

From: (b)(7)(C)
To: (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Palo Verde NPP - Suspicious Activity Reports
Date: Monday, October 28, 2019 1:34:00 PM
Attachments: [2019 - Palo Verde. 2.pdf](#)
[2019 - Palo Verde.pdf](#)

These two attachments are the SID-02998 and SID-02999 documents that were released to you in response to NRC-2020-000181, which may be found in public ADAMS as ML20231A488.

Good afternoon.

I wanted to follow up with you to see whether there is any continued investigation into the two UAV overflight events at Palo Verde from earlier this month, or whether these have been closed "unresolved."

Thank you,

(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2019 2:03 PM
To: (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Palo Verde NPP - Suspicious Activity Reports

SA (b)(7)(C)

We have received two separate suspicious activity reports from Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant regarding multiple UAVs flying over / around the facility overnight. The first report was from Sunday night, and the other report was from Monday night (see attached).

Site security was unable to observe any identifying markings on the UAVs themselves or locate the operator(s), so I do not know how much additional investigation can be undertaken. However, if you are able to get any additional information, please let me know so that I can update our records / database accordingly.

Thank you,

(b)(7)(C)

Intelligence Specialist
Response Coordination Branch, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Tel: (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(7)(C)
To:
Cc:
Subject: FW: PVGS - UAV overflights (an update)
Date: Wednesday, October 02, 2019 3:33:00 PM

(b)(7)(C)

See below for an update on the UAV overflights at Palo Verde. The licensee asked about the best way to report future overflight events, and I encouraged them to continue to route those through the HOO, rather than to me directly. I also used this opportunity to reinforce the value of suspicious activity reporting more broadly.

Just wanted to keep you in the loop. Have a nice afternoon.

(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2019 3:31 PM
To: Morris, Scott <Scott.Morris@nrc.gov>; Lantz, Ryan <Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov>; Miller, Geoffrey <Geoffrey.Miller@nrc.gov>; Vogel, Anton <Anton.Vogel@nrc.gov>; Inverso, Tara <Tara.Inverso@nrc.gov>
Cc: Dixon, John <John.Dixon@nrc.gov>; Haire, Mark <Mark.Haire@nrc.gov>
Subject: PVGS - UAV overflights (an update)

Scott,

At the urging of John Dixon (thanks, John!), I just received a call from Sean Darnseif and Michael Casenza (?) from PVGS to update me on the activities their site is undertaking to attempt to identify the UAV operators from earlier this week.

According to our discussions just now, PVGS is working closely with their regulatory affairs staff, LLEA, DHS, FAA, and FBI to address the UAV overflights. Further, PVGS intends to deploy a counter-drone technology from Area Armor to attempt to identify the UAV operators. This technology apparently has a 13-mile radius and can determine the specific point from which the UAVs were launched so that LLEA / site security can locate the operator(s). I confirmed with the licensee that they have coordinated the use of this counter drone technology with FAA, and they informed me that this technology only locates the UAVs; it does not interfere with the flight pattern of those UAVs in any way. PVGS has also staffed an additional team on the backshift to help search for any potential operators should additional UAVs be observed later this week.

I have conveyed this information to my FBI counterpart with whom I have been coordinating this week for his awareness, and I have asked both PVGS and the FBI to keep me informed of any additional information they may receive during the course of this investigation. I will also share this information with ILTAB for their on-call duty officer's awareness.

Thank you,

(b)(7)(C)

Intelligence Specialist
Response Coordination Branch, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Tel: (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

From: Dixon, John
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2019 1:38 PM
To: Peabody, Charley; You, David; Bywater, Russ
Subject: FW: NRC Daily Notes for October 11, 2019

FYI. The drone issue is getting higher views, not specific to PV but it may have driven it faster.

John L. Dixon
Chief, Branch D
817-200-1574
(b)(7)(C) (c)

From: NRC Intranet <drupal@nrc.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 11, 2019 3:01 PM
To: NRC Daily Notes <NRCDailyNotes@nrc.gov>
Subject: NRC Daily Notes for October 11, 2019

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Sensitive Internal Info (default)~~

Daily Notes for October 11, 2019

NSIR

~~(OUO - SII)~~

On October 8, staff from NSIR visited Entergy Corporation's new information technology facility in Houston, TX to discuss Entergy's initiative to develop a process for cyber security performance testing. The Entergy nuclear cyber security management team is developing a procedure for conducting functional performance testing that could potentially be used to inform the staff's future cyber security oversight program. Entergy intends to submit the testing procedure to the staff once the process is mature.

~~(OUO - SII)~~

On October 10, NSIR staff attended a meeting of the Nuclear Security Council's (NSC) Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Policy Coordinating Committee Restricted Working Group. Attendees included representatives from NSC, DOD, DOE, DOT, FAA, DHS' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, DOJ, and FBI. The meeting covered recent drone flyovers at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station and other sites, each agency's role, potential need for interagency assistance/coordination, and thoughts for future actions. Specific topics included current FAA and DOJ legal prohibitions and associated limitations, legislation being considered by DHS and their associated report to Congress due later this year, lack of consistency in reporting across agencies, how to assess actual threats/vulnerabilities/unacceptable consequences (while NRC remained mostly in a listening mode, staff pointed out that to date, no flyovers have exhibited a threat to a nuclear power plant), and potential assessment criteria to assist in identifying trends. The NSC is assessing the information discussed and will likely schedule future working group meetings on this topic.

NMSS

~~(OUO - SII)~~

On October 10, NMSS staff held the eleventh and final NEIMA Section 108 public meeting on community advisory board (CAB) best practices near Crystal River at the Citrus County Chamber of Commerce. There were 43 attendees, including three local officials and staff from Congressman Daniel Webster and Senator Rubio's offices. Congressman Webster's staff provided a statement, along with comments from nine members of the public. Comments focused on the effectiveness of Duke Energy's communication with the local community. While some

attendees stated that there was a need for a CAB, the local organizers noted that they were having difficulty gaining any public interest in the decommissioning.

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Sensitive Internal Info (default)~~

From: (b)(7)(C)
To: (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Palo Verde NPP - Suspicious Activity Reports
Date: Monday, December 30, 2019 9:17:00 AM
Attachments: [2019 - Palo Verde, Dec..pdf](#)

SA (b)(7)(C)

We received a suspicious activity report regarding a drone overflight of Palo Verde on December 21, 2019 (attached). As there were no identifying features on the drone and the operator was not located, I am closing this incident in our system as "unresolved." I wanted to pass the information along to you for your awareness, since I know there have been several other UAV overflights of Palo Verde this fall.

Thank you,

(b)(7)(C)

SID # SID-03010

Created by Howard Crouch on Dec 21, 2019 11:13:56 AM

General Information

Access Control

All Tabs

Last Comment

Howard Crouch [818], Dec 21, 2019 11:32:26 AM, Draft:

Record Number
SID-03010EN #
N/A

Incident Status

- ☐ Open
- ☐ Closed Resolved
- ☒ Closed Unresolved

General Information

Incident / Communication Document Date
Dec 21, 2019 5:25:00 PST(-0800)Subject/Short Description
Drone SightingReporting Organization
Power Reactor - OperatingSite/Licensee
Palo VerdeSite/Licensee Name
Palo VerdeState
AZRegion
4Timezone
(GMT-7:00) Mountain Standard Time [US/Arizona]Report Category
Drone

Non-Sensitive Attachments

Recorded on 21-Dec-2019 at 11.47.09.WAV
Recorded on 21-Dec-2019 at 11.52.53.WAV

(R) Sensitive Attachments

Document Links

External Links

External Reference Number

Vehicle(s) Involved (Query)

Person(s) Involved (Query)

Incident Information

Non Responsive Record

12/30/2019

73.71 Report?
☒ Yes ☐ No

37.57 Report?
☒ Yes ☐ No

37.81 Report?
☒ Yes ☐ No

Notification Date/Time/Timezone
Dec 21, 2019 10:48:00 CST

(R) Caller Name
Gil Tapia

(R) Caller Title
Security Shift Leader

Caller Affiliation
Palo Verde

(R) Call Back Phone #
(623) 393-6471

HOO/HERO
Howard Crouch

ILTAB Duty Officer

(b)(7)(C)

(R) Detailed Description of Incident

At 0525 PST, Plant Security Officers observed a drone near the plant cooling towers. Due to multiple officers reporting, there is a potential that two drones were observed with only one drone flying over the protected area.

Prepare to Redact

The drone flew from the cooling tower area, over Unit 3, then exited over the switchyard heading north. Only one pass was made. Altitude was over 300 feet since it cleared the Unit 3 containment. Approximate time over the facility was 40 seconds. Only a single pass was made.

The drone was a large industrial sized craft with an approximate 3 foot diameter. It was too dark to identify markings but it did have a white spotlight in front and a green light in back.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and file a report with the Maricopa County Sheriff Office. No other external notifications were made.

Notified R4DO (Drake).

This report is open pending ILTAB/ILTAT review. ILTAB/ILTAT will update or close this report when appropriate.

Redacted Description of Incident

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Redact Selected Text

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This report is open pending ILTAB/ILTAT review. ILTAB/ILTAT will update or close this report when appropriate.

Updates / ILTAB Summary

ILTAT (b)(7)(C) reviewed the incoming SID report, and notified the FBI's WMD Coordinator for awareness. Due to a lack of identifying features on the drone and the inability to locate the operator, no additional investigation is expected at this time. The incident is being closed "unresolved."

Last Updated
Dec 30, 2019 11:13:00 CST

Caller's Notification Information

NRC's External Notifition Information

(R) = "Restricted Field" (not viewable by general users)

From: (b)(7)(C)
To: Lanfear, Raymond
Subject: RE: Palo Verde Security Event. *OOO*
Date: Tuesday, October 22, 2019 3:30:00 PM

Typically, yes. I just didn't know whether the topic of UAVs had come up during any of your more routine engagement with PVGS. I plan to reach out to the site security folks later this week to follow-up, but I didn't want to duplicate any efforts that may have already been undertaken.

Thanks.

(b)(7)(C)

From: Lanfear, Raymond
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2019 3:29 PM
To: (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Palo Verde Security Event. *OOO*

I do not know.

I thought the SID stood for itself. Should other UAV overflights occur, a new SID would capture it.

From: (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2019 3:25 PM
To: Lanfear, Raymond <Raymond.Lanfear@nrc.gov>
Subject: RE: Palo Verde Security Event. *OOO*

Thanks for the update, Ray.

On a different topic, I assume, having seen no further SID reports on the topic, that there have been no additional UAV overflights of PV. Is that correct?

From: Lanfear, Raymond
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2019 3:23 PM
To: Holman, David <David.Holman@nrc.gov>; Johnson, Daryl <Daryl.Johnson@nrc.gov>
Cc: (b)(7)(C); Kellar, Ray <Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov>; Huyck, Doug <Doug.Huyck@nrc.gov>; Larsen, Jim <James.Larsen@nrc.gov>; Dixon, John <John.Dixon@nrc.gov>
Subject: RE: Palo Verde Security Event. *OOO*

All

I spoke with PV regulatory affairs today.

- The individual is on administrative leave until they meet with the MRO (No earlier than Friday)
- As part of the investigation, a BOP questionnaires were completed by the individuals leaders
- The Corporate security has completed their interviews with the individuals
- ~Friday the corporate security investigation will be submitted PV security/AA.

Thank you
Ray

From: Holman, David
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2019 3:23 PM
To: Johnson, Daryl <Daryl.Johnson@nrc.gov>
Cc: (b)(7)(C) Kellar, Ray <Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov>; Huyck, Doug <Doug.Huyck@nrc.gov>; Lanfear, Raymond <Raymond.Lanfear@nrc.gov>; Larsen, Jim <James.Larsen@nrc.gov>; Dixon, John <John.Dixon@nrc.gov>
Subject: RE: Palo Verde Security Event. *OUO*

Daryl – I haven't seen the report that you are referencing (don't know how to work your RPS-Oversight prompt below), but I am aware of the event based on the DRP branch chief's mention at our morning Safety Meeting. I called out to the PVNGS AA manager and got a brief synopsis, minus the actual verbiage that set this into motion:

- A PV co-worker of the non-licensed operator (PV refers to as auxiliary operator (AO)) saw something he deemed disturbing on AO's Facebook page that had been posted in **2018**.
[I believe it was a comment vs pictures, but I'm not sure].
- When he got to work he reported the Facebook content to his supervisor.
- His supervisor reported it to security/AA.
- The AA manager (RO) treated the report as potentially disqualifying information and placed his badge on hold and made a PADS entry.
- The RO checked to make sure all of the AOs required BOP protocols were up to date, all was in order and there were no previous BOP related reports/complaints found.
- The RO is holding until APS corporate investigators finish an investigation on the issue.
- Once the investigation is complete, the RO will have the AO interviewed/re-assessed by the psychologist [the AO is part of the critical group].
- All of the learned/developed information will then be used to make a determination on continued unescorted access.

Ray Lanfear will continue to try to obtain the specific posting contents tomorrow. The AA was off-site when we spoke and I was unable to reach our contacts in the PVNGS Security Operations section today.

v/r

David A. Holman
US NRC / Region IV
Senior Physical Security Inspector
Division of Reactor Safety
Plant Support Branch 1
(817) 200 1240

From: Johnson, Daryl
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2019 2:01 PM
To: Larsen, Jim <James.Larsen@nrc.gov>; Buchanan, James <James.Buchanan@nrc.gov>; Holman, David <David.Holman@nrc.gov>
Cc: (b)(7)(C); Kellar, Ray <Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov>; Huyck, Doug <Doug.Huyck@nrc.gov>
Subject: Palo Verde Security Event.

Region IV,

Reference this event report (see below). Any additional details are greatly appreciated.

Thanks.

Daryl Johnson

Senior Security Specialist
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response
Division of Security Operations
Security Oversight and Support Branch
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From: NRR_DIRS_IOEB.Resource@nrc.gov <NRR_DIRS_IOEB.Resource@nrc.gov>
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2019 2:20 PM
To: Johnson, Daryl <Daryl.Johnson@nrc.gov>
Subject: New Operating Experience Clearinghouse Item for Your Information

~~NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~**MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/ PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**~~
~~DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST~~
~~OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR~~

The Operating Experience Clearinghouse is sending the information below to you for your awareness. If you have any questions on this item or about the Operating Experience Clearinghouse, please send an email to NRR_DIRS_IOEB.Resource@nrc.gov.

- - FFD concern with an non-licensed auxiliary operator

[Open in RPS-Oversight](#)

Screening Level: Level 1

Description:

Aux Operator has been removed from shift and has access to site denied based on media postings of a violent nature.

ML Number:

Sent to:

FFD - MER1@nrc.gov, BXZ1@nrc.gov, Paul.Harris@nrc.gov

HUMAN PERF/SAFETY CULTURE - Molly.Keefe-Forsyth@nrc.gov

PHYS SECURITY - Niry.Simonian@nrc.gov, Andrew.Woyansky@nrc.gov, Daryl.Johnson@nrc.gov