



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 23, 2021

Mr. Don Moul  
Executive Vice President, Nuclear  
Division and Chief Nuclear Officer  
Florida Power & Light Company  
Mail Stop: EX/EB  
700 Universe Blvd.  
Juno Beach, FL 33408

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT NOS. 268 AND 270 REGARDING TORNADO MISSILE  
PROTECTION LICENSING BASIS (EPID L-2020-LLA-0021)

Dear Mr. Moul:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 268 and 270 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27, respectively, for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Point Beach). The amendments consist of changes to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for tornado missile protection to resolve licensing basis non-conformances in response to your application dated February 6, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20037A007).

A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's monthly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Russell S. Haskell, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch III  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 268 to DPR-24
2. Amendment No. 270 to DPR-27
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: Listserv



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-266

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 268  
License No. DPR-24

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), dated February 6, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 268, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is amended to authorize revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), as set forth in the application dated February 6, 2020. The licensee shall update the UFSAR to incorporate the plant-specific tornado missile protection as described in the licensee's application dated February 6, 2020, and the NRC staff's safety evaluation attached to this amendment, and shall submit the revised description authorized by this amendment with the next update of the UFSAR.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of the date of issuance. The UFSAR changes shall be implemented in the next periodic update to the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Nancy L. Salgado, Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch III  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Date of issuance: February 23, 2021



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-301

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 270  
License No. DPR-27

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), dated February 6, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 270, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is amended to authorize revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), as set forth in the application dated February 6, 2020. The licensee shall update the UFSAR to incorporate the plant-specific tornado missile protection as described in the licensee's application dated February 6, 2020, and the NRC staff's safety evaluation attached to this amendment, and shall submit the revised description authorized by this amendment with the next update of the UFSAR.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of the date of issuance. The UFSAR changes shall be implemented in the next periodic update to the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Nancy L. Salgado, Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch III  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Date of issuance: February 23, 2021



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 268 AND 270

TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, Commission) dated February 6, 2020,<sup>1</sup> NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), proposed in a license amendment request (LAR) revisions to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Point Beach), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) regarding tornado missile protection by describing the historical plant design for safe shutdown equipment located external to Seismic Class I structures. Specifically, the proposed changes would revise: (1) Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3.1, "Overall Plant Requirements General Design Criteria (GDC) 1-5" and (2) Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3.12, "References."

1.1 Purpose for the Proposed Change

By letter dated June 10, 2015, the NRC issued Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection,"<sup>2</sup> to: (1) remind licensees of the need to conform their facility to the current, site-specific licensing basis, for tornado-generated missile protection, (2) provide examples of failures to conform with a plant's tornado-generated missile licensing basis, and (3) remind licensees of the NRC staff's position that systematic evaluation program or individual plant examination of external events (IPEEE) results do not constitute regulatory requirements, and are not part of the plant-specific tornado-generated missile licensing basis, unless the NRC or licensee took action to specifically amend the licensing basis.

By letter dated June 10, 2015,<sup>3</sup> the NRC granted enforcement discretion<sup>3</sup> for tornado missile protection nonconformances based on a generic risk analysis which demonstrated a very low probability of tornado missile scenarios leading to core damage. The licensee states in the LAR

<sup>1</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML20037A007.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection," dated June 10, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15020A419).

<sup>3</sup> NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance," dated June 10, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15111A269).

the proposed revisions to the UFSAR will resolve licensing basis nonconformance associated with tornado missile protection at Point Beach.

For Point Beach, the enforcement discretion would expire three years after the June 2015 issuance of the RIS. By letter dated May 21, 2018,<sup>4</sup> the NRC extended the enforcement discretion to June 2020 following the licensee's extension request<sup>5</sup> demonstrating that the Point Beach implementation of compensatory measures is consistent with NRC-approved regulatory guidance.

## 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

### 2.1 System Design and Operation

As stated in the LAR, all systems and components of the facility are classified according to their importance. In the LAR it states:

The original classification system at Point Beach used designators called Class I, Class II, and Class III. Those items vital to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor, or whose failure might cause or increase the severity of a loss-of-coolant accident, or result in an uncontrolled release of excessive amounts of radioactivity were designated Class I. Those items important to reactor operation but not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor and whose failure could not result in the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity were designated Class II. Those items not related to reactor operation or safety were designated Class III.

All systems and components designated Seismic Class I are designed so that there is no loss of function in the event of the maximum hypothetical ground acceleration acting in the horizontal and vertical directions simultaneously. The working stress for both Seismic Class I and Seismic Class II items is kept within code allowable values for the design earthquake. Similarly, measures are taken in the plant design to appropriately protect these Class I systems and components against high winds, flooding, and other natural phenomena.

Most of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at Point Beach that are needed to maintain the facility in a safe condition are located within structures designed to withstand tornado effects. The NRC staff has established that the safety significance of a small number of components located outside structures designed to withstand tornadoes is typically low. Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, Revision 1, describes a bounding estimate of core damage frequency of four per one-hundred thousand years that was derived from the tornado strike frequency. Furthermore, as stated in the EGM, some licensees have sought and received approval of license amendments to accept tornado missile non-compliances based on computer simulations that showed a very small annual probability of a tornado missile strike on any non-complying SSCs (i.e., less than one per million years). The

<sup>4</sup> USNRC Letter to NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC, Request to Extend Enforcement Discretion Provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002 for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Non-Conformances Identified in Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection," (EPID: L-2018-LLL-0018), May 21, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18135A305).

<sup>5</sup> NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC, Letter NRC 2018-0022 to USNRC, Request to Extend Enforcement Discretion Provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002 for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Non-conformances Identified in Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection", April 26, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18116A306).

licensee identified the following four components located outside structures designed to withstand tornadoes in its extension request for enforcement discretion which included; steam supplies to turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pumps, TDAFW pumps exhaust stacks, main steam system valves, and diesel fuel oil storage tank vent. Although these examples do not bound the types of components that may be located outside structures, they are representative of components in systems with redundant trains of equipment that have often been located outside structures because the components interface with the atmosphere directly (e.g., exhaust pipes and vents) or transport fluids between structures.

## 2.2 Description of the Proposed Changes

The proposed license amendment would modify the Point Beach licensing basis by incorporating historical design input information for tornado missile protection in Section 1.3.1, "Overall Plant Requirements (GDC 1 - GDC 5)," and Section 1.3.12, "References," of the Point Beach UFSAR.

As proposed in the LAR, the following text will be added to Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3.1:

The design basis for tornado missile protection of systems and components is that it is possible to shut the plant down and maintain the plant in safe shutdown during and after the passage of a tornado. The systems and equipment needed for this event do not lose function provided (Reference 1):

- a) Critical items are housed in structures capable of withstanding tornado winds, depressurization and missiles, or
- b) the separation provided between redundant systems or components is such that reasonable assurance exists that a single missile cannot cause a loss of function of both systems or components, and
- c) large structures, such as facade, auxiliary building superstructure, turbine buildings, etc., are so designed that they will not collapse and fall on redundant components or systems.

Additionally, as proposed in the LAR, the following reference will be added to Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3.12(1):

Westinghouse Letter E-R-206, "Point Beach Criteria," from R. Salvatori, Westinghouse PWR [pressurized-water reactor] Systems Division Reliability Group, to F. Konchar, Point Beach Project, October 2, 1969.



### 2.3 Tornado-Missile Protection Licensing Basis

Point Beach was designed to meet the GDC in Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, including GDC 2 ("Design bases for protection against natural phenomena"). The current licensing basis for tornado-missile protection is contained in Section 1.3.1, "Overall Plant Requirements (GDC 1 - GDC 5)," of the Point Beach UFSAR.

The licensing basis for tornado-missile protection, described in UFSAR, states, in part:

The containments and Seismic Class I portions of the Auxiliary Building, the turbine hall, the pumphouse, and the diesel generator building are designed to withstand the effects of a tornado. The design criteria of the containment and the Class I portions of the auxiliary and turbine buildings to withstand the effects of a tornado, including wind force, pressure differential, and missile impingement are described in Bechtel Topical Report B-TOP-3, "Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Against Tornadoes." Design criteria for the diesel generator building are described in FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] Appendix D. The design of the pumphouse to withstand tornados and tornado missiles is described in Section 9.6. Seismic design criteria are described in FSAR Appendix A.5.

The SSCs important to safety are designed either to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of the capability to perform their safety functions or are designed such that upon response or failure they will be in a safe condition. In accordance with NRC regulations and the plant's principal design criteria, SSCs vital to the shutdown capability of the reactor are designed to withstand the maximum probable natural phenomena at the site, determined from recorded data for the site vicinity, with appropriate margin to account for uncertainties in historical data. Appropriate combinations of structural loadings from normal, accident, and natural phenomena are considered in the plant design.

The credible missiles at Point Beach created by natural phenomena are those generated by tornadoes. The typical method used to meet the GDC is to provide positive (i.e., physical) protection features such as locating required equipment in structures designed for tornado missiles and providing barriers designed for tornado missiles.

### 2.4 Applicable Regulatory Requirements and Guidance

GDC 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomena," in Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50, establishes requirements regarding the ability of SSCs important to safety to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without the loss of capability to perform their safety functions.

Regulation 10 CFR 50.71(e), states, in part:

Each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor under the provisions of Sections 50.21 or 50.22, and each applicant for a combined license under 10 CFR Part 52 of this chapter, shall update periodically, as provided in paragraphs (e) (3) and (4) of this section, the final safety analysis report (FSAR) originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. This submittal

shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by the applicant or licensee or prepared by the applicant or licensee pursuant to Commission requirement since the submittal of the original FSAR, or as appropriate, the last update to the FSAR under this section.

Point Beach, UFSAR, Section 1.3.1 and UFSAR, Section 1.3.12.

NRC RIS 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection," dated June 10, 2015.<sup>6</sup>

NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants" (SRP), Section 3.5.1.4, Revision 4, "Missiles Generated by Extreme Winds," issued March 2015, and Section 3.5.2, Revision 3, "Structures, Systems, and Components to be Protected from Externally-Generated Missiles," issued March 2007,<sup>7</sup> contain the current acceptance criteria governing tornado-missile protection. The criteria generally specifies that SSCs that are important to safety be provided with sufficient, positive tornado-missile protection (i.e., barriers) to withstand the maximum credible tornado threat.

Regulatory Guide 1.76, Revision 1, "Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,"<sup>8</sup> issued March 2007, provides a method to define design-basis tornado and design-basis tornado-generated missiles that a nuclear power plant should be designed to withstand to prevent undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

### 3.0 Technical Evaluation

As stated in the Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3, the GDC describe the principal criteria and safety objectives for the design of Point Beach. The Point Beach GDCs are like the Atomic Industrial Forum version of the Proposed 1967 GDCs published by the Atomic Energy Commission. Specifically, in Point Beach UFSAR, Section 5.1, it states:

Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention or to the mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that enable such systems and components to withstand, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, the forces that might reasonably be imposed by the occurrence of an extraordinary natural phenomenon such as earthquake, tornado, flooding condition, high wind, or heavy ice. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been officially recorded for the site and the surrounding area and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design. (GDC 2)

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's proposed revisions to the Point Beach UFSAR for tornado missile design basis based on a historical design input documented by letter dated

<sup>6</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML15020A419.

<sup>7</sup> ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14190A180 and ML070460362, respectively.

<sup>8</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML070360253.

October 2, 1969, "Point Beach Criteria."<sup>9</sup> The proposed tornado missile design criteria are to either house critical items in structures capable of withstanding tornado winds, or to provide separation between redundant systems or components with reasonable assurance that a single missile cannot cause a loss of function of both systems or components, and ensure large structures are so designed that they will not collapse and fall on redundant components or systems.

To determine the consistency of the licensee's proposed revisions to the Point Beach UFSAR, the NRC staff reviewed the tornado missile protections design basis of two contemporary nuclear power plants;

- 1) Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3, (IP3) FSAR (Update), Revision 7, Section 16.2.1, "Definition of Design Basis Tornado,"<sup>10</sup> states, in part:

[t]he plant is safeguarded from the tornados by the combined use of buildings and structures designed to withstand tornados, and by redundancy of components.

IP3 FSAR (Update), Revision 7, Section 16.2.2, "Tornado-Proof Systems and Equipment," states, in part:

[e]quipment and systems contained within tornado proof structures are protected from tornadoes and tornado missiles. Components and systems not housed within tornado-proof structures (but essential for safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor) are provided with protection to that function by component or system redundancy.

- 2) St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, UFSAR, Section 3.5.1.4, "Missile Generated by Natural Phenomena"<sup>11</sup> states, in part:

Plant structures, system and components required for safe shutdown are protected from the effects of a tornado missile by any of the following means:

- a. Design of structures, systems or components to withstand missile impact
- b. Protection of systems or components by structures designed to withstand missile impact
- c. Separation of redundant components to preclude simultaneous failure by single missile impact

The NRC staff determined that both the IP3 and St. Lucie, Unit 2, FSARs contain evaluations of plant design against GDC 2. In each of these examples, the design basis includes a criterion of separation of redundant components to prevent failure from a single missile as providing acceptable protection because the safety function could be accomplished following failure of one redundant component because the redundant component would not be damaged by a single missile. The NRC staff determined, that similarly, the Point Beach GDC 2 tornado missile design criterion contains an element related to safety-significance or risk in

<sup>9</sup> Westinghouse Letter E-R-206, "Point Beach Criteria," from R. Salvatori, Westinghouse [Pressurized Water Reactor] PWR Systems Division Reliability Group, to F. Konchar, Point Beach Project, October 2, 1969. (referenced in ADAMS ML16251A150).

<sup>10</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML17299A229.

<sup>11</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML19141A221.

determining the design basis for protection from tornado missiles. The staff concluded the licensee at Point Beach is acceptably exhibiting consistency, as applied by other sites, in their proposed approach to the UFSAR revisions.

Following the NRC staff's review of the furnished information included in this LAR, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee's methodology to evaluate the risk of tornado generated missiles at Point Beach adequately supports the proposed changes for tornado missile protections, and is therefore acceptable.

The Point Beach IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Summary Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML20086B527), concludes that due to the low frequency of high winds and tornadoes at the Point Beach site, the contribution to plant risk from high winds and tornadoes is not significant. The licensee determined the only significant contributor to core damage frequency from tornado or straight winds would be the failure of the diesel generator exhaust stacks as a result of winds exceeding the modified design value; tornado generated missiles were not a significant contributor. As a mitigative approach, and to support a defense-in-depth strategy, the licensee has since installed additional emergency diesel generators designed to withstand stronger winds and tornado effects, thereby increasing the reliability of the emergency power function. Also, Point Beach UFSAR, Section 1.3.11, "Resolution of Other Issues Addressed by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events," states that:

[d]uring the NRC review of the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) License Amendment Request, the NRC revisited the IPEEE information, thereby incorporating it by reference into the EPU license bases.

In its Safety Evaluation Report [SER] for the Point Beach EPU<sup>12</sup> dated May 3, 2011, the staff states that external events at Point Beach, including tornadoes, have an acceptably low risk. The NRC staff's evaluation concluded there were no identified issues associated with the licensee's evaluation of the risk related to external events, as they pertained to the EPU. Additionally, during the staff's evaluation of the EPU LAR, the staff considered the results of the licensee's IPEEE review of "Other External Events Risk," where the licensee stated:

The PBNP [Point Beach] IPEEE addresses events other than seismic and fires, including high winds/tornadoes, external floods, transportation, and nearby accidents. Consistent with the IPEEE guidance, the licensee reviewed the plant environs against regulatory requirements regarding these hazards and concluded that PBNP meets the applicable NRC SRP [Standard Review Plan] guidance and, therefore, has an acceptably low risk with respect to these hazards.

Based on the information furnished by the licensee in this LAR, the NRC staff have determined that for a tornado missile induced scenario to occur, a tornado would have to touch down at the site and result in the generation of missiles that would hit and fail vulnerable, unprotected safety-related equipment and/or unprotected safety-related subcomponents in a manner that is non-repairable and non-recoverable. The NRC staff concluded that the safety significance of a small number of components, located outside the Point Beach structures designed to withstand tornadoes, is low.

The NRC staff evaluated the proposed criteria for the Point Beach tornado missile protection design bases against the regulatory criterion established in GDC 2. GDC 2 established a

<sup>12</sup> ADAMS Accession No. ML110450159.

performance standard to enable essential systems to withstand forces that might reasonably be imposed by a tornado without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The NRC staff found that the proposed tornado design criteria would be consistent with GDC 2 because the new criteria apply to systems with redundant components that ensure the system essential safety function can be accomplished following a single tornado missile strike. The probability of a second missile strike that damages the redundant component is sufficiently low that there is not an undue risk to the public associated with the proposed tornado missile design basis. The staff considered the following information supporting this finding:

- The proposed tornado missile design basis is consistent with licensee records at the time of original licensing and consistent with the design basis for other contemporary reactor sites,
- The NRC's generic risk analysis determined that the risk associated with a component unprotected from tornado missiles would be low because it would be a fraction of the tornado strike frequency, and
- The IPEEE evaluation did not find tornado missile risk was significant relative to Point Beach risk from external events or tornado risk in general.

### 3.1 NRC Staff Conclusion

Following the NRC staff's review of the LAR, the staff concluded that the licensee has demonstrated that the nonconforming conditions are not likely to adversely affect the ability of SSCs important to safety to withstand the potential effects of extreme winds and missiles associated with such winds on plant SSCs important to safety. Further, the staff determined the licensee has demonstrated that SSCs important to safety will be capable of performing their safety functions during and following a tornado. Accordingly, the current nonconforming conditions do not affect the NRC staff's finding of reasonable assurance that SSCs important to safety will be capable of performing their safety functions during and following a tornado. Therefore, the staff have concluded the licensee's UFSAR revisions, as proposed, are acceptable.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, on January 29, 2021, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the *Federal Register* on April 21, 2020 (85 FR 22186). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: H. Wagage, NRR

Date of issuance: February 23, 2021

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 268 AND 270 REGARDING TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION LICENSING BASIS (EPID L-2020-LLA-0021) DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2021

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**ADAMS Accession No.: ML20363A176**

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