

# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

#### DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

#### WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED

DOCKET NO. 50-341

#### FERMI-2

#### AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 36 License No. NPF-43

- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Detroit Edison Company (the licensee) dated April 3, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission:
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

# Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 36, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. DECo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John O. Thoma, Acting Director Project Directorate III-1

John O. Froma

Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V & Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 30, 1989

#### ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 36

#### FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

#### DOCKET NO. 50-341

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 3-44	3/4 3-44
3/4 3-64	3/4 3-64
3/4 9-3	3/4 9-3
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
B 3/4 9-1	B 3/4 9-1

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-	ROD BLOCK MONITOR		
	a. Upscale b. Inoperative	< 0.66 W + 40%  NA  SECTION THEOMAL DOMED	< 0.66 W + 43% NA > 3% of DATED TYEDMAL DOWED
is	APRM	JO OF THE WILL TOWER	2.50 UI NAILU I TENIAL TOWER
	a. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High b. Inoperative c. Downscale d. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Setdown	<pre>&lt; 0.66 W + 42%* NA &gt; 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER &lt; 12% of RATED THERMAL POWER</pre>	<pre>&lt; 0.66 W + 45%* NA &gt; 3% of RATED THERMAL POWER &lt; 14% of RATED THERMAL POWER</pre>
3	H.		2000
4	a. Detector not full in b. Upscale c. Inoperative d. Downscale INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS	NA < 1.0 x 10 <sup>5</sup> cps NA > 3 cps**	NA < 1.6 x 10 <sup>5</sup> cps NA > 2 cps**
	a. Detector not full in b. Upscale	NA < 108/125 divisions of Full scale	NA < 110/125 divisions of full scale
5.	c. Inoperative d. Downscale SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME	NA > 5/125 divisions of full scale	NA > 3/125 divisions of Full scale
	a. Water Level-High b. Scram Trip Bypass	< 589'11\\ \text{NA}	< 591'0" NA
9	REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW a. Upscale	< 108/125% of rated flow	< 111/125% of rated flow
	b. Inoperative c. Comparator	NA < 10% flow deviation	NA < 11% flow deviation
1	REACTOR MODE SWITCH SHUTDOWN POSITION	AN	AA

<sup>\*\*</sup>May be reduced to > 0.7 cps provided the signal-to-noise ratio is > 20.

#### INSTRUMENTATION

#### SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.3.7.6 At least the following source range monitor channels shall be OPERABLE:
  - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2\*, three.
  - In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 3 and 4, two.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 2\*, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2\* with one of the above required source 1. range monitor channels inoperable, restore at least 3 source range monitor channels to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4 with one or more of the above required source range monitor channels inoperable, verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within 1 hour.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.3.7.6 Each of the above required source range monitor channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
  - 8. Performance of a:
    - CHANNEL CHECK at least once per:
      - a) 12 hours in CONDITION 2\*, and
      - b) 24 hours in CONDITION 3 or 4.
    - CHANNEL CALIBRATION\*\* at least once per 18 months.
  - Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
    - Within 24 hours prior to moving the reactor mode switch from the Shutdown position, if not performed within the previous 7 days, and
    - 2. At least once per 31 days.
  - Verifying, prior to withdrawal of control rods, that the SRM count rate is at least > 3\*\*\* cps with the detector fully inserted.

<sup>\*</sup>With IRM's on range 2 or below.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. \*\*\*May be reduced to > 0.7 cps provided signal-to-noise ratio is > 20.

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FERMI - UNIT 2

INST	INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL	CAL IBRATION	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
ï	Reactor Vessel Pressure	Σ	~	1, 2
2.	Reactor Vessel Water Level, Fuel Zone	Σ	×	1, 2
3.	Suppression Chamber Water Level	Σ	R	1, 2
4	Suppression Chamber Water Temperature	Σ	×	1, 2
5.	Suppression Chamber Air Temperature	Σ	×	1, 2
.9	Suppression Chamber Pressure	Σ	R	1, 2
7.	Drywell Pressure, Wide Range	Σ	R	1, 2
89	Drywell Air Temperature	Σ	æ	1, 2
9.	Drywell Oxygen Concentration	Σ	×	1, 2
10.	Drywell Hydrogen Concentration	Σ	*0	1, 2
11.	Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators	Σ	×	1, 2
12.	Containment High Range Radiation Monitor	Σ	R**	1, 2, 3
13.	Standby Gas Treatment System Radiation Monitors***	Σ	R	1, 2, 3
14.	Neutron Flux	Σ	œ	1, 2
15.	Drywell Sump Level	Σ	œ	1, 2
16.	Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position	Σ	ж	1, 2, 3

\*Using sample gas containing:

Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen. a. One volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

<sup>\*\*</sup>CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/hr and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/hr with an installed or portable gamma source.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>High (accident) range noble gas monitors.

#### REFUELING OPERATIONS

#### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor\* (SRM) channels shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:
  - a. Annunciation and continuous visual indication in the control room,
  - b. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and
  - Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1, the "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn".

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and insert all insertable control rods.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.9.2 Each of the above required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
  - a. At least once per 12 hours:
    - 1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK,
    - Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and
    - During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.

<sup>\*</sup>Maintenance of a minimum count rate for these channels is not required when sixteen or fewer fuel assemblies, each of which are installed in one of the four positions directly adjacent to one of the four permanently installed SRM nuclear detectors (four fuel assemblies surrounding each SRM detector), are in the core. SRM minimum count rate requirements apply for any CORE ALTERATION involving any other fuel assembly. The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of the normal SRM detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

<sup>\*</sup>Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.10.2. FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3 /mendment No. 36

#### REFUELING OPERATIONS

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
  - 1. Within 24 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and
  - 2. At least once per 7 days.
- c. Verifying that the channel count rate is at  $\geq$  3\* cps:
  - 1. Prior to control rod withdrawal.
  - Prior to and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS, and
  - 3. At least once per 24 hours.
- d. Verifying, within 8 hours prior to and at least once per 12 hours during, that the RPS circuitry "shorting links" have been removed during the time any control rod is withdrawn\*\* unless adequate shutdown margin has demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1.

<sup>\*</sup>May be reduced to > 0.7 cps provided the signal-to-noise ratio is > 20. Maintenance of a minimum count rate for these channels is not required when sixteen or fewer fuel assemblies, each of which are installed in one of the four positions directly adjacent to one of the four permanently installed SRM nuclear detectors (four fuel assemblies surrounding each SRM detector), are in the core. SRM minimum count rate requirements apply for any CORE ALTERATION involving any other fuel assembly.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

# 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH

Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

#### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors, one located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other located in an adjacent quadrant, ensures reactivity monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. The SRM in the adjacent quadrant provides a back-up to the SRM in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed whenever a continuous multiplying medium exists between the location of CORE ALTERATIONS and the SRM. The minimum count rate is not required when sixteen or fewer fuel assemblies, each directly adjacent to a permanently installed SRM nuclear detector, are in the core. This provision allows complete core unloading without the use of special movable detectors. During core re-loading up to four irradiated fuel assemblies are placed next to each SRM detector to produce greater than the minimum count rate. Fuel loading patterns are chosen such that each set of contiguous fuel assemblies surrounds at least one SRM detector. This ensures a continuous multiplying medium is established between at least one SRM detector and the location of CORE ALTERATIONS thus enhancing the ability of the SRMs to respond to any abnormal reactivity increase.

## 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION

The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod.

# 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

# 3/4.9.5 COMMUNCIATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel.

#### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM

The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that (1) the refueling platform will be used for handling control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel, (2) each crane and hoist has sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and control rods, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

#### 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

# 3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

#### 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL

These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specification provides for the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully withdrawn.

#### 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling mode loop be OPERABLE or that an alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation ensures that 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay neat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during REFUELING, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation would be available through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication and to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison in the event it becomes necessary to actuate the standby liquid control system.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops OPERABLE when there is less than 20 feet 6 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 20 feet 6 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay that removal or emergency procedures to cool the core.