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July 5, 1989


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2  
NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
SPECIAL REPORT 89-004  
FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER  
THAN 14 DAYS RESULT IN SPECIAL REPORT  
AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where fire rated assemblies were inoperable longer than 14 days. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,

  
W. G. Hairston, III

JJP/ct

Enclosure: SR 50-366/1989-004

c: (See next page.)

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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c: Georgia Power Company

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Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch

GO-NORMS

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ENCLOSURE

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2  
NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
SPECIAL REPORT 89-004  
FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER  
THAN 14 DAYS RESULT IN SPECIAL REPORT  
AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted as required by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

The FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1 states that sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations separating safety related areas may be inoperable for up to 14 days. If this time limit is exceeded, a special report is required.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

On 6/8/89 at 0831 CDT, Unit 2 was in the run mode at an approximate power level of 2180 CMWT (approximately 89% of rated thermal power).

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 5/25/89 at 0831 CDT, the sealing devices for penetrations 2243-H310C and 2243-H311C in the three hour fire rated east wall of the Oil Storage Room on the 112 foot elevation of the Unit 2 Control Building were breached. The sealing devices were breached in a controlled manner to support the installation of piping for a new Control Building Chilled Water System per Design Change Request 88-146. The sealing devices remained breached (inoperable) for more than 14 days.

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the sealing devices in the east wall of the Oil Storage Room inoperable prior to the sealing devices being breached. An hourly fire watch was established and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-89-231 was initiated to ensure compliance with the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, action a. On 6/8/89 at 0831 CDT, the sealing devices were still breached.



ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
DAYS RESULT IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED  
BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The sealing devices were breached in a controlled manner to support scheduled work activities, i.e., the installation of piping per Design Change Request 88-146.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the sealing devices in the east wall inoperable and established the required fire watches to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement a. The action statement requires that:

With one or more of the ... required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(s) and/or sealing device(s) or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly(s) and sealing devices(s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

The sealing devices were breached in a controlled manner using approved administrative controls. Fire watches were established and all requirements of the FHA were met. These steps ensured that, were a fire to occur, it would be promptly detected and extinguished. Based on the above information, it is concluded this event did not have any adverse nuclear safety impact.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The sealing devices in the east wall of the Oil Storage Room were declared inoperable and an hourly fire watch was established per the requirements of the FHA. On 6/8/89 at 1435 CDT, the sealing devices were declared operable and LCO 2-89-231 was terminated after the penetrations were sealed and inspected by plant Quality Control inspectors.