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DEFINITIONS

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CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

1-6c

DEFINITIONS

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

1.41 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.7. Plant operation within these core operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY
PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1407 Date 11/2/87

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

ACTION: (Continued)

- c) A power distribution map is obtained from the incore detectors and F_0 and F_{RH} are verified to be within their limits within 72^{ΔH} hours.
- d) Either the THERMAL POWER level is reduced to $\leq 60\%$ of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within one hour and within the next 4 hours the High Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to $\leq 70\%$ of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination, or
- e) The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within $+ 6.5\%$ of the inoperable rod within one hour while maintaining the ~~rod sequence, insertion and overlap limits of Figures 3.1-2 and 3.1-3;~~ the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.

position of the rods within the limits provided in the Core Operating Limits Report.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each control rod shall be determined to be within the group average height limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the Asymmetric Rod Fault Circuitry is inoperable, then verify the individual rod position(s) of the rod(s), with inoperable Fault Circuitry at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each control rod not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 2% in any one direction at least once every 31 days.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

REGULATING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The regulating rod groups shall be limited in physical insertion as shown on Figures 3.1-2a, and -2b, 3.1-3a, and -3b. A rod group overlap of 25.5% shall be maintained between sequential withdrawn groups 5, 6 and 7, positioned within the acceptable operating limits for regulating rod position provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION

With the regulating rod groups inserted beyond the ^{operating} ~~above insertion~~ limits (in a region other than acceptable operation), or with any group sequence or overlap outside the ~~specified~~ limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, either:

- a. Restore the regulating groups to within the ^{provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT} limits within 2 hours, or
^{provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT}
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the rod group position, ^{using the} ~~above figures~~ within 2 hours, or
^{limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT}
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

NOTE: If in unacceptable region, also see Section 3/4.1.1.1.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.
#With $k_{eff} \geq 1.0$.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

REGULATING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

4.1.3.6 The position of each regulating group shall be determined to be within the ~~insertion, sequence and overlap~~ limits at least once every 12 hours except when:

- a. The regulating rod insertion limit alarm is inoperable, then verify the groups to be within the insertion limits at least once per 4 hours;
- b. The control rod drive sequence alarm is inoperable, then verify the groups to be within the sequence and overlap limits at least once per 4 hours.

Figure 3.1-2a Regulating Group Position Limits,
 0 to 325± 10 EFPD, Four RC Pumps --
 Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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


Figure 3.1-2b Regulating Group Position Limits After
 325± 10 EFPD, Four RC pumps, APSRs
 Withdrawn -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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


Figure 3.1-3a Regulating Group Position Limits,
 0 to 325 ± 10 EFPD, Three RC Pumps --
 Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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



Figure 3.1-3b Regulating Group Position Limits
 After 325 ± 10 EFPD, Three RC Pumps,
 APSRs Withdrawn -- Davis-Besse 1,
 Cycle 6

DELETED



REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

ROD PROGRAM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.7 Each control rod (^{assembly} safety, ^{location} regulating and APSR) shall be programmed to operate in the core ^{position} and rod group specified in Figure 3.1-4, the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

With any control rod (^{assembly} not programmed to operate as specified above, be in HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


4.1.3.7

- a. Each control rod (^{assembly}) shall be demonstrated to be programmed to operate in the specified core ^{position} and rod group by:
1. Selection and actuation from the control room and verification of movement of the proper rod as indicated by both the absolute and relative position indicators:
 - a) For all control rods (^{assemblies}) after the control rod drive patches are locked subsequent to test, reprogramming or maintenance within the panels.
 - b) For specifically affected individual rods (^{assemblies}) following maintenance, test, reconnection or modification of power or instrumentation cables from the control rod drive control system to the control rod drive.
 2. Verifying that each cable that has been disconnected has been properly matched and reconnected to the specified control rod drive.
- b. At least once each 7 days, verify that the control rod drive patch panels are locked.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.

Figure 3.1-4 Control Rod Core Locations and Group Assignments --
 Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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X Group Number

Group	No. of Rods	Function
1	4	Safety
2	8	Safety
3	4	Safety
4	9	Safety
5	12	Control
6	8	Control
7	8	Control
8	8	APSRs
Total	61	

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

XENON REACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.8 THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above the power level cutoff specified in Figure 3.1-2 unless one of the following conditions is satisfied: *the acceptable operating limits for regulating rod position provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.*

- a. Xenon reactivity is within 10 percent of the equilibrium value for RATED THERMAL POWER and is approaching stability, or
- b. THERMAL POWER has been within a range of 87 to 92 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER for a period exceeding 2 hours in the soluble poison control mode, excluding xenon free start-ups.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to the power level cutoff within 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.8 Xenon reactivity shall be determined to be within 10% of the equilibrium value for RATED THERMAL POWER and to be approaching stability or it shall be determined that the THERMAL POWER has been in the range of 87 to 92% of RATED THERMAL POWER for \geq 2 hours, prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the power level cutoff.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.9 The axial power shaping rod group shall be limited in physical insertion as shown on Figures 3.1-5a, 5b, and 5c within the acceptable operating limits for axial power shaping rod position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2*.

ACTION

With the axial power shaping rod group outside the above insertion limits, either:

- a. Restore the axial power shaping rod group to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the rod group position using the above figures within 2 hours, or acceptable operating limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.9 The position of the axial power shaping rod group shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once every 12 hours except when the axial power shaping rod insertion limit alarm is inoperable, then verify the group to be within the insertion limits at least once every 4 hours.

provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

*With $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$.

Figure 3.1-5a APSR Position Limits, 0 to 325± 10 EFPD,
Four RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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


Figure 3.1-5b APSR Position Limits After
325± 10 EFPD, Three or Four RC
Pumps, APSRs Withdrawn --
Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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



Figure 3.1-5c APSR Position Limits, 0 to 325± 10 EFPD,
Three RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE shall be maintained within the limits shown on Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2, acceptable AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE operating limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

ACTION

With AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE exceeding the limits specified above, either:

- a. Restore the AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE to within ^{the} limits within 15 minutes, or _{provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT}
- b. Within one hour reduce power until imbalance limits are met or to 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER or less. _{provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT}

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1. The AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE shall be determined to be within ^{the} limits at least once every 12 hours when above 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER except when the AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE alarm is inoperable, then calculate the AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE at least once per hour.

_{provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT}

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

Figure 3.2-1 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Limits,
Four RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1,
Cycle 6

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



Figure 3.2-2 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Limits,
Three RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1,
Cycle 6

DELETED



POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

QUADRANT POWER TILT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.4 THE QUADRANT POWER TILT shall not exceed the Steady State Limit of Table 3.2-1. for QUADRANT POWER TILT provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

ACTION:

- a. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT determined to exceed the Steady State Limit but less than or equal to the Transient Limit of Table 3.2-1: provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:
 1. Within 2 hours:
 - a) Either reduce the QUADRANT POWER TILT to within its Steady State Limit, or
 - b) Reduce THERMAL POWER so as not to exceed THERMAL POWER, including power level cutoff, allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination less at least 2% for each 1% of QUADRANT POWER TILT in excess of the Steady State Limit and within 4 hours, reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint and the Flux- Δ Flux-Flow Trip Setpoint at least 2% for each 1% of QUADRANT POWER TILT in excess of the Steady State Limit.
 2. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT is within its Steady State Limit within 24 hours after exceeding the Steady State Limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within the next 2 hours and reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint to \leq 65.5% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within the next 4 hours.
 3. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT is verified within its Steady State Limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY
PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1407 Date 11/2/83

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

- b. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT determined to exceed the Transient Limit but less than the Maximum Limit of Table 3.2-1, due to misalignment of either a safety, regulating or axial power shaping rod: *provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT*
1. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 2% for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT in excess of the Steady State Limit within 30 minutes.
 2. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT is within its Transient Limit within 2 hours after exceeding the Transient Limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within the next 2 hours and reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint to < 65.5% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within the next 4 hours.
 3. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT is verified within its Steady State Limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT determined to exceed the Transient Limit but less than the Maximum Limit of Table 3.2-1, due to causes other than the misalignment of either a safety, regulating or axial power shaping rod: *provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT*
1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 2 hours and reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint to < 65.5% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within the next 4 hours.
 2. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 60% of THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT is verified within its Steady State Limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued)

- d. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT determined to exceed the Maximum Limit of ~~Table 3.2-i~~, reduce THERMAL POWER to $\leq 15\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours.

provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT shall be determined to be ~~within the~~ ^{\leq the Steady State} limits at least once every 7 days during operation above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER except when the QUADRANT POWER TILT alarm is inoperable, then the QUADRANT POWER TILT shall be calculated at least once per 12 hours.

provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

Table 3.2-1 QUADRANT POWER TILT Limits

DELETED

QUADRANT POWER TILT as measured by:	Steady state limit for THERMAL POWER \leq 50%	Steady state limit for THERMAL POWER $>$ 50%	Transient limit	Maximum limit
Symmetrical incore detector system	6.83	4.12	10.03	20.0
Power range channels	4.05	1.96	6.96	20.0
Minimum incore detector system	2.80	1.90	4.40	20.0

BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (normal operation) and II (incidents of moderate frequency) events by: (a) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core ≥ 1.30 during normal operation and during short term transients, (b) maintaining the peak linear power density ≤ 18.4 kW/ft during normal operation, and (c) maintaining the peak power density less than the limits given in the bases to specification 2.1 during short term transients. In addition, the above criteria must be met in order to meet the assumptions used for the loss-of-coolant accidents.

The power imbalance envelope ^{defined in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT} defined in Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 and the insertion limit curves ^{defined in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT} ~~Figures 3.1-2 and 3.1-3~~ are based on LOCA analyses which have defined the maximum linear heat rate such that the maximum clad temperature will not exceed the Final Acceptance Criteria of 2200°F following a LOCA. Operation outside of the power imbalance envelope alone does not constitute a situation that would cause the Final Acceptance Criteria to be exceeded should a LOCA occur. The power imbalance envelope represents the boundary of operation limited by the Final Acceptance Criteria only if the control rods are at the insertion limits, as defined by ~~Figures 3.1-2 and 3.1-3~~ and if the steady-state limit QUADRANT POWER TILT ^{exists}. Additional conservatism is introduced by application of:

- a. Nuclear uncertainty factors.
- b. Thermal calibration uncertainty.
- c. Fuel densification effects.
- d. Hot rod manufacturing tolerance factors.
- e. Potential fuel rod bow effects.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensures that the original criteria are met.

The definitions of the design limit nuclear power peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

F_Q Nuclear heat flux hot channel factor, is defined as the maximum local fuel rod linear power density divided by the average fuel rod linear power density, assuming nominal fuel pellet and rod dimensions.

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY
PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1529 Date 1/5/89

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

microcuries per gram as a function of time for the duration of the specific activity above the steady-state level; and (5) The time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded the radioiodine limit.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT

6.9.1.6 Routine reports of operating statistics, shutdown experience and challenges to the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) and the Pressurizer Code Safety Valves shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Management and Program Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Office, to arrive no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.7 (Insert A)

Insert A

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.7 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle and any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- 3.1.3.6 Regulating Rod Insertion Limits
- 3.1.3.7 Rod Program
- 3.1.3.8 Xenon Reactivity
- 3.1.3.9 Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits
- 3.2.1 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE
- 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT

The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits addressed by the individual Technical Specifications shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically:

- 1) BAW-10122A Rev. 1, "Normal Operating Controls", May 1984
- 2) BAW-10116A, "Assembly Calculations and Fitted Nuclear Data", May 1977
- 3) BAW-10117P-A, "Babcock & Wilcox Version of PDQ User's Manual", January 1977
- 4) BAW-10118A, "Core Computational Techniques and Procedures", December 1979.
- 5) BAW-10124A, "FLAME 3 - A Three-Dimensional Nodal Code for Calculating Core Reactivity and Power Distributions", August 1976
- 6) BAW-10125A, "Verification of Three-Dimensional FLAME Code", August 1976
- 7) BAW-10152A, "NOODLE - A Multi-Dimensional Two-Group Reactor Simulator", June 1985
- 8) BAW-10119, "Power Peaking Nuclear Reliability Factors", June 1977

The methodology for Rod Program received NRC approval in the Safety Evaluation Report dated _____.

The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revision or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.

Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
Serial Number 1691
Attachment 3
Page 1

SAMPLE

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1

CYCLE 6

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

REVISION 0

TOLEDO EDISON
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1
CYCLE 6
CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT
REVISION 0

1.0 Core Operating Limits

This Core Operating Limits Report for DB-1 Cycle 6 has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.7. The core operating limits have been developed using the methodology provided in the references.

The following cycle-specific core operating limits are included in this report:

- 1) Regulating rod insertion limits
- 2) Rod program group positions
- 3) Axial power shaping rod insertion limits
- 4) Axial power imbalance operating limits and
- 5) Quadrant power tilt limits.

2.0 References

- 1) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10122A Rev. 1, "Normal Operating Controls", May 1984
- 2) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10116A, "Assembly Calculations and Fitted Nuclear Data", May 1977
- 3) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10117P-A, "Babcock & Wilcox Version of PDQ User's Manual", January 1977
- 4) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10118A, "Core Computational Techniques and Procedures", December 1979.
- 5) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10124A, "FLAME 3 - A Three-Dimensional Nodal Code for Calculating Core Reactivity and Power Distributions", August 1976
- 6) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10125A, "Verification of Three-Dimensional FLAME Code", August 1976
- 7) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10152A, "NOODLE - A Multi-Dimensional Two-Group Reactor Simulator", June 1985


Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
Serial Number 1691
Attachment 3
Page 3

- 8) B&W Fuel Company, Topical Report BAW-10119, "Power Peaking Nuclear Reliability Factors", June 1977
- 9) Letter from _____ to _____, dated _____, 1989. (NRC SER for Rod Program)

SAMPLE
DRAFT

Figure 1 Regulating Group Position Limits,
 0 to 325 ± 10 EFPD, Four RC Pumps --
 Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
 to by Technical Specification
 3.1.3.6




Note 1: A Rod Group overlap of 25+5% between sequential withdrawn groups 5 and 6, and 6 and 7 shall be maintained.

DRAFT

Figure 2 Regulating Group Position Limits After
 325+ 10 EFPD, Four RC pumps, APSRs
 Withdrawn -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
 to by Technical Specification
 3.1.3.6




Note 1: A Rod Group overlap of 25+5% between sequential withdrawn groups 5 and 6, and 6 and 7 shall be maintained.

DRAFT

Figure 3 Regulating Group Position Limits, 0 to 325 ± 10 EFPD, Three RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred to by Technical Specification 3.1.3.6




Note 1: A Rod Group overlap of 25+5% between sequential withdrawn groups 5 and 6, and 6 and 7 shall be maintained.

DRAFT

Figure 4 Regulating Group Position Limits
 After 325 ± 10 EFPD, Three RC Pumps,
 APSRs Withdrawn -- Davis-Besse 1,
 Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
 to by Technical Specification
 3.1.3.6




Note 1: A Rod Group overlap of 25+5% between sequential withdrawn groups 5 and 6, and 6 and 7 shall be maintained.

SAMPLE

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Figure 5 Control Rod Core Locations and Group Assignments -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred to by Technical Specification 3.1.3.7



Group	No. of Rods	Function
1	4	Safety
2	8	Safety
3	4	Safety
4	9	Safety
5	12	Control
6	8	Control
7	8	Control
8	8	APSRs
Total	61	


X Group Number

SAMPLE

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Figure 6 APSR Position Limits, 0 to 325 ± 10 EFPD,
Four RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6


This Figure is referred
to by Technical Specification
3.1.3.9



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Figure 7 APSR Position Limits After
 325 ± 10 EFPD, Three or Four RC
Pumps, APSRs Withdrawn --
Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
to by Technical Specification
3.1.3.9



SAMPLE
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Figure 8 APSR Position Limits, 0 to 325± 10 EFPD,
Three RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1, Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
to by Technical Specification
3.1.3.9





Figure 9 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Limits,
Four RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1,
Cycle 6


This Figure is referred
to by Technical Specification
3.2.1



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Figure 10 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Limits,
Three RC Pumps -- Davis-Besse 1,
Cycle 6

This Figure is referred
to by Technical Specification
3.2.1



This Table is referred
 to by Technical Specification
 3.2.4

Table 1 QUADRANT POWER TILT Limits

	Steady state limit for THERMAL POWER \leq 50%	Steady state limit for THERMAL POWER $>$ 50%	Transient Limit	Maximum Limit
QUADRANT POWER TILT as measured by:				
Symmetrical incore detector system	6.83	4.12	10.03	20.0
Power range channels	4.05	1.96	6.96	20.0
Minimum incore detector system	2.80	1.90	4.40	20.0

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