NRC Form 366 (9-83)	anna a caantal na na na na nanananana	an a cover any billing a subject to an include	NEE/AMA AND AND AN AN AMA AND AN	n fan fan Ganner of Den ander of			NATIONAL PROPERTY AND A CONTRACT OF A DESCRIPTION OF A DESCRIPA DESCRIPTION OF A DESCRIPTION OF A DESCRIPTON	U.S. NU	CLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										APPROVED OMB NO. 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 8: 31/88							
FACILITY NAME (1)	the public official above statements		4747 A District State of D-18-01				D	OCKET NUMBER	(2)	PAGE (3)							
RIVER BE	ND 'STATIC	ON					(0 5 0 0	10 4 5	8 1 OF 013							
TITLE (4) Isolatio	n of DIV	II Contai	nment Ve	entilation	Syste	m, Ur	it Cooler	and Chi	lled Wate	r Supply							
Valves D	ue to Hig	h Negativ	e Differ	cential Con	ntainn	ent t	O Rx Buil	ding Ann	ulus Pres	sure							
EVENT DATE	(5)		(6)	REPORT DAT	E (7)		OTHER P	ACILITIES INVO	LVED (8)								
MONTH DAY	YEAR YEAR	NUMBER	NUMBER	MONTH DAY	YEAR		FACILITY NAM	65	DUCKETNUMBE	H(S)							
					ŀ	*******			0 13 0 10								
0 4 0 7	80 80	- 01118	00	0508	89				0 1510 10								
0050071	THIS RE	PORT IS SUBMITTE	D PURSUANT 1	TO THE REQUIREME	NTS OF 10	CFR \$ (0	Check one or more o	f the following) (1	1)								
MODE (9)	20	.402(b)		20.405(c)	****	X	50,73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)								
POWER	20	405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)								
(10)	10 20	.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (S)	pecify in Abstract in Text, NRC Form							
	20	.406(a)(1)(iii)	-	50.73(a)(2)(i)		-	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A	1	366A)								
	20	.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(e)(2)(ii)		-	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8	1									
	20	.40%(a)(1)(v)		SO.73(a) (Z) (III)	FOR THIS	ER (12)	50.73(a)(2)(x)		<u> </u>								
NAME				CONTRACT				1	TELEPHONE NUM	NBER							
								AREA CODE									
L. A. En	L. A. England, Director-Nuclear						510 4	3 18 1 1 - 14 1 1 14									
		COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH COMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPORT	(13)		********							
CAUSE SYSTEM	COMPONENT	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS									
	111																
					1			<u> </u>	Lucart								
		SUPPLEMI	ENTAL REPORT	EXPECTED (14)				EXPECT SUBMISS	ED ON								
YES Ilt yes, con	mplata EXPECTED	SUBMISSION DATE	E)	X NO				DATE (1	5)								
ABSTRACT (Limit to	1400 spaces, i.e., i	opp. uximately fifteen	single-space type	swritten lines) (16)													
At 042 (refue ventil buildi in tri isolat pressu	7 on 4/ ling), ation s ng annu pping t ion of re was	7/89 wit an isola ystem oc lus nega he Divis the Divi restored	h the tion o curred tive d ion 2 sion 2 and t	unit in (f the Div due to a ifferent: primary (chilled he system	Opera visio a hig ial p conta wate ns we	tion n 2 h co ress inme r su re r	al Condi primary ntainmen ure. Th nt unit pply val eturned	tion 5 contain t to re is sign cooler ves. C to serv	ament actor al resu fan and Containm rice.	lted ent							
At the contro contai water failin contai routin for co regard servic	time o l (APC) nment t closer g to re nment p e conta ntainme to pot e.	f this e system o annulu to the i alize th ressure inment v nt venti ential E	vent, was no s diff solati is con to be enting ng wil SF act	the react t in serv erential on setpor dition ex drawn dow . As con l be rev uations w	tor b vice, pres int t kiste vn to crect ised when	uild cau sure han d, a the ive to i the	ing annu sing the to be 3 normal. llowed t isolati action, nclude p APC syst	lus pre actual to 5 i The op he prim on setp plant p recauti em is r	nches o erator, ary oint du procedur ons wit	f ring es h							
The pl differ there safety result a resu	ant sys ential was no relate , there lt of t	tems act pressure possibil d unit c was no his even	uated setpo ity of oolers impact t.	as design int. Sin a design were not on the h 90519025 DR ADDC	ned u nce t bas req nealt 7 890	pon he p is L uire h an 508	reaching lant was OCA. Th d to be d safety 8	the hi in col erefore operabl of the	gh d shutd e, the e. As public	own, a as							

. .

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXPIRES: 8/31/98

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)									LEP	NUMB	PAGE (3)							
											YEA	a 🗌	-	NUMB	ER		NUMBER	and and the second		
RIVER BEND STATION	0	1	5	0	0	10	1	4	5	8	8 9	-	-	0 1	8		010	0 2	OF	0 3
TEXT (If more space is required, use eliditional NRC Form 366A's) (17)					deserve	-									Assessed	Are adverted	been conditioned		descende	

REPORTED CONDITION

NAC Form 366A

At 0427 on 4/7/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (refueling), an unplanned isolation of the Division 2 primary containment ventilation system (*BK*) occurred due to a high primary containment to reactor building annulus negative differential pressure. This signal resulted in tripping the Division 2 primary containment unit cooler (*CLR*) fan (*FAN*) and isolation of the Division 2 chilled water supply valves (*ISV*). Primary containment pressure was restored and the systems were returned to service. This event is being reported as an engineered safety feature actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

At approximately 0419 on 4/7/89, a high primary containment pressure alarm was received. It is normal to receive this alarm periodically while primary containment integrity is being maintained. This pressure alarm is set at 0.25 psig (6.9 inches of water). In response to the alarm, a licensed operator began a routine vent of the containment at 0421 through the Containment Purge Filter (*VA*) Exhaust Fan (*FAN*) in accordance with approved procedures. At 0427, an automatic isolation of the Division 2 primary containment ventilation system was initiated by a Division 2 high primary containment to annulus negative differential pressure signal. This isolation setpoint is approximately -12 inches of water (-0.43 psig). The Division 2 containment unit cooler fan tripped and the Division 2 chilled water valves isolated per design. The operator responded immediately to restore the systems in accordance with plant procedures.

The River Bend Station (RBS) design incorporates two safety-related primary containment unit coolers to remove heat to control pressure in the primary containment following a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Primary containment depressurization due to an uncontrolled cooldown is terminated by differential pressure switches (*PDS*) which automatically isolate the containment unit coolers at a containment differential pressure of -12 inches of water. This serves to prevent the containment pressure from exceeding its design value of -0.60 psid (-16.63 inches of water).

During normal plant operation, secondary containment integrity is required to be maintained. This includes maintaining a negative pressure in the reactor building (*NG*) annulus. This negative pressure is maintained by the annulus pressure control system (*VC*). However, during refueling, secondary containment integrity is not required to be maintained and the annulus pressure control system was not in service. Primary containment integrity was being maintained as required. This ventilation system configuration established an operating condition with atmospheric pressure in the annulus instead

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)										LE	RNU		PAGE (3)							
										YE	AR		SEQU	MBE	AL	NUM	BER					
RIVER BEND STATION	0	15	5	0	0	0	4	15	18	8	9		01	1	8	 0	0	0	3	OF	0	13
TEXT (If more spice is required, use additional NRC Form 306:1's) (17)			reation			a second at a		-			Bridgenath					 						

of the normal -3 to -5 inches of water. This made the initial primary containment to reactor building annulus differential pressure 3 to 5 inches of water closer to the isolation actuation setpoint than it would have been during normal plant operation. The operator failed to realize this condition existed. As a result, the operator allowed the primary containment pressure to be drawn down to the isolation setpoint during the venting procedure.

A review of previous LERs submitted by RBS revealed no previous events involving actuation of the high primary containment to reactor building annulus differential pressure isolation of the primary containment ventilation system.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

NRC Form 36CA

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this event will include revising plant procedures for containment venting to include precautions with regard to potential ESF actuations and maintaining compliance with Technical Specification limits when the annulus pressure control system is not in service. These procedure changes will be completed by 6/15/89. Additionally, a review of this event and the procedure changes will be included as part of future operator training.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The plant systems actuated as designed upon reaching the high negative differential pressure setpoint. Since the plant was in cold shutdown (Operational Condition 5), there was no possibility of a design basis LOCA. Therefore, the safety related unit coolers were not required to be operable. As a result, there was no impact on safe operation of the plant or to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).



RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775 AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

> May 8 , 1989 RBG-30842 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 89-018 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

J.E. Booker J. E. Booker by 6

Manager-River Bend Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group

1/1

JEB/TFP/WJB/JHM/ch

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

> NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064