12. | Reopen Cont spray BYPASS BVs closed in Step 3.2 | P (Step 3.8.3) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 80-45 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 13. | Trip all Drywell Cooling Fans | P (Step 3.8.4) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Recognizes tripped based on initial conditions or visual inspection. |

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|------------------|---|-----------------------------|---------------------|--|
| 14. | Verify all Reactor Recirc Pumps are tripped | | P (Step 3.8.5) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes all 5 Recirc pump green lights on, red lights off |
| 15. | Start either: CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 111 and 112 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 111 and 112 OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121 and 122 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 121 and 122 | | P (Step 3.8.6) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Starts one of the following groups of pumps by rotating control switches CW to START: • CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 111 and 112 • CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 111 and 112 OR • CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121 and 122 • CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 121 and 122 • CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 121 and 122 |
| Evaluator Note: | | Cue: Your task is complete. | | |
| TASK STANDARD | | Torus cooling is initiated. | | |
| STOP | TIME | | | |



| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: A high power ATWS has occurred. An RPV Blowdown has been performed due to exceeding HCTL. Torus water temperature is approximately 150°F and rising. All DW cooling fans are tripped. |
|-----------------------|--|
| | All DW cooling fans are tripped. |

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), place Containment Spray loop 111 in Torus Cooling |
|------------|---|
| CUE | per N1-EOP-1 attachment 16. |



| Training Id: 2020 N | MP1 NRC Simulator JPM S-5 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Alternate RP Title: (Alternate Pa | V Blowdown Through the R th) | eactor Head Vent | Valves |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/19/19 |
| Validated By | | Jason Quick | 7/15/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Арј | proximate Duration: 15 | minutes | |
| Documentation of P | erformance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signatur | e: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 2. N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- 3. NUREG 1123 K/A 239001 A2.09, (3.4/3.7)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to operate major EC System valves to reduce RPV pressure via alternate methods.
- b. This JPM is considered alternate path because the normal method of RPV blowdown will be determined to be unavailable. The operator will be required to recognize alternate blowdown systems will be required to depressurize the RPV via alternate methods, in accordance with N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded **Pass/Fail**.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-EOP-1-01001, Implement NMP1 EOP Support Procedure (PRA)
- b. K/A 239001 A2.09, (3.4/3.7)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | Yes |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. The reactor is in a shutdown condition (Post-scram)
 - b. Initialize simulator to IC 163
 - c. Verify the following malfunctions are inserted
 - AD07B, ERV 112 FAILS CLOSED (Burned Out Solenoid)
 - AD07C, ERV 113 FAILS CLOSED (Burned Out Solenoid)
 - AD07D, ERV 121 FAILS CLOSED (Burned Out Solenoid)
 - AD07E, ERV 122 FAILS CLOSED (Burned Out Solenoid)
 - AD07F, ERV 123 FAILS CLOSED (Burned Out Solenoid)
 - MS03A, ONE MSIV FAILS CLOSED (VALVE 122)
 - MS03B, ONE MSIV FAILS CLOSED (VALVE 112)
 - TC12, ALL BYPASS VALVES FAIL CLOSED (0-100%), FV=100
 - d. Verify RPV pressure is at least 72 psi above torus pressure
 - e. Override BOJM switch closed.
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. No steps need to be marked up.

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The reactor has been scrammed
- MSIVs are closed
- RPV Blowdown is required

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), commencing an RPV Blowdown. Initiate Emergency Condensers and open 4 ERVs.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Initiate Emergency Condensers as follows: | | |
| a. | Place 39-05, EMERG CNDSR RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 control switch to OPEN Note: It is not necessary to reference N1-EOP-8 since this action is normally directed by the US. Candidate may pull EOP Hardcard Att 9 | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates 39-05, EMERG CNDSR RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 control switch CW to OPEN |
| b. | Place 39-06, EMERG CNDSR RET ISOLATION VALVE 12 control switch to OPEN | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates 39-06, EMERG CNDSR RET ISOLATION VALVE 12 control switch CW to OPEN |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|------|--|--|---------------------|--|
| 3. | Opens ERV 111 Note: All other ERVs will fail to open when attempted. | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates ERV 111 control switch CW to OPEN, observes green and blue lights off, both red lights on |
| Alte | rnate Path | The alternate path begins when the normal RPV Blowdown method fails. The operator will need to recognize the use of alternate blowdown systems is required to complete the task. Once the operator recognizes Detail 'O' from N1-EOP-8 must be used, the evaluator will cue which alternate blowdown option to use; N1-EOP-1, Attachment 22. | | |
| 4. | Attempts to open ERVs 112, 113, 121, 122, and 123 | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Rotates control switches for ERVs 112, 113, 121, 122, and 123 CW to OPEN, observes green and blue lights off, both red lights off |
| 5. | Reports only ERV 111 is open and determines alternate blowdown systems must be used. Cue: Acknowledge report. If necessary, have the applicant make a recommendation for completing the emergency depressurization. When the applicant makes the determination that alternate blowdown methods from Detail 'O' of N1-EOP-8 must be used, direct the applicant to depressurize the RPV using the Reactor Head Vents per N1-EOP-1, Attachment 22. | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: The critical portion of this step is related to the applicant recognizing the failure of the normal RPV blowdown method, and the requirement of the use of alternate blowdown systems to complete the emergency depressurization. |
| 6. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review/utilize the correct section | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: N1-EOP-1 obtained, Attachment 22 referenced |
| N | Note: The remaining JPM steps are from N1-EOP-1, Attachment 22. | | | iment 22. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 7. | Unlock AND close motor breaker 37-01, REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE 11, PB 171B (East Wall) Evaluator cue: When requested as in-plant operator, insert remote ED68, Reactor Head Vent Valve, and report breaker 37-01 is closed. | P (3.1.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Dispatches in-plant operator to close breaker 37-01 at PB 171B |
| 8. | Open Reactor Head Vents: Open 37-01, REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE 11. (Panel F) Open 37-06, DRYWELL FLOODING VENT BV (Panel J). | P (3.1.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotate 37-01 control switch CW to Open. Spring return to normal. *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotate 37-06 control switch CW to Open. Spring return to normal. |
| 9. | IF Reactor Head Vent CANNOT be opened AND executing SAP-1 | P (3.2) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines step 3.2 does not need to be performed. |
| 10. | Lineup EC vents to Main Condenser as follows: Open Main Turbine Bypass Valves at Panel A using BOJM. | P (3.3.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Attempts to open TBVs using BOJM at Panel A. |
| 11. | IF Main Turbine Bypass Valves CANNOT be opened, THEN open 02-03 DRAIN VALVE TO CONDENSER, at Panel N Note: The Turbine Bypass Valves will fail to open. | P (3.3.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 02-03 DRAIN VALVE TO CONDENSER, by depressing associated button at Panel N. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 12. | Verify open the following Emergency Condenser Vents at Panel K: | P (3.3.3) | |
| 12a | 05-02, EMERG COND VENT TO MN STM ISOLATION VALVE 11 | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates 05-02 control switch CW to OPEN, observes red light on, green light off |
| 12b | 05-11, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 05-11 red light on and green light off |
| 12c | 05-01R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 111 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 05-01R red light on and green light off |
| 12d | 05-03, EMERG COND VENT TO MN STM ISOLATION VALVE 12 | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates 05-03 control switch CW to OPEN, observes red light on, green light off |
| 12e | 05-04R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 121 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 05-04R red light on and green light off |
| 12f | 05-12, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 122 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 05-12 red light on and green light off |
| 13. | Reports that the Reactor is being depressurized using the Emergency Condenser vents to the Main Condenser | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|------|--|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Eva | luator Cue: | Your task is complete. | | |
| | TASK STANDARD The RPV is being depressurized through the Emergency Condensers, all available ERVs and the Reactor Head Vents. | | | gency Condensers, all |
| STOP | TIME | | | |



| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: The reactor has been scrammed MSIVs are closed RPV Blowdown is required |
|-----------------------|---|
|-----------------------|---|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), commencing an RPV Blowdown. Initiate Emergency |
|------------|--|
| CUE | Condensers and open 4 ERVs. |



| Training Id: 2020 N | IRC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-6 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Title: Place 11 Sh | utdown Cooling Loop in Service | e (Alternate Pa | ıth) |
| Approvals: | ataowii dooiiiig 200p iii bei viet | o (Anternate i a | |
| • | Signature / Printed Na | <u>me</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Aı | oproximate Duration: 20 min | nutes | |
| Documentation of | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: C | ompletion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signatu | re: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-OP-4, Shutdown Cooling System
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 205000, A4.01, (3.7/3.7)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to operate the SDC system. The operator will attempt to put SDC system 11 in service.
- b. This JPM is considered alternate path because shortly after a SDC pump is started, it will trip. The operator will be expected to make a recommendation, based on plant conditions, to place 12 SDC loop in service.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded *Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-205000-01002
- b. K/A 205000, A4.01, (3.7/3.7)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | Yes |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. Initialize simulator to IC 168
 - b. Verify SDC temperature recorder on.
 - c. Update 70-49, 70-54, and 70-58 status to "4".
 - d. Verify recirc suction temperature is displayed (computer point A427).
 - e. Verify SDC is removed from service (TCVs closed, pumps secured, IVs closed, inlet BVs closed).
 - f. Verify SDC Pump 13 in PTL and info/caution tagged
 - g. Verify SDC 13 suction valve is info/caution tagged (38-05)
 - h. Verify Malfunction SC01C inserted
 - i. Verify Malfunction SC01A on TRG 1 with 30 second TD
 - j. Verify TRG 1 condition is "ZDSCPSTR(1)==1"
 - k. Verify the following remotes are preset:
 - SC01 = close
 - SC02 = installed
 - SC03 = close
 - I. Verify remotes SC04A(B)(C) = 100% are preset.
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. N1-OP-4, E.3.1 marked complete.

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Reactor is shutdown with all control rods inserted.
- Reactor pressure is less than 120 psig.
- N1-OP-4 has been completed through step E.3.1 for placing Shutdown Cooling in service.
- Shutdown Cooling has been filled and vented within the last 24 hours and does not require further filling or venting.
- Shutdown Cooling IV fuses/breakers have been installed.
- Cooling Water has been placed in service per section E.2.0
- SDC pump 13 is OOS for maintenance.
- Reactor water level is being monitored by another operator.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), place Shutdown Cooling loop 11 in service per N1-OP-4 starting at step E.3.2.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: N1-OP-4 obtained, precautions & limitations reviewed, & section E.3.0 referenced |
| 3. | Open the following valves: (Step 3.2) | | |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|--|---------------------|--|
| 3a. | 38-03, SDC VALVE 11 PUMP SUCTION | P (Step E.3.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-03 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 3b. | 3b. 38-04, SDC VALVE 12 PUMP SUCTION (Step | | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-04 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 3c. | 38-05, SDC VALVE 13 PUMP SUCTION Note: Candidate may request an SQR one-time procedure change be processed before proceeding. Cue: If SQR one-time procedure change is requested, inform the Operator that the step can be left open and to proceed. | P (Step E.3.2) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Recognizes 38-05 is tagged closed |
| 4. | Fill AND vent the SDC System by performing the following: | P (Step 3.3) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines fill and vent not required due to initial conditions |
| 5. | Verify all rods inserted UNLESS directed by EOPs | P (Step 3.4) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines all rods are inserted per initial conditions or simulator setup |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 6. | IF SDC IV fuses AND breakers have NOT been installed, THEN perform the following: | P (Step 3.5) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines SDC IV fuses and breakers have been installed per initial conditions or simulator setup |
| 7. | Open IV-38-02, SDC SYSTEM IN IV 12 (OUTSIDE) | P (Step 3.6) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-02 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 8. | WHEN Reactor pressure is less than 120 psig, un-isolate Shutdown Cooling System as follows: | P (Step 3.7) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines Reactor pressure is less than 120 psig per initial conditions or simulator setup |
| 8a | Monitor Reactor vessel level | P (Step 3.7.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines another operator is monitoring Reactor water level per initial conditions |
| 8b | IF Reactor vessel level begins to go down WHILE un-isolating Shutdown Cooling System, THEN isolate Shutdown Cooling System AND determine cause of reduction in Reactor Vessel level | P (Step 3.7.2) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines Reactor water level is stable in subsequent steps |
| 8c | Open 38-13, SDC SYSTEM OUT IV 1 (INSIDE) | P (Step 3.7.3) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-13 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|--|---|---|
| 8d | Open 38-01, SDC SYTEM IN IV 11 (INSIDE) | P (Step 3.7.4) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-01 by rotating control switch CW to OPEN |
| 9. | Vent Shutdown Cooling pumps using the following valves: | P (step 3.8) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines venting not required due to initial conditions |
| 10. | Vent heat exchangers using the following valves: | P (Step 3.9) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines venting not required due to initial conditions |
| 11. | Verify open the following valves: 38-134, SDC PUMP RECIRC VALVE 11 38-131, SDC PUMP RECIRC VALVE 12 38-128, SDC PUMP RECIRC VALVE 13 Note: Candidate may disregard 38-128 because the associated pump is tagged out. | P (Step 3.10) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes green light off, red light on for all |
| 12. | Start 11 SDC Pump as follows: (Step 3.11) | Note: Pump Seal was NOT discovered de-staged (Step 3.11.2) | |
| 12a | Verify Cooling Water in Service per N1-OP-4 Section E | P (Step 3.11.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines this is already complete per the initial conditions. |

| | PERFORMANCE | | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|--|--|----------------------|---|
| 12b | Verify SD COOLING TCV 11 manual controller selected for zero output demand | | P (Step 3.11.3.a) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes SD COOLING TCV 11 manual controller selected for zero output demand |
| 12g | g Place 11 SDC Pump Control Switch in START UNTIL 11 SDC PUMP running light is lit | | P (Step 3.11.3.b) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Starts SDC pump 11 by rotating control switch CW to START |
| Alter | Alternate Path 11 SDC pump will fail, initiating the alte | | e alternate path | |
| 13. | Open respective SD Cooling TCV approximately 10% for selected SDC Loop: • 38-09, SD COOLING TCV 11 NOTE: 1 minute after 11 SDC pump in service, verify tripped 11 SDC pump (event trigger). Alarm K3-1-1, SDC Pump 11 trip, comes in on the pump trip. The alarm response procedure gives direction to start another pump. | | P (Step 3.11.4) | *PASS / FAIL / NA STD: Opens 38-09 by rotating knurled knob CW Note: Step may be NA if pump trips prior to executing. |
| | Cue: If applicant does not make a recommendation to place another SDC pump in service, ask "What would you recommend?". Role Play: If candidate asks about normalizing SDC loop 11, tell them to leave SDC loop 11 as is. | | | |
| 14. | . Start 12 SDC Pump as follows: (Step 3.11) Note: Pump Seal was NOT discover de-staged (Step 3.11.2) | | | |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|----------------------|---|
| 14a | Verify SD COOLING TCV 12 manual controller selected for zero output demand | P (Step 3.11.3.c) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes SD COOLING TCV 12 manual controller selected for zero output demand |
| 14c | Place 12 SDC Pump Control Switch in START UNTIL 12 SDC PUMP running light is lit (Step 3.11.2.0) | P (Step 3.11.3.d) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Starts SDC pump 12 by rotating control switch CW to START |
| 15. | Open respective SD Cooling TCV approximately 10% for selected SDC Loop: 38-10, SD COOLING TCV 12 | P (Step 3.11.4) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 38-10 by rotating knurled knob CW |
| 16. | If reactor water flashing occurs in SDC System, reduce reactor water flow via selected SDC cooling TCV and maximize RBCLC cooling water flow. Cue: No flashing observed. | P (Step 3.11.5) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Pump amp indicator observed as steady. |
| 17. | Adjust SDC COOLING TCV 12 for gradual warmup of the system. NOTE: Operator will monitor temperatures on panel recorder. NOTE: Operator may choose not to make any further adjustments based on the rate at which the loop is warming up with 38-10 10% open. Cue: Tell operator no further adjustments in the system are required. | P (Step 3.11.6) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Rotate knob on controller 38-10 CW or CCW as required for a gradual warmup as indicated on 38-136B. |



STOP TIME

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|---|---------------------|-------------------|
| 18. | Inform SM SDC Loop 12 in service | | P | SAT / UNSAT |
| Cue: Acknowledge report | | · | | |
| Evaluator Note: | | Cue: Your task is complete. | | |
| | | Applicant recognizes failure of Sho Cooling Loop 12 placed in service. | _ | Pump 11. Shutdown |



| | - |
|--------------------|---|
| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: The Reactor is shutdown with all rods in. Reactor pressure is less than 120 psig. N1-OP-4 has been completed through step E.3.1 for placing Shutdown Cooling in service. Shutdown Cooling has been filled and vented within the last 24 hours and does not require further filling or venting. Shutdown Cooling IV fuses/breakers have been installed. Cooling Water has been placed in service per section E.2.0 SDC pump 13 is OOS for maintenance. |
| | Reactor water level is being monitored by another operator. |
| | 1 - Reactor frater level is being monitored by another operator. |

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), place Shutdown Cooling loop 11 in service per N1- |
|------------|---|
| CUE | OP-4 starting at step E.3.2. |



| Training Id: 2020 NI | RC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-7 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Title: Channel 11 I | Non-Coincident Scram Test | | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | - | Dave Mason | 7/13/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Ар | proximate Duration: 20 | minutes | |
| Documentation of F | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signatur | re: | Date: | |



- 1. N1-ST-R4, Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel, Shutdown and Scram Dump Volume Level Scram Bypass Instrument Channel Test
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 215004 A4.05, (3.1/3.2)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to operate back panel equipment associated with neutron monitoring. The operator will generate a scram signal using SRMs.
- b. This JPM is considered NOT alternate path.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. NS-OPS-01007
- b. K/A 215004 A4.05, (3.1/3.2)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. The reactor is in cold shutdown condition with the Mode Switch in Refuel
 - b. Initialize simulator to IC 168
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Provide sufficient copies of N1-ST-R4, section 8.5. Also include P&Ls and completed Prerequisites.

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The reactor is in a shutdown condition with the mode switch in RFFUEL.
- Non-Coincident Scram testing is to be performed on SRM 11 for Post-Maintenance Testing.
- No personnel are working in the CRD Accumulator area.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), perform N1-ST-R4 Section 8.5, Channel 11 and 12 Non-Coincident Scram Test, for SRM 11 only, steps 8.5.1 through 8.5.13.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | STD: N1-ST-R4 obtained. |
| 3. | Verify RPS clear of half scrams. | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | | P (8.5.1) | STD: Observes channel 11 and 12 white scram lights lit on F Panel. |
| 4. | IF personnel are working in CRD Accumulator area, THEN notify personnel a full scram is to | P | SAT / UNSAT |
| | be initiated. | (8.5.2) | STD: Determines step NA per initial conditions. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|---|---------------------|--|
| 5. | Place REFUEL INST. TRIP BYPASS 11 switch on M Panel to NON-COINCIDENT position. | P (8.5.3) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At M Panel, rotate keylock switch for Refuel Inst Trip Bypass 11 CW to Non-Coincident |
| 6. | Place REFUEL INST. TRIP BYPASS 12 switch on M Panel to NON-COINCIDENT position. | P (8.5.4) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At M Panel, rotate keylock switch for Refuel Inst Trip Bypass 12 CW to Non-Coincident |
| 7. | Place SRM 11 Mode Selector switch to PERIOD. | P (8.5.5) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At G Panel, rotates SRM 11 Mode Selector Switch CCW to Period. |
| 8. | Place RESET switch to RAMP AND release | P (8.5.6) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At G Panel, rotates the RESET switch CCW to RAMP, then releases. |
| 9. | Place AND hold RAMP switch to FIXED. | P (8.5.7) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At G Panel, holds RAMP switch CW to FIXED while observing LOG RATE meter indication rising. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 10. | WHEN LOG RATE meter indicates greater than 5 x 10 ⁵ CPS, THEN confirm the following: • Annunciator F1-3-1, RPS CH 11 MAN REACTOR TRIP – alarmed [T/S] • Annunciator F1-4-1, RPS CH 11 REFUEL INST TRIP – alarmed • Annunciator F4-3-8, RPS CH 12 MAN REACTORTRIP – alarmed [T/S] • Channel 11 White SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS lights at M Panel - off • Channel 11 SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS white lights at F Panel - off • Channel 11 Red B.U. SCRAM S.D.V. VENT & DRAIN VALVE light at F Panel – off • Computer Point W022, ***RPS CH11 MAN RX TRIP - YES • Channel 12 White SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS lights at M Panel - off • Channel 12 SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS white lights at F Panel – off • Channel 12 Red B.U. SCRAM S.D.V. VENT & DRAIN VALVE light at F Panel – off • Channel 12 Red B.U. SCRAM S.D.V. VENT & DRAIN VALVE light at F Panel – off • Computer Point W068, ***RPS CH12 MAN RX TRIP – YES Note: The RAMP switch will need to be released in order to verify the proper plant response on F and E panels. The applicant may request direction. If so, direct the applicant to release the RAMP switch to verify appropriate plant response. The alarms will continue flashing until acknowledged. | P (8.5.8) | STD: Verfifies appropriate scram signal indications per step 8.5.8. |
| 11. | Release RAMP switch | P (8.5.9 | SAT / UNSAT STD: Releases RAMP switch and allows switch to return to its normal position. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 12. | Place SRM 11 Mode Switch to OPERATE | P (8.5.10) | *PASS / FAIL STD: At G panel, rotates SRM 11 Mode Selector Switch CW to OPERATE |
| 13. | Reset any SRM 11 (SRM 12) alarms. | P (8.5.11) | SAT / UNSAT STD: At G Panel, rotates RESET switch CW to TRIP and releases |
| 14. | IF Scram Dump Volume High Level Automatic Scram is indicated (ANN F1-1-8 AND/OR F4-1-1), THEN perform the following: Note: This condition is not expected. These steps are expected to be NA | | |
| 14a | Place SCRAM DISCHARGE VOL HIGH LEVEL BYPASS CH 11-1/12-1 switch to BYPASS. | P (8.5.12) | SAT / UNSAT /NA STD: On F Panel, rotates SCRAM DISCHARGE VOL HIGH LEVEL BYPASS CH 11- 1/12-1 switch CW to BYPASS |
| 14b | Place SCRAM DISCHARGE VOL HIGH LEVEL BYPASS CH 11-2/12-2 switch to BYPASS. | P (8.5.12) | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: On F Panel, rotates SCRAM DISCHARGE VOL HIGH LEVEL BYPASS CH 11- 2/12-2 switch CW to BYPASS |
| 14c | Reset Reactor Scram | P (8.5.12) | SAT / UNSAT / NA STD: On F Panel, depresses REACTOR TRIP RESET pushbutton and releases. |

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|---|---------------------|--|
| 15. | Depress REACTOR TRIP RESET pushbutton at E panel AND confirm the following: • Annunciator F1-3-1, RPS CH 11 MAN REACTOR TRIP - clear • Annunciator F1-4-1, RPS CH 11 REFUEL INST TRIP - clear • Annunciator F4-3-8, RPS CH 12 MAN REACTOR TRIP - clear • Channel 11 White SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS lights at M Panel - lit • Channel 11 SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS white lights at F Panel - lit • Channel 11 Red B.U. SCRAM S.D.V. VENT & DRAIN VALVE light at F Panel - lit • Computer Point W022, ***RPS CH11 MAN RX TRIP - NO • Channel 12 White SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS lights at M Panel - lit • Channel 12 SCRAM SOLENOID GROUPS white lights at F Panel - lit • Channel 12 Red B.U. SCRAM S.D.V. VENT & DRAIN VALVE light at F Panel - lit • Computer Point W068, ***RPS CH12 MAN RX TRIP - NO | P (8.5.13) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Verfifies appropriate scram signal indications have cleared per step 8.5.13. |
| Evalu | Evaluator Note: Cue: Your task is complete. | | |

| TASK | N1-ST-R4 Section 8.5, Channel 11 and 12 Non-Coincident Scram Test has |
|----------|---|
| STANDARD | been completed for SRM 11. |

| STOP TIME | |
|-----------|--|
|-----------|--|



| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: The reactor is in a shutdown condition with the mode switch in REFUEL. Non-Coincident Scram testing is to be performed on SRM 11 for Post-Maintenance Testing. No personnel are working in the CRD Accumulator area. |
|-----------------------|--|
|-----------------------|--|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), perform N1-ST-R4 Section 8.5, Channel 11 and 12 |
|------------|---|
| CUE | Non-Coincident Scram Test, for SRM 11 only, steps 8.5.1 through 8.5.13. |



| Training Id: 2020 N | IRC NMP1 Simulator JPM S-8 | _ Revision: | 0.0 |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Title: EDG 103 Co | ontrol Room Start Following S | tation Blackout | |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printed N | <u>lame</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/3/20 |
| Validated By | | Jeremy Spring | 7/15/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| Aı | pproximate Duration:15 n | ninutes | |
| Documentation of | Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: Comments: | Pass / Fail | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Signature: | | Date: | |



- 1. N1-OP-45, Emergency Diesel Generators
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295003 AA1.02, (4.2/4.3)



A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to operate the Emergency Diesel Generator and associated electric plant controls from the control room.
- b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded*Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-264000-01004
- b. K/A 295003 AA1.02, (4.2/4.3)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Perform |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Evaluation Location | Simulator |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location



- 5. Simulator Setup (if required)
 - a. The reactor is in a SBO condition
 - b. Initialize simulator to IC 164
 - Mode switch in Shutdown
 - Malfunctions ED01A, ED02A, EG01, DG01A, DG01B all inserted
 - AFTER at least 3:00 minutes, delete malfunction **DG01B**, DG 103 Fail To Start (Man and Auto), to allow a restart from the control room.
 - Ensure only one EC is in service.
- 6. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Provide sufficient copies of N1-OP-45, section H.19.

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

- · A Station Blackout has occurred
- N1-SOP-33A.2 Station Blackout is being implemented
- EDG 102 troubleshooting is in progress
- EDG 103 trouble shooting is complete and repairs have been made
- EDG 103 is now available and ready to return to service

Instructor / Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), Perform a control room start of EDG 103 and energize PB 103 from the EDG 103, per N1-OP-45 section H.19.0.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: 3 way communications are conducted |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Current version of procedure obtained. Precautions & limitations are reviewed. |
| 3. Verify the following for EDG 103: | | | |
| 3.1 | Power Board 103 is de-energized. | P (H.19.1.1) | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observe PB 103 AC VOLTS indicate 0 on A Panel. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|--|
| 3.2 | Normal Supply BKR R1013, PB 103 in PULL TO LOCK. Alarm A5-1-2, Trans 101S Aux Fdr 1013 R1013 Trip clears | P (H.19.1.2) | *PASS / FAIL STD: R1013 control switch in PTL position per N1-OP-45. Critical Step Justification: If this step is not performed, an uncontrolled engine start will occur following engine EM Stop reset. |
| 3.3 | Supply BKR R1053, PB 17 (B Section) CLOSED. | P (H.19.1.3) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe Breaker R1053 red light on and green light off. |
| 3.4 | BREAKER R1052, PB 17 Bus Tie (A to B Section) OPEN. | P (H.19.1.4) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe Breaker R1052 green light on and red light off. |
| 3.5 | BV-96-103 EDG103, Starting Air Block Valve OPEN. Cue: Report air block valve is open. | P (H.19.1.5) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Acknowledge report using proper 3 way communications. |
| 3.6 | R1032, Diesel Generator 103 Output Breaker, OPEN AND Green Flagged. | P (H.19.1.6) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe control switch in green flag position and green light on and red light off. |
| 3.7 | Exceptions to Standby Lineup have been evaluated by SM for impact on DG operation. Cue: Report no exceptions to lineup that impact DG operation. | P (H.19.1.7) | SAT/UNSAT STD: 3 way communications are conducted |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|---|---------------------|---|
| 3.8 | Lubricating AND coolant levels normal. Cue: Report both levels are normal. | P (H.19.1.8) | SAT/UNSAT STD: 3 way communications are conducted |
| 4. | Verify Over-Speed Trip RESET (handle horizontal). Cue: Report over-speed trip is reset. | P (H.19.2) | SAT/UNSAT STD:3 way communications are conducted |
| 5. | Depress 48X RESET button inside Control Cabinet. Cue: Report 48X reset button has been depressed. | P (H.19.3) | SAT/UNSAT STD:3 way communications are conducted |
| 6. | Verify Speed Droop Set to 0 (Zero). Cue: Report speed droop is set to 0. | P (H.19.4) | SAT/UNSAT STD:3 way communications are conducted |
| 7. | Verify CLOSED DG103 CONT POWER BKR (DG 103 Control Cabinet). Cue: Report control power breaker is closed. | P (H.19.5) | SAT/UNSAT STD:3 way communications are conducted |
| 8. | Verify LOCKOUT 86DG3 Relay Reset (A5-Panel). | P (H.19.6) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe 86DG3 is reset on A Panel. |
| 9. | Verify relays reset by taking DIESEL GEN 103 Control Switch to EM STOP. Alarm A5-3-5 DSL GEN 103 START-RUN OFF NORMAL clears | P (H.19.7) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Switch placed to EM STOP and released. Critical Step Justification: If this step is not performed, the engine will not start in subsequent steps. |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-----|--|---------------------|---|
| | NOTE: DG 103 will be started with an Auto Star has DC power from the Battery. | rt Signal to assu | ure the Governor Circuit |
| 10. | Place in NEUTRAL (green flagged) R1013, PB 103 Normal Supply Breaker (DG103 will Auto Start). GEN 103 Voltmeter and frequency rise as engine starts | P (H.19.8) | *PASS / FAIL STD: R1013 control switch place in NEUTRAL. Green light is ON and red light is off. Critical Step Justification: If this step is not performed, the engine will not start. |
| 11. | Confirm DG output at approximately 60 Hz/4160V. | P (H.19.9) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe GEN 103 Voltmeter reads about 4150 volts and frequency is about 60 Hz. |
| 12. | Place Sync Key in R1032 SYN AND place to ON. | P (H.19.10) | *PASS / FAIL STD: Sync Key inserted for R1032 and positioned to ON. Observe INCOMING AC VOLTS rise. Critical Step Justification: If this step is not performed, R1032 will not close, preventing bus from energizing. |

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|---|---|---------------------|---|
| 13. | Close R1032 Breaker. | 2 Diesel Generator 103 Output | P (H.19.11) | *PASS / FAIL STD: R1032 control switch position to close breaker. Red light on and green light off. Critical Step Justification: If this step is not performed, R1032 will not close, preventing bus from energizing. |
| 14. | Confirm normal voltage on PB 103. | | P (H.19.12) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Observe PB 103 AC VOLTS indicate about 4160 AC VOLTS. |
| 15. | Enter N1-SOP-33A.1. Cue: As US, inform operator that another operator will implement N1-SOP-33A.1 actions. | | P (H.19.13) | SAT/UNSAT STD: Acknowledge report using proper 3 way communications. |
| Eval | uator Cue: | Your task is complete. | | |
| Evaluator Note: | | The procedure does not direct ren Key is removed prior to performing | | |
| TASK EDG 103 has been started and PB 103 is energized from EDG 103. STANDARD | | | ed from EDG 103. | |

| STOP TIME | |
|-----------|--|
|-----------|--|



JPM Handout

| A Station Blackout has occurred N1-SOP-33A.2 Station Blackout is being implemented EDG 102 troubleshooting is in progress EDG 103 trouble shooting is complete and repairs have been made EDG 103 is now available and ready to return to service | |
|---|--|
|---|--|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), Perform a control room start of EDG 103 and |
|------------|--|
| CUE | energize PB 103 from the EDG 103, per N1-OP-45 section H.19.0. |



| Training Id: 2020 NRC NMP1 Plant JPM P-1 | | P-1 Revision: | 0.0 |
|--|------------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| Title: Respond | to CLC Makeup Tank Lev | el Alarm (Alternate Pa | th) |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / | Printed Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/30/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/16/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| | Approximate Duration: | 10 minutes | |
| Documentation | of Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | e |
| Grade: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Comments: | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Sign | ature: | Date: | |



References

- 1. N1-ARP H1-1-4
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295018, AA2.04 (2.9/2.9)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to locally interpret indications associated with degraded cooling water conditions.
- b. This JPM is considered alternate path because CLC makeup tank level does not respond as expected, requiring the operator to take additional mitigating actions.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded **Pass/Fail**.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-208000-01001, Respond to Annunciator H1-4-4
- b. K/A 295018, AA2.04 (2.9/2.9)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Simulate | |
|---------------------|----------|--|
| Evaluation Location | Plant | |
| Time Critical Task | No | |
| Alternate Path | Yes | |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes | |

4. Recommended Start Location

- a. Unit 1 Turbine Building
- 5. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Prepare a copy of ARP H1-4-4



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Control Room has received annunciator H1-4-4, CLOSED LOOP COOL MAKEUP TANK LEVEL HIGH-LOW.
- Computer point B115, CLC MU TK LVL HIGH, is in alarm.
- Control Room indications show CLC Makeup tank level is 7' and rising.
- Annunciator H1-4-5, LQ PROCESS RAD MON, is NOT in alarm.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), perform the field actions for the high CLC Makeup tank level per ARP H1-4-4.

START TIME

| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|--|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repe | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | | | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: ARP H1-4-4 obtained |
| Evaluator Note: All valves listed in this JPM are log The applicant may also do a visua Turbine Building elevation 261'. | | | _ | |
| 3. | alarm, perfo | s of annunciator H1-4-5 AND if in orm applicable actions of Ann. H1- ntinue with actions below | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines from initial conditions that H1-4-5 is NOT in alarm |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|---|---|---------------------|---|
| 4. | Close 71-229, BV-CLC MAKE-UP TANK INLET FROM MAKE-UP LCV Cue: The indicated handwheel is rotated fully in the indicated direction | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Closes 71-229 by rotating handwheel fully CW |
| 5. | fully in the indicated direction. Open 71-224, DRAIN - CLC MAKE-UP TANK Cue: The indicated handwheel is rotated in the direction indicated. | | Р | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 71-224 by rotating handwheel CCW |
| Alter | nate Path | The alternate path is revealed in the | ne following step |). |
| 6. | Cue: CLC slowly lowe | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes CLC Makeup tank level *PASS / FAIL STD: Closes 71-224 by |
| | | indicated handwheel is rotated direction indicated. | | rotating handwheel fully CW |
| 7. | IF level is steady, THEN reopen 71-229 and monitor operation Cue: CLC Makeup tank level indicates 7' and slowly rising. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes CLC Makeup tank level SAT / UNSAT |
| | | | | STD: Does NOT reopen 71- 229 |

| | PERFORMANCE | | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|---|---|---------------------|---|
| 8. | IF level continues to rise, THEN throttle 71- 224, CLC MU TANK DRAIN as necessary and notify SM | | | *PASS / FAIL STD: Opens 71-224 by rotating handwheel CCW |
| | <u>Cue:</u> The indicated handwheel is rotated in the direction indicated.<u>Cue:</u> CLC Makeup tank level indicates 6' and stable. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes CLC Makeup tank level |
| 9. | Reports task completion. | | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Proper communications used |
| Evalu | uator Note: | Evaluator Note: Cue: Your task is complete. | | |

| TASK | CLC makeup tank level restored to normal band in accordance with N1-ARP- |
|----------|--|
| STANDARD | H1-4-4. |

|--|



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: The Control Room has received annunciator H1-4-4, CLOSED LOOP COOL MAKEUP TANK LEVEL HIGH-LOW. Computer point B115, CLC MU TK LVL – HIGH, is in alarm. Control Room indications show CLC Makeup tank level is 7' and rising. |
|-----------------------|--|
| | Annunciator H1-4-5, LQ PROCESS RAD MON, is NOT in alarm. |

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), perform the field actions for the high CLC |
|------------|--|
| CUE | Makeup tank level per ARP H1-4-4. |



| Training Id: 2020 NRC NMP1 Plant JPM P-2 Revision: 0.0 | | | | | 0.0 |
|--|---------|--------------------------|------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Title: Initiate I | Emerger | ncy Condenser Locally | y (P | RA) | |
| Approvals: | | | | | |
| | | <u>Signature / Print</u> | <u>ted</u> | <u>Name</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | | | / Paul Isham | 1/10/20 |
| Validated By | | | | Dave Mason | 7/16/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | | | / Phil Nichols | |
| | Approx | kimate Duration: | 10 r | ninutes | |
| Documentation | of Perf | ormance: | | | |
| Performer: | | | | | |
| Evaluator: | | | | | |
| Start Time: | | Stop Time: | | Completion Time | |
| Grade: | | Pass / Fail | | | |
| Comments: | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Evaluators Signature: | | | | Date: | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-13, Emergency Cooling System
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 2070000 A2.08 (3.8/3.8)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to locate and operate the components to locally initiate Emergency Condensers.
- b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded *Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-207000-01017, Verify Emergency Condenser Initiation (PRA)
- b. K/A 2070000 A2.08 (3.8/3.8)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Simulate |
|---------------------|----------|
| Evaluation Location | Plant |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

- a. Unit 1 Turbine Building
- 5. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Prepare sufficient copies of N1-OP-13, Section H.2. Include Precautions and Limitations.



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Reactor has failed to scram and N1-EOP-3 has been entered.
- The Emergency Condenser Condensate Return Valves have failed to open.
- N1-OP-13 section H.2 is complete through step 2.3.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(Operators Name), place Emergency Condenser Loop 11 in service by opening the Condensate Return Valve locally in accordance with N1-OP-13 starting at step H.2.4.

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|--|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | Р | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: N1-OP-13 obtained, precautions & limitations reviewed & section H.2 referenced |
| 3. | Close 113-529, BV-IA Manifold Supply | Р | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Cue: The indicated handwheel is rotated fully in the direction indicated. | | STD: 113-529 handwheel rotated fully CW |



| | | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|-------|---|-----------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 4. | Remove cap from 113-530, Vent-IA Manifold | | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Note: A wrench is hanging below the air pipe. | | | STD: Cap removed from 113-530 by rotating CCW |
| | Cue: The cap is removed. | | | |
| 5. | Open 113-530 | | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | Cue: The indicated handwheel is rotated fully in the direction indicated. Air flow is heard. | | | STD: 113-530 handwheel rotated fully CCW |
| | Role Play: If contacted as Control Room, report that Emergency Condenser 11 has gone into service. | | | |
| Evalu | ıator Note: | Cue: Your task is complete. | | |

| TASK STANDARD | Emergency Condenser Loop 11 has been placed in service locally. |
|------------------|---|
| STOP TIME | |



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS | Given: • The Reactor has failed to scram and N1-EOP-3 has been entered. |
|-----------------------|---|
| | The Emergency Condenser Condensate Return Valves have failed to open. |
| | N1-OP-13 section H.2 is complete through step 2.3. |

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), place Emergency Condenser Loop 11 in service by | |
|------------|---|--|
| CUE | opening the Condensate Return Valve locally in accordance with N1-OP-13 | |
| | starting at step H.2.4. | |



| Training Id: 202 | 0 NRC NMP1 Plant JPM P-3 | Revision: | 0.0 |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Title: Lineup to | Flood the Reactor Vessel Usin | ng the Diesel Fire | Pump |
| Approvals: | | | |
| | Signature / Printe | d Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | / Paul Isham | 1/10/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/16/20 |
| Facility Reviewer | | / Phil Nichols | |
| | Approximate Duration: 15 | minutes | |
| Documentation | of Performance: | | |
| Performer: | | | |
| Evaluator: | | <u> </u> | |
| Start Time: | Stop Time: | Completion Time | |
| Grade: | Pass / Fail | | |
| Comments: | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Evaluators Sign | ature: | Date: | |



References

- 1. N1-SOP-21.2, Control Room Evacuation
- 2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9)



Instructor Information

A. JPM Information

1. Description

- a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to locate and operate components associated with the firewater system and use the system to maintain reactor water level in an emergency.
- b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.
- c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded *Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

- a. N1-286000-01021, Use Fire Water as an alternate source for maintaining reactor water level.
- b. K/A 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9)
- 3. Evaluation / Task Criteria

| Evaluation Method | Simulate |
|---------------------|----------|
| Evaluation Location | Plant |
| Time Critical Task | No |
| Alternate Path | No |
| LOD >1.0 | Yes |

4. Recommended Start Location

- a. Unit 1 Turbine Building
- 5. JPM Setup (if required)
 - a. Provide a copy of N1-SOP-21.2, Attachment 10.



B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently.
 The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given:

- The Control Room has been evacuated due to a fire.
- N1-SOP-21.2, Control Room Evacuation, has been entered.
- RPV injection is immediately required.

Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions

INITIATING CUE

(**Operators Name**), inject water into the RPV in accordance with N1-SOP-21.2, Attachment 10

START TIME

| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 1. | Provide repeat back of initiating cue | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary. | Р | STD: Proper communications used |
| 2. | Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and | | SAT / UNSAT |
| | review / utilize the correct section of the procedure | Р | STD: N1-SOP-21.2, Attachment 10 obtained |
| 3. | Unlock the following valves: (Step 3.1) | | |
| | (Turbine Building 261 near Hydro Pump) | | |
| | Note: The lock on these valves would require a VA-1 key | | |
| 3a | 100-33, BV-FIREWATER TO FEEDWATER | | *PASS / FAIL |
| | INLET Cue: Valve 100-33 is unlocked | S | STD: Using a VA-1 key, simulates unlocking 100-33 |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 3b | 29-411, BV-FIRE WATER TO FEEDWATER INLET 2ND Cue: Valve 29-411 is unlocked | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Using a VA-1 key, simulates unlocking 29-411 |
| 3c | 29-07, BV-FIREWATER TO FEEDWATER OUTLET Cue: Valve 29-07 is unlocked | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Using a VA-1 key, simulates unlocking 29-07 |
| 3d | 29-413, BV-FEEDWATER TO FEEDWATER LEAKBY FLOWGLASS Cue: Valve 29-413 is unlocked | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Using a VA-1 key, simulates unlocking 29-413 |
| 4. | Close 29-413, BV-FEEDWATER TO FEEDWATER LEAKBY FLOWGLASS (Step 3.2) | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Simulates closing 29- 413 by rotating the hand wheel CW |
| 5. | IF RPV injection is immediately required, THEN skip to Step 3.5 | Р | SAT / UNSAT STD: Recognizes RPV injection is immediately required based on initial conditions, and moves ahead in the procedure to step 3.5. |
| 6. | WHEN Directed, THEN throttle open, as directed, the following valves to begin injection into RPV: (Step 3.5) Note: Opening these valves will Auto-Start the fire pump(s) on low fire water header pressure. | | |



| | PERFORMANCE | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|----|--|---------------------|---|
| 6a | 29-07, BV-FIREWATER TO FEEDWATER OUTLET | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Simulates opening 29- 07 by rotating the hand wheel CCW |
| 6b | 29-411, BV-FIRE WATER TO FEEDWATER INLET 2ND | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Simulates opening 29- 411 by rotating the hand wheel CCW |
| 6c | 100-33, BV-FIREWATER TO FEEDWATER INLET | S | *PASS / FAIL STD: Simulates opening 100-33 by rotating the hand wheel CCW |
| 7. | Verify the following valves closed: | | |
| 7a | 29-146, BV-FW PUMP 11 WARMUP (TB 291, North Wall) | S | SAT / UNSAT STD: Simulates 29-146 verified closed, hand wheel fully CCW |
| 7b | 29-152, BV-FW-PUMP 12 WARMUP (TB 291, North wall) | S | SAT / UNSAT STD: Simulates 29-152 verified closed, hand wheel fully CCW |
| 7c | 29-128, BV-FW-PUMP 13 WARMUP (TB 305, SW of 13 FCV) | S | SAT / UNSAT STD: Simulates 29-128 verified closed, hand wheel fully CCW |



| | PERFORMANCE | | ACT. CODE P/S/NA | EVALUATOR |
|---|---|--|--------------------------|--|
| 8. | IF Step 3.4 was NOT performed previously, THEN perform step 3.4 | | | SAT / UNSAT STD: Determines step doesn't require any action since the fire pumps autostart. |
| Evaluator Note: Cue: Your task is complete. Another operator will complete any remaining actions. | | | l complete any remaining | |

| The fire water system is lined up and injecting water into the RPV. TANDARD |
|--|
|--|

|--|



JPM Handout

| INITIAL CONDITIONS Given: The Control Room has been evacuated due to a fire. N1-SOP-21.2, Control Room Evacuation, has been entered. RPV injection is immediately required. |
|---|
|---|

| INITIATING | (Operators Name), inject water into the RPV in accordance with N1-SOP- |
|------------|--|
| CUE | 21.2, Attachment 10 |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 | | Scenario No | o.: NRC-1 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|----------------------------------|--|-------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Examiners: | | | Operators: | |
| | | | _ | |

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 50% power. Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking.

Turnover: Start Circulating Water pump 11. Raise Reactor power with Recirculation flow.

| Event No. | Malf. No. | Event Type* | Event Description |
|--|----------------|--------------------|---|
| 1 | N/A | N – BOP, SRO | Start Circulating Water Pump 11 N1-OP-19 |
| 2 | N/A | R – ATC, SRO | Raise Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow N1-OP-1, N1-OP-43B |
| 3 | HV01A HV02 | C-BOP TS-SRO | Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 trips. Requires RBEVS initiation. L1-3-4, L1-1-5, N1-EOP-5, N1-OP-10, Technical Specifications |
| 4 | RR65E RR09E | I –All TS-SRO | RR pump 15 Blind Controller failure and delayed pump trip N1-SOP-1.3, Tech Spec 3.1.7 |
| 5 | RX01 | C – All | Fuel Failure N1-SOP-25.2, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-1 |
| 6 | ED27 FW03A | C – BOP | Powerboard 12 Fails to Auto Transfer and Feedwater Pump 11 Trips N1-SOP-30.2, N1-SOP-1 |
| 7 | MS01 | M – All | Main Steam Line Break in Turbine Building N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-6 |
| 8 | MS13A MS13C | C – All | Two MSIVs Fail to Close N1-EOP-6, N1-EOP-8 |
| 9 | Overrides | C – ATC | Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans Trip N1-EOP-6, N1-EOP-8 |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | | | |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario | No.: NRC-1 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|---|-------------------|--|
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Event 6, 7, 8, 9 | 4 | |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) Events 3, 4, 5, 6 | 4 | |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) Event 7 | 1 | |
| EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-6 | 2 | |
| Entry into contingency EOP with substantive actions (at least 1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-8 | 1 | |
| 6. Preidentified Critical tasks (at least 2) | 2 | |
| CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: | | CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION: |
| CT-1.0: Given fuel failure causing elevated Main Steam Line radiation levels, scram the Reactor within 15 minutes of exceeding 3.75 times normal full power background, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2. | | High Main Steam Line radiation levels indicate fuel failure and release of fission products to the Reactor coolant. A Reactor scram is required by N1-SOP-25.2 and reduces the rate of energy production and thus the heat input, radioactivity release, and flow down the Main Steam Lines. Scramming the Reactor also allows further mitigating actions, such as Reactor isolation and depressurization. |
| CT- 2.0: Given an un-isolable primary system discharg primary and secondary containments, commence N1-E Blowdown, before off-site release rate exceeds the Gerlevel, in accordance with N1-EOP-6. | OP-8, RPV | An un-isolable primary system discharging outside of Primary and Secondary Containments resulting in off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency limit indicates a significant problem posing a direct and immediate threat to the health and safety of the public. A blowdown minimizes flow through the break, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and places the primary system in the lowest possible energy state. This will lower the release of radioactivity to the environment and lower the dose received by the public. |

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins at approximately 50% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. Circulating Water pump 11 is out of service following maintenance. The crew will start Circulating Water pump 11, then raise Reactor power with recirculation flow.

After the crew has raised reactor power, #11 RB exhaust fan will trip. The crew will diagnose the fan trip and a positive RB pressure. With #12 RB exhaust fan OOS, the crew will start the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (RBEVS) to restore a negative RB pressure. One RBEVS train will trip. Entry into N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required. SRO determines TS 3.4.4 must be entered for the inoperable RBEVS system.

Next, RRP 15 flow rises due to a blind controller failure. The crew will take the M/A station to manual, and the rise will stop. RRMG 15 will develop a high slot temperature, requiring the crew to remove it from service.

Next, fuel failure will occur due to the previous transients. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-25.2, Fuel Failure or High Activity in Rx Coolant or Off-Gas. This includes performing an emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1, and eventually scramming the Reactor per N1-SOP-1 (Critical Task). When the Generator trips after the scram, Powerboard 12 will fail to transfer to reserve power. The crew will execute N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of Powerboard 12, to re-energize the powerboard. Feedwater Pump 11 will trip shortly after the reactor scram.

Following the scram, a Main Steam line break will occur. The MSIVs will fail to close both automatically and manually, leading to an un-isolable leak into the Turbine Building. The running Turbine Building ventilation exhaust fan will trip. The crew will start the standby Turbine Building ventilation exhaust fan, however it will trip after a short time delay. This will allow an un-monitored, ground level release from the Turbine Building. The crew will enter N1-EOP-6, Radioactivity Release Control. Field reports will indicate off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency level. The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N1-EOP-8 (Critical Task).



| | | сору | 01 |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Training Id: NMP1 NRC 2020 Scenario | | Revision: | 0.0 |
| Title: Simulator Sce | enario #1 | | |
| | Signature / Printed N | <u>ame</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/28/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/15/20 |
| | | Jason Quick | |
| | | Jeremy Spring | |
| Facility Reviewer | | Phil Nichols | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-1, Nuclear Steam Supply System
- 2. N1-OP-19, Circulating Water System
- 3. N1-OP-43B, Normal Power Operations
- 4. N1-OP-10, Reactor Building Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System
- 5. N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump Trip at Power
- 6. N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 7. N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction
- 8. N1-SOP-25.2, Fuel Failure or High Activity in Reactor Coolant or Off Gas
- 9. N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- 10. N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment Control
- 11. N1-EOP-6, Radioactivity Release Control
- 12. N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- 13. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. Scenario Description

Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:

The scenario begins at approximately 50% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. Circulating Water pump 11 is out of service following maintenance. The crew will start Circulating Water pump 11, then raise Reactor power with recirculation flow.

After the crew has raised reactor power, #11 RB exhaust fan will trip. The crew will diagnose the fan trip and a positive RB pressure. With #12 RB exhaust fan OOS, the crew will start the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (RBEVS) to restore a negative RB pressure. One RBEVS train will trip. Entry into N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required. SRO determines TS 3.4.4 must be entered for the inoperable RBEVS system.

Next, RRP 15 flow rises due to a blind controller failure. The crew will take the M/A station to manual, and the rise will stop. RRMG 15 will develop a high slot temperature, requiring the crew to remove it from service.

Next, fuel failure will occur due to the previous transients. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-25.2, Fuel Failure or High Activity in Rx Coolant or Off-Gas. This includes performing an emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1, and eventually scramming the Reactor per N1-SOP-1 (Critical Task). When the Generator trips after the scram, Powerboard 12 will fail to auto transfer to reserve power. The crew will execute N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of Powerboard 12, to re-energize the powerboard. Feedwater Pump 11 will trip shortly after the reactor scram.

Following the scram, a Main Steam line break will occur. The MSIVs will fail to close both automatically and manually, leading to an un-isolable leak into the Turbine Building. The running Turbine Building ventilation exhaust fan will trip. The crew will start the standby Turbine Building ventilation exhaust fan, however it will trip after a short time delay. This will allow an un-monitored, ground level release from the Turbine Building. The crew will enter N1-EOP-6, Radioactivity Release Control. Field reports will indicate off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency level. The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N1-EOP-8 (Critical Task).

1. Termination Criteria

a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, RPV Blowdown in progress



Critical Tasks

CT-1, Given fuel failure causing elevated Main Steam Line radiation levels, scram the Reactor within 15 minutes of exceeding 3.75 times normal full power background, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> High Main Steam Line radiation levels indicate fuel failure and release of fission products to the Reactor coolant. A Reactor scram reduces the rate of energy production and thus the heat input, radioactivity release, and flow down the Main Steam Lines. Scramming the Reactor also allows further mitigating actions, such as Reactor isolation and depressurization.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple annunciators and radiation monitors will provide indications of fuel failure. N1-SOP-25.2 directs scramming the Reactor.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Rotation of the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN or depressing the manual scram pushbuttons will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Control rod position and Reactor power indications will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the scram.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.



CT-2, Given an un-isolable primary system discharging outside of primary and secondary containments, commence N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, before off-site release rate exceeds the General Emergency level, in accordance with N1-EOP-6.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> An un-isolable primary system discharging outside of Primary and Secondary Containments resulting in off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency limit indicates a significant problem posing a direct and immediate threat to the health and safety of the public. A blowdown minimizes flow through the break, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and places the primary system in the lowest possible energy state. This will lower the release of radioactivity to the environment and lower the dose received by the public.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple annunciators will provide indications of a primary system discharging into the Turbine Building. MSIV valve position indicators will provide indication that the system is un-isolable. Field reports will provide indication that offsite release rate approaches the General Emergency level. N1-EOP-6 provides direction to blowdown the Reactor.

Measurable Performance Indicators: The crew will manually initiate Emergency Condensers and open ERVs.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Emergency Condenser and ERV instrumentation will provide indication that these systems are functioning properly once placed in service. Multiple Reactor pressure indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the blowdown.

Bounding Criteria: Based on procedural requirements in N1-EOP-6. ERVs do not need to be opened before offsite release rate exceeds the GE level. N1-EOP-8 must be entered and working toward opening ERVs.

- 3. Length
 - a. ~60 minutes
- 4. Mitigation Strategy Code
 - a. RR4, Primary system leak outside of primary and secondary containment, RPV Blowdown required due to General Emergency release rate approached
- 5. Technical Specifications
 - a. TS 3.4.4
 - b. TS 3.1.7.e
- 6. EAL Classification
 - a. General Emergency EAL RG1 Dose assessment indicates >1000mRem TEDE at site boundary



- 7. Special Orders
 - a. None



B. Initial Conditions

| 1. | IC Number |
|----|-----------|
| | |

- a. IC-151
- 2. Presets / With Triggers
 - a. Malfunctions

| 1) | NM10A, IRM CHANNEL 11 FAILURE- UPSCALE | Inserted |
|-----|--|----------|
| 2) | HV01B, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 12 | Inserted |
| 3) | HV01A, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 11 | TRG 1 |
| 4) | RR65E, RR Pump 15 Blind Controller Input Signal Failure, FV=95, RT=5min | TRG 2 |
| 5) | RR09E, RR Pump 15 MG Slot Temperature Increase, DT=30sec, RT=10min, FV=80 | TRG 3 |
| 6) | RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE, FV=34, IV=10, RT=5:00 | TRG 4 |
| 7) | MS01, Steam Line Break Outside PC Area, FV=12, IV=5, RT=4:00 | TRG 5 |
| 8) | HV02A, RB Emergency Ventilation Fan Trip 11 | TRG 12 |
| 9) | HV02B, RB Emergency Ventilation Fan Trip 12 | TRG 15 |
| 10) | FW03A, FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 11 | Inserted |
| 11) | ED27, PB 12 Auto Transfer Failure | Inserted |
| 12) | MS13A, MSIV FAILS OPEN MS01-01(111), FV=10% | Inserted |
| 13) | MS13C, MSIV FAILS OPEN MS01-03(112), FV=10% | Inserted |

- b. Remotes
- 1) CW16, CW DP Buzzer ON/OFF, Off Inserted
- 2) AT10, Lake Water Temperature, RV=38 Inserted



c. Overrides

| 1) | DI-5355 , POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS A, FV=on, DT=2:00 | TRG 5 |
|-----|---|-------|
| 2) | DI-5356 , POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS C, FV=off, DT=2:00 | TRG 5 |
| (Tu | rbine Building Ventilation exhaust fan 11 trips) | |
| 3) | DI-5357 , POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS A, FV=on, DT=1:00 | TRG 6 |
| 4) | DI-5358 , POS 2 1L9/203-01A POS C, FV=off, DT=1:00 | TRG 6 |

(Turbine Building Ventilation exhaust fan 12 trips)

d. Annunciators

1) None

e. Event Triggers

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|---|----------------|---------------------------|
| TRG 6, Initiates when Turbine Building exhaust fan 12 is started | zdhvtbft(6)==0 | Blank |
| TRG 10, Ramps up fuel failure once the stack isolates | hzlog002g==1 | imf rx01 (0 0) 45 8:00 34 |
| TRG 3, Initiates when RRP 15 M/A station is taken to manual to initiate slot temperature rise. | zdrrmam(5)==1 | Blank |
| TRG 22, Initiates when RRP 15 M/A station is taken to manual to delete M/A station oscillations | zdrrmam(5)==1 | dmf rr65e |
| TRG 25, Delete slot temperature rise malfunction when the recirc pump is secured. | hzlrrmgt(5)==1 | dmf rr09e |

f. Equipment Out of Service

- 1) Reactor Build Exhaust Fan 12 secured with info/caution tag
- 2) IRM 11 bypassed with info/caution tag
- 3) Circulating Water Pump 11 secured with no tag

g. Support Documentation

- 1) REMA for power ascension with recirc flow
- 2) Markup N1-OP-19 Section E.2.0 up to step E.2.7
- 3) Markup N1-OP-43B Section F.3.0 to the appropriate steps for 50% power level (up to F.3.25 with steps 3.20 and 3.23 still open)



h. Miscellaneous

- 1) Ensure TB Exhaust Fan 11 is in service
- 2) Protect the following equipment: EDG 103, PB 103, PB 12, Circ Water pump 12
- 3) DW Cooling Fan 11 secured



SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

| ON | COMING | SHIFT: □ N | D | | DATE: | Today | | |
|-----|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| | RT I: Control Pa | | med by the oncoi | • | tor <u>befo</u> | <u>re</u> assumin | g the shift | t. |
| PA | RT II: | To be <u>review</u> | <u>red</u> by the oncom | ing Operato | or <u>before</u> | assuming | the shift. | |
| | LCO Statu Shift Turno | s (SRO) over Informatio | on Sheet | | | | | |
| Evc | olutions/Ge | neral Informat | ion/Equipment Sta | itus: | | | | |
| • | Reactor po | wer is approxir | nately 50%. | | | | | |
| • | | uilding Exhaust | Fan 12 is out of serv | vice for mainte | enance. | | | |
| • | Maintenan | ce is complete | for Circulating Water | r Pump 11 and | d it is read | dy to be retur | ned to serv | ice. |
| PAI | RT III: | Remarks/Pla | nned Evolutions: | : | | | | |
| • | E.2.7. In sis standing | step E.2.12, it is | mp 11 per N1-OP-1 desired to stop bothen house. All person | n Circulating V | Vater Prim | ning pumps. | A Plant Ope | erator |
| • | | Reactor power a B Section F.3.0 | ascension with Recire | culation flow p | per the pro | ovided ReMA | A and N1-OF | P-43B. |



Shift Turnover

| Instructor Actions / Plant Response | Operator Actions |
|---|---|
| Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown. | |
| Verify annunciator sound turned on If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown | |
| Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels. | Crew Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift |



Event #1: Start Circulating Water Pump 11

| Event Information | The Plant is operating approximately 50% power The crew will start Circ Water Pump 11 per N1-OP-19 |
|----------------------|---|
| imormation | The crew will start Circ water Fump 11 per N1-OF-19 |

| | SRO Directs starting Circulating Water pump 11 per N1-OP-19 Section E.2.0 Provides oversight for evolution |
|--|---|
| Role Play: When requested, report a good start on Circulating Water pump 11. Role Play: When requested, report normal circulating water pump discharge pressure in Screen House. Role Play: If asked as Shift Manager, direct securing both Water Box Priming pumps. | Reviews N1-OP-19 Section E.2.0 Verifies running CRD Pump flow greater than 60 GPM Starts 74-01, CONDSR CIRCULATING WATER PUMP 11 Closes 74-20, FISH SCREEN DRAIN VALVE 11 Contacts Operator to confirm normal circulating water pump discharge pressure in Screen House Verifies the following pumps are stopped per SM direction: 75-09, COND. WATER BOX PRIMING PUMP NO. 11 75-08, COND. WATER BOX PRIMING PUMP NO. 12 |
| | Monitors plant parameters |



Event #2: Power Ascension With Recirculation Flow

| Event Information | The crew will raise power with recirc flow per the REMA |
|----------------------|---|
| Information | |

| Note: | Directs power ascension with Recirculation flow in accordance with N1-OP-43B and the Reactivity Maneuver Instruction (REMA) Provides oversight of reactivity maneuver ATC |
|---|---|
| N1-OP-43B includes the following power-to-flow map restrictions: PRIOR to exceeding 65% flow, verify greater than 50% Rod Line OR that RIP region will NOT be entered. PRIOR to 100% rodline raise recirc flow to greater than 59% flow (approximately 40 x 106 lb/hr) to avoid the flow biased control rod block line. | Acknowledges direction from SRO Raises Recirculation flow with master Recirculation flow controller Monitors APRMs Monitors Recirculation flow Monitors Feedwater flow and RPV water level Observes power-to-flow map restrictions |
| Note: Recommend initiating the next event when Reactor power is between 50-55% power. | Monitors individual RRPs for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors Feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV water level remains within program band (65" - 83") |



Event

Information

Event #3: Loss of Normal Reactor Building Ventilation

maintenance.

| As directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction : HV01A , Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 11 TRG 1 | CREW Recognize/report L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS, in alarm. Recognize/report L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP - VIB, in alarm. Recognize/report exhaust fan 11 tripped. |
|--|--|
| L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11–12 TRIP–VIB L1-2-4, RB VENT SUP SYSTEM L1-2-5, RB VENT EXH FLOW LOW L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS RB dP drops to 0" | Acknowledge report L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS, in alarm. Acknowledge report L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP - VIB, in alarm. Acknowledge report exhaust fan 11 tripped. Direct actions of L1-3-4 and L1-1-5 to be performed. Acknowledge reactor building negative pressure is degraded low. Recognize entry condition for N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control. Determine no emergency exists (activation of emergency plan not required). Per ARP, ensure RBEVS started and RB ventilation isolated Determine that with one RBEVS train inoperable, a 7 day LCO is required per TS 3.4.4.e |

• A trip of RB Exhaust Fan 11 occurs with RB Exhaust Fan 12 OOS for

• The crew will need to re-establish negative RB D/P with RBEVS

December 2020



Event 3 Continued

Console Operator

When the <u>first</u> RBEVS train is started, insert the respective malfunction to trip the RBEVS fan. Then delete the malfunction for the other RBEVS fan.

If RBEVS fan 11 is started, insert the following malfunction:

TRG 12 HV02A, RB Emergency Ventilation Fan Trip

Then, delete malfunction **HV02B** allowing RBEVS fan 12 to operate

-OR-

If RBEVS fan 12 is started, insert the following malfunction:

TRG 15 HV02B, RB Emergency Ventilation Fan Trip 12

Then, delete malfunction **HV02A** allowing RBEVS fan 11 to operate

BOP

- Acknowledge direction to perform actions of L1-3-4, L1-1-5
- Monitor Reactor Building D/P
- Inform SRO D/P is zero
- Start RBEVS per N1-OP-10
 - Verify open 202-36, EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV
 - Verify closed 202-47, EM VENTILATION TIE BV
 - Verify closed 202-74, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV
 - Verify closed 202-75, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV

If starting RBEVS 11

- Place 202-37, EM VENTILATION LOOP
 11 INLET BV control switch to OPEN
- Verify open 202-37, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 INLET BV
- Start 202-53, EVS FAN 11
- Verify open 202-34, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET BV
- Confirm proper operation of 202-50, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11 INLET FCV, by observing flow indication and Rx Bldg DP

If starting RBEVS 12

- Place 202-38, EM VENTILATION LOOP
 12 INLET BV control switch to OPEN
- Verify open 202-38, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 INLET BV
- Start 202-33, EVS FAN 12
- Verify open 202-35, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET BV
- Confirm proper operation of 202-51, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 12 INLET FCV, by observing flow and Rx Bldg DP



| ent 3 Continued | BOP Continued |
|-----------------|---|
| | Isolate reactor building ventilation per N1-OP-10 |
| | Place REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FANS |
| | 11 and 12 in OFF |
| | Place REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST |
| | FANS 11 and 12 in OFF |
| | Place control switch for 202-31, |
| | REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST |
| | ISOLATION VALVE 12 and 202-32, |
| | REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST |
| | ISOLATION VALVE 11 in CLOSE |
| | Place control switch for 202-15, |
| | REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION |
| | VALVE 11 <u>and</u> 202-16, REACTOR |
| | BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 12 |
| | in CLOSE |
| | Report RBEVS in service and reactor building ventilation isolated |



Event #4: Recirc Pump 15 M/A Failure and High Temperature Trip

Event Information

- The plant is operating with 5 recirc loops in service at less than rated power.
- RRP15 flow rises due to a blind controller failure, but stops when placed in Manual
- RRP15 runs a high slot temperature and must be tripped

| As directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction : RR65E, RR Pump 15 Blind Controller Input Signal Failure, FV=95, RT=5min TRG 2 APRMs, MWth, MWe, all rise | Diagnose/report Recirc pump 15 parameters are elevated. |
|---|--|
| | SRO Acknowledges report of power rising May direct entry into N1-SOP-1.5 May direct entry into N1-OP-1, Sect H for the Recirculation System failures Directs taking manual control of RR Pump 15 M/A station Acknowledges report that RR Pump 15 is in manual and able to be controlled |
| | ATC • Monitors plant parameters |
| | Recognizes and reports RR Pump 15 controller rising Nulls deviation meter on RR Pump 15 (may reference N1-OP-1, Sect. F.1.0) Places RR Pump 15 M/A station in MAN Verifies failure stops Notifies SRO/Crew that RR Pump 15 is in manual and that the malfunction has stopped |



Verify the following **malfunction** is **automatically inserted** when the RRP 15 M/A station is taken to MAN:

RR09E, RR Pump 15 MG Slot Temperature Increase, DT=30sec, RT=10:00, FV=80

TRG 3

Expected Annunciator:

F2-2-5, REACT RECIRC MG SET 15 ~6 min

Expected Computer Points:

B399 RRMG 15 GEN SLOT TEMP C ~ 5min A130 RRMG 15 GEN SLOT TEMP HIGH ~6 min

B404 RRP 15 MTR Slot Temp High

CREW

- Acknowledge/report Annunciator F2-2-5
- Observe computer points A130 and B399 in alarm

<u>Note:</u> If the crew does not take action to secure the pump after a reasonable time trip RR Pump 15 by **inserting malfunction RR01E**.

Note: N1-OP-1 directs lowering power per N1-OP-43B. However, due to the emergent nature of this event, the crew will likely lower power using the guidance of N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction.

Role Play: If contacted as the Ops Director regarding the high temperature, direct the crew to remove the MG Set from service.

SRO

- Acknowledges RRMG 15 high slot temperature
- Directs execution of ARP F2-2-5
- Directs a reactor power reduction
- Provides oversight of reactivity manipulation
- May direct a trip of RR Pump 15 and entry into N1-SOP-1.3
- May direct entry into N1-SOP-1.5 after the trip
- May direct removing RR Pump 15 from service using N1-OP-1, Sect H.1.0
- Enter T.S. 3.6.2 for inoperable APRMs while RR Pump 15 Discharge Valve is open if the pump is tripped
- Enters T.S. 3.1.7.e for partial loop operation

ATC

- Monitors plant parameters
- When directed, lowers power with recirculation flow
- Verifies P/F Map updated for 4 loop operation
- Lowers Recirc flow as necessary to remain within flow limits for 4 loop operation
- Monitors plant limits for 4 loop operation



Role Play: If requested to check Turbine Building Ventilation and MG Set Ventilation, wait 3 minutes, then report that everything is normal with the ventilation. Report that the generator end of RRMG 15 is very hot to the touch.

Note: N1-OP-1 directs lowering power per N1-OP-43B. However, due to the emergent nature of this event, the crew will likely lower power using the guidance of N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction.

<u>Note:</u> Verify **TRG 25 inserts** to automatically **delete** RR09E when the recirc pump is tripped.

BOP

- Enters ARP F2-2-5
- Enters N1-OP-1, Sect F.4
- Dispatches operator to verify proper operation of MG Set Area Ventilation, TB Track Bay AND Roll door position(s), and MG Set Area Coolers.
- Verifies Reactor Recirc Pump parameters are within the following limits:
 - Generator MW 0.790 MW
 - Generator Amps 240 A
 - RRP Flow 16.8 X 106 lbm/hr
 - Generator Frequency 11.5 Hz to 56 Hz
- Verifies total recirculation flow is evenly balanced between all operating RRPs
- When Generator slot temperature continues to rise and approaches or exceeds 120°C, reduces loading on affected RRMG by lowering power per N1-OP-43B

If directed to trip RR Pump 15:

- Places RR Pump MOTOR 15 MG SET switch to STOP
- Enters N1-SOP-1.3
- Notifies SRO the APRMs are inop
- Close RR Pump 15 Discharge Valve
- Holds Discharge Valve in OPEN position for 2 to 3 seconds
- Records time
- Notifies SRO the APRMs are operable

If directed, removes RR Pump 15 from service using N1-OP-1, Sect H.1

- Verifies open RR Pump 15 Bypass Valve
- Lowers flow on RR Pump 15 to 6 to 8 x 10⁶
 lbm/br
- Closes RR Pump 15 Discharge Valve
- When the Discharge Valve is closed, places RR Pump MOTOR 15 MG SET switch to STOP
- Holds Discharge Valve in OPEN position for 2 to 3 seconds



Events #5 & #6: Fuel Failure, PB 12 Fails to Fast Transfer.

Event Information

- A fuel failure occurs due to the power ascension earlier.
- The crew will manually scram the reactor.
- PB 12 will not auto transfer but will be available
- FWP 11 will trip

When directed by the lead examiner, **insert** malfunction:

RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE, FV=34, IV=10, RT=5:00

TRG 4

Rising off-gas radiation levels Rising main steam line radiation levels Expected Annunciators:

H1-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION H1-2-7, OFF GAS RAD MON 11-12 FILTER ΔP SAMPLE FLOW H1-3-7, MAIN CNDSR OG TIMER STARTED ISOL TD 15 M H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS

F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO (later) F4-2-2, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 12 HI/LO (later)

Verify the following malfunctions are preset:

ED27, PB 12 Auto Transfer Failure

FW03A, FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 11

Powerboard 12 voltage drops to zero after Generator trip Feedwater pump 11 starts and then immediately trips

CREW

- Acknowledges/reports annunciator H1-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION
- Recognizes rising offgas and main steam line radiation levels
- Diagnoses fuel failure



Note:

Normal Full Power Background (NFPB) Main Steam Line (MSL) radiation levels are approximately 410 mR/hr at this power level. Any value between 400-500 mR/hr is reasonable. This makes a reasonable range of 1500-1875 mR/hr for the 3.75 times NFPB benchmark. The crew may establish a lower threshold for executing the scram and vessel isolation. Alternately, if the crew scrams and closes MSIVs early, 3.75 times NFPB may not be reached.

Note:

High pressure Feedwater will be unavailable until Powerboard 12 is re-energized.

Note:

Recommend initiating the next event once the crew has stabilized the plant post-scram and PB 12 is reenergized.

SRO

- Acknowledges reports
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-25.2, Fuel Failure/High Activity
- May direct emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as necessary to control radiation levels
- Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation
- Directs Reactor scram

CT-1

- Acknowledges scram report
- Enters N1-EOP-2, RPV Control, on low Reactor water level
- Answers "Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04?" Yes
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- Directs Reactor water level control 53-95" using Feedwater/Condensate and CRD
- Directs Reactor pressure control 800-1000 psig on Turbine Bypass Valves or Emergency Condenser 11
- May direct MSIVs closed
- Directs manual vessel isolation and entry into N1-SOP-40.2 if Main Steam Line radiation levels reach 3.75 x Normal Full Power Background (NFPB)
- Enters N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control, on high area radiation levels
- Acknowledges failure of Powerboard 12 to transfer to reserve power
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of Powerboard 12



| ents 5 & 6 continued | ATC |
|----------------------|--|
| | If directed, performs emergency power reduction |
| | per N1-SOP-1.1 |
| | Places Mode Switch in Shutdown or |
| | depresses RPS pushbuttons |
| | CT-1 |
| | Performs scram verification actions of N1-SOP-1, |
| | Reactor Scram: |
| | Confirms all rods inserted |
| | Observes Reactor power lowering |
| | Places IRMs on range 9 |
| | Inserts IRM and SRM detectors |
| | Down-ranges IRMs as necessary |
| | Controls Reactor pressure as directed |
| | May perform a manual vessel isolation by placing |
| | both Vessel Isolation Ch 11 and Ch 12 Control |
| | Switches on the E Panel to ISOLATION, if |
| | necessary |
| | 1 |



Event 5 & 6 continued

Role Play: When dispatched as Chemistry to take samples, acknowledge request.

Role Play: When directed to close Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors, wait 2 minutes then report the Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors are CLOSED. Also report that RP is with you, and they have detected higher than normal rad levels near the offgas piping.

Note: Normal Full Power Background (NFPB) Main Steam Line (MSL) radiation levels are approximately 410 mR/hr at this power level. Any value between 400-500 mR/hr is reasonable. This makes a reasonable range of 1500-1875 mR/hr for the 3.75 times NFPB benchmark.

Note:

High pressure Feedwater will be unavailable until Powerboard 12 is re-energized.

BOP

- Executes N1-SOP-25.2
- Notifies Chemistry to sample offgas and reactor coolant for gross activity
- Directs operator to close Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors
- Monitors ARMs and rad monitors to determine plant radiation levels
- Notifies US/Crew of rising Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor levels
- Notifies US if MSL Rad Monitors approach/exceed 3.75 X Normal Full Power Background (NFPB)
- Performs Reactor water level control actions of N1-SOP-1:
 - Attempts to restore RPV water level to 53-95" by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU, as necessary
 - Determines both electric Feedwater pumps
 NOT running
- May close MSIVs
- May verify Vessel Isolation per N1-SOP-40.2



Event 5 & 6 continued

Role Play: If contacted to check PB 12, wait two minutes and report that you see nothing abnormal at the powerboard.

Note:

At the examiner's discretion, move on to next event when PB 12 has been re-energized.

ATC/BOP

Executes N1-SOP-30.2

N1-SOP-30.2 Actions:

- Verifies Reactor scram due to less than 3 operating Recirculation loops
- Verifies Service Water pump 11 running
- Continuously monitors for thermal hydraulic instability
- Verifies:
 - TBCLC pump 11 running
 - IAC 11 running
 - RBCLC system running
- Re-energizes Powerboard 12:
 - Answers "Are A5-4-1, A5-4-2, A5-1-8, OR A5-2-8 in alarm?" No
 - Obtains SRO permission to re-energize Powerboard 12
 - Verifies open Breaker R122
 - Inserts Sync. Key into R123 AND rotates clockwise to ON
 - Closes Breaker R123
 - Rotates Sync. Key counterclockwise to OFF AND removes
 - Closes Breakers R124 and R121



Events #7, #8, & #9: Main Steam Line Break in Turbine Building, MSIVs Fail to Close, Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan Trips

Event Information

- Fuel failure is complicated by a MSL break in the TB
- · Two MSIVs fail to isolate
- Lose TB Exhaust ventilation leading to unmonitored ground level release.

When directed by the lead examiner, **insert malfunctions**:

MS01, Steam Line Break Outside PC Area, FV=12, IV=5, RT=4:00

TRG 5

Main Steam tunnel temperatures rise Turbine Building radiation levels rise

Expected Annunciators:

F1-2-2, RPS CH 11 MAIN STM LINE BREAK F2-3-2, MAIN STM LINE BREAK AREA TEMP HIGH F4-2-7, RPS CH 12 MAIN STM LINE BREAK H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS

The following **overrides** also **insert** on **TRG 5**:

DI-5355, POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS A, FV=on, DT=2:00

DI-5356, POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS C, FV=off, DT=2:00

Turbine Building exhaust fan 11 trips on a time delay

CREW

- Acknowledges/reports annunciators H1-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION
- Diagnoses Main Steam Line break



Events 7, 8, & 9 continued

Verify the following **overrides** are **automatically inserted** when Turbine Building exhaust fan 12 is started:

TRG 6

DI-5357, POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS A, DT=30, FV=on, DT=1:00

DI-5358, POS_2 1L9/203-01A POS C, DT=30, FV=off, DT=1:00

Turbine Building exhaust fan 12 trips

Verify the following malfunctions are preset:

MS13A, MSIV FAILS OPEN MS01-01(111), FV=10%

MS13C, MSIV FAILS OPEN MS01-03(112), FV=10%

Two MSIVs fail mid-position on closure

Role Plays:

When the crew has determined both Turbine Building exhaust fans are inoperable, **-OR-** as directed by the lead examiner, **-OR-** when requested as RP to assess dose, wait 2 minutes then report as Off-Site Dose Assessment Manager that dose assessment indicates 50 mr/hr TEDE and rising at the site boundary.

Three minutes later, report that dose is 500 mrem TEDE and rising at the site boundary. (Criteria for SAE RS1 is met)

Three minutes after previous field report, report that dose assessment indicates 800 mrem TEDE and rising at the site boundary.

Three minutes later, report that dose assessment indicates 950 mrem TEDE and rising at the site boundary.

Three minutes later, report that dose assessment indicates 1100 mrem TEDE and rising at the site boundary. (Criteria for GE RG1 is met)

SRO

- Acknowledges reports
- Directs MSIVs closed
- Directs Turbine Building evacuation
- Acknowledges failure of two MSIVs to close
- May direct cooldown using Turbine Bypass Valves or Emergency Condensers <100°F/hr
- Acknowledges trip of Turbine Building exhaust fan 11
- Directs start of Turbine Building exhaust fan 12
- Acknowledges trip of Turbine Building exhaust fan 12
- Dispatches personnel to monitor on-site/off-site radiation levels
- Acknowledges off-site release rate reports
- Enters N1-EOP-6 due to off-site release rate above Alert level
- May direct rapid depressurization with Emergency Condensers >100°F/hr
- Determines off-site release rate is approaching



| If asked for an update between reports, give an extrapolated value for dose at the site boundary. If dispatched into the plant for any other task, wait 2 minutes and then report that there is excessive steam in the Turbine Building and you have backed out. | the General Emergency level Enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown Directs initiation of ECs Directs open 4 ERVs | |
|---|---|--|
| Events 7, 8, & 9 continued | ATC/BOP Reports failure of MSIVs to automatically close on high steam tunnel temperature Attempts to manually close MSIVs Reports failure of two MSIVs to close Makes Turbine Building evacuation announcement May open Turbine Bypass Valves or initiate Emergency Condensers to cooldown <100°F/hr Reports trip of Turbine Building exhaust fan 11 Starts Turbine Building exhaust fan 12 Reports trip of Turbine Building exhaust fan 12 Dispatches personnel to monitor on-site/off-site radiation levels Acknowledges/reports off-site release rate reports May perform rapid depressurization with Emergency Condenser 11 >100°F/hr Initiates EC 11/12 Open 4 ERVs CT-2 Controls Reactor water level 53-95" using Condensate/Feedwater and CRD | |

| Event Termination |
|--------------------------|
| Criteria |

- RPV water level controlled in assigned band
- RPV Blowdown in progress

| Facility: Nine | Mile Point Unit 1 | Scenario N | o.: NRC-2 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|----------------|-------------------|------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Examiners: | | | Operators: | |
| | | | | |

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 85% power. Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking.

Turnover: Shutdown Condensate Pump 11 for maintenance due to a motor oil leak and place in Pull-To-Lock. Then Perform a Rod Sequence Exchange.

| Event No. | Malf. No. | Event Type* | Event Description | |
|--|--------------|------------------|--|--|
| 1 | N/A | N -BOP TS-SRO | Condensate Pump 11 shutdown N1-OP-15A, Technical Specifications | |
| 2 | N/A | R –ATC, SRO | Rod Sequence Exchange N1-OP-5, ReMA | |
| 3 | RD04 | C-ATC | Stuck control rod (2017 NRC Scenario 1) N1-OP-5 | |
| 4 | EC03B | C-BOP, TS-SRO | Emergency Condenser 12 Inadvertent Initiation ARP K1-1-5, N1-OP-13, Technical Specifications | |
| 5 | RD34 IA01 | C –All | Instrument air leak, Reactor scram required N1-SOP-20.1, N1-SOP-1 | |
| 6 | RD33 | M –All | ATWS N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-3 | |
| 7 | Overrides | C –All | Feedwater Isolation Valves 11 and 12 fail to isolate N1-EOP-3 | |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | | | | |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario | No.: NRC-2 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Event 6, 7 | 2 | |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) Events 3, 4, 5 | 3 | |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) Event 6 | 1 | |
| EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) N1-EOP-2 | 1 | |
| Entry into contingency EOP with substantive actions (at least 1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-3 | 1 | |
| 6. Preidentified Critical tasks (at least 2) | 3 | |
| CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: | | CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION: |
| CT-1.0: Given lowering Instrument Air System pressure, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram within 15 minutes of air pressure lowering to <70 psig, in accordance with N1-ARP-F3 and/or N1-SOP-20.1. | | Lowering instrument air pressure and CRD air pressure can result in various rods drifting to unpredictable locations in the core. This can lead to an unanalyzed rod pattern and localized power peaking resulting in fuel damage. |
| CT- 2.0: Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% and RPV water level above -41 inches, the crew will terminate and prevent all injection except boron and CRD, within 15 minutes of failure to scram indications, in accordance with N1-EOP-3. | | High Reactor power after a scram represents a challenge to nuclear fuel and to plant heat sinks. In the event of a loss of the normal heat sink, this may result in adding heat to the Torus and challenging the Primary Containment. Lowering Reactor power reduces these challenges. |
| CT-3.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with pow will lower reactor power by inserting control rods or in 15 minutes of failure to scram indications, in accordan | jecting boron, within | Inserting control rods lowers Reactor power, which reduces challenges to the plant during a failure to scram. Additionally, inserting control rods ultimately provides a long-term, stable core shutdown. Boron injection will lower power, however, alone may not provide a stable shutdown condition. |

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins at approximately 85% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. The crew is directed to remove Condensate Pump 11 from service immediately for maintenance due to a motor oil leak. This requires entry into TS 3.1.8 for a redundant HPCI component.

After the pump has been removed from service, the crew will conduct a rod pattern exchange. During the rod pattern exchange, a control rod becomes stuck. The crew will enter N1-OP-5, Section H.13 and raise drive water pressure to move the control rod. While the control rod is stuck, entry into Tech Spec 3.1.1.a(2) is required.

Then, an inadvertent EC initiation occurs. The crew will respond to isolate the EC and the SRO will determine Tech Spec 3.1.3.b requires a 7 day LCO.

Next, an Instrument Air leak will occur in the piping to the CRD system. The crew will insert a manual Reactor scram as CRD air pressure lowers below 60 psig (**Critical Task**).

When the scram occurs the control rods will not fully insert. The crew must terminate and prevent injection (**Critical Task**). When the operator attempts to close Feedwater Isolation Valves 11 and 12, the valves will fail to isolate Feedwater flow. The crew must diagnose the failure and place the Feedwater pumps in Pull-To-Lock to terminate feeding the RPV. The crew will lower Reactor power by inserting control rods per EOP-3.1 and/or using Liquid Poison (**Critical Task**).



| | | Copy | of |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Training Id: NMP1 N | RC 2020 Scenario | Revision: | 0.0 |
| Title: Simulator Sce | nario #2 | | |
| | Signature / Printed Nam | <u>e</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/28/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/15/20 |
| | | ason Quick | |
| | Jer | emy Spring | |
| Facility Reviewer | | Phil Nichols | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-5, Control Rod Drive System
- 2. N1-OP-15A, Condensate System
- 3. N1-OP-13, Emergency Cooling System
- 4. N1-SOP-20.1, Instrument Air Failure
- 5. N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 6. N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- 7. N1-EOP-3, Failure to Scram
- 8. N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 9. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. Scenario Description

Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:

The scenario begins at approximately 85% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. The crew is directed to remove Condensate Pump 11 from service immediately for maintenance due to a motor oil leak. This requires entry into TS 3.1.8 for a redundant HPCI component.

After the pump has been removed from service, the crew will conduct a rod pattern exchange. During the rod pattern exchange, a control rod becomes stuck. The crew will enter N1-OP-5, Section H.13 and raise drive water pressure to move the control rod.

Then, an inadvertent EC initiation occurs. The crew will respond to isolate the EC and the SRO will determine Tech Spec 3.1.3.b requires a 7 day LCO.

Next, an Instrument Air leak will occur in the piping to the CRD system. The crew will insert a manual Reactor scram as IAS air pressure lowers below 70 psig (**Critical Task**).

When the scram occurs the control rods will not fully insert. The crew must terminate and prevent injection (**Critical Task**). When the operator attempts to close Feedwater Isolation Valves 11 and 12, the valves will fail to isolate Feedwater flow. The crew must diagnose the failure and place the Feedwater pumps in Pull-To-Lock to terminate feeding the RPV. The crew will lower Reactor power by inserting control rods per EOP-3.1 and/or using Liquid Poison (**Critical Task**).

Termination Criteria

 a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, Reactor power < 6%, Control rod insertion in progress or complete



2. Critical Tasks

CT-1, Given lowering Instrument Air System pressure, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram within 15 minutes of air pressure lowering to <70 psig, in accordance with N1-ARP-F3 and/or N1-SOP-20.1.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Lowering Instrument and CRD system air pressure can result in various rods drifting to unpredictable locations in the core. This can lead to an unanalyzed rod pattern and localized power peaking resulting in fuel damage.

<u>Cueing:</u> Annunciators on L1 and F3 will provide indication for lowering plant air pressures. Procedures direct inserting a manual reactor scram for lowering instrument air pressure.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Inserting a manual reactor scram will provide observable actions for the evaluation team

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Control rod position and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to insert control rods.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.



CT-2, Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% and RPV water level above -41 inches, the crew will terminate and prevent all injection except boron and CRD, within 15 minutes of failure to scram indications, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> High Reactor power after a scram represents a challenge to nuclear fuel and to plant heat sinks. In the event of a loss of the normal heat sink, this may result in adding heat to the Torus and challenging the Primary Containment. Lowering Reactor power reduces these challenges.

<u>Cueing:</u> Control rod position and Reactor power indications will indicate a failure to scram with Reactor power above 6%. N1-EOP-3 provides direction to trip Recirculation pumps and terminate and prevent injection based on Reactor power.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of Recirculation pump control switches, Feedwater system components, and Core Spray jumpers will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Lowering Recirculation flow, Feedwater flow, Reactor water level, and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding the success of crew actions.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

CT-3, Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6%, the crew will lower reactor power by inserting control rods or injecting boron, within 15 minutes of failure to scram indications, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Inserting control rods lowers Reactor power, which reduces challenges to the plant during a failure to scram. Additionally, inserting control rods ultimately provides a long-term, stable core shutdown. Boron injection will lower power, however, alone <u>may</u> not provide a stable shutdown condition.

<u>Cueing:</u> Control rod position and Reactor power indications will indicate a failure to scram. N1-EOP-3 provides direction to insert control rods.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of RPS, CRD, and RMCS controls will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Control rod position and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to lower power by inserting control rods or injecting Boron.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

- 3. Length
 - a. ~60 minutes
- 4. Mitigation Strategy Code
 - a. AT1, ATWS requiring RPV water level to be lowered, no Blowdown



- 5. Technical Specifications
 - a. TS 3.1.1
 - b. TS 3.1.3
 - c. TS 3.1.8
- 6. EAL Classification
 - a. Alert per EAL MA3 An automatic Scram failed to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power >6% AND Manual/ARI actions taken at the reactor control console failed to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power >6%
- 7. Special Orders
 - a. None



B. Initial Conditions

| 4 | \sim | NI. | | I |
|---|------------|------|----|-----|
| 1 | | IVII | ım | her |
| | | | | |

- a. IC-152
- 2. Presets / With Triggers
 - a. Malfunctions

| 1) | NM10A, IRM CHANNEL 11 FAILURE- UPSCALE | Inserted |
|-----|--|----------|
| 2) | HV01B, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 12 | Inserted |
| 3) | RD04R1827, 18-27 Control Rod Failure - Stuck | Inserted |
| 4) | EC03B, EC RETURN VALVE FAILS OPEN(IV 39-06) | TRG 2 |
| 5) | RD34, Loss of CRD Instrument Air Pres., RT=5:00, FV=20 | TRG 6 |
| 6) | IA01, Loss of Instrument Air, RT=6:00, FV=65 | TRG 6 |
| 7) | RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1, FV=12 | Inserted |
| 8) | RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2, FV=12 | Inserted |
| 9) | RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3, FV=18 | Inserted |
| 10) | RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4, FV=12 | Inserted |
| 11) | RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5, FV=12 | Inserted |

b. Remotes

| 1) | FW01A, Condensate Pump 11 Discharge Valve 50-10, FV=close | TRG 25 |
|----|--|--------|
| 2) | FW52A, RMC-29-439 Switch: HPCI Channel 11 Power Switch, RV = Off | TRG 23 |
| 3) | FW52B, RMC-29-440 Switch: HPCI Channel 12 Power Switch, RV = Off | TRG 23 |

- c. Overrides
- DI-2936 Inop 1F10/31-03A PULL OU, On (FWIV Failure)
 DI-2939 Pos_1 1F10/31-03A PULL OU, On (FWIV Failure)
 Inserted

NMP1 NRC Scenario 2 December 2020



d. Annunciators

1) **F1-1-8**, Fail Off
2) **F3-1-4**, Fail Off
3) **F4-1-1**, Fail Off
TRG10

e. Event Triggers

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|---|---|-----------------------|
| TRG 1, Activates when CRD drive water pressure is raised above 300 psig to delete stuck rod | rdpnep01>290 | dmf rd04r1827 |
| TRG 20 – Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement | hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(177)==0 | bat n20scen2trg20.bat |

- f. Equipment Out of Service
 - 1) Reactor Build Exhaust Fan 12 secured with info/caution tag
 - 2) IRM 11 bypassed with info/caution tag
- g. Support Documentation
 - 1) N1-OP-15A section H.9.0, completed through step 9.3
 - 2) ReMA and Rod Movement Sheets for sequence exchange
- h. Miscellaneous
 - 1) DW Cooling Fan 11 secured
 - 2) Ensure batch file "n20scen2trg20.bat" is in the root batch file directory (NMP1PRE / NMP1 / OPENSIM_U1 / Batch)



SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

| ON COMING SHIFT: D DATE: Today | |
|---|--|
| PART I: To be <u>performed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. • Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs) | |
| PART II: To be <u>reviewed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. | |
| LCO Status (SRO)Shift Turnover Information Sheet | |
| Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status: | |
| Reactor power is approximately 85%. | |
| Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. | |
| IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking. | |
| A rod sequence exchange is in progress and has been placed on hold due to an oil leak from Condensate pump 11 motor. | |
| | |
| PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions: | |
| Shutdown Condensate pump 11 per N1-OP-15A section H.9.0. Then place the control switch in PTL in preparation for a clearance. | |
| Continue the Control Rod Sequence Exchange per ReMA. Scram time testing will not be performed | |

this shift.



Shift Turnover

| Instructor Actions / Plant Response | Operator Actions |
|---|---|
| Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown. | |
| Verify annunciator sound turned on If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown | |
| Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels. | Crew Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift |



Event #1: Shutdown Condensate Pump 11

| Event | The crew will shutdown Condensate Pump 11 and place in PTL |
|-------------|--|
| Information | |

| | SRO Directs shutdown of Condensate pump 11 per N1-OP-15A, Section H.9.0 |
|--|---|
| | Provides oversight for evolution Enters T.S. 3.1.8.b for removal of a redundant HPCI component from service, 15 day LCO |
| | ATC • Monitors plant parameters |
| Role Play: When directed to slowly close 50-10, acknowledge order, wait approximately 1 minute and insert remote: FW01A, Condensate Pump 11 Discharge Valve 50-10, FV=close TRG 25 Then report 50-10 is 90% closed. | Acknowledges direction to shutdown Condensate pump 11 May notifies SRO to enter LCO for HPCI Monitors Feedwater Booster pump suction pressure (computer point D454 ~ 123 psig) Directs operator in field to slowly close 50-10, BV - COND PMP 11 DISCHARGE WHEN the Condensate Pump 11 discharge valve is 90% closed, places the pump control switch in PTL Verifies: Maximum Condensate pump motor current ≤ |
| Role Play: If contacted as operator to report local FW pump suction pressure, immediately report FW pump suction pressure based on simulator value of FWBP discharge pressure minus 50 psig (~300 psi). Role Play: When directed to fully close 50-10, acknowledge order, wait approximately 15 seconds and report valve is fully closed. | Minimum FW Booster pump suction pressure within the acceptable range of curve shown in OP-15C attachment 4 (minimum pressure at 85% flow (~6 mlbs/hr) is 72 psig) Minimum FW pump suction pressure ≥ 200 psig Directs operator in field to fully close 50-10, BV - COND PMP 11 DISCHARGE Verifies no abnormal Main Condenser air in- |



Event

Information

Events #2 & #3: Rod Sequence Exchange, Stuck Control Rod

• Reactor power is approximately 85%

• The crew will perform a rod sequence exchange

One control rod is stuck and can be freed by raising drive water pressure

| Note: Lead examiner may move to the next event once sufficient action is observed on the reactivity manipulation. | SRO Directs performance of Control Rod Sequence Exchange per RMI and N1-OP-5 Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation Acknowledges control rod 18-27 is stuck Directs RO to perform N1-OP-5 section H.13.0 for the stuck control rod Acknowledges control rod 18-27 moves with higher drive water pressure Determines entry into Tech Spec 3.1.1.a(2) is required while the control rod is stuck. |
|---|---|
| Note: RMI includes rods 14-27, 38-27, 18-27, and 34-27 | ATC Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains copy of ReMA Withdraws control rods per rod movement sheets and N1-OP-5 Turns control rod power on Selects rod Uses CONTROL ROD MOVEMENT switch to notch rod Monitors APRM indications |



| Note: Verify TRG1 automatically inserts when drive water pressure is raised, to delete the stuck rod malfunction. | ATC Determines control rod 18-27 is stuck Performs N1-OP-5 section H.13.0 for the stuck control rod Raises drive water pressure by approximately 50 psig Determines control rod 18-27 is no longer stuck |
|---|--|
| | Monitors Feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV water level remains within program band (65" - 83") |



Event #4: Inadvertent Initiation of Emergency Condenser 12

| Event Information Emergency Condenser 12 goes into service inadvertently The crew will isolate the EC per the ARPs SRO makes Tech Spec determination. | | |
|---|---|--|
| | | |
| EC 12 Condensate Returnation Reactor power rises Reactor water level initial Expected Annunciators: | VALVE FAILS OPEN (IV 39- TRG 2 In Valve (39-06) opens | Recognize/report Emergency Condenser 12 initiation Recognize/report Reactor power and water level rising Recognize/report no valid Emergency Condenser initiation signal |
| • | | SRO Acknowledges reports from crew Directs response with ARP K1-1-5 Directs securing Emergency Condenser 12 Declares Emergency Condenser 12 inoperable but available Enters a 7 day LCO per Tech Spec 3.1.3.b May direct entry into N1-SOP-1.5, Unplanned Reactor Power Change |
| Note: The next event should water level has stabiliz | NOT be inserted until Reactor ed from this event. | BOPExecutes ARP K1-1-5Closes: |

o 39-08R EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 122,

o 39-10R EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 121

and/or



Event #5: Instrument Air Leak

Event

| Information | reactor Scram. | - ' |
|--|---|---|
| RD34, Loss of CRD Ins | aminer, insert malfunctions : strument Air Pres, RT=5:00, nt Air, RT=6:00, FV=65 TRG 6 | Recognizes/reports lowering instrument air pressure Observes start of standby IAC |
| minutes CRD air pressure lowers Expected Annunciators: L1-4-7, INST AIR BACK-0 | ompressor (IAC) loads ompressor (IAC) starts wers – Reaches 70# at ~4 | SRO Acknowledges reports Directs execution of ARP F3-3-2 May direct entry into SOP-20.1 May direct execution of ARP L1-4-7 Acknowledges instrument air pressure < 70 psig Directs manual Reactor scram (CT-1.0) Acknowledges scram report |
| | | Monitors plant parameters Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN or depresses RPS pushbuttons (CT-1.0) Provides scram report |
| | cted as operator check for air der. Wait 2 minutes and report | BOP • Executes ARP F3-3-2 |

• Lowering Instrument Air pressure and CRD air pressure leads to a manual

If directed executes ARP L1-4-7

Monitors instrument air pressure

below 60 psig

Dispatches Operator to check for air leaks

Reports when instrument air pressure lowers

air leakage on Reactor Building 237' West, near the

HCUs and it cannot be isolated.



Events #6 & #7: ATWS with Failure of FW Isolation Valves to Isolate

| ATWS with Failure of FW Isolation Valves to Isolate Crew responds per N1-EOP-3 |
|---|
|---|

| Verify the following malfunctions are preset: RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1, FV=12 RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2, FV=12 RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3, FV=18 RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4, FV=12 RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5, FV=12 Control rods partially insert Reactor power remains > 6% | CREW Diagnose failure of control rods to insert Diagnose Reactor power above 6% |
|---|---|
| | Enters EOP-2, RPV Control, due to Reactor power above 6% when scram required Answers "Are all rods inserted to at least position 04?" NO Answers "Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron?" NO Exits EOP-2, enters EOP-3, Failure to Scram Directs ADS bypassed Directs prevention of Core Spray injection per EOP-1 att 4 May enter EOP-4 on high torus temperature Directs lockout of Containment Spray pumps except pump(s) used for torus cooling |



SRO Continued Events 6 and 7 continued EOP-3 Level Leg Actions: Directs bypass of low-low RPV water level MSIV isolation per EOP-1 att 2 Determines Reactor power is above 6% and RPV water level is above -41 inches • Directs terminate and prevent of all RPV injection except boron and CRD per EOP-1 att 24 (CT-2.0) Directs RPV level lowered to at least -41 inches Directs RPV water level controlled -109 to -41 inches with Condensate/FW and CRD EOP-3 Pressure Leg Actions: If any ERV is cycling: • Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers • Directs ERVs opened to lower RPV pressure to less than 965 psig Directs RPV pressure controlled below 1080 psig using TBVs, ECs and/or ERVs Monitors Figure M, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit



| Frants C and 7 and transit | ODO santinuad | | |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| Events 6 and 7 continued | SRO continued | | |
| | EOP-3 Power Leg Actions: | | |
| | Directs initiation of ARI | | |
| | Answers "Is the Turbine Generator On-line?" NO | | |
| | Answers "Reactor power?" Above 6% | | |
| | Directs Recirc pumps verified tripped | | |
| | Directs execution of EOP-3.1, Alternate Rod | | |
| | Insertion (CT-3.0) | | |
| | If power is oscillating more than 25% or before | | |
| | Torus temperature reaches 110°F: | | |
| | Records Liquid Poison tank level | | |
| | Directs Liquid Poison injection (CT-3.0) | | |
| | Acknowledges first Liquid Poison pump | | |
| | injecting | | |
| | | | |
| | RODepresses RPS pushbuttons | | |
| | Initiates ARI | | |
| | Bypasses Core Spray IV interlocks per N1-EOP-1 | | |
| | Att 4 by installing six jumpers (17, 18, 19, 24, 25, | | |
| | 26) inside Panel N | | |
| | Bypasses low-low RPV water level MSIV isolation | | |
| | per EOP-1 att 2 by installing four jumpers (1, 2, 8, | | |
| | 9) inside Panel N | | |
| | Performs EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) | | |
| | and/or 4 (manual scrams) (see actions below) | | |
| | Inserts SRMs | | |
| | Inserts IRMs | | |
| | Controls IRM recorders and range switches as | | |
| | required to monitor power | | |
| | Reports when APRMs are < 6% | | |
| | Reports status of control rod insertion | | |
| | | | |



Events 6 and 7 continued

Note: Control rods will successfully insert using RMCS.

Note: RO will likely have to fully open the CRD flow control valve and/or close 44-04 in order to achieve rod movement via RMCS; these methods are preferential to closing 44-167 due to ability to perform from the control room and not preventing further scram attempts by blocking the charging water header.

Note: When ARI is overridden, the scram is reset, and annunciator F4-1-1 clears, then TRG 20 will activate. Verify this occurs and the RD33 malfunctions all delete. This allows all control rods to insert on the next manual scram attempt.

As directed by the examiner, if it's desired to 'time compress' scramming to all rods in, **insert TRG 10** to fail off appropriate annunciators and **insert TRG 20** to remove ATWS malfunctions all <u>AFTER</u> verifying the scram is reset.

RO Continued

Possible EOP-3.1 Section 3 Actions:

- Verify a CRD Pump running
- Place Reactor Mode Switch in REFUEL
- Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE
- Installed RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
- Reset the scram
- Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions of core (use LPRM indications) (CT-3.0)
- If more drive pressure is required, then perform one of more of the following:
 - Fully open CRD Flow Control Valve (F panel)
 - Close 44-04, Control Rod Drive Water Cont V (F Panel)
 - Close 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237')

Possible EOP-3.1 Section 4 Actions:

- Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE
- Installed RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
- Reset the scram
- Verify open 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237')
- When the SDV is drained, then initiate a manual scram (CT-3.0)



Events 6 and 7 continued

Role Play: When directed as in plant operator to place HPCI keylock selector switches Ch11 and Ch 12 in OFF, wait one minute and insert remotes:

FW52A, RMC-29-439 Switch: HPCI Channel 11

Power Switch, RV = Off

FW52B, RMC-29-440 Switch: HPCI Channel 12

Power Switch, RV = Off

TRG 23

Then report that HPCI switches are off.

BOP

- Bypasses ADS
- Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD per N1-EOP-1 Att 24 (CT-2.0):
 - Attempts to close both FEEDWATER
 ISOLATION Valves 11 and 12
 - Determines FWIVs will not close and places FWPs in PTL.
 - Selects Manual on 11, 12 and 13 FWP Valve
 Control selector switches
 - Closes 11, 12 and 13 Feedwater FCV (Knurled Knob) full counterclockwise
 - Directs EO to place HPCI keylock selector switches in the Aux Control Room
 - Verifies closed, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE
 - Verifies in MAN, FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE,
 AND set to zero output
 - Verifies in MAN, FWP 12 BYPASS VALVE,
 AND set to zero output
- Informs SRO when RPV water level reaches -41 inches



BOP continued

- If any ERV is cycling:
 - Initiates Emergency Condensers
 - IF initiating EC Loop 11, places 39-05, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 control switch in OPEN
 - IF initiating EC Loop 12, places 39-06, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 12 control switch in OPEN (and opens steam IVs if isolated due to previous event)
 - Subsequently controls EC valves per EOP-HC att 9
 - Manually opens ERVs to lower RPV pressure to 965 psig
- Controls RPV pressure below 1080 psig with TBVs, ECs and/or ERVs
- Verifies all Recirc Pumps tripped
- Initiates Liquid Poison as directed
 - Reports initial tank level
 - Starts Liquid Poison pump 11 or 12
 - Verifies RWCU isolated

Event Termination Criteria

- RPV water level controlled in assigned band
- Reactor power < 6%
- Control rod insertion in progress or complete

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 | Scenario No.: NRC-3 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Examiners: | Operators: | |
| | | |

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 87% power. Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking.

Turnover: Recirc Pump 11 MG set has been repaired and is ready to be returned to service. Restore 11 recirc pump to service.

After starting Recirc Pump 11 MG set and placing in service, operate it for one hour while maintenance takes readings before returning to 100% power.

| Event No. | Malf. No. | Event Type* | Event Description |
|--|------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| 1 | N/A | N -BOP, SRO | Restore Recirc Pump 15 to service |
| 2 | NM19C | I-ATC, SRO | APRM 13 fails upscale ARP (2017 NRC Scenario 4) |
| 3 | AD05A | C –BOP R-ATC TS-SRO | ERV Inadvertently opens (2017 NRC Scenario 3) N1-SOP-1.4, N1-SOP-1.1, Technical Specifications |
| 4 | ED05 | C-All TS-SRO | Powerboard 12 Electrical Fault N1-SOP-30.2, N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-1.1, Technical Specifications |
| 5 | EC01 | M -All | Steam leak inside Drywell N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4 |
| 6 | PC10A PC10C | C-All | Failed open Torus to Drywell vacuum breaker N1-EOP-4 (2017 NRC Scenario 3) |
| 7 | FW28A FW28B CS07 | C –BOP, SRO | HPCI fails to initiate, Core Spray fails to auto-inject N1-EOP-2 (2017 NRC Scenario 3) |
| 8 | CT01A CT01B | C- ATC, SRO | Containment Spray pumps 111 and 112 trip N1-EOP-8, N1-EOP-4 |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | | | |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario | No.: NRC-3 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|---|------------|---|
| Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) | 3 | |
| Event 6, 7, 8 | | |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) | 3 | |
| Events 2, 3, 4 3. Major transients (1-2) | | |
| Event 5 | 1 | |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4 | 2 | |
| Entry into contingency EOP with substantive actions (at least 1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-8 | 1 | |
| 6. Preidentified Critical tasks (at least 2) | 3 | |
| CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: | | CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION: |
| CT-1.0: Given an inadvertently open ERV at power, close the ERV or insert a manual scram prior to Torus temperature exceeding 110°F, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.4 | | A manual Reactor scram is required before Torus temperature exceeds 110°F. This reduces the rate of energy production and thus heat input to the Torus. Additionally, this allows evaluating the success of the Reactor scram before boron injection would be required due to Torus temperature in the event of a failure to scram. Closing the ERV prior to the need for the scram avoids the need for these more substantial actions, prevents challenging the plant with a scram, and stops heat input to the Torus. |
| CT- 2.0: Given a LOCA in the Drywell and a failure of HPCI to initiate, the crew will inject with preferred and alternate injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2. Injection with preferred and alternate injection systems may be initiated before RPV level lowers to -84 inches, but must be initiated within 15 minutes of RPV water level lowering below -84 inches. | | Maintaining Reactor water level above - 84 inches ensures adequate core cooling through the preferred method of core submergence. This protects the integrity of the fuel cladding. |
| CT- 3.0: Given a LOCA in the Drywell and degraded Containment Spray capability, the crew will execute N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, when it is determined Torus pressure cannot be maintained inside the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit, in accordance with N1-EOP-4. N1-EOP-8 may be entered prior to exceeding PSP, but must be executed within 15 minutes of exceeding PSP. | | A Blowdown is required to limit further release of energy into the Primary Containment and to ensure that the RPV is depressurized while pressure suppression capability is still available. This protects the integrity of the Primary Containment. |

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins at approximately 87% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance.

Immediately after assuming the shift the crew will be directed to restore Recirculation Pump 15 to service and return to full power. The crew will assess plant conditions and verify Recirculation Flow is less than 50 Mlbm/hr. They will then return Recirculation Pump 15 to service.

After the crew has placed the recirc pump in service, APRM 13 will fail upscale causing a half scram. The crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram.

When the half scram is reset, ERV 111 will inadvertently open. The crew will enter N1-SOP-1.4, Stuck Open ERV. The crew will perform an emergency power reduction to approximately 85% power, then take actions to close ERV 111 (Critical Task). These actions will close the ERV, but leave it inoperable. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact.

Next, Powerboard 12 will de-energize due to an electrical fault. This will cause loss of multiple major loads, including a second Recirculation pump, a Service Water pump, and a Circulating Water pump. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-30.2. This will include lowering Reactor power to restore the plant within single Circulating Water pump operating limitations. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact of this power loss.

A steam leak will then develop in the Primary Containment. The crew will insert a scram. Following the scram, HPCI will fail to initiate, requiring manual action to establish injection with preferred and/or alternate injection systems to maintain RPV water level (**Critical Task**).

When the crew attempts to spray the Containment, Containment Spray pumps 111 and 112 will trip. The two remaining Containment Spray pumps will be insufficient to avoid violating PSP, and the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown (Critical Task).



| | | сору | 01 |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Training Id: NMP1 NRC 2020 Scenario | | Revision: | 0.0 |
| Title: Simulator Sce | enario #3 | | |
| | | | |
| | <u>Signature / Printed N</u> | <u>ame</u> | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | | Paul Isham | 1/28/20 |
| Validated By | | Dave Mason | 7/15/20 |
| | | Jason Quick | |
| | | Jeremy Spring | |
| Facility Reviewer | | Phil Nichols | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-1, Nuclear Steam Supply System
- 2. N1-OP-43B, Normal Power Operations
- 3. N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction
- 4. N1-SOP-1.4, Stuck Open ERV
- 5. N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 6. N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump Trip at Power
- 7. N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of Power Board 12
- 8. N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- 9. N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment Control
- 10. N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 11. N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- 12. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. Scenario Description

Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:

The scenario begins at approximately 87% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance.

Immediately after assuming the shift the crew will be directed to restore Recirculation Pump 15 to service and return to full power. The crew will assess plant conditions and verify Recirculation Flow is less than 50 Mlbm/hr. They will then return Recirculation Pump 15 to service.

After the crew has placed the recirc pump in service, APRM 13 will fail upscale causing a half scram. The crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram.

When the half scram is reset, ERV 111 will inadvertently open. The crew will enter N1-SOP-1.4, Stuck Open ERV. The crew will perform an emergency power reduction to approximately 85% power, then take actions to close ERV 111 (Critical Task). These actions will close the ERV, but leave it inoperable. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact.

Next, Powerboard 12 will de-energize due to an electrical fault. This will cause loss of multiple major loads, including a second Recirculation pump, a Service Water pump, and a Circulating Water pump. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-30.2. This will include lowering Reactor power to restore the plant within single Circulating Water pump operating limitations. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact of this power loss.

A steam leak will then develop in the Primary Containment. The crew will insert a scram. Following the scram, HPCI will fail to initiate, requiring manual action to establish injection with preferred and/or alternate injection systems to maintain RPV water level (**Critical Task**).

When the crew attempts to spray the Containment, Containment Spray pumps 111 and 112 will trip. The two remaining Containment Spray pumps will be insufficient to avoid violating PSP, and the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown (Critical Task).

1. Termination Criteria

a. RPV Blowdown in progress, Primary Containment pressure controlled per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17



Critical Tasks

CT-1, Given an inadvertently open ERV at power, close the ERV or insert a manual scram prior to Torus temperature exceeding 110°F, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.4

Justification:

Safety Significance: A manual Reactor scram is required before Torus temperature exceeds 110°F. This reduces the rate of energy production and thus heat input to the Torus. Additionally, this allows evaluating the success of the Reactor scram before boron injection would be required due to Torus temperature in the event of a failure to scram. Closing the ERV prior to the need for the scram avoids the need for these more substantial actions, prevents challenging the plant with a scram, and stops heat input to the Torus.

<u>Cueing:</u> ERV position, ERV acoustic monitors, ERV tailpipe temperature, Torus temperature, Reactor pressure, and steam flow indicate an open ERV. N1-SOP-1.4 provides direction to close the ERV or scram the Reactor.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Pulling ERV fuses, directing ERV closure actions in the field, rotating the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN, and/or depressing the manual scram pushbuttons will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> ERV position, ERV acoustic monitors, ERV tailpipe temperature, Torus temperature, Reactor pressure, and steam flow will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to close the ERV. Control rod position and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to scram the Reactor.

<u>Bounding Criteria:</u> Based on procedural requirements in N1-SOP-1.4. A manual reactor scram must be inserted before Torus water temperature reaches 110F.



CT-2, Given a LOCA in the Drywell and a failure of HPCI to initiate, the crew will inject with preferred and alternate injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2. Injection with preferred and alternate injection systems may be initiated before RPV level lowers to -84 inches, but must be initiated within 15 minutes of RPV water level lowering below -84 inches.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Maintaining Reactor water level above -84 inches ensures adequate core cooling through the preferred method of core submergence. This protects the integrity of the fuel cladding.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple Reactor water level indicators and annunciators will provide indications of lowering Reactor water level. N1-EOP-2 provides multiple procedure steps directing injection with preferred and alternate injection systems.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of pumps and/or valves in the preferred or alternate injection system(s) will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Multiple Reactor water level indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of injection with preferred and alternate injection systems.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

CT-3, Given a LOCA in the Drywell and degraded Containment Spray capability, the crew will execute N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, when it is determined Torus pressure cannot be maintained inside the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit, in accordance with N1-EOP-4. N1-EOP-8 may be entered prior to exceeding PSP, but must be executed within 15 minutes of exceeding PSP.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> A Blowdown is required to limit further release of energy into the Primary Containment and to ensure that the RPV is depressurized while pressure suppression capability is still available. This protects the integrity of the Primary Containment.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple Primary Containment pressure indicators and annunciators will provide indications. N1-EOP-4 provides direction to monitor the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit and blowdown if required.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> The crew will manually open valves to initiate Emergency Condensers. The crew will manually open ERVs.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Emergency Condenser and ERV instrumentation will provide indication that these systems are functioning properly once placed in service. Multiple Reactor pressure indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the blowdown.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

- 3. Length
 - a. ~60 minutes



- 4. Mitigation Strategy Code
 - a. PC4, RPV Blowdown due to PSP
- 5. Technical Specifications
 - a. TS 3.1.5
 - b. TS 3.1.7
 - c. TS 3.1.8
- 6. EAL Classification
 - a. Alert, EAL FA1 Any loss or any potential loss of either fuel clad barrier or RCS barrier.
- 7. Special Orders
 - a. None



B. Initial Conditions

- a. IC-153
- 2. Presets / With Triggers
 - a. Malfunctions

| 1) | NM10A, IRM CHANNEL 11 FAILURE- UPSCALE | Inserted |
|-----|---|----------|
| 2) | HV01B, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 12 | Inserted |
| 3) | NM19C, APRM Channel 13 Failure – Upscale | TRG 1 |
| 4) | AD05A, ERV 111 Failure - Opens Electrically, 2 + c/w F-PNL FUSE | TRG 3 |
| 5) | ED05, PB 12 Electrical Fault | TRG 5 |
| 6) | EC01, Steam Supply Line Break in PC, FV=11 | TRG 7 |
| 7) | PC10A, BV 68-01 Fails Open | TRG 23 |
| 8) | PC10C, BV 68-03 Fails Open | TRG 23 |
| 9) | FW28A, HPCI MODE: FWP 11 AUTO-START FAIL | Inserted |
| 10) | FW28B, HPCI MODE: FWP 12 AUTO-START FAIL | Inserted |
| 11) | CT01A, CT Pump 111 Trip | Inserted |
| 12) | CT01B, CT Pump 112 Trip | Inserted |
| 13) | CS07, CS Injection Valves Failure to Auto Open | Inserted |

- b. Remotes
- 1) AD01A, ERV 111 Fuses, Pulled TRG 27
- 2) AD07, Acoustic Monitor Alarm Reset, RESET TRG 28
 - c. Overrides
- 1) None



- d. Annunciators
- 1) None
 - e. Event Triggers

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|---|--------------|---------------------------|
| TRG 23, Initiated when Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown to increase the size of the leak. | zdrpstdn==1 | imf ec01 (0 0) 30 4:00 11 |
| TRG 24, Initiates when Containment Spray flow is initiated to increase size of the leak. | ctfdw>100 | imf ec01 (0 0) 45 1:00 30 |

- f. Equipment Out of Service
 - 1) Reactor Build Exhaust Fan 12 secured with info/caution tag
 - 2) IRM 11 bypassed with info/caution tag
 - 3) Recirc Pump 15 secured, ready for start
- g. Support Documentation
 - 1) N1-OP-1 marked up through step H.4.4
 - 2) ReMA for 15 Recirc Pump start
- h. Miscellaneous
 - 1) DW Cooling Fan 15 secured



SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

| ON | COMING SHIFT: D DATE: Today |
|---------|---|
| PA • | RT I: To be <u>performed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs) |
| РΑ | RT II: To be <u>reviewed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. |
| • | LCO Status (SRO) Shift Turnover Information Sheet |
| Evo | olutions/General Information/Equipment Status: |
| • | Reactor power is approximately 87%. |
| • | Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking. |
| • | RRP 15 removed from service for repairs and is ready to be returned to service. TS 3.1.7.e. Four loop operation. |
| | |
| РА | RT III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions: |
| • | Start RRP 15 per N1-OP-1, H.4.0, and return to five-loop operation. N1-OP-1, H.4.0, signed off up to step H.4.5. |
| • | Reactor power is at 87%. Verify recirc flow <50 Mlbm/hr to support starting RRP 15. |

After starting Recirc Pump 15 MG set, operate it on the master flow controller for one hour while

maintenance takes readings before returning to 100% power.



Shift Turnover

| Instructor Actions / Plant Response | Operator Actions |
|---|---|
| Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown. | |
| Verify annunciator sound turned on If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown | |
| Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels. | Crew Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift |



Event #1: Restore Recirc Pump 15 to Service

| Event | The plant is operating in 4 loop operation |
|-------------|--|
| Information | The crew will restore RRP 15 to service |

| Note: Crew directed to start RRP 15 in pre-brief, starting at N1-OP-1, step H.4.5. | SRO Direct start up of RRP 15, using N1-OP-1, starting at step H.4.5 and the ReMA Supervise reactivity manipulation Acknowledge report that RRP 15 is in service Determine TS 3.1.7.e no longer applies and the LCO Actions can be exited |
|--|--|
| | Continuously observe the following: APRMs Recirc flow Monitor P/F map and transfer from 4 loop to 5 loop map when the startup is performed |
| CAUTIONS from N1-OP-1 Failure to raise Recirc Pump speed during opening of discharge valve may result in stalled rotor and pump trip due to reverse flow. To Prevent backflow thru the RRP, discharge valve should be opened before MG frequency lowers to 20 Hz. Frequency will raise, then drop quickly, then raise again before SLOWLY lowering. Discharge BV should be opened when frequency is slowly lowering. | Verify recirculation flow < 50 x 10⁶ lb/hr Verify RRP 15 GEMAC in MAN and matched with other four GEMACs but no greater than 50% Verify RRP 15 discharge valve closed Verify RRP 15 suction and discharge bypass valves are open Make a plant announcement for start of RRP 15 Place RRP 15 control switch to START and observe indications MG MOTOR starts, Amp Meter Amps increase then decrease MG Generator accelerates to proper speed (approx 50 - 60 Hz) Generator Field Bkr closes Generator slows toward 20% speed (Approximately 11.5 Hz) |

Page **11** of **30**



Role Play: As EO sent to Aux Control Room, wait one minute then report you have reset 50SR Pump Motor Stalled Rotor Target

Role Play: As EO, when requested report MG set oil temperature is 120°F and stable.

BOP Continued

- WHEN speed (Frequency Meter) is between 30 and 25 Hz, open REACTOR R PUMP DISCH VALVE
- Verify RRP 11 maintained less than or equal to OP limits
- Adjust pump speed to match other pumps
- Null RRP 11 controller and shift to BAL or AUTO
- Verify power/flow map updated to five loop requirements
- Dispatch EO to reset 50SR Pump Motor Stalled Rotor Target (Aux Control Room)
- Dispatch EO to check MG set oil temperature locally
- May perform N1-ARP-F2-1-1 action to depress PUMP MOTOR VIBRATION RESET pushbutton on F Panel, clearing annunciator F2-1-1



Event #2: APRM 13 Upscale Failure

| Event | APRM 13 fails upscale |
|-------------|---|
| Information | Crew bypasses APRM and resets half scram IAW ARPs |

When directed by examiner, insert malfunction: NM19C APRM CHANNEL 13 FAIL UPSCALE

TRG 1

APRM 13 Fails Upscale The following annunciators alarm F2-1-6 APRM 11-14 F1-1-1 RPS CH 11 REACT NEUTRON MONITOR F1-2-1 RPS CH 11 REACTOR AUTO TRIP F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK

Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report from SRO. Advise that you will provide requested assistance.

The APRM will not be repaired during the scenario.

Note: Technical Specification requirements from Tables 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g are satisfied with only one APRM failed.

ATC

- Recognize/report RPS Channel 11 trip
- Reports APRM 13 Upscale

SRO

- Acknowledges report from RO
- Directs RO/BOP to follow ARPs for failed APRM, Half-SCRAM and ROD BLOCK
- Contacts WEC/Management and informs them of failed instrument. Requests assistance in correcting problem.
- Reviews Technical Specifications for impact of failed instrument.
 - o TS 3.6.2.a requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to cause a SCRAM on High Flux
 - TS 3.6.2.g requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to initiate a ROD BLOCK on High
- Determines that APRM 13 may be bypassed
- Directs RO to bypass APRM 13 and reset RPS Channel 11 trip.



Event 2 continued BOP Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains ARP F2-1-6 and executes Verifies alarm computer points B183 (ROD BLOCK) and D052 (UPSCALE HIHI FLUX) Observes LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries Drawer (Panel "G") and determines that APRM 13 has an upscale condition If required, bypass APRM per N1-OP-38C. Obtains/reviews ARP F1-1-1 Confirm RPS Channel 11 tripped Confirms other channel readings are normal/ Obtains/reviews ARP F1-2-1 Determines that failed APRM caused trip When cause is corrected (APRM is bypassed), reset RPS Channel 11 Obtains/reviews ARP F3-4-4 Confirms alarm by observing computer point C067 RWM ROD BLOCK Determines caused by failed APRM When directed to verify APRM 13 bypassed, observes APRM 13 bypass light on Panel "G" (LPRM-APRM AUXILIARIES DRAWER) **ATC** Note: When APRM 13 is bypassed F2-1-6, F3-4-4 and F1-1-1 should all clear. Completes RO actions for ARP F2-1-6 The LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries drawer will indicate the Determines that APRM 13 has UPSCALE/HI-HI HIHI condition until the APRM is bypassed then the condition BYPASS indicating light will also be illuminated. Monitors other APRM channels to determine that power is stable/unchanged Following the bypassing of APRM 13 and the reset of Verifies proper power to flow ratio on 5-Loop the half-scram, all annunciators will be clear. **Operating Curve**



| Event 2 continued | ВОР |
|---------------------------|---|
| Bypass APRM | Bypasses APRM 13 per N1-OP-38C Places APRM BYPASS joystick on Panel "E" to "APRM 13" position Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on E Panel. Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on LPRM-APRM auxiliaries drawer (G Panel). Confirm computer printout "APRM BYPASS YES". |
| Reset RPS Channel 11 Trip | After APRM bypassed reset RPS Channel 11 trip Verifies F1-1-1 clear Depress SCRAM RESET pushbutton on "E" Verifies F1-2-1 clear and resets annunciators Report APRM 13 bypassed and ARP actions completed to SRO |



Event #3: ERV 111 Inadvertently Opens

| Event Information ERV 111 Inadvertently Opens Operators will respond per SOP-1.4 to attempt to shut the ERV and SOP1.1 to lower power. The ERV will shut when fuses are pulled |
|---|
|---|

When directed by lead examiner, **insert** malfunction:

AD05A, ERV 111 Failure - Opens Inadvertently

TRG 3

ERV 111 opens
Reactor pressure lowers slightly
Reactor power lowers and then rises slightly
Torus temperature rises
Torus level rises
Expected annunciators:

F1-4-8, STEAM LINE DETECTION SYS FLOW OFF NORM

F2-4-1, MAIN STM LINE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE OPEN

H3-4-5, PRESS SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES FLOW

CREW

- Acknowledges/reports annunciators
- Diagnoses ERV 111 has inadvertently opened



| Event 3 continued | Acknowledges reports Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.4, Stuck Open ERV Directs emergency power reduction to approximately 85% power Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation Determines that ERV 111 is inoperable per TS 3.1.5.b, requiring a 10 hour shutdown Directs taking action to close ERV 111 or directs a manual scram prior to Torus temperature exceeding 110°F, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.4 |
|-------------------|--|
| | Performs emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 Reduces Recirculation master controller to lower power to approximately 85% Monitors APRMs Monitors Recirculation flow Monitors Feedwater flow and RPV water level Monitors position on power to flow map If Torus temperature approaches 110°F, inserts manual Reactor scram |



Event 3 continued

Role Play: When directed as Operator to go to Auxiliary Control Room and verify ERV 111 is open, wait one minute and report ERV 111 is open. Subsequent reports on acoustic monitor status may be given immediately, with close attention paid to the actual status of the ERV.

Note: Safety glasses, gloves, no metal, and long sleeves or a lab coat are required for pulling fuses in F panel.

Role Play: If the Operator is directed to pull fuses or place the ERV switches to PWR-OFF in the RB wait 3 minutes and **insert remote**:

AD01A, ERV 111 Fuses, FV=pulled

TRG 27

Report fuses are pulled -or- switches are in PWR-OFF position.

Role Play: When directed as operator to reset the acoustic monitor, wait 1 minute and **insert remote**:

AD07, Acoustic Monitor Alarm Reset, FV=reset

TRG 28

Report acoustic monitor is reset.

BOP

- Enters N1-SOP-1.4
- Determines ERV 111 is open using:
 - Valve indicating lights on F panel
 - Red ERV flow indicating light on F panel
- Sends an operator to the Aux Control Room to verify ERV open using Acoustic Monitor
- May send an operator to RB 237' to standby for pulling local ERV fuses
- Attempts to close ERV 111 by performing one or all of the following:
 - Depresses ADS Timer Reset pushbuttons
 - Cycles Control Switch for ERV 111
 - Pulls control power fuses F15 and F30 in F panel (ERV 111)
 - o OR
 - Directs operator to pull ERV 111 fuses or place ERV switches to PWR-OFF on RB 237'

CT-1

December 2020

- Checks with operator in Aux Control Room to see if ERV is still open
- Determines/verifies ERV closes
- Directs reset of acoustic monitor
- Notifies crew that ERV 111 has closed
- Monitors Torus temperature
- Reports if/when Torus temperature exceeds 85°F
 or Torus level exceeds 11.25'
 - Places Containment Spray pumps in PTL if directed

NMP1 NRC Scenario 3



BOP continued

- Places Torus cooling in service when directed,
 per N1-SOP-1.4, att 2 or N1-EOP-1 att 16:
 - Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV(s) for selected loop
 - Verifies closed 80-115
 - Verifies closed 80-114
 - Verifies closed Cont Spray Discharge IV for selected loop
 - Verifies open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop
 - Fully opens 80-118
 - Starts Containment Spray Raw Water pump in selected loop
 - Starts Containment Spray pump in selected loop



Event #4: Powerboard 12 Electrical Fault

| Event | 4160V Power board 12 de-energizes and will not be available for the remainder |
|-------------|---|
| Information | of the scenario. |

When directed by lead examiner, **insert** malfunction:

ED05, PB 12 Electrical Fault

TRG 5

Reactor power lowers due to RRP trips

Reactor water level rises due to RRP trips

Expected Annunciators:

A5-1-6, PB 12 R122 TRIP

A5-4-7, POWER BD 17 LOW BUS VOLTAGE

Also the following equipment trips:

Reactor Recirculation Pump 14/15

Three Drywell Fans

Condensate Pump 13

Circulating Water Pump 12

Service Water Pump 12

TBCLC Pump 12

IAC 12

Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 (already OOS)

CREW

- Diagnose/report loss of PB 12
- Recognize/report loss of:
 - Reactor Recirculation Pump 14/15
 - Three Drywell Fans
 - Condensate Pump 13
 - Circulating Water Pump 12
 - Service Water Pump 12
 - RBCLC Pump 13
 - TBCLC Pump 12
 - IAC 12
- Recognize/report drop in Reactor power
- Recognize/report lowering condenser vacuum



SRO

- Acknowledges reports from crew
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of PB 12
- Directs Emergency Power Reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 to stabilize condenser vacuum, as necessary
- Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.3, Recirculation
 Pump Trip
- Directs RO to re-energize Powerboards 17A and 13B/C-15B/C
- May enter N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control, on loss of Reactor Building D/P
 - Directs restoration of Reactor Building D/P with either RBVS or RBEVS
- Reviews Technical Specifications
- Acknowledges that the APRMs are inoperable while the RRP discharge valves are still open
- Determines Technical Specification 3.1.7.e limits
 Reactor power to 90% in 3 loop operation
- Determines Core Operating Limits Report
 (COLR) requires APLHGR and MCPR penalties
- Determines Technical Specification 3.1.8.b is entered again for loss of power to Feedwater pump 12 and Condensate pump 13, 15 day LCO
- May enter EOP-4 if DW conditions permit.

Note: On the loss of Powerboard 12, Recirc pumps 14 and 15 trip. The APRMs are inoperable due to reverse flow through the tripped Recirc loops. The APRMs will be declared operable once the discharge valves are closed.



ATC

- Acknowledges direction from SRO
- · Confirms plant is stable by verifying:
 - No thermal hydraulic Instability
 - 3 Recirc pumps running
 - Not operating in the Restricted Zone
- Executes N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction, to lower recirc flow and/or insert CRAM rods to stabilize condenser vacuum, as required
- Determines plant operating point on the 3-loop power to flow curves

Role Play:

If dispatched to investigate Powerboard 12, wait 2 minutes then report that the normal supply breaker (R122) tripped on overcurrent.

If dispatched to investigate Powerboard 17A, wait 2 minutes then report that there are no problems evident at Powerboard 17. Report that electrical maintenance has also looked at the Powerboard and concurs with re-energizing it.

Role Play:

If dispatched to lineup Steam Packing Exhauster 11, wait 4 minutes, then **insert remote**:

MS08, SPE 11 SUCTION VLV, FV=open

Then report task completion.

If asked to also close suction valve to Steam Packing Exhauster 12, wait 2 minutes, then **insert remote**:

MS09, SPE 12 SUCTION VLV, FV=close

Then report task completion.

BOP

- Executes N1-SOP-30.2, Loss of Power Board 12
- Starts Service Water pump 11
- Coordinates with ATC to monitor APRMs and LPRMs
- Verifies TBCLC pump 11 running
- Verifies IAC 11 running
- Verifies RBCLC pumps running
- Verifies Steam Packing Exhauster 11 running
- Observes annunciator A5-2-8 in alarm
- Determines Power Board 12 is faulted and cannot be reenergized



Event 4 continued

DW Cooling Fans 11, 12, & 13 are restored, if not green flagged previously. DW temperatures begin to lower

Role Play: As operator when directed to energize Powerboards 13B/C-15B/C, acknowledge order. If asked about status during remainder of scenario, report that you are being briefed by the WEC.

Role Play: As operator when directed to restore Offgas vacuum pump, acknowledge order. If called for a status on actions, report that you are being briefed by the WEC.

BOP continued

- Restores power to Powerboard 17A as follows:
 - Opens R1051
 - Closes R1052
 - Verifies Power Board 17B amps <962
- Dispatches operator to re-energize Power Boards
 13 B/C, 14 B/C, and 15 B/C per attachment 4
- Notifies SRO that APRMs are inoperable
- Closes Recirc pump 14 and 15 discharge valves
- Holds open for 2-3 seconds Recirc pump 14 and
 15 discharge valve
- Records time when Recirc pump 14 and 15 discharge valve is cracked open
- Executes N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump Trip, as time permits
- Dispatches operator to restore Offgas Vacuum
 Pump



Event 4 continued

BOP continued

- Respond to either annunciator (or as directed by SRO) and restore RB D/P:
 - L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11-12 TRIP –
 VIB
 - Verifies closed Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 outlet damper
 - Starts Reactor Building Exhaust Fan11
 - L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS
 - o Starts RBEVS per OP-10

Possible actions in OP-10 Section H.1.0 to start RBEVS

- Verifies open 202-36, EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV
- Verifies closed the following valves:
 - 202-47, EM VENTILATION TIE BV
 - 202-74, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV
 - 202-75, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV
- Places 202-37(38), EM VENTILATION LOOP
 11(12) INLET BV control switch to OPEN
- Verifies open 202-37(38), EM VENTILATION LOOP 11(12) INLET BV
- Starts 202-53(33), EVS FAN 11(12)
- Verifies open 202-34(35), EM VENT EXHAUST
 FAN 11(12) OUTLET BV
- Confirms proper operation of 202-50(51), EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11(12) INLET FCV, by observing indicating lights and flow indication
- Notifies Rad Protection that the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system is in service

Role Play: As RP, acknowledge report that RBEVS is in service and RBVS is secured.



Events #5, #6, #7, and #8: Steam Leak Inside Drywell, Vacuum Breaker Fails Open, Failure of HPCI and Core Spray to Initiate, Trip of Containment Spray Pumps 111 and 112

| Event | • | EC Steam line Break in the Drywell with multiple system failures |
|-------------|---|--|
| Information | | |

When directed by the lead examiner, **insert** malfunction:

EC01, Steam Supply Line Break in PC, FV=11

TRG 7

Drywell humidity, pressure and temperature rise Drywell leakage rises Expected annunciators: H2-1-1, Drywell Floor Drain Level High H2-4-7, Drywell Water Leak Detection Sys

K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure High-Low

F1-1-5(4-1-4), RPS Ch 11(12) Drywell Press High

Verify the following **malfunctions** are **preset**:

FW28A, HPCI Mode Failure to Initiate 11
FW28B, HPCI Mode Failure to Initiate 12
CT01A, CT Pump 111 Trip
CT01B, CT Pump 112 Trip
CS07, CS Injection Valves Failure to Auto Open

RPV water level slowly lowering
Containment Spray pump 111 red light off, green light on and amps go to zero
Containment Spray pump 112 red light off, green light on and amps go to zero
Core Spray IVs do NOT open at 365 psig
Expected annunciator:
K1-1-7, Containment Spray Pump 111 Trip Fail to Run

K1-1-8, Containment Spray Pump 112 Trip Fail to Run

CREW

- Diagnose/report degrading containment parameters
- Acknowledge/report annunciators
- Diagnose failure of HPCI to automatically initiate
- Diagnose the trip of Containment Spray pumps
 111 and 112



SRO Events 5, 6, 7, and 8 continued Acknowledges reports Directs manual scram Verify the following malfunctions automatically Acknowledges scram report insert when the mode switch is taken to SHUTDOWN: Enters N1-EOP-2 on low RPV water level Directs N1-SOP-1 actions EC01, Steam Supply Line Break in PC, IV=11, Directs RPV water level controlled 53-95" with RT=4:00, FV=30 PC10A, BV 68-01 Fails Open Condensate/FW and CRD PC10C, BV 68-03 Fails Open When notified of the failure of HPCI to initiate. **TRG 23** directs manual control of Feedwater Containment conditions further degrade Two Torus-to-Drywell vacuum breakers indicate open (preferred and alternate injection systems) Expected annunciator: K1-4-6, Torus-DW Vac Relief Check Valve Open CT-2 Directs RPV pressure controlled 800-1000 psig with Turbine Bypass Valves (if available) or **Emergency Condensers** May direct closure of MSIVs to limit cooldown Enters N1-EOP-4 due to high drywell pressure and temperature Verify the following malfunction automatically Direct lockout of Containment Spray pumps inserts when Containment Spray flow is initiated to the Drywell: Re-enters N1-EOP-2 due to high drywell pressure and low RPV water level EC01, Steam Supply Line Break in PC, IV=30, RT=1:00, FV=45 **TRG 24**



Events 5, 6, 7, and 8 continued

Role Play: If directed to perform in-plant actions to line up Containment Spray Raw Water to Containment Spray, acknowledge order, but delay any field actions.

Note: Core Spray injection will only be prevented if not needed for core cooling. If the crew has not yet re-established RPV injection when this step is evaluated, the Core Spray jumpers may not be installed until later. N1-EOP-2 step P-1 provides continuous guidance for this consideration.

SRO continued

- When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300°F:
 - Answers "Below the Containment Spray Initiation Limit?" – Yes
 - Verifies all Recirc pumps tripped
 - Directs trip of all Drywell cooling fans
 - Directs operation of Containment Spray per EOP-1 attachment 17
- Evaluates/monitors position on Pressure Suppression Pressure curve
- Acknowledges report of Containment Spray pumps 111 and 112 trip
- May direct rapid depressurization with ECs in anticipation of RPV Blowdown
- Determines Torus pressure cannot be maintained within Pressure Suppression Pressure limit
- Enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown

CT-3

- Answers "Are all control rods inserted to at least 04?" YES
- Answers "Drywell pressure?" At or above 3.5 psig
- May direct prevention of Core Spray injection per EOP-1 attachment 4
- Directs EC initiation
- Answers "Torus water level?" Above 8.0 ft
- Directs open 4 ERVs



| Events 5, 6, 7, and 8 continued | ATC | |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| | Monitors plant parameters | |
| | When directed, places Mode Switch in Shutdown | |
| | or depresses RPS pushbuttons | |
| | Provides scram report | |
| | Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, scram | |
| | verification actions | |
| | Places IRMs on range 9 | |
| | Inserts IRM and SRM detectors | |
| | Down-ranges IRMs as necessary to monitor | |
| | power decrease | |
| | If recirc pumps have not yet tripped, reduces | |
| | recirc flow to 25-43 Mlbm/hr | |
| | Maintains RPV pressure below 1080 psig and | |
| | in assigned band | |



Events 5, 6, 7, and 8 continued

Note: Feedwater level control actions will vary depending on when the operator diagnoses the failure of HPCI to automatically control injection through Feedwater flow control valves 11 and 12.

BOP

- Monitors/reports degrading Containment parameters
- Performs RPV water level control actions of SOP-1, Reactor Scram:
 - Restores RPV level to 53-95" by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU
 - Starts 11 MDFWP
 - Determines RPV water level is recovering
 - Terminates 13 FWP injection as follows:
 - Closes 13 FWP VALVE CONTROL
 - Disengages 13 FWP
 - Closes 29-10, Feedwater Pump 13 Blocking Valve
 - Verifies RPV water level above 53"
 - Verifies 11 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
 - Places FWP BYPASS Valve 11 or 12 in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches
 - If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
 - Verifies all FW Pump FCVs closed
 - Secures CRD Pumps not required
 - Diagnoses failure of HPCI to automatically initiate
 - Notifies SRO/Crew of HPCI failure
 - Manually controls RPV injection to restore and maintain level

CT-2



Events 7, 8, and 9 continued

Note: Core Spray pumps may be placed in PTL if needed before N1-EOP-1 attachment 4 jumpers can be installed due to scenario progression and resource limitations. If Core Spray pumps are placed in PTL, at least one Core Spray pump should be restarted after jumper installation for App J water seal. Core Spray may also be used as an alternate injection source.

RO/BOP

- Places Containment Spray pumps in PTL
- Closes MSIVs, as directed
- Reports when Torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or Drywell temperature approaches 300°F
- Verifies Recirc pumps tripped
- Trips Drywell cooling fans
- Initiates Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17
 - Diagnoses/reports Containment Spray pumps
 111 and 112 trip
 - Verifies started Containment Spray pumps
 121 and 122
 - If 80-118 is open for Torus Cooling:
 - Opens 80-35
 - Closes 80-118
 - Verifies open 80-40 and 80-45
- Prevents Core Spray injection installing EOP-1 attachment 4 jumpers (17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26), if directed
- Initiates both ECs
- Opens 4 ERVs

CT-3

Event Termination Criteria

- RPV Blowdown in progress
- Primary Containment pressure controlled per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 | Scenario No.: NRC-4 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Examiners: | Operators: | |
| | | |

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 100% power. Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking.

Turnover: Lower Torus water level to 10.8 feet per N1-OP-14 using Containment Spray 111.

| Event No. | Malf. No. | Event Type* | Event Description | |
|--|----------------|-----------------------------|---|--|
| 1 | N/A | N – BOP | Transfer Torus Water to the Waste Collection Tank N1-OP-14 | |
| 2 | CT01A | C-BOP TS-SRO | Containment Spray Pump 111 Trip Technical Specifications | |
| 3 | TC03A | C-ATC, SRO | EPR Fails High N1-SOP-31.2 | |
| 4 | RP20B | TS-SRO | Drywell Pressure transmitter Failed Low Technical Specifications | |
| 5 | PC05 CW06B | C – BOP, SRO R-ATC | Seismic Event with Circulating Water Pump trip. N1-SOP-28, N1-SOP-1.1 | |
| 6 | EG11 | C –All | Degraded 345KV Grid conditions N1-SOP-33B.1, N1-SOP-1 | |
| 7 | RR29 | M –All | Coolant leak in Drywell N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4 | |
| 8 | FW03A FW03B | C –All | Trip of Feedwater Pumps N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-8 | |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | | | | |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario | No.: NRC-4 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|--|--|---|
| Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Events 7, 8 | 2 | |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) Events 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | 5 | |
| Major transients (1-2) Event 7 | 1 | |
| EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4 | 2 | |
| Entry into contingency EOP with substantive actions (at least 1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-8 | 1 | |
| 6. Preidentified Critical tasks (at least 2) | 2 | |
| CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: | CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION: | |
| CT-1.0: Given a LOCA in the Drywell with Drywell temp 300F or Torus pressure exceeding 13 psig, initiate Con to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit, N1-EOP-4. | Initiating Containment Sprays reduces Primary Containment pressure. This reduces stresses on the Drywell and Torus, assists in avoiding "chugging" that may cause fatigue failure of the LOCA downcomers, and avoids the need for a blowdown. These benefits reduce challenges to the fuel cladding, the RPV, and the Primary Containment. | |
| CT- 2.0: Given a LOCA with degraded high pressure injection capability, the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2. Injection with preferred and/or alternate injection systems must be performed within 15 minutes of performing an RPV blowdown. | | Maintaining Reactor water level above - 84 inches ensures adequate core cooling through the preferred method of core submergence. This protects the integrity of the fuel cladding. |

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins at approximately 100% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. Torus water level is at the high end of the normal band. The crew will lower Torus Water Level in accordance with N1-OP-14 using 111 Containment Spray System. Containment Spray pump 111 will trip requiring the SRO to make a Tech Spec call.

Then, the EPR fails high. The MPR automatically takes control of pressure at a value about 5 psig above the initial pressure. The crew will enter N1-SOP-31.2, remove the EPR from service and return reactor pressure to the initial value.

Next, one of the four drywell pressure transmitters fails downscale, preventing that channel from actuating protective functions. The transmitter inputs to RPS, Core Spray, Containment Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS). Tech Spec 3.6.2 entry is required.

Next, a seismic event occurs causing one of the circulating water pumps to trip. The crew will respond by lowering power per N1-SOP-1.1 in order to maintain condenser vacuum. Then, a grid disturbance develops, resulting in lowering frequency and voltage on the 345KV power lines. The crew will enter N1-SOP-33B.1 and monitor grid frequency to determine action times for tripping the turbine. As the grid continues to degrade, the crew will scram the Reactor.

A coolant leak in the Drywell will develop following the scram. The crew will enter N1-EOP-4 and re-enter N1-EOP-2. The crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-4 (**Critical Task**). The remaining high pressure Feedwater pump will trip, causing RPV water level to lower to the top of active fuel (TAF). With the degraded high pressure injection capability, the crew will enter RPV Blowdown before RPV water level drops below -109 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2 (**Critical Task**).



| | Сору | of |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Training Id: NMP1 NI | RC 2020 Scenario Revision: | 0.0 |
| Title: Simulator Sce | nario #4 | |
| | Signature / Printed Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | Paul Isham | 1/29/20 |
| Validated By | Dave Mason | 7/15/20 |
| | Jason Quick | |
| | Jeremy Spring | |
| Facility Reviewer | Phil Nichols | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-14, Containment Spray System
- 2. N1-SOP-28, Seismic Event
- 3. N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction
- 4. N1-SOP-31.2, Pressure Regulator Malfunctions
- 5. N1-SOP-33B.1, Major 345 KV Grid Disturbances
- 6. N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 7. N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- 8. N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment Control
- 9. N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 10. N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- 11. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. Scenario Description

Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:

The scenario begins at approximately 100% power. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking and Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. Torus water level is at the high end of the normal band. The crew will lower Torus Water Level in accordance with N1-OP-14 using 111 Containment Spray System. Containment Spray pump 111 will trip requiring the SRO to make a Tech Spec call.

Then, the EPR fails high. The MPR automatically takes control of pressure at a value about 5 psig above the initial pressure. The crew will enter N1-SOP-31.2, remove the EPR from service and return reactor pressure to the initial value.

Next, one of the four drywell pressure transmitters fails downscale, preventing that channel from actuating protective functions. The transmitter inputs to RPS, Core Spray, Containment Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS). Tech Spec 3.6.2 entry is required.

Next, a seismic event occurs causing one of the circulating water pumps to trip. The crew will respond by lowering power per N1-SOP-1.1 in order to maintain condenser vacuum. Then, a grid disturbance develops, resulting in lowering frequency and voltage on the 345KV power lines. The crew will enter N1-SOP-33B.1 and monitor grid frequency to determine action times for tripping the turbine. As the grid continues to degrade, the crew will scram the Reactor.

A coolant leak in the Drywell will develop following the scram. The crew will enter N1-EOP-4 and re-enter N1-EOP-2. The crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-4 (**Critical Task**). The remaining high pressure Feedwater pump will trip, causing RPV water level to lower to the top of active fuel (TAF). With the degraded high pressure injection capability, the crew will enter RPV Blowdown before RPV water level drops below -109 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2 (**Critical Task**).

1. Termination Criteria

 a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, RPV Blowdown in progress, Primary Containment pressure maintained per N1-EOP-4



Critical Tasks

CT-1, Given a LOCA in the Drywell with Drywell temperature approaching 300F or Torus pressure exceeding 13 psig, initiate Containment Sprays prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit, in accordance with N1-EOP-4.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Initiating Containment Sprays reduces Primary Containment pressure. This reduces stresses on the Drywell and Torus, assists in avoiding "chugging" that may cause fatigue failure of the LOCA downcomers, and avoids the need for a blowdown. These benefits reduce challenges to the fuel cladding, the RPV, and the Primary Containment.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications and annunciators will indicate degrading conditions. N1-EOP-4 provides direction to initiate Containment Sprays.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of Containment Spray pump control switches will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Containment Spray flow and lowering Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to initiate Containment Sprays.

Bounding Criteria: Based on procedural requirements in N1-EOP-4. Exceeding the Pressure Suppression limit would require an RPV Blowdown.

CT-2, Given a LOCA with degraded high pressure injection capability, the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-2. Injection with preferred and/or alternate injection systems must be performed within 15 minutes of performing an RPV blowdown.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Maintaining Reactor water level above -84 inches ensures adequate core cooling through the preferred method of core submergence. This protects the integrity of the fuel cladding.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple Reactor water level indicators and annunciators will provide indications of lowering Reactor water level. N1-EOP-2 provides multiple procedure steps directing injection with preferred and alternate injection systems.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of pumps and/or valves in the preferred or alternate injection system(s) will provide observable actions for the evaluation team. As well as operating ERVs for depressurization

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Multiple Reactor water level indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of injection with preferred and alternate injection systems.

<u>Bounding Criteria:</u> Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation to allow RPV pressure to lower to within the capacity of low pressure injection sources.

- 3. Length
 - a. ~60 minutes
- 4. Mitigation Strategy Code
 - a. RL2, LOCA Results in RPV Water Level Below TAF, Blowdown and Recover Level with Low Pressure Systems



- 5. Technical Specifications
 - a. TS 3.3.7.b for trip
 - b. TS 3.3.7.d for water seal
 - c. TS 3.6.2
- 6. EAL Classification
 - a. Unusual Event EAL HU4- Confirmed Seismic
 - b. Alert EAL FA1 Loss of RCS barrier
- 7. Special Orders
 - a. None



В. **Initial Conditions** 1. IC Number a. IC-154 2. Presets / With Triggers Malfunctions a. 1) NM10A, IRM CHANNEL 11 FAILURE- UPSCALE Inserted 2) HV01B, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 12 Inserted CT01A, Containment Spray Pump Trip 111 **TRG 1** 3) TC03A, EPR - FAILS HIGH TRG 2 4) **RP20B**, RPS 11 DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED LOW TRG 3 5) 6) PC05, Seismic Event Triggered **TRG 5** CW06B, Circulating Water Pump Trip 12 **TRG 5** 7) **EG11,** 345 KV Power Grid Transient, RT=7:00, RSV=355, SV=345 TRG 6 8)

b. Remotes

FW03A, Feedwater Pump Trip 11, DT=2:00

AT10, Lake Water Temperature, RV=37

FW03B, Feedwater Pump Trip 12

2) MC02, OG2,4 12 SIDE PRI JET VAP SUCT VLVS, FV=0 TRG 15
3) MC04, MS14,16 12 SIDE PRI JET STM VLVS, FV=0, DT = 2 Min TRG 15

TRG 10

TRG 10

Inserted

Inserted

RR29, RR Loop Rupture on Pump 15 Suction Line, DT=3:00, RT=7:00, FV=17

- c. Overrides
- 1) None

9)

10)

11)

1)

- d. Annunciators
- 1) None



e. Event Triggers

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|--|--------------|---------|
| TRG 10, Triggers the LOCA and the trip of FW pump 11 when the mode switch is taken to SHUTDOWN | zdrpstdn==1 | Blank |

- f. Equipment Out of Service
 - 1) Reactor Build Exhaust Fan 12 secured with info/caution tag
 - 2) IRM 11 bypassed with info/caution tag
- g. Support Documentation
 - 1) N1-OP-14, completed to section H.1.3
- h. Miscellaneous
 - 1) DW Cooling Fan 11 secured



SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

| ON COMING SHIFT: D DATE: Today | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| PART I: To be <u>performed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs) | | | | |
| PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift. LCO Status (SRO) Shift Turnover Information Sheet | | | | |
| Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status: • Reactor power is approximately 100%. | | | | |
| Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking. | | | | |
| PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions: • Lower Torus Water level to 10.8 feet per N1-OP-14 using Containment Spray 111 starting at step H.1.3. Operators are standing by in the reactor building and screenhouse. | | | | |



Shift Turnover

| Instructor Actions / Plant Response | Operator Actions |
|---|---|
| Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown. | |
| Verify annunciator sound turned on If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown | |
| Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels. | Crew Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift |



Events #1 & #2: Transfer Torus Water to the Waste Collection Tank, Containment Spray Pump 111 Trips

| Event |
|-------------|
| Information |

- Crew will lower torus water level per N1-OP-14
- SRO makes Tech Spec call on trip of containment spray pump

SRO

- Direct lower torus water level to waste collector tank using N1-OP-14, using Containment Spray 111
- Acknowledge reports from BOP
- Acknowledge trip of Containment Spray Pump 111

Role Play:

When requested as the plant operator, immediately report no gap on 80-16.

Role Play:

When directed to shut 93-65, wait 1 minute and report 93-65 is closed.

Role Play:

As the plant operator in the screen house, immediately report proper lubrication flow and the seal line temperature feels consistent with lake temperature. (N1-OP-14 steps H.1.9.1 and 1.9.2)


K1-4-8, CONTAINMENT SPRAY LOOP 11 PRESSURE LOW

BOP

- Acknowledge direction from the SRO
- Close the following valves:
 - · 80-45
 - ∘ 80-16
- Direct a plant operator to verify there is no gap on 80-16.
- Open 80-118
- Verify open 80-40
- Direct plant operator to unlock and close 93-65
- Notify SRO to log BV-93-65 closed
- Make a plant announcement for starting Containment Spray Pump 111 and Containment Spray Raw Water Pump 111
- Start raw water pump
- Direct plant operator to verify proper packing lubrication and flow
- Start Containment Spray Pump 111



| Events 1 and 2 continued Role Play: As the operator in Rad Waste, after 80-118 has been throttled in the shut direction for approximately 5 seconds, inform the control room that flow is high enough. | Open 80-115 Open 80-114 Contact Rad Waste and have them standby to monitor flow Throttle close on 80-118 Acknowledge report from Rad Waste Inform the SRO that water is being transferred from the TORUS |
|--|--|
| As Directed by the examiner, insert malfunction, | |
| CT01A, Containment Spray Pump Trip 111 TRG 1 Containment Spray Pump 111 trips | |
| Role Play: When asked, inform the control room you were nearby and heard a "pop" and saw a small puff of smoke on the pump motor when it tripped. There is no fire. | CREW Recognize and report trip of Containment Spray Pump 111 Direct EO to investigate the trip of the pump Reference the ARP for K1-1-7 |
| Note: At the examiner's discretion, the scenario can move on to event 3 prior to waiting for the containment spray lineup being returned to normal. | SRO Direct RO to return containment spray lineup to normal using N1-OP-14 |
| Role Play: If directed to vent 60.1-20 and 60.1.21, wait one minute and report the task is complete. Role Play: As plant operator, wait 1 minute and inform the control room you have completed step G.1.23 | Acknowledge direction from the SRO Open 80-118 Close 80-114 and 80-115 Green Flag Containment Spray Pump Stop Containment Spray Raw Water Pump 111 Direct the in-plant operator to vent the following pressure indicators PI-60.1-20 PI-60.1-21 Place Containment Spray Raw Water Pump 111 in pull to lock Swap Containment Spray Raw Water Pump 111 discharge to Core Spray 11 (after 10 minutes) Direct EO to perform steps G.1.6 - G.1.23 |



| Events 1 and 2 continued | ВОР |
|---|---|
| Role Play: Wait 1 minute and report 93-57 is closed and 93-65 is locked open and both were independently verified. | Acknowledge report from plant operator Realign Containment Spray Pump 111 discharge to the heat exchanger Have realignment independently verified Direct the plant operators to perform and independently verify the following: 93-57 is closed 93-65 is opened and locked |
| Role Play: When directed to close 80-178 and 80-182, wait approximately 1 minute and report the valves are closed. Role Play: As the plant operator, wait approximately 1 minute and report valve 80-178 in Step G.2.15 is open. | Acknowledge report from plant operators Inform SRO to log 93-65 is locked open Green flag Containment Spray Raw Water Pump 111 and have in independently verified Place Containment Spray Pump 111 in PTL Direct plant operators to close 80-178 Close 80-01 Direct the PO to unlock and close 80-182 Close 80-40 Verify 80-16 is closed Direct the PO to perform steps G.2.5 - G.2.15 |
| | Acknowledge report from plant operator Open 80-01 Green flag Containment Spray Pump 111 Verify closed the following 80-44 80-41 Open the following valves: 80-16 80-40 80-45 Verify 80-118 is closed |



Event #3: EPR Fails High

Event Information

- Plant is operating at or near rated conditions
- The EPR fails high
- MPR takes control at new higher pressure
- Crew will restore pressure to pre-transient value

| When directed by the examiner, insert the following malfunction: | |
|--|--|
| Power spike approximately 10% before retuning to original value RPV pressure rise approximately 6 psig EPR servo stroke drops to 0 -A2-4-4, TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS REG IN CONTROL -A2-4-5, TURBINE ELECTRICAL PRESS. REG. PRESS. VOLTS. EPR Setpoint fails high | RO Recognize and report A2-4-4 Recognize changes in power and RPV pressure and updates crew |
| The following annunciators may flash in an out as pressure changes: F3-4-4, ROD BLOCK F2-1-8, APRM 11-14 F3-1-1, APRM 15-18 | SRO Updates crew on entry into N1-SOP-31.2 Directs RO to execute N1-SOP-31.2 Establishes oversight of SOP execution Contacts the SM May direct power reduction to maintain less than rated. |
| | ROEnters N1-SOP-31.2 and updates crewMake station announcement |



Role Play:

If dispatched to the Front Standard to look for any abnormal indications as to why the EPR failed, **wait** 2 minutes and **report** there are no indications on the Front Standard for the EPR failure.

Role Play:

If dispatched to the Aux. Control Room to check to indications as to why the EPR failed, **wait** 1 minute and **report** there are no indications available to indicate why the EPR failed.

RO

- Determines RPV pressure is higher and stable with MPR in control (EPR failure)
- Verify MPR takes control by observing the following:
 - A2-4-4 alarmed
 - Pressure stable approx. 3 to 5 psig higher
 - Control valves slightly closed
- · Place EPR switch to OFF
- Verify EPR % servo stroke remains at 0%
- Adjust MPR to control reactor pressure as directed by SRO.
- Pressure under control? YES
- Return Reactor pressure to pre-transient value as directed by SRO.
- Refers to N1-OP-31
- Informs SRO that the COLR needs to be referenced.

Role Play:

If directed as Reactor Engineering to evaluate Thermal Limits, acknowledge the direction. This will not be completed by the end of the scenario.

Role Play

- Acknowledge report to Ops and Plant Management.
- Acknowledge report to the Duty Manager.
- As WEC/FIN, acknowledge request to engage the organization to troubleshoot and repair of the EPR.

SRO

- Conduct a post transient brief
- Evaluate the COLR
- Determine that no thermal limit adjustments are required
- Notifies WEC, Duty Manager, and SOS of EPR failure



Event #4: Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale

| Event |
|-------------|
| Information |

- Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale
- SRO reviews tech spec impact

When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:

RP20B RPS 11 DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED LOW

TRG 3

ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL 11 TROUBLE red light illuminates. Red light is located on upper left side of F Panel. No Annunciator.

Role Play:

WHEN dispatched to RPS Cabinets, report Drywell Pressure transmitter 201.2-476A is downscale with gross failure lit. All other DW pressure transmitters are reading correctly for current DW pressure.

Note: Tech Specs 3.6.2.a, d, e, f and I all apply.

- 3.6.2.a Scram Note (o) "With one channel required by Table 3.6.2.a inoperable in one or more parameters, place the inoperable channel and/or that trip system in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- 3.6.2.d Note (f) requires placing channel in tripped condition within 24 hours or take the action required by Specification 3.6.2.a for that parameter. This requires tripping the channel in 12 hours. 3.6.2.e Note (c) also applies the same way.
- 3.6.2.I is 7 day LCO for CREVS. 3.4.5 must also be entered for CREVS system.

CREW

- Identifies and reports ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL 11 TROUBLE red light illuminated.
- Dispatches operator to Reactor Building 281 to check RPS cabinets
- May refer to drawing C-18014-C sheet 1 and table to determine functions of affected instrument.

SRO

- Declares DWP transmitter inoperable.
- Enter Tech Spec 3.6.2 for instruments that initiate scram, primary coolant or containment isolation, core spray initiation, containment spray initiation and ADS initiation.
- Determines transmitter must be placed in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- Notifies the WEC.
- · Notifies Ops Management.
- Conducts crew brief/update.



Event #5: Seismic Event with Circulating Water Pump Trip

Event Information

- A seismic event occurs which cause a Circ Water pump to trip.
- The crew will perform actions for a seismic event as well as lower reactor power to maintain condenser vacuum.

SOP-1.1 to maintain vacuum above 25"

Establish oversight of power reduction

| When directed by examiner, insert malfunction: | CREW |
|---|---|
| PC05, Seismic Event Triggered TRG 5 CW06B, Circulating Water Pump Trip 12 TRG 5 H2-1-6, Seismic Detection Equipment Event H2-2-4, CIRCULATING WTR PUMP 12 TRIP OVERLOAD Circulating Water Pump 12 motor amps drops to zero Water Box Level South drops downscale Condenser Vacuum begins to lower | Recognizes and reports annunciator H2-2-4 |
| Note: When the operator assumes ownership of condenser vacuum, the SRO will set a limit above 22.1" vacuum for scramming the plant. | SRO Acknowledges reports Directs execution of N1-SOP-28, Seismic Event Updates crew on entry into N1-SOP-1.1 and N1-SOP-25.1 Directs RO to execute N1-SOP-25.1 Assigns ownership of condenser vacuum with directions to scram at a specific threshold value Directs and emergency power reduction per N1- |



Event 5 continued

Role Play: If contacted as Unit 2 or JAF, report that you have also experienced a seismic event and that you have confirmed the seismic event with JAF or Unit 2 (as appropriate). Report that Unit 2 seismic recorders indicated >0.075g.

Role Play: If contacted as IMD to interpret seismic data on the J panel, acknowledge request.

Role Play: When dispatched to inspect plant equipment / investigate leakage, wait 3 minutes, then report no damage found.

Role Play: If dispatched to investigate CW Pump 12 trip, wait approximately 2 minutes and report CW Pump 12 tripped on overcurrent

BOP

- Executes N1-SOP-28, Seismic Event
- Confirms seismic event indicator on J panel
- Contacts Unit 2 and JAF to confirm seismic event
- Notifies I&C to interpret seismic data
- Notifies SRO to review EAL HU4
- Answers "Did event cause any auto system(s) response?" No
- Notifies SRO to suspend ALL activities AND transient initiations NOT essential for safe operation UNTIL inspections are completed
- Dispatches operators to inspect plant equipment for damage

ATC

- Acknowledges direction from SRO
- Reference ARP for H2-2-4
- Enters N1-SOP-25.1
- Reference N1-OP-19, Section H.3
- Monitors plant delta temperatures to ensure plant is not exceeding the SPDES permit
- Informs crew that power needs to be lowered to maintain condenser vacuum > 26"
- Enters N1-SOP-1.1
- Reduces RRP flow to about 85% power
- Inserts cram rods

Note: Cram rods are inserted (approximately 4)

Condenser vacuum stabilizes above 26"



Event 5 continued

Role Play

When dispatched to isolate the south side SJAEs, wait approximately 15 minutes and **insert** the following **remotes:**

MC02, OG2,4 12 SIDE PRI JET VAP SUCT VLVS, Close

MC04, MS14,16 12 SIDE PRI JET STM VLVS, Close, DT = 2 Min

TRG 15

Report task completion and SJAE steam header pressure at 150 psig.

The scenario will move on to the next event prior to completion of this role play.

ATC Continued

- Receives SRO concurrence to isolate south side SJAEs
- Dispatches an inplant operator to isolate the south side SJAEs by closing the following valves
 - 76-50 (OG-2), BV PRI JET 11 VAPOR CNDSR 12 UPPER
 - 76-56 (OG-4), BV PRI JET 14 VAPOR CNDSR 12 LOWER
 - 76-61 (OG-6), BV SPARE JET VAPOR CNDSR 12 UPPER
 - 76-58 (OG-8), BV SPARE JET VAPOR CNDSR 12 LOWER
 - 06.2-01 (MS-14), BV PRI JET 11 STM CNDSR 12 UPPER
 - 06.2-04 (MS-16), BV PRI JET 14 -STMCNDSR 12 LOWER
- Dispatches a plant operator verify SJAE steam header pressure is at 150 psig
- · Acknowledges report from the field
- Closes 74-06, Fish Screen 12
- Opens 74-21, Fish Screen 12 Drain Valve
- Places CONDENSER WATER BOX BLOCKING VALVE 121 and CONDENSER WATER BOX VENT VALVE 122 control switch in VENT
- Monitors Process Computer Point B460, Turbine Exhaust Hood Temperature
- Monitors north side water box level



Events #6: Degraded 345 KV

| Event | Grid instabilities lead to a Reactor Scram and Turbine trip |
|-------------|---|
| Information | |

When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:

EG11, 345 KV Power Grid Transient, RT=7:00, IV=355, FV=345

345KV frequency and voltage lower

TRG 6

Expected annunciators:

A6-3-3, 345 KV Sys Frequency High – Low (first ~30sec)

A8-1-3, 115 KV Bus Low Voltage (second)

A6-2-6, 345 KV Bus Voltage High-Low (later)

Note: Turbine operational time limit changes as grid conditions continue to degrade:

| Variation from 60 Hz | Operation Time |
|----------------------|----------------|
| ± 0.6 Hz | Unlimited |
| ± 0.6 Hz to 1.4 Hz | 90 minutes |
| ± 1.4 Hz to 1.9 Hz | 12 minutes |
| > ± 1.9 Hz | 0 minutes |

Note: 1.9Hz variation occurs at ~6.5 minutes after the malfunction is inserted.

CREW

- Acknowledges/reports annunciators
- Diagnoses/reports lowering 345 KV grid frequency

SRO

- Acknowledges reports
- Directs execution of ARPs
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-33B.1, Major 345 KV
 Grid Disturbances
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-33A.3, Major 115 KV
 Grid Disturbances
- Acknowledges report that turbine operational time limit is exceeded for current frequency variation
- Directs manual scram
- Acknowledges scram report
- Enters N1-EOP-2 on low RPV water level
- Directs N1-SOP-1 actions
- Directs RPV water level controlled 53-95" with Condensate/FW and CRD
- Directs RPV pressure controlled 800-1000 psig with Turbine Bypass Valves or Emergency Condensers



Event 6 continued

Role Play: If contacted as operator to check for abnormal indications (pump operation, Aux Control Room panels, breaker targets, etc.) due to the grid disturbance, wait 2 minutes and report there are no abnormal indications.

Role Play: If contacted as Power Control regarding grid voltage or frequency, give current values based on the simulator instructor station.

Role Play: If contacted as Power Control regarding status of offsite power, inform that thunderstorms have caused a loss of some generation and you do not currently have an estimated time for restoration.

Role Play: If contacted as Power Control regarding the low voltage post contingency alarm, inform that the low voltage post contingency alarm is NOT alarming.

ATC

- Monitors plant parameters
- When directed, places Mode Switch in Shutdown or depresses RPS pushbuttons
- Provides scram report
- Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, scram verification actions
 - Places IRMs on range 9
 - Inserts IRM and SRM detectors
 - Downranges IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease
 - Reduces Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 10⁶
 lb/hr
 - Maintains RPV pressure below 1080 psig and in assigned band

BOP

- Executes ARPs
- May execute N1-SOP-33A.3
- Executes N1-SOP-33B.1
- Monitors 345 KV grid frequency and determines magnitude of frequency variation
- Contacts Power Control and obtains 345 KV line frequency
- Updates crew on turbine operational time limit as grid frequency lowers
- May notify Power Control of turbine operational time limit
- May place Turbine Vibration chart recorder in fast speed



Event 6 continued

Note: If the crew fails to insert a manual reactor scram for a prolonged period of time following grid frequency lowering below 58.1 Hz, the lead examiner may choose to force the scenario progression by inserting malfunction:

TC01, Main Turbine Trip

BOP continued

- When grid frequency lowers to 58.1 Hz, notifies crew that turbine must be tripped and Reactor must be scrammed
- Performs SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level actions:
 - Restores RPV level to 53-95" by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU, as necessary
 - Determines #13 FWP was running
 - Determines RPV water level is recovering
 - Verifies at least one Electric FW Pump running
 - Terminates 13 FWP injection as follows:
 - Places 13 FWP VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL and closes
 - Disengages 13 FWP
 - Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13
 BLOCKING VALVE a CLOSE signal
 - Verifies RPV water level above 53"
 - Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
 - Resets HPCI signal, if required
 - Places 12 FWP BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches
 - If RPV level reaches 85" and rising, then:
 - Verifies all Feedwater Pumps OFF
 - Secures CRD Pumps not required
 - Maximizes RWCU reject flow
 - Closes FWIVs if required
 - · Closes MSIVs if required
 - Maintains RPV water level in assigned band



Events #7 & #8: LOCA with Degraded High Pressure Injection

| Event | A LOCA occurs in the Primary Containment |
|-------------|--|
| Information | MD FWPs trip |

Verify the following malfunctions are automatically

inserted when the mode switch is taken to Shutdown:

RR29, RR Loop Rupture on Pump 15 Suction Line, DT=3:00, RT=7:00, FV=17

FW03A, Feedwater Pump Trip 11, DT=2:00

TRG 10

Initial response:

Drywell humidity, pressure and temperature rise

Drywell leakage rises

RPV level and pressure lower

Expected annunciators:

H2-4-7, Drywell Water Leak Detection Sys

K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure High-Low

F1-1-5, RPS Ch 11 Drywell Press High

F4-1-4, RPS Ch 12 Drywell Press High

Delayed response:

Feedwater Pump trips

CREW

 Diagnose/report degrading containment parameters



Events 7 and 8 continued

Note: If Torus cooling is in service candidate will use EOP-1, att 17, sect. 3.2.3

SRO

- Acknowledges reports
- Enters N1-EOP-4 due to high drywell pressure and temperature
- Re-enters N1-EOP-2 due to high drywell pressure and low RPV level
- Directs Containment Spray pumps locked out (unless pump is in Torus cooling)
- Acknowledges trip of Feedwater pump 11 & 12
- When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300°F:
 - Answers "Below the Containment Spray Initiation Limit?" – Yes
 - Verifies all Recirc pumps are tripped
 - Directs trip of all Drywell cooling fans
 - Directs operation of Containment Spray per EOP-1 attachment 17 (CT-1.0)
- Evaluates/monitors position on Pressure Suppression Pressure curve
- Directs RPV injection with CRD and/or Liquid Poison
- May direct closure of MSIVs and pressure control using Emergency Condensers
- Transitions to alternate level control leg of EOP-2
- May direct vessel/containment isolation per N1-SOP-40.2

NMP1 NRC Scenario 4



Events 7 and 8 continued

SRO continued

- Directs ADS bypassed
- Directs verification of EC initiation
- Answers "Are 2 or more Subsystems available?"
 Yes (Both loops of Core Spray available)
- Waits until RPV water level drops to -84 inches
- Answers "Is any Subsystem lined up with a pump running?" – Yes (Both loops of Core Spray running)
- Answers "Is any injection source lined up with a pump running?" – Yes
- Enters EOP-8, RPV Blowdown:
 - Answers "Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04?" – Yes
 - Answers "Drywell pressure?" At or above
 3.5 psig
 - Directs EC initiation
 - Answers "Torus water level?" Above 8.0 ft
 - Directs open 4 ERVs (CT-2.0)
- Verifies injection of entire contents of Liquid Poison tank
- Directs injection with available systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches (CT-2.0)
- Directs installation of Core Spray jumpers (EOP-1 attachment 4) to allow control of Core Spray IVs
- Transitions back to normal level control leg of EOP-2
- Directs restoration of RPV level to 53-95 inches

<u>Note:</u> Most likely injection sources are Core Spray, Condensate/Feedwater, CRD and/or Liquid Poison.



Events 7 and 8 continued

Note: If Torus cooling is in service candidate will use EOP-1, att 17, sect. 3.2.3

ATC/BOP

- Updates crew on reactor and containment parameters
- Locks out Containment Spray pumps
- Recognizes/reports trip of Feedwater pump 11
- Maximizes RPV injection with CRD and Liquid Poison
- When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300°F:
 - Verifies all Recirc pump are tripped
 - Trips all Drywell cooling fans
 - Initiates Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17 (CT-1.0)
 - Verifies started two Containment Spray pumps (111 or 122 preferred)
- May start additional Containment Spray and Containment Spray Raw Water pumps as necessary
- Bypasses ADS
- Verifies EC initiation
 - Verifies 39-05 and 39-06 open or previously open
- May secure ECs for pressure control
 - If RPV water level is above 5", then closes 39-05 and/or 39-06
 - If RPV water level is below 5", then closes
 EC steam IVs
- When RPV water level drops below -84 inches:
 - Initiates ECs
 - Verifies open 39-05
 - Verifies open 39-06
 - Opens steam IVs as necessary
 - Opens 4 ERVs (CT-2.0)
- Verifies Liquid Poison injection to inject entire contents of Liquid Poison tank



Events 7 and 8 continued

Note: Available injection systems include:

- Condensate/FW Booster (preferred-Att 25/26)
- CRD
- Core Spray
- Containment Spray Raw Water valved to Core Spray
- Fire Water
- Liquid Poison

ATC/BOP Continued

- Injects with available systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches (CT-2.0)
- Bypasses Core Spray IV interlocks per N1-EOP-1
 Att 4 by installing six jumpers (17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26) inside Panel N
- Throttles Core Spray IVs as necessary to control RPV water level
- Restores RPV water level to 53-95 inches

Event Termination Criteria

- RPV water level controlled in assigned band
- RPV Blowdown in progress
- Primary Containment pressure maintained per EOP-4

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 | Scenario No.: NRC-5 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 NRC |
|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Examiners: | Operators: | |
| | ************************************** | |

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 2-3% power. Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking.

Turnover: Power ascension is on hold to place the EPR in Service.

| Event No. | Malf. No. | Event Type* | Event Description |
|--------------|-------------------------|----------------|---|
| 1 | N/A | N-BOP, SRO | Place the EPR in control N1-OP-43A, N1-OP-31, |
| 2 | N/A | R-ATC, SRO | Raise reactor power with control rods |
| 3 | NM01C | I-ATC, SRO | SRM Fails Upscale N1-OP-38A (2017 NRC Scenario 1) |
| 4 | RD05 | C-ATC | Control Rod Uncouples During Coupling Check N1-OP-5, Technical Specifications |
| 5 | RM51A | TS-SRO | Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Failure ARP F1-2-7, Technical Specifications |
| 6 | CW02A CW02B | C-All | Sequential Loss of Service Water N1-SOP-18.1 |
| 7 | RP05A RP05B | I-BOP, SRO | RPS fails to scram the reactor, ARI is successful N1-EOP-2, N1-SOP-1 (2017 NRC Scenario 1) |
| 8 | EC02 | M –All | EC 11 Steam Leak in the Reactor Building (2017 NRC Scenario 1) ARP K1-1-1, K1-3-4, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-5 |
| 9 | EC07A EC08A EC08B | C –All | EC 11 will not isolate, requiring a RPV Blowdown N1-EOP-8 (2017 NRC Scenario 1) |

| Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario | No.: NRC-5 | Op-Test No.: LC1 19-1 |
|---|-------------------|--|
| Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Events 7, 8, 9 | 3 | |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) Events 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 | 5 | |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) Event 8 | 1 | |
| EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-5 | 2 | |
| Entry into contingency EOP with substantive actions (at least 1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-8 | 1 | |
| 6. Preidentified Critical tasks (at least 2) | 3 | |
| CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: | | CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION: |
| CT-1.0: Given the plant at power with a trip of both Service Water Pumps, the crew will start ESW pumps within 5 minutes to restore cooling to vital plant loads in accordance with N1-SOP-18.1. | | Service Water is the ultimate heat sink for the RBCLC system. Failure to restore cooling to this system will result in a loss of cooling to equipment important to safe plant operation, such as recirculation pump seals and RWCU, and would result in unnecessary challenge to plant safety. |
| CT- 2.0: Given conditions requiring a scram and failure of an RPS channel to trip, the crew will manually initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) within 15 minutes to shutdown the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-1 and/or N1-EOP-3. | | Inserting control rods during a transient lowers reactor power, which reduces challenges to the plant during the transient. With RPS failing to trip, the crew must rely on backup shutdown methods to ensure control rods are inserted to provide long term, stable, core shutdown. |
| CT- 3.0: Given an un-isolable Emergency Condenser leak outside Primary Containment and two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit, execute N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-5. This task must be completed within 15 minutes of the control room being notified of a second general area temperature exceeding the maximum safe limit. | | An un-isolable primary system discharging outside of Primary Containment resulting in two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit indicates a wide-spread problem posing a direct and immediate threat to Secondary Containment. A blowdown minimizes flow through the break, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and places the primary system in the lowest possible energy state. |

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario begins with the plant in a startup at approximately 2-3% power and raising power by control rod withdrawal. Control rod withdrawal has been stopped while the crew places the Electric Pressure Regulator (EPR) in service per N1-OP-43A and N1-OP-31. When the EPR is in service the crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods. While withdrawing control rods, an SRM upscale trip will occur. The crew will respond per ARP F3-4-1 and N1-OP-38A to bypass the SRM.

While continuing to withdraw control rods and performing a coupling check on a fully withdrawn rod, the rod becomes uncoupled. The crew will recouple the control rod per N1-OP-5. While the control rod is uncoupled, Tech Spec 3.1.1.a(2) applies.

After the control rod is recoupled, a Main Steam Line Rad monitor will fail inoperable. The SRO will address Tech Specs.

Next, a sequential loss of Service Water occurs. SWP 11 trips first. The crews tries to restore Service Water with SWP 12, but that also eventually fails, resulting in a loss of all Service Water. The crew will exercise the override in N1-SOP-18.1, including starting ESW Pumps (Critical Task) and scramming the reactor. The Mode Switch will fail to scram the Reactor, however manual ARI actuation will result in successful control rod insertion (Critical Task).

Next, a steam leak will develop from Emergency Condenser 11. The crew will attempt to isolate the leak, however the Emergency Condenser will fail to isolate both automatically and manually. Two General Areas of the Reactor Building will exceed the maximum safe temperatures. The crew will blowdown the Reactor per N1-EOP-8 (**Critical Task**).



| | Сору | of |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Training Id: NMP1 NI | RC 2020 Scenario Revision: | 0.0 |
| Title: Simulator Sce | nario #5 | |
| | Signature / Printed Name | <u>Date</u> |
| Developed By | Paul Isham | 1/28/20 |
| Validated By | Dave Mason | 7/14/20 |
| | Jeremy Spring | |
| | Jason Quick | |
| Facility Reviewer | Phil Nichols | |



References

- 1. N1-OP-31, Tandem Compound Reheat Turbine
- 2. N1-OP-43A, Plant Startup
- 3. N1-OP-38A, Source Range Monitor
- 4. N1-OP-5, Control Rod Drive System
- 5. N1-SOP-18.1, Service Water Failure / Low Intake Level
- 6. N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 7. N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- 8. N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control
- 9. N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 10. N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- 11. Unit 1 Technical Specifications



Instructor Information

A. Scenario Description

Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:

The scenario begins with the plant in a startup at approximately 2-3% power and raising power by control rod withdrawal. Control rod withdrawal has been stopped while the crew places the Electric Pressure Regulator (EPR) in service per N1-OP-43A and N1-OP-31. When the EPR is in service the crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods. While withdrawing control rods, an SRM upscale trip will occur. The crew will respond per ARP F3-4-1 and N1-OP-38A to bypass the SRM.

While continuing to withdraw control rods and performing a coupling check on a fully withdrawn rod, the rod becomes uncoupled. The crew will recouple the control rod per N1-OP-5. While the control rod is uncoupled, Tech Spec 3.1.1.a(2) applies.

After the control rod is recoupled, a Main Steam Line Rad monitor will fail inoperable. The SRO will address Tech Specs.

Next, a sequential loss of Service Water occurs. SWP 11 trips first. The crews tries to restore Service Water with SWP 12, but that also eventually fails, resulting in a loss of all Service Water. The crew will exercise the override in N1-SOP-18.1, including starting ESW Pumps (Critical Task) and scramming the reactor. The Mode Switch will fail to scram the Reactor, however manual ARI actuation will result in successful control rod insertion (Critical Task).

Next, a steam leak will develop from Emergency Condenser 11. The crew will attempt to isolate the leak, however the Emergency Condenser will fail to isolate both automatically and manually. Two General Areas of the Reactor Building will exceed the maximum safe temperatures. The crew will blowdown the Reactor per N1-EOP-8 (**Critical Task**).

1. Termination Criteria

a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, RPV Blowdown in progress



2. Critical Tasks

CT-1, Given the plant at power with a trip of both Service Water Pumps, the crew will start ESW pumps within 5 minutes to restore cooling to vital plant loads in accordance with N1-SOP-18.1.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Service Water is the ultimate heat sink for the RBCLC system. Failure to restore cooling to this system will result in a loss of cooling to equipment important to safe plant operation, such as recirculation pump seals and RWCU, and would result in unnecessary challenge to plant safety.

<u>Cueing:</u> Alarms and indicating lights indicate the loss of Service Water. N1-SOP-18.1 provides direction to establish cooling with ESW pumps.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of the ESW Pump switches will provide observable action for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> Indicating lights and component temperature trends will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation



CT-2, Given conditions requiring a scram and failure of an RPS channel to trip, the crew will manually initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) within 15 minutes to shutdown the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-1 and/or N1-EOP-3.

Justification:

<u>Safety Significance:</u> Inserting control rods during a transient lowers reactor power, which reduces challenges to the plant during the transient. With RPS failing to trip, the crew must rely on backup shutdown methods to ensure control rods are inserted to provide long term, stable, core shutdown.

<u>Cueing:</u> Control rod position, Reactor power indications, and RPS lights will indicate an electric failure to scram. N1-SOP-1 provides direction to initiate ARI.

<u>Measurable Performance Indicators:</u> Manipulation of the Mode Switch and manual ARI will provide observable action for the evaluation team.

<u>Performance Feedback</u>: Control rod position and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to insert control rods.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation

CT-3, Given an un-isolable Emergency Condenser leak outside Primary Containment and two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit, execute N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-5. This task must be completed within 15 minutes of the control room being notified of a second general area temperature exceeding the maximum safe limit.

Justification:

Safety Significance: An un-isolable primary system discharging outside of Primary Containment resulting in two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit indicates a wide-spread problem posing a direct and immediate threat to Secondary Containment. A blowdown minimizes flow through the break, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and places the primary system in the lowest possible energy state.

<u>Cueing:</u> Multiple annunciators will provide indications of a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment. Emergency Condenser valve position indicators will provide indication that the system is un-isolable. Field reports will provide indication that two general areas is above the maximum safe temperature limit. N1-EOP-5 provides direction to blowdown the Reactor.

Measurable Performance Indicators: The crew will manually open ERVs.

<u>Performance Feedback:</u> ERV instrumentation will provide indication that these valves are functioning properly once placed in service. Multiple Reactor pressure indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the blowdown.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.



- 3. Length
 - a. ~60 minutes
- 4. Mitigation Strategy Code
 - a. SC1, Primary System Leak in Secondary Containment, Blowdown Required
- 5. Technical Specifications
 - a. TS 3.1.1 Control Rod uncoupled
 - b. TS 3.6.2 MSL Rad Monitor Failure
- 6. EAL Classification
 - a. Site Area Emergency per EAL FS1 (Loss or potential loss of ANY two fission product barriers)
- 7. Special Orders
 - a. None



B. Initial Conditions

| 1 | IC | Νlı | ım | h | ام | r |
|---|-------|-----|------|---|----|---|
| | ı | IVL | 1111 | U | H | ı |

- a. IC-155
- 2. Presets / With Triggers
 - a. Malfunctions

| 1) | NM10A, IRM CHANNEL 11 FAILURE- UPSCALE | Inserted |
|-----|---|----------|
| 2) | HV01B, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 12 | Inserted |
| 3) | RP05B, Reactor Protection System Failure to Scram Ch 12 | Inserted |
| 4) | EC07A, Emergency Condenser 11 Fails to Isolate | Inserted |
| 5) | EC08A, EC Loop 11 Stm IV Fail to Close 111, FV=50 | Inserted |
| 6) | EC08B, EC Loop 11 Stm IV Fail to Close 112, FV=50 | Inserted |
| 7) | RD05R2243, 22-43 Control Rod Failure - Uncoupled | Inserted |
| 8) | NM01C, SRM CHANNEL 13 FAILURE - UPSCALE | TRG 1 |
| 9) | RM51A, PRM Steam Line Rad Mon 111, Norm Malfunction, FV=0 | TRG 2 |
| 10) | CW02A, SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 11 | TRG 3 |
| 11) | CW02B, SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 12, DT = 10 seconds | TRG 4 |
| 12) | EC02, Steam Supply Line Break in RB, FV=20% | TRG 7 |

- b. Remotes
- 1) RD07, Reset of Rod Drift Alarm, Reset TRG 10
 - c. Overrides
- 1) None
 - d. Annunciators
- 1) None



e. Event Triggers

| Event # | Event Action | Command |
|--|-------------------|---------------|
| 1 (Inserts SRM upscale trip during control rod withdrawal when rod is at position 24) | rdvposd(112)==384 | Blank |
| 25 (Use to manually delete control rod overtravel malfunction when the rod is inserted to position 44) | Available | dmf rd05r2243 |
| 4 (Trips SWP 12 on a time delay after being started) | zdcwpstr(4)==1 | Blank |
| 7 (Initiates LOCA when MS is placed in SD) | zdrpstdn==1 | Blank |

f. Equipment Out of Service

- 1) Reactor Build Exhaust Fan 12 secured with info/caution tag
 - a) Fan green light overridden off. Damper light remains lit (powered from RPS).
- 2) IRM 11 bypassed with info/caution tag

g. Support Documentation

- 1) N1-OP-31 marked up to step E.4.9
- 2) N1-OP-43A marked up to step E.3.26 with 3.23 open and 3.27 marked N/A
- 3) ReMA for control rod moves
- 4) Startup Control Rod Sequence marked up to current rod

h. Miscellaneous

- 1) DW Cooling Fan 11 secured
- 2) MPR is in control. EPR is ready to be placed in service.





SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

| ON COMING SHIFT: D DATE: Today |
|--|
| PART I: To be <u>performed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. • Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs) |
| PART II: To be <u>reviewed</u> by the oncoming Operator <u>before</u> assuming the shift. |
| LCO Status (SRO)Shift Turnover Information Sheet |
| Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status: |
| Reactor power is approximately 2-3% with a plant startup in progress IAW N1-OP-43A. |
| Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 is out of service for maintenance. IRM 11 is bypassed due to spiking. |
| Reactor pressure is approximately 900 psig with one Turbine Bypass Valve open and the MPR in control. |
| Drywell inspection is complete. FIN team is inerting the containment per N1-OP-43A and N1-OP-9. |
| PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions: |
| Raise Reactor pressure to 918 psig and place the EPR in service per N1-OP-43A step E.3.26 and N1-OP-31 steps E.4.9 to E.4.13 |
| Continue power ascension by withdrawing control rods per the ReMA |



Shift Turnover

| Instructor Actions / Plant Response | Operator Actions |
|---|---|
| Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown. • Verify annunciator sound turned on • If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown | |
| Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels. | Crew Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift |



Event #1: Place the EPR is Service

| Event | A plant startup is in progress with reactor pressure ~900 psig with the MPR in |
|-------------|---|
| Information | control |
| | Crew will place the EPR in control |

SRO

 Directs EPR be placed in service per N1-OP-43A step E.3.2.6 and N1-OP-31 steps E.4.9 to E.4.13

Note: RO may raise power by withdrawing control rods while waiting for Reactor pressure rise to shift to the EPR.

Note: As MPR setpoint is raised Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) throttle closed then reopen as RPV pressure rises to the new MPR setpoint. As the MPR is adjusted, Annunciator A1-4-6 TURBINE BY-PASS VALVES OPEN, clears and alarms, as the TBVs close when setpoint is raised and re-open as pressure rises to the new setpoint.

WHEN EPR servo approaches MPR servo position, observe EPR assuming control by response of steam pressure, EPR control light and Annunciator A2-4-4 clearing.

BOP

- Acknowledges order to place EPR in service
- Verify EPR meter reads ~1010 psig (E Panel)
- Place EPR switch to ON (E Panel)
- Confirm A2-4-5 clears
- Lower EPR setpoint to 918 psig
- Raises Reactor pressure by manually adjusting MPR setpoint by bumping MECHANICAL PRESSURE REG switch to RAISE
- When Reactor pressure approaches 918 psig, observes EPR taking control of Reactor pressure
- · Raises MPR setpoint above EPR setpoint



Events #2, #3, & #4: Withdraw Control Rods, SRM Upscale Failure, Control Rod Uncouples During Coupling Check

Event Information

- Plant startup is in progress with the EPR in control
- · Crew resumes withdrawing control rods
- An SRM upscale trip occurs. The crew bypasses the SRM per an ARP.
- A control rod uncouples during a coupling check. The crew recouples the control rod per N1-OP-5.

Note: Insert TRG 25 to delete malfunction RD05R2243 when control rod 22-43 is inserted to position 44.

Note: While the control rod is uncoupled, TS 3.1.1.a(2) requires LCO entry.

SRO

- Directs RO to withdraw rods per Startup Rod Sequence and N1-OP-5 section F.1.0
- Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation
- Acknowledges SRM upscale trip
- Acknowledges control rod 22-43 is uncoupled
- Directs RO to perform N1-OP-5 section H.18.0 for the uncoupled control rod
- Acknowledges control rod 22-43 is recoupled
- Determines TS 3.1.1.a(2) requires LCO entry while control rod is uncoupled..

Note: The SRM upscale trip will occur while withdrawing the first control rod.

Verify TRG 1 automatically **inserts** when control rod 22-43 reaches position 24.

NM01C, SRM CHANNEL 13 FAILURE – UPSCALE

SRM 13 indicates upscale
Expected Annunciators:
F3-4-1, SRM 13-14
F4-4-8, RPS CH 12 REFUEL INST TRIP

RO

- Withdraws control rod 22-43 per the rod sequence sheet
 - Verifies Control Rod Power is On
 - Depresses Rod Select pushbutton for control rod 22-43
 - Places 4S1 Control Rod Movement switch to the rod out notch position
 - Observes SRM and period response
 - Observes RMCS, RPIS and CRD indications



| | Acknowledges/reports annunciators Diagnoses SRM 13 failed upscale |
|------------------------------|---|
| Events 2, 3, and 4 continued | Directs execution of ARP F3-4-1 Determines Technical Specification 3.5.1 allows bypassing SRM 13 Determines Technical Specification 3.5.3 does not apply under current plant conditions Directs bypassing SRM 13 per N1-OP-38A |
| | ATC Suspends control rod movement Monitors plant parameters |



Events 2, 3, and 4 continued

ATC (SRM upscale failure actions)

- Executes ARP F3-4-1
- Confirms computer point
- Observes E Panel to determine which of the following off-normal conditions exist AND on which channel:
 - DOWNSCALE OR INOP light
 - UPSCALE HI COUNT light
 - UPSCALE HI-HI light
- Monitors period meter on G Panel
- Monitors count rate meter on G Panel
- Verifies correct position of detector in core on E Panel
- Bypasses SRM 13 per N1-OP-38A section H.1.0
- Determines operability of all SRMs:
 - Verifies all SRMs are reading consistent with current plant condition
 - Verifies Control Room Logs for inoperable SRMs
 - Observes IF the SRM switch is in bypass
- Coordinates with SRO to verify Tech Specs 3.5.1
 AND 3.5.3 will be met when desired SRM is bypassed
- Places BYPASS switch to bypass position for SRM 13



| Events 2, 3, and 4 continued | ATC (Control Rod Overtravel) |
|--|--|
| | Resumes withdrawing control rod 22-43 per the rod sequence sheet |
| Note: Insert TRG 25 to delete malfunction | When control rod is at position 48, performs a coupling check |
| RD05R2243 when control rod 22-43 is inserted to | Simultaneously place 4S1 to ROD OUT NOTCH and 4S3 CONTROL ROD N |
| position 44. | OVERRIDE switch to NOTCH OVERRIDE Recognize/report annunciator F3-1-6, Control Rod Overtravel in alarm. Diagnoses uncoupled control rod Notifies SRO/Crew References N1-OP-5, H.18, Uncoupled Control |
| Note: Allow enough control rod movement to evaluate operator's ability to perform the reactivity manipulation, and then move on to event 5. | Rod Inserts control rod 22-43 to position 44 Withdraws control rod 22-43 to position 48 and re-performs coupling check Recognize / report control 22-43 is recoupled Resumes normal control rod withdrawal |
| | Monitors plant parameters |



Event #5: Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Failure

| Event Information | A MSL Rad monitor will fail inoperable The SRO will address Tech Specs |
|----------------------|--|
|----------------------|--|

| When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction : RM51A, PRM Steam Line Rad Mon 111, Norm Malfunction, FV=0 TRG 2 Expected Annunciator: F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO | CREW Acknowledge/report Annunciator F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO Diagnose failure of MSL Rad Monitor 111 |
|--|--|
| Role Play: When requested to investigate the MSL rad monitor failure, report that you will begin an immediate investigation | SRO Acknowledges report of MSL Rad Monitor alarm Directs execution of ARP for F1-2-7 Acknowledges MSL Rad Monitor has failed Informs WEC, requests investigation of the failure Enters TS Table 3.6.2.h (requires placing channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours or verifying Mechanical Vacuum pump isolated) Briefs crew on failure of MSL Rad Monitor |
| | Monitors plant parameters |
| | Executes ARP for F1-2-7 Goes to back panel or checks PPC and determines the other MSL Rad Monitors indicate normal readings Observes downscale light on MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 and diagnoses the Monitor is INOP Notifies crew MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 is INOP |



Events #6 & #7: Sequential Loss of Service Water, RPS Fails to Scram the Reactor

| Event | Service water pump 11 is operating and trips. |
|-------------|---|
| Information | Service Water pump 12 is started and trips on a time delay |
| | The crew establishes ESW cooling and scrams the reactor per N1-SOP-18.1 |

| When directed by the lead instructor/evaluator, insert the following malfunctions: | Crew Report annunciators H1-1-2 and H1-4-2 |
|---|--|
| TRG3 CW02A, SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 11, FV=TRUE | |
| The following plant response is observed: Service Water pump 11 trips Annunciator H1-1-2, SERVICE WATER PUMP 11 TRIP OVERLOAD alarms Annunciator H1-4-2, REACTOR BLDG SERV W PRESS/SERV W PUMPHDR PRESS alarms | |
| Note The crew may enter the SOP before performing the ARPs, so actions are included here. | SRO Acknowledge report from crew Update the crew Direct RO to enter N1-SOP-18.1 |
| | Acknowledges order Announces critical parameters and control bands, action point, and what actions will be taken. |



| Note Either ARP H1-1-2 or H1-4-2 will get the standby Service Water Pump started Role Play As the plant operator dispatched to verify open 72- 25, wait one minute and report the valve is verified open Role Play As the plant operator dispatched to investigate pump | ATC (N1-ARP-H1-1-2) Confirm alarm on computer printout. (CP E056 SERV WATER PMP 11 TRIP) Make a plant announcement and Start Service Water Pump 12. Verify open 72-25 (SW-20), TIE VLV - SW HEADER'S 11 & 12. Place Service Water Pump 11 control switch to STOP. |
|---|--|
| trip, wait approximately one minute and report the SW Pump breaker tripped on overcurrent. | |
| Note: Verify TRG4 automatically inserts to trip Service Water Pump 12 when Service Water Pump 12 is started. | ATC Recognize and report trip of 12 Service Water Pump. Places Mode Switch in Shutdown or depresses RPS pushbuttons. Recognize and report failure to scram conditions. |
| | Directs / concurs with SOP-18.1 override actions |
| | BOP (N1-SOP-18.1 override) Starts both Emergency SW pumps (CT-1) Initiates emergency condenser. Closes MSIVs. Trips all recirc pumps. Initiates ARI to insert control rods when RPS fails to de-energize (CT-2) |



Events #8 & #9: Un-isolable EC Steam Leak into Secondary Containment

| Event |
|-------------|
| Information |

- The reactor has been scrammed from a low power condition
- An EC Steam leak occurs which leads to blowdown.

Verify the following **malfunctions** are **automatically**

inserted when the mode switch is taken to SHUTDOWN:

EC02, Steam Supply Line Break in RB, FV=20%

TRG 7

Reactor Building D/P lowers

Rising temperatures, pressures and radiation levels in the Secondary Containment

RBEVS auto-starts

RBVS isolates

Expected Annunciators:

L1-3-4, REACT. BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS

L1-4-3, REACT BLDG VENT RAD MONITOR OFF NORMAL

L1-3(4)-6, EMER VENT SYS CHANNEL 11(12) RELAY OPERATE

MFP2 2-1-1-7, REAC BLDG 318 LOCAL PNL NO.7 FIRE K1-4-3, EMER COOLING SYSTEM 11 STEAM LEAK AREA T HI

K1-4-5, EMER COOLING SYSTEM 12 STEAM LEAK AREA T HI

L1-3-3, CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS

Verify the following malfunctions are preset:

EC07A, Emergency Condenser 11 Fails to Isolate

EC08A, EC Loop 11 Stm IV Fail to Close 111, FV=50

EC08A, EC Loop 11 Stm IV Fail to Close 112, FV=50

Emergency Condenser 11 isolation valves will not close

CREW

- Acknowledge/report annunciators
- Recognize/report Emergency Condenser 11 steam leak
- Recognize/report failure of Emergency Condenser 11 to isolate



Events 8 and 9 continued

Note: Due to the fire panel alarm, the crew may dispatch the Fire Brigade Leader to investigate.

Role Play: If dispatched as FBL to investigate fire alarm, acknowledge the direction, wait two minutes, then report, "No indication of smoke or fire, but there is steam coming from the ECIV room.

Note: By this point in the scenario, EC 12 temperature monitor will likely be in alarm also, due to the close proximity of the temperature switches. Therefore the crew will possibly isolate EC 12 and not place it in service for the Blowdown.

SRO

- Acknowledges reports
- Enters N1-EOP-5 on high Reactor Building Vent rad levels, high Reactor Building area temps / rad levels, and/or loss of RB D/P
- Directs manual isolation of EC11
- Directs Reactor Building evacuation
- Acknowledges manual isolation failure
- Directs dispatching of an operator and RP tech to obtain general area temps and rad levels in the Reactor Building
- When Reactor Building Ventilation exhaust radiation exceeds 5 mR/hr, directs verification of RB Vent isolation and RBEVS initiation
- Determines area temperatures and/or radiation levels are above setpoints in Tables T and R, and transitions to N1-EOP-5 circle 27
- Determines a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building and the discharge cannot be isolated, and transitions to N1-EOP-5 circle 28
- May direct anticipatory blowdown with TBVs and/or Emergency Condenser 12 with cooldown in excess of 100°F/hr
- Acknowledges reports of Reactor Building temperatures and radiation levels
- When report is received that 2 General Areas temperatures are above 135°F, enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- Answers "Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04" YES
- Answers "Drywell pressure?" <3.5 psig
- May direct initiation of Emergency Condenser 12
- Answers "Torus water level?" >8 ft
- Directs open 4 ERVs

CT-3



Events 8 & 9 continued

Note: No General Area temperature information is available until an Operator has been dispatched to the Reactor Building to monitor area temperatures. The timeline of field reports may be adjusted by examiner as necessary for evaluation purposes.

Role Play: When directed as Operator and RP tech to obtain General Area temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building:

Wait approximately 3 minutes and report RB 318' west side temperature is 125°F and rising, radiation level is 2 mr/hr and rising. Also report that you see steam coming from the area of the EC steam IV room.

Note: When one general area temperature is reported above 135°F and a second general area temperature is reported as approaching 135°F, the crew is likely to perform an anticipatory blowdown per EOP-2.

Wait approximately 2 more minutes and report RB 318' west side temperature is 137°F and rising, radiation level is 4 mr/hr and rising. Report RB 318' east side temperature is 123°F and rising, radiation level is 2 mr/hr and rising.

Wait approximately 2 more minutes and report RB 318' west side temperature is 145°F and rising, radiation level is 6 mr/hr and rising. Report RB 318' east side temperature is 136°F and rising, radiation level is 3 mr/hr and rising.

BOP/ATC

- Attempts to isolate Emergency Condenser 11 by closing the following valves per ARP K1-4-3:
 - 39-07R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 112
 - 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111
 - 39-05, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 11
 - 39-11R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 111
 - 39-12R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 112
 - 05-01R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 111
 - 05-11, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112
- Reports failure of 39-07R and 39-09R to close
- Dispatches operator and RP tech to obtain
 Reactor Building General Area temperatures and radiation levels
- Notifies crew of reports on General Area temperatures and radiation levels
- Performs RPV water level control actions of N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram:
 - Restores RPV level to 53-95" by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU



BOP/ATC Continued

- Verifies RPV water level above 53"
- Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
- Places FWP BYPASS Valve 11 or 12 in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches
- If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
 - Verifies off all FW Pumps
 - Secures CRD Pumps not required
- May initiate Emergency Condenser 12
- Opens 4 ERVs

CT-3

| Event | Termination |
|--------------|-------------|
| Criteria | a |

- RPV water level controlled in assigned band
- RPV Blowdown in progress