



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

October 20, 2020

Mr. James Barstow
Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Support Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street, LP 4A-c
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

**SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANTS – TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2020012 AND 05000328/2020012**

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On September 9, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. On August 31, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Scott Hunnewell and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Br 2
Div of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000327 and 05000328
License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

Enclosure: As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANTS – TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
 INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2020012 AND 05000328/2020012
 DATED: October 20, 2020

DISTRIBUTION:

M. Kowal, RII
 S. Price, RII
 L. Gibson, RII
 RidNrrPMSequoyah Resource
 RidsNrrDro Resource

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: **ML20294A177**

OFFICE	RII: DRS	RII: DRS	RII: DRS	RII: DRS	RII: DRP	RII: DRS
NAME	P. Braaten	D. Strickland	J. Montgomery	J. Dymek	T. Stephens	S. Shaeffer
DATE	10/16/20	10/15/20	10/16/20	10/16/20	10/15/20	10/20/20

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000327 and 05000328

License Numbers: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Report Numbers: 05000327/2020012 and 05000328/2020012

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-012-0012

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plants

Location: Soddy Daisy

Inspection Dates: June 07, 2020 to August 28, 2020

Inspectors: P. Braaten, Reactor Inspector
J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Strickland, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Br 2
Div of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a triennial fire protection inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Allowed Preconditioning of Alternative Safe Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000328/2020012-01 Open/Closed	[H.1] - Resources	71111.21N.05
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, "Surveillance Test Program," by providing operators with inadequate surveillance procedures that preconditioned alternative safe shutdown transfer switches and controls.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N.05 - Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI)

Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) Credited for Fire Prevention, Detection, Suppression, or Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Review (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors verified that the following systems credited in the approved fire protection program could perform their licensing basis function:

- a. Review deficiencies or open fire protection impairments for the selected system, including any temporary modifications, operator workarounds, or compensatory measures.
- b. Verify that operator actions can be accomplished as assumed in the licensee's FHA, or as assumed in the licensee's fire probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA) analysis and SSA.
- c. Review repetitive or similar maintenance work requests which could be an indicator of a design deficiency and could affect the ability of the components to perform their functions, when needed.
- d. Ensure that post maintenance and/or surveillance activities are performed as scheduled.
- e. Perform a walkdown inspection to identify equipment alignment discrepancies. Inspect for deficient conditions such as corrosion, missing fasteners, cracks, and degraded insulation.
- f. Ensure the selected SSCs that are subject to aging management review (AMR) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54 are being managed for aging (e.g., loss of material, cracking, reduction of heat transfer) in accordance with appropriate aging management programs. Verify that the licensee's aging management program activities (such as, Fuel Oil Analysis or Selective Leaching Aging Management Program) associated with FP equipment are being implemented.
- g. If a review of operating experience issues will be completed for the selected inspection sample, verify that the licensee adequately reviewed and dispositioned the operating experience in accordance with their processes.

The team selected the following SSCs as samples.

- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System
- Unit 2 Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves

- Unit 1 12v DC Power System
- Cable Tray Water Spray System in 1B2-B and 2A2-A 480v Shutdown Board Rooms
- CO2 System in Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room and Required Fire/Smoke Dampers

Fire Protection Program Administrative Controls (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the following fire protection program administrative controls were implemented in accordance with the current licensing basis:

- Combustible Control Program

Fire Protection Program Changes/Modifications (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the following changes to ensure that they did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown post-fire and to verify that fire protection program documents and procedures affected by the changes were updated.

- Engineering Modification to Replace Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Allowed Preconditioning of Alternative Safe Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000328/2020012-01 Open/Closed	[H.1] - Resources	71111.21N.05
<p>The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, "Surveillance Test Program," by providing operators with inadequate surveillance procedures that preconditioned alternative safe shutdown transfer switches and controls.</p> <p><u>Description:</u> To support inspection of the Unit 2 Pressurizer PORVs and their credit for fire safe shutdown, inspectors reviewed records for the last completion of surveillance test procedure 2-PI-OPS-000-010.D, "Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches." This test procedure verifies the operation of remote shutdown transfer switches and controls that are credited to meet the alternative shutdown requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3. In reviewing this surveillance test procedure, inspectors discovered a sequence of test steps that appeared to constitute preconditioning of the Pressurizer PORVs under surveillance.</p> <p>For PORV 2-PCV-68-334, after operators receive authorization from the SRO to perform the surveillance, the test directs operators to cycle transfer switch 2-XS-68-334C at least three times to clean contacts. The next step is to cycle control switch 2-HS-68-334C at least three times to clean contacts.</p>			

NRC Technical Guidance Part 9900, "Maintenance – Preconditioning of Structures, Systems, and Components Before Determining Operability," gives guidance on the acceptability of preconditioning SSCs before the performance of surveillance testing. This document states that the NRC expects surveillance and testing processes of SSCs to be evaluated in an "as-found" condition. This guidance is echoed in TVA fleet procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, "Surveillance Test Program." NPG-SPP-06.9.2 states, "Surveillance sequences and alignment activities that are implemented prior to a surveillance test should be intended to facilitate testing or prevent unnecessary wear and damage to equipment and/or systems. Test procedure steps that exercise equipment prior to testing activities are not allowed unless they provide a specific benefit, such as improved safety, reduced wear and tear, or facilitate better test methods. The potential of such activities to unintentionally mask degradation must be considered." Cycling electrical contacts repeatedly to clean them does not specifically facilitate test performance or provide any specific benefit. Further, cleaning the contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings of the surveillance could unintentionally mask degradation of the circuit and the contacts.

Inspectors noted that the steps for PORV 2-PCV-68-340 were structured the same. The last performance of the surveillance for these two valves was November 23, 2018. Inspectors also reviewed the test procedure for other examples of this test sequence, and found that the surveillances for the 4 Main Steam Isolation Valves, the main Charging Header flow control valve (FCV) 62-93, multiple 6.9kV Shutdown Board feeder breakers, and the FCV for RHR Hot Leg injection to loops 1 & 3 (2-FCV-63-172) all contained the same, or similar steps to clean the electrical contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings of the surveillance.

Corrective Action References: CR 1616116

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to establish adequate surveillance test instructions in accordance with TVA fleet procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, surveillance test procedure 2-PI-OPS-000-010.D directed operators to cycle transfer and control switches to clean the contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings to determine whether the surveillance acceptance criteria had been met. Those procedure steps constitute unacceptable preconditioning of the SSCs.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to determine the as-found condition of the transfer switches and controls reduced the ability of the licensee to provide reasonable assurance that the licensee's alternative shutdown capability would have been available between tests.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, "Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP." Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown/hot standby conditions using the credited safe shutdown success path (Question 1.4.7-C).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, leaders did not ensure that a set of procedures were in place that ensured preconditioning did not take place.

Enforcement:

Violation: Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) requires, in part, that TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Section 9.5.1 of the FSAR states that the Fire Protection System and fire protection features are described in the Fire Protection Report. Part II of the Fire Protection Report is the Fire Protection Plan, and Section 6.0 of the Fire Protection Plan states that the QA program for fire protection uses the applicable parts of the TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan. Fleet procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.5, "Fire Protection QA Program" requires that activities shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable TVA Nuclear Power Group (NPG) programs to provide controls for modification, installation, surveillance, maintenance, operation, and program administration. The NPG Test Program is described in NPG-SPP-06.9, and child procedures. NPG-SPP-06.9.2, "Surveillance Test Program," requires that "Surveillance sequences and alignment activities that are implemented prior to a surveillance test should be intended to facilitate testing or prevent unnecessary wear and damage to equipment and/or systems. Test procedure steps that exercise equipment prior to testing activities are not allowed unless they provide a specific benefit, such as improved safety, reduced wear and tear, or facilitate better test methods. The potential of such activities to unintentionally mask degradation must be considered."

Contrary to the above, from August 3, 2018 to June 12, 2020, the licensee used a surveillance test procedure that directed operators to exercise equipment prior to surveillance testing activities, without a specific benefit.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On August 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the triennial fire protection inspection results to Mr. Scott Hunnewell and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.21N.05	Calculations	26D54EPMABBIMPFA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Fire Hazards Analysis Calculation	Rev. 145
		72-92743	Seismic Analysis of 24 Ton CO2 Tank	Rev. 0
		APS2068	Appendix R - Post Fire RCS Cooldown and Depressurization	Rev. 2
		B25850329800	Fire Protection Pipe Support Calculation for Cantilevered 1-inch Pipe	03/27/1985
		D2SDJ-P213350	Analysis of the Auxiliary Power System for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R	Rev. 64
		EDQ0009992017000385FHA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Fire Hazards Analysis Calculation – FSSD Compliance Mitigation Strategy	Rev. 3
		MDN000NA2019000628	SQN Fire PRA - Fire Risk Quantification	Rev. 1
		MDQ0026-97001	Motor Driven Fire Pump Replacement Sprinkler Calculation	06/25/2018
		MDQ0026-97001B	Control Valve(s) 0FCV-26-151 & 0FCV-2066 HPFP Sprinkler Calculation	12/03/2013
		MDQ0026-97001D	Flow Testing to Support Pipe Degradation	12/24/1997
		MDQ0026-980041	HPFP Sprinkler Calculation, Boric Acid Tank Room, 690.0' AB, Sprinkler Addition	12/16/1998
		SQN-APPR-1	Analysis of AC/DC Instrument & Control (I&C) Power Systems to Identify Associated Circuits - 10 CFR 50 Appendix R	Rev. 20
		SQN-APS-003	480VAC APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study	Rev. 108
		SQN-DC-V-10.7	Design Criteria Document - 10CFR50, Appendix R, Type I,II, & III Circuits	Rev. 4
		SQN-DC-V-24.0	Design Criteria Document - Fire Protection for Appendix R Requirements	Rev. 10
		SQN-DC-V-43.0	Design Criteria Document - High-Pressure Fire Protection Water Supply System	Rev. 9
SQN-DC-V-7.5	Design Criteria Document - Fire Protection	Rev. 14		

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Systems	
		SQN-DC-V-7.6	Design Criteria Document - Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems for Fire Alarm and Supervisory Service	Rev. 4
		SQNAPPR10	Appendix R Hot Short Analysis for Non High/Low RCS Pressure Interfaces and Non-High Impact Circuits	Rev. 25
		XDN00000020110001	OMAs for 10 CFR Appendix R III.G.2 Compliance	1/27/2014
	Corrective Action Documents	1072726	Appendix R Fire Concern Regarding Smoke Migration	8/7/2019
		1440822	Appendix R Control Building Issue for RHR Pumps	08/20/2018
		1581033	NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (TFPI) Readiness Self-Assessment	02/24/2020
		1610002	Appendix R Lighting Deficiency Created by Design Change	6/8/2020
		1627936	Light heads misaimed	8/4/2020
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	1590413	SA-1581033 2020 TFPI Deficiencies in testing for remote shutdown transfer switches	06/09/2020
		1613748	Alternate shutdown transfer switch testing deficiencies	06/10/2020
		1616116	NRC identified issue related to transfer switch testing	06/12/2020
		CR1632843	Fire Door C-22 Missing Screws from Plate on Door	08/25/2020
		CR1632915	Abandon Office Chair Staged in Auxiliary Building Equipment Room	8/26/2020
	Drawings	1,2 45W1699-50	Conduit & Grounding, Floor EI.734.0, Details Sheet 12	Rev. 3
		1,2 46W-455-1	Architectural Door Frames and Details	Rev. 1
		1,2 46W454-4	Architectural Door and Hardware Schedule	Rev. 1
		1,2 46W454-7	Architectural Door and Hardware Schedule	Rev. 0
		1,2 47W494-4	Fire Protection Compartmentation-Fire Cells	Rev. 15

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Plan El. 734.0'	
		1,2 47W494-6	Fire Protection Compartmentation-Fire Cells, Plan El. 669.0' & 685.0'	Rev. 7
		1,2 47W850-27	Flow Diagram-High Pressure Fire Protection	Rev. 11
		1,2-45N639-1	Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System Schematic Diagrams Sh-1	Rev. 3
		1,2-45N639-2	Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System Schematic Diagrams Sh-2	Rev. 3
		1,2-45N639-3	Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System Schematic Diagrams Sh-3	Rev. 15
		1,2-45N703-1	Wiring Diagrams - 125V Vital Battery Board I Single Line Sheet 1	Rev. 85
		1,2-45N703-2	Wiring Diagram - 125V Vital Board Battery Board II Single Line Sheet 2	Rev. 45
		1,2-45N703-3	Wiring Diagrams - 125V Vital Battery Board III Single Line Sheet 3	Rev. 49
		1,2-45N703-4	Wiring Diagrams - Vital Battery Board IV Single Line Sheet 4	Rev. 51
		1,2-45N749-1	Wiring Diagrams 480V SD Board 1A1-A Single Line	Rev. 54
		1,2-47W801-1	Flow Diagram - Main & Reheat Steam	Rev. 120
		1,2-47W813-1	Flow Diagram-Reactor Cooling System	Rev. 58
		1-3591A12	Breaker Setting Sheet 480V S/D Bd 1A1	Rev. 3
		1-3591A13	Breaker Setting Sheet 480V Shutdown Board 1A1	Rev. 4
		2-47W809-1	Flow Diagram - Chemical & Volume Control System	Rev. 77
	Engineering Changes	22644	Replace Pressurizer PORVs Due to Current Valves Being Obsolete and Reaching End of Life	07/18/2018
	Engineering Evaluations		Fire Protection Report	Rev. 37
	Fire Plans	Aux 0-734-02	Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Auxiliary Building El. 734.0	Rev. 9

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		AUX-0-734.00	Fire Protection Pre-Plan Auxiliary Building El. 734.0	Rev. 4
		Aux. 0-734-01	Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Auxiliary Building Elevation 734.0'	Rev. 10
		CON 0-685-00	Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Control Building El. 685.0'	Rev. 7
	Miscellaneous	FOR 200283	Fire Protection Impairment Permit	7/15/2020
		FOR 200302	Fire Protection Impairment Permit	08/03/2020
		FOR 202030	Fire Protection Impairment Permit	1/28/2020
		QIR-SPQ-SQN-88-182	CO2 Discharge Times Pre-Operational Test	02/11/1988
		SNQ-VM-4085	Vendor Manual for Protect-O-Wire Special Hazards Application	Rev. 1
		SNQ-VM-4534/VD-P115-4534	Peerless Pump Vendor Manual	Rev. 6
		TCE 2020-12	Transient Combustible Permit	05/01/2020
		TCE 2020-20	Transient Combustible Permit	10/03/2020
		TCE 2020-21	Transient Combustible Permit	10/03/2020
	Procedures	0-MI-FPU-000-001	General Maintenance Instructions for Fire Protection Systems	Rev. 15
		0-PI-FPU-317-537.Q	Fire and Medical Emergency Equipment Inventory	Rev. 23
		0-SI-EBT-250-100.1	Vital Battery Quarterly Inspection	4/9/2020
		0-SI-EBT-250-100.3	Vital Battery I and Charger Annual Inspection	8/6/2018
		0-SI-EBT-250-100.6	U0 Spare 125 v Vital Batt Charger #1 Performance Test	5/24/2016
		0-SI-FPU-0026-002.Y	Auxiliary and Diesel Generator Building System 26 Flow Test	09/26/2019
		0-SI-FPU-0026-200R	Diesel Engine RPM Factory Test Settings (2100 RPM)	11/11/2000
0-SI-FPU-0026-201R		Flow Test Surveillance for Motor-Driven Fire Pump	01/19/2018	
0-SI-FPU-013		Fire Detection Panel 0-L-632 Test	Rev. 13	
0-SI-FPU-026-201R		Flow Test Surveillance for Motor-Driven Fire Pump	06/25/2019	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		0-SI-SXV-000-206.0	U2 PMT for Vlvs During Refueling	4/10/2020
		0-SI-SXV-068-201.0	U2 Stroke Pzr PORVs	11/2/2018
		119684884	0-SI-FPU-026-200.R Diesel Driven Fire Pump B 18 Month Flow Test	06/22/2019
		2-PI-OPS-000-0033.0	Periodic Stroking of U2 Time Critical Valves	10/28/2018
		AOP-N.08	Fire Safe Shutdown	
		NPG-SPP-01.3	Housekeeping	Rev. 8
		NPG-SPP-03.6	Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory Reviews	Rev. 10
		NPG-SPP-06.9	Testing Programs	Rev. 2
		NPG-SPP-06.9.1	Conduct of Testing	Rev. 12
		NPG-SPP-06.9.2	Surveillance Test Program	Rev. 9
		NPG-SPP-09.3	Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control	Rev. 33
		NPG-SPP-18.4.5	Fire Protection Quality Assurance	Rev. 3
		SI-237.1	Powerhouse CO2 Fire Protection System Test	09/30/2019
		TVA-NQA-PLN89-A	Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan (NQAP) (Quality Assurance Program Description)	Rev. 38
	Self-Assessments	DCP-SQN-18-011	Fire Protection Program Regulatory Review for DCN-SQN18-011 (Detection)	Rev. 0
		None	Fire Protection Program Health Report	06/30/2020
		None	System Health Report (System 26) HPFP	03/31/2020
		QA-SQ-19-013	Off-Year Fire Protection Assessment	08/23/2019
	Work Orders	115342170	0-PI-FPU-026-122.Y HPFP Yard Flow Test	08.06/14
		116401835	2-PI-OPS-000-010.B Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches	12/10/2015
		117675098	2-PI-OPS-000-010.C Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches	05/23/2017
		118187526	0-PI-FPU-026-122.Y HPFP Yard Flow Test	06/10/2017
		118573914	0-SI-FPU-026-202.R Diesel Fire Pump 18 Month Inspection	05/31/2018
118573915		0-SI-FPU-026-200.R Diesel Driven Fire Pump B 18 Month Flow Test	07/23/2018	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		119198061	2-PI-OPS-000-010.D Verification Of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches	12/04/2019
		119684878	0-SI-FPU-026-202.R Diesel Fire Pump 18 Month Inspection	06/14/2019
		12027921	0-SI-FPU-026-193.M Motor Driven Fire Pump B Mini-Flow Test	02/06/2020
		1203140059	2-PI-OPS-000-010.A Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches	05/02/2020
		120403941	0-SI-FPU-026-192.M Motor Driven Fire Pump A Operability Test	03/12/2020
		120469066	0-SI-FPU-026-193.M Motor Driven Fire Pump B Mini-Flow Test	04/09/2020
		120501411	0-SI-FPU-026-192.M Motor Driven Fire Pump A Operability Test	04/16/2020
		WO119605602	Power House CO2 Fire Protection System test	
		WO120314291	Visual Inspection of Fire Dampers for 0-SI-FPU-031-001R	