GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

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August 30, 1989
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed supplement one to Licensee Event Report No. 89-010 Revision 2 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. This revision is to incorporate further investigation and corrective actions.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker

J. E. Booker
Manager-River Bend Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TFP/RGW/JHM/KES/ch

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)
Missing or Inadequate Penetration Seals Per Technical Specification 3.7.7.a

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 3	1 8	8 9	8 9	— 0 1 0	— 0 2	0 8	3 0	8 9		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing	AREA CODE 5 0 4 — 3 8 1 — 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO		0 7	3 1	9 0

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1300 on 3/18/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 5, an unsealed penetration was discovered in a control building fire wall on the 116 foot elevation. Also, on the same elevation of the control building four conduits lacking internal seals were discovered at 1400 on 3/20/89.

These deficiencies rendered the fire barriers inoperable in accordance with River Bend Station Technical Specification 3.7.7.a. Upon discovery of the nonconforming conditions, the existing hourly fire watch patrols for these conditions were added to LCO 87-078. Additional corrective action will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

Inspections performed by Operations QC were part of their ongoing activities. The areas where the unsealed penetrations were discovered involved the same shutdown division. Therefore, with the alternate division available, plant safety was assured and the health and safety of the public was not endangered.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At 1300 on 3/18/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 5, an unsealed penetration was discovered in a control building fire wall on the 116 foot elevation. There was no fire rated material between the metal reducer on one side and the kaowool on the other side. At 1400 on 3/20/89, several electrical conduits over a door were found to lack internal seals, also located on the 116 foot elevation of the control building. These deficiencies rendered the fire barrier inoperable and are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

INVESTIGATION

These deficiencies were discovered as a result of routine inspections performed by Operations QC. These deficient penetration seals rendered the fire barrier inoperable per Technical Specification 3.7.7.a and constituted a missed Technical Specification action.

Performance of the inspections by Operations QC were part of the corrective action discussed in LER 88-009 on page 17 of 33 in item 5 which states, "All site personnel have been informed by memorandum to be aware of any opening in floors and walls during the performance of their routine activities."

During investigation of the open sleeve it was found that during construction the opening was originally sealed as a spare penetration on 2/25/85. Sometime between that date and 3/21/85 a conduit was attached to the sleeve and a cable pulled through the conduit. The originally installed seal was removed and a piece of kaowool was stuffed into the south side of the penetration giving the appearance of a completed seal. The north side of the seal had a reducer installed rendering that side inaccessible.

Conduits lacking internal seals consisted of scheduled and unscheduled conduits. Unscheduled conduits consist of fire detection, lighting, security and communications. A review of the penetration seal data bases indicated the above described internal seals were never installed. Therefore, it is concluded they were never sealed by the subvendor responsible for sealing penetrations during construction.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Management review of the fire barrier program and its deficiencies has resulted in the formation of a task force consisting of Engineering, Projects, and Quality Control personnel to develop a corrective action program which includes inspection of samples of all types of fire barrier penetration seals including internal conduit seals for type and adequacy of installation. The samples will be based on MIL STD 105D guidelines for sample size and acceptance/rejection criteria. The task force was charged with developing a detailed work scope and corrective action program.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The task force membership and charter were approved by the senior vice president on June 15, 1989. The task force made three presentations to the work scope committee between July 19 and August 30 with a final plan being presented on August 30, 1989. The project plan included: a) work scope definition on a task basis, b) schedule of tasks, c) resource requirements and d) quarterly reporting requirements.

The plan provides for dedication of appropriate existing resources from: a) Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) to conduct inspections in order to identify the existance and extent of questionable safety related fire barriers, b) Design Engineering to evaluate the QC finding and define corrective action, c) Maintenance to complete corrective action.

The MIL-STD 105D sampling program will provide early identification of any generic safety related seal problems. If rejection levels are reached, the whole populations will be inspected. The initial sampling plan for each of the five types of penetration seals is scheduled for completion by June 30, 1990. A supplemental report will be provided by July 31, 1990.

Deficient penetrations will be reworked or dispositioned on discovery in accordance with plant specifications by maintenance work orders. Fire watch patrols will be continued and maintained as appropriate.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The improperly sealed wall sleeve, passes through a fire wall separating Fire Area C-24 from C-10C in the control building. The conduits lacking internal seals pass through a fire wall separating Fire Area C-24 from C-9C. These areas all use Division 2 for safe shutdown.

Fire Areas C-9C and C-10C are the NW and SW cable chases in the control building which abutt Fire Area C-24. The cable chases are protected by sprinkler system (*KP*) AS-6A. Fire Areas C-9C and C-10C contain Division 1 shutdown items. Fire Area C-24 contains both Divisions 1 and 2 components with Division 2 protected. Therefore, the loss of the Division 1 components in any of the 3 fire areas should not affect plant safety as the Division 2 systems are still available in Fire Area C-24 and via the Division 2 cable chases in Fire Areas C-1C and C-2C. The sprinkler systems in Fire Areas C-9C and C-10C, two of the affected Fire Areas, would mitigate any fire damage. From a practical standpoint based on visual observation, operational sprinkler systems, physical installation and lack of transient combustibles it is highly unlikely that the partially sealed penetration and unsealed internal conduits would allow a fire to travel from one zone to another.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Previous conditions reported in LER 88-009 indicated deficient floor plug annulus sealing from Fire Area C-16 98' elevation control building to the Fire Area C-24. A fire in Area C-24 is not expected to travel downward to Fire Area C-16 due to the natural upward propagation of a fire. C-16 is a Division 1 area and C-24 is a protected Division 2 area. Therefore, plant safety was assured as shutdown Division 2 remained operable and the health and safety of the public was not endangered.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).